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8. International trade

Balance of payments — share of world trade

The current account of the balance of payments provides information on international transactions in goods and services, as well as income (from employment and investment) and current transfers. For all these transactions, the balance of payments registers the value of credits and debits. A credit is an inflow in relation to the provision of goods, services, income and current transfers and is similar to an export. A debit is an outflow made for the acquisition of goods, services, income and current transfers and is similar to an import.

The EU-27 accounted for more than a quarter of world trade in goods in 2018 (see Map 8.1). Goods exported from the EU-27 to non-member countries (extra-EU trade) accounted for 12.0 % of global exports, while goods exported to other EU Member States (intra-EU trade) accounted for 16.8 % of global exports. In a similar vein, goods imported into the EU-27 from non-member countries accounted for 10.7 % of global imports, while goods imported from other EU Member States accounted for 16.7 % of global imports.

Leaving aside intra-EU trade and focusing on extra-EU trade, the EU-27’s share of world trade in goods was the largest in terms of exports, with China having a slightly smaller share (11.5 %), and second largest in terms of imports, behind the United States (12.5 %). The United States had the third largest share of world exports of goods (8.0 %) and China (9.9 %) the third largest share of world imports, with Japan recording the fourth largest shares for both exports (3.5 %) and imports (also 3.5 %). South Korea, the United Kingdom, Canada, Mexico and Russia had the next largest shares of world exports (between 2.1 % and 3.0 %), while the United Kingdom, India, South Korea, Canada and Mexico had shares of world imports that were between 2.3 % and 3.2 %.

Turning to services (see Map 8.2), the EU-27’s contribution to world trade was even greater. Extra-EU trade accounted for 16.4 % of world exports of services and intra-EU trade for 15.6 %, while extra-EU trade accounted for 14.8 % of world imports of services and intra-EU trade for 15.8 %. The EU-27’s extra-EU trade in services was clearly larger than that of any of the other G20 members, both in terms of exports and imports. Regardless of whether analysing exports or imports, the United States had the second largest share of world trade in services (12.2 % of exports and 9.0 % of imports), followed by China and the United Kingdom, with China having a larger share of imports (8.3 %) and the United Kingdom a larger share of exports (6.0 %). India, Japan and South Korea had the next largest shares both of exports and of imports.

Trade in goods

The second part of this chapter focuses specifically on trade in goods. Figure 8.1 uses balance of payments and national accounts data to show the relative importance of trade in goods compared with gross domestic product (GDP). Thereafter, the focus is on international trade in goods statistics.

The level of international trade in goods relative to overall economic activity (the ratio of traded goods to GDP) may be expected to be considerably higher for relatively small countries that are more integrated in the world’s economy as a result of not producing a full range of goods (and services), as can be seen, for example, with Mexico (74.9 %) and South Korea (66.4 %) in Figure 8.1. By contrast, among the G20 members the United States reported the lowest ratio of trade in goods (shown here as the sum of exports and imports of goods) to GDP (20.6 %) in 2018. The equivalent ratio for the EU-27 was 29.6 %; note that the latter only includes extra-EU trade.

Comparing 2008 with 2018, the ratio of trade in goods to GDP increased notably in Mexico and to a smaller extent in Turkey and a much smaller extent in the EU-27, the United Kingdom, Brazil and Japan. Elsewhere the ratio declined, with relatively large decreases in Indonesia, Argentina, India, South Africa, South Korea and China, and a particularly large decrease in Saudi Arabia.

The EU-27 had a trade surplus for goods equal to EUR 152.1 billion in 2018. Figure 8.2 shows the trade in goods between the EU-27 and the other G20 members and with the rest of the world. In 2018, the EU-27 had relatively large trade deficits with China (EUR 154 billion) and Russia (EUR 79 billion), and smaller ones with several other Asian countries: Indonesia, South Korea, Japan and Saudi Arabia. The EU-27 had trade surpluses for goods between EUR 14 billion and EUR 23 billion with Mexico, Canada and Australia, while its largest trade surpluses for goods were with the United Kingdom (EUR 124 billion) and the United States (EUR 138 billion).

In 2018, the EU-27’s largest trade partner (exports and imports combined) for goods among the G20 members was the United States, followed by China, the United Kingdom, Russia, Turkey and Japan, all with total trade in excess of EUR 100 billion.

Together, the G20 members accounted for 65.7 % of the EU-27’s exports of goods in 2018 and 66.6 % of its imports. Looking at the individual flows, the EU-27’s largest export markets in 2018 were the United States and the United Kingdom, followed at some distance by China, whereas for the EU-27’s imports from these three countries the positions were different, with China the largest supplier, followed by the United States and then the United Kingdom. The next largest trading partners for goods were the same, regardless whether analysing exports or imports: Russia, Turkey, Japan, South Korea and India. Indonesia had the smallest share of the EU-27’s exports to the G20 members, while Argentina had the smallest share of the EU-27’s imports from the G20 members.

Figures 8.3 and 8.4 show the reverse situation, namely the importance of the EU-27 as a trading partner for the other G20 members in terms of international trade in goods; data are available for 2008 and 2018.

Some 47.1 % of all goods exported from the United Kingdom in 2018 were destined for the EU-27, which was the case for slightly smaller shares from Turkey (44.1 %) and Russia (43.3 %). By contrast, less than one tenth of the goods exported from Japan, Indonesia, South Korea, Canada, Mexico, Australia or Saudi Arabia were destined for the EU-27. Between 2008 and 2018 the EU-27 became a less important export market in relative terms for most of the G20 members, as only Turkey and Saudi Arabia recorded increases in the shares of their exports destined for the EU-27, while there was no notable change for Canada. Decreases of more than 5.0 percentage points were recorded in Brazil, South Africa, the United Kingdom and Russia.

The EU-27 was the source of more than half (52.8 %) of all goods imported into the United Kingdom in 2018, around one third of the imports into Russia (35.4 %) and Turkey (32.9 %). India (8.9 %) and Indonesia (6.9 %) were the only G20 members for which the EU-27 supplied less than one tenth of their total imports in 2018. Between 2008 and 2018 the importance of the EU-27 as a source of imports increased in relative terms in Japan, the United States and South Korea, in all of which the EU-27 gained just above 2.0 percentage points of the share of imports. Smaller increases were observed in Argentina, the United Kingdom, Canada and China. Elsewhere, the share of the EU-27 in the total imports of each of the G20 members fell, most notably in Russia (down 5.4 points), India (down 3.1 points) and Saudi Arabia (down 2.3 points).

Trade in services

The final part of this chapter focuses on trade in services. Figure 8.5 uses balance of payments and national accounts data to show the relative importance of trade in services compared with GDP and can be compared with a similar calculation that was presented for goods in Figure 8.1. Thereafter, the focus is on balance of payments data.

The level of international trade in services (exports and imports combined) relative to overall economic activity (GDP) was higher in the United Kingdom in 2018 than in any of the other G20 members, reaching 23.5 %. The next highest ratios were 13.8 % in South Korea, 13.2 % in Saudi Arabia, 12.9 % in the EU-27 (only extra-EU27), just above 12.5 % in Canada. The lowest levels for this ratio were recorded in Brazil, China and Mexico, all less than 6.0 %.

Comparing 2008 with 2018, the ratio of trade in services to GDP increased by 4.8 points in the United Kingdom, the largest increase among the G20 members, with the EU-27 (up 3.5 points) recording the second highest increase. A majority of G20 members reported an increase in the ratio of trade in services to GDP between 2008 and 2018, although this was not the case in India, China, Indonesia, South Africa, Saudi Arabia or South Korea where there were decreases.

As already noted, the EU-27 was the second largest exporter and importer of services relative to GDP in 2018 among the G20 members. In absolute terms, extra-EU exports were valued at EUR 969 billion and imports at EUR 824 billion, resulting in a trade surplus for services of EUR 145 billion. The EU-27 had trade surpluses for services in 2018 with all G20 members except for India, Turkey and the United States. The EU-27’s trade surplus for services with the United Kingdom was valued at EUR 45.1 billion in 2018, the largest of its trade surpluses with any of the G20 members.

In 2018, the EU-27’s largest trade partners (exports and imports combined) for services among the G20 members were, by far, the United States and the United Kingdom (see Figure 8.6), both with total trade in excess of EUR 370 billion. The EU-27’s smallest trade partners for services among the G20 members were the same as for goods, namely Argentina and Indonesia.

In 2018, the G20 members accounted for more than 60 % of the EU-27’s extra-EU trade in services: 63.4 % of exports and 60.3 % of imports, slightly less than the G20’s shares of the EU-27’s exports and imports of goods.

However, two of the G20 members — the United Kingdom and the United States — were the largest partners for the EU-27 for trade in services, as can be seen from Figures 8.7 and 8.8: more than one fifth (21.5 %) of the EU-27’s exports of services were destined for the United Kingdom in 2018 and 18.5 % for the United States, while close to one quarter (23.8 %) of the EU-27’s imports of services originated in the United States and 19.7 % in the United Kingdom. In relative terms, the United Kingdom and the United States were more important partners for the EU-27 for trade in services (combining exports and imports) than they were for trade in goods as, to a lesser extent, were Canada and Australia. Argentina’s share of the EU-27’s exports and imports of goods was similar to its share of the EU-27’s exports and imports of services. The remaining G20 members had a larger share of the EU-27’s trade in goods than its trade in services and this was most notably the case for China, Russia and Turkey.

Between 2013 and 2018, the share of EU-27 exports of services destined for the United Kingdom expanded by 1.9 percentage points and there was an increase of 1.6 points in the share going to China as well as smaller increases for the United States, Saudi Arabia, Japan, Mexico and India as destinations. These changes were mirrored by falls in the shares of EU-27 exports of services destined for Turkey, Indonesia, South Korea, Brazil and most strongly Russia (down 1.4 points). A broadly similar picture was observed for the EU-27’s imports of services, although with the notable difference that the United States’ share of imports fell. Increases in shares were largest for the United Kingdom (0.4 points) and China (0.3 points), while decreases in the share of imports were largest for Russia and Turkey (both down 0.8 points).

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9. Business

Structure of the economy

Figure 9.1 illustrates the economic structure in the G20 economies, using national accounts data to group economic activities into five broad headings based on the ISIC Rev.3 classification. In 2018, services contributed at least 70 % of the total gross value added in the economies of the United States, the United Kingdom, Brazil, the EU-27, Canada, Australia and Japan — see Figure 9.1. In all of the other G20 countries, services was also the largest of the five activity groupings shown and accounted for more than half of total gross value added except in Saudi Arabia (48.1 %) and Indonesia (45.2 %). Manufacturing was the second largest activity in value added terms in most of the G20 members. Exceptions were Saudi Arabia, Australia and Russia where mining and utilities was the second largest activity. India and Indonesia were the only G20 members where agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing contributed more than one tenth of total gross value added and Indonesia was the only one where construction contributed more than one tenth of total gross value added.

Figure 9.2 focuses on industrial activities, including mining and quarrying, manufacturing and utilities. The data show the share of industrial employment in enterprises of different size classes. These size classes are defined in terms of the number of persons employed and range from micro enterprises with less than 10 persons employed to large enterprises with 250 or more persons employed. Collectively, the enterprises which are not large are often referred to as small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).

Large enterprises generally have higher labour productivity than SMEs and so their share of industrial employment tends to be lower than their share of value added. Across the EU-27, large enterprises employed 46.1 % of the total industrial workforce in 2017. The lowest employment shares for large enterprises were observed in South Korea (definition differs) and Turkey, with shares just over one quarter and one third respectively. Japan (2016 data; definition differs), Australia (2016 data; definition differs) and the United Kingdom all recorded employment shares within the industrial workforce for large enterprises that were similar to that in the EU-27 and under half. Elsewhere the share ranged from 50.0 % in Brazil (2014 data) and 52.1 % in Canada (2016 data; definition differs) to 65.2 % in the United States (2015 data; definition differs) and 85.2 % in Russia (definition differs).

Short-term business statistics

The line graphs presented in Figures 9.3 and 9.4 illustrate developments for the industrial production index and for the domestic industrial output price index. The indices presented are calculated from annual indices but the underlying series are normally monthly or quarterly data which facilitate a rapid assessment of the economic climate. These figures show the developments for the G20 members; for ease of readability these figures have been presented in several parts with the EU-27 shown in all parts for the purpose of comparison.

For the industrial production index the time series shown starts in 2006 in order to illustrate the impact of the global financial and economic crisis. The impact of the crisis on industrial activities and the subsequent recovery was substantial in several G20 members and this is reflected in the time series shown. Four of the G20 members — Japan, the United Kingdom, Brazil and South Africa — had lower levels (in real terms) of industrial output in 2018 (latest data are for 2017 for South Africa) than they had at their pre-crisis peak: 2007 for South Africa, Japan and the United Kingdom, 2008 for Brazil. In Brazil, industrial output in 2018 was 11.6 % lower than it had been in 2008. By comparison, 2018 was the first year that the level of industrial output in the EU-27 was higher (by 0.9 %) than it had been in 2007, which was the pre-crisis peak level of output. Turning to the G20 members that experienced rapid industrial growth during the years shown in Figure 9.3 — South Korea, Indonesia, Turkey and India — only Turkey recorded an actual fall in output during the crisis, whereas the others experienced a slowdown in industrial activity. After falls in 2008 and 2009, Turkey’s industrial output rebounded in 2010 to surpass the 2007 peak and by 2018 Turkish industrial output was 66.5 % higher than it had been in 2007. Over a comparable period, in other words between 2007 (after which growth slowed for a year or two) and 2018, industrial output increased by 37.7 % in South Korea, 58.0 % in Indonesia (manufacturing only) and 66.5 % in India.

Looking at just the latest annual rates of change, between 2017 and 2018, Indonesia recorded the fastest growth in industrial production, up 5.5 %, just ahead of India (5.2 %) and the United States (4.1 %). All G20 members recorded growth in industrial output in 2018; in the EU-27, an increase of 1.3 % was observed.

The domestic industrial producer price index is a business cycle indicator whose objective is to measure the development of transaction prices of industrial activities within the domestic market. For this indicator the time series shown starts in 2007, again in order to illustrate the impact of the global financial and economic crisis — prices continued to rise during the early stages of the crisis and it was not until 2009 that there was a slowdown or fall in prices. As such, whereas output generally peaked in 2007, prices generally peaked in 2008.

As was the case for production, not all of the G20 members recorded an actual fall in industrial producer prices during the crisis: Mexico and Turkey recorded increases every year during the period from 2007 to 2019. All of the other G20 members shown in Figure 9.4 recorded a fall in prices between 2008 and 2009. Japan was the only G20 member that still had lower domestic industrial producer prices in 2019 than at the peak level early in the crisis: industrial prices in Japan were 2.5 % lower in 2019 than they had been in 2008, equivalent to an average fall of 0.2 % per year. Comparing the peak price level in 2008 with 2019, increases were relatively subdued — less than 20 % overall and at most 1.6 % per year on average — in South Korea, the EU-27, the United States, Canada, Australia (¹) and the United Kingdom. Elsewhere, average domestic industrial producer prices rose between 2008 and 2019 more rapidly, ranging from 4.5 % per year in Mexico to 9.9 % in Turkey. The latest annual rates of change (2019 compared with 2018) confirm that industrial producer prices rose at a rapid pace in Turkey, up 17.6 %, followed at some distance by an increase of 10.2 % in South Africa, while prices fell slightly in Canada and South Korea.

Tourism

A tourist (also known as an overnight visitor) is a visitor who stays at least one night in collective or private tourist accommodation in a specified geographical area. Tourists include residents (domestic tourists) and non-residents (international tourists), regardless of the purpose of travel, including people travelling for business, pleasure or other reasons. Note that international tourists are classified according to their country of residence, not according to their citizenship. As such, citizens residing abroad who return to their country of citizenship on a temporary visit are included as international tourists, although in practice not all countries follow this approach.

There were around 1.34 billion international tourist arrivals worldwide in 2017, among which 485 million were in the EU-27 (see Map 9.1): note that this EU-27 total includes arrivals in EU Member States of tourists from other Member States. As such, the EU-27 received 36.2 % of all international tourist arrivals worldwide, more than half the 67.3 % share received by all G20 members. The next largest G20 tourism markets in terms of international tourist arrivals were the United States (77 million arrivals, 5.7 % of the world total) and China (61 million, 4.5 %). Shares between 2 % and 3 % were observed for Mexico, the United Kingdom, Turkey and Japan.

Relative to population size, there were 1 087 international tourist arrivals per 1 000 inhabitants in the EU-27 (including intra-EU arrivals) in 2017, by far the highest ratio among the G20 members, nearly double the next highest ratios which were around 570 per 1 000 inhabitants in the United Kingdom and Canada and more than six times the world average of 179 per 1 000 inhabitants (see Figure 9.5). Most of the remaining G20 members received between 150 and 490 international tourist arrivals per 1 000 inhabitants in 2017, with some of the G20’s most populous countries — Indonesia, China, Brazil and India — well below this range.

Between 2007 and 2017, the number of international arrivals in the EU-27 of tourists (including intra-EU arrivals) relative to the size of the population increased by 34 % from 809 per 1 000 inhabitants to 1 087 per 1 000 inhabitants. Worldwide, the number of international tourist arrivals relative to population size increased by 30 % between these years. Japan’s ratio increased greatly, more than trebling, while the ratio of international tourist arrivals to population more than doubled in India and Indonesia. In the United States, Turkey, Brazil, the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, China, Russia and Canada, growth for this ratio that was below the world average, while the ratio fell 2.5 % in South Africa.

Tourism is crucial for many countries, offering employment opportunities and a considerable revenue stream; this is particularly true for a number of developing and emerging economies which have been transformed by a growth in tourism.

International tourism receipts include payments (and prepayments) in a country by international tourists, including payments to domestic carriers for international transport. International tourism receipts worldwide were valued at EUR 1.35 trillion in 2017, among which EUR 395 billion were in the EU-27 (see Map 9.2: note that this EU-27 total includes not only receipts from outside of the EU, but also receipts from intra-EU tourism. As such, the EU-27 received 29.3 % of all international tourism receipts worldwide, more than the share received by any of the other G20 members, which collectively received 39.4 % of the world total. The next largest G20 tourism market in terms of international tourism receipts was the United States (16.5 % of the world total). Shares between 2.1 % and 3.4 % were observed for the United Kingdom, Australia, Japan, China and Turkey.

These international tourist receipts were valued at 3.7 % of GDP in Turkey, 3.3 % in Australia, 3.0 % in the EU-27 (including extra- and intra-EU receipts) and 2.8 % in South Africa, the highest such ratios in 2017 among the G20 members (see Figure 9.6). In most of the other G20 members, international tourism receipts ranged from 0.8 % to 2.2 % of GDP, although Brazil and China (both 0.3 %) were below this range; the world average was 1.9 %.

Between 2007 and 2017, the ratio of international tourism receipts to GDP increased by 0.1 points worldwide and by 0.5 points in the EU-27. Among the non-G20 members this ratio fell in Argentina (0.9 points), China (down 0.8 points) and South Africa (down 0.6 points) while it was relatively unchanged (an increase or decrease of at most 0.1 points) in Brazil, Russia, Canada, Indonesia and India. Growth in this ratio was strongest in Japan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey (all up 0.5 points) and Mexico (up 0.6 points). In relative terms, the largest increase was in Japan, where international tourist receipts more than doubled from 0.3 % of GDP in 2007 to 0.8 % in 2017. The largest relative decrease was in China, where GDP growth outstripped the growth in international tourism receipts such that the ratio in 2017 (0.3 %) was just over one quarter of its level in 2007 (1.0 %).

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10. Research and development

R & D expenditure

Research and development (R & D) includes creative work carried out on a systematic basis in order to increase the stock of knowledge of man, culture and society, and the use of this knowledge to devise new applications. Gross domestic expenditure on research and development (GERD) is a key measure of the level of R & D activity performed in an economy. It includes R & D that is funded from abroad, but excludes payments made abroad.

GERD in the EU-27 was EUR 280 billion in 2017 and EUR 295 billion in 2018. The relation between the level of GERD and gross domestic product (GDP) is known as R & D intensity (see Figure 10.1), and it stood in the EU-27 at 2.15 % in 2017. By far the highest R & D intensity in 2017 among the G20 members was in South Korea, where GERD was equivalent to 4.55 % of GDP. Japan, the United States and China show that they also recorded relatively high R & D intensities, all above  2.00 % and therefore also above the world average of 1.68 % (2016 data). Indonesia recorded the lowest R & D intensity among the G20 members, with GERD equivalent to 0.24 % of GDP.

An alternative calculation based on R & D expenditure can also be seen in Figure 10.1, namely the level of GERD relative to population size. The resulting ratio per inhabitant provides a very clear distinction between G20 members. The United States, South Korea and Japan stand out with GERD per inhabitant in excess of EUR 1 000. Australia (2015 data), Canada, the EU-27 and the United Kingdom completed the group of G20 members with relatively high GERD per inhabitant, all in the range of EUR 590-890. Among the other G20 members, only China, Saudi Arabia (2013 data), Russia and Brazil (2016 data) recorded GERD of at least EUR 100 per inhabitant, while this indicator was below EUR 10 per inhabitant in Indonesia.

Looking at R & D expenditure by the source of funds describes the sector of origin of the R & D funding rather than the sector where the R & D was performed. Funding for R & D may come from the following sectors: business enterprises, government, higher education institutions, private non-profit making organisations and abroad.

Nearly three fifths (59 %) of total R & D expenditure within the EU-27 in 2017 was funded by business enterprises, while three tenths (30 %) was funded by government and a further 9 % from abroad (foreign funds) — see Figure 10.2. Funding by the higher education and private non-profit sectors was relatively small, each around 1 % of the total. China (79 %), Japan (78 %), South Korea (76 %) and the United States (64 %) all reported larger shares of funding from the business enterprise sector than was observed in the EU-27 and smaller shares from the government sector. The United Kingdom (2016) was the only other G20 member that reported a majority (52 %) of R & D funding originating from the business enterprise sector. In five G20 members the share of funding from the business enterprise sector was lower than that from the government sector, with the business enterprise sector’s share at 39 % in South Africa (2016 data), 30 % in Russia, 21 % in Mexico (2016 data), 18 % in Argentina (2016 data) and 8 % in Indonesia.

The higher education sector provided more than 5 % of funding in only two G20 members, its share reaching 12 % in Canada and 13 % in Turkey. Funding from abroad only exceeded 6 % in the EU-27 (9 %), Canada (11 %), South Africa (12 %; 2016 data) and the United Kingdom (16 %; 2016 data). The highest share of funding that came from private non-profit making organisations was recorded in Mexico, at 6 % (2016 data).

R & D personnel

R & D personnel include all individuals employed directly in the field of R & D, covering not only researchers, but also technicians and equivalent staff as well as supporting staff (such as managers, administrators and clerical staff). A full-time equivalent is a unit to measure employed persons or students in a way that makes them comparable although they may work or study a different number of hours per week. The unit is obtained by comparing the number of hours worked by a person with the average number of hours of a full-time worker. A full-time person is therefore counted as one unit, while a part-time person gets a score in proportion to the hours they work.

Figure 10.3 puts the figures on the size of the R & D workforce into context, showing them relative to the overall size of the workforce. In 2017, R & D personnel made up 1.76 % of all employment in South Korea, the highest share among the G20 members. The share of 1.41 % observed for the EU-27 was the second highest share, followed closely by the United Kingdom (1.38 %) and Japan (1.35 %). Canada and Russia were the only other G20 members to record shares over 1.00 % and in fact the next highest share was 0.54 % in Turkey. Shares of 0.11 % were observed for Mexico (2013 data) and India (2015 data) while the lowest share, 0.05 %, was recorded for Indonesia. A minority of the G20 members experienced a decrease in the R & D share of the workforce between 2007 and 2017, with falls of less than 0.10 percentage points in Mexico (2007-2013) and Japan and larger falls in Russia (down 0.17 points) and Canada (0.24 points; 2007-2016). Increases in excess of 0.20 percentage points were observed in Turkey (up 0.23 points), China (0.29 points), the EU-27 (0.33 points) and most notably South Korea (0.65 points).

Based on where they perform their work, R & D personnel can be classified to the following sectors: business enterprises, government, higher education institutions and private non-profit making organisations. In 2017, more than half (58 %) of all R & D personnel (in full-time equivalents) in the EU-27 were employed in the business enterprise sector, around one quarter (28 %) in higher education and most of the remainder in the government sector (13 %) — see Figure 10.4. The share of R & D personnel in the business enterprise sector peaked at 77 % in China and 75 % in South Korea and was also higher than in the EU-27 in Japan (68 %) and Canada (60 %). By contrast, less than one third of all R & D personnel worked in the business enterprise sector in Mexico (2013 data), South Africa (2015 data), India (2015 data), Brazil (2014 data), Argentina (2016 data) and Indonesia. In Brazil and Indonesia, the higher education sector was the dominant employer, with 74 % and 70 % of the total respectively; South Africa was the only other G20 member where the share of R & D personnel in this sector exceeded one half. In Argentina and India, the government sector employed around half of all R & D personnel. The share of R & D personnel in the private non-profit making sector was generally small, peaking at 5 % in India.