MIGRATION AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS

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Proceedings of a dialogue workshop organised by DG Research (RTD) with DG Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) and DG Justice and Home Affairs (JAI)
Brussels, January 28 - 29, 2002

Brussels, January 2003
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http://www.cordis.lu/improving/socio-economic/home.htm, for information on the Key Action “Improving the Socio-economic Knowledge Base” under the 5th Framework Programme.

http://improving-ser.sti.jrc.it/default/, the database of socio-economic projects funded under the 4th and 5th Framework Programme.

Foreword for the Report on the Migration and integration: challenges to European Society.

Immigration is not a new phenomenon for Europe and migrants have always made a major contribution to the economic development of the Union and to the cultural diversity which characterises European society. Today, although the situation is very diverse across Member States, there is an increasing recognition of the need to achieve better integration of immigrants in our societies. This is particularly important for the future because we are entering a new phase where the demand for migrant workers is growing as a result of our declining and ageing populations.

Following the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty and the special European Council in Tampere, the Union is responding by developing a common immigration policy. The objective is to find ways to manage migration flows more efficiently and to integrate migrants into society having in mind the best interests of the Member States and of the developing countries from which most immigrants come. Migrants will play an essential role in the future in sustaining economic growth, the competitiveness of our economy and the European social model. This message was reinforced by the Commission in its 2003 Spring Report on the Lisbon strategy when it underlined the need for better integration of migrants in order to ensure high levels of employment and productivity in the next decades as the population balance changes dramatically.

Most Member States have developed national strategies over the last decade to adapt and enhance arrangements for integration. Given the heterogeneity of the immigrant population and the specificities of our different social and political structures, there is clearly no single way forward. There are, however, many similarities in the problems to be faced and in the policies being developed to tackle them. Developing models of integration which respect diversity, the principles of democracy and the fundamental European values of freedom, human dignity, equality, solidarity and human rights standards, remains a challenge for the European Union as a whole.

The need for a sound basis for analysis has led the Commission to reinforce the collection of statistics and to support social and economic research in these fields. Research, set into a context of historical and contemporary migration streams into Europe, has been developed under the 4th and 5th Framework Programmes. It addresses trends in the socio-economic context, as well as issues raised by migrant groups themselves with respect to employment, racism, civil rights, and participation. The various studies which have been undertaken illustrate the different historical experience of migration, its variety in time, space and locality in different Member States.

This report reviews and summarises the findings of 17 research projects conducted under the Targeted Socio-Economic Research programme (TSER) of the 4th Framework Programme and the Key Action "Improving Socio-Economic Knowledge Basis" of the 5th Framework Programme of DG Research. The report attempts to draw out the most significant findings from this research, and to discuss its relevance for policies concerning immigration and integration in the European Union.
Under the 6th Framework Programme a wider range of issues concerning immigration and asylum will be the subject of research and analysis. These will help us to understand better the changing phenomena of migration and to respond more adequately to the challenges which it poses for European society.

Brussels, March 2003

Philippe Busquin
Commissioner for Research

Antonio Vitorino
Commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs

Anna Diamantopoulou
Commissioner for Employment and Social Affairs
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BACKGROUND

MIGRATION AND MINORITIES IN WESTERN EUROPE

Immigration and the social integration of new ethnic minorities have become important policy challenges in all EU countries in recent years. The significance of migration is nothing new: all European states are the result of historical encounters between peoples of differing origins and characteristics. State formation in the pre-modern period took place through the territorial expansion of successful kingdoms, leading to the incorporation of the peoples of expanded areas. Cultural difference was not perceived as a problem at a time when the rulers shared a common heritage, based on family ties, while there was little in common between rulers and subjects. Over long periods – often centuries – diverse peoples grew together to form nations, although some groups, such as Jews and Gypsies – always remained excluded from emerging national identities. The rise of democratic nationalism from the 18th century made national belonging much more salient. It became essential to define who belonged to the nation (or people), which had become the basis of political power and legitimacy. This made it equally important to define who did not belong, and who was therefore to be excluded from the political community.

National origins and culture became the markers of inclusion and exclusion. The visible symbols were a common heritage, language, customs and (sometimes) religion. Where these did not exist, it was the task of national intellectuals to invent them. In principle, the national model stipulated that the citizens of a given nation should focus their whole life on the national community, and that national belonging should be immutable. However, this contradicted the whole historical experience of Europe, which was always based on trade, interchange and mobility between regions and peoples. Therefore, the newly demarcated borders had to be complemented by the process of ‘naturalisation’, through which those migrants considered worthy of the honour gave up their previous ‘nature’ or nationality, and took on a new one – that of their new country of residence. Migration, of course, continued, for economic progress and prosperity depended on movement across European borders. Industrialisation in the 19th and early 20th century required large-scale mobility of workers, leading to new populations of non-nationals (Castles and Davidson 2000).

The nationalist project reached its culmination in a period of deep crisis in the early 20th century. Its most extreme leaders claimed that national purity was the key to greatness. To achieve this, they sought to physically eliminate ethnic minorities. This genocidal madness was defeated, though at great cost. In the aftermath, the great majority of Europeans rejected extreme nationalism and racism. The project of European unification was largely born out of this revulsion. The new post-war governments of Western Europe adopted laws and constitutions outlawing racial discrimination and guaranteeing equal legal status to all citizens. However, in the depressed economic conditions of the immediate post-war period, few new migrants entered the area. Indeed, there was a widespread view that Europe was ‘overpopulated’. Several governments (including the Netherlands and Britain) encouraged overseas emigration of their citizens. Many of Central and Western Europe’s historical minorities had been decimated or considerably reduced. However, Europe’s new commitment to ethnic and cultural pluralism was soon to be put to the
test: economic recovery and then the ‘economic miracles’ of certain countries rapidly attracted migrant workers from poorer countries on the European periphery, as well as immigrants from former colonies of European powers. By the early 1970s, Western Europe had large immigrant populations, as Table 1 shows.

### TABLE 1 Immigrant populations in selected Western European countries, 1950-75 (thousands)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>716</td>
<td>835</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2 128</td>
<td>2 663</td>
<td>3 339</td>
<td>4 196</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (FRG)</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>686</td>
<td>2 977</td>
<td>4 090</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>1 573</td>
<td>2 205</td>
<td>3 968</td>
<td>4 153</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>585</td>
<td>983</td>
<td>1 012</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes**: Figures for all countries except Great Britain are for foreign residents. They exclude naturalised persons and immigrants from the Dutch and French colonies. Great Britain data are Census figures for 1951, 1961 and 1971 and estimates for 1975. The 1951 and 1961 data are for overseas-born persons, and exclude children born to immigrants in Great Britain. The 1971 and 1975 figures include children born in Great Britain, with both parents born abroad.

**Source**: Castles, Booth and Wallace (1984): 87-8 (where detailed sources are given).

European policy makers responded to these new challenges largely by denying that there was a problem. In some countries, foreign workers from nearby countries were seen as ‘guestworkers’ who would stay only temporarily and not bring in their families, and who go away if their labour was no longer needed. Immigration rules and citizenship laws were designed to prevent settlement, and keep migrants mobile. This was a system of differential exclusion: foreign residents were included in some areas of society (especially the labour market), but excluded from others (especially political rights, national identity and social welfare systems). In other countries, migrants were expected to stay – indeed they were seen as demographically useful in countering low birth rates and replenishing war losses. Especially long-distance migrants from the colonies could not be expected to leave quickly; moreover they often had citizenship rights. In these countries, the emphasis was on assimilation: immigrants were expected to use the national language, and adopt accepted modes of behaviour and social identity. In both approaches, policy makers believed in the controllability of difference: immigration was not seen as a problem for society.

It did not take long before such expectations began to seem questionable. The watershed was the 1973 ‘oil crisis’. When the German government stopped recruitment and other governments followed suit, they hoped that the now unwanted ‘guests’ would go away. Yet most ‘guestworkers’ did not leave. Instead, many brought in their families and began to settle permanently. Ethnic communities began to develop in all major western European cities. Permanent settlement had not been envisaged for the foreign workers. Many Western European states proclaimed themselves ‘zero immigration countries’. In fact some foreign workers did go home, but many stayed. Governments initially tried to prevent family reunion, but with little success. In the end, it was grudgingly accepted as a human right. In several countries,
the law courts played a major role in preventing policies deemed to violate the protection of the family contained in national constitutions.

Foreign populations changed in structure. In the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) for instance, the number of foreign men declined slightly between 1974 and 1981, but the number of foreign women increased by 12 per cent, while the number of children aged up to 15 grew by 52 per cent (Castles et al. 1984, 102). Instead of declining, as policy-makers had expected, the total foreign population of the FRG remained fairly constant at about 4 million in the late 1970s, only to increase again to 4.5 million in the early 1980s and to over 5 million prior to German reunification in 1990. By 1999, 7.3 million foreigners resided in reunited Germany (OECD, 2001, 172). Table 2 gives information on the growth of foreign populations in some European immigration countries.

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>724</td>
<td>748</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>845</td>
<td>905</td>
<td>910</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>3,714b</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>3,597</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>3,263</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>4,453</td>
<td>4,379</td>
<td>5,242</td>
<td>7,174</td>
<td>7,344</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>126d</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>781</td>
<td>991</td>
<td>1,520e</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>36.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>521</td>
<td>553</td>
<td>692</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>651</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>801</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>893</td>
<td>940</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>1,331</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>1,731</td>
<td>1,875</td>
<td>2,060</td>
<td>2,208</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: a Figure for 1998; b Figure for 1982; c metropolitan France only; d Figure for April 2000; e Figure for December 2000


Since the mid-1970s, immigration and ethnic diversity have come to be seen as key challenges for European societies. The false expectations and misguided policies of the early years have taken many years to revise. Often they led to persistent expectations and stereotypes among local populations. There were high political costs for politicians who dared to question long-held myths. That is why it has taken a long time for European statesmen to respond effectively to the social challenges of immigration and ethnic diversity. The need for realistic and balanced approaches has been understood for many years, but the capacity to devise and implement long-term strategies has often been lacking.

In a situation of economic restructuring and increased international competition, immigration soon came to be seen as a major challenge to welfare systems and social cohesion. By the 1980s, as immigrants settled and brought in their families, they made increased demands on housing, educational, health and welfare systems. Structural unemployment affected low-skilled workers most severely, and many immigrant
workers had entered the labour market at fairly low levels. Competition between disadvantaged local groups and immigrants for jobs requiring limited qualifications, as well as for low-cost housing and social amenities, precipitated serious (and sometimes violent) conflicts. Right-wing groups deliberately provoked racism, as a way of mobilising popular support for their political aims.

In the second half of the 1980s, there was a resurgence of migration to Western Europe. The new migrants came as workers (both legal and illegal) but increasingly also as asylum seekers. Many were from Africa, Asia and Latin America, but in the late 1980s the crises in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe led to new East-West movements. Panic developed in Western and Southern Europe, with fears of influxes of up to 50 million East-West migrants (Thränhardt 1996, 228). Such predictions proved much exaggerated. By the mid-1990s it was clear that there would be no large-scale movements of population from East to West. This was due to several factors: control measures; economic and political stabilisation in Eastern Europe; and the absence of migration networks to facilitate movements. Those who did move were generally members of ethnic minorities who received an official welcome in their ancestral homelands.

Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece comprise a distinctive sub-group of EU states with regard to international migration. Until 1973, they were mainly countries of emigration. As a result of economic growth (partly due to EU membership) labour demand grew rapidly, and they began to attract immigrants. In the post-Cold War period, inflows of both unskilled workers and asylum seekers have increased rapidly. Southern European countries have come to share many of the concerns and characteristics of their EU partner states to the north, yet remain demarcated by the key role played by the underground economy in shaping inflows, the preponderance of illegal migration in overall migration and by weak governmental capacity to regulate international migration.

By the mid-1990s, immigration flows to many Western Europe countries had stabilised and in some cases declined from the peak levels of 1991-2. However, new debate began about the future need for immigrants. Low fertility was leading to demographic decline and an ageing population (Münz 1996). Germany began to recruit new types of ‘guestworkers’ from Eastern Europe, often under conditions even more onerous than the old ‘guestworker system’ (Rudolph 1996). Yet Eastern Europe offers no long-term demographic reserves: the total fertility rate is low and life expectancy is actually declining in some areas due to environmental factors. The high fertility and young underemployed populations of North Africa and Turkey appear in an ambivalent light to many Europeans. On the one hand they are seen as a source of workers for factories and building sites, and of carers for the aged; on the other hand there are fears of being ‘swamped’ by new influxes.

The debate gained new impetus in 2000 through a Report on Replacement Migration (Division 2001), which gave detailed calculations on the decline in fertility in developed countries, and how this would affect population size and ageing. The Report showed that, on current trends, populations might decline dramatically. For instance, the Italian population could fall from 57 million in 2000 to just 41 million by 2050. This led to the question whether increased immigration could compensate for demographic change, by maintaining the size of the general population, the working-age population, or the ratio of workers to dependents. The UN Population Division
showed that extremely high levels of immigration would be needed to achieve such objectives, and implied that these would be neither desirable nor realistic in the context of other social and political goals. This conclusion was shared by most commentators and policy-makers. However, the strong public impact of the Report did open up new debates on the need for both skilled and unskilled labour migration to developed countries, and helped undermine the myth of ‘zero immigration polices’.

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND MIGRATION

Migration has figured importantly in the history of European integration. The architects of greater cooperation always understood that the removal of barriers would encourage population mobility. The Treaty of Paris of 1951 which created the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) barred restrictions on employment based on nationality for citizens of the six member states. The 1957 Treaty of Rome envisaged the creation of a common market between the six signatory states. Under Article 48, workers from member states were to enjoy freedom of movement if they found employment in another member-state. In the 1950s, Italy pushed for regional integration in order to foster employment opportunities for its many jobless workers. However, the freedom of labour movement applied only to citizens of European Economic Community (EEC) member states, not to third country nationals. By 1968, when Article 48 came into effect, Italy’s unemployment problem had eased. Italian citizens nevertheless were the major beneficiaries of Article 48 but relatively little intra-EEC labour migration occurred: the beneficial effects of the EEC in achieving more equal economic conditions within the Community reduced the need for internal labour migration.

The growing support for further easing of border controls led France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands to sign the Schengen Agreement in 1985. These states committed themselves to a border-free Europe in which EU citizens could circulate freely, while external frontier controls were to be harmonised and tightened. The Single European Act of 1986 defined the common market as ‘an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured within the provisions of this treaty’. Many Europeans, as well as the governments of some Member States balked at the idea of eliminating internal boundaries, fearing that it would lead to increased illegal migration and loss of governmental control over entry and stay of aliens. On 26 March 1995, the Schengen Agreement finally came into force for those signatory states which had established the necessary procedures: Germany, Belgium, Spain, France, Portugal, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. This meant complete removal of border controls for people moving between these countries. Effectively, the Agreement created a new class of ‘Schengen citizens’, to be added to the existing categories of EU citizens and non-EU citizens.

The momentum towards free movement and a common European policy on migration was strengthened by the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, which established community competence in the areas of migration and asylum (Article 63). Principles for a common policy were laid down by the European Council meeting in Tampere in October 1999. The policy includes four main elements: ‘partnership with countries of origin; a common European asylum system which should lead in the longer term to a common asylum procedure and a uniform status for those granted asylum; fair treatment of third country nationals and the more efficient management of migration
flows’ (Communities 2001). A The Commission is currently working on policies and frameworks for EU management of migration, which is expected to become a reality by 2004. A key issue in the EU and many of its member states is the growth in undocumented migration and asylum seeker entries. Another key issue is social integration of existing immigrant populations. Long-term management of migration is seen as crucial, particularly with regard to recruitment of essential labour, as well as family reunion. This has led to calls for cooperation with countries of origin in addressing the root causes of migration, which are seen to lie in disparities in economic conditions and human rights between countries of the South and the rich countries of the North.

Back in the 1980s, the planned accession of Spain and Portugal sparked an important debate over the likely effects of their entry upon labour mobility. Some feared the rest of the enlarged European Community would be flooded with Portuguese and Spanish workers. But at the end of a seven-year transition period, the predicted massive inflow did not occur. Instead, Spain and Portugal had become significant areas of immigration in their own right as public and private investments poured in. Intra-European capital mobility substituted for intra-European labour mobility. Negotiations between the EU and various Central and Eastern European states over planned accession sparked a similar debate in 2000. But, at the end of the planned transition period, most experts do not anticipate large inflows of unskilled migrant workers. However, some critics of EU enlargement continue to warn of mass influxes from the East. Such fears remain a potent force in European politics, making it difficult to achieve a rational debate and long-term policy perspectives.

SOCIAL INTEGRATION OF IMMIGRANTS

As a result of immigration since 1945, most EU countries now have significant immigrant or ethnic minority population shares in their populations. Much of the TSER research assessed in this Report is concerned with various aspects of the social integration of immigrants and minorities in European societies. However, integration is a complex process that presents difficulties in conceptual, practical and policy terms. This section discusses some of the problems which arise in studying social integration.

None of the EU countries has consciously set out to build a multicultural society (that is, a society consisting of many cultural or ethnic groups sharing the same space), yet that has been the long-term result of processes of immigration initiated for economic or political reasons. All immigration countries have to face up to broadly similar challenges with regard to integration. But they have developed quite different approaches with regard to policies and goals.

The earlier approaches have already been referred to above: the differential exclusion model used in ‘guestworker’ recruiting countries meant using migrant labour, but preventing migrants from becoming a permanent part of society. The assimilation model used for colonial migrants and groups allowed to settle was designed to turn immigrants into nationals, by getting them to give up their distinct languages and cultures. Both these models proved problematic by the 1980s: former ‘guestworkers’ were settling, while colonial migrants were forming communities, and maintaining
their languages, religions and customs. Trying to prevent the emergence of ethnic difference had failed, and policy makers now sought ways of managing difference. In response, the model of multiculturalism was borrowed from Canada and Australia, and applied first in Sweden, the Netherlands and the UK, and then, in modified forms, elsewhere.

Multiculturalism can be characterised as a model for public policy designed to ensure the full socio-economic and political participation of all members of an increasingly diverse population. Multiculturalism generally means the public acceptance of immigrant and minority groups as distinct communities which are distinguishable from the majority population with regard to language, culture and social behaviour; and which have their own associations and social infrastructure. Multiculturalism implies that members of such groups should be granted equal rights in all spheres of society, without being expected to give up their diversity, although usually with an expectation of conformity to certain key values. It is this combination of recognition of cultural difference and measures to ensure social equality which is the essential feature of multiculturalism. It seems evident that democratic civil societies (Bauböck 1996) and modern welfare states (Bommes and Halfmann 1998) have inherent drives towards integrating minorities and accepting a fair measure of cultural difference.

However, multiculturalism has not been accepted everywhere. Some countries (such as Austria and Switzerland) have maintained policies designed to keep migrants separate from the host population, while others have maintained assimilation policies – usually in the milder form of integration or insertion (France). In recent years, critics of multiculturalism have claimed that it hinders integration and keeps immigrants separate from host populations by encouraging cultural difference. This has led to a shift away from multiculturalism in favour of integration policies in the Netherlands (Entzinger 2002).

We will not go into detail on the evolution of varying approaches to integration in specific EU countries, as this would take up too much space. A number of useful comparative studies exist (Doomernik 1998; Entzinger 2000; Favell 1998; Portes and Rumbaut 1996; Reitz 1998; Süßmuth 2001; Westin 2000; Koopmans and Statham 2000; Castles and Miller 1998; Cornelius et al. 2003). A major determining factor in the varying approaches is the historical experience of the various countries with immigrants and minorities during the process of nation-state formation. Such processes have been strongly shaped by territorial expansion, incorporation of minorities, recruitment of migrant labour, reception of refugees, processes of cultural homogenisation, and practices of discrimination and exclusion. European practices towards colonised peoples were also major influences in shaping later practices towards immigrants and minorities at home. Such historical elements need to be linked to current conditions. A convenient way of summarising the various aspects would be to analyse each national immigration-integration situation in terms of four groups of factors:

- **History**: Past experiences of the country with regard to immigration and minorities, and the laws, policies and attitudes based on this.
- **State**: Immigration rules, legislation on the status of various groups of entrants, naturalisation and citizenship rules, integration policy, role of various agencies
and sectors (health, education, welfare etc), anti-discrimination legislation, role of local government.

- **Market**: labour market opportunities, ethnic business, housing market, access to services, immigrants and refugees as consumers.
- **Community**: attitudes and behaviour of the majority population, emergence of ethnic communities, inter-group relations, multicultural neighbourhoods, political mobilisation and participation of immigrants.

Obviously, these groups of factors have strong linkages, for instance community attitudes help shape legislation or labour market opportunities, the housing market influences needs for government services and so on. Government integration policy directly shapes the state sector, but government can also set rules that influence markets (for instance through anti-discrimination legislation) or the community (for instance through education and welfare policies).

However, in the context of globalisation it is no longer adequate to conceptualise immigration-integration processes simply at the nation-state level. It is necessary to add a fifth group of factors to the analysis:

**Transnational factors**: the links and networks which immigrants and refugees develop with their countries of origin and with co-ethnics in other parts of the world. Such networks have economic, political, social and cultural aspects, and may have considerable influence on the way in which people integrate in any given society (Vertovec 1999).

A discussion on integration can start with the very general question: how do newcomers to a country become part of society? More specifically, we can ask: what happens to immigrants once they are in Europe? In what way and to what extent do they find work and housing? If it possible for them to access public services of various kinds, especially welfare and educational services? How do they negotiate all the private services needed in a complex economy, such as banks, rental and estate agents and insurance? How do they build up social and cultural relationships within their own ethnic groups and with the wider community? How do they come to participate in political processes at various levels? Do they encounter barriers to full participation based on their national origins, race, ethnicity, or social and cultural background? These are just some aspects of the complex process of becoming part of a new society that is referred to in popular and political usage as *integration*.

The very broadness of the integration process makes it hard to define in any precise way. Integration of newcomers to a society takes place at every level and in every sector of society. It involves a wide range of social actors: public officials, political decision-makers, employers, trade union officials, fellow-workers, service providers, neighbours and so on. The immigrants and refugees themselves play a crucial role in the integration process. Developing the human agency needed to function effectively in a new environment requires the individual and collective initiative of the newcomers. Where restrictive rules and rigid systems confine them to a passive role, integration may be slow and incomplete.

Popular attitudes and polices often seem to be based on the assumption that integration is a one-way process. Migrants are expected to integrate into the existing
culture or society without any reciprocal accommodation. Integration then has the connotation of assimilation. In contrast, much of the research literature stress that integration is a two-way process: it requires adaptation on the part of the newcomer but also by the host society. Successful integration can only take place if the host society provides access to jobs and services, and acceptance of the immigrants in social interaction. Above all, integration in a democracy presupposes acquisition of legal and political rights by the new members of society, so that they can become equal partners. In this approach, integration can also mean that minority groups should be supported in maintaining their cultural and social identities, since the right to cultural choices is intrinsic to democracy.

Because integration is such a complex process it cannot be studied from the perspective of any single social science. Economics, political science, history, sociology, anthropology, geography, urban studies, demography and psychology all have a part to play. The research reviewed in this Report comes from a wide range of social scientific disciplines and much of it is consciously interdisciplinary. There is no single, generally accepted definition, theory or model of immigrant and refugee integration. The concept continues to be controversial and hotly debated.

An understanding of the various factors conditioning immigrant and refugee integration will affect the efficiency of policy interventions. Policy makers need to know what categories of entrants are involved in integration processes, and what their specific characteristics are. They also need to examine the role of different societal sectors, institutions and agencies in integration. Indicators of what is deemed to be successful integration should be highlighted, as well as problems in the process. This will help in formulating realistic expectations of how integration should take place, and the likely duration of specific aspects of it. It is important to realise that while some government policies may assist integration (e.g. assistance in finding work or housing), others may hinder it (e.g. dispersal to areas with poor employment opportunities, restrictions on the right to work or on welfare entitlements).

Integration is often assumed to be a singular, universal, stage-sequential and regularly paced process to which all individual immigrants or refugees are exposed. It is with reference to such presumed universal stages and pace that migrants and refugees are often judged, in public discourse, ‘successfully’ or ‘unsuccessfully’ integrated. The research done in the TSER Programme indicates that integration should be recognised as an umbrella term suggesting a set of possible and overlapping processes and spheres.

It is important to perceive immigrants as active participants in a collective process of integration. They first integrate by way of consolidating their relationships with family and extended kin groups, then sub-groups and wider ethnic groups, then neighbourhoods and cities, and finally into what we might call national society as a whole. This ‘nested process’ should be recognised in policy terms, since different domains of policy impact on each level or arena of integration in this sense.

Variations in integration processes and outcomes have been attributed to a range of factors such as demographic characteristics of a group, legal status, labour market and social status, and cultural and religious elements brought from the home country. Such factors are often conceived in monolithic terms such as ‘Islam’ or ‘village
culture’ of this or that country. Contemporary research and analysis demonstrates that much more work is needed on factors such as: gender relations, home country conditions and dynamics, conditions of the migration process itself, changing sources of human, social and financial capital, and the role of transnational networks and patterns of interaction in patterning migrant strategies.

When we examine integration and factors conditioning integration, does it make a difference whether the newcomers are immigrants, refugees or indeed asylum-seekers? Certain social processes influencing integration are similar in character for all people entering a new society. However, there are significant differences in processes or trajectories of integration that are largely conditioned by structural factors. First and perhaps foremost is the issue of official status. The state assigns newcomers to specific categories according to their mode of entry. These categories shape rights and opportunities, and thus have important effects on patterns of integration. Any discussion of integration needs to examine both the general process, and the variants resulting from official classifications and policies. In fact all immigration countries have a range of policies for different groups: skilled immigrants, refugees, dependents of legal entrants, asylum-seekers and undocumented workers. Their experiences and the long-term outcomes of settlement processes may differ radically (Portes and Rumbaut 1996). With regard to these variables, researchers need to analyse both vulnerabilities and opportunities surrounding the trajectory of immigrant individuals and groups, including the differential resources which pathways of incorporation present. Combining the following check-lists for each group of immigrants could lead to a kind of Integration Matrix, which might help in identifying specific situations, needs and problems, and in subsequently in the planning of immigrant and refugee services.

Conditions of Exit: factors concerning the specific socio-economic and political conditions in migrants’ places of origin, including poverty, class structure, political dynamics or repression, conflict, environmental degradation;

Categories of entrant: skilled immigrant workers, unskilled immigrant workers, undocumented workers, refugees, asylum seekers, students, dependents of primary migrants in the other categories;

Legal status: citizenship, residence status, right to work, entitlement to social housing, health care, welfare and social services;

Characteristics of entrants: age, gender, place of origin, nationality, ethnicity, presence of family members, English proficiency, educational background, religion, occupation and skill level, qualifications (recognised in the UK/unrecognised), migration experience (voluntary/forced, legal/illegal);

Characteristics of ethnic community: number in UK, geographic distribution, segregation/concentration in specific areas, religion, ethnic community associations, leadership, social divisions, political divisions;

Conditions of receiving context: nature of national receptivity (immigration suppressed, permitted but not encouraged, or welcomed and supported), type and extent of government policies (such as access to various legal statuses, assistance,
English language training, induction packages), available housing stock, degree of physical segregation, nature of local labour market, school provision, availability of advice bureaux, history of same or other ethnic group presence; public opinion surrounding stereotypes, prejudice, discrimination and racist violence v. patterns of tolerance, cooperative activity and group interchange.

Such approaches importantly shift attention from factors that presumably reduce migrants and refugees to mere pawns of wider systems and structures. Their own motivations, strategies and networks need be emphasised. This includes not only the use of ‘forms of capital’ but factors surrounding individual and household decision-making (today often conducted transnationally over the telephone or other modes of telecommunication), the pooling and use of investments (not least in process and method of migration itself), savings and remittances.

For purposes of policy formation and evaluation, it would be extremely useful to have a set of generally accepted indicators of integration. However, arriving at such a set of indicators presents considerable problems. The assessment of different aspects of integration of immigrants and refugees includes objective indicators that are relatively easily quantifiable, as well as subjective or qualitative indicators. The former include indicators such as employment rates among refugees or statistics of accessing and completing further education courses, the latter includes indicators such as playing a role in the community, personal satisfaction, or having a ‘voice’. We list below possible indicators of some aspects of integration.

Indicators of education, training and employment
- statistics of accessing and completing training programmes;
- statistics of accessing and completing further education courses;
- statistics of those who successfully re-qualify and are able to practise their original profession;
- statistics of those who have their qualifications recognised for academic or employment purposes;
- number of job applications made, interviews attended and job offers granted;
- number of successfully self-employed immigrants and refugees;
- number of immigrants and refugees who set up successful businesses;
- unemployment rates amongst immigrants and refugees (considering different categories, such as gender, nationality, age etc.).
- employment distribution by occupation and industry;
- economic outcomes (such as income levels or home ownership) of immigrants and refugees compared with those of the majority population.

Indicators of social integration
- residential segregation (e.g. indexes of dissimilarity and segregation);
- intermarriage;
- language use and acquisition;
- social interaction within and outside group;
- rates of victimisation to crime;
- rates of racially-motivated offences
- rates of offending for various types of crime.
Indicators of health
- life expectancy;
- age and gender specific mortality rates;
- age and gender specific morbidity rates for significant illnesses;
- accident rates;
- access to medical services.

Indicators of legal integration
- right to reside in the country;
- right to participate in the labour market;
- right to access social services;
- acquisition of citizenship.

Indicators of political integration
- participation in trade unions and professional associations;
- participation in other associations;
- participation in political parties;
- participation as voters;
- election to representative positions in local, regional and national government.

Indicators of overall integration
- demographic indicators, such as such as fertility and mortality rates, life expectancy and inter-marriage (the rationale behind this indicator is that if a group of newcomers/refugees ‘behaves’ demographically in a similar way to the indigenous population, we may consider the group integrated into the receiving society. This does not imply cultural assimilation because the group in question may or may not retain many of its cultural characteristics);
- personal assessments of availability, quality, and adequacy of assistance programmes and services provided;
- personal assessments of satisfaction with one’s achievements and situation in the receiving society.

The above list should by no means be considered comprehensive or complete. The major problems in constructing and evaluating indicators of integration suggest the need for more work in this area. It might be possible in this way to establish a set of agreed indicators for integration. These could be linked in a matrix, which might allow the weighting of different aspects, as well as consideration of group differences with regard to starting conditions and desired outcomes.

Clearly research on immigration of immigrants and minorities in the EU countries is still at an early stage, and much work still needs to be done on methods, data sources and modes of comparison. The research assessed in this Report makes important contributions to this process.
INTRODUCTION

AIMS AND PURPOSE OF THE REPORT

This report reviews and summarises the findings of 17 research projects conducted under the Targeted Socio-Economic Research programme (TSER) of the Fourth Framework Programme under selected themes and headings relating to migration. Where possible and relevant, the report identifies important scientific and policy findings from the projects.

The three main themes and the sub-themes were identified by DG Research as being relevant to the policy process of international immigration into the European Union, as outlined below:

Theme 1: Migration in Europe

- The magnitude of geographical mobility
- The socio-demographic characteristics of the people moving
- The reasons for moving
- The demographic/economic background determining future population movements
- Mobility patterns in the light of EU enlargement

Theme 2: Living Conditions of the Migrants

- Differences between mobile and non-mobile people
- Consequences of the arrival of new populations for the demand and supply of services
- Living conditions of migrant populations and ethnic minorities compared to those of local populations
- Are differences in living conditions between migrants and local populations narrowing or growing?
- How is the process of integration evolving?

Theme 3: Migration and Social Cohesion

- Does mobility affect the ability of migrants to participate fully in economic, social and political life?
- What is the ability of communities to absorb and integrate newcomers?
- What are the barriers and disincentives for participation?
- What are the most relevant cultural barriers?
- What are the factors facilitating participation?
- What is the potential of multiculturalism to enhance social cohesion?
Of the 17 reports submitted for review, not all were final reports containing research findings, and others only partly addressed migrants and migration. The assessments were carried out in 2001-2. Some reports consisted only of summaries and abstracts, or un-refereed conference papers, while one was in the form of a published book. (The editor, M. Peraldi, was contacted by the authors to seek advice on the main findings of the research with regard to the questions that had been formulated for our assessment.) It should be noted that several of the final reports referred to books either published or in publication, as well as special issues of journals. Some reports contained little or no information or findings of relevance.

The findings reported herein are based solely on the final reports of the various projects, and it should not be assumed that they represent either the most up-to-date or most authoritative research on the particular topics. The projects were initiated from 1995 onwards, and later ones have yet to publish their full findings. A Workshop was held in Brussels in January 2002, to enable the assessment team to discuss the reports and their findings with some of the researchers, as well as with officials of appropriate Directorate Generals of the Commission. The Report presented here is an attempt to draw out the most significant findings from the research, and to discuss its policy relevance. In view of the wide scope of the TSER research, and the many questions addressed, our Report cannot claim to present a full picture of the many projects. Nor does our Report claim to assess the quality or the accuracy of the TSER research. The TSER research reports represent a complex and valuable resource for policy makers, researchers and the public in general. Our assessment Report is limited in purpose, and is no substitute for a detailed reading of the specific studies. The authors take full responsibility for the selection made, and for our interpretation of the findings. We thank the researchers, the officials of DG Research and the other participants at the January 2002 Workshop for their support.

The following reports were reviewed:

**Child Immigration Project (CHIP)**
*Carla Collicelli (co-ordinator), SOE2-CT98-1109*

**Family Reunification Evaluation Project (FARE)**
*Raffaele Bracalenti (co-ordinator), SOE2-CT98-3081*

**Effectiveness of National Integration Strategies Towards Second Generation Youth**
*Prof Dr D. Heckmann (co-ordinator), SOE1-CT97-3055*

**Households, Work and Flexibility**
*Clare Wallace (co-ordinator), HPSE-CT-1999-00030*

**Immigration as a Challenge to Settlement Policies and Education**
*P. Pitkänen (co-ordinator), SOE-2-GC-2045*

**Does Implementation Matter? Informal Administration Practices and Shifting Immigrant Strategies in Four Member States (IAPASIS)**
*Anna Triandafyllidou (co-ordinator) HPSA-CT-1999-0001*
Migrants and Minorities in European Cities
Malcolm Cross (co-ordinator), SOE1-CT95-3011

Migrant Insertion in the Informal Economy: Deviant Behaviour and the Impact on Receiving Societies
Emilio Reyneri (co-ordinator), SOE1-CT95-3005

Working on the Fringes: Immigrant Businesses, Economic Integration and Informal Practices
Jan Rath (co-ordinator), SOE2-CT97-3065

L’économie de Bazaar dans les Metropoles Euro-méditerranéennes
Michel Peraldi (co-ordinator), SOE1-CT98-3074

Self-Employment Activities Concerning Women and Minorities
Prof Dr U Apitzsch (co-ordinator), SOE1-CT97-3042

Social Exclusion as a Multidimensional Process: Subcultural and Formally Assisted Strategies for Coping With and Avoiding Social Exclusion (CASE)
Arno Pilgram and Heinz Steinert (co-ordinators), SOE1-CT98-2048

Social Exclusion in European Neighbourhoods
G. Cars (co-ordinator), SOE1-CT97-3057

Border Cities and Towns: Causes of Social Exclusion in Peripheral Europe
L. Leontidou (co-ordinator), SOE2-CT97-3048

The Dynamics of Social Change in Europe
Richard Berthoud (co-ordinator) HPSE-CT-1999-00032

Muslim Voices in the European Union: The Stranger Within
Pandeli Glavanis (co-ordinator) SOE1-CT96-3024

Social Strategies in Risk Societies: From Biography to Social Policy
P. Chamberlayne (co-ordinator), SOE1-CT95-3010

Notes on text

Use of italics in quotations follows the practice in the reports. We have corrected obvious spelling and style errors in quotations. Indented material is quotations from the original text. Short quotations are not indented but in single quotation marks. All references appear at the end of the report.
METHODOLOGY

The research projects in the TSER programme employed a wide range of social scientific methodologies and included some innovative research design strategies. The national teams were confronted with significant challenges in terms of data availability and comparative analysis, which often involved substantial preliminary groundwork. In many cases, the practice of research diverged from initial intentions in order to meet unanticipated problems and opportunities. The effort and imagination involved in cross-national research within the European Union, particularly on the subject of immigration, cannot be under-estimated. The main methodological issues are: the selection of national cases for study; the choice of appropriate methods for the research aims; and the development of new indicators for comparative social research.

Selection of countries

The TSER programme is grounded in cross-national and collaborative research. Regarding the 17 projects under review, the number of national teams varied from four to eight. Table 1 shows the countries selected for each project. As might be expected, the larger countries in the European Union, namely France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, are most likely to be involved in the projects. Smaller countries and those that joined more recently are less represented. A few projects involved partners in non-EU countries, including future member states. There were two main forms of comparative research in the TSER programme. The first took countries as the unit of comparative analysis, generally where government policies were under review. The second compared cities or neighbourhoods, often when the research focus was on the labour market, informal activities or other economic phenomena. One project, Border Cities and Towns (Leontidou et al., 2001a), combined research in islands, border town and exclaves.

Comparative analysis is grounded in theoretical and conceptual frameworks that help to identify appropriate cases for study. In the projects reviewed here, there were several recurrent frameworks, all of which assumed categorical differences between types of member state. For example, the comparative analysis in the project on Informal Administration Practices and Shifting Immigrant Strategies (Triandafyllidou, 2001) employed three dimensions of similarity and/or difference to differentiate the four countries being studied:

(a) ‘old’ (Germany and the UK) and ‘new’ (Greece and Italy) immigration countries;
(b) rational, efficient (Germany and the UK) and clientelistic, inefficient (Greece and Italy) administration systems;
(c) ethnic (Germany and Greece) and civic (Italy and the UK) nation-states.

The intention was to test ‘whether the division between industrialised North (Germany, UK) and less-favoured South (Greece and Italy) is still valid in terms of policy-making within the EU or whether the distinction between ethnic vs. civic
Table 1: Countries Selected for the TSER Projects Under Review

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Others: Slovenia (4, 14), Switzerland (2, 16), Israel (5, 9), South Africa (9), Canada (9), USA (9), Australia (9), Bulgaria (4), Czech Republic (4), Hungary (4), Romania (4)

Key:
1 Child Immigration Project (CHIP)
2 Family Reunification Evaluation Project (FARE)
3 Effectiveness of National Integration Strategies Towards Second Generation Youth
4 Households, Work and Flexibility
5 Immigration as a Challenge to Settlement Policies and Education
6 Does Implementation Matter? Informal Administration Practices and Shifting Immigrant Strategies in Four Member States (IAPASIS)
7 Migrants and Minorities in European Cities
8 Migrant Insertion in the Informal Economy: Deviant Behaviour and the Impact on Receiving Societies
9 Working on the Fringes: Immigrant Businesses, Economic Integration and Informal Practices
10 L’économie de Bazaar dans les Metropoles Euro-méditerranéennes
11 Self-Employment Activities Concerning Women and Minorities
12 Social Exclusion as a Multidimensional Process: Subcultural and Formally Assisted Strategies for Coping With and Avoiding Social Exclusion (CASE)
13 Social Exclusion in European Neighbourhoods
14 Border Cities and Towns: Causes of Social Exclusion in Peripheral Europe
15 The Dynamics of Social Change in Europe
16 Muslim Voices in the European Union: The Stranger Within
17 Social Strategies in Risk Societies: From Biography to Social Policy
nationalism is more important for immigration policy implementation’ (Triandafyllidou, 2001, p. 107). The research, as might be expected, in fact showed that differences were more subtle and dynamic than the typology, not least because of the processes of European integration.

The first dimension listed above, between old (N. Europe) and new (S. Europe) immigration countries, was also employed by the projects on Self-employment activities concerning women and minorities (Apitzsch et al., 2001) and Migrant Insertion in the Informal Economy (Reyneri, 1999). The contrast between ethnic, civic or pluralistic, and republican or assimilationist models of national identity and immigrant integration were often used as a basis for selection by the projects, for example in the Effectiveness of National Integration Strategies Towards Second Generation Migrant Youth in a Comparative European Perspective (EFFNATIS) research (Heckmann et al., 2001), where the anticipated national differences were found. A similar conceptual framework was used by the project entitled Immigration as a Challenge for Settlement Policies and Education (Pitkänen, 2000), that also included Israel as a comparator.

The third variant contrasted national welfare systems. The Social Exclusion as a Multidimensional Process project (Cremer-Schafer et al., 2001) selected its national cases based on four types of social policy or welfare-state regime, derived from prior research. The four types are classified according to two dimensions: (a) whether provision is universalistic in scope or confined to wage labour and insurance only; (b) high and low levels of support. Sweden is an example of a universalistic welfare regime with high support, contrasting with Great Britain’s low support. Wage-labour is the basis of welfare systems in Germany (high) and Spain (low). Social Exclusion in European Neighbourhoods (Cars, 1999) also distinguished between Northern and Southern Europe, or in this case, Latin Rim countries. The two groups were differentiated by the degree of development of their welfare states, which was deemed relevant to an understanding of social exclusion.

Methods

The research methods employed by the TSER programme projects were characterised by both variety and innovation. They included both quantitative and qualitative research, as befitting the subject matter. All projects undertook extensive research into secondary materials, such as national censuses and labour force surveys.

An exemplar of formal quantitative analysis was The Dynamics of Social Change in Europe (Berthoud, 2000), based on longitudinal data, following the same individuals year-to-year rather than taking a snapshot of aggregated data every ten years or so by using a national census. The European Community Household panel survey contains data on the same individuals and their household members in every year since 1994. It allowed researchers to understand how individuals’ employment and family histories are linked.

More commonly, projects undertook extensive surveys of immigrants themselves, often involving targeted sampling techniques such as random walk or snowball sampling. As an example, the Effectiveness of National Integration Strategies
Towards Second Generation Migrant Youth in a Comparative European Perspective (EFFNATIS) project was designed to test whether there were differences between national modes of immigrant integration (Heckmann et al., 2001). To this end, detailed questionnaire surveys were undertaken among 16-25 year-olds in three countries specifically chosen to emphasise difference. Based on theory, it was anticipated that there would be a difference between immigrant youth in France (a Republican model), Germany (an ethnic model) and Britain (a multicultural model). Using logistical regression and multivariate analyses, the expected differences were found to be significant. One relevant factor in the study is that different immigrant groups were surveyed in each of the three countries, and each group was compared with the autochthonous population within its respective national context.

Standardising even questionnaire surveys between different national contexts is not straightforward. The Family Reunification Evaluation Project (Bracalenti, 2001) involved interviews with 40 immigrant families in each partner country, Italy, France, Sweden and Germany (where only 30 were conducted). The project undertook preliminary work to establish a common set of interview questions, which formed the first half of the interview. The second half was developed with respect to the different needs of each national partner. In practice, the national teams conducted interviews in quite different ways: some recorded, some did not; some were more open-ended than others; some allowed the interviewees to define the subject matter. One issue which clouded the comparative element was whether to include refugees alongside labour migrants. Furthermore, the researchers found that there was no universal definition of what constitutes a ‘family’ for the purposes of reunification. Upon closer inspection, the concept of reunification through formal means became blurred, as families were formed or created by multiple routes.

A number of projects moved further towards the qualitative end of the spectrum of methodologies by less structured interviews. Notable in this case was the Social Strategies in Risk Societies (SOSTRIS) project. It developed the sociological ideas of the risk society, individualisation and reflexivity to explore exclusion in Europe (Chamberlayne et al., 1999). It concentrated on the life experiences of individual Europeans in seven countries through socio-biographical and life-history methods. The ‘biographic interpretive method’ involves:

- collecting data via a non-intrusive life history method, which provides the maximum scope for subjects to structure their reports according to their own frames of reference. Data is analysed by a rigorous protocol which distinguishes between the ‘lived’ and the ‘told’ life. It employs definite analytic procedures to explore the significance of themes in each of these, and also gives careful attention to the forms of presentation of subjects’ narratives, and their implicit meanings. (Chamberlayne et al., 1999, 5)

The life history or life journey allowed individuals to incorporate personal and family histories, aspirations, resources and strategies into their accounts. These socio-biographic methods were first employed to investigate six categories of persons at risk from social exclusion: the early retired, single parents, ethnic minorities and migrants, unqualified youth, and ex-traditional workers. The seven national teams interviewed six or seven people in each of the six risk categories, making 252 interviews in total. Similar methods
were then used to understand the role of 13 agencies or institutions, characterised by their innovative attempts to combat exclusion.

The project’s focus on individuals rather than neighbourhoods (such as found in Cars, 1999) was justified by the research focus on the implications of exclusion for individuals, as well as a belief that it was an effective way to focus on individual agency and strategy. It was understood that individuals were ‘skilled, experienced and competent participants in social life’, fully capable of analysing their situation and expressing it. The team also argued that social policy and practice needed to be based on understanding of individuals’ experience. The report’s policy recommendations were consistent with this theoretical position, regarding ‘reflexivity’ – the capacity of individuals to constantly monitor their circumstances and devise strategies accordingly – as an essential resource for both citizens and agencies coping with exclusion. By focusing more on individual lives, the research was able to demonstrate that social exclusion is multi-dimensional, and that life stories could be distinctive.

A similar approach but with different intentions characterised the project on Self-employment activities concerning women and minorities (Apitzsch et al., 2001). It too was based on a biographical method. It involved the systematic collection of life histories from a stratified sample of 14 migrant men, 14 migrant women and 14 native women in each of six countries, making 252 cases. In each country, the intention was to split the sample between participants/beneficiaries and non-participants in self-employment programmes, in order to determine whether such programme were helpful. In practice this proved difficult to accomplish in every national case. The biographies were standardised to include information on socio-economic background, family history, education, migration history, work history and participation in various programmes. The project established a qualitative database from these interviews, intended to be accessed with NUD*IST software. However, the expectations placed in the software were not fully realised when the project ended.

The self-employment study differed from the social risk study in its understanding of the purpose of biographical methods. The former drew its theoretical inspiration from Schutzte and Strauss, who understood that there are aspects of social reality not generally recognised by actors, especially the degree to which individuals’ life courses are embedded in social structures. The study looked precisely for the unacknowledged aspects of actors’ behaviour rather than evidence of their competence.

The two projects above concentrated on individuals and their life histories. A contrasting approach was adopted by another project, that focused less on individuals and more on episodes or situations in which people found themselves. The Social Exclusion as a Multidimensional Process project (Cremer-Schafer et al., 2001) collected over 3000 ‘narratives or episodes of (experienced or impending) social exclusion’ from eight cities. The sampling frame was based on community studies, with stories being collected from two disadvantaged communities in each city. The stories of exclusion were related to their contexts by expert interviews, observation and statistical data. The project’s focus on events or episodes set it apart from the usual approach of analysing either aggregate data on poverty or individual biographies and families as a whole. Episodes highlight that exclusion takes place through situations of conflict rather than in the cumulative development of an
excluded or abnormal person. The focus is therefore on situations and how people may use agencies to help them rather than careers or life histories of poverty and exclusion. Exclusion is regarded as dynamic and contested, and at the same time policies may be envisioned as relevant to situations rather than ‘needy’ individuals.

Many of the topics of interest in migrant research are not well-covered by official, aggregate data sets. This is particularly so in the case of cross-national projects. As is well-known, definitions of such things as ‘immigrant’, ‘foreigner’, ‘ethnic group’ vary from country to country, as do the methods of official data collection. In addition, key issues such as the informal economy and deviance are, almost by definition, poorly represented in official sources. The project entitled Migrant Insertion in the Informal Economy (Reyneri, 1999) addressed the difficulties of researching migrants in the informal economy by combining a wide range of sources, from interviews to secondary literature. The Spanish team conducted ethnographies with participant observation in three Barcelona neighbourhoods in order to judge local reactions to immigrants. Such reactions were backed up by quantitative analysis of press reports. In Italy the project team supplemented their quantitative analysis of official crime and imprisonment statistics with interviews and observation throughout the judicial system, including judges, lawyers, police officers and witnesses.

The difficulties of researching the informal economy were also apparent from the report on l’Économie de Bazar dans les Metropoles Euroméditerrannéennes (Peraldi, 2001a, 2001b). Project teams in various European port or trading cities – Marseilles, Antwerp, Milan, Paris, Barcelona, Genoa among them – undertook ethnographies of the places and people associated with the bazaar economy. This included drug dealers, street vendors, shopkeepers, mechanics, traders, and seamen. This project was characterised by the attention to the sites or locations of informal activities.

Research into the causes and consequences of immigration have conventionally, and understandably, concentrated on immigrants themselves, either as they appear in aggregated statistics or interviewed individually and as part of families. But one of the objectives of Informal Administration Practices and Shifting Immigrant Strategies (Traindafyllidou, 2001) was to better understand how the outcomes of immigration control and enforcement are influenced by interactions between immigrants on the one hand, and professionals dealing with immigration on the other. It was hypothesised that the organisational culture of migration institutions would differ from country to country based on differences in national self-understanding among officials, and that this would impact on the immigration process. To investigate this situation, the project undertook participant observation with immigration officials. The aim of this method was to understand how such officials formed meanings, interpretations, and presuppositions about immigrants. This information was then the basis for subsequent interviews designed to uncover the organisational culture, the customary rules used in decision-making rather than the formal, legal procedures.

Researchers in this field have begun to understand that involvement by the research subjects themselves may not only enhance the quality of the findings, but also address some of the ethical problems arising from inquiries about the less powerful. Part of the Immigration as a Challenge for Settlement Policies and Education project involved students in teacher training colleges communicating with one another via
email (Pitkänen, 2000). The ‘Open Europe’ project, as it was called, lasted for ten weeks. The premise of the exercise was that:

the interaction among student teacher colleagues from different cultures provides information and knowledge with new perspectives of multicultural practices and experiential activities, which increase the chances for valuable insights towards multiculturalism. The behavioural approach focussed more on the student teachers' skills and operative competence in multicultural pedagogy in order to prepare them to work with ethnic minorities and multicultural classes. The behavioural approach presumed that the Internet discussions offer the participants an opportunity to build new diversity-interaction skills, to reinforce their existing skills, as well as to transfer their learning experiences to real-life training situations. (Pitkänen, 2000, 29)

It is likely that future research on migrant groups in Europe will increasingly involve migrant individuals and their organisations in designing and carrying out the research.

**Indicators**

As befits a programme of cross-national research within the European Union, several projects devoted energies to establishing new comparative indicators. Given the often-observed lack of correspondence between official classifications, these projects sought to derive new indicators grounded in the appropriate theoretical and conceptual frameworks.

*The Child Immigration Project* (Collicelli, 2000), for example, had to devise indicators of well-being that were not only relevant to minors, as opposed to adults, but could also be standardised across the countries being studied. For five areas – material well-being, health, delinquency, community participation and education – there were 20 individual indicators, including such things as involvement in sport and pregnancy and abortion in adolescence. The result was a ‘new definition of well-being for children of immigrant origin according to a hierarchy of basic indicators that could be used for evaluating the condition of children and targeting specific policy’. The indicators could be used to evaluate policies intended to improve the well-being of children of immigrants.

The project on the *Social Exclusion in European Neighbourhoods* (Cars, 1999) also developed a common set of qualitative and quantitative indicators grounded in a conceptual framework for understanding social exclusion and applicable across the European Union. The indicators permitted the project to establish what common features there were in social exclusion; they included economic change and its impact on labour market processes. The project was also able to identify divergent elements, namely cultural factors such as family and community structures, and national welfare polices, such as training and labour market policies. The project argued that no single indicator could reveal social exclusion in a comparative way, but only the pattern established by taking several variables together.

**Methodology: Summary**
This review is not exhaustive of the methodologies adopted and devised by the TSER programme projects, but it is indicative of the range of methods and how project teams addressed many of the challenges of researching migrants. The creative approach to obstacles continued into the dissemination phase of the projects. Some produced their own websites designed to continue after the end of the project and facilitate the creation of networks of research. A good example is the project on Working on the Fringes: Immigrant Businesses, Economic Integration and Informal Practices (Rath, 1999). This site involves partners outside the European Union. It includes a Listserv, ‘Imment’, created to further research on immigrant entrepreneurs.

Projects selected countries for comparison based on key conceptual frameworks. These commonly contrasted old and new immigration countries, different national modes of integration or national identity, and/or variations in welfare state regime. The larger, longer-standing member states were more frequently chosen than the smaller and more recent members of the European Union.

The full range of research methodologies was employed, often tailored to meet the difficulties of researching immigrants. As well as quantitative analysis of national datasets, there was extensive use of surveys. These often faced problems in practice, notably in operating the same, standard set of questions across different national contexts. The limitations of surveys led many projects to explore more personal and intensive research design, using individual biographies, and/or narratives. Here, the problems of analysing large sets of data with existing software were encountered. In addition to interviewing immigrants, at least one project undertook participant observation among public officials charged with making decisions on immigrant entry.

To meet the demand for cross-national comparative study, certain projects devised their own sets of key social indicators. These might be used, for example, to understand processes such as social exclusion and to form baselines for evaluating the success of public policies.

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1 [http://users.fmg.uva.nl/jrath/ImmEnt/tser.htm](http://users.fmg.uva.nl/jrath/ImmEnt/tser.htm)
THEME 1: MIGRATION IN EUROPE

INTRODUCTION

As outlined in the general introduction to this report, levels of in-migration into the European Union are increasing and at the same time, the patterns of movement are becoming more complex. Although the TSER programme projects as a whole were not intended to describe and explain the overall picture of migration and mobility, individual reports contained important findings on key issues and for selected countries. There were two issues in particular. Firstly, research into the socio-demographic characteristics of people moving revealed new and complicated patterns. The classic definitions and typologies of migration fail to adequately capture the range and diversity of mobility between the EU and other states on the one hand and between EU member states on the other. Yet at the same time, labour migration and, increasingly, family reunification, remain important sources of immigration. Secondly, when considering the reasons for mobility, a number of projects directly addressed whether the informal or underground economy was the cause or the consequence of migration. It is often assumed that the informal economy is associated with undocumented or illegal immigration. Furthermore, evidence from the USA suggests that immigrants operating in the informal economy are over-represented in self-employment and in small ethnic enterprises. Following on from this, it might be asked whether migrants compete with local workers. These questions were examined in a comparison between Southern and Northern Europe.

PATTERNS AND TYPOLOGIES OF MIGRATION

Many of the movements of population towards the urban centres of Europe can no longer be considered as migrations, in the sense of permanent settlement of foreign residents who take up specific types of employment in the labour market. They may also involve circulatory movement or wandering, and cross-border nomadism or commercial mobility.

The project on *L'économie de Bazaar dans les Metropoles Euro-méditerranéennes* (the bazaar economy in Euro-Mediterranean cities) co-ordinated by Michel Peraldi is not concerned with migration in the classical sense of the word, but with the dynamics of mobility which they call ‘migratory circulation’ [or cyclical migration]. The research team focussed on populations which move regularly, on the one hand between countries of origin in North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa, and on the other hand within Europe itself between cities which are both market places and places of quite long-standing entry and settlement of diasporas resulting from older migratory movements. These movements have an essentially economic basis, since they involve commercial activities, whether legal or illegal, formal or informal (Peraldi, 2001a, 2001b, 2001c). Similar observations are made with respect to Greece, where Psimmenos and Georgoulas (2001, 39) describe a ‘mosaic of mobility-immobility’, which can only be understood by referring back to its pre-modern roots.

The research findings of Peraldi and his collaborators imply a general and critical reflection on the character of movements which are often lumped together under the
over-general term of ‘migrations’. The migrant careers which were analysed appear not as permanent settlement linked to specific types of employment, but in reality as repeated sojourns of varying duration, punctuated by returns of varying duration to the country of origin. Other movements to Marseille and other towns of the Euro-Mediterranean area are, by contrast, regular forms of cyclical mobility. Yet others are random movements across several European countries. Under these conditions, the phenomena which public opinion perceives as permanent settlement of foreign populations are in fact practices of mobility between traditional source countries for migrants to Europe as well as mobility within Europe itself. This project suggests some elements of a typology of these forms of mobility:

- **The wanderings** typical of young people experiencing family break-up, and/or difficulties of entering school and work, and who come from the large urban centres of sub-Saharan or North Africa, as well as from disadvantaged areas of European cities. They may end up, either temporarily or permanently, in criminal economies.

- **Commercial mobility**, which mainly concerns groups originating in middle-class communities which have experienced economic instability. Such people receive support during their mobility from family linkages based on migrant diasporas which have become established in metropolitan centres. These play a strategic role in supply of goods to poor countries of the South as well as within the dynamism of market places in European ports (specifically in this research: Marseille, Naples, Alicante and Antwerp).

- **Exile**, which refers to populations who are the victims of recent political conflicts. Their situation in European societies depends not only on the selective polices which have been introduced in each European country, but also on their links with older migrant groups which have become established in these countries.

- Finally, the ‘classical’ labour migrations, which today seem to be characterised by a concentration in the most precarious and chaotic sectors of the labour market – a precariousness that is also to be found in the conditions of travel and residence. In these cases too, it is important to emphasise the role of established migrant communities in European countries, who play the part of intermediaries or organisers in these precarious labour markets.

These distinctions are obviously of a theoretical nature. In reality, life histories show that ‘migrant careers’ may include two or more of these forms. There is a lack of empirical research on these new types of mobility (Peraldi, 2001c).

Further light is shed on new forms of mobility and the socio-demographic characteristics of migrants by the findings of the project on *Border Cities and Towns: Causes of Social Exclusion in Peripheral Europe* (Leontidou et al. 2001). This research compares six locations: Ireland, Corsica, Lisbon (Portugal), Lesvos (Greece), Malaga and Melilla (a Spanish exclave in North Africa), and Gorizia/Nova Gorica (on the Italy-Slovenia border). There is a significant level of ‘transience-nomadism-commuting’ across borders in Spain, Greece, Ireland and Italy. Illegal trespassing of borders especially peripatetic populations and semi-nomadic ethnic groups such as Kurds and Albanians, by refugees and by Gypsies. For Gypsies, a socially excluded group, there is a relationship between borders and nomadic life. Between Italy and Slovenia, people commute everyday for work between the sides of the border of Gorizia and Nova Gorica (Leontidou, 2001b, 58). There are also new migratory flows
from Brazil, Hungary and Russia which mostly consist of women, many of whom belong to prostitution networks. Many aim to reach other EU countries from the border towns (Matias-Ferreira et al., 2001a, 62).

In Gorizia, migrants come from Turkey, Iraq, Sri Lanka, ex-Yugoslavia, and Romania, and most are illegal and undocumented workers. Immigration flows are especially noted at the borders. Those coming from Slovenia into Italy are generally illegal. Legal immigration takes place into economic sectors where there are few Italian workers e.g., agriculture, food sector, and building and road works. Other undocumented workers come through Gorizia from elsewhere, e.g., from Kosovo, Albania, Romania, and Kurdistan, in order to reach other EU destinations. Much of this flow is involved in organised crime. Migrants in Melilla are likewise heterogeneous. They can be divided up in various ways: into border crossers and residents, Muslims and non-Muslims, and documented and non-documentined. Immigrants in Melilla see the border in two ways – as a door to a better life and as a wall. The wall assumes a physical presence as barbed wire and ditches, and a symbolic one through immigration laws. In Lesvos there has been a significant increase since 1995 among the transient populations. Many are from Albania, Iraq, Iran, Rwanda, Pakistan, Romania and Bulgaria. These assume an important economic role on the island (Matias-Ferreira et al., 2001a, 62).

Melilla, which is surrounded by Morocco, ‘imports poverty in a literal sense’. The ethnic homogeneity of newcomers often leads to a model of collective social exclusion and sometimes distracts attention from the older members of the same community who are better off. This problem can also exist in Lisbon with the immigration of sub-Saharan people, though the problem is not as severe, as Lisbon is a large city where the migrant population is heterogeneous (Peraldi et al., 2001a, 31).

Although these two projects uncover a diverse rage of mobility, other confirm that the classic patterns persist. According to Reyneri and Baganha (1999, 5) in Portugal and Greece, the vast majority of immigrants fit perfectly into the stereotype of the old European immigration: poor peasants and out-of-work farm labourers with little education, coming from rural societies. This is because migrants come mainly due to colonial linkages in the case of African countries with Portuguese as the official language, or territorial proximity and ethnic-religious links in the case of Albanians coming to Greece. But even in these countries this does not apply to certain groups of migrants: Brazilians and Chinese in Portugal and Poles and Filipinos in Greece – who are mainly well-educated, middle-class and of urban origins. However, the situation is different in Spain and Italy, where ‘emigration is to a large extent fed by elite youths’ – even though they mainly get low-skilled jobs (Reyneri and Baganha, 1999, 5).

Undocumented immigrants are seen to pose a threat in many EU countries. Even legal immigrants ‘represent the “outside” brought within’ as they are often seen as a ‘challenge to the communal integrity’. Citizenship and rights of entry are still seen intrinsically as the sovereign right of the nation state (Gow and Leontidou, 2001, 17). In Southern Europe, there were five main ways in which migrants became undocumented (Reyneri and Baganha, 1999, 9):

(i) Illegal border crossing.
(ii) Legal entry with short-term permits, and then staying beyond the duration of the permits.
(iii) Entry with false documents. (This usually involves people-smuggling organisations).
(iv) Becoming illegal after expiry and non-renewal of the original permit.
(v) Asylum-seekers who stay after refusal of their application.

The patterns of undocumented migration to France and Germany are rather similar, except that entry as asylum seekers is more common:

The majority of persons living in France and Germany without papers to work entered the country legally either as asylum seekers, tourists or other exceptional and limited permits. Some groups came with the hope of escape from ethnic and civil conflict, but also to pursue perhaps targeted socio-economic needs … But it is not only a question of migration pressure either being forced to escape for political or economic reasons. Certain interest groups and governments, such as is the case in Germany, have had an interest in certain kinds of migratory processes, such as the new ‘temporary’ policies. Migrant workers have been recruited as part of one of the new temporary programmes initiated for eastern Europeans in 1991. The ‘guestworker’ mentality of the state continues. (Wilpert and Laacher, 1999, 55-6)

Often overlooked in the study of migration is the extent of emigration, return migration or outflow. Evidence from German research indicates that, for selected countries, the numbers leaving Germany exceed the numbers entering Germany (Vogel and Cyrus, 2001, 26-7). Largely due to return migration of refugees to Yugoslavia, there was a negative immigration balance in 1997 and 1998 (of 21,768 and 33,455 respectively). Vogel and Cyrus conclude that ‘under the influence of restrictive immigration policies pressing for the return of people seeking protection and favouring temporary work, migration saldos came down considerably and are now negative’ (27).

THE REASONS FOR MOVING: THE INFORMAL ECONOMY

One of the most significant findings of the TSER projects concerns the way in which the growth of informal economies in EU countries acts as a ‘pull factor’ which attracts undocumented migrants. The project on Migrant Insertion in the Informal Economy found that ‘the idea of migrants “escaping for survival” does not even remotely correspond to the individual characteristics of the vast majority of the nearly 1,500,000 immigrants who have entered southern Europe over the last 12-15 years’ (Reyneri and Baganha, 1999, 4). To explain this, and also why ‘elite migrant youths’ are doing low-skilled jobs, the authors examine the hypothesis that there are splits between social and occupational identity, and between identity in the receiving and the origin countries. They state that the complexity and variety of migratory projects leads them to question the validity and adequacy of a single explanatory model (Reyneri and Baganha, 1999, 5). They discuss a variety of economic, social and cultural causes for this migration. Based on research in Italy, Portugal and Greece they conclude:
The evidence uncovered supports the hypothesis of a pull effect by the underground economy from the supply side. Most migrants are not desperate people without means of survival, but people looking to improve their circumstances. So they are deeply affected by information about what to expect in receiving countries. Without a doubt, a widespread underground economy exercises a particular attraction in an international context where European borders are strictly closed. Those who do not hold a permit of stay for work reasons are obviously cut off from the regular labour market, and were it not for the shelter of the irregular economy, they would soon be forced back to their home country. Thus the ready availability of employment in the underground economy, where no documents are required, promotes undocumented migration. Far from being an effect of illegal migration, the submerged economy would appear to be one of its causes. (Reyneri and Baganha, 1999, 8, italics added)

The study also finds evidence that controls on the informal economy can influence migration, in the case of Spain. After the mid 1990s ‘the opportunities for migrants of entering the underground economy decreased substantially because of the tighter controls from the labour inspectors’ (Reyneri and Baganha, 1999, 18). As a result, illegal entries decreased.

The argument that the existence of unemployment in Southern Europe demonstrates that migration to these countries is caused by push factors in the country of origin was also examined in this research. They argue against this, on the grounds that many of the unemployed in Southern Europe are fairly highly-educated young people or women, who are unwilling to take low-skilled jobs. Moreover, these groups live in the households of employed men, and are therefore able to wait for better job opportunities. This factor is strengthened by regional disparities: the regions where jobs are vacant, like the Centre and North-East of Italy do not correspond with labour surplus areas (the South). However, internal migration is now low, because of high housing costs in the North, and better household incomes in the South (Reyneri and Baganha, 1999, 10-11).

The evidence leads us to conclude that some demand for migrant workers does exist in South European countries, even in those whose overall unemployment rate is high. The usual reason used against the ‘pull effect’ hypothesis seems to fail when unemployment segmentation is taken into account. (Reyneri and Baganha, 1999, 11)

The employment structure in Southern Europe is different from Northern Europe: there is a high proportion of small businesses and self-employment and relatively low skill levels on average. ‘In the countries of Southern Europe, employment opportunities remain orientated towards low-skilled jobs, with correspondingly low social status, in very small and relatively unstructured production units’ (Reyneri and Baganha, 1999, 13). Furthermore:

A significant part of the current employment opportunities in low and unskilled jobs is taking place in the firmly rooted and well spread underground economy of these countries. Thus migrant workers entering Greece, Italy,
Portugal and Spain found a huge underground economy that offered them a wide range of jobs without demanding any document, either for working or for staying. (Reyneri and Baganha, 1999, 13)

According to Reyneri and Baganha (1999, 14-15) typical jobs for migrants include:

- Domestic work – especially for women;
- Street-selling (mainly in Italy);
- Agriculture: ‘The use of migrant labour in seasonal harvesting increased and spread through all South European regions over time until it became a fundamental part of Mediterranean-type agriculture and migrants had replaced national workers. The exception is Portugal’ (Reyneri and Baganha, 1999, 14).
- The building industry;
- Small manufacturing – only in Italy;
- Low-level services in metropolitan areas.

The proportion of self-employment is low, except for Brazilians in Portugal.

Reyneri and Baganha (1999, 16 italics added) summarise their findings as follows:

To sum up, it is not the case that enclaves are formed which are closed to the receiving society, nor do we find ethnic businesses based on the exploitation of human and monetary resources of their own ethnic group. Only the Chinese, as usual, organise their business (restaurants and garment sweatshops) on the basis of the intense use of family and co-ethnic labour. Therefore in South European countries ... immigrant over-representation in the underground economy is not at all related to their over-representation in small ethnic entrepreneurships, as occurs in most receiving countries, from North European ones to United States.

With regard to the informal economy in Northern Europe the case study on France and Germany notes that there is growing concern about the ‘black economy’ in both countries. This phenomenon seems to be closely linked to new forms of immigration into the two countries. The study tries to answer the following questions (Wilpert and Laacher, 1999, 40):

- What is the influence of ‘black’ migrant labour on the indigenous labour market?
- Is there an impact on the older waves of immigrants settled in the country?
- Is it a process of competition, replacement or complementarity?

They find that:

With few exceptions the use of black labour is to be found in very similar branches of the economy in both countries: construction, restaurants and cafes, industrial cleaning and personal services. A major exception appears to be the garment industry which has been found to date to have a much more important share of undocumented in subcontracted and clandestine ateliers and sweat shops in France than in Germany. (Wilpert and Laacher, 1999, 51)

Furthermore:
Black market and illegal work can occur in any area of economic activity. For black market labour it is the terms of the employment (non-registered for taxes and social insurance) and for illegal work it is the illegal status of the non-citizen employee which contributes to illegality. According to German law, i.e. the practices of law enforcement, the illegal status of a foreigner is a more serious crime than black market work. All foreigners living and working in Germany without a residence and work permit are considered to be involved in an illegal relationship. The work activity itself need not be illegal. Thus, while in France legislation has distanced itself from the former preoccupation with clandestine operations as specific to the sweat shops employing illegal foreigner, the legislation in Germany has becomes continuously more directed at controlling the illegal employment of foreigners. (Wilpert and Laacher, 1999, 51-2)

The result is, firstly, that there is a decrease in the number of foreigners in non-declared work in France. Secondly, French people are as likely as foreigners to be accused of this offence. However, the naturalisation rate has been much higher in France, so that many French citizens doing undocumented work may be naturalised or second-generation immigrants (Wilpert and Laacher, 1999, 52).

In Germany informal work is not limited to undocumented foreigners, but is also done increasingly by foreigners with legal status, or by young adults of Turkish origins. Informal work is also frequently done by people who come legally through family reunion, but have a four-year waiting period for a work permit. The trend is linked to a general increase in Schwarzarbeit (‘black work’):

Some of our interview partners have indicated that working in the black job market is a means to supplement their low incomes and to try to collect enough savings to achieve some of these goals. Generally they communicate the feeling that everyone does it. Working black is a self-evident alternative, because ‘everyone does’, – ‘look at the Germans’ – ‘it would be stupid not to’. (Wilpert and Laacher, 1999, 53)

Thus, less qualified foreign residents have become a flexible labour reserve and may be entering the informal sector to a certain extent in both countries. In some cases in Germany it is perceived as necessary to work in the informal sector to supplement income from low public assistance. And, also to earn money for work and not to be a recipient of public assistance. In other cases working without a permit is a result of a precarious legal status, a permit to stay which does not include an accrued right to a work permit. The informal are often the only jobs which low skilled unemployed persons can find. (Wilpert and Laacher, 1999, 53)

An important question is whether migrant workers can be seen as competition for local workers, or rather in terms of replacement or substitution? The Southern European evidence indicates competition only with marginal sections of national labour force: young dropouts, uneducated women, elderly people, national ethnic minorities (Reyneri and Baganha, 1999, 17).
These unqualified, irregular, low-status working positions, the so-called ‘3-D jobs’ (dirty, difficult and dangerous) are just those that migrants are inserted in. Even in Italy as well as in Spain, where unemployment rate is the highest, all observers agree that ‘the migrants take the jobs the locals refuse. Its simply a matter of substitution’. Therefore a trend towards an ethnic segmentation of the labour market is growing. We are only at the first stage, but in the next future it is likely that an ‘ethnic division of labour’ shall consolidate. (Reyneri and Baganha, 1999, 17)

A similar finding is reported for France and Germany (Wilpert and Laacher 1999, 53, 54-5):

[T]he jobs for which the guestworkers were recruited and the undocumented are assuming are not the same. Unionised factory work is no longer available … Unionised workers are unemployed. Only sub-contracted projects or unregistered black market work is available in construction. This is where undocumented foreigners and legal foreign resident, the descendants of guestworkers may also be found. The undocumented are in no direct competition to the indigenous workers or to the more highly qualified foreign residents.

The pull of casual labour for undocumented workers is also confirmed by Duvell and Jordan (2001) in the case of the UK, most particularly London.

The project on Migrant Insertion in the Informal Economy spells out the policy consequences of its findings:

In conclusion, from a policy point of view, the huge informalisation of employment in the South European countries plays a crucial role in understanding what occurs as regards migratory inflows and their impact on receiving societies … A formal policy of no migrants’ admittance, justified with the high domestic unemployment, coupled with sizeable illegal inflows attracted by the underground economy, the lack of a policy of integration coupled with the strong exploitation and stigmatisation of migrant workers employed in the black labour market: this mix is causing more and more perverse effects. (Reyneri and Baganha, 1999, 19)

The authors also recognise the obstacles to addressing this issue:

However, interrupting this cycle is not at all easy. First, EU countries should recognise themselves as immigration ones. Second, they should admit and institutionalise the segmentation of their own labour markets i.e., that there can be at the same time both youth unemployment and a not fulfilled demand for the bad jobs. Third, they should open the borders to a labour immigration, of course well checked. (Reyneri and Baganha, 1999, 19)

THE REASONS FOR MOVING: FAMILY REUNIFICATION
Across Europe, since the restrictions on primary migration in the 1970s there has been a marked increase in flows of people by way of family reunification. This mode of migration has comprised a sizeable proportion of the inflows into most EU countries (see Table 2, from Bracalenti, 2001, 24). With the stabilisation of the numbers entering using work permits, this category has assumed greater significance. In Italy, for example, family reunification has increased constantly from 4,232 cases in 1990 to 48,450 cases in 1998 (Bracalenti, 2001, 35). Most requests are for spouses, followed by children under 14, children over 4, and finally for parents. The incidence of immigrant minors seems particularly low in Italy (1.4 per cent) in comparison with countries such as Great Britain and Belgium, where the proportion of immigrant minors is respectively 10 per cent and 14 per cent (Collicelli, 2001, 4).

The Family Reunification Evaluation Project (Bracalenti, 2001) points out that the rights of immigrant workers to reunite with their families are underpinned by a variety of international conventions, including: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (article 16, para. 3), International Labour Organization conventions No. 97 of 1949 and No. 143 of 1975, and two United Nations conventions concerning the rights of children. However, in most industrialised countries the right to reunification is accepted only formally; most nation states have rigid conditions to which the procedure for reunification is submitted. EU policy recognises family reunification, but its 1992 Copenhagen resolution on the topic is not legally binding on member states (Bracalenti, 2001, 21-22).

Table 2 – Inflows of Family Migration into Selected EU Countries (in thousands), and as a Proportion of Total Foreign Population Inflow (excluding asylum-seekers)¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>74.1</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>36.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>441.0</td>
<td>407.8</td>
<td>296.6</td>
<td>229.0</td>
<td>268.0</td>
<td>921.0</td>
<td>341.0</td>
<td>367.0</td>
<td>485.0</td>
<td>565.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

family inflows as a percentage of total foreign population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>93</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>87</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
¹ Data were derived from calculations of total foreign population (excluding asylum-seekers) and information available on inflows of foreign labour (thousands). Foreign labour excludes temporary migrants, seasonal workers and students.
² Entries of total foreign inflow correspond to permanent settlers within the meaning of the 1971 Immigration Act and subsequent amendments.

Source: Family Reunification Evaluation (FARE) Project 2001

For reunification of migrants’ families, European countries require sufficient income and lodgings for family maintenance (Bracalenti, 2001, 22). Categories relevant to
family reunification are largely the same across the EU, although there are some minor variations (see Table 3 from Bracalenti, 2001, 23).

There is an increase in female migrants, which is not solely the result of family reunification however. Migration trends in Italy exemplify similar patterns across Europe. Breaking the long-standing model of young male labour migrants eventually bringing over wives and children, the growing demand for domestic work has prompted a significant shift towards female chain migration. Following this, many family reunification processes entail bringing to Europe male spouses and children (Bracalenti, 2001, 25). However, family reunification for domestic workers is often stifled due to the scarcity of independent housing, as a high percentage of such workers reside in employers’ households. In Germany, 4.7% of migrants are female (Vogel and Cyrus, 2001), and only 3 per cent are aged over 65, compared with 16 per cent of native Germans.

Among authorised family reunification migration in Italy, in 1997 the highest proportion were from African countries (35.3 per cent, especially Albania Egypt, Tunisia and Senegal), followed by Europe (32.8 per cent, mainly Albania, Serbia, Macedonia and Romania), Asia (25.8 per cent, mainly Sri Lanka and China) (Bracalenti, 2001, 38).

### Table 3 – Beneficiaries of Family Reunification in the European Union

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>Spouse</th>
<th>Minor Children</th>
<th>Parents</th>
<th>Other Relatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>less than 18 dependent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>yes (also de facto partner)</td>
<td>less than 18 living with person with parental responsibility</td>
<td>over 60 dependent</td>
<td>for special reasons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>less than 18; less than 21 for member states to the European charter</td>
<td>not considered</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>less than 16 unmarried; less than 18 for specific cases</td>
<td>for humanitarian reasons</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>less than 18 dependent</td>
<td></td>
<td>dependent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>depending on individual circumstances</td>
<td>depending on the circumstances</td>
<td>depending on the individual circumstances non-minor children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>less than 18 dependent</td>
<td>dependent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>less than 18</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>non-minor children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>yes (also de facto partner)</td>
<td>less than 18 dependent</td>
<td>if non-reunification causes difficulties</td>
<td>in exceptional circumstances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>dependent</td>
<td>dependent</td>
<td>may be considered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>less than 18</td>
<td>dependent</td>
<td>non-minor children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>less than 18, dependent, unmarried dependent widow mother; widower father</td>
<td>dependent for extraordinary reasons</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MIGRATION IN EUROPE: SUMMARY

The patterns of mobility into and within Europe have become more complicated and less easily characterised as immigration, in the conventional sense of movement from one country to another followed by permanent settlement. The TSER programme projects contain much evidence on this development. There are more different types of migrants. In Italy for example, there were 16 different permit categories for foreigners in 1990, but already 21 by 1999 (Veikou and Triandafyllidou, 2001). Germany has five standard types of residence permit, varying by type of toleration and length of stay allowed, plus two exceptional categories (Vogel and Cyrus 2001, 14). Nor are migrant careers necessarily linked to specific types of employment. There is evidence of mobility between countries and locations on the one hand, and between different types of work on the other.

Regarding the causes of migration, the main finding is that the informal or underground economy is not caused by the presence of (often illegal) immigrants, but the opposite; the informal economy is a major pull factor in migration, in both Southern and Northern Europe. Furthermore, illegal work may be found in any area of economic activity and it is not confined to foreigners. High unemployment in Southern Europe is neither evidence of the absence of any pull factor, nor does it indicate that migrants compete with local workers, except those in an already marginal position in the labour market. A comparison of Germany and France suggests that the former’s attempts to clamp down on illegal entry are less successful at curbing the informal economy.

The level of immigration caused by family reunification is increasing relative to work-related movement, although there remains much variation in how European countries interpret international conventions on this matter. But the increase in female immigration is not only due to family reunification. It is also linked to demand for female labour in certain sectors, such as tourism and domestic work.
THEME 2: LIVING CONDITIONS OF THE MIGRANTS

INTRODUCTION

For most immigrants into Europe, research shows how their new situation generally involves a variety of precarious conditions. Such conditions, and the varied socio-economic and legal statuses they entail, have differential impacts on the local demand and supply of public services. They may also affect the path of integration. The TSER programme projects did not attempt to provide any kind of comprehensive overview of migrants’ living conditions with respect to local populations. Peraldi and collaborators, for instance, specifically point out that their research does not permit them to put forward general propositions with regard to the totality of migratory phenomena, especially since it seems necessary to understand these phenomena in all their diversity and different forms rather than through some unifying template of ‘the migrant condition’ (Peraldi, 2001c). However, a number of significant findings do relate to this topic, and two in particular. The first relates to the children of immigrants and their integration. Teacher training and language education are critical for successful integration, as the research demonstrates. But there are also significant differences between the various national models of integration and how these affect policy. The second area of research addresses living conditions and integration within the informal economy.

LIVING CONDITIONS OF MIGRANTS AND DEMAND FOR SERVICES

Overall, there is a widespread perception that poor living and work conditions are seen as the normal fate of immigrants (Bohnisch and Cremer-Schafer, 2001, 70). This begins with relative disadvantage in the economic sphere but also extends to housing. The presence of newcomers therefore has an impact on the demand for welfare services. But their ability to access them successfully is often hindered.

Unemployment obviously represents one of the most serious conditions affecting many migrants in Europe. The report on Migrant Insertion in the Informal Economy (Reyneri, 1999) discusses immigrant unemployment in France and Germany, especially for youth (Wilpert and Laacher, 1999: 50). Although the figures may be dated, some findings are indicative: for example in Berlin the official unemployment rate for foreigners reached 34 per cent in 1998. This is more than twice as high as among German citizens. The gap between foreigners and Germans has widened significantly, from 0.7% in 1979 to 8.5 % in 1998 (Vogel and Cyrus, 2001, 31). Moreover, whereas only 38 % of unemployed Germans had no vocational qualifications in 1997, the figure among foreigners was 78%. The unemployment rate among 16-21 year-old foreigners in other urban areas is estimated to be as high as 50 per cent. A similar situation exists for this age group (15-24) in France. According to the 1992 census over 20 per cent of all young persons independent of nationality in this age group were unemployed and unemployment reached 50.6 per cent among young foreigners.

However, at least one study found counter-intuitive results. On the Greek island of Lesvos, migrants play an important role in the economic life of the community. Many
of the better-off locals are closely involved with transient immigrants in the informal economy. ‘Activities seem to cover a whole area of services: nursing and care workers (mostly female workers from Bulgaria, Romania and the Ukraine), construction, farming and of course, agriculture’ (Matias-Ferreira et al., 2001a, 62).

Certain aspects of economic and social change constitute new factors of poverty where ‘the immigrant remains poor in the promised land’ (Peraldi et al., 2001a, 29). Among immigrants poverty has different dimensions, such as insecure forms of employment, shortage of money as well as shortcomings in training, work capacity, health and housing. Further, the clandestine situation and lack of skills of many migrants means they establish ‘an extremely precarious work bonds, which does not allow them to have any kind of social protection’ (Matias-Ferreira et al., 2001a, 60).

Another important set of topics concerning migrants’ living conditions involves housing problems. In Italy, one research project found that the living conditions of legal and illegal immigrants do not different much. Both have considerable difficulties with housing, due not least to: (i) high prices in the private market; (ii) discriminatory practices on the part of the landlords; and (iii) poor reception policies, which have created mini ghettos (Giovanetti and Quassoli, 2001, 149-150). In Bologna, in fact, housing is by far the worst source of exclusion. This is exacerbated by the speculative local real estate market, the low number of flats available, the lack of comprehensive housing policy, and the presence of thousands of students competing for the same housing market. Researchers found that half of immigrant residents live in temporary accommodation (reception centres, etc.). They experience problems and discrimination due to low incomes and high rents, overcrowding, unsatisfactory hygienic conditions, forms of forced co-habitation, and distance from their workplace (Quassoli et al., 2001, 161). Immigrant families often move in together as a coping strategy against hard economic times, as exhibited in Austria and Sweden (Tham, 2001, 307).

The living conditions of immigrants especially affect public services in health, housing and education. Children of immigrant origin, for instance, tend to have less access to health care and they are more likely to be taken into state care (or foster families) (Collicelli, 2001, 48). Research indicates that on the whole, immigrant children tend to have comparatively poor school performance rates, exhibit conduct problems in schools, and in some countries are attributed higher rates of criminal activity (Collicelli, 2001, 48). Serious attention to education, as one means of improving living conditions in the long run, is high on the public agenda of most migrant-receiving states in Europe. Another study found that it is immigrant women who often become dependant on social services. This phenomenon arises especially due to their specific experiences of discrimination as women and immigrants. The combined effect for many immigrant women amounts to a kind of ‘social invisibility’ (Giovanetti and Quassoli, 2001, 155). Hence welfare and public services are required for survival.

However, many new immigrants are simply not aware of the kinds of services available for them. Even if they are, it has been found that migrant women and men will often use the welfare state as a last resort. While migrants regularly complain that they are prevented from taking on new jobs (usually due to discrimination), they do not respond predominantly by citing their right to work. Instead, they indicate their
concern that generally, people should not depend on the welfare state. Maintaining a sense of independence is highly important to many migrants (Bohnisch and Cremer-Schafer, 2001, 53-56).

The Child Immigration Project (CHIP) examined the growing need for teacher training specifically to deal with immigrant children. This is currently lacking across Europe:

in none of the CHIP countries have specific courses been set up and rendered compulsory for the training of teachers, initially and in an ongoing fashion, with relation to the teaching of children of immigrant origin, nor have the existing programmes been updated in this respect’ (Collicelli, 2001, 79).

The research found that in many countries, such as Belgium and Italy, teachers could attend external courses in multicultural or intercultural education. But these are organised outside official channels, run by ‘independent institutes which do not depend on the school authorities or are arranged by the individuals schools’. Such courses are not compulsory and do not have to comply with any standards governing their content or form, although this is starting to change (Collicelli, 2001, 79).

Similarly, the study pointed to the need for public resources to be devoted to special language training in schools:

As far as the language difficulties of newcomers are concerned, all countries employ supplementary language classes and most have stated that good native language skills assist in the acquisition of the arrival country language. Some countries accompany the development of the native language with specific resources, and allow these children to follow fundamental courses in their native language for a certain period of time. In Belgium and in Italy, further, some schools have placed language mediators directly in classrooms with foreign students to assist them during their insertion. (Collicelli, 2001, 85)

This is confirmed by the Family Reunification Project, which also identified obstacles to migrants taking up language courses in Germany:

The lack of language-competence represents, besides the prohibition to work [for immigrants under family reunification schemes], the main obstacle for integration. The missing language skills are often the cause of prolonged unemployment even after the two year period of the work-prohibition has expired. Often the migrants do not learn the German language, particularly in the case of women, because the German courses are too expensive or they are lacking the necessary time due to being engaged with child-care or/and work. German-courses have to generally be paid for by the migrants themselves and take usually place at adult education centres in the evening. Many immigrants however have unusual working hours and are often on a low income which further reduces their possibilities in attending a German language course. (Bracalenti, 2001, 56)

As with education, in other socio-cultural, economic or political domains the integration process is highly conditioned by public policy. Policy usually has a
powerful role in fostering immigrant integration, but it may also hinder it as well. In Germany, for instance, one project found that ‘[t]he two year prohibition to work [for people arriving under family reunification schemes] is of course not only a psychological problem and one which delays or even prevents integration, but also an economic one … In many cases we found at least one member of the married couple to be dependent on social benefits. The distribution of food stamps is perceived as especially humiliating’ (Bracalenti, 2001, 59). Here, details or secondary effects of rather positive policies have had negative effects. The research found that:

Some migrants were out of work and only received social benefits at the time of applying for family-reunification. This was often a serious problem and delayed the reunification process as German policy requires immigrants to have a minimum income equal to the basic social benefit (Sozialhilfe) of which the whole family would be entitled, plus the rent of their accommodation, plus 10% in order to meet the income requirements for a family reunification. In addition, depending on the number of dependants, the applicant’s premises need to correspond to a certain amount of square metres, a requirement often difficult to satisfy seeing that many migrants, even if working, are on a low income. Considering that social benefits in Germany still fairly generous and that a family of five can receive an amount of social benefits equal to an average wage (which many people however do not earn), it can be said that the housing and income requirements of a family reunification in Germany are in fact set so high that the living standard of many Germans does not correspond to those requirements. (Bracalenti, 2001, 53)

Another study focused upon families of several ethnic minorities (especially African) that are living in slums in Lisbon. There, immigrants can only apply for a housing licence if they have permanent residence. Those without such status live in very degraded conditions. Respondents claim that there is a lack of structured and specific domestic policy directed towards these groups (Gasparini, Zago, and Afouxenidis, 2001, 68).

PROGRESS TOWARDS INTEGRATION: EVIDENCE FROM THE SECOND GENERATION

Are differences in living conditions between migrants and local populations narrowing or growing? Is there any evidence that integration is evolving? Whether there is good evidence for integration is difficult to establish. ‘Integration’ is one of the most difficult terms to define – and topics to research – in the entire field of migration studies. It might refer to a role in the labour market, to activities surrounding political participation, to use of social services, or to involvement in social and cultural practices. Among projects surveyed for this report, research revealed a variety of findings surrounding practically all of these meanings of ‘integration’. The TSER programme projects approached these questions by focussing on trends among children of immigrants or the so-called second generation.

Overall, young people tend to be ‘mostly much more integrated than their parents’ (Bracalenti, 2001, 57). In Germany one project found that among young people of
immigrant origin (particularly those born in Germany), some youths speak German better than their original mother tongue which they are usually not able to write. Many of them have largely adapted to the German way of living. Italy has a group of well-educated and young immigrants who are ‘not deeply embedded in networks linked with country of origin’. They are more likely to integrate with the Italian culture and people, and more likely to be disappointed with the migration experience (Giovanetti and Quassoli, 2001, 148). A considerable number of second-generation youth in Germany continue, however, to marry people from their parents’ country of origin. And ‘even if those second generation immigrants interviewed largely felt integrated into society, they did not have the same intensity of contacts to Germans as to their own ethnic community. Their closest friends had mostly the same ethnic origins as themselves’ (Bracalenti, 2001, 57). The same project produced a related, important finding regarding members of the first generation and changes in their pattern of interaction: ‘[w]hatever contact many immigrants had to Germans in earlier times’, the project found, ‘they are often reduced once the spouse and children join them’ (Bracalenti, 2001, 56).

But another cross-national study found that:

In most cases, children of immigrant origin have a problem of school failure, to a greater or lesser degree, as measured in terms of: delay – they are in a class with younger children because they have been held back or placed at a lower level; dropping out – the students abandon school [usually between ages 14-16] or are suspended by the school; absenteeism, repeated absences; concentration of children of immigrant origin in less qualified types of education [technical or vocational rather than preparatory for university]’ (Collicelli, 2001, 72-3).

Such trends are often exacerbated by racial discrimination, or at least stereotyping, among teachers, school authorities and classmates. The same project concludes that in general, ‘no European country has yet seriously addressed the problem of the numerous children of immigrant origin who receive no education at all, despite the fact that in almost all countries … schooling up to a certain age is a right and a duty for all’ (Collicelli, 2001, 74).

Problems of integration and participation were also examined by the Effectiveness of National Integration Strategies Towards Second Generation Youth project (Heckmann et al., 2001). This report also discovers certain significant differences between three European countries in the degrees of structural, cultural, social and identification integration. In terms of structural integration (education, training and employment) however, there appears to be no systematic pattern of national differences between France, Germany and Britain. Compared to Germany and Britain, however, France has expanded its system of higher education such that the Portuguese Children of International Migrants (CIM) tend to outperform the French autochthonous group in educational attainment. The differences in university attainment between CIM and the autochthonous population are the lowest in France and the largest in Germany, while Britain holds an intermediate position (Heckman et al., 2001, 12).
As far as integration into the labour market is concerned, CIM in Germany seem to be relatively better off than the French youth who seem unable to translate their formal educational status into a labour market position and their rate of unemployment is high. This is explained in terms of ‘over-academisation’, meaning that in France there is a lack of labour market vocational training affecting both native and CIM youth (Heckman et al., 2001, 12). Britain appears to have the largest difference between CIM and the autochthonous population regarding employment. Over three quarters of autochthonous youth are in employment or vocational training while the majority of Pakistani and Indian CIM remain in the educational system or are unemployed (Heckman et al., 2001, 12). Despite the many problems, CIM reach higher educational and occupational levels than have their parents (Heckman et al., 2001, 15).

In terms of children’s cultural integration, acculturation has occurred through popular mass culture. In Germany, CIM use their parents’ language with friends and in the family much more than in France and in Britain. Religion is also an area in which CIM identify with that of their parents. As for social integration, in France and Germany there are more inter-ethnic friendships than in Britain, where friendships are more ethnically homogenous. This may be due to a high degree of ethnic residential segregation in Britain. The same patterns for the three countries are evident with inter-marriage (Heckman et al., 2001, 14).

Fourthly, identification integration for CIM in all three cases is quite low for the countries in which they were born and live. The report states that ‘[t]he prime modes of identification are with their parents’ home country and multiple forms of identification, that is, “hyphenated” identities’ relating to both countries. Identification with parent’s home country is strongest in Germany while multiple forms are more prominent in France and Britain (Heckman et al., 2001, 114-15).

Effectiveness of National Integration Strategies Towards Second Generation Youth made some general observations about immigrant youth in Europe:

- They are not ‘time bombs’ waiting to explode, but in fact show a high degree of satisfaction with life
- There is no evidence of widespread radicalism or religious fervour
- Integration is not hindered by exposure to ethnic media, such as satellite television
- They reach higher educational and occupational levels than their parents
- The vast majority reported competence in the language of their host country

The project led by Pitkänen (2000) gives an overview of settlement and integration policies in five EU countries plus Israel. This research suggests that:

Although the increase in in-migration is a reality in all the countries within this project, there are several possible outcomes of adaptation of the newcomers that have been recognised as being successful. In France, Greece and Israel, the overall aim is unilateral acceptance by the newcomers of the existing social structure and its sets of norms. In Britain and in Finland, the political aims can be characterised as pluralistic, implying that while sharing values and norms of their new host societies, immigrants should have the opportunity to maintain and evolve their unique qualities and capacities. In
Germany, the actual political debate implies a greater recognition of the reality of a plural society that has begun to emerge together with a greater acceptance of the policy consequences. (Pitkänen, 2000, 4)

For the Pitkänen team, the education of the second generation represents one of the foremost modes of migrant integration. Indeed, as suggested by another project team, ‘[c]hildren instead tend to generally adapt faster to the new situation and are as a result much better integrated than their parents’ (Bracalenti, 2001, 54). The report (Pitkänen, 2000, 4-6) gives one paragraph summaries of the educational approaches in the context of immigrant integration policies of each of the six countries studied. These are worth citing in full:

In Britain, with the change of government in 1997, a greater recognition of Britain’s plural society has begun to emerge. In schools with ethnic minorities, theories of multi-cultural education were developed and put into practice. This sought to take notice of cultural diversity and use it as a tool in the education of all children. As such, it was an aspect of the child-centred approach to education that formed the basis of pedagogy particularly, but not exclusively, adopted in primary education. Alongside multi-cultural education, theories of anti-racist education were developed, the purpose of which is inherent in the name. (Pitkänen, 2000, 4)

In France, the claim to universality, which the French refer to as ‘the chauvinism of the universal’… defines practically all the political postures and intellectuals who target French integration … One essential aspect of the French school system is its strong centralisation based on … the cult of unity at all levels, political, administrative, linguistic, educational and cultural. The central power controls, not only the orientation of education policies, but also the school’s entire organisation, including programmes, national exams, career orientation. (Pitkänen, 2000 4-5)

In Germany, education is controlled not by the Federal Government but by the Länder. Schools do not have a homogeneous group of foreign children to cater for, but three main groups: (1) Those who have been born and grown up in Germany, speak German well and have only weak links to their parents’ home country; (2) those who came to Germany at an early age (1-6), who do not have sufficient knowledge of German and cannot be taught together with German children immediately; (3) children who come to Germany already at school age and have no knowledge of the language. At the same time, the number of countries of origin is increasing. (Pitkänen, 2000, 5)

In Finland, the educational policy design for immigrants follows the general design of immigrant policy. The current ideology comprises the following main principles for the education of immigrants: equality, functional bilingualism and multiculturalism. Equality in education implies that education aims to provide immigrants with the skills and knowledge they need in order to be able to function fully as equal members of Finnish society. Functional bilingualism means that immigrants are to be given an opportunity to study either Finnish or Sweden, the official languages of Sweden, as well as their own mother tongue…. Multiculturalism in education is a very vague term
which broadly implies in Finnish education policy that the encounter of cultures is to be made an experience that enriches both parties, dissolves prejudices and increases tolerance in society. (Pitkänen, 2000, 5)

In Greece, a mono-cultural and mono-linguistic educational policy is still the dominant model in most of the cases concerning returning Greeks as migrants of foreign origin. ... The general inclination is to provide immigrants with an education that respects their social, religious and cultural peculiarities in combination with an essential Greek language competence. This effort has started in Greece not because of the foreigners who have increased in number since 1990, but mainly because of the large number of Greeks returning from abroad after extended periods of residence. Most of them come back to Greece, having practically lost their competence in the language (Pitkänen, 2000, 5-6).

Despite the fact that practically all of the main migrant-receiving countries have developed some educational policies concerning children of immigrants, one EC-funded cross-national comparative study nevertheless concludes that there remain significant problems in this field. The Child Immigration Project (CHIP) recommends as best practice the notion of intercultural education, in which both children of immigrants and of the host society are taught about cultural difference and interaction. This, the project members suggest, is the optimal educational policy for integration and future social cohesion. However, there are serious problems around formulating and, particularly, implementing such policy across Europe. CHIP concludes that the main obstacle to true intercultural education, common to all the countries surveyed (including Greece, Italy, France, Belgium and the United Kingdom), consists in the substantial ethnocentrism of school programmes. Although the education systems of these countries are shown to have made efforts to recognise the role of the linguistic and cultural diversity of immigrants, their policies are still couched in a presumed cultural homogeneity of the school to which the immigrants must adapt. CHIP reports that in some cases:

an explicit role of the school in conducting a national curriculum aimed at creating citizens with a common culture makes it difficult to legitimise intercultural education. The approach of the school, as evident not only in curricula and textbooks but also in the attitude of teachers, appears to be limited to the rejection of diversity, with the resulting tendency to assimilate, an officially sanctioned discrimination of everything which is different, and to an attempt to add multicultural content as an afterthought to an existing programme. (Collicelli, 2001, 80).

Overall, the conclusions are blunt and to the point:

The countries of new immigration are still struggling to formulate a vision of inclusion for the adults that today’s children of immigrant origin will become. If they are projected by the school system into low-status roles, or into a status not commensurate with the resources they will have acquired, then the principle of inclusion does not function. (Collicelli, 2001, 74).
LIVING CONDITIONS AND INTEGRATION IN THE INFORMAL ECONOMY

The project on *L’économie de Bazaar dans les Metropoles Euro-méditerranéennes* focuses at greater depth on the place of migrants in the informal economy within Europe (Peraldi 2001b). The project relates to two populations. The first are the established migrant commercial entrepreneurs, who arrived in France before the introduction of restrictive laws over the last decade. The entrepreneurs carry out transnational activities, not only because they supply goods to the markets of the countries from which they originate (black Africa and North Africa), but because they obtain their supplies from markets with a European scope. One study examines the case of the second-hand car market, which has its source of supply in northern Europe, its market places in Marseille or Alicante, and its outlets in Algeria, Tunisia or Africa. These entrepreneurs are perfectly integrated, both culturally and economically, in the local urban societies where they carry out their activities. On the other hand, to the extent they occupy strategic urban sites which are central but dilapidated, they may hinder projects of re-investment in these areas put forward by local municipalities or urban renewal agencies. In such cases, two opposing economic logics clash. One is represented by the traders who use the degradation of urban property as a condition of their economic activity. The other privileges the renewal of real estate and infrastructure. Media campaigns against such commercial activities and those who pursue them, and the stigmatisation which they experience, are much more the result of this economic competition than of their quality of being ‘migrants’ or their status as ‘foreigners’ (Peraldi, 2001c).

The other population whose activities are examined in this research are the favoured clients of the first group: smugglers, couriers and hawkers, who are responsible for the movement of most of the goods which circulate through these channels. This group consists of recent migrants, but the term ‘traveller’ fits better, in the sense of the provisional status and the repeated mobility that is characteristic of them. Such groups are the direct consequence of the political and police mechanisms through which the European states seek to regulate migratory flows. Indeed, in the context of increasingly radical modes of political and police control and closure of frontiers that determine the conditions for the organisation of contemporary migration in Europe, mobility tends to become a stable status rather than a stage in the process of integration. This group too is perfectly integrated in cultural and economic terms, both in the European cities where they pursue their commercial activities and in their countries of origin.

With regard to these populations, Peraldi et al. suggest a political conclusion: the territorial framework of the nation state is no longer the appropriate framework to describe and evaluate the cultural dynamics, the linkages and the social and professional careers through which the lives of these populations are organised. In a strict sense, they live between several worlds, but their universe is simultaneously both more limited and broader than the territorial framework of the nation-state: more limited because it is primarily based on the city, the metropolitan area – they pursue their activities in cities and move between cities (they don’t know France but Marseille, they don’t work in Turkey but in Istanbul, they don’t know Europe but Marseille, Naples, Milan, Dusseldorf); broader to the extent that they develop
continuities and porosities between the worlds that political and cultural frontiers divide (Peraldi, 2001c).

The study by Peraldi and collaborators gives rise to new questions: is it possible to generalise this new status of ‘the transborder citizen? If so, compared to which other migrant populations? Or are these exceptional behaviour patterns, based less on a specific status or cultural belonging than on a certain economic activity? This question remains open and requires further empirical research to examine additional mobile populations (Peraldi, 2001c).

LIVING CONDITIONS OF THE MIGRANTS: SUMMARY

The main findings of the research are that immigrants generally experience lower living conditions than local citizens, particularly in employment and housing. Immigrant children tend to perform relatively poorly in school, with greater problems of conduct and higher drop out rates.

The demand for public services from newcomers is clear, although the uptake may be compromised by lack of information or regulations that make it difficult to access services, such as language courses not being available outside work hours.

The evidence of convergence in living conditions between migrants and the local population comes mainly from studies of the second generation. Despite being more integrated than their parents, as evidenced by linguistic competence for example, children still face exclusion. Most still identify with their parents’ country of birth. But fears that the children of immigrants are a time bomb waiting to explode, or that they are fired with political and religious radicalism, find no support from the research.

In sum, the TSER projects provide mixed findings covering a selected range of issues concerning the living conditions of immigrants in Europe. Such findings need to be incorporated and juxtaposed with other research findings and social science theory. Two specific project conclusions, however, serve well to summarise the situation generally.

The first, drawn from a focused study in Italy, paints a rather gloomy picture that can be said to represent the situation across Europe. In public discourse and understanding, the project members suggest:

Social exclusion seems to be a typical condition for migrants and one that is often taken for granted. Most often experience discrimination in the labour market – e.g., unfair dismissal, problems finding accommodation, and even uncivil behaviour is taken as normal experience of being an immigrant. They are seen as second-class citizens and immigrants see this as their lot. (Bohnisch and Cremer-Schafer, 2001, 69-70)

The second, drawn from the study focusing on the plight of children of immigrants, points to ongoing problems of policy and practice. In each European country studied, the Child Immigration Project observed:
there is a noteworthy gap between legislation and action, in both directions. In other words, laws are often not followed by adequate intervention, and in many other cases action is far ahead of the principles contained in laws and directives’ (Collicelli, 2001, 86).
THEME 3: MIGRATION AND SOCIAL COHESION

INTRODUCTION

As migration flows within Europe continue to increase to an unprecedented high level, the question of social cohesion reveals unequivocal urgency for many countries that consider themselves to be reasonably homogenous and cohesive. Typically, the process of social integration of immigrants and ethnic minorities is seen as an important and urgent strategy to be adopted by host societies in order to retain an adequate level of social cohesion and prosperity. In many of the projects under review, there is an implicit understanding that integration is a necessary aspect of social cohesion. The relevant characteristics to understanding the process of social cohesion include: the potential of communities at national and local scales to integrate immigrants; the barriers to integration and participation, or social exclusion, including criminalisation; and the factors facilitating participation, including multiculturalism. Because the ability to earn a living is critical to both an ability to participate in society and the willingness of host societies to accept newcomers, the labour market may also be considered as relevant to social cohesion.

THE POTENTIAL FOR INTEGRATING NEWCOMERS

The ability of communities to absorb and integrate immigrants depends on a number of factors. On the one hand there is preparedness of national and local communities to accept newcomers, partly reflected in the various national models of integration throughout the European Union. On the other hand there are factors and resources specific to communities, such as border towns. For example, it is easier for immigrants if they move into an already established ethnic community, though this is not always possible, as reported by Cremer-Schafer et al. (2001). New migrants no longer find ‘strongly rooted communities and networks of fellow citizens that once acted as a first reference point for marking out work opportunities’ (Giovanetti and Quassoli, 2001, 148). Another way to examine this issue is to focus on the potential for immigrants to integrate economically, for example through self-employment in the labour market.

In many countries there are specific national models of integration for immigrants, as described by the project entitled Effectiveness of National Integration Strategies Towards Second Generation Youth (EFFNATIS) (Heckmann et al. 2001). Eight countries were included in this project to analyse national modes of integration of children of international immigrants (CIM), aged 16-25.

In France the national integration policy is, on the whole, political. It is basically an assimilation policy which aims for cultural homogeneity where all people are equally transformed into French citizens, having the right to participate in public life and to become a part of the ‘community of citizens’. By contrast, for many years Germany denied the presence of foreigners as migrants. From the mid 1970s it introduced integration measures which were of an ambiguous nature. Fundamental changes have occurred since the beginning of the project in that nationality law has changed to introduce an element of ius soli. One of the main features of the German mode of
integration has been to open up the core institutions such as labour market, education and training and housing. In Great Britain policies have been developed to promote equal opportunity and equal rights for ethnic minorities. Central to this policy has been the issue of race relations to eliminate and deal with racial discrimination. Nevertheless, ‘the discourse on ethnicity and the incorporation of migrants … is strongly racialized’ (Heckman et al, 2001, 10).

Spain is a relatively new country of immigration with large numbers of illegals immigrants and ensuing amnesties. So far Spain has been mostly concerned with questions of schooling. Concern has been with enrolling immigrant school children who will be expected to follow the Spanish curriculum. Finland has also only recently become a country of immigration and developed an official integration policy in 1999. Finland has drawn up individual integration plans for immigrants and has introduced a system of competence assessment to help migrants into the labour market. Sweden has more concerned to limit the intake of immigrants so as to make more resources available to those who have been accepted. Swedish integration policies rely heavily on general welfare policies, so it is generally accepted that the public sector promotes immigrant integration as opposed to other countries where NGOs play a prominent role.

Although Switzerland is a multicultural country, it does not recognise itself as a country of immigration and so has no integration policy at the federal level. The issues which have been of importance for the political integration of the country such as federalism, municipal autonomy, consociational and direct democracy, have been important though ambiguous issues for migrants and their children. In the Netherlands, the traditions of consociational democracy and ‘pillarisation’ have been important principles of integration and nationhood for both the Dutch and for the integration of migrants. Multicultural policies have meant that special programmes were introduced for migrants. But many of these have been substituted by general polices for all the disadvantaged.

The EFFNATIS project (Heckmann et al., 2001) concluded that there were marked national differences in the modes of immigrant integration, but also some signs of convergence as a result of the countries all being welfare states. But they could not conclude that one national context was systematically more effective than the others. France’s ‘assimilationist’ policy has strengths in the expansion of education, in acculturation and in identification, but shows weaknesses in training and employment. Germany, with an ambiguous policy in the past, has strengths in training and employment, but weaknesses in education, legal integration and identificational integration. In Britain education of immigrant children has progressed far, but patterns of ethnic inequality can be identified in training and employment. The British policy for social and cultural integration seems to have reproduced ethic minority structures.

Some local communities reveal mixed reactions to the arrival of newcomers, especially in border towns. In the project Border Cities and Towns: Causes of Social Exclusion in Peripheral Europe, it was found that ‘social exclusion of vulnerable groups, especially immigrants, refugees and transients is polyvalent, and dividing lines are more diverse than the host/immigrant duality (Leontidou, 2001a, 76). Often there is a scattering of families between the two border towns and general social
conditions seem to be ‘more open and receptive to rational economic requirements’. In Melilla, for example, there are several ethnic communities which seem to interact without difficulty, although there are some prejudices. The arrival of migrants from Morocco has created problems of accommodation and of legal regulation. Social relations between the migrant and local populations often lack cohesion and sometimes show a strong antagonism or even racism underneath an apparently tolerant treatment. In Lesvos similar problematic relations exist between the local and immigrant populations, and seasonal workers are treated with suspicion. There exists a traditional cleavage between the north and south of the island between populations of Turkish and Greek origin. As a result, economic exchanges between the two parts have been slowed down. There is also concern for refugees, and that infrastructure should be set up to help their integration. On the other hand, refugees’ social problems were seen as someone else’s responsibility. Similar problems exist in Corsica between the local and foreign populations, who are ‘not well integrated in the cities and are often cut off from Corsican society’ (Peraldi et al., 2001b, 36-37). Finally, in Lisbon immigrants lead a ‘marginal and degraded way of life yet are very important to the economy of the city (Matias-Ferreira, Donnan, and Afouxenidis, 2001a, 62).

In each locality there are multiple forms of integration. For example, in some cases people may experience close community cooperation while they may experience minimal integration in terms of the institutional and political. ‘Civil society on each side of the border functions in relation to the local nation-states in question, and cooperation on the one level may coincide with fragmentation on the other’ (Leontidou, 2001b, 57).

BARRIERS TO INTEGRATION AND PARTICIPATION

Migrants experience many barriers and disincentives often in the form of exclusion from the labour market, from major social, legal and political institutions as well as exclusion within communities and neighbourhoods. Thus, the process of social exclusion has become a frequent subject of study regarding migrant integration and social cohesion. Exclusion is the obverse of the potential for integrating newcomers; it may be defined as being deprived of aspects of full social participation. It can be examined at both national and local scales, such as the neighbourhood. Furthermore, newcomers are often stigmatised, treated as undesirables or criminals. The TSER programme projects contain important findings regarding the criminalisation of immigrants in Italy and Greece. Finally, some projects focussed on the barriers to participation faced by children of immigrants.

Social exclusion at the national level

The projects on Social Exclusion as a Multidimensional Process and Social Strategies in Risk Societies examine the general process of social exclusion experienced by immigrants at the national level (Cremer-Schafer et al., 2001: Chamberlayne et al., 1999). Important findings are also contained within the project on Migrant Insertion in the Informal Economy (Reyneri, 1999). There are several different approaches to the question of exclusion and barriers to integration. Cremer-Schafer et al.’s study compares Italy, Sweden and Austria in terms of the legal status of immigrants and how this can form a barrier to participation in the wider society. The report by
Chamberlayne et al. (1999) analyses forms of social exclusion mainly in terms of *ethnicity* and various forms of discrimination and racism. It argues that ethnicity is ‘an exceptionally diverse and complex phenomenon, defying almost any generalisation’ in Europe. In a study of the impact of immigration on South European societies, Solé criticises purely cultural approaches (especially those that emphasise the media and public opinion) and emphasises the need to look at *material conditions*, including position in the occupational structure and immigration legislation in the receiving country (Solé, 1999). The study argues that social reactions are influenced by objective factors, such as labour market, shadow economy, and housing conditions, as well as institutional factors, such as laws and regulations (Solé, 1999, 31). These two areas, together with the characteristics of the migratory flows themselves make up the ‘three key influences’ that shape social reactions.

Rejection of migrants stems from a logic of exclusion, which is synonymous with social marginalisation and social segregation. We understand exclusion to be forced separation or removal from the mainstream of a society or group, generally in connection with ethnic-related variables. Social marginalisation is based more on cultural aspects while social segregation involves deliberate actions or regulations … which tend to relegate certain ethnic or racial minorities to second class citizenship, depriving them of certain rights, freedoms and opportunities … The factors studied have an impact on the local population which then develops a logic whereby immigrants are excluded on three grounds: public security, cultural identity … and economic grounds or competition for resources (especially jobs) … the importance of these dimensions differs from one country to the next. (Solé, 1999, 32)

The report of *Social Exclusion as a Multidimensional Process* compared national modes of social exclusion. In Italy migrants are seen as a necessary evil who provide an economic opportunity for the country. They are legally excluded but socially included. Migrants have to cope with a far more complex society than their homeland, ‘where before finding a job the key problem is to define one’s own occupational identity within a segmented and fragmented labour market’ (Giovanetti and Quassoli, 2001, 148). Socialization agencies of the past (trade unions, social movements, mass parties) no longer play the crucial mediating roles they once did. The main way of coping is through participation in the informal economy, which does not prevent a person from settling in the country and fully participating. Immigrant women, however, are mostly ignored in Italy and their needs are not recognised. Many experience exploitation and loss of rights in many work places (Giovanetti and Quassoli, 2001, 150-153). They experience physical, social, cultural exclusion, often confined to four walls of home, with no job. Women risk impoverishment and many are single mothers. Finally, Chamberlayne et al.’s study found that attitudes to ethnicity varied within Italy. It found a contrast between the tolerance of the South with the intolerance of the North, which harbours racist sentiments even towards the South of Italy.

In Sweden legal immigrants are legally included, but socially excluded, i.e. there is no official exclusion but still a high degree of informal exclusion. The Swedish welfare state is based on an inclusive discourse and a commitment to equality. Swedish policy offers access to legal and formal treatment for immigrants through a policy of integration and it rejects exclusion through the law which would result in second class
citizens as well as the guest workers system. Despite this, a majority of migrants feel excluded from the labour market. In one suburb, Rinkeby, 50 per cent of the population are welfare recipients and 73 per cent are of immigrant background. Being an immigrant in Sweden means having to face many social and cultural obstacles despite legal inclusion. Immigrants are expected ‘to be assimilated into Swedish culture before they can start their integration process’, beginning with competence in Swedish language:

It’s not that Sweden restrains migrants from being citizens in a legal sense, but rather that immigrants have to deal with a great deal of cultural and social obstructions to be perceived on the same terms as native born Swedes. (Karazman-Morawetz, 2001, 327)

The Swedish case study in Chamberlayne et al. (1999, 49) also stresses the ‘painful gap’ between a dominant liberal ideology, for years inclined to celebrate Swedish altruism towards the Third World, and welcome for refugees and asylum-seekers, and a reality of growing ethnic friction on the streets of the poorer urban areas where immigrants mostly live.

The case of Austria is different, because it focuses on illegal immigrants who are legally and socially excluded. For most immigrants (mainly Poles), legal barriers are insurmountable. The resulting social exclusion can only be partly managed and compensated for. Strategies for survival include individual or family support and other informal non-governmental agencies. ‘Since illegal aliens are excluded from access to state or municipal community agencies and from welfare support, individual and personal resources are of considerable significance with regard to active and relatively successful managing of exclusion’ (Karazman-Morawetz, 2001, 322). The black market also provides a means for participating, but success here does not translate into integration in other, non-economic, spheres.

In the ethnically-mixed urban populations of the United Kingdom, Chamberlayne et al. found among the children of immigrant families revealed a combination of new opportunities and continuing blocks to opportunity. The report argued that ‘how to reconcile traditions of family origin with the individualised and, in gender terms, more egalitarian norms of late-modern Britain were a significant issue for several of our subjects’. It continued, ‘in terms of gender, race and class, our British cases display the complexity of a society in a half-way condition, which has dissolved many of its old ascriptive identities, whilst remaining quite unsure about what stable social identities and resources are to replace them’ (Chamberlayne et al., 1999, 61).

For France, Chamberlayne et al. reported that:

The implicit norm is of individuals regarded equitably, as citizens of France, of whatever gender, class or ethnic origin they may be … In practice the French research describes a situation that falls far short of this expectation. The loss of economic opportunities due to unemployment, a curtailing of social entitlements won during an earlier period, discriminatory practices towards those of particular ethnic origins, and a reduction of support for parenting roles, are cited as causes of enhanced risk. (Chamberlayne et al., 1999, 61)
Much of the report concerned the self-definition of migrants rather than just their legal status. The Spanish team looked at migrants from Latin America and Asia, but found that they did not define themselves primarily as migrants – other criteria were more important to them. The Greek component was concerned not with migrants but with long-standing ethnic minorities of Gypsy origin. In former East Germany, ethnicity had become much more important after reunification. The report states that, high unemployment and poverty in former East Germany since reunification ‘has replaced immigrants and asylum seekers as West Germany’s “other”, while East Germans, anxious to avoid that position themselves, are keen to keep immigrants in it, creating racist collusion between East and West Germany’ (Chamberlayne et al., 1999, 96).

The report points to major variations in biographical experiences of exclusion and risk found in the studies. This suggests the need for considerable caution in the formulation and development of European social policies. These need to be responsive to the very diverse needs of individuals, but also to be sensitive to national variations (Chamberlayne et al., 1999, 61-2). The studies also found a high degree of variation between individuals within a given ethnic population: ‘a plurality of identities based on individualisation and personal emancipation’ (Chamberlayne, et al. 1999, 50).

Ethnic minority populations in Europe are widely regarded as ‘outsiders’, as threats to the life of the majority. One concludes from our research, however, that their experience of difference and of belonging wholly to no one nation, makes them in some respects the most fully, or at least potentially, ‘European’ or post modern of all our research subjects. (Chamberlayne et al., 1999, 50)

Further findings on social exclusion at the national scale are contained within the report of *Migrant Insertion in the Informal Economy* (Reyneri 1999). Solé stresses the impact of restrictive immigration policies on social exclusion. The four countries being studied (Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal) were all pressured by the European Union to tighten up their migration policies and become ‘Europe’s gendarmes’. As Solé states, these restrictions were ‘not necessarily demanded by their local societies but have created an immigration problem’. The research claims that ‘Spain is a perfect example of the social indifference to immigration at the time the Ley de Extranjería was passed in 1985, a year before Spain entered the EC. This law introduced the figure of the ‘illegal’ immigrant in social imagery’ (Solé, 1999, 34).

A comparison of these four Southern European countries shows that the total volume of immigrants is not as important as might be assumed in explaining conflict and exclusion. In Spain, ‘despite the small number of immigrants and state controls over the entry of immigrants and their insertion in society, immigration has had a significant impact, which has been blown up by the mass media’ (Solé, 1999, 36). In part this may because, whereas in Italy people identify with their neighbourhood or town, in the other countries – Spain included – there is a stronger feeling of national identity. Another important factors is the composition of migratory flows. In Italy migrants come from many countries without close political or cultural ties to Italy. This may help explain the strength of the rejection immigrants experience. Mass outflows or expulsions (Albania) also lead to greater fears in receiving countries (Italy
and Greece). In Spain, immigrants are less heterogeneous (mainly from Morocco) and this seems to reduce rejection (Solé, 1999, 36).

**Social exclusion in neighbourhoods and border towns**

Immigrants in a neighbourhood of Bologna, Italy, have occupied a group of houses in an area which was described by locals as an ‘oasis of calm’. According to them, it has now become a ‘Gypsy camp’. The arrival of the migrants has brought about many changes to the neighbourhood and the long-standing residents: despite the efforts of the newcomers, many prior residents believe that they are too far apart regarding customs, cultures and religion (Bohnisch and Cremer-Schafer, 2001, 67-68). This example illustrates how local-level experiences are instrumental in mediating the host society’s attitude to newcomers, and how this reaction may be involved with other processes of urban change not specifically connected with immigration.

Social exclusion is commonly experienced and therefore studied at a neighbourhood scale. The Social Exclusion in European Neighbourhoods report comparing 10 neighbourhoods in eight countries notes that immigrants and ethnic minorities may share disadvantage with other vulnerable groups – the unemployed, poor elderly, and single parents. The research also considered the potential for such communities to manage conflict locally.

Social exclusion is defined in this study as distinct from poverty and marginalisation, corresponding to macro-scale shifts to Post-Fordism. To be specific, it is ‘arises from processes of economic change which create new forms of social fragmentation, which mean that some groups are facing intertwined problems leaving them “behind” and “outside” and this threatens social harmony’ (Cars, 1999, 15). Social exclusion is often concentrated in pockets of poverty, which may be found in both regions and cities of economic decline as well as places that are economically buoyant. It follows that there are ‘highly localized dynamics’ at work. Socially excluded neighbourhoods may be distinguished by location – whether central or peripheral in the city in question. They may also be classified by cause, either resulting from *economic decline* or from *displacement*, when planning and housing allocation policies result in an influx of new residents. Most of the ten neighbourhoods in the study were characterized by both decline and displacement. The presence of immigrants or ethnic minorities was not itself a cause of social exclusion, but it did intensify existing processes.

The report further distinguishes between two sets of processes affecting such neighbourhoods. ‘Outside in’ processes are concentration and containment of vulnerable groups, as well as the cultural barrier of stigmatisation. It was noted that ‘every single resident was aware that they lived in a stigmatised neighbourhood’ (Cars, 1999, 92), and that stigmatisation acts like a ‘lobster trap’ – i.e. it is easy to get into the neighbourhood but then very difficult to leave. There are three main markers of stigmatisation visible to the outside or wider society, only one of which was a significant concentration of minority ethnic and/or immigrant groups, found in six of the ten neighbourhoods. The other two were the specific architectural styles associated with public housing and visible signs that public authorities do not care for the, including vandalized and unkempt public spaces, poor physical maintenance and inadequate rubbish collection.
Because stigmatisation from the outside labels all residents as alike, an internal response is to find ways of differentiating one’s status from others. Such localised status systems can confer a measure of self-worth, but they are also divisive. Here again, immigrant status is only one of the dimensions by which residents judge one another, alongside employment, participation in local organisations, respectability and upkeep of housing. The authors find that:

In some neighbourhoods, there are ‘parallel and separate’ communities sharing the same urban living space … But there is an asymmetry in this dual system, in that the host community defines itself as superior to the immigrant/minority community at least partly in response to the way that ethnicity is used as a marker of stigmatisation by the wider society. (Cars, 1999, 98)

But at the same time:

The minority community uses its internal status system combined with separateness as a defence against the pervasive message that they are inferior as a consequence of their skin colour and/or citizenship position. (Cars, 1999, 98)

Because of this dual system, children and young people can find themselves in a particularly difficult position, because they come into contact with the host society every day at school etc. and are ‘under pressure to behave in ways which conform with the norms of the host society’ (Cars, 1999, 98).

Other ‘inside’ processes include a more structural barrier arising from the operation of land and housing markets along with the rules for allocating social housing – ‘the demographic life cycle’ of neighbourhoods. The demographic life cycle of neighbourhoods works as follows. New social housing estates are at first occupied by young households with children. Over time part of this cohort moves up and out but part either remains as elderly households or dies in situ. There comes a time when this departing population is replaced by a new young cohort, that may include a high proportion of children and adolescents. In this way ‘the demographic life cycle of the neighbourhood as a whole creates the basis for conflict between elder, long-established residents and newcomers’ (94)

Four factors influence the degree to which this conflict can be managed. The first is ‘whether newcomers are drawn from social groups whose basic norms of behaviour are markedly different from those of the elder established residents … most obvious where newcomers were drawn from minority ethnic or immigrant groups’ (Cars, 1999, 95). The extent to which this was relevant varied according to the different neighbourhoods. In Church Street, London, there were several significantly large minority ethnic groups (constituting 21 per cent of residents) leading to a ‘chronologically layered set of conflictual relationships’ (95). By contrast, in Leoforos Alexandras, Athens, ‘there was a large group of illegal immigrants, who are likely to exercise very strong control over their own children as a way of avoiding drawing official attention to themselves’ (95). Furthermore ‘where adults were unable to communicate among themselves, as a result of linguistic difference, then the conflicts appeared to be much sharper’ (95).
The second factor is whether there were networks of related families living within the same neighbourhood, and the third is whether mothers with young children were able to form support networks among themselves. Finally, conflict management was related to the size of the neighbourhood; in larger neighbourhoods adolescents could manage their conflicts through dividing up the territory, and in smaller neighbourhoods conflict could be exported to nearby areas.

In Frankfurt, by comparison, local government undertakes practices of ‘ethnic control’. Housing policy attempts to mix ‘different status groups and ethnic groups of every area. Administrators have tried to prevent ‘one-sided’ social structures’ (Quassoli et al., 2001, 182). By trying to mix social groups of various kinds, local government is able to listen to long-term or original tenants with regard to the outcome of who new members can be. This way, they can exclude foreigners, welfare recipients, and families with many children since the preferences of long-term/original tenants carry certain weight in decision-making process (Quassoli et al., 2001, 182).

Thus, the project on Social Exclusion in European Neighbourhoods finds that the presence of immigrants and/or minority ethnic groups was one among several factors influencing the extent to which the structural problems arising from the neighbourhood demographic life cycle could be managed locally. Neighbourhood social conflict did not derive solely from their presence, but generally revolved around the problems caused by adolescents (particularly boys) and young children. But for long-time residents, the life cycle means that they may experience newcomers as threatening and intimidating, especially when they feel a ‘loss of personal authority and “informal” social control’ (Cars, 1999, 96).

Social exclusion also exists in border towns where there is often a local ambiguity towards immigrants. On Lesvos, social exclusion is based on cultural differences and ethnicity. Thus Albanian immigrants and Gypsies are deemed to be excluded on the basis of being different. There is a local ambiguity towards immigrants. On the one hand locals express sympathy towards immigrants while, on the other hand, they fear that they will settle permanently:

As long as the island is just a stepping stone on the way to mainland Greece, locals can be sympathetic to migrants because they do not see them as rivals. In this respect, the categorisation of immigrants as socially excluded is the best way to ensure their transient status. Should they not be seen as socially excluded, the local population would face the dilemma of having to do something to better integrate them into the social fabric. (Donnan, 2001, 41)

In the cases of Ireland and Malaga and Mellila there appears to be a close connection between ethnic and spatial/locality exclusion, similar to that observed in the study of ten neighbourhoods (above). As Donnan (2001, 49) reports, ‘the more the whole culture is likely to be perceived as a source indicator of social exclusion, the more the whole locality is likely to be perceived as socially excluded in its entirety’.

For socially excluded Africans in Lisbon, the difficulty for integration is due to factors such as poor qualifications and education, the composition and behaviour of
the domestic groups, in accordance with their cultural roots, and also difficulty over
the Portuguese language. Often men are employed in public sector works while
women are employed in the domestic sector. Their employment in poorly paid work
intensifies their social exclusion. Their clandestine situation exacerbates their social
exclusion (Matias-Ferreira, Donnan, and Afouxenidis, 2001a, 60).

The criminalisation of immigrants

Social exclusion, as many of the reports show, is not simply a matter of material
disadvantage or political marginalisation but also involves significant cultural
processes. In Barcelona, for example, there has been a rise in crime: this is routinely
blamed on migrants, although this has no factual basis (Hanak, 2001, 255). The report
on *Migrant Insertion in the Informal Economy* (Reyneri, 1999) shows how
‘criminalisation’ of immigrants operates in certain countries affecting their ability to
fully participate. The research contains studies on ‘deviant behaviour and
criminalisation of immigrants, mainly with reference to Italy and Greece, although not
in much detail. The report’s methodology is characterised as ‘constructionist’:

According to the constructionist approach, the deviance or criminality of
migrants or those attributed to them are to be considered as the result of
interactions among different social actors in defined frames. The main actors
are: the government, local authorities, police and judicial system, mass-media,
opinion-makers, citizen committees and moral entrepreneurs. Therefore it is a
phenomenon or social fact identified and explained by means of the police
acts, of the justice administration, by the analysis of experts and in particular,
by the analysis of statistics regarding criminality, often reflecting social or
racial prejudices as well as power relations. (Palidda, Frangoulis and
Papantoniou, 1999, 21)

The implication seems to be that foreigners are criminal partly because of laws and
social practices which push them into criminality, and partly because of perceptions
(labelling) that exaggerates their deviance.

There are three principal findings in the study (Palidda, Frangoulis and Papantoniou,
1999, 22-3). Firstly, there is a correlation between the deviant criminal behaviour of
some immigrants and conditions in countries of origin, which are marked by
economic, social and political turmoil, cultural breakdown, violence and civil war.
This applies, for example, to men from Albania, Nigeria, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia,
other African countries, the Balkans and Eastern Europe. This encourages deviant or
criminal behaviour by a certain segment of the population (often young people and
the most enterprising, or those imitating deviant models), who migrate with the idea
of taking advantage of the opportunities presented by wealthy societies.

Secondly, because restrictions on migration make it nearly impossible to migrate
legally, migrants have to use the services of smugglers. In doing so they risk being
criminalized by association. This covers:

immigrants who belong to migratory chains dominated by a deviant model of
insertion, situated between informality and illegality (for example, black
market cigarettes, small-time deals, or the drug trade, related to organised
Thirdly, migrants confront great difficulties in achieving legal status in the country of destination as well as the very temporary and precarious nature of this status. This pushes immigrants towards illegality – especially young ones, and those in the most marginal groups. Another outcome is the devaluing of the traditional model of achieving success through regular or irregular work, and the corresponding adoption, particularly among the young, of deviant models, which provide the illusion of achieving success through illegal activities. This fits well with the increasing ‘demand’ for migrants in illegal activities, ‘ethnicising’ some deviant activities in the same fashion as some segments of irregular or semi-regular activities. In conclusion, these factors combine to create a growing spiral of criminalisation, self-criminalisation and victimisation, particularly with respect to youths from the countries bordering the European Union such as in the Balkans, Eastern Europe and North Africa.

Related to criminalisation is the higher levels of incarceration for foreigners. Palidda et al. (1999) note a big increase from 1990 to 1997 of the foreign-born among prison populations. Figures from the Council of Europe, as well their own data, show for instance that in Germany the rate of imprisonment for natives in 1997 was 66 per 100,000 people, compared with 342 for foreigners. This means that the imprisonment rate for foreigners was five times higher than for natives. The prisoners were mainly youths from Turkey and Eastern Europe. The ratio of foreign to native imprisonment rates was 16 in Spain, 13 in Italy, eight in the Netherlands, seven in Portugal, six in Belgium and Switzerland, five in France and Norway, four in Austria and Sweden and three in Denmark (Palidda et al., 1999, 24-5). They also point out that many of the natives are actually naturalised or second- generation immigrants, so that the immigrant/ethnic minority over-representation is even higher (26).

They also discuss which groups are least affected by deviance. These include women and men who are recruited into migratory chains and included in networks with strong internal cohesion and social control. This includes women from the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Cape Verde, Latin America and Eastern Europe, and men from India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh.

The overall conclusion of the report is:

Criminalisation, self-criminalisation and the ethnicisation of some illegal activities together with the emphasis on law enforcement and penal measures and the increasingly hostile attitude towards immigrants may lead to the formation of a class of criminals and deviants in Europe who are either immigrants or of foreign roots. Just as the rate of incarceration for blacks in the United States is seven to eight times higher than that of whites, some immigrants groups in Europe have already reached even higher levels … The risk posed by incipient racism in Europe could be even greater than in the United States, because in European countries, it seems to reach greater extremes, with immigrants considered the new public enemy number 1. (Palidda et al., 1999, 29, italics added).
The exclusion of children

Immigrant children also experience various forms of social exclusion, according to the *Child Immigration Project* (Collicelli, 2001) and the *Family Reunification Project* (Bracalenti, 2001). The former included a large-scale comparative study of the situation of children of immigrant origin in Europe. A key task of the study involved the examination of school provision, particularly for children of immigrant origin without residence permits (Collicelli, 2001, 71). The project found considerable differences across Europe. For instance, in *Belgium* access to school is guaranteed to minors regardless of parents’ status if accompanied by a parent or guardian. Unaccompanied minors must be entrusted to a guardian (person or institution). Immigrant students are enrolled in a ‘parallel’ register, but included in applications for subsidies, which assists the school in accepting them. In *France* access to school is also guaranteed to minors regardless of their parents’ status. However, in *Greece* the children of immigrants without documents cannot enrol in school. Minors without documents, like their parents, have no rights to services. The situation is paralleled in *Sweden* where the children of immigrants without documents cannot enrol in school. Minors without documents, like their parents, have no rights to services, except emergency health care. A kind of middle position is represented by *Italy*, where children whose parents do not have permits are enrolled with ‘reserve’. The ‘reserve’ is lifted whenever their parents obtain documents. The ‘reserve’ does not affect the ultimate school career of the child. And in the *United Kingdom* the situation is wholly different: there, any truly ‘illegal immigrants’, and thus their children, would not be easily traceable unless a school or education authority had reasons to be suspicious and conducted more detailed checks were carried out. Schooling is thus provided regardless of status.

THE INFORMAL ECONOMY AND SELF-EMPLOYMENT

One of the major areas of social exclusion for immigrants is in the labour market. Two of the projects – *Migrant Insertion in the Informal Economy* (Reyner, 1999) and *Self-Employment Activities Concerning Women and Minorities* (Apitzsch, 2001) deal directly with this issue.

Immigrant men and women often find that in some European Union countries it is very difficult to be integrated into the formal labour market. As a result, they may turn to the informal economy or to self-employment. The shadow or informal economy is an important facet of integration, but there are contrasting situations in different countries. Because in Portugal the informal economy employs both immigrants and native-born, working in informal jobs is not an added component of exclusion as it is elsewhere. In both Portugal and Greece the state has little control over the sector and ‘employers run practically no risk if they hire illegal immigrants’ (Solé, 1999, 37). But in Spain and Italy, the government is cracking down on the informal economy and this is making it hard for immigrants to find work. It has caused the general population to disparage those who work informally:
Recent efforts to control the shadow economy [in Italy] have caused people to increasingly look down on immigrants, who tend to fill the jobs the local population does not want. (Solé, 1999, 37)

The report concludes that immigration policy, institutional factors, and labour market are linked:

Attitudes of rejection are unquestionably a perfect instrument for legitimising restrictive policy measures. Moreover, rejection further aggravates the precarious conditions of the immigrant population, triggering yet stronger feelings of rejection and creating a vicious circle … This means that the victims are automatically blamed for their inferior position in society and the labour market and for their political subordination. (Solé, 1999, 38)

The Apitzsch et al. (2001) report concerns the issue of self-employment among women and minorities. One major reason for immigrants to move into self-employment is the exclusion experienced in the labour market leading to unemployment and impoverishment. In this report migrant men and women and female members of the majority society were interviewed regarding self-employment activities. These three groups are the most vulnerable to social exclusion and unemployment. They are often forced into insecure jobs in the secondary sector of the dual labour market and are often under-employed as well. Both women and migrants show growing rates of involvement in self-employment projects as integration strategies (Apitzsch et al., 2001, 9-10). The research illustrates how these groups experience barriers in seeking help to move into self-employment.

The project found that there are two main types of orientation to self-employment: (i) the gender-biased self-restrictive/modest or solo self-employment’ and (ii) the expansive type of self-employment. The analysis reveals that women who are ‘threatened by unemployment are structurally more eligible for the self-restrictive type of business’. While this appears to contradict the emancipatory aspects of self-employment, this research found that striving for autonomy and the restricted type of self-employment go well together. On the other hand, self-employed women are mostly committed to their families and so see self-employment as a ‘sensible balance of duties that should not be disturbed by expansion’. In Southern Italy this type of self-employment is often a means to earn a supplementary family income and frequently seen as informal type of work, often not visible and not registered for taxation (Apitzsch et al., 2001, 12).

The second, ‘expansive’ type of business is preferred, where possible, by both migrant men and by women (including native-born and second-generation) who want to improve their self-esteem. Indeed, it was found that the overwhelming reason for immigrant entrepreneurs to start their own business (especially in the Danish case) was to ‘prop up faltering self-esteem’. The study states:

Whatever the particular form, we can categorise this motive as a kind of ‘pressure to innovate’, which arises out of the structural exclusion of immigrants from the main labour market, forcing them to consider other options in order to bring forward their personal identity, as opposed to the
social identity imposed upon them by the host society (Apitzsch et al., 2001, 13).

One positive aspect of the collective self-employment policies has been the socialising process for participants who claim that the programs have strengthened their self-esteem and social integration competency (Apitzsch et al., 2001, 18).

The research also considered policy responses. ‘Modest or restricted’ business is often described in the literature as inappropriate and too marginal to warrant funding. Therefore, there is normally very little funding available for ‘modest’ businesses. Training courses are therefore often irrelevant to the interests of the women. But institutions need to embark on a learning process, which ‘will have to accept the biographical embeddedness of the “modest” type of business and the aspect of biographical success that is entailed in this type that is not visible, if success is defined only in economic terms’ (Apitzsch et al., 2001, 15).

Three kinds of programme were assessed: (i) individual bridging allowances; (ii) collective self-employment policies; (iii) targeted mentoring programmes.

Although differences exist between the various countries depending of their welfare regime, differences also exist between north European countries. For example, Danish, English and Swedish immigrants, as well as native women, used the ‘individual bridging allowance’ more frequently than those in other countries. In Germany by comparison, immigrant men and women are poorly informed about such programmes and do not participate as much as native women. A common problem with this programme is that support is very limited – six months in Germany and, while much better in Denmark, two and a half years was also seen as too short. Nevertheless, ‘the combination of the self-employment with the unemployment benefit that is granted unlimited was therefore the better solution in some cases in Germany and Denmark’. On the other hand, Swedish and Danish recipients also reported that support was not adequate for a first business, while the high Swedish tax would also hinder the process of stabilisation of the business (Apitzsch et al., 2001, 15-16). On the whole, the main criticism of this strategy is the short duration in some European countries; the restriction to those who are eligible for unemployment benefits and its unavailability to those who want to start-up a new business while in employment; and the insufficient information available to immigrant men and women (16-17).

‘Collective self-employment policies’ have been suggested for migrant women in Sweden and Greece (and also for native women in Greece) because they do not have a ‘male majority member bias’. In Italy, the tradition of co-operatives has been an ‘instrument for integrating Italian and minority women in the sector of paid work’ (Apitzsch et al., 2001, 17). One of the problems with these policies is that they have been strongly based on a top-down approach. Migrant women have not been consulted on their specific expertise about business concepts which could have been mobilised for the policy. Bureaucratic rules dictate certain criteria for qualification, such as long-term unemployment, thus rendering it extremely difficult to reach many women. It is often assumed that they are domestic workers, although many of the women who participate have high formal qualifications from their countries of origin. It is often mentioned that recruitment often follows the need to reduce unemployment
statistics thus leading to inappropriate strategies for the women. Because such policies are introduced in order to reduce unemployment levels, migrant women without any motivation were forced to participate (Apitzsch et al., 2001, 17-18).

In Greece and Italy, the self-employment activities often take place in a policy vacuum. African migrants in these two countries view self-employment in four different ways. Firstly, it is seen as a way out of the exploitative work conditions in the informal economy; second, it is regarded as a ‘natural option’ for their community to engage in order to integrate into the labour market; third, it is seen as a way to expand one’s ideas, be independent and help create jobs for others; fourth, informal networks become especially important when setting up businesses in a policy vacuum (Apitzsch et al., 2001, 18). The researchers concluded ‘that the programs themselves as well as the access criteria to the policy are still deficit-oriented and develop patronizing types of so-called ‘active social citizenship policies’, unable to sustain agency, creativity and networking’ (19).

‘Targeted mentoring programmes’ work in a complementary way to national programmes. This project revealed that many migrants, especially refugees in northern Europe, along with Greek Pontians and Africans in Greece and Italy, have middle to high formal qualifications that are not realized in the labour market of the host society:

There is a lack of policies towards detecting qualifications and giving support in formulating ideas and entrepreneurial concepts … The comparison between the Danish, Swedish and German cases show that a very active entrepreneurial policy, as in the Swedish case, is not necessarily something positive. On the contrary, this can contribute to clientalisation of the entrepreneur who remains as helpless as before. (Apitzsch et al., 2001, 19)

The analysis of the biographical interviews with native and migrant women showed that a significant type of women’s business tends to adhere to self-restricted, non-expansive entrepreneurial strategies. From the perspective of the ‘standard’ model of entrepreneurship, this type of business is often regarded as condemned to failure and the entrepreneurs as not worth of being supported by the policy. The case analyses show, however, that it is not good policy practice to push self-employed women into more expansive projects.

**FACILITATING PARTICIPATION AND INTEGRATION**

What are the main factors facilitating participation that might be expected to lead to greater social cohesion and integration? To what extent can national citizenship policies assist integration? Should these be founded on universal principles or involve a measure of multiculturalism. The TSER programme projects generally find that systematic and innovative policy strategies provide the best foundation for immigrant integration and participation. Some projects identified best practices for participation, commonly identifying bottom-up, rather than top-down, strategies as successful.

The *Child Immigration Project* (Colicelli, 2001) advocates the importance of citizenship to facilitate integration and well-being. There are two main reasons.
Firstly, ‘a clear and reliable route to citizenship allows the child of immigrant origin to plan and invest in the arrival country, eliminating the precariousness which negatively affects well-being’ (Collicelli, 2001, 49, italics in original). Secondly, ‘citizenship is a formal means of guaranteeing access to those resources which are a precondition for well-being’ (49).

The formal citizenship rights for immigrant minors vary between countries (Collicelli, 2001, 51):

- **Belgium**: children born in Belgium to foreign parents who are resident for the last 10 years are guaranteed citizenship upon request up to age 12. Children born to Belgian-born foreign parents are automatically citizens.
- **France**: guaranteed citizenship for French-born foreigners with five years residence requesting citizenship at age 18.
- **Greece**: immediate citizenship for Pontian ethnic Greeks, regularisation for Albanian ethnic Greeks. Naturalisation can be requested after 10 years residence.
- **Italy**: conditional possibility of naturalisation after 10 years continuous residence, requiring renunciation of other citizenship. There is a high rejection rate, but guaranteed citizenship for Italian-born foreigners upon reaching age 18.
- **Sweden**: conditional possibility of naturalisation for Swedish-born and long-resident foreigners between age 21 and 23. Otherwise naturalisation is granted after five years legal residence, renouncing other nationalities.
- **UK**: children born in the UK to resident foreigners receive citizenship. Otherwise, UK-born children receive citizenship after 10 years continuous residence.

In summary, the broader area of ‘citizenship’ affects the following important areas of minors:

- the legal stability offered the minor (the right to permanence, protection from expulsion, the right to juridical citizenship);
- the space created for children of immigrant origin;
- the proposal made to children by the host society (the ‘deal’ or agreement), how explicit it is, and how unanimous it is;
- the protection of factors of identity (language, religion, culture).

CHIP reveals a wide disparity in the European approaches regarding the first point, that of legal stability. Although no CHIP country allows a minor to be stripped of citizenship, there are many countries where a non-citizen minor cannot expect to become a citizen (e.g., Italy), or where the possible penalties for deviance are greater for a non-citizen minor (e.g., Italy and Sweden) (Collicelli, 2001, 49).

In various ways, the TSER programme projects discussed whether general policies could achieve greater integration or whether specific strategies targeted on newcomers and their children, in the form of multiculturalism for example, were more successful. The Effectiveness of National Integration Strategies Towards Second Generation Youth (EFFNATIS) project (Heckmann et al., 2001, 20) claims that migrant
integration is more successful if issues of immigrant inclusion or exclusion are dealt with in general integration policies rather than through measures especially developed for immigrants. Several studies however, reveal the importance of multiculturalism for enhancing social cohesion. One of the case studies in Chamberlayne et al. (1999, 75) is concerned with a voluntary organisation which has set up a day centre for Gypsy children who sell and beg at traffic lights in Athens. The centre’s work shows the value of shifting education and political ideology from a culturally homogeneous notion of national identity to a citizen-based form of multiculturalism. The report states that ‘the perception that Gypsies must be involved in their own self-help and development points the way to a new politics of empowerment for Greek society in general … The centre argues for a strong programme of measures within mainstream services to enforce the rights and responsibilities of all children and parents’ (Chamberlayne et al., 1999, 75)

The CHIP report also suggests the importance of multicultural education for all children, immigrant and non-immigrant alike. There is a growing awareness that schools are where different cultures meet and the main site of contact between immigrant children and the wider society. The report also states that schools are an excellent laboratory in which to study and perfect models of integration’ (Collicelli, 2001, 86). It goes on:

Inter-cultural/multicultural education has significant advantages, not only in a wider perspective but also from the more immediate and concrete point of view of the school results of students of immigrant origin. Since they feel more accepted, they cease to have a closed, defensive attitude and at the same time their parents, seeing the ‘cultural open-mindedness’ of the school, stop feeling ashamed in relation to an institution which they idealise and rear and cease to oppose it because they feel unaccepted; instead, they tend to follow their children’s school career more closely, to the advantage of the children’s results. (Collicelli, 2001, 79)

The most forceful support for multiculturalism comes from the findings of the project on Immigration as a Challenge for Settlement Policies and Education (Pitkänen, 2000). It examines the contribution of higher education institutions which train teachers, in creating the necessary understanding and capabilities for teaching children in multi-ethnic societies. The case studies in higher education institutions in five EU countries (plus Israel) examine student teachers’ awareness of ethnic diversity and multiculturalism, leading to suggestions for training strategies and policy measures to enhance multicultural education.

Although in general the students teachers did adopt the principles of national policy programmes and curricula, there were ‘certain ambiguities’:

On the one hand, in the countries where the goal is unilateral acceptance of norms of the mainstream society, the students seem to have adopted universalistic (or assimilationist) conceptions towards education, whereas in the countries with pluralistic goals, the students seem to support pluralistic educational ideals. On the other hand, however, most of the students, in all countries, had positive attitudes towards cultural diversity and pluralism in education. (Pitkänen, 2000, 6)
Teacher training programmes do provide students with the competencies required to carry out the goals expressed in the national policy programmes and curricula. But the report does say also that ‘since national policies and curricula vary widely, so also do the nature and contents of the training courses’ (Pitkänen, 2000, 6). Most of the students surveyed had limited understanding of multicultural issues. But:

in the countries where the students were in contact with representatives of foreign cultures on a daily basis, students’ self-confidence in their cultural knowledge was higher. (Pitkänen, 2000, 7)

Other factors contributing to self-confidence were contacts with people from different cultural backgrounds, living or working abroad, attending courses on cultural diversity issues, or going to multicultural schools. Further students who were themselves members of ethnic minority groups had a higher level of confidence. Finally, male respondents showed a greater confidence than females in their cultural knowledge (Pitkänen, 2000, 7).

The report found that most students agreed with pluralistic statements and supported the idea of racial, cultural and linguistic diversity, while also recognising that immigrants should respect the mainstream culture of their host country. ‘The majority of the students thought that it is very important to take care that the minority pupils master the official language(s) of the country of residence’ (Pitkänen, 2000, 7). But it is also important to note that 30 per cent of student teachers did not think that all students should have a fair chance irrespective of their backgrounds.

There were differences between countries. French and German student teachers expressed assimilationist opinions, although they emphasised ‘linguistic rather than cultural uniformity’ (Pitkänen, 2000, 39). In all the countries:

student teachers generally thought that ethnic minority pupils should be encouraged to retain their languages and cultural traditions. Student teachers from ethnic minority backgrounds had a more positive attitude than average towards multiculturalism. (Pitkänen, 2000, 39)

As for policy implications, the report notes considerable variations in the way teacher training institutions respond to immigration and ethnic diversity. ‘Factors influencing these variations include the historical context of the states, their cultural traditions and the nature, circumstances and origins of the newcomers’ (Pitkänen, 2000, 10). The historical and political context of the school system was particularly important in France, where the ideal of universalism was strong – no student should be distinguished from another. The report states clearly:

With the increase in transnational mobility it behoves European higher education institutions not only to review the current policies and practices but also to support the recognition and acceptance of ethnic and cultural diversity. Thus, the increase in cultural diversity is challenging the higher education institutions, in all countries, to make efforts to develop the teacher training that can provide students with cognitive powers, attitudes and operative competencies required to function effectively in multicultural environments.
We recommend that a concerted effort will be made in all partner states within the European Community to ensure that the regulations governing the training of all teachers should be amended to include knowledge and skills in multicultural teaching. (Pitkänen, 2000, 10)

There are two specific recommendations:

(i) Educational research in order to provide empirically validated knowledge needed to improve ‘culturally responsive education’ and, thus, the academic performance of immigrant pupils.
(ii) Concerted efforts within the EU to search for common acceptable standards for teacher training (Pitkänen, 2000, 11).

While strategies like the ones suggested above have many positive aspects which facilitate participation, they frequently fall short due to lack of adequate knowledge and planning. Immigrant informants in the Family Reunification Project describe a dearth of relevant information and a ‘general lack of helpfulness on the part of authorities’ regarding processes of family reunification (Bracalenti, 2001, 52). In the case of a German study:

Most of the applicants were informed very poorly on how to proceed with the family reunification process. This caused unnecessary psychological stress and a lot of extra work because the applicants needed to repeatedly return to the same authorities who never properly explained the whole procedure to them, but only told them step by step what documents they had to provide them with. Due to this situation, most applicants had to search for assistance elsewhere, which normally brought them to contact non-governmental advice centres for migrants. (Bracalenti, 2001, 52)

Some projects are concerned with ‘best practice’ policy. For example, in the project on self-employment, many respondents in the clustered groups agreed that the idea of self-employment strategies is a positive national welfare policy (Apitzsch et al., 2001). They also looked positively on the idea of finding best practices in order to universalise them throughout Europe. In the Strategies in Risk Societies research (Chamberlayne et al., 1999) a number of innovative social policy projects (mainly involving NGOs) in the various countries are discussed. In Britain they look at the Refugee Education Project (REP), an ‘entirely bottom-up development’. It regards the refugee community as a resource, emphasising its resilience and capacity for learning, and its assertive contribution to local political culture. In so doing ‘REP is also modelling the British government’s own “best value” policy of “quality in individual lives”, while exposing the political barriers which may cut across the mobilisation of social capital’ (Chamberlayne et al., 1999, 65).

Another case study on a voluntary organisation is concerned with AGORA in Sweden, a meeting and activity centre for women from different ethnic backgrounds. It has staff from Bosnia, Chile, Eritrea and Iran and ‘their empowerment through the project is itself a model and an indictment of the wasted skills of and social exclusion of highly educated immigrant women’ (Chamberlayne et al., 1999, 78). The project also indicates ‘the immense transformative potential in agencies which operate beyond the prevailing structure of society, developed both individually and through
group interaction’ (Chamberlayne et al., 1999, 78). In the UK, immigrant women also often find themselves in a ‘doubly marginal position’ of being a woman and a member of an ethnic minority group. Many communities do not have resources to help integration, but in Harehills, Leeds, a well-respected Asian woman, started a Centre to teach English language and provide networking and training for women. It was able to link to other government resources and it changed many women’s lives (Wessels, 2001, 339). This case confirmed that patterns of association are important in addressing exclusion, independently of community-level mobilization. A place to meet and a common awareness are vital. The UK research showed that, in fact, groups marginalized by society were better at associating in this way than, for example, the native-born, white working class.

There are other policies and circumstances that facilitate participation. With regard to the multidimensionality of social exclusion it was found that networking in the migrant community was a very useful form of integration for migrants experiencing multiple forms of social exclusion. National migrant community networks are a crucial resource for jobs, housing, and information in Italy (Giovanetti and Quassoli, 2001, 150). But sub-cultural networks can become an obstacle as well as a remedy to social exclusion. Hanak (2001, 257) found that ‘local agencies in Rinkeby [Sweden] provide a whole range of activities and institutions aiming at improving opportunities for immigrants and promoting their integration into Swedish mainstream society, but considering the empirical material there is no clear evidence on special associations and organisations that are “successful” in terms of creating inclusionary arrangements and exchanges.’

MIGRATION AND SOCIAL COHESION: SUMMARY

The fact that EU member states are all welfare states and subscribe to the principles of human rights means that they all have the potential to integrate newcomers. Although many of the TSER projects explored national differences in modes of integration, there were, on the one hand, signs of convergence and, on the other, little evidence that any one country was more successful at integrating newcomers than others (Heckmann et al., 2001).

Furthermore, the barriers to participation and integration also vary from country to country, with sometimes interesting results. The CASE project found that immigrants in Sweden were legally included but socially or informally excluded, mainly because their limited ability in Swedish language caused them to be rejected by employers. By contrast, illegal immigrants in Italy are legally excluded but the informal sector provides a means for them to be socially included. Other research found no evidence that the volume of immigration was significant in explaining exclusion. In Spain, strong attachments to national identity mean that low levels of immigration are nonetheless met with hostility. In Italy by contrast, where immigration is higher, there appear to be more tolerance, perhaps because Italians identify more with their neighbourhood or town.

National modes of integration and exclusion are mediated by, and experienced in, local levels such as the neighbourhood. Here, reactions to newcomers are closely bound up with other, local-level, processes such as housing decline and
neighbourhood stigmatisation by the wider society. At this scale, it is clear that immigrants are not the only groups in society enduring exclusion, nor is their presence the only cause of exclusion. But locally and nationally, immigrants are stigmatised and often constructed as criminal or deviant; this is apparent in the markedly higher levels of incarceration of foreigners reported by Palidda et al. (1999). The research finds that conditions in the country of origin as well as obstacles to legal immigration may force migrants into illegality. Their findings emphasise that criminalisation by the wider society risks producing the very class of criminal foreigners it so fears. In a related finding, government crackdowns on the informal economy in Spain and Italy may cause the public to further disparage those, often immigrants, who work in it.

Although there is much evidence of exclusion documented by the TSER reports, there are also examples of factors facilitating participation in society. The Child Immigration Project demonstrates the relevance of citizenship rights for the integration of minors, not least because full rights creates legal stability. Yet many European societies compromise these rights. In education, strong support is found for multicultural policies, which may improve the attitudes of children as well as their immigrant parents. If children feel accepted at school, their parents will also feel more accepted and more involved in their education. Yet a survey of teacher training programmes across the EU finds wide disparities in the level of provision and finds that national models of integration significantly inform curricula. It is noteworthy that the majority of trainee teachers in all the countries studied had positive attitudes to cultural diversity. There is a need for common acceptable standards for teacher training in multiculturalism across the EU.
DIVERSITY AND CONVERGENCE

This final section is designed to mention some general points which emerge from the research. In view of the broad scope of the studies, and their diversity in themes and methods, it is not possible to present a set of conclusions here. However, a number of issues recur in many of the studies. We will present some of these here in the form of a list, which can help identify topics for further investigation and discussion. Obviously, we cannot claim that these points are comprehensive, nor that they contain the most important findings of the work. A careful reading of the individual research reports is recommended for this.

1. Policy
Several of the studies demonstrate the importance of government policy in shaping the conditions for immigration and integration. They also show that policies in this area have often had unforeseen and even undesirable consequences. An obvious example is the way increased border restriction has created the conditions for a transnational migrant smuggling industry. All EU countries have changed their policies on immigration, integration and citizenship in recent years – often several times. Policy should therefore be seen as a collective learning process.

2. Public opinion and leadership
Public opinion appears in many cases to drive official policies. Attitudes have often proved a constraint on policies designed to achieve greater equity, or to remove barriers to participation. Public opinion has to be taken seriously in democracies, but it is important to realise that opinion is itself socially constructed. The media and political leaders play a big part in this. Public opinion has often been influence by unwillingness to face up to realities and to take unpopular decisions. Far-sighted leadership is vital, and the EU could play a major part in developing the long-term perspectives needed for this.

3. The actors in immigration and integration
An important cause of policy modification has often been the neglect of various actors in initial policy formation processes. It is vital to realise that a wide range of societal groups have a stake in immigration and integration, and should be included in policy debates. Integration is not just the result of state policies, but of the attitudes and actions of a wide range of groups and individuals. Above all it is vital to include immigrants and ethnic minorities at all stages, if policies are to succeed.

4. The informal economy
A recurring theme in many of the research reports, whatever their central theme, has been the importance of the informal economy in immigration and integration. The informal economy is partly a result of the combination of stricter migration control and deregulation of labour markets. It acts as a magnet for undocumented migrants, but also helps to provide the conditions for economic and social integration. The informal economy is generally seen as undesirable and even pathological. However, it might be better to see it as a dynamic factor in social adaptation and change, and to seek ways of making it function to achieve desirable objectives.

5. Social exclusion
This is another theme that runs through most of the reports. Many immigrants and their descendants remain at the margin of society, with serious consequences for social cohesion. One of the most disturbing findings is that social exclusion has, in many places, come to be seen as a ‘normal condition’ for immigrants and minorities. It is important to understand social exclusion as a cumulative process, in which localised processes in various sub-sectors of society (the labour market, social rights, housing, health, education, etc.) interact to cause exclusion from society for minorities defined in terms of origins, race, ethnicity, gender, generation and location.

6. The ambivalence of welfare services
Government services play a crucial role in integration. Equal access to education, welfare, health and other services is vital if immigrants are to avoid social exclusion. However, research has indicated that some types of service provision actually add to exclusion, by separating immigrants from the rest of the population. Some special services for minorities may hinder integration in education and the labour market. This is one reason for the scepticism of many people towards multiculturalism, which has led to a move away from such policies in some places. It is important to make it clear that multiculturalism, as an appropriate strategy for ethnically diverse societies, has two dimensions: one is recognition of the right to be culturally different, while the other is the provision of the conditions for social equality, such as language courses, vocational training and access to mainstream services.

7. Human rights and the rule of law
Much of the research indicates that social divisions and inequality are in part due to the lack of rights experienced by many immigrants, especially in the early stages of settlement. In several countries, the law courts have acted as a corrective to discriminatory policies (for instance on family reunion, security of residence, access to services) put forward by governments and bureaucracies. It is essential for social integration and cohesion that immigrants and minorities should enjoy full human rights and have equal access to the legal system.

8. Diversity and convergence
The research reports show the diversity of experience of various groups of migrants, of various immigration countries, and of various sub-groups in each place. Policies need to reflect such diversity. On the other hand, there are also clear trends to convergence in settlement experience, community formation and national laws and policies. This convergence can serve as the basis for collaborative policy making. It points to the value of comparative research and international exchange of experience. The transnational collaborative approach epitomised in the multi-national TSER studies can serve as blueprint for EU-wide cooperation in this field.
REFERENCES

REFERENCES TO BACKGROUND SECTION


**REFERENCES TO TSER RESEARCH REPORTS**


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