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Data extracted in April 2026.

Planned article update: June 2027.

Highlights

This article is a part of a set of statistical articles, which are based on the Eurostat publication ’Sustainable development in the European Union — Monitoring report on progress towards the SDGs in an EU context — 2026 edition’. This report is the tenth edition of Eurostat’s series of monitoring reports on sustainable development, which provide a quantitative assessment of progress of the EU towards the SDGs in an EU context.

Developments of selected SDG indicators in the EU and other major world economies

Eradicating poverty, protecting the planet and ensuring that all people enjoy peace and prosperity by 2030 requires collective action in the EU and beyond. However, the 2025 UN SDG progress report reveals that globally only 18% of the SDG targets are on track to be achieved by 2030, 17% are making moderate progress, nearly half show minimal or no progress, and 18% have regressed below 2015 levels.

This section compares developments in the EU and other major world economies, based on six indicators from the EU SDG indicator set. Table 1 lists the countries selected for comparison in this chapter and illustrates their shares of global GDP, population and land area. Together, these economies accounted for 75% of global GDP, 56% of the global population and 54% of the global land area in 2024. The graphs include those countries for which data are available.

Table 1: GDP, population and land area of selected countries (global share in %, 2024)
Source: World Bank (‘GDP, purchasing power parity (PPP), current international $’), Eurostat (demo_gind), United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (‘Total population by sex’) and FAOSTAT, Land use (‘Land area’).

Monetary poverty (SDG 1)

Poverty harms people’s lives and can undermine social cohesion and economic growth. Monetary poverty refers to the share of people with an equivalised disposable income below 60% of the national median, after accounting for social transfers. Policy measures such as unemployment benefits, sickness benefits, progressive taxation, as well as social and employment services, have contributed significantly to reduce monetary poverty in the EU. With a monetary poverty rate of 16.2% in the income year 2023 — 0.3 percentage points lower than in the 2018 income year — the EU had the lowest poverty rate among the major world economies. For comparison, the at-risk-of-poverty rates in Brazil and the United States were slightly above 25% in 2022 and 2023, respectively.

Figure 1: Persons at risk of monetary poverty after social transfers (% of population, 2018 and 2023)
Source: Eurostat (sdg_01_20) and OECD (‘Poverty rate based on disposable income, 60% of the national median disposable income’)

Education (SDG 4)

Tertiary education is crucial for a knowledge-based economy, as higher attainment tends to improve employment prospects and job quality while supporting competitiveness, innovation and productivity. In 2024, 44.1% of the EU population aged 25 to 34 had attained tertiary education, an improvement of 4.5 percentage points compared with 2019. The EU’s tertiary educational attainment rate was lower than in other major world economies, such as South Korea (70.6%), Japan (66.0%), the United Kingdom (60.3%) or Australia (57.2%). At the other end of the spectrum, in Mexico, Brazil and India less than 30% of the age cohort had completed tertiary qualifications by 2023 or 2024.

During the most recent five-year period, all countries monitored here increased their shares of highly educated adults in their populations.

Figure 2: Tertiary educational attainment (% of population aged 25 to 34, 2019 and 2024)
Source: Eurostat (sdg_04_20) and OECD (‘Adults' educational attainment distribution, by age group and gender’)

Employment (SDG 8)

Employment is central to socio-economic development and social cohesion, because it provides the income and inclusion needed for decent living standards while helping to reduce poverty and inequality. In 2024, the EU’s employment rate for people aged 15 to 64 years was 70.8%, which is higher than in many major economies of the world, such as South Korea, Brazil or India, but lower than in Japan (79.4%), Canada (74.7%) or the United States (71.9%). All economies shown in Figure 3 saw an increase in their employment rate between 2019 and 2024, except Canada and the United Kingdom. While in the EU the employment rate is mainly monitored for people aged 20 to 64 years (see Figure 8.8), global data for this indicator are only available for the 15 to 64-year-old age group .

Figure 3: Employment rate (% of population aged 15 to 64, 2019 and 2024)
Source: Eurostat (lfsi_emp_a) and ILOSTAT (‘Employment-to-population ratio by sex and age (%)’)

Patent applications (SDG 9)

Patent applications are a measure for innovation, reflecting the creative capacity to develop new technologies and the economic exploitation of research results that underpin competitiveness and productivity. In 2024, 747 patent applications per million inhabitants were recorded in the EU. This was comparable to the United States, but significantly less than in some other major world economies, such as Japan (1 913 patent applications per million inhabitants) and China (1 187). South Korea recorded by far the highest number of patent applications in that year, with 3 783 per million inhabitants.

Over the past decade, trends in patent applications per million inhabitants have developed unevenly across major world economies. While some countries, such as China and South Korea, saw an increase in the number of patent applications, others, including the United States and the United Kingdom, experienced a decline between 2015 and 2024. Over the same period, the EU recorded a modest increase of 2.8% in the number of patent applications per million inhabitants.

Figure 4: Patent applications (per million inhabitants, 2015–2024)
Source: WIPO statistics database

Zero emission cars (SDG 12 & SDG 13)

Currently, passenger cars generate more than half of road-transport emissions. Accelerating the uptake of zero-emission vehicles reduces greenhouse gas emissions and helps to meet climate targets. In 2024, sales of zero emission cars — including both battery electric vehicles (BEV) and fuel cell electric vehicles (FCEV) — accounted for 14% of all sales of new cars in the EU. This marks a sevenfold increase since 2019, when their share was just 2%. However, in 2024 the share decreased by 1 percentage point compared with 2023. Among major global economies, only China and the United Kingdom surpassed the EU’s sales share of new zero emission cars in 2024, reaching 27% and 19%, respectively. Over the past five years, the share of zero emission car sales rose significantly in all major world economies for which data are available (see Figure 5). Globally, more than 11 million new zero emission cars were registered in 2024, representing 14% of all new cars sold that year .

Figure 5: Sales share of new zero-emission cars (%, 2015–2024)
Source: International Energy Agency

Greenhouse gas emissions (SDG 13)

Greenhouse (GHG) gas emissions from human activities trap heat in the atmosphere, thereby driving global warming and increasing the risk of more frequent and severe extreme weather, sea-level rise and ecosystem disruption. The EU (6.8 tonnes per capita) and the United Kingdom (5.5 tonnes per capita) were the lowest per-capita emitters of GHGs among high-income economies in 2024 . The EU’s per-capita emissions were around three times less than in Australia (19.7 tonnes per capita) and the United States (18.1 tonnes per capita). Nevertheless, the EU’s per-capita emissions were higher than in several other major economies, such as India, Brazil and Mexico. Countries with higher GDP per capita generally cause higher GHG emissions per capita (see Figure 6). The EU’s emissions were also higher than the world average (6.2 tonnes per capita).

When comparing GHG emissions in absolute terms, China’s emissions were by far the highest in 2024, with 15.1 gigatonnes (Gt), followed by the United States (6.2 Gt), India (4.0 Gt) and the EU (3.1 Gt).

Figure 6: Greenhouse gas emissions per capita and GDP per capita, 2024
Source: Climate watch (‘PIK-PRIMAP historical emissions’ ); World Bank (‘GDP per capita, purchasing power parity (PPP), current international $’)

Between 2019 and 2024, many major economies reduced their per-capita emissions, as shown in Figure 7. The United Kingdom recorded the largest decrease (19.0%), followed by Canada (15.9%) and the EU (15.7%). In contrast, India increased its per-capita emissions by 14.6%, while China’s emissions increased by 10.2%.

Figure 7: Greenhouse gas emissions per capita (tonnes of CO₂ equivalent per capita, 2019 and 2024)
Source: Climate watch (‘PIK-PRIMAP historical emissions’ )

Share of renewables in total energy supply (SDG 7 & SDG 13)

Renewable energies are crucial for cutting greenhouse gas emissions while reducing dependence on imported fossil fuels and exposure to supply shocks and high energy costs. In 2023, the share of renewable energy in final energy consumption in the EU stood at 12.6%. Brazil and India recorded higher shares of renewables, at 29.6% and 26.5%, respectively. At the other end of the spectrum, the shares in South Korea and Russia were below 2%. Between 2018 and 2023, most major world economies increased their shares of renewable energy. The largest gains were observed in India (2.4 percentage points), Brazil (1.8 percentage points) and the EU (1.6 percentage points).

Figure 8: Renewables as a share of final energy consumption (%, 2018 and 2023)
Source: Eurostat (nrg_bal_s) and United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistics Division (Energy Balances)

Spillover effects of EU consumption

In a globalised world, countries’ actions towards sustainable development may positively or negatively influence other countries and their capacity to achieve the SDGs. Therefore, domestic policies and behaviours may have an impact beyond national borders. The impacts that activities in one sector, region or country have on other sectors, regions or countries are called spillover effects (or simply ‘spillovers’).

Policy context

The EU’s trade policy review aims to make supply chains more sustainable by addressing the impacts of the EU’s consumption and trade on the rest of the world, in particular by promoting sustainability standards.

The carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) entered into force in May 2023 and has been implemented in phases: after a transitional reporting period (October 2023 to December 2025), its definitive regime applies from January 2026. The CBAM addresses the risk of carbon leakage, which occurs when industries transfer polluting production to other countries with less stringent climate policies, or when EU products are replaced by more carbon-intensive imports. Under the definitive regime, authorised importers of selected carbon-intensive goods must declare embedded emissions and surrender CBAM certificates linked to the carbon price under the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS).

The Ecodesign for Sustainable Products Regulation (ESPR) establishes a framework to improve the sustainability of products placed on the EU market by setting ecodesign requirements that can cover aspects such as durability, reparability, energy and resource efficiency, and recyclability. It also provides for a Digital Product Passport (DPP) to make key product information available along value chains, supporting more transparent supply chains and enabling circular economy strategies that can help reduce the material impacts of EU consumption.

The Directive on corporate sustainability due diligence (CSDDD) aims to foster sustainable and responsible corporate behaviour in companies’ operations and across their global value chains. The rules are meant to ensure businesses address any adverse human rights and environmental impacts of their actions, inside and outside Europe. The Commission has recently proposed to simplify the duties and reduce regulatory burden, while preserving the original policy objectives.

The Regulation on deforestation-free products (EUDR) promotes the consumption of ‘deforestation-free’ products to decrease the EU’s impact on global deforestation embodied in imported agricultural products. It is intended to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and biodiversity loss. Recent simplification measures will reduce administrative costs and burden for companies covered by the Regulation.

This chapter measures spillover effects using four indicators: gross value added (GVA), greenhouse gas (GHG) footprint, material footprint and cropland footprint. These indicators differ from those analysed in the 17 SDG chapters of this report by following a consumption-based perspective.

In this context, ‘consumption-based’ refers to use of resources associated with the final consumption of goods and services in the EU, regardless of where this resource use occurs along the global production chain. In contrast, ‘production-based’ refers to the use of resources at the place of production, regardless of where resulting goods and services are ultimately consumed.

A sole focus on production-based accounting can create incentives to shift production to other countries, as this may lead to an apparent reduction in domestic resource use — often referred to as ‘leakage’. A consumption-based perspective, by contrast, captures global resource use driven by a country’s demand.

Measuring consumption-induced spillover effects is a complex and data-intensive exercise, requiring data on direct cross-border flows (imports and exports) and indirect cross-border flows (socio-economic and environmental impacts of specific products and sectors throughout the entire supply chain). Many of these indirect impacts are difficult to measure and, therefore, quantifying them requires making assumptions and using model-based estimates . For more information on the methodology behind the indicators presented here, please see the explanatory note on the Eurostat website.

To understand the relative impact of the EU’s consumption patterns, it helps to compare the EU’s footprints with its global population share (see Table 2). In 2023, the EU was home to 5.5% of the world population . The table shows that the EU’s footprints were disproportionally higher, with the EU accounting for 16.4% of global GVA, 7.8% of global GHG emissions, 5.9% of the global material footprint and around 8.4% of the global cropland footprint . Despite the slight increase in the EU’s population over the past five years, its GHG and material footprints decreased over the same period.

Table 2: EU’s population and footprints, 2018 and 2023

Gross value added (GVA)

GVA measures the economic value created in a country and constitutes the main part of the gross domestic product (GDP). It is calculated as the total value of all goods and services produced minus the cost of materials and services used in production (excluding taxes and subsidies on products). GVA is a widely available indicator, showing how much economic value is generated both inside and outside the EU through EU consumption.

• GVA generated outside the EU as a result of EU consumption rose by 31% between 2018 and 2023

Between 2018 and 2023, GVA generated by EU consumption grew by 28%, rising from EUR 11 716 billion to EUR 14 999 billion. This includes GVA generated both within and outside the EU. The GVA generated within the EU also increased by 28% during this period, making up the largest share (EUR 12 838 billion in 2023). Meanwhile, the GVA generated outside the EU as a result of EU consumption rose by 31%, from EUR 1 653 billion in 2018 to EUR 2 160 billion in 2023.

For comparison, consumption outside the EU generated EUR 2 697 billion in value added within the EU. This was 25% more than what EU consumption generated abroad, reflecting the trade surplus of the EU economy. In total, 16% of the global GVA is linked to the EU’s consumption, which is almost three times the EU’s share of the global population.

Figure 9: Gross value added as a result of EU consumption (EUR billion, 2010–2023)
Source: Eurostat, JRC (estimates based on FIGARO data)

Greenhouse gas emissions footprint

While the previous section shows that the EU consumption generates positive external economic effects, it also causes emissions within and outside the EU. The greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions footprint estimates the emissions associated with the final demand for goods and services in the EU. It includes all emissions generated at any stage of a product’s life cycle before its final use, regardless of whether the greenhouse gases are emitted within or outside the EU borders.

• In 2023, only 65% of GHG emissions induced by EU consumption were generated in the EU

As shown in Figure 10, the EU’s GHG emissions footprint decreased by 12.0% between 2018 and 2023, reaching 4.0 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide (CO₂) equivalents in 2023. This was close to the lowest recorded value observed during the pandemic in 2020.

In 2023, 2.6 billion tonnes of GHG emissions — equivalent to 65% of the total emissions serving the EU’s consumption — were generated in the EU. The remaining 1.4 billion tonnes of GHGs (35%) were emitted in non-EU countries. Among these, China had the largest share with 0.4 billion tonnes or around 26% of the non-EU total. This reflects that China is one of the EU’s main trading partners, with 20.6% of the EU’s total imports (in value) originating from China in 2023 .

The United States accounted for 0.10 Gt GHG emissions serving the EU’s consumption, followed by Russia (0.09 Gt) and India (0.07 Gt) in 2023. Compared with 2022, the share of emissions from Russia in the EU’s footprint declined by 57%, while the emissions from China and the United States decreased by 8% and 4%, respectively.

Figure 10: Greenhouse gas emission footprint (billion tonnes of CO₂ equivalents, EU, 2010–2023)
Source: Eurostat (env_ac_ghgfp)

• GHG emissions resulting from EU consumption go down, but the EU’s share of global emissions remains larger than its share of world population

In 2023, 6.4% of the global GHG emissions (in CO₂ equivalents) were emitted in the EU. The same year, 7.8% of the global GHG emissions could be traced back to the EU’s consumption. This indicates that EU consumption generated a disproportionally high share of the world’s emissions when compared with its share of the global population (5.5%). However, other main economies of the world share the same pattern.

With a population of 1.42 billion, China’s share of the world population was 17.6% in 2023, while its consumption accounted for more than a quarter (27.2%) of the world’s GHG emissions in that year. The United States had an even larger discrepancy between the share in population and the share in consumption-linked GHG emissions. While the country was home to 4.2% of the world’s population, its share in global emissions was more than three times higher, at 13.3%. India, on the other hand, hosted 17.8% of the global population, but its consumption caused only 8.3% of global GHG emissions. The rest of the world (excluding China, EU, the United States, India and Russia) accounted for more than half (53.1%) of the world population, while only 39.7% of global GHG emissions could be attributed to consumption in these countries in 2023.

Figure 11 presents the shares of GHG emissions both produced and consumed by several major world economies, alongside their respective shares of the global population. The left side of the diagram illustrates GHG emissions from the production perspective, showing the share of global emissions generated within the selected countries. The middle section depicts emissions from a consumption perspective, indicating the origins of the emissions associated with consumption in these countries. The right side of the diagram represents each country’s share of the global population, showing whether their contribution to the global GHG footprint is proportional to their population size.

Figure 11: Comparison of GHG emissions from a production and consumption perspective with world population, 2023
Source: Eurostat (env_ac_ghgfp and (demo_gind)) and UN World Population Prospects

Material footprint

The material footprint, also referred to as raw material consumption, shows the amount of materials required along the supply chains of the goods and services finally consumed in a country. These materials refer to the broad categories of biomass, metal ores, non-metallic minerals and fossil energy carriers. Eurostat estimates the material footprint by converting the actual weight of the goods traded internationally into the weight of materials extracted to produce these goods — the so-called raw material equivalents of imports and exports. These raw material equivalents can be several times larger than the weight of the imported or exported goods.

The material footprint highlights the increasing spatial separation of production and consumption and the relocation of environmental impacts associated with material extraction. All raw materials extracted and used worldwide are allocated to domestic final consumption.

• Raw material extraction outside the EU serving EU consumption decreased by 16.2% between 2018 and 2023

In the past 13 years, the EU’s material footprint experienced ups and downs, fluctuating between 6.1 billion tonnes (recorded in 2013) and 7.0 billion tonnes (recorded in 2011), as Figure 12 illustrates. The EU’s material footprint has decreased by 7.0% since 2018, reaching 6.1 billion tonnes in 2023. This corresponds to 5.9% of the raw materials consumed globally. The EU’s share of global raw material consumption was thus around 0.4 percentage point above its population share. Of all the raw materials serving the EU’s consumption, 4.0 billion tonnes or around 65% were extracted in the EU, while 2.2 billion tonnes were extracted outside the EU’s borders. This means that around one-third of the raw materials needed for EU consumption were imported. The decrease in the EU’s material footprint was mainly due to a reduction in raw material extraction outside the EU (by 16.2%), while extraction in the EU serving EU consumption only fell by 1.2% between 2018 and 2023.

Figure 12: Material footprint (billion tonnes, EU, 2010–2023)
Source: Eurostat (env_ac_rme) and materialflows.net

• In 2023, the EU remained a net importer of raw materials, largely due to imports of fossil energy materials

In 2023, the EU imported about 2.3 times more fossil energy materials and more than 1.5 times more metal ores than it exported, as Figure 13 illustrates. The large difference between imports and exports of fossil energy materials highlights the EU’s strong energy dependency on other countries. Overall, the EU imported more goods (in raw material equivalents) than it exported.

Figure 13: EU imports and exports in raw material equivalents (million tonnes, 2023)
Source: Eurostat (env_ac_rme)

Cropland footprint

Land use footprints estimate the total land area, both domestically and abroad, that is required to serve EU consumption. While land use itself does not show concrete and direct environmental impacts, it is a proxy for the pressure on ecosystems and biodiversity stemming from production and consumption systems. This chapter focuses on land that is used to cultivate crops. The data are modelled based on land use coefficients of traded agricultural products.

• The EU’s cropland footprint increased by 1.5% between 2019 and 2024

Between 2019 and 2024, the EU’s cropland footprint increased by 1.5%. As Figure 14 illustrates, this increase was driven by a 1.5% rise in both the land used for crop production outside the EU for EU consumption and the land used within the EU for the same purpose.

In 2024, the EU consumed crops cultivated on 124 million hectares (ha) of cropland located both inside and outside the EU, representing about 8.4% of the world’s cropland. This indicates that the EU’s consumption used a disproportionally high share of the global cropland, compared with its share of the world’s population (5.5%). This highlights the EU’s dependency on foreign land to serve domestic consumption.

Out of the 124 million ha of the cropland footprint, 69 million ha of land were located within the EU and 55 million ha were outside the EU. The main countries in which cropland served EU consumption were Argentina, Brazil and Ukraine. The main traded goods produced on these croplands were vegetable oils, oil seed crops and residues of food industries (such as oilcakes, mostly used as animal feed) . At the same time, 24 million ha of EU cropland served consumption abroad. The main exported products were cereals, followed by meat of ruminant livestock and vegetable oils .

Figure 14: Cropland footprint (million ha, EU, 2014–2024)
Source: JRC, Eurostat, FAOSTAT (Land use)

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Methodology

More detailed information on EU SDG indicators for monitoring of progress towards the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), such as indicator relevance, definitions, methodological notes, background and potential linkages can be found in the introduction as well as in Annex II of the publication ’Sustainable development in the European Union — Monitoring report on progress towards the SDGs in an EU context — 2026 edition’.