THE EUROPEAN UNION EMERGENCY TRUST FUND FOR STABILITY AND ADDRESSING ROOT CAUSES OF IRREGULAR MIGRATION AND DISPLACED PERSONS IN AFRICA

STRATEGIC ORIENTATION DOCUMENT

The European Commission Decision on the establishment of the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing the root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa (the ‘Trust Fund’) was adopted on 20 October 2015.¹ The Trust Fund was formally constituted at the Valletta Summit on Migration held on 11-12 November 2015. The Trust Fund will provide funding to fulfil the objectives and implement the Valletta Action Plan and complement financial instruments available for cooperation with African partners by the EU, its Member States and associated countries.

More specifically, it will help address the root causes of destabilisation, forced displacement and irregular migration by promoting economic and equal opportunities, strengthening resilience of vulnerable people, security and development. The Trust Fund will enable the EU, its Member States and contributing donors to respond to the different dimensions of crisis situations by providing support jointly, flexibly and quickly. In doing so, it will complement other strands of action such as political dialogue and development cooperation programmes, as well as humanitarian assistance, stabilisation and crisis response assistance and CFSP/CSDP² actions where appropriate. It will also complement the activities of EU Member States and of other development partners.

It is part of a wider response to the challenges posed by the multifaceted migration phenomenon with which Europe and Africa are both confronted, fully recognising the benefits of well managed migration and mobility between and within the two continents. It also reflects the joint interest of all parties to ensure that refugee flows are managed in an effective, sustainable and safe manner and with full respect for human rights and international law.

It also complements the EU's Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, which recognises the benefits deriving from well-managed mobility taking account of the interests of all parties – the EU, partner countries and migrants themselves – and includes political instruments (bilateral and regional policy dialogues and action plans), legal instruments (such as visa facilitation and readmission agreements), operational support and capacity-building as well as programme and project support made available to third countries and other stakeholders, e.g. civil society and international organisations.

The EU has established dedicated bilateral and regional migration dialogues with countries of West, Central and North Africa (Rabat Process) and East Africa (Khartoum Process). In addition, bilateral Mobility Partnerships (MP) and Common Agendas on Migration and Mobility (CAMM) have been established with a number of strategic partners, such as Morocco, Tunisia (MPs) and Nigeria (CAMM). Further such bilateral dialogues are under consideration with Egypt, Ethiopia, and Niger. The Trust Fund will contribute to this overall approach on migration with high level dialogues at its centre.

² CFSP/CSDP: Common Foreign and Security Policy / Common Security and Defence Policy
The overall objective of the Trust Fund\(^3\) is to address crises in the regions of the Sahel and Lake Chad, the Horn of Africa and in parts of North Africa. It will support all aspects of stability and contribute to better migration management as well as addressing the root causes of destabilisation, forced displacement and irregular migration, in particular by promoting resilience, economic and equal opportunities, security and development, and addressing human rights abuses. The Trust Fund shall intervene in coordination with national and regional frameworks, the other EU instruments, the bilateral cooperation of Member States, and the instruments of other development partners. The actions identified in the Trust Fund shall feed into the future and ongoing joint programming actions/documents elaborated jointly by the Commission services, the EEAS, Member States, and the recipient countries.

The Fund’s interventions will be based on an integrated and evidence-driven approach, coordinated with regional, national or local actors and with other donor interventions and in line with relevant EU and African strategic frameworks and action plans. Its overall impact – the desired end result – should include a more inclusive political and economic environment across the regions, expansion and strengthening of the rule of law, increased economic productivity and social cohesion and new opportunities for local populations.

The Trust Fund will finance activities in North Africa and in the following countries in Africa, crossed by the major migration routes:

- **for the Sahel region and Lake Chad area:** Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, The Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal;
- **for the Horn of Africa:** Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda;
- **for North Africa:** Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia;
- **African neighbours** of these eligible countries may also, on a case-by-case basis, benefit from projects with a regional dimension in order to deal with regional migration flows.

### 1. ANALYSIS AND CHALLENGES

Migration and mobility are among the key areas of cooperation for the EU and its neighbours. Ensuring protection for those in need and tackling common challenges such as reducing the incentives for irregular migration and combating smuggling and trafficking in human beings, while, at the same time, enhancing mobility – especially for education, scientific, cultural, training and professional purposes – are important for the relationship between the EU and its Southern neighbours.

At the same time, the Sahel and Lake Chad region, the Horn of Africa and some parts of North Africa have struggled with growing challenges ranging from extreme poverty, insufficient resilience to food and nutrition crises and/or environmental stress in a context of demographic expansion, through weak social and economic infrastructure, institutional fragility and governance difficulties, to serious crime, insecurity or intra- or inter-state tensions and in some cases open conflict or terrorism/violent extremism. Some of these challenges – or combinations thereof – have induced or forced millions of people into patterns of irregular migration and have created the conditions for smuggling of migrants or even trafficking in human beings.

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\(^3\) as set out in Article 2 of the Constitutive Agreement
The last few years have seen major crises emerge, specifically in Libya and Yemen, as well as revived conflicts in South Sudan, Mali and around Lake Chad and protracted fragile situations such as in Sudan and Somalia. A number of other countries are at risk of violent conflict or an escalation of violence in the future. In addition, the Sahel, Lake Chad and the Horn regions regularly suffer humanitarian crises through natural disasters such as drought, which are likely to become even more acute as a result of climate change, and trigger further humanitarian needs.

Displacement, conflict and fragility data paint a stark image of the multi-dimensional crises affecting eligible countries: According to the 2015 Fragile States Index\(^4\), half of the top 30 most fragile countries worldwide are found among those covered by the Trust Fund. Of the eighteen countries within the Trust Fund’s Sahel/Lake Chad and Horn of Africa regions, sixteen rank within the lowest quadrant of the UN Human Development Index. Conflict and displacement also often play out in areas which are characterised by very low state presence and porosity of borders. This is recognised in the ECOWAS\(^5\) Sahel Strategy, the IGAD\(^6\) peace and security strategy, as well as the EU Sahel Strategy\(^7\), the Council conclusions on Boko Haram threat\(^8\) and the EU Action Plan for the Horn of Africa\(^9\).

By the end of 2014, more than 3.1 million refugees originated from the countries covered by the Trust Fund, i.e. approximately 23% of the global total. The countries also hosted some 3.4 million refugees, representing approximately one quarter of the global refugee population. European Commission figures available for 2015 show that the number of refugees is, as of November 2015, already at over 4.7 million.\(^10\) Forced displacement across the region also included an additional 9.4 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in 2015.

Most forced displacement is intra-region, but a growing mixed flow of migrants\(^11\) has also moved across the Mediterranean towards Europe. On the Central Mediterranean route between Africa and the EU, more than 100,000 illegal border crossings were detected within the period of January to August 2015, and a similar number was detected for the same period in 2014.\(^12\) At the same time, more than 115,000 return decisions were adopted by EU Member States on third country nationals from African states in general, but the majority of these decisions have not been implemented (return ratio ranging generally between 10-30%).

Women and girls are increasingly on the move. They represent approximately half of the world’s 1 billion migrants and comprise about half of any refugee, internally displaced or stateless population.\(^13\) The proportion of refugee children has also increased, from 46% in 2011 to 51% in 2014. Women and children in refugee camps and IDP settings are at risk of sexual violence and abuse. Throughout the migration cycle, women are more at risk of physical violence by fellow migrants, smugglers, and state officers, and can be forced to exchange sex for transport, food, or accommodation. Pregnant women are at additional risk.

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\(^4\) The Fund for Peace is an independent non-profit research and educational organisation that works to prevent violent conflict and promote sustainable security. The Fund produces The Failed States Index, an annual ranking of 177 countries across 12 indicators.

\(^5\) ECOWAS: Economic Community Of West African States

\(^6\) IGAD: Intergovernmental Authority on Development


\(^8\) Adopted at the foreign Affairs Council of February 9, 2015

\(^9\) Council conclusions on the Sahel Regional Action Plan 2015-2020 Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 20 April 2015; Joint staff working paper, 7776/15

\(^10\) Source: European Commission (DG ECHO); excluding Senegal and The Gambia

\(^11\) Mixed flows are defined by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) as “complex population movements including refugees, asylum-seekers, economic migrants and other migrants”, Source: Irregular Migration and Mixed Flows: IOM’s Approach (YEAR)

\(^12\) Source: Commission estimates

\(^13\) UNHCR (2015)
According to UNICEF, 12% of women currently arriving in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) are pregnant, and at increased risk of health complications.

According to demographic projections, 330 million young people will enter the labour market in the next 15 years in Sub-Saharan Africa. The challenge of their socio-economic integration is immense. The loss of young people to frustrated aspirations and hopelessness is not only a drain on development potential, but may also foster radicalisation and the spread of instability and violence or even violent extremism. A lack of success in integrating these young people would be a collective failure, and potentially destabilising for both Africa and Europe.

Eligible countries include many vulnerable countries where assistance from the Trust Fund can be most effective and where it should have the highest impact and best outcomes. Eligible countries are also some of the main countries of origin, transit and destination of migration in Africa. Partnership with them is crucial in order to prevent and fight irregular migration, smuggling and trafficking in human beings, maximise the development impact of migration and mobility, promote international protection and organise legal migration and mobility.

Beyond these common challenges, the Sahel and the Lake Chad region, the Horn of Africa and North Africa have region-specific political and socio-economic profiles and characteristics. An appropriate response thus requires a targeted approach that also takes into account the different degrees of political dialogue and cooperation between the EU and its partners.

The Trust Fund will therefore consist of three windows, one for the Sahel and Lake Chad region, a second for the Horn of Africa and the third for North Africa. However, the activities funded will not necessarily correspond to the geographical scope of the three windows. Under certain themes, such as migration management, cross-window activities will be favoured.

A) Sahel and Lake Chad region

Security and development in the Sahel and the Lake Chad basin are crucial to the European Union. Given the proximity of the Sahel to the EU and its immediate neighbourhood, the EU is committed to work closely with the countries of the Sahel and Lake Chad regions to support their efforts to achieve peace, security and development. In 2011, the EU adopted its Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel, as a response to increasing security and development challenges. In April 2015, this was complemented by the adoption of the Sahel Regional Action Plan, which identifies four priorities: (i) Preventing and countering radicalisation; (ii) Creating appropriate conditions for youth; (iii) Migration and mobility; (iv) Border management, fight against illicit trafficking and transnational organised crime.

With regard to the Lake Chad basin, the EU has three general objectives which are (a) to prevent a general destabilisation of the region; (b) to help reduce the physical threat from Boko Haram to the people of the region; and (c) to contribute to a long-term solution to the root causes that have fuelled the insurgency.

The security situation in the Sahel and in the Lake Chad basin is extremely volatile and includes widespread organised crime and violent extremism and terrorist attacks. In addition, the region is marked by smuggling of migrants and even trafficking in human beings. Increased attacks on, kidnappings of and threats to girls and women by groups such as Boko Haram are a major cause for girls and women fleeing their places of origin in search of safety.
There is a mutually reinforcing relationship between gender inequalities and state fragility in the Sahel.\textsuperscript{14} Women’s political, economic and social exclusion is being exacerbated by the rise of radical Islamist opposition movements. Out of 152 countries on the UN Gender Inequality Index, Niger ranks 151, Chad 150 and Mali 148. Sahelian women’s rights are increasingly caught up in broader political contests over the nature of state and society.\textsuperscript{15} All of these factors as well as reduced resilience are among the root causes of forced displacement and irregular migration and cause people to move in order to avoid conflict, seek protection from persecution or serious harm, and build a better life.

\textit{Poverty and fragility}

Testimony to its socio-economic fragility, large parts of the region continue to face serious food and nutrition challenges which are compounded by the erosion of people’s resilience, due to the increasing frequency of natural disasters (drought but also flooding), the weakness of social services, as well as the impact of conflict and violence. Many of the challenges are structural and cut across several sectors, comprising, for instance, inadequate access to food and health care, insufficient capacities for diagnosis and treatment of malnutrition and weak or insufficient social safety nets. Additional factors contributing to the risk of crises include climate change and the degradation of ecosystems, resulting in erratic weather patterns. It is crucial to build the resilience of vulnerable populations.

There is a widespread lack of economic opportunities and disparities in wealth distribution in the region, in particular for youth. Economic development in the region is mainly driven by agriculture and extractive industries. Diversification of economic activities and stronger non-mineral based economic growth is necessary to create employment and to reduce significantly poverty and income inequalities that continue to prevail across the region.

In the Lake Chad basin, most employment has traditionally been provided by fishing, farming and herding activities. To create additional job opportunities value-added processing of agricultural products, improving trade opportunities and infrastructure should be explored, including vocational training and support for small and medium enterprises (SMEs).

\textit{Economic and political issues}

The EU has already developed a strong portfolio in many areas related to governance and administrative reform in the region. Specific attention still needs to be given to strengthening economic governance, given the importance of transparent, predictable and conducive business environment for fostering economic recovery and equitable growth. Attention should also be given to supporting institutions charged with reforms.

As regards political governance, some of the countries in the region have embarked upon ambitious or gradual reforms, including with a view to strengthening transparency and curbing and preventing corruption in the state sector. Other important reforms concern the provision of basic state services to citizens, including rule of law by means of promoting independence of the judiciary, and need to be consolidated.

\textit{Conflict and instability}

Violent conflict and terrorism are increasingly prevalent across the region, of which Boko Haram-related violence in North-Eastern Nigeria is the most preoccupying feature at the present stage. There is also an increasing spill-over of this violence to neighbouring countries.

\textsuperscript{14} FRIDE policy brief, Nº 204 Gender Inequality and State Fragility in the Sahel, June 2015

\textsuperscript{15} FRIDE policy brief, Nº 204 Gender Inequality and State Fragility in the Sahel, June 2015
like Cameroon, Chad and Niger. The challenge of violent extremism in the Sahel and Lake Chad region is fuelled by a combination of complex factors and circumstances, which go beyond poverty, discrimination, poor economic conditions.

In addition to the violence itself, the presence of Boko Haram has severely disrupted traditional economic activity in the Lake Chad basin, thereby exacerbating existing vulnerabilities.

Migration and displacement
The challenges related to irregular migration and forced displacement are not similar across this region and need to be addressed more specifically, according to particular characteristics of national or sub-regional situations. Priorities to address stability and migration-related challenges therefore need to take into account the country-specific situation and the ongoing efforts made by the countries themselves as well as the EU and other international partners.

Migration and mobility have traditionally characterised the Sahel and the Lake Chad basin. Approximate 84% of migratory flows in West Africa are internal and 6 million people circulate each year within the region (mostly towards the south of the region) for family and/or economic reasons. At the heart of the regional economic integration project, the effective implementation of the ECOWAS Protocol on freedom of movement and a concerted approach to migration needs to be implemented for the region’s growth and development, to provide economic opportunities to populations and thereby prevent irregular migration flows.

Irregular migratory flows towards the EU increased substantially in 2014, notably through the Central Mediterranean route. The year 2015 has so far seen a further aggravation of the situation. The Sahel countries are crossed by major African migration routes, with the dynamics of forced displacement and migration taking different forms. The main countries of origin of migration are Nigeria, Senegal, The Gambia and Mali. Niger is an important hub and transit country for migratory movements from the region towards the coasts of the Mediterranean, requiring strengthened EU efforts, notably to reinforce in a complementary way the actions already launched by the CSDP mission EUCAP Sahel Niger.

With regard to forced displacement, in 2014, the region was host to some 881,061 officially registered refugees. Some 284,377 refugees originated from the region, with most staying within it. 1.8 million IDPs complete the overall picture of forced displacement in 2014. Data available for 2015 show the figure of refugees already above 976,000 and the IDPs at 2.37 million.

Nigeria is currently the main origin country in the region, both in terms of IDPs and refugees staying in the neighbouring countries. The situation remains preoccupying, with some 2.1 million IDPs in the country alone, as of September 2015.

B) The Horn of Africa
In November 2011, the EU adopted a Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa to guide its engagement in the region. The challenges identified in the Strategic Framework remain relevant today: persistent poverty and vulnerability, as well as recurrent food insecurity, exacerbated by the effects of climate change, social grievance, absence of the rule of law, corruption, unaccountable governance, proliferation of small arms; border and/or water disputes; regional cooperation that needs further strengthening. All these factors combine to produce chronic instability in the region.

In October 2015, the EU adopted a Regional Action Plan which highlights particular issues, also affecting EU interests, that have become more pronounced and critical over the last few years, i.e. irregular migration and forced displacement as well as violent radicalisation. Under
the Action Plan, EU interventions in the Horn of Africa aim to resolve and prevent conflict, foster lasting security, stability, development and good governance based on the democratic principles of inclusion, rule of law and respect for human rights.

**Economic and political issues**
The Horn of Africa region has experienced some very positive GDP growth rates – in some cases like Ethiopia of double digits – and several countries have made progress towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals. The benefits of growth, however, are not trickling down everywhere, nor evenly, to the population. High levels of inequality and low levels of social and political participation in public life are still prevalent, undermining national cohesion and adding to a sense of disenfranchisement and marginalisation. This mostly affects young people, who represent over 60% of the population. These challenges are compounded by weak accountability, low levels of transparency and pervasive corruption, as well as restricted political participation and possibility of exercising fundamental rights.

**Conflict and instability**
The Horn of Africa is often ranked as one of the most violent regions in the world. Conflict is currently mostly intra-state in nature, e.g. in Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan. Whilst Somalia is slowly emerging from prolonged conflict, the situation in South Sudan is extremely precarious despite the signing of a peace agreement, and remains a threat to the stability of the region.

The Horn of Africa also retains a significant risk of inter-state conflict. At the same time, the internal dynamics of the region are affected by broader supra-regional dynamics such as the Gulf States’ increasingly active engagement in the politics of the Horn. Dynamics in the Horn of Africa, notably in Sudan and South Sudan, also have a significant impact upon neighbouring regions, whether in the Sahel or Central Africa (Chad, Central African Republic) or in North Africa (Egypt, Libya).

Various forms of violent extremism have also increased in recent years. Growing alienation of communities across the Horn creates a sense of exclusion and marginalisation, which can be exploited to indoctrinate radical and extremist ideologies. Terrorist groups, notably Al-Shabaab, have expanded their influence to a point where they pose a danger to all states in the region and have been able to perpetrate several atrocities.

**Migration and displacement**
The countries of the Horn of Africa are a source of, a transit route and a destination for unprecedented migration flows, mostly within the region but also into Europe (Western and Northern route), Gulf countries and the Middle East (Eastern Route), as well as Southern Africa (Southern route).

In a region with an estimated 242 million inhabitants, the Horn of Africa hosts over 8.9 million displaced persons, including over 6.5 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and about 2.4 million refugees. This is the largest IDP and refugee population in Africa. According to UNHCR, Ethiopia and Kenya are the first and second receiving countries of refugees in Africa while Sudan and South Sudan also account for the biggest IDP population in Africa and one of the biggest in the world.

Countries of the Horn of Africa are also among the main countries of origin of mixed migration flows from Africa to Europe.

A complex set of drivers underpin forced displacement and mixed migration. They include armed conflict, political repression, poor governance, lack of economic opportunities, food
insecurity and climatic disasters. Under the Khartoum Process, the region has set up a regional cooperation framework for ongoing dialogue on Migration and Mobility focusing primarily on human trafficking and smuggling.

C) North Africa

**Economic and political issues**

Together with partner countries, the EU has already developed a strong portfolio in many areas related to governance and administrative reform in the North Africa region. Specific attention still needs to be given under ENI to strengthening economic governance, given the importance of transparent, predictable and conducive business environment for fostering economic recovery and equitable growth. Attention should also be given to supporting institutions charged with reforms.

As regards political governance, some of the countries in the region have embarked upon ambitious or gradual reforms, including with a view to strengthening transparency and curbing and preventing corruption in the state sector. Other important reforms concern the provision of basic state services to citizens, including rule of law by means of promoting independence of the judiciary, and need to be consolidated.

**Legal Migration and Mobility**

North Africa has the largest resident diaspora population within the European Union of the three regions covered by the Trust Fund. Enhancing mobility – especially for education, scientific, cultural, training and professional purposes – recognising the contribution made to the economic and cultural life of the EU and ensuring the protection of the rights of these communities are therefore especially important aspects to be taken into account for these countries.

Some activities under these headings (see Annex 'North Africa window') will come under the Trust Fund, while others are to be funded from other programmes and instruments in accordance with the Valletta Action Plan. These will contribute to an overall balanced approach.

**Conflict and instability**

The deteriorating security situation in Libya since last year is the main risk and aggravating factor for instability in North Africa. The Libyan territory is now controlled by various competing armed factions. In the absence of a centralised state, Libya has become a fertile ground for organised crime, trafficking, smuggling and terrorism, including by factions allied to Daesh.

Negative spill-over effects have been felt in neighbouring countries of the region, as well as in the Sahel region, sometimes in a back-and-forth dynamic. Unless an effective political settlement to the Libyan crisis is implemented, this trend may continue to destabilise the North Africa region and beyond.

As always, instability and conflict can result in forced displacement and form a conducive environment to smuggling of migrants and even trafficking of human beings. These elements should therefore be factored into the strategic response that the Trust Fund will deliver.

**Irregular Migration and displacement**

The EU has, since the Arab Spring, significantly developed its bilateral relations on migration and mobility with ENP partner countries. Mobility Partnerships, based on mutual offers of commitments and project initiatives covering mobility, migration and asylum issues, are the
most complete frameworks for bilateral cooperation between the EU and its partner countries in the field of migration. So far, such political agreements have been signed with Morocco and Tunisia while preliminary discussions with Egypt have started. Bilateral discussions on migration have been launched also with Algeria, while Libya remains a priority country for such a dialogue as soon as circumstances allow. Beyond bilateral channels, migration management in this region requires effective regional dialogue and cooperation frameworks able to address migration-related questions in a comprehensive way along the main migratory routes and to contribute to the reinforcement of a more effective and human rights-based migration management. To this end, the EU and its partners from North West and Central Africa are engaged in relevant discussions in the framework of the ‘Rabat Process’. Since it was established in 2006, the Rabat Process has fostered a solid and fruitful dialogue between the EU and the African countries involved, and enhanced cooperation through the implementation of bilateral, sub-regional, regional and multilateral initiatives.

A regional dialogue with similar objectives, the ‘Khartoum Process’, was launched at a Ministerial Conference in Rome in November 2014, involving countries along the East African migration route and including Egypt and Tunisia.

In terms of mixed migration flows, the North Africa region remains either a transit or final destination for mixed migration flows from Sub-Saharan Africa, and from other conflict-affected countries. The instability still affecting some parts of the region, in particular the conflict in Libya, also continues to generate an increase in the number of persons seeking international protection, as well as irregular movements to Europe. Those in need of protection include the most vulnerable groups on the move, with increased numbers of displaced persons being arbitrarily arrested and detained. Terrorist activity in some parts of the region also reduces de facto access to international protection.

In 2015, UNHCR has registered 155,000 Syrians who have sought refuge in North Africa, approximately 140,000 of them in Egypt. An increasing number of asylum-seekers from South Sudan and Sudan have lately been registered in Egypt, but the number of Somalis, Eritreans, Ethiopian, and Iraqi asylum-seekers remains high.

Large numbers of irregular migrants have continued to take the risk of crossing the Mediterranean via the so-called Central Mediterranean route departing from Libya. So far in 2015, approximately 110,000 have arrived on Italian shores, of whom almost half originate from the Horn of Africa or West Africa. Mixed migration flows from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Gambia, Ghana, Cameroon, Senegal or Guinea, have also marked the Western Mediterranean Route.

In this respect, the key challenge in North Africa continues to be the arrival of mixed migration flows at the time when some of the countries face a risk of instability and witness a period of political transition. This is exacerbated by the absence in some countries of national and regional strategies for managing mixed migration movements, and the lack of national asylum systems in some countries, which are consistent with international standards.

While North Africa is considered to a large extent as a point of transit, in many cases migrants remain in the region for extended periods, establishing communities often clustered together in specific cities and even in specific neighbourhoods in cities of arrival. The search for viable and feasible approaches for displaced people remains a key priority and resilience of host communities is an essential component of any solution. Durable solutions need to be re-addressed with a larger emphasis on the positive contributions and potential of displaced people for the development of host communities.
2. **PRINCIPLES OF INTERVENTION**

The principles and criteria that will guide implementation of the general strategy are:

- **A process to ensure strategic and efficient interventions, in tandem with political dialogue.** Strategies will be elaborated per window in order to frame the interventions. They will outline the particular challenges faced by the region; ongoing EU activities (incl. CSDP where applicable); objectives, priorities and actions that can be implemented in support of those objectives. More detailed operational frameworks will be developed during the identification phase and be presented to the respective Operational Committees. Political dialogue and in-field coordination, led collectively along with EU Member States, will be essential to ensure local ownership.

- **An in-depth understanding of local contexts will enable an evidence-based targeting of geographies, beneficiaries and implementing partners.** This should allow greater precision in the adoption of decisions about where to make investments (areas affected by conflict or at increasing risk of conflict, forced displacement, trafficking or smuggling; areas lacking social services and opportunities or which are a source of irregular migration), who should benefit from them (e.g. at-risk-youth), and with which implementing partners (local, national, regional or international) the objectives can best be advanced in the particular context. To increase efficiency in addressing migration issues, cross-window and cross-region dimension will be considered.

- **Local ownership** will facilitate dialogue and thereby foster cooperation under the Trust Fund. To ensure local ownership, projects should respond to the needs of both partner Governments and communities alike, and allow them to participate in the different steps of the project design (from planning to implementation), while maintaining speed of delivery. Activities to be funded under each window should be in line with these strategic orientations, as well as with existing sectoral, regional and/or development strategies where relevant. **Effective dialogue and cooperation with relevant Regional Organisations** is also necessary to ensure ownership.

- **Holistic, integrated and coordinated approach:** The root causes of instability, forced displacement and irregular migration are diverse, complex and often inter-related. This approach will also promote gender equality at source, and protect children and women along migration routes. Reducing gender inequality, and other forms of discrimination, can also help to prevent further violence and abuse and reduce irregular migration. To have maximum impact and build the resilience of the most vulnerable, projects to be funded should, on the one hand, balance service and livelihood deficits with capacity-building of national and local governments, and, on the other hand, coordinate with other responses from humanitarian, development, Government and private-sector actors. To the extent that they exist and for reasons of sustainability, projects should build on existing frameworks and mechanisms, and be integrated into regional and national policies and plans.

- **Do no harm:** The Trust Fund will take a **conflict-sensitive approach** to designing, implementing and evaluating interventions funded through the Trust Fund. This involves minimising the unintended consequences of the development intervention on conflict situations, i.e. ‘avoiding harm’ and maximising the development contribution to peace and stability.

- **Strong research and analysis** is central to understanding the context and ensuring that interventions have a positive impact. This aspiration is reflected in the EU commitment to fund research and analysis through the Trust Fund, and to use joint
analysis between the relevant EU institutions and Member States and relevant partners.

- **Complementarity with and subsidiarity to EU instruments and tools and/or donor interventions:** The Trust Fund will cover the gaps, both in geographic and in thematic terms, not covered by other means or by other development partners (including EU Member States). This will need to be indicated for each project approved, for example by targeting actions in areas that are not under the control of the national authorities and/or by implementing activities that might fall outside of the scope of the signed National and Regional Indicative Programs and/or by implementing a ‘linking relief rehabilitation and development’ (LRRD) approach. To preserve flexibility, decisions on whether to use – separately from those of the Trust Fund – resources available under the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace, will be taken well before interventions are developed and presented to the respective Operational Committees.

- **Specific legal requirements of the various sources of financing (“notional approach”):** The Trust Fund will include funds from a number of EU budget lines as well as from the European Development Fund (EDF), EU Member States and other partners. For the EU contributions, the European Commission will ensure that the specific requirements of the relevant legal bases will be respected, on the basis of a “notional approach” (including, for example, the requirements regarding official development assistance (ODA) eligibility under the EDF and the Development Cooperation Instrument). In cases where a beneficiary country or regional organisation has agreed to the transfer of funds covered by existing programming documents (National or Regional Indicative Programmes) into the Trust Fund, the scope and objectives of the original programming provisions will be respected while taking into account the specific objectives of the Trust Fund. The inclusion of resources from the IcSP is subject to finding arrangements that would preserve the specific requirements of the IcSP regulation, including the flexibility and rapidity of actions under Article 3. With regard to the contributions of EU Member States and other donors, donors may indicate the specific window(s) to which they wish their allocations to be allocated.

### 3. Objectives and strategic lines of action for the Trust Fund and its regional windows

The activities financed by the Trust Fund must contribute to the overall objective of the Fund as set out in Article 2 of the Constitutive Agreement, namely to support all aspects of stability and contribute to address the root causes of destabilisation, forced displacement and irregular migration, in particular by promoting resilience, economic and equal opportunities, security and development and better migration management.

In line with Annex I to the Constitutive Agreement, the Trust Fund will therefore be implemented along the following four strategic lines of action applicable to the three windows. While more specific objectives and lines of action for each of the windows are indicatively outlined in the window specific strategies, sufficient flexibility, as an inherent element of the Trust Fund, will be kept, so as to quickly adapt to changing circumstances or

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new challenges by providing support to any relevant areas covered under the four strategic lines of action.

**Objective 1: Greater economic and employment opportunities**

Establishing inclusive economic programmes that create employment opportunities, especially for young people and women in local communities, with a focus on vocational training and creation of micro- and small enterprises. Some interventions will, in particular, support returnees after their return to their countries of origin.

**Intervention logic:** If the Trust Fund can help meet the economic and social needs of regional populations and create opportunities especially for young people and women, it will catalyse stability, inclusive economic growth, social cohesion and development in the region. Actions will take account of the particular situations of women and other people that may face additional barriers to accessing economic opportunities and financial services.

The main assumption is that short and long term grievances arising from economic and social exclusion, marginalisation and inequality are important drivers of violence, forced displacement and irregular migration and that the Trust Fund can help to provide alternative opportunities for communities in the respective regions, stimulating stability, inclusive economic and social growth and development.

**Objective 2: Strengthening resilience of communities and in particular the most vulnerable, as well as refugees and displaced people**

Supporting resilience in terms of food security and of the wider economy, including basic services for local populations, and in particular the most vulnerable, as well as refugees and displaced people, including through community centres or other means of providing them with food and nutrition security, health, education and social protection, as well as environmental sustainability.

**Intervention logic:** If the Trust Fund can sustainably improve the provision of basic services and food security and protection for local communities and those displaced by violent conflict, political oppression and environmental pressures - tensions between host and displaced communities will be reduced and resource management, resilience, protection and human development will be improved for vulnerable communities. Ensuring that these measures take account of age and gender dimensions will be essential.

The main assumption here is that the Trust Fund will improve the ability of individuals, households, communities, and state and regional institutions to prepare for, to withstand, to adapt, and to quickly recover from stresses and shocks without compromising long-term development prospects. Improved resilience should reduce violence and risk-taking behaviour. By bringing together political dialogue, peacebuilding, principled humanitarian aid and development priorities through a comprehensive and coherent approach, better results will be achieved on the ground. Furthermore, moving from humanitarian assistance to longer-term development processes should empower populations and institutions alike both in areas of protracted displacement as well as areas of return.

**Objective 3: Improved migration management in countries of origin, transit and destination**

Improving migration management in all its aspects in line with the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, and the Rabat and Khartoum processes, including contributing to the development of national and regional strategies on migration management, containing and preventing irregular migration and fight against trafficking of human beings, smuggling of migrants and other related crimes, effective return and readmission, international protection and asylum, legal migration and mobility, enhancing synergies between migration and
development. All efforts need to be made bearing in mind the fact that migration flows are mixed and that credible solutions need to be found for people in need of international protection. Further, the principle of ‘non-refoulement’ needs to be mainstreamed in the various interventions.

**Intervention logic:** If the Trust Fund can strengthen institutions that manage migration and borders (including in their capacities), it will prevent smuggling of migrants and trafficking of vulnerable groups by criminal networks, as well as facilitating mutually agreed arrangements on return and readmission, which give preference to voluntary return and ensure full respect of human rights and human dignity. Comprehensive migration policies should be supported, so as to enhance the implementation of legislative and regulatory frameworks aligned with international conventions and agreements, to facilitate the management of civil status registration and the issuance of identity and travel documents and to improve protection, notably through the support to Regional Development and Protection Programmes (RDPP).

At the same time, mobility regimes can stimulate regional economic development, exchanges of knowledge, skills and entrepreneurship. As regards legal migration and mobility, including at intra-regional level, comprehensive labour migration policies and strategies will be promoted, supporting talent and skill management and qualification recognition. To this end, legal tools should be adopted and credible administrative structures built to protect migrants’ rights and fight against illegal employment and system abuse. The collection of reliable, accurate and comprehensive data on labour migration and markets and on migrant workers, including residence and work permits, while respecting international standards on the protection of personal data, is also conducive to assess labour markets needs and manage migration better.

Tackling trafficking and forced labour, and ensuring that where migration happens it is safe from such risks will reduce the risks that girls, boys and women fall into prostitution, forced labour and other abusive situations. Developing gender and age appropriate responses to the crises can diminish sexual violence.

**Objective 4: Improved governance and conflict prevention and reduction of forced displacement and irregular migration**

**Supporting improvements in the overall good governance**, in particular by promoting conflict prevention, addressing human rights abuses and enforcing the rule of law, including through capacity building in support of security and development, as well as law enforcement, including border management and migration related aspects. Some actions will also contribute to prevent and counter radicalisation and extremism.

The Trust Fund should support countries in enhancing their border management capacities, in preventing and managing irregular migration and in strengthening operational cooperation in border management through national strategies, cooperation agreements and secure exchange of information as well as technical cooperation in the area of border staff training and in the area of new technologies.

**Intervention logic:** If the Trust Fund can improve governance so that governments work with their citizens to provide more inclusive services (including security and justice), it will create a stronger social contract and a more peaceful society which is conducive to development and economic and social growth. Supporting women’s organisations and participation in decision making and in peace and security, will be also measures to support good governance. Fragility and gender inequality are mutually reinforcing. The assumption is that reducing inequality and discrimination will reduce causes of irregular migration but also protect women and children from systematic abuse throughout the migration cycle. Depending on the context,
measures may be needed to support the inclusion of groups traditionally discriminated against in order to improve social cohesion and peace.

_Cross cutting output: Improved policy and practice_

**Intervention logic:** If the Trust Fund can help fill knowledge gaps about the causes and drivers of forced displacement, irregular migration and violent conflict, including their gender and age dimensions, at a regional, country and local level, capture lessons learned and generate evidence of impact, and feed this knowledge into improved practice, it will multiply its impact and be more able to react flexibly and in a conflict sensitive manner to changing circumstance.

The main assumption here is that the Trust Fund can have much greater impact by ensuring information, experience and lessons generated across the program are used to influence other development programming. As all interventions have a positive or negative impact on the development context and by using analysis to target programming, it is more likely to have a positive effect.

In order to support this output, dedicated funding from the Trust Fund will be made available to carry out specific analyses, gather relevant data and draw lessons learned which will inform strategic decisions, and project design and implementation.

All projects funded by the Trust Fund will contribute to the above objectives.

_The Trust Fund Board may review this Strategic Orientation Document, including the specific orientations per window, on an annual basis._
## 4. Indicative Resources Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instruments</th>
<th>Commitments (EUR)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reserve of the 11th EDF</td>
<td>1 000 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Indicative Programme for West Africa – 11th EDF</td>
<td>200 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Indicative Programme for Central Africa – 11th EDF</td>
<td>10 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Indicative Programme for Eastern Africa, Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean – 11th EDF</td>
<td>25 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Indicative Programmes for Horn of Africa 11th EDF</td>
<td>80 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Support Programme for South Sudan – 9th and previous EDFs</td>
<td>80 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Neighbourhood Instrument</td>
<td>200 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian aid, food aid and disaster preparedness*</td>
<td>50 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development Cooperation Instrument</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund / Internal Security Fund (tbc)</td>
<td>20 000 000 (tbc)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Member States’ contributions</td>
<td>Amounts to be confirmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicative total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>1 800 000 000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Notionally earmarked to the resilience interventions.

The amounts originating from regional and national indicative programmes will be used respecting the geographical scope of the legal base. This is in line with the ‘notional approach’ referred to above under principles of intervention. For example, the West African Regional Indicative Programme (RIP) contribution will be used in West Africa.

As for the financial contribution of EUR 1 000 000 000 financed from the reserve of the 11th European Development Fund (EDF) the Commission Decision mentions in its Article 1 that “Out of this funding, two thirds shall be allocated to the Sahel region and the Lake Chad Basin, and one third to the Horn of Africa region”. It specifies in Article 4, however (setting the payment modalities), that “The geographical split mentioned in article 1 may be revisited through a Commission decision before drawing from the second and third tranches, adopted in accordance with the procedures laid down in Article 14 of Council Regulation (EU) 2015/322 on the implementation of the 11th EDF”.

EU Member States and third countries making additional contributions, will decide to which window or windows of the Trust Fund they will allocate their financial contributions.
1. Regional background and context
The Sahel and Lake Chad Window of the EU Emergency Trust Fund comprises of nine countries: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, The Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal. These countries have in common a considerable number of challenges that can be addressed by the Trust Fund, complementing EU instruments employed.

In the Sahel and Lake Chad region, challenges linked to the extreme poverty, lack of stability including economic fragility and low resilience remain acute. This is exacerbated by climate change in a region where more than 80% of the population relies essentially on agriculture and pastoral activities. Irregular migration and related crimes such as trafficking in human beings and smuggling of migrants, corruption, illicit trafficking and transnational organised crime are thriving particularly where there is an insufficient presence of governmental authority and public administration. These security challenges have been increasingly linked to terrorist groups and illicit trafficking of all kinds.

The region also faces growing challenges related to demographic pressure, extreme poverty, institutional weaknesses and governance, weak social and economic infrastructures, environmental stress and insufficient resilience to food and nutrition crises. All of these factors are root causes of forced displacement and make people flee conflict, seek protection from persecution or serious harm, or seek new economic opportunities and build a better life.

As a consequence, migration pressure is mounting, with serious implication both for the countries in the region and the EU.

Given the proximity of the Sahel to the EU and its immediate neighbourhood, the EU is working closely with the countries of the Sahel and Lake Chad region to support their efforts to achieve peace, security and development. In 2011, the EU adopted its Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel, as a response to the increasing security and development challenges in the region, and in April 2015, this was complemented by the adoption of the Sahel Regional Action Plan, which identifies four priorities: (i) Preventing and countering radicalisation; (ii) Creating appropriate conditions for youth; (iii) Migration and mobility; (iv) Border management, fight against illicit trafficking and transnational organised crime. These four domains are all highly relevant for the stabilisation of the Sahel region, and have been endorsed by the Sahel Foreign Ministers of the G5 Sahel during their meeting with the High Representative/Vice-President of the Commission in June 2015.

Concerning the Lake Chad, on which 30 million people’s subsistence depends, after the war in Darfur, the unfolding crisis in Libya, the tensions between Soudan and South Soudan, and the conflict in Mali, the region is now affected by two other important and linked crisis: the destabilisation of the Central African Republic and the escalation of the Boko Haram violence around Lake Chad. Nigeria has been at the centre of the conflict, but Cameroon, Chad and Niger are also seriously impacted. It is the EU’s political objective, in coordination and cooperation with other stakeholders to (i) help prevent a general destabilisation of the Lake
Chad region; (ii) help reduce the physical threat from Boko Haram to the people of the region; (iii) contribute to a long-term solution to the root causes that have fuelled terrorism and radicalisation, including by revitalising the Lake Chad Basin. The EU’s response has to be centred on Nigeria where the crisis has its origin, but needs also to include elements of support to the neighbouring countries, in particular Cameroon, Chad and Niger, experiencing the spill-over effects of the threat and the violence.

Dialogue between the EU and the region of Sahel/Lake Chad on security, stability and migration-related issues is currently being stepped up, based on existing or reinforced dialogues (e.g. Sahel Strategy, CAMM signed with Nigeria, visit of the High Representative Vice President Mogherini to Niger on September 18, 2015, the Valletta Summit on Migration of November 11-12, 2015) and different platforms (Rabat process, ECOWAS, G5 Sahel18, Lake Chad Basin Commission). These processes should be strengthened by the reinforcement of dialogue at local level, which are essential to further develop cooperation and to reinforce the EU engagement in the region.

Migration and mobility has traditionally characterised the Sahel and Lake Chad region. Nomadism and transhumance are ancestral practices in this region of the world used to adapt to difficult environmental context (erratic rainfall, drought, etc.). These movements of populations can be triggers of conflicts and could be exacerbated by climate change. Approximately 84% of migratory flows in West Africa are internal and an estimated 6 million people circulate each year within the region for family and/or economic reasons. At the heart of the regional economic integration project, the effective implementation of the ECOWAS Protocol on freedom of movement and a concerted approach to migration is considered vital for the region’s growth and development, to provide economic opportunities to populations and thereby prevent irregular migration flows.

Irregular migration flows towards the EU increased substantially in 2014, notably through the Central Mediterranean route, and the flows have been continuously high so far in 2015. The main countries of origin of migration are Nigeria, Senegal, The Gambia and Mali. Niger is an important hub and transit country for migratory movements towards the coasts of the Mediterranean with migrants coming not only from the West and Central African countries, but also from the Horn of Africa and the Middle East. This has led to strengthened efforts and EU support, notably through the reinforcement the CSDP mission EUCAP Sahel in Niger and other instruments.

2. Regional challenges and priorities

Most of the challenges related to the root causes of instability, irregular migration and forced displacement are transnational and have a regional character and should be treated as such. However, the sub-regions and individual countries have different characteristics and it is therefore important that they are targeted specifically taking into consideration their particular context.

A considerable proportion of the countries covered by the Trust Fund are areas with widespread poverty, food and nutrition insecurity, lack of natural resources for agricultural development and a lack of employment opportunities, in particular for youth. Such areas (e.g. the Kayes region in Mali, “Zone du Fleuve” in Senegal) are traditionally regions of emigration, in particular to Europe. For similar reasons, intra-regional migration, often seasonal, takes place on a large scale from Sahel countries (e.g. Niger, Burkina Faso) to West African coastal countries such as Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire.

18 G5 Sahel was formally created December 2014 by the following states: Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger
On the other hand, some specific regions covered by the Trust Fund are known as major regions of transit for irregular migrant flows, such as Northern Mali and the Agadez region in Niger. Whereas transit through northern Mali has declined due to the security situation, it is estimated that an average of 2000 migrants per week have been transiting through Agadez in 2015, thus representing a major hub for the Mediterranean route that reaches Europe through Northern Africa. Such massive flows of migrants exert significant pressure on local communities and infrastructure. However, they also provide considerable sources of income both in the formal and informal sectors. In addition, the presence of human trafficking and smuggling networks are a major feature of these regions, not without having a significant impact on societies, in particular the rule of law and justice environment. The Trust Fund should support the generation of alternative sources of revenue, not only for migrants but also for host populations.

Other regions are marked by insecurity and terrorist action, such as the North of Mali and the Lake Chad region, as well as by serious environmental threats that could be exacerbated if the Lake Chad would further dry up. This instable situation is causing not only numerous losses of human lives, in particular due to Boko Haram violence, but also an important flow of refugees and internal displacement of the local population. As of November 2015, some 2.5 million people are estimated to be internally displaced in the Lake Chad region. The number of people facing acute level of food shortage is estimated at 4 million, but terrorist activities and insecurity take other tolls in terms of a breakdown of trade flows (and tax revenue), as well as a largely reduced presence of public administration and basic social services.

Summarising these specific sets of challenges, a number of broad priorities can indicatively be identified, within the wider framework of the four priority areas of intervention of the Trust Fund:

(a) In situations or regions marked by ongoing armed conflict, terrorist activity and massive displacement of people, Trust Fund support should contribute to enhance sustainable livelihoods and self-reliance opportunities for displaced people, host communities and violence-affected populations, as well as to strengthen their human rights, in particular of the most vulnerable people such as women and children. Complementing the ongoing humanitarian aid to refugees and displaced people, it could thus focus on improving the protection capacities of the competent authorities and on developing Regional Development and Protection Programmes (RDPP), as well as on the provision of basic services, on economic recovery and revitalisation of the Lake Chad, promoting economic opportunities for displaced persons, especially for youth, thus reducing dependency on humanitarian assistance.

(b) In situations or regions with generally low levels of development, high prevalence of low incomes, food and nutrition insecurity and insufficient access to basic services, the Trust Fund could contribute to strengthening resilience, in particular of the most vulnerable parts of the population, including through improved food and nutrition security, health services, education and social protection.

(c) In situations or regions under demographic pressure and offering low employment prospects, especially for youth, the Trust Fund could contribute to enhancing professional skills and employability of young people, to promote regional frameworks for legal migration and mobility, to stepping up support to SME development and increasing access to finance and financial inclusion. In this regard, the Trust Fund could focus on empowering women and supporting the reintegration of returnees.

(d) In regions of origin and transit of irregular migrants and in regional economic hubs, the Trust Fund could help to boost socio-economic development, by creating job
opportunities, especially for youth. It could also support enhancing national and regional capacities regarding migration management, including the elaboration of comprehensive national and regional strategies to address cross-border issues such as migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings, the establishment of data collection and analysis systems as well as return and readmission, legislative and policy frameworks and promote comprehensive packages for better preventing and fighting migrant smuggling as well as promoting return and reintegration of migrants to their home countries.

(e) Across the region, to address wider issues of governance and security, the Trust Fund should help to improve capacities of partner countries to fight terrorism and organised crime, particularly criminal networks involved in migrants’ smuggling and trafficking of human beings, as well as to promote security and justice sector reform. It could support cross-border cooperation and specific actions, including capacity building (law enforcement, judiciary, consular) or the reinforcement of dialogue at different levels; to improve border management, including the development of civil registries, as well as contribute to counter radicalisation and violent extremism and promoting non-violent conflict resolution.

Within this overall strategic approach and in line with the indicative regional priorities identified, targeted specific dialogues with national, regional and local authorities and other stakeholders will be developed to guide and facilitate the identification and coordination of projects and activities supported by the Trust Fund at country, sub-regional and regional level.

3. Relations between the Trust Fund and EU instruments

The EU is involved in the region via a variety of tools including instruments for development cooperation, the EU Special Representative for the Sahel, civil and military CSDP missions, the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), Humanitarian aid, as well as the resilience initiative AGIR, and others. Equally important are the ongoing and planned programmes and activities of the Members States, which should be taken into consideration as an integral part of the overall EU intervention, joint programming being an important instrument for this coordination.

Development cooperation already contributes to a large extent to tackling the situation of fragility and instability. EU current programming for 2014-2020 already supports African partners to address a number of the most urgent issues, both at national and regional level through the National Indicatives Programmes (NIP) and the Regional Indicative Programme (RIP). The identification of actions will be carried out with the full ownership and under the primary responsibility of the countries concerned, according to the principles set out in the Strategic orientation document of the Trust fund and in coordination with key regional organisations and partners, in particular the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC), the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), the G5 Sahel19, the Lake Chad Basin Commission, as well as with civil society.

19 Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger.
THE EUROPEAN UNION EMERGENCY TRUST FUND FOR STABILITY AND ADDRESSING ROOT CAUSES OF IRREGULAR MIGRATION AND DISPLACED PERSONS IN AFRICA

STRATEGIC ORIENTATION DOCUMENT

ANNEX: HORN OF AFRICA WINDOW

1. Regional background and challenges to be addressed

Forced displacement, irregular migration, trafficking in human beings, smuggling of people and violent conflict are transnational challenges that affect all the countries of the Horn of Africa (and beyond), albeit to various degrees. The geostrategic situation of the region makes it a source of (Eritrea, Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan), a destination for (Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Uganda) and a transit region (Sudan, Ethiopia, Djibouti) for migrants and refugees. The region has been confronted with mixed migration flows of unprecedented magnitude, both within the region and towards Europe, the Gulf States and Southern Africa. In a region with an estimated 242 million inhabitants, the Horn of Africa hosts over 8.9 million displaced persons, including over 6.5 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and about 2.4 million refugees. This is the largest IDP and refugee population in Africa.

The root causes of this are firmly linked to the chronic instability in the region. The Horn is often ranked as one of the most violent regions in the World with the conflicts in Sudan, Somalia and South Sudan, and ongoing tensions between Eritrea and Ethiopia, affecting the stability of the entire region and having a spillover effect in the Sahel and North Africa. The internal dynamics of the Horn are also affected by the increased active engagement of the Gulf States in the region and the effect of the Yemen crisis.

Although manifested differently according to national and local contexts, marginalisation, lack of economic opportunities, weak governance, absence of the rule of law, natural disasters, food insecurity and long-standing conflict drivers are at the roots of these problems. Approximately 60-70% of the region consists of lightly populated borderlands, remote and peripheral arid and semi-arid areas. While they usually receive little investment, the peripheries and borderlands are often important sites of cross-border economies and bear the brunt of refugee movements, including protracted situations. The lack of equitable distribution of wealth can result in a growing alienation between the centre and periphery. This tension is at the root of the multiple political, economic, social and environmental vulnerabilities afflicting the region, whose effects transcend and spill over borders.

Moreover, various forms of violent extremism are also increasing across the region. Terrorist groups, notably Al-Shabaab, pose a danger to all states in the region and have been able to perpetrate several grave atrocities.

2. Response strategy

In this context, the central priority of the EU is to support peace, stability and prosperity throughout the Horn of Africa. It is essential to reduce the negative impact of violent conflict, forced displacement and irregular migration; to foster a more inclusive political and economic environment across the region; and to create new opportunities for vulnerable communities, in particular youth.
The EU intervention in the Horn should therefore help to expand and strengthen the rule of law, as well as migration management, including capacity for reintegration of returnees, increase economic productivity and social cohesion, and build resilience to natural and man-made disasters, particularly in peripheral areas and borderlands.

This requires action at the national level combined with a strong approach. The scale of migration and displacement and their nature (protracted and across boundaries) calls for cross-border solutions and burden sharing. To address some of these challenges, the region has set up a regional cooperation framework within the Africa-EU Migration and Mobility dialogue, the Khartoum Process, which currently focuses primarily on addressing trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling. Tackling violent conflict and extremism, themselves drivers of forced displacement, also requires a regional approach, given the connection between the different contributing factors. A regional approach is also needed to strengthening resilience and interventions in peripheral regions, across borders and will demand a better synchronisation of national and regional approaches towards the political, development, economic, migration and security aspects.

3. The priorities for the Trust Fund’s Horn of Africa Window

The Trust Fund envisages actions on a country, regional and cross-regional basis. To ensure strategic and efficient interventions, the identification of projects should be based on a dialogue with relevant authorities and other stakeholders. A conflict sensitive and evidence-based approach, underpinned by an in-depth understanding of local contexts, and how instability, forced displacement and irregular migration affect local economic and social development, should guide all interventions.

In line with the four priority areas of intervention of the Trust Fund, the initial priority actions under the Horn of Africa window relevant to all countries have been indicatively outlined below. Given the disparity of challenges faced by each partner country, further country-specific priorities will be identified in a next step.

Priority actions:

- The Horn of Africa window could catalyse a new approach to peripheral and cross border areas, providing a more targeted response to tackle the main determinants of vulnerability (marginalisation, exclusion, destitution) and targeting populations at risk (particularly youth) in particular where instability, forced displacement and irregular migration are playing out.

This new approach should prioritise interventions along identified migratory routes used by mixed migrants spanning across the region and neighbouring countries, such as Chad, Egypt, Libya or Yemen. It could also focus on peripheral areas such as the coasts of Kenya and Tanzania, North-Eastern Kenya, northern Uganda, Somalia and peripheral areas of Ethiopia where actual or perceived grievances offer a breeding ground for violent extremism and/or civil unrest. Particular attention could also be paid to specific cross-border areas identified by the regional body IGAD where lack of development, destitution and environmental degradation drives violent conflict and displacement on a massive scale, such as in the Karamoja (Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda and South Sudan), Somali and (Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya) the Dikhil (Ethiopia, Somalia and Djibouti) clusters.

- In close coordination with the new resilience approach to borderlands and peripheral areas, the Horn of Africa window should also prioritise the creation of economic opportunities and job skills for the Youth through technical vocational and education training and employment generation related actions. In addition to those areas
mentioned above, Trust Fund interventions could focus on specific areas of Sudan (such as the Eastern states and Darfur), Eritrea, Tanzania and Djibouti.

- The Horn of Africa window should aim to facilitate the implementation of the Migration and Mobility Dialogue and the Khartoum process, as well as the Common Agenda on Migration and Mobility (CAMM) with Ethiopia, in particular by developing enhanced national capacity to address mixed migration flows, improve migration governance, strengthen international protection, provide for integrated border management, foster mobility and free movement of people, address remittances and diaspora issues, increase capacity in prevention and fighting against trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling, including through the creation of dedicated national strategies, and provide assistance for sustainable reintegration of the returned persons. A specific emphasis should be put on the development of national and regional migration policies and legislation, on the development of national capacities for migration management, including identification and readmission and reintegration, on the establishment of data collection and analysis systems and on support to police and judicial authorities in line with international standards on rights of migrants.

This will apply to all the countries part of the Khartoum process, where specific actions will be agreed with the concerned countries through adequate political dialogue. A combination of regional, cross-regional and national approaches will be pursued, including in relation to integrated border management, free movement of people return and readmission of migrants, and addressing remittances issues.

- The Horn of Africa window should support a Regional Development and Protection Programme (RDPP) for the Horn of Africa notably in the largest receiving countries of forcefully displaced people. Actions could address the developmental and protection needs of people suffering long-term displacement, both refugee/IDP and returnee populations, and host and return communities. They should focus on durable solutions, improving protection space, in particular for the most vulnerable groups, including the provision of and access to basic services, appropriate reception conditions, and capacity building for authorities, generating income, creating jobs, education and livelihood opportunities, fostering social cohesion amongst the refugee and host communities, and raising awareness about the perils of irregular migration and criminal networks.

In the Horn of Africa, these actions could prioritise Ethiopia, Kenya, and Sudan, with the possibility of adding other countries such as Uganda who are also hosting large refugee communities.

- Special priority should also be given to sustainable solutions for the Somali refugees, including greater prospects for voluntary return, provision of basic services and improved living conditions of IDPs and development prospects for peoples living in areas freed from Al-Shabaab.

- In South Sudan, the Trust Fund should support the direct needs of the people including basic services, livelihood, justice and reconciliation. Support to establishing

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20 Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya, Egypt and Tunisia.
21 An amount of 85 million from the existing South Sudan Support Programme 2011-2013 will be implemented through the Trust Fund in support of the peace agreement. A notional approach will be applied to this amount so that it support actions implemented within South Sudanese territory.
the transitional institutions and developing sound policies, including economic, is also essential for the rebuilding of the country and should be foreseen.

In view of the interdependences between the different regions, the possibility to design interventions across the windows of the Trust Fund will be important. For example, the links with Libya (a transit country in the Central Mediterranean migratory route and a factor of instability in Darfur), Egypt (transit country in the Northern migratory route and also an important actor regarding key security issues of the region) and Chad (home to a large population of Darfuri refugees) are particularly relevant.

The country specific priorities and actions to be funded under the Horn of Africa window will be based on a country-by-country and local analyses, as will take into account actions foreseen under other EU Instruments notably the National Indicative Programmes and thematic programmes under the Development Cooperation Instrument.

4. Relations between the Trust Fund and EU instruments

The EU is involved in the region via a variety of tools including instruments for development cooperation, the EU Special Representative, civil and military CSDP missions, the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) and others.

Migration and forced displacement obey to different push and pull factors, which EU assistance can facilitate to address according to their different nature. The Horn of Africa window of the Trust Fund will have a focus on borderlands, which lag in development and where displaced populations settle disproportionately. Host communities are traditionally underrepresented and public and private investments in basic services, economic opportunities, justice and security are very limited. The Trust Fund will support the countries of the region to address the root causes that lead groups of people to migrate out of poverty and destitution. It will facilitate development-oriented solutions, prioritising both refugees and IDPs, as well as host and, where possible, return communities.

Despite conflict and instability, the Horn of Africa is also a region with steep economic growth and dynamism, vast natural resources such as oil, gas and underground water, untapped agricultural capacity and an emerging entrepreneurial and business community. Through national, regional and thematic indicative programmes, the EU is already supporting the countries of the region to sustain economic growth whilst making it more equitable, manage natural resources transparently and responsibly and harness them for inclusive development, exploit the agriculture potential and strengthen the business climate. Through this approach, the EU will facilitate the efforts of partner countries to respond to the aspirations of its people and their desire to evolve and reach their potential.

EU national and regional programmes in the Horn of Africa amount to EUR 3.4 billion for the period 2014-2020. They focus on supporting the agriculture and infrastructure sectors, and improve accountability and overall governance. They directly contribute to addressing the motivations that encourage groups of people to voluntarily migrate for economic reasons. By comparison, the Horn of Africa window of the Trust Fund will implement a budget of EUR 600 million, and will focus on increasing human development, job creation, migration management and combatting violent conflict and extremism. It will directly contribute to addressing the push factors that force people to migrate because of instability, poverty and destitution.

Both the national and regional indicative programmes, and the Horn of Africa window of the Trust Fund, will be implemented in full complementarity with each other. Whilst each will respond to particular motivations that lead people to migrate, and as such each will prioritise
different geographical areas, separate population groups, specific thematic areas, and particular institutional support partner countries, both will respond to the overarching objectives of supporting partner countries to address root causes of irregular migration.

Complementarities will also be sought with actions implemented through other funding instruments such as the Development Cooperation Instrument and in particular its thematic programmes such as the Global Public Goods and Challenges in the area of migration and asylum.
THE EUROPEAN UNION EMERGENCY TRUST FUND FOR STABILITY AND ADDRESSING ROOT CAUSES OF IRREGULAR MIGRATION AND DISPLACED PERSONS IN AFRICA

STRATEGIC ORIENTATION DOCUMENT

ANNEX: NORTH AFRICA WINDOW

1. Regional background and challenges to be addressed

North Africa remains an area of transit and final destination for mixed migration flows from sub-Saharan Africa, West Africa, the Horn of Africa and the Middle East, with many countries of these regions affected by on-going conflict. It also represents one of the largest destination regions for foreign labour and is a region of origin for migrants, albeit to a lesser extent.

The movements of displaced people across North Africa reflect a broad set of historical, economic, social and demographic dynamics. Yet these mixed migration flows reveal fundamental deficiencies in development, stability, peace and security. The movements of refugees, asylum seekers and economic migrants, including unaccompanied minors and victims of trafficking

Migratory flows through and to North Africa comprise the Western routes (originating from West Africa by way of Mauritania and Morocco or through the desert via Niger and Mali to Algeria, Morocco and Libya) and the Central Mediterranean routes (originating in the Horn of Africa by way of Sudan into Libya and to a lesser extent into Egypt). Yet these ever-shifting routes, in some areas highly dangerous, are not always matched by a commensurate degree of cooperation between authorities and neighbouring countries on an inter-regional level.

Outflows originating from North Africa, including secondary movements of migrants from other regions such as the Middle East or Sub-Saharan Africa can often be irregular and thus difficult to manage and respond to. However, they have life-changing effects on migrants themselves, on host communities and on communities of origin, and thus have to be governed ensuring developmental objectives and migrants’ rights.

Terrorist activity from Libya, as well as in the Sahel, also represent major security threats for neighbouring countries where law enforcement bodies have a limited ability to monitor and detect movements across borders. Moreover, forced displacement generated by the Syrian crisis, although limited, has further contributed to instabilities in the region. Stranded migrants who seek return assistance in unstable countries face further challenges due to the lack of proper travel documentation. The ability of migrant smuggling networks and other organised crime groups to quickly and easily adapt to new routes, and the opportunity offered by criminal networks to escape insecure circumstances, expose migrants to further vulnerabilities such as ransoms, exploitation or trafficking.

The instability still affecting some parts of the region, in particular Libya, continues to generate irregular movements to Europe, as well as an increase in the number of persons seeking international protection. Libya serves as both a country of final destination and a country of transit towards Europe for irregular migration and forced displacement. It also remains the most common departure point in North Africa. The ongoing political and security
crisis in the country, with rival groups competing for power, has created greater protection needs, in particular with regard to the most vulnerable groups on the move.

Women and children face additional threats during their transit or at the point of arrival, including trafficking, prostitution, exploitation, violence and sexual abuse, as well as discriminations on the labour market.

2. Response strategy

In this context, the central priority of the EU is to promote security, stability and prosperity, as well as conflict prevention and peace-building, and thus contribute to the effective management of migration throughout North Africa.

To this end, the strategy of the window North of Africa will follow two main axes:

- **A rights-based migration management**: this should be carried out by contributing to social cohesion, safe mobility and security, including through a gender-sensitive and child friendly approach. Ensuring international protection, in accordance with international law, for persons displaced by war, persecution or natural disasters remains essential. Forcibly displaced populations should be guaranteed access to durable solutions and the right to non-refoulement, as well as access to basic social and health services. A more effective border management in North African countries would in addition lead to a more efficient management of mixed migration flows and countering human trafficking.

- **Advancing mutually beneficial legal migration and mobility**: this is an important part of addressing the drivers of forced displacement and irregular migration, along with fostering a more inclusive political and economic environment across the region. This would be conducive to creating new opportunities for vulnerable communities and youth groups who are at risk of marginalisation and exclusion, leading in some cases to radicalisation and violent extremism.

These actions should not only be carried out on a national level, but they also call for cross-border solutions and responsibility sharing. The possibility offered by the Trust Fund to address cross-border issues will allow for the development of joint actions along the migratory routes which concern these countries.

Since some of these countries, such as Morocco and Tunisia, do already implement a number of migration programmes (see in particular those implemented in the framework of the Mobility partnerships between the EU and Morocco and the EU and Tunisia), **complementarity** with other EU instruments and/or donors will have to be duly addressed. The Trust Fund will consequently cover the gaps (both in geographical or thematic terms) not covered by other instruments (or other development partners, including EU Member States).

Moreover, the actions implemented in the North African window will have to be strongly coordinated with two regional policy dialogues:

1. The Rabat Process, launched at the first Euro-African Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development in July 2006 in Rabat, which brings together governments of 55 European and African countries (North, West and Central Africa), together with
the European Commission and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). It has fostered enhanced dialogue and cooperation on migration in a broad sense (legal migration and mobility; prevention of irregular migration and measures to counteract it; migration and development; international protection), and has identified common priorities in order to develop operational and practical cooperation.

2. The Khartoum Process, which was created as a regional dialogue and cooperation framework within the Africa-EU Migration and Mobility dialogue and was formally launched at a Ministerial Conference in November 2014 in Rome. In its first phase, the focus will be on addressing trafficking in human beings as well as the smuggling of migrants.

3. The priorities for the North of Africa Window

The Trust Fund envisages actions on a country, regional and cross-regional basis in close consultation and co-ordination with the relevant national authorities. To ensure strategic and efficient interventions, the identification of projects should be based on a dialogue with relevant authorities and other stakeholders, such as civil society and international organisations. An evidence-based approach, underpinned by an in-depth understanding of local contexts, including a gender and non-discrimination analysis, should guide all interventions, and conflict analyses where relevant.

In line with the four priority areas of intervention of the EU Trust Fund, as well as more globally with the European Agenda on Migration, the review of the European Neighbourhood Policy, other EU external priorities and activities in the North Africa region, such as humanitarian aid, and the Action Plan to be adopted at the Valletta Summit on Migration (11-12 November 2015), the initial priority actions under the North Africa window relevant to all countries are outlined below.

They should mainly concentrate on the third objective of the Trust fund (“Improved migration management in countries of origin, transit and destination”), and will interlink with objective 2 ("Strengthening resilience of communities and in particular the most vulnerable, as well as refugees and displaced people") and 4 ("Improved governance and conflict prevention and of forced displacement and irregular migration") in the sense that resilience actions will be mainly developed with a focus on asylum seekers, refugees and vulnerable migrants (with a particular attention to women and children) and security including through the contribution to effective integrated border management.

Given the disparity of challenges faced by each partner country, further country-specific priorities will be identified in a next step.

Priority actions:

i) Migration Governance:

- capacity building on legislative and regulatory issues, so as to progressively develop fully-fledged migration systems, as well as integration policies and measures, to ensure migrants’ needs and aspirations are addressed, including the rights of those most vulnerable,
their human, social and health rights are protected and their socio-economic and human potential is not lost; where possible, durable solutions for those forcefully displaced should be encouraged. The setting-up of child protection systems should also be supported;

- Capacity building for improved knowledge information on migration, including statistics;
- building capacities of institutions piloting migration policies to mainstream the 'migration' and 'international protection' dimension into public policies at national and local level such as:
  - Employment policies,
  - Vocational training,
  - Social protection,
  - Health and education,
  - Social cohesion, including through an enhanced dialogue with and support to civil society organisations active on these issues,
  - Security policy,
- taking due account of gender equality and child protection dimensions to both protect migrants and to reduce some of the drivers of migration.

- targeting both the diaspora abroad and migrants on national soils to enhance the positive impact of migration on societies and economies;
- sharing best practices and developing shared approaches in the establishment and management of structured migration policies in the region and promoting networks between relevant institutions and administrations (building on the experience of Euromed Migration); this would include concrete actions, as well as the transfer of expertise between national institutions in the region and their EU counterparts and on a cross-regional basis, on migration issues such as:
  - National migration policies and strategies
  - Promoting and managing the mobility of the labour force and human talent including job placements abroad,
  - Mobilising diaspora skills for development,
  - Promoting and protecting the rights of migrants and refugees,
  - Protecting women and children on the move and rescue them from exploitation, in line with international standards,
  - Integrated border management,
  - National policies in the fight against trafficking and smuggling,
ii) **Advance mutually-beneficial legal migration and mobility**

- improve labour market information systems; reinforce cooperation and networking between labour agencies and relevant institutions in the field of job creation with a view to facilitating job placements and opportunities;
- improve skills and jobs matching relating to the European and African labour market and develop mobility schemes in relevant sectors (e.g. agriculture, construction, tourism, health); promoting ethical recruitment standards so as to prevent 'brain drain'; support the improvement of qualification systems so as to contribute to this improved matching;
- strengthen cooperation on pre-departure measures (e.g. foreign language and vocational training)
- promote the setting-up of a system based on expression of an interest by employers, so as to allow employers to identify priority applicants from a pool of candidates;
- reinforce regional mobility schemes, including South-South mobility;
- work on circular migration and mobility so as to engage persons residing in a third country who come temporarily to the EU to work or study or persons regularly settled in the EU, in an activity (business, professional, voluntary or other) in their country of origin;
- provide start-up capital to promote "brain circulation" and encourage reduced costs and increased benefits of medium and highly skilled emigration, by supporting migrants going back to their countries of origin so they can reintegrate and contribute, with the acquired skills and knowledge, to local economic and societal development.
- mobilise the human and financial capacities of the diaspora to increase investments, as well as transfer of skills and knowledge, in their countries of origin.

iii) **Ensuring protection for those in need**

- improve capacities of partner countries to establish functioning policy, legislative and institutional frameworks on asylum and international protection, including through the support for all aspects of registration, documentation and refugee status determination, whenever relevant;
- promote political outreach and advocacy measures to prevent and tackle the root causes of forced displacement, as well as engineer durable solutions through the engagement of the human potential of the displaced, self-sufficiency, advocacy for the right to move and work, access to sustainable livelihoods, health and education;
- strengthen the resilience of displaced populations together with their host communities, through the delivery of services (education, health, legal aid, social protection and other relevant assistance), job skills and income-generating opportunities, by following the
inclusive approach of putting the local communities, beside the displaced people, in the centre of consideration;

- boost a culture of rights, dialogue and social cohesion, as well as and the protection of vulnerable and at-risk groups at both national and community level;

These actions will build on the experience gained under the Regional and Development Protection Programmes (RDPP).

iv) **Tackle the drivers of irregular migration,**

- addressing the drivers of irregular migration, in specific areas of origin, by supporting economic and social programmes creating employment and education opportunities, especially for young people and women in local communities, whenever relevant and not already covered by national sectorial development programmes.

- support efforts aimed at improving the exchange of information, establishing national and regional strategies addressing migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings and at scaling up operational cooperation, information exchange and capacity building against migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings;

- develop networking tools and information sharing on migration (based on the experience of I-Map) sensitive to gender and age disaggregated data;

- strengthen integrated border management capacities by further enhancing regulatory, institutional and procedural frameworks and further developing more effective national and regional cooperation and coordination among all the relevant authorities and agencies involved, so as to facilitate regular movements of persons and goods, while addressing security threats. Enhance cooperation with EU agencies, such as the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), FRONTEX, CEPOL, EUROPOL and Interpol;

- tighten cooperation with partner countries to follow up mutually agreed arrangements on return and readmission, giving preference to voluntary return, and ensuring full respect of human rights and human dignity. A special focus will notably be given to ensure that those returning to their countries of origin can reintegrate on a long-term basis and contribute to the local economy and society;

- develop mechanisms for voluntary return and sustainable reintegration of irregular migrants from the host country to the countries of origin, in line with integration policies developed within the 'country of origin' and the principle of 'non-refoulement':
  - facilitate the inclusion of returnees through national programmes that promote entrepreneurship, vocational training and social inclusion, also for their host communities;
  - develop synergies between development programmes in the countries of origin (including programmes funded by the European Union) and sustainable voluntary return schemes;
develop accompanying measures, including opportunities for job placement and psychosocial support, to help ensure dignified return and sustainable reintegration of the returnees into their societies and communities;

v) **Improve information and the protection of vulnerable migrants along the migratory route:**

- develop synergies between public social services and humanitarian services provided by civil society organisations supporting vulnerable migrants along migratory routes;
- support the networking of stakeholders (public authorities, associations, civil society organisations, international donors) involved in the protection of vulnerable migrants along migratory routes;
- set up, streamline and harmonise the provision of services to vulnerable migrants and refugees along migratory routes, including conflict-sensitivity with regard to access to similar services by host communities: health services and social protection, identification of victims of trafficking and appropriate assistance and protection, assistance to unaccompanied minors, referrals to public services, rehabilitation services, education, legal aid, including in the framework of post-return reintegration etc.;
- develop information campaigns / coordinated advocacy along migration routes on the risks of these migration routes and on the hazards of irregular migration, based on communication tools developed with the involvement of vulnerable migrants already in the host countries or by returned migrants;
- promote rights, dialogue, community consultation, resilience and social cohesion to reduce tensions in host societies and communities and to combat all forms and manifestations of racism, xenophobia and discrimination. These actions will also contribute to reduce exclusion and marginalisation which are central causes of radicalisation and violent extremism;
- in connection with point ii), facilitate referrals to mechanisms of voluntary return throughout the migratory route.

As highlighted under the different priorities, the possibility to design interventions across the windows of the Trust Fund will be important. Buildings links between North African countries with African countries based on the Western route and Central Route of migration to Europe (both belonging to the Sahel/Lake Chad and Horn of Africa windows) is particularly relevant.

4. **Relations between the Trust Fund and EU instruments**

The EU is active in the North Africa region via a variety of tools including development cooperation and humanitarian instruments, CSDP missions or the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) amongst others.

The EU Trust Fund will serve the objectives of the ongoing review of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Economic and social development will remain at the heart of the
revised ENP, in enhancing economic governance and supporting structural reforms for improved competitiveness which are key to developing the countries’ economic resilience. It will be ensured that economic and social development remains inclusive and leads to job creation and equal opportunities for women and youth. The EU will also help improve the employability of the local workforce and focus efforts on the creation of opportunities particularly for the youngest generations. This will range from support to expand access to primary and secondary education, and fighting illiteracy, to ensuring the development of top level skills through access to higher education.

The ENP review will include migration as one of its main priorities. In this respect, the Trust fund will focus on the commonalities the North African countries face in addressing their respective migration challenges. Owing to the possibility offered by the Trust fund to work across the borders of geographic instruments, it will give a strong focus on actions to be implemented along the migration routes.

The review of the European Neighbourhood Policy is also expected to give a stronger focus on enhancing cooperation security issues, among which security sector reform and border security, due to the specific security challenges these countries are facing, especially in North Africa. As set out in the European Agenda on Security, the EC has proposed to prioritise EU actions focused on internal security in particular tackling terrorism and preventing radicalisation; disrupting organise crime, and fighting cybercrime. All these issues are expected to be taken into account in the next programming phases of the North African countries.

EU national and regional programmes in North Africa amount to between € 3,1 and 3,8 billion for the 2014-2020 period. Through national, regional and thematic indicative programmes, the EU is already supporting the countries of North Africa to sustain economic growth whilst making it more equitable, support inclusive social development, manage natural resources transparently and responsibly and improve overall governance.

The ENI national and regional indicative programmes, the thematic and global instruments covering this region, the IcSP and the North of Africa window of the Trust Fund will be implemented in full complementarity with each other. Synergies and complementarities with EU humanitarian response in the countries concerned notably in relation to the assistance to refugees, displaced and most vulnerable migrants, will also be ensured. The same goes for coordination with the IcSP on rapid crisis response. Whilst each will respond to particular motivations that lead people to migrate, and as such each will prioritise different geographical areas, target groups, thematic areas, and institutional support to partner countries, both will respond to the overarching objectives of supporting partner countries to address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement and will fully exploit the benefits of well-managed migration.