Eurosceptic parties can be divided into ‘hard’ – those opposed to the entire European project – and ‘soft’ – those concerned about specific aspects of European integration. Their economic and cultural stances may also differ as they are found at both the far right and far left of the political spectrum and their development is linked to specific national conditions.
Hard Eurosceptic parties include Alternative für Deutschland in Germany, Fratelli d’Italia in Italy and the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands. Among the examples of soft Eurosceptic parties are Fidesz in Hungary, Law and Justice in Poland and Vox in Spain.
Support for Eurosceptic parties was low throughout most of the 2000s. But since the 2008 financial crisis, the share of votes in national elections for hard Eurosceptic parties has risen from less than 5 % to 14 %, according to the Commission’s research report.
Taking soft Eurosceptic parties into account, it has gone from around 7 % to 27 % in 2022. Support for hard Euroscepticism has not increased significantly since the 2016 Brexit referendum, perhaps as a result of its consequences. Conversely, support for soft Euroscepticism has continued to rise.
Soft and hard Euroscepticism combined are particularly strong in countries governed by Eurosceptic parties or coalitions, such as Hungary, Italy and Poland, as well as in France. In all four countries, Eurosceptic parties represent half of the electorate. Elsewhere, their support levels exceed 25 % in the Netherlands and Sweden and 20 % in Belgium. Hard Eurosceptic parties gained significant vote shares in recent French, Italian and Swedish national elections.
Distribution of the vote for Eurosceptic parties also varies within countries. In France, support for hard Eurosceptic parties is concentrated in the northeast and along the Mediterranean coast. In Poland, Euroscepticism is more prevalent in the east. The same is true for Germany, with the divide corresponding to the old inner German border. In Belgium, the divide largely follows the linguistic border, Euroscepticism being stronger among Dutch speakers.
The relationship between Euroscepticism and levels of development is nuanced. Using cohesion policy categories, hard Euroscepticism is more popular in transition and more developed regions than less developed regions (15 % v 9 %). On the other hand, the combined vote shares for soft and hard Euroscepticism are higher in less developed and transition regions than in more developed regions (34 % v 22 %).
Drivers of discontent
What is driving this rise in discontent? Some see it as a result of the re-emergence of identity issues. Many people feel threatened by changes related to diversity or social values. Older people and those with lower levels of educational attainment are viewed as more susceptible to such sentiments. Similar arguments have been made about people in places with limited population mobility.
For others, the appeal of anti-system parties is linked to long-term economic decline in places that have struggled to adapt to globalisation, trade integration and the green and digital transitions.
These cultural and economic factors often coincide geographically. Big cities tend to be economically dynamic, diverse places where progressive ideas are accepted. Many smaller cities, towns and rural areas lack these characteristics.
Into the trap
This brings us to the concept of the regional development trap. A region falls into a development trap if the prosperity of its inhabitants does not improve relative to its own past performance and if its economic growth falls behind national and EU averages.
Discontent is more likely to grow in places that have fallen into a development trap. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, people who had something and lost it (territories in decline) are more susceptible to discontent than people who never had anything (territories that have always lagged behind).
Moreover, individual perceptions of development are always relative. Standards of living in Europe have increased considerably, but not evenly, in recent decades. Large swathes of north-eastern and eastern France and most of Italy and Greece have struggled to keep pace with the rest of Europe – and it is in France and Italy where the risk of entrapment was highest from 2001 to 2018. People in such areas not only realise that they are doing worse than before but also that other regions are doing better.
Another feature to consider is the intensity of the trap. People in places where income has suffered a relatively big decline, employment prospects are far lower than in neighbouring regions and productivity has been stagnant for decades are bound to feel resentment. While the intensity of the traps is high in France and Italy, the most intense traps are found in Croatia and Greece.
Finally, the longer the duration of the trap, the harder it becomes to escape it. Long periods of entrapment lead to fewer opportunities and deterioration of essential services. Here too, France and Italy are among the worst-affected countries, along with Greece and Spain.
A direct link?
So are the risk, intensity and duration of a development trap directly linked to a rise in support for Eurosceptic parties?
Vote shares for hard Eurosceptic parties are significantly higher in regions with more employment in industry, more older people and fewer people who have undertaken higher education, but lower in areas with efficient government.
Surprisingly, they are also higher in wealthier regions. There are two possible explanations for this: firstly, people in wealthy regions may feel that they have more to lose from low growth; secondly, it may be easier to persuade people in wealthier regions that they do not benefit from EU membership.
Other characteristics of areas where hard Eurosceptic parties do well are those with high unemployment and high levels of immigration from outside the EU, whereas high percentages of residents from other EU Member States tend to lower Eurosceptic vote shares. Eurosceptic parties garner strong support in less densely populated suburbs, medium-sized cities, towns and rural areas. Unexpectedly, many areas in which hard Euroscepticism is popular have high electoral turnouts.
As regards the risk and intensity of entrapment, between 2001 and 2018, voters in regions at risk of entrapment were far more likely to vote for hard Eurosceptic parties in national elections than those in regions at lower risk. The more intense the trap, the greater the vote share for hard Eurosceptic parties.
In terms of duration, inhabitants of a region that is trapped, even if only briefly, are far more likely to support hard Eurosceptic parties than people in other places. The length of time a region spends entrapped contributes to an almost exponential increase in discontent, as expressed at the ballot box.
Taking account of support for hard and soft Eurosceptic parties, factors such as high levels of industrial employment, low overall employment, ineffective government and low population density remain significant. Conversely, turnout at elections in areas with high levels of combined support for hard and soft Eurosceptic parties tends to be relatively low.
The role of the development trap remains strong, as does its duration. For regions that have spent two decades in a development trap, the impact on Eurosceptic voting is double that in regions that have entered a development trap since 2010.
In addition, the link between economic stagnation and Euroscepticism is not confined to a single electoral cycle. Voters in places that have experienced a development trap are unlikely to support European integration in the future unless the lack of economic dynamism is addressed.
Escaping the trap
The Commission’s research highlights the need for policies based on the local situation to help regions to escape development traps and tackle Euroscepticism. As cohesion policy investments tend to reduce Eurosceptic voting, they have a key role to play.
To this end, the Commission calls for more research into three issues. Firstly, better understanding is needed of the causes of development traps and how they can be overcome so as to develop the right mix of policies and investments for each region. The best policy response is likely to differ for more and less developed regions and for cities and rural areas.
Secondly, more engagement with residents of smaller cities, towns and rural areas can make it possible to understand why they feel that the place in which they live does not matter. Giving more people a say in cohesion policy programmes may assuage their feeling that their voices are not heard. Multi-level governance could also ensure that local priorities are considered in regional development strategies.
Finally, research is needed to identify where access to essential services is deteriorating, who is most affected and how policies can ensure sufficient access. This requires policies that promote a balanced spatial distribution of costs and benefits. When places that are struggling incur significant costs or benefit less than other areas, this is likely to fuel discontent, undermining development and social cohesion.
