TIME TO DECIDE:

THE GAME-CHANGERS

In foresight, a game-changer is, as its name indicates, a decision-making point. This is where human decisions will make the difference and determine the future(s) to come – it is for this reason that they are formulated as questions, rather than statements.

Game-changers are not free-floating: they are always set in a future determined by the megatrends and catalysts evolving. In that sense, the future can be thought of as a cone whose outline is shaped by larger trends – but whose exact shape will be determined to a significant extent by decisions we take. This is why

The focus of decision-makers should be those elements of the future they can shape.

The game-changers presented here are extrapolated from the trends (identified in the year-long ESPAS consultation process) outlined above. In effect, they constitute a European look at global priorities for action.

HOW DO WE SAVE THE PLANET?

Climate change is the most important policy issue to address: climate-related decisions will determine not only the future of our economies and societies, but indeed of humankind as a species. For the EU, this challenge is divided in two components: one concerns European progress on achieving its goals; the other concerns the rest of the world – Europe will not be able to curb emissions alone, but it will be one of the three key players in the field.

The European Commission’s climate strategy addresses the first dimension, laying out clear goals for 2030 – but further action is required given that the United States has left the Paris Agreement. This includes investing more in R&D to open up new avenues in technology which could assist in achieving these objectives, and a thorough discussion about the EU’s energy transition: for instance, while the move away from coal is no longer as controversial as it used to be, there is still a reluctance to accept nuclear energy. And there are other areas that have the potential to turn ‘green’: agriculture, for instance, could help to achieve these goals. (e.g. by reducing deforestation). ¹⁴⁰ In addition, Europe has started to gear up towards creating an economic system as a whole that is sustainable and circular.¹⁴¹ However, its member states are not at equal levels when it comes to curbing emissions – some will need more help than others.¹⁴² Globally, of the 'big three', both as leaders and polluters, the US has turned away from its responsibility, and China still lacks the stance to shape a global response. This means that

The responsibility to, quite literally, save the planet rests with Europe.

But Europe will not be able to lead this response alone, which leads us to the second concern: partners, including at the state, regional and local level, will be imperative to achieve the goals. This includes, of course, China, but also middle income countries with fast-growing economies such as India, Brazil and Indonesia, as well as regional and even municipal levels in states that are reticent to act against climate change at the national level. For many actors, the necessary measures might be difficult to implement, so Europe will have to deploy environmental diplomacy in a hitherto unseen way.

HOW DO WE IMPROVE AGEING?

An ageing population can be a good thing – but only if age occurs in good health. Unfortunately, at the moment more years alive does not mean more healthy years. On average, older adults today experience almost the same levels of health decline as their parents – despite technological progress and longer lives, we have not yet achieved ‘morbidity compression’ – the reduction of ill health to the last few years of life.

The real issue with ageing is not the length of life, but the health of life.

At the moment, Europeans spend nearly two decades with one or more illnesses. It is worth noting that while women live longer than men, they fall ill slightly earlier. This means that the majority of deaths, not just in Europe but also in the world, will be because of non-communicable diseases such as cancer and cardiovascular diseases. The most important cost of age is therefore not pension, but health- and long-term care.

To reduce the projected 2% increase in European spending on age-related issues by 2030, we need to not only reform our pension system, but perhaps more importantly, achieve healthy ageing.

After all, unhealthy aging is not inevitable. A recent study shows that lifestyle has a dramatic impact on health: not smoking, being of normal weight and/or having low blood pressure meant not just six years of longer life – but nine years of healthy life compared to those who smoked, were obese and had high blood pressure.¹⁴³ But currently, 46% of Europeans never exercise, and only 7% do so five days a week – the amount which significantly reduces morbidity and maintains cognitive capacities.¹⁴⁴ The same goes for diet: at the moment, one in two Europeans is overweight or obese – a number that is projected to increase in the coming years along with related diseases such as diabetes, coronary heart disease, stroke and cancer. 18.4% of Europeans still smoke daily, creating avoidable consequences for their health, such as cancer and cardio-vascular diseases. According to the European Commission, smoking remains the largest avoidable health risk in the EU.¹⁴⁵

At the moment, ageing in Europe is seen mainly from a pension and healthcare angle, and migration as a potential solution. However, healthier older adults will be able to work longer, require less medical care, and be happier all around. Radical policy choices in the healthcare sector will therefore have not just financial, but also political ramifications.¹⁴⁶ To achieve this, Europeans have to lose 5% of their weight on average, increase their physical activity and stop smoking.¹⁴⁷ In addition, continuous improvement of gender equality will ensure that the currently timid upswing in European fertility is not turned around but evolves positively.¹⁴⁸

HOW DO WE MANAGE NEW TECHNOLOGIES?

The acceleration of technological progress seems to pose for some a primarily philosophical question about what it means to be human in the age of AI.¹⁴⁹ That said, there are other geopolitical and economic issues to consider because

Europe is still playing catch up to the fourth industrial revolution.

When it comes to research and patents for new technologies, China and the United States are in the process of defining the future of not just the digital market – but of the future market altogether, and indeed geopolitics and warfare, too.¹⁵⁰ This is because even though digital technology will not be everything, it will impact almost everything.

For Europe, a set of policy questions arises from this development: do we want to become the shapers of digital ethics, and contribute a distinctly European, carefully calibrated and agile regulatory digital eco-system to the ongoing race for digital leadership? Are we willing to invest, de-regulate, anticipate, and legislate? Do we develop a digital strategy to address all the socioeconomic issues resulting from digital innovation? Do we try and pre-empt the disruption of the labour market by re-training those whose jobs are at risk of automation? Do we counter the development of technologies that undermine democracy and human rights both in Europe and abroad? Do we teach ourselves how to handle the overflow of information and life assistance these new technologies can provide? Are we equipped to deal with hyper-progress at both the individual, as well as collective level? If we fail to respond, others will, in different ways.

Precisely because new technologies have all the potential, negative and positive, it is a domain that particularly requires political leadership and vision – and decisive action.

HOW DO WE POSITION EUROPE IN THE WORLD?

Many aspects of the poly-nodal system we are entering are familiar to Europeans: we have built our foundations on relations and communication between powers of different sizes, and the plural nature of the world will mirror the plural nature of Europe. That said, this does not mean that finding our distinct place (and ability to influence) in this context will be an easy task.

But we do not have to wait for a place to be assigned to us. Indeed, the EU Global Strategy already contains the vision that we have for ourselves as a global player – now is the time to implement it with even more determination.¹⁵¹ We can do this proactively by continuing to be a strong leader in the fight against climate change, a stout defender of democracy and human rights, a continuous supporter of the global trade system, a reliable contributor to multilateral organisations, and an agenda-setter for the development of human-centric technology and ethical uses of AI.¹⁵²

But to be defined as distinctly European in future geopolitics will require more than this: it will also require a change in mindset (and perhaps also institutions and procedures) as it will mean being more active in areas we did not sufficiently address before (for instance, in defence and conflict abroad). We will have to acknowledge the fact that the peaceful world we dreamt of is not yet within reach, adjust the way we communicate with the world and present ourselves, and act with conviction.

If we do so, and continue to build on the EU’s achievements of the past decades, we have the potential to be one of the shapers and innovators of this century – and continue to serve as an inspiration for others despite its flaws.¹⁵³ In this case, a united

Europe can be bold about its vision for humanity.

Unity in foreign policy will also help us forge a closer bond with our citizens again: overwhelmingly and regularly, two-thirds to three quarters of Europeans are in favour of common action in defence and foreign policy. We have a mandate to achieve this goal.¹⁵⁴

HOW DO WE MANAGE CONFLICT?

Although Europe has managed to create a safe haven for itself, war is not a dying breed. With climate change acting as a conflict accelerator, and the international system’s current instability, we will have to accept that conflicts will be part of our future

As Europeans we reject violence, but we will have to be ready for those who do not.

This means that we will have to be able to confront those attempting to infringe on our rights and achievements, but also to address conflicts elsewhere. This is not just out of altruism: conflicts in our neighbourhood have already impacted us in several ways and ignoring these issues will not make them disappear.

This means two things for us: first, how do we ready ourselves for both potential physical and online attacks? Do we have the necessary procedures, equipment, and imagination to pre-empt and deter all forms of attack, ranging from ‘classical’ kinetic wars to political agitation, disinformation and infiltration? Do we reap the benefits of our political community also in the defence sector? Only when we can say confidently ‘yes’ to these questions have we done our duty.

Second, conflicts elsewhere need to be prevented, solved and their aftermath stabilised more efficiently. This is not Europe’s sole responsibility, but it is still one of our concerns – in areas of strategic interest, it is even an imperative. So far, we have been only moderately successful in preventing conflict, but not necessarily because conflicts cannot prevented. For instance, we have not engaged forcefully enough in conflict mediation, and we have virtually abstained from post-conflict military stabilisation – conflict relapse is proven to significantly decrease if there are United Nations troops present.¹⁵⁵

Our Integrated Approach serves as an important roadmap for this as it thoroughly addresses all levels of conflict. But unless it is implemented, we will not see the necessary results. This will mean deploying all available tools (diplomatic, economic, military) to conflicts, and engaging a range of actors (e.g. international organisations, governments, civil society) in the process.¹⁵⁶ And we must stay committed to these efforts, as they normally take several years, and explain their purpose to our citizens. In addition, Europe might want to reconsider its support to United Nations peacekeeping missions, which play an important role in post-conflict stabilisation. At the moment, Europe contributes just 7.4% of United Nations peacekeeping troops (in contrast to China, which is now the largest troop contributor).¹⁵⁷

In both types of conflict, at home or abroad, defence will not be the only tool, but it will be the main tool.

This is perhaps the most difficult reality to accept for Europeans and will inevitably require a change in strategic culture. Most importantly, working together on these challenges will make them more manageable than facing them alone.

HOW DO WE PROTECT DEMOCRACY AT HOME?

European democracy currently faces a series of challenges: election meddling, populist parties, challenges to the rule of law, unrest over reforms, inequality and migration all appear to threaten our political way of life in different ways. But the current situation must not be misread merely as an attack on democracy: it is also an opportunity to adapt our systems to the new political environment we now live in. The new environment is as much about new connectivity and information flows as it is about populism. In fact, political participation has increased over the last years,¹⁵⁸ indicating that

Democracy is not in question – but the way we practice it is.

Indeed, one of the many drivers of populism is perceived government unresponsiveness rather than the desire to install authoritarian regimes. It is this frustration that outsiders can tap into and feed in disinformation to destabilise our systems – but it is not a frustration that cannot be remedied. How political leaders connect to citizens, how policy options are formulated, communicated and implemented will determine how well ‘democracy 4.0’ will be suited for the coming years.

Protecting our own way of life therefore includes closing the gap between citizens and their governments by making it more visible and approachable (at local and regional levels, for instance), developing a relatable (rather than technocratic) narrative, and reinvigorating the European vision as something more than just economics – but a desirable way of life well-suited to manage the future. In addition, ‘populistproofing’ democratic critical infrastructure, especially oversight and accountability mechanisms, will be key to protect democracies in the case of a populist government interlude. Once in government, populists are often tempted to hollow out the rule of law and certain basic freedoms (e.g. press), gradually eroding democracy. Strengthening the rule of law will therefore protect us from such populist erosion.

HOW DO WE REACH EQUALITY?

In some ways, the current emphasis on inequality brings us back to a point that was always a cornerstone of European democracy: equality. Although the discussion currently focuses on its economic dimension, there is a broader case to be made for equality as a long-term vision for European well-being as a whole. In this sense, equality is about more than labour markets and income: it is about social inclusion, political participation and equal access to opportunities. In other words

The more equal our societies are, the better prepared we are to face the challenges of the future.

Achieving equality of participation and opportunities is not an altruistic endeavour, it will benefit all: studies show that improvements to gender equality for instance would create up to 10.5 million additional jobs by 2050, pushing the Union’s employment rate to almost 80%. If so, Europe’s GDP per capita could increase by up to nearly 10% by that date.¹⁵⁹ Regarding excessive economic inequality, measures such as a minimum wage, or a basic income are considered as having a neutral or even positive effect on growth.¹⁶⁰ Improved education systems, including mechanisms to promote life-long learning, will better equip our societies are well-equipped for the challenges of the future, allow them to adapt and innovate, and manage modern connectivity and false information. This essentially requires two things: an understanding of inequality that goes beyond economics – and committed political leadership.

Footnotes:

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• 140: European Commission, ‘A Clean Planet for all: A European long-term strategic vision for a prosperous, modern, competitive and climate neutral economy’, 28 November 2018, available at https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/docs/pages/com_2018_733_analysis_in_support_en_0.pdf; European Environment Agency, ‘Trends and projections in Europe 2018: Tracking progress towards Europe’s climate and energy targets’, https://espas.secure.europarl.europa.eu/orbis/sites/default/files/generated/document/en/16_2018%20TrendsProjections%20TH-AL-18-018-EN-N.pdf;
• 141: European Commission, ‘Reflection Paper: Towards a sustainable Europe by 2030’, January 2019, available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/rp_sustainable_europe_30-01_en_web.pdf
• 142: European Commission, ‘Global trends of methane emissions and their impacts on ozone concentrations’, 2018, https://espas.secure.europarl.europa.eu/orbis/sites/default/files/generated/document/en/KJNA29394ENN.en_.pdf
• 143: Silvan Licher et al., ‘Lifetime risk and multimorbidity of non-communicable diseases and disease-free life expectancy in the general population: A population-based cohort study’, PLOS Medecine, February 2019, available at https://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1002741
• 144: World Health Organisation, ‘Physical activity factsheets for the 28 European Union Member States of the WHO European Region’, 2018, available at http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/382334/28fs-physical-activity-euro-rep-eng.pdf?ua=1
• 145: Eurostat, ‘Tobacco consumption statistics’, available at https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Tobacco_consumption_statistics
• 146: World Health Organisation, ‘World report on Ageing and Health’, Geneva 2015, p.70, available at http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/186463/9789240694811_eng.pdf;jsessionid=4D697B6C455F69CB1A17C03DD5E6357B?sequence=1
• 147: OECD, ‘Policy insights: Obesity Update 2017’, 2017, available at https://www.oecd.org/els/health-systems/Obesity-Update-2017.pdf; Laura Webber et al, ‘The future burden of obesity-related diseases in the 53 WHO European-Region countries and the impact of effective interventions: a modelling study’, BMJ Open, 2014, available at https://bmjopen.bmj.com/content/4/7/e004787. World Health Organisation, ‘Progress report on implementation of the Physical Activity Strategy for the WHO European Region 2016–2025’, 8 August 2018, available at http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/378394/68wd08e_B_PR_PhysicalActivity_180459.pdf?ua=1
• 148: RAND, ‘Low fertility in Europe: Is there still reason to worry?’, 2011, Santa Monica, California, available at https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1080.html
• 149: Yuval Noah Hariri, 21 Lessons for the 21st Century (Jonathan Cape: London, 2018)
• 150: Foreign Policy, ‘Whoever Predicts the Future Will Win the AI Arms Race’, March 2019, available at https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/05/whoever-predicts-the-future-correctly-will-win-the-ai-arms-race-russia-china-united-states-artificial-intelligence-defense/?utm_source=PostUp&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=11682&utm_term=Flashpoints%20OC
• 151: European External Action Service, ‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy’, June 2016, available at https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/united-states-america/36116/shared-vision-common-action-stronger-europe_en
• 152: European Political Strategy Centre, ‘Strong Europe, better world: Defending Global Cooperation, Multilateralism and Democracy in Turbulent Times’, January 2019
• 153: Kishore Mahbubani, Has the West Lost It? A Provocation (London: Penguin Books, 2018)
• 154: European Commission, ‘Special Eurobarometer 461: Designing Europe’s future: Security and Defence’, April 2017, available at https://ec.europa.eu%2Fcommfrontoffice%2Fpublicopinion%2Findex.m%2FResultDoc%2Fdownload%2FDocumentKy%2F78778&usg=AOvVaw1IhKu4inLAK7xi7hTJpo8z
• 155: Richard Gowan & Stephen John Stedman, ‘The International Regime for Treating Civil War, 1988 – 2017’, Daedalus, Volume 147, No. 3, Winter 2018. Sebastian von Einsiedel et al., ‘Civil War Trends and the Changing Nature of Armed Conflict’, United Nations University, Center for Policy Research, April 2017, available at https://cpr.unu.edu/civil-war-trends-and-the-changing-nature-of-armed-conflict.html
• 156: European External Action Service, ‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy’, June 2016, available at https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/united-states-america/36116/shared-vision-common-action-stronger-europe_en
• 157: United Nations Peacekeeping, ‘Contributions by country’, available at https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/contributions-country-1
• 158: The Economist Intelligence Unit, ‘Democracy Index 2018: Me too? Political participation, protest and democracy’, 2019. David van Reybrouck, Contre les Elections (Paris: Babel, 2016)
• 159: European Institute for Gender Equality, ‚Gender equality boosts economic growth‘, March 2017, available at https://eige.europa.eu/news-and-events/news/gender-equality-boosts-economic-growth
• 160: OECD, ‘In It Together: Why Less Inequality Benefits All’, 2015, p.69, https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/employment/in-it-together-why-less-inequality-benefits-all_9789264235120-en#page70