Migration: Facing Realities and Maximising Opportunities

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University of Sussex

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Structure of the Book/Report

1 Introduction
2 Policies and flows
3 Integration
4 Migration and Development
5 Conclusion

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Evidence from FP7 Projects

The FP7 projects reviewed here are in three groups. First are completed projects which deal wholly or mainly with migration:

- EUMAGINE – Imagining Europe from the Outside
- MAFE – Migrations between Africa and Europe
- SOM – Support and Opposition to Migration
- TRANS-NET – Transnationalisation, Migration and Transformation: A Multi-Level Analysis of Migrant Transnationalism

Second are two projects centrally concerned with migration but only recently started, so outputs are as yet very few:

- EURA-NET – Transnational Migration in Transition: Transformative Characteristics of Temporary Mobility of People
- TEMPER – Temporary versus Permanent Migration
Third, there is a longer list of projects, some parts of which deal directly or indirectly with migration, whose outputs have been selectively sampled:

- ACCEPT PLURALISM – Tolerance, Pluralism and Social Cohesion: Responding to the Challenges of the 21st Century
- DEMAND-AT – Demand-Side Measures Against Human Trafficking
- EDUMIGROM – Ethnic Differences in Education and Diverging Prospects for Urban Youth in an Enlarged Europe
- EUMARGINS – On the Margins of the European Community
- FIDUCIA – New European Crimes and Trust-Based Policy
- GEITONIES – Generating Interethnic Tolerance and Neighbourhood Integration in European Urban Spaces
- NEUJOBS – Creating and Adapting Jobs in Europe in the Context of a Socio-Ecological Transition
- NOPOOR – Enhancing Knowledge for Renewed Policies against Poverty
- RURBANAFRICA – African Rural–City Connections
- SEARCH – Sharing Knowledge Assets: InterRegionally Cohesive Neighbourhoods
Tackling the Migration Challenge

This report was written against a background of multiple challenges, personal, emotional, logistical and intellectual

• the book was written in one month – August 2015
• it was written against the emotional unfolding of migration and refugee events in Syria, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Balkans and Germany
• on a wider scale, there was an increasing perception in all EU countries of migration as a major ‘problem’ (Table 1)
• hence, increasingly negative attitude towards immigration, although this varies markedly between countries (Table 2)
• yet, some of this negative attitude can be probably traced to an exaggerated perception of the scale of the immigration phenomenon in Europe (Table 3)
Table 1 Answers to the Question ‘What are the two most important issues facing the EU at the moment?’ (% data)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immigration</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic situation</td>
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<td>27</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
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<tr>
<td>State of public finances</td>
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<td>Terrorism</td>
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<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>Climate change and the environment</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rising prices, cost of living</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Crime</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU’s influence on the world</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
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</table>

*Eurobarometer 2014, 2015*
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Table 2 Does the following statement evoke positive or negative feelings? ‘Immigration of people from outside the EU’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>% positive</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>% positive</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>% positive</th>
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<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
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<td>Malta</td>
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Table 3 Answers to the Questions: Out of 100 people, a) How many are immigrants in your country? b) How many are Muslims?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>a) Immigrants</th>
<th></th>
<th>b) Muslims</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<td>actual</td>
<td>average guess</td>
<td>difference</td>
<td>actual</td>
<td>average guess</td>
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<td>GB</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>11</td>
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<td>16</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
<td>5</td>
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Policy Conclusion: need a concerted programme of school education and public awareness about the real scale of migration in Europe
A European Agenda on Migration

The policy review was also framed partially by the EC’s *A European Agenda on Migration*, published in May 2015, just as the research review was being commissioned.

Beyond the immediate objective of saving lives at sea, the *European Agenda* nominated *four pillars* for a more effective management of migration:

- **Reducing the incentives for irregular migration** – addressing the root causes of irregular and forced displacement; anti-trafficking and anti-smuggling measures; repatriation of irregular migrants

- **Border management** – ‘smart borders’ to facilitate bona fide travellers whilst more effectively controlling irregular movements

- **Common asylum policy** – move coherent application of the current system combined with re-evaluation of the effectiveness and fairness of the Dublin system

- **New policy for legal migration** – combining moves to foster better integration, and a clearer matching of immigration to labour-market needs in host countries, with an increasing focus on development in countries of origin
Flows: New Geographies and New Temporalities

New geographies

- following the ‘old geographies’ of mass labour migration (1950s – 1970s) and immigration into Southern Europe (1980s – 2008), the main newer migration flows have been East-West (post-1989 and 2004) and from Africa and the Middle East

- ‘fragmented journeys’ (Collyer 2010): rising importance of transit migration and transit countries (Morocco, Libya, Turkey); onward and serial migration within Europe; role of islands as footholds (Canaries, Malta, Lampedusa, Lesbos)

- the two ‘crisis’ migrations: the post-2008 economic crisis (exodus of unemployed from EU’s southern periphery), and the more recent refugee/migrant crisis from Syria

New temporalities

- mobility instead of migration (also a discursive shift in research and in policy)

- more migration which is circular, temporary, seasonal, short-term – this poses challenges to integration policy and to workers’ rights (TEMPER and EURA-NET study new forms of temporary migration)

- irregular migrants, especially, have unpredictable migration/mobility paths, reacting to constraints and following opportunities as they arise

- ‘liquid migration’ (Engbersen and Snel 2013), constituted by ‘intentional unpredictability’
Flows and Policies: some key findings

• Migration is becoming increasingly diversified by new typologies and motivations.

• The classic binaries (forced vs voluntary, legal vs irregular, temporary vs permanent, high-skilled vs low-skilled, refugees vs economic migrants...) are being blurred, so that we have hybrid and mixed forms of migration.

• A new important dichotomy has emerged: the distinction between the aspiration to migrate and the ability to do so. More and more would-be migrants aspire to move but are not allowed to, legally. Nevertheless many do find a means to migrate, as irregular migrants.

• Results from EUMAGINE show that aspiration to migrate is positively correlated with education, youth and gender (males). And yet, in three of the four countries studied (Morocco, Turkey, Senegal), it is negatively correlated with wealth – so it is the poorest who want to migrate to escape poverty. In Ukraine, aspiration to migrate is spread across all wealth classes.

• Results from MAFE show that Africa-Europe migration is basically a migration of skills (this time not of the poorest), but not into appropriate-level jobs: hence de-skilling. However when African migrants have at least some of their (higher) education and training in Europe, they are more likely to enter skilled work.
Flows and Policies: some key policy implications

• Research tells us that restrictive immigration policies do not stop migration. Rather, they increase the cost of emigration for migrants, increase the risks that migrants take, and foster the development of smuggling networks, including human trafficking.

• Such policies reduce the incidence of return migration, since migrants are ‘trapped’ in their irregular status with all that implies (eg. labour market exploitation). This suggests, counter-intuitively, that policies to promote return migration should start with regularisation of irregular migrants.

• Policies promoting student incoming mobility and exchanges should be developed to encourage effective entry into European skilled labour markets and to encourage ‘brain circulation’

• More work needs to be done to harmonise the recognition of qualifications and promote the access of third-country nationals for the purpose of research, study, training and internships etc.
Integration: selected highlights

• Integration is a contested concept with multiple dimensions – multi-form and multi-layered

• Europe is a ‘continent of integration’ (Scholten et al. 2015) with increasing ethnic, cultural and religious diversity matched with pressures to accommodate to the ‘European fold’. Three histories of integration: well-established (France, UK, Germany etc.); recent (Italy, Spain, Ireland etc.); hardly begun (Poland, Hungary, Romania etc.)

Two brief integration highlights from research:

• EUMARGINS found that in the labour market, discrimination against migrants is higher in higher-level jobs, whereas exploitation is greatest when migrants are irregular and/or work in the informal sector. Yet NORFACE MIDI-REDIE project found that cultural diversity in the workplace boosts economic performance and business creativity.

• ACCEPT PLURALISM tackles the major challenge of accommodating cultural and religious diversity in a context of ongoing migration, the quest for tolerance and social cohesion, but the challenge of extremism. Points the way to the school as the crucial setting for inculcating positive attitudes towards diversity. Recommends mandatory dialogue between schools, students and parents; avoid rigid models; appoint more teachers from ethnically diverse backgrounds.
Migration and Development (of origin countries)

There has been much discussion on the Migration-Development Nexus over the past 10-15 years. How are the two related? What causalities can be observed? These questions can be answered at several levels – theoretical, policy, empirical – but there is little consensus.

• theoretical: neoliberal economics vs neomarxist dependency analysis.

• policy analysis: ‘root causes’ (foster development in order to stop migration) vs ‘route out of poverty’ (facilitate migration as an escape from poverty – cf. UNDP Human Development Report 2009 on ‘overcoming the barriers to human mobility for development’)

• empirical evidence is also often conflicting: focus on three main potential impacts of migration on origin-country development:
  - remittances (including social remittances)
  - return migration
  - involving the diaspora in home-country development
Remittances and Social Remittances

Remittances: the panacea?

• Evidence from MAFE (as well as from other surveys and from international bodies such as the World Bank and IOM) indicates a positive impact in terms of alleviating poverty, stimulating human development (better housing, clothing, food, health), children’s education, investment in businesses, and coping with crisis.

• However, as individual-scale ‘bottom-up’ financial transfers and investments, remittances cannot be relied on for strategic, macro-scale development initiatives.

Social remittances

• These are ‘the ideas, behaviours, identities, and social capital that flow from receiving- to sending-country communities’ (Levitt 1998) – and are recognised as increasingly important in the M-D nexus, although under-researched.

• TRANS-NET found that social remittances were transmitted both ways (also acknowledged by Levitt and Lamba-Nieves 2011) and laterally across diasporas – examples are improved gender relations, working practices, and ideas in the political sphere.
Return Migration

• Return decisions are often more complex than the original emigration decision. Who returns? Are returnees ‘successes’ or ‘failures’?

• When return takes places, financial remittances stop, but social remittances intensify. Residual families may emotionally want their migrant members to return, but not so financially.

• Return migration is not necessarily the end of the migration cycle. Return moves may be embedded in circular or seasonal migration, or may be an interval between migrations to different destinations for different purposes. Hence it is better to talk of return mobilities, including periodic return visits which may be a substitute for definitive return.

• MAFE survey data show that the average age of return Europe to Africa is 45 and takes place after 5-10 years abroad. This indicates that neither the most recent nor the longest-established tend to return. Those who went abroad to study are more likely to return (hence brain circulation rather than brain drain).

• MAFE data also question the established assumption that African family reunification leads to long-term settlement in Europe. Families are just as likely to reunify in Africa or remain transnationally split in fluid configurations over the long term

• Finally MAFE demonstrates relatively positive post-return outcomes: 70% of returnees are economically active, often self-employed (but this may be a survival strategy). Return also leads to home-country investment.
Mobilising the Diaspora

• This is the most recently-promoted policy for encouraging migrants to contribute to the development of their home country, especially if large-scale investments can be leveraged in this way.

• Seen as appealing to migrants since they don’t have to physically return, except for visits; hence they are free to pursue their lucrative work or business activities abroad.

• Types of activities involved:
  - setting up business ventures in the home country, perhaps in partnership with locals
  - investment in state-sponsored projects
  - philanthropic ventures – charitable foundations, donations to emergency funds
  - diasporic volunteering as a home-targeted form of VSO
  - training, teaching and mentoring visits – eg to universities, schools, hospitals and other training facilities.

• Co-development and Hometown Associations. HTAs are popular in North America amongst Latin American migrants. NOPOOR research on HTAs in France of Malians shows positive outcomes – expansion of schools, health centres, and water amenities.
Conclusions on Research Needs

• Big question surrounds the role of migration in the light of the long-term ageing of the EU’s population and the shrinkage of its working-age population.

• More research of a large-scale cross-national comparative nature in order to inform policy in the light of rising pressures from immigration.

• More information needed on the evolving forms of migration/mobility not picked up by standard census and survey datasets – the various forms of ‘mixed’ and ‘liquid’ migration, such as onward migration and new migration routes that suddenly open up (TEMPER and EURA-NET will help here).

• Research on how to improve the accuracy and the empathy of public opinion towards migrants, and therefore on school education and public awareness campaigns, in order to neutralise the negative politicisation and mediatisation of the migration issue.

• On integration, research could focus on the transferability of good practice and successful outcomes to other more problematic contexts.

• On the potential for migration to contribute to development, research could concentrate on social remittances, on the effective management of return migration, and on identifying those measures which effectively target the well-being of those who feel they have no option but to migrate – to give them the encouragement to choose to stay.