Statistics Explained

SDG 16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels


Data extracted in April 2024.

Planned article update: June 2025.

Highlights


Goal-level assessment of SDG 16 on “Peace, justice and strong institutions” showing the EU has made moderate progress during the most recent five-year period of available data.
EU trend of SDG 16 on peace, justice and strong institutions

This article is a part of a set of statistical articles, which are based on the Eurostat publication ’Sustainable development in the European Union — Monitoring report on progress towards the SDGs in an EU context — 2024 edition’. This report is the eighth edition of Eurostat’s series of monitoring reports on sustainable development, which provide a quantitative assessment of progress of the EU towards the SDGs in an EU context.

SDG 16 calls for peaceful and inclusive societies based on respect for human rights, protection of the most vulnerable, the rule of law and good governance at all levels. It also envisions transparent, effective and accountable institutions.

Full article

Peace, justice and strong institutions in the EU: overview and key trends

Peace and security are prerequisites for sustainable development, in line with the integrated nature of the 2030 Agenda. Peace, security, democracy, the rule of law and respect for fundamental rights are also founding values of the EU. Monitoring SDG 16 in an EU context focuses on personal security, access to justice and trust in institutions within the EU. The progress towards SDG 16 has been mixed in all these areas. While over the past few years deaths due to homicide or assault and the perceived occurrence of crime, violence and vandalism have fallen considerably, the number of victims of trafficking in human beings in the EU has increased. Government expenditure on law courts has grown significantly and more than half of Europeans consider their justice system to be independent, although this share has declined over the past five years. The assessment of corruption in the EU has remained stable.

Peace and personal security

Safety is a crucial aspect of a person’s life. Insecurity is a common source of fear and worry, and negatively affects quality of life. Physical insecurity includes all the external factors that could potentially put an individual’s physical integrity in danger. Crime is one of the most obvious causes of insecurity. Analyses of physical insecurity usually combine two aspects: the subjective perception of insecurity and the objective lack of safety. In this chapter, subjective perception of insecurity is monitored by perception of crime, while objective security is measured by two indicators — homicide death rate and victims of human trafficking.

The EU has become a safer place to live

Homicide is one of the most serious crimes. In the EU, deaths due to homicide have fallen steadily since 2006, reaching a rate of 0.7 deaths per 100 000 people in 2021. This corresponds to a reduction of 41 % over the assessed 15-year period. The improvement has continued in the short-term period since 2016, albeit at a somewhat slower pace. The decrease in homicides in the EU has gone hand in hand with improvements in people’s perception of crime, violence or vandalism. Since 2010, the share of people reporting the occurrence of such problems in their area has fallen in the EU. In 2020, 10.7 % of the population felt affected by these issues, which is 2.4 percentage points less than in 2010 and the lowest value recorded.

The perception of being affected by crime, violence or vandalism differs across socio-demographic sub-groups of the EU population and across degrees of urbanisation. In 2020, 13.7 % of the population living in households with an equivalised disposable income below the poverty threshold — set at 60 % of the national median equivalised income — felt affected by such problems. However, this was the case for only 10.2 % of the population living in households above the poverty threshold in that year. Similarly, in 2020 the perceived occurrence of crime, violence or vandalism in cities (16.3 %) was almost three times higher than in rural areas (5.8 %) and almost twice as high as in towns and suburbs (8.4 %) [1].

The fear of victimisation paradox: when objective and subjective measures of physical insecurity do not match

National figures show that the perceived exposure to crime, violence or vandalism in 2020 was eight times higher in the most affected country (19.1 % of the population in Bulgaria) than in the least affected country (2.4 % in Croatia). However, country differences in this subjective indicator need to be treated with caution. Research suggests that crime rates from police registers and the subjective exposure to crime may differ, as population groups with low victimisation rates may be particularly afraid of crime (the so-called ‘fear of victimisation paradox’) [2]. This is, for instance, the case in Ireland and Malta, which have the lowest death rates due to homicide across the EU, but have relatively high shares of people who say they feel affected by crime or other problems in their area (see Figures 2 and 4). In contrast, death rates due to homicide were the highest in the Baltic countries, which had rather low shares of people feeling affected by crime, violence or vandalism in their neighbourhood. It should, however, be acknowledged that this comparison may not capture the full picture, as forms of crime other than homicide also contribute to perceived insecurity.

Men are more likely to die from homicide, while women are more likely to be victims of violence in their homes and sexual assaults

Deaths due to homicide in the EU show a remarkable gender gap. While death rates due to homicide have fallen for both sexes, they remain about twice as high for men (0.9 deaths per 100 000 persons in 2021, compared with 0.4 deaths per 100 000 persons for women) [3]. Worldwide, the gap is even bigger since 81 % of all homicides are committed against men and boys [4].

However, while men have a higher overall risk of being killed, women have a significantly higher risk of being killed by their intimate partners or family members. A study by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and UN Women shows that intimate partner- or family-related homicides accounted for 56 % of women who were killed in 2021 globally, while this was only the case for 11 % of male homicides [5]. On the EU level, women are about twice as likely as men to be victims of intentional homicide by family and relatives or their intimate partner. In 2022, 0.4 out of 100 000 women were victims of such homicide, compared with only 0.2 per 100 000 men [6]. This is an issue of concern when considering the broader concept of violence against women, encompassing all forms of physical, sexual and psychological violence.

Data from Eurostat’s official crime statistics on intentional homicide and sexual offences show that women are much more likely to be victims of such crimes than men. In 2022, 64 out of 100 000 women were victims of sexual assault, and 38 out of 100 000 women were victims of rape. The rates were significantly lower for men, with 11 per 100 000 men for sexual assault and 4 out of 100 000 men for rape [7].

The prevalence of homicide and other types of violence varies greatly across the EU. However, cross-country comparisons of the crime statistics should be made with caution. Comparability is affected by different legal definitions concerning offenders and victims, different levels of police efficiency and the stigma associated with disclosing cases of violence against women [8] (see the article on SDG 5 ‘Gender equality' for more information on gender-based violence).

The number of detected victims of trafficking in human beings increased strongly in 2022

Human trafficking is a global crime that degrades people to commodities and exploits them for profit. Sexual and labour exploitation are the most common purposes of trafficking but forced begging, forced criminality and organ trafficking are also prevalent forms of exploitation [9]. Human trafficking destroys individuals’ lives by depriving people of their dignity, freedom and fundamental rights. In the EU, the number of victims of human trafficking increased by almost 30 % over the past five years, reaching 2.3 per 100 000 people in 2022 — the highest value on record. This corresponds to 10 093 registered victims the same year, reflecting a 41 % increase compared with 2021. The actual number is likely to be significantly higher, since many victims remain undetected [10]. The sharp increase in the number of victims of human trafficking in 2022 can be attributed to the fact that armed conflicts, natural and man-made disasters, and displacement increase the number of victims of trafficking exploited within and outside crisis areas [11]. Several Member States signalled that Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine contributed to higher awareness of this crime, prompting the introduction of preventive measures which have led to a recent increase in the detection of victims [12].

Women in the EU are more likely to be victims of human trafficking than men, with a rate of 2.7 per 100 000 people, as opposed to 1.7 per 100 000 people for men in 2022. This gap has significantly narrowed over the years, as the rate for women has declined by 3.3 % since 2008, while for men it increased by 153.8 %. This is also in line with global figures that show that the share of women and girls in detected victims of human trafficking in the world decreased from 84 % in 2004 to 60 % in 2020 [13].

In 2022, sexual exploitation was the predominant form of exploitation in the EU Member States, accounting for 41.4 % of victims of trafficking, which was the lowest prevalence on record. The share of labour exploitation has been increasing over the years and almost reached the same share as sexual exploitation — 41.1 % in 2022. Other exploitative purposes, including organ removal, use for benefit fraud, criminal activities and forced begging, accounted for 17.5 % in 2022 [14].


Access to justice

Well-functioning justice systems are an important structural condition on which EU Member States base their sustainable growth and social stability policies. Whatever the model of the national justice system or the legal tradition in which it is anchored, quality, independence and efficiency are among the essential parameters of an ‘effective justice system’. As there is no single agreed way of measuring the quality of justice systems, the budget actually spent on courts is used here as a proxy for this topic. Moreover, judges need to be able to make decisions without interference or pressure from governments, politicians or economic actors, to ensure that individuals and businesses can fully enjoy their rights. The perceived independence of the justice system is used to monitor this aspect.

EU expenditure on law courts has grown over the past few years

In the EU, general government expenditure on law courts has risen by 51.2 % since 2007, reaching EUR 51.1 billion in 2022. In per capita terms, this corresponds to a 47.3 % increase from EUR 77.2 per inhabitant in 2007 to EUR 113.7 per inhabitant in 2022. However, when viewed as a share of total government expenditure, spending on law courts remained stable at 0.7 % between 2007 and 2019. In 2020, the share decreased to 0.6 % of total expenditure, largely due to increases in other government expenditure to mitigate the economic and social impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and remained at this level through 2021 and 2022. In relation to GDP, expenditure on law courts has also been stable since 2007, at 0.3 % of GDP [15].

Just above half of the EU population considers the justice system to be sufficiently independent

In 2023, 53 % of EU inhabitants rated the independence of the courts and judges in their country as ‘very good’ or ‘fairly good’, one percentage point lower than in 2018. At the same time, the perception of ‘very bad’ or ‘fairly bad’ increased by 2 percentage points, from 34 % to 36 %. Interference or pressure from government and politicians was the most likely reason for a bad rating of perceived independence of courts and judges [16]. The opinion about the independence of courts and judges varied significantly across Member States. While in Finland, Denmark and Austria, the majority of respondents (86 %, 86 % and 83 %, respectively) rated the independence of their courts and judges as ‘very good’ or ‘fairly good’, this was only the case for 22 % of respondents in Croatia and 23 % in Poland [17].

Age, employment status, education and experience with the justice system seem to have a notable effect on the perception of the independence of the justice system. In 2023, 59 % of 15- to 24-year-old respondents in the EU gave a good rating, compared with 51 % of respondents aged 55 or over. Employees (58 %) were more likely to give a good rating than self-employed people (53 %), manual workers or people who were not employed (50 % each). The longer people remained in education, the more likely they were to rate the independence of courts and judges as good: 55 % of those who completed education aged 20 or above gave a good rating, compared with 41 % of those who completed education aged 15 or younger. Notably, respondents who had been involved in a dispute that had gone to court were more evenly split between those who rated their system as good (46 %) and bad (47 %) than those who had not been to court (54 % good, 35 % bad) [18].


Trust in institutions

Effective justice systems are a prerequisite for the fight against corruption. Corruption causes social harm, especially when it is orchestrated by organised crime groups to commit other serious crimes, such as trafficking in drugs and humans. Corruption can undermine trust in democratic institutions and weaken the accountability of political leadership. It also inflicts financial damage by lowering investment levels, hampering the fair operation of the internal market and reducing public finances.

Corruption perception in the EU has stagnated since 2016

As there is no meaningful way to assess absolute levels of corruption in countries or territories on the basis of hard empirical evidence, capturing perceptions of corruption of those in a position to offer assessments of public-sector corruption is currently the most reliable method of comparing relative corruption levels across countries. According to Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), the EU scored 64 on a scale from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean) in 2023. This was 21 points more than the world average score of 43. The EU’s score remained stable at this level since 2016, indicating there were no significant changes in corruption perception in Europe.

On a country level, EU countries continued to rank among the least-corrupt globally in 2023 and made up more than a half of the global top 10 least-corrupt countries. Within the EU, northern European countries achieved the best scores, with Denmark, Finland and Sweden leading the ranking. At the other end of the scale, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania showed the highest levels of perceived corruption across the EU, ranking at positions 76, 67 and 63, respectively, on the global list (comprising 180 countries in total) [19].

Country rankings in the CPI largely correspond to analogous answers collected in 2023 through a Eurobarometer survey [20], in which Finland, Denmark and Sweden were identified as having the least corruption. Responses to this survey, however, paint a more pessimistic picture of corruption levels across the EU than the CPI. In all but six countries, at least half of respondents considered corruption a widespread national problem. For the EU as a whole, this translates into an average of 70 % of respondents sharing this perception in 2023. This share has fallen by 6 percentage points since 2013. The proportion of population who thinks corruption in their country is rare was 26 % in 2023.

There is a notable relationship between the CPI and the perceived independence of the justice system. Countries with a high CPI ranking, such as Denmark, Finland or Sweden, also show a high share of the population rating the independence of the justice system as ‘good’ (see Figures 10 and 12). Conversely, countries with less optimistic ratings of the justice system’s independence also tend to have lower CPI scores, for example Bulgaria and Croatia. As both indicators are based on people’s perceptions, however, a causal relationship between the effectiveness of the justice system and the occurrence of corruption cannot be inferred based on these data. Effective justice systems are nevertheless considered to be a prerequisite for fighting corruption [21].

Trust in EU institutions has fluctuated over the past few years

Confidence in political institutions is key for effective democracies. On the one hand, citizens’ confidence increases the probability that they will vote in democratic elections. On the other hand, it provides politicians and political parties with the necessary mandate to take decisions that are accepted in society.

Trust in three of the EU’s main institutions — the European Parliament, the European Commission and the European Central Bank — has experienced periods of growth and decline throughout the past two decades. After a drop in trust for all three institutions in 2020, data from autumn 2023 indicate that they have regained some trust, with 49 % of the population expressing their confidence in European Parliament, 46 % in the European Commission and 45 % in the European Central Bank [22]. Throughout the years, the European Parliament has remained the most trusted of the three institutions surveyed.

The economic crisis may have played a role in the decline in trust in EU institutions observed between 2007 and 2015, while the COVID-19 pandemic might have influenced the drop in 2020. High inflation levels due to pressure on energy, food and other commodity prices as a result of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine might have caused a decline in trust in the EU Institutions in 2022 and 2023. However, surveys show that citizens tend to only have a general idea about the EU and lack a deeper knowledge of the role and powers of the EU institutions, making confidence in the EU more dependent on contextual information than on actual governance [23].

Main indicators


Standardised death rate due to homicide


The long-term evaluation of the indicator for standardised death rate due to homicide for the period 2006 to 2021, shows significant progress towards the SD objectives. The short-term evaluation for the period 2016 to 2021, also shows significant progress towards the SD objectives.

This indicator tracks deaths due to homicide and injuries inflicted by another person with the intent to injure or kill by any means, including ‘late effects’ from assault (International Classification of Diseases (ICD) codes X85 to Y09 and Y87.1). It does not include deaths due to legal interventions or war (ICD codes Y35 and Y36). The data are presented as standardised death rates, meaning they are adjusted to a standard age distribution to measure death rates independently of the population’s age structure.

A line chart with three lines showing the standardised death rate due to homicide, by sex in the EU, from 2002 to 2021, as number per 100,000 persons. The lines represent the figures for women, men and the total population.
Figure 1: Standardised death rate due to homicide, by sex, EU, 2002–2021 (number per 100 000 persons)
Source: Eurostat (sdg_16_10)


A double vertical bar chart showing the standardised death rate due to homicide, by country, in 2016 and 2021, as number per 100,000 persons in the EU, EU Member States and other European countries. The bars show the years.
Figure 2: Standardised death rate due to homicide, by country, 2016 and 2021 (number per 100 000 persons)
Source: Eurostat (sdg_16_10)


A map of Europe showing the standardised death rate due to homicide by NUTS 2 region, in 2021, as number per 100,000 persons. The map shows EU Member States and other European countries.
Map 1: Standardised death rate due to homicide, by NUTS 2 region, 2021 (number per 100 000 persons)
Source: Eurostat (hlth_cd_asdr2)

Population reporting crime, violence or vandalism in their area


The long-term evaluation of the indicator for population reporting crime, violence or vandalism in their area for the period 2010 to 2020, shows significant progress towards the SD objectives. The short-term evaluation for the period 2015 to 2020, also shows significant progress towards the SD objectives.

This indicator shows the share of the population who reported facing the problem of crime, violence or vandalism in their local area. This describes the situation where the respondent feels crime, violence or vandalism in the area to be a problem for the household, although this perception is not necessarily based on personal experience. The data stem from the EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC).

A line chart showing the percentage of population reporting occurrence of crime, violence or vandalism in their area, in the EU from 2010 to 2020.
Figure 3: Population reporting occurrence of crime, violence or vandalism in their area, EU, 2010-2020 (% of population)
Note: y-axis does not start at 0.
Source: Eurostat (sdg_16_20)


A double vertical bar chart showing the percentage of population reporting occurrence of crime, violence or vandalism in their area, by country in 2015 and 2020 in the EU, EU Member States and other European countries. The bars show the years.
Figure 4: Population reporting occurrence of crime, violence or vandalism in their area, by country, 2015 and 2020 (% of population)
Source: Eurostat (sdg_16_20)

Victims of trafficking in human beings


The long-term evaluation of the indicator for ^victims of trafficking in human beings for the period 2008 to 2022, shows a significant movement away from the SD objectives. The short-term evaluation for the period 2017 to 2022, also shows significant movement away from the SD objectives.

This indicator shows victims of trafficking in human beings as defined under Article 2 of the Directive 2011/36/EU. A registered victim can include a person who has been formally identified as a victim of trafficking in human beings by the relevant formal authority in a Member State or a person who has met the criteria of the EU Directive but has not been formally identified by the relevant formal authority as a trafficking victim or who has declined to be formally or legally identified as trafficked.

A line chart with three lines showing the number of victims of trafficking in human beings per 100 000 persons, by sex, in the EU from 2008 to 2022. The lines each represent the number for women, men, and total.
Figure 5: Victims of trafficking in human beings, by sex, EU, 2008-2022 (number per 100 000 persons)
Source: Eurostat (sdg_16_70)


A double vertical bar chart showing the total number of victims of trafficking in human beings per 100 000 persons, by country, in 2017 and 2022 in the EU, EU Member States and other European countries. The bars represent the years.
Figure 6: Victims of trafficking in human beings, by country, 2017 and 2022 (number per 100 000 persons)
Source: Eurostat (sdg_16_70)

General government total expenditure on law courts


The long-term evaluation of the indicator for general government total expenditure on law courts for the period 2007 to 2022, shows significant progress towards the SD objectives. The short-term evaluation for the period 2017 to 2022, also shows significant progress towards the SD objectives.

This indicator refers to the general government total expenditure on law courts. It includes expenditure on the administration, operation or support of civil and criminal law courts and the judicial system, including enforcement of fines and legal settlements imposed by the courts. The operation of parole and probation systems, legal representation and advice on behalf of government or on behalf of others provided by government in cash or in services are also taken into account. Law courts include administrative tribunals, ombudsmen and the like, but excludes prison administrations.

A line chart showing the general government total expenditure on law courts expressed in million euros, in the EU from 2001 to 2022.
Figure 7: General government total expenditure on law courts, EU, 2001-2022 (million EUR)
Note: y-axis does not start at 0.
Source: Eurostat (sdg_16_30)


A double vertical bar chart showing the general government total expenditure on law courts, by country in 2017 and 2022, as euros per inhabitant in the EU, EU Member States and other European countries. The bars show the years.
Figure 8: General government total expenditure on law courts, by country, 2017 and 2022 (EUR per inhabitant)
Source: Eurostat (sdg_16_30)

Perceived independence of the justice system: very or fairly good


The long-term evaluation of the indicator for perceived independence of the justice system: very or fairly good is not possible because the time series is too short. The short-term evaluation for the period 2018 to 2023, shows moderate movement away from the SD objectives.

This indicator is designed to explore respondents’ perceptions about the independence of the judiciary across EU Member States, looking specifically at the perceived independence of the courts and judges in a country. Data on the perceived independence of the justice system stem from annual Flash Eurobarometer surveys, which started in 2016 on behalf of the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers.

A line chart with three lines showing the perceived independence of the justice system, in the EU from 2016 to 2023, as a percentage of the population. The lines show the percentage of population that perceive the independence of the justice system to very good or fairly good, very bad or fairly bad, and percentage that don’t know.
Figure 9: Perceived independence of the justice system, EU, 2016–2023 (% of population)
Source: European Commission services, Eurobarometer, Eurostat (sdg_16_40)


A stacked vertical bar chart showing the perceived independence of the justice system, by country in 2023, as a percentage of the population in the EU and EU Member States. The bars show the percentage of population that perceive the independence of the justice system to very good, fairly good, very bad, fairly bad, and percentage that don’t know.
Figure 10: Perceived independence of the justice system, by country, 2023 (% of population)
Source: European Commission services, Eurobarometer, Eurostat (sdg_16_40)

Corruption Perceptions Index


The long-term evaluation of the indicator for Corruption Perceptions Index for the period 2012 to 2023, shows no progress towards nor movement away from the SD objectives. The short-term evaluation for the period 2018 to 2023, also shows no progress towards nor movement away from the SD objectives.

This indicator is a composite index based on a combination of surveys and assessments of corruption from 13 different sources and scores. It ranks countries based on how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be, with a score of 0 representing a very high level of corruption and 100 representing a very clean country. The sources of information used for the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) are based on data gathered in the 24 months preceding the publication of the index. The CPI includes only sources that provide a score for a set of countries/territories and that measure perceptions of corruption in the public sector. For a country/territory to be included in the ranking, it must be included in a minimum of three of the CPI’s data sources. The CPI is published by Transparency International.

A line chart showing the Corruption Perceptions Index, in the EU from 2012 to 2023, on a score scale of 0 that represents highly corrupt to 100 that represents very clean.
Figure 11: Corruption Perceptions Index, EU, 2012-2023 (score scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean))
Note: y-axis does not start at 0.
Source: Transparency International, Eurostat (sdg_16_50)


A double vertical bar chart showing the Corruption Perceptions Index, by country in 2018 and 2023, on a score scale of 0 that represents highly corrupt to 100 that represents very clean, in the EU, EU Member States, other European countries and non-European countries such as Japan, United States, South Korea and Russia. The bars show the years.
Figure 12: Corruption Perceptions Index, by country, 2018 and 2023 (score scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean))
Source: Transparency International, Eurostat (sdg_16_50)

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More detailed information on EU SDG indicators for monitoring of progress towards the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), such as indicator relevance, definitions, methodological notes, background and potential linkages can be found in the introduction as well as in Annex II of the publication ’Sustainable development in the European Union — Monitoring report on progress towards the SDGs in an EU context — 2024 edition’.

Notes

  1. Eurostat (ilc_mdvdw06)
  2. See for example: Rader, N. (2017), Fear of Crime, Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Criminology.
  3. Eurostat (sdg_16_10).
  4. UNODC and UN Women (2022), Gender-related killings of women and girls (femicide/feminicide), United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, p. 5.
  5. Ibid.
  6. Eurostat (crim_hom_vrel).
  7. Eurostat (crim_hom_soff).
  8. For more information see Eurostat metadata on Crime and criminal justice (crim) and European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2014), Violence against women: an EU-wide survey, Main results, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, pp. 25–26, 32.
  9. UNODC, Human Trafficking FAQs.
  10. European Commission (2021), EU Strategy on Combatting Trafficking in Human Beings, COM(2021) 171 final.
  11. UNODC (2022), Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2022, p. 38.
  12. Eurostat (2024), Statistics Explained: Trafficking in human beings statistics.
  13. UNODC (2022), Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2022, p. xi.
  14. Eurostat (2024), Statistics Explained: Trafficking in human beings statistics.
  15. Eurostat (gov_10a_exp)
  16. European Commission (2023), Flash Eurobarometer 519, Report on Perceived independence of the national justice systems in the EU among the general public, p. 2.
  17. Ibid, p. 5.
  18. Ibid, p. 6.
  19. Transparency International (2024), Corruption Perceptions Index 2023.
  20. European Commission (2023), Special Eurobarometer 534 on Citizens’ attitudes towards corruption in the EU in 2023, pp. 17–18.
  21. Also see European Commission (2016), European Semester Thematic Factsheet on Effective Justice Systems.
  22. European Commission (2023), Standard Eurobarometer 100, Public Opinion in the European Union, p. 75.
  23. European Research Centre for Anti-Corruption and State-Building (ERCAS) & Hertie School of Governance (2015), Public integrity and trust in Europe, Berlin, p. 19; and Eurofound (2022), Fifth round of the Living, working and COVID-19 e-survey: Living in a new era of uncertainty, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.