MID-TERM STRATEGIC EVALUATION OF THE EU REGIONAL TRUST FUND IN RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS

Final Synthesis Report
October 2018

Evaluation carried out on behalf of the European Commission
Mid-term Strategic Evaluation
of the EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis

This evaluation was commissioned by the European Commission, DG NEAR

The opinions expressed in this document represent the authors’ points of view which are not necessarily shared by the European Commission or by the authorities of the countries involved.
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<tr>
<td>ACTED</td>
<td>Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil society Organisations</td>
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<td>CRRF</td>
<td>Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework</td>
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<td>DCI</td>
<td>Development Cooperation Instrument</td>
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<td>DoA</td>
<td>Description of Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>DG DEVCO</td>
<td>Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>DG ECHO</td>
<td>European Commission Humanitarian Aid &amp; Civil Protection</td>
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<td>DG HOME</td>
<td>Directorate-General Migration and Home Affairs</td>
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<td>DG NEAR</td>
<td>Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations</td>
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<td>EC</td>
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<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
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<td>ENI</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood Instrument</td>
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<td>EQ</td>
<td>Evaluation Question</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESSRP</td>
<td>Emergency Services and Social Resilience Program</td>
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<td>ET</td>
<td>Evaluation Team</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUD</td>
<td>European Union Delegation</td>
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<td>EUTF</td>
<td>European Union Trust Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCAS</td>
<td>Fragile and conflict affected states</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Facility</td>
<td>Facility for Refugees in Turkey</td>
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<tr>
<td>GiZ</td>
<td>Die Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit</td>
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<tr>
<td>GVC</td>
<td>Gruppo di Volontariato Civile</td>
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<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<td>IFI</td>
<td>International Financing Institutions</td>
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<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
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<td>IPA</td>
<td>Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>IO</td>
<td>International Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>JHDF</td>
<td>Joint Humanitarian Development Framework</td>
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<td>JRP</td>
<td>Jordan Response Plan</td>
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<td>KfW</td>
<td>Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau</td>
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<td>Key Performance Indicators</td>
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<td>LCRP</td>
<td>Lebanon crisis response plan</td>
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<td>LSCTF</td>
<td>Lebanon Syria Crisis Trust Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
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<td>Non-governmental organizations</td>
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<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<td>Quarterly Information Notes</td>
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<td>RDPP</td>
<td>Regional Development and Protection Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROM</td>
<td>Results Oriented Monitoring</td>
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<td>SOC</td>
<td>Syrian National Coalition of Revolutionary and Opposition Forces</td>
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<td>SRTF</td>
<td>Syrian Recovery Trust Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>ToR</td>
<td>Terms of Reference</td>
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<tr>
<td>TVET</td>
<td>Technical and vocational education and training</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children's Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>WASH</td>
<td>Water, Sanitation and Hygiene</td>
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<tr>
<td>3Cs</td>
<td>Coordination, complementarity, coherence</td>
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Executive summary

Europe is leading the funding response to the Syria crisis with more than €10 billion of assistance to affected communities from the European Union (EU) and its Member States (MS). Starting in 2014, an increasing proportion of non-humanitarian aid has been channelled through the EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis (EUTF). The EUTF facilitates donations from 22 EU Member States, Turkey and the EU budget, aiming to enhance the resilience and recovery of Syrian refugees and host communities in neighbouring countries and Iraqi internally displaced persons.

Commissioned by the European Commission (EC), the Mid-Term Strategic Evaluation of the EUTF provides an independent assessment of the governance structure, the project selection process, and the overall rationale of the EUTF. The evaluation does not assess project level results. The evaluation is intended to contribute evidence and analysis for the decision on whether to extend the EUTF beyond its current end date in December 2019. The evaluation covers the period from the establishment of the EUTF in December 2014 until April 2018. The geographical scope includes Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq and to a lesser extent, Egypt, the Western Balkans and Armenia. The thematic scope includes access to basic education; access to higher and further education; resilience and local development, including livelihoods and social cohesion; access to health services; access to WASH services; and protection.¹

The evaluation is theory-based, drawing on contribution analysis, and it applies participatory, conflict-sensitive, and gender-responsive approaches. The method follows the OECD-DAC criteria for evaluating development assistance, namely relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. This is complemented by the assessment of coordination, complementarity and coherence, as well as EU added value. In addition to collecting and analysing documentary evidence, the five-person evaluation team conducted interviews and field research in Brussels, Lebanon, Jordan, Serbia and Turkey with a range of stakeholders, including the EUTF team in Brussels and in European Delegations (EUDs), relevant EUD staff, EU Member States (MS) donors and bilateral development agencies, implementing partners of EUTF-funded Actions and host government officials. Interviews with stakeholders relevant to the Iraq case study were conducted in Amman and Brussels.

EUTF raison d’être

The EUTF was conceived during 2013-2014 when it became apparent that the Syria crisis would become protracted, that Syria’s neighbours were strongly affected by the crisis and the associated large refugee displacements, and that the EU’s existing mechanisms were too dispersed for an effective response. Building on lessons in Lebanon, where the EU had invoked ‘special measures’ to aid the communities hosting Syrian refugees, the EUTF was set up with a regional scope to “address the needs of refugees, internally displaced persons and returnees, and provide assistance to host communities and administrations in countries neighbouring Syria to enhance resilience and early recovery”.²

The EUTF sought to overcome three main challenges that were undermining an effective response to the Syria crisis: i) past aid programmes were not adequately aligned, ii) funding appeals were not met by donors, and iii) the aid modalities were not effective in the difficult operational context. In order to address them, the EUTF was set up with ten characteristics, which in effect responded to the EUTF’s raison d’être. The EUTF aimed to be large scale, cost-effective, and with a multi-sectoral, regional, multi-partner, rapid and flexible approach that evolved over time. The evaluation judges whether the EUTF delivered on the aims envisaged by these

¹ These are in line with the EUTF Results Framework.

² The Constitutive Agreement states that the overall objective of the Trust Fund is “to provide a coherent and reinforced aid response to the Syrian crisis on a regional scale, responding primarily in the first instance to the needs of refugees from Syria in neighbouring countries, as well as of the communities hosting the refugees and their administrations, in particular as regards resilience and early recovery
defining characteristics. At the time of its creation the EUTF was also expected to generate leverage, i.e. multiply the effect of individual Member States or the EU, or both. Finally, the EUTF was also intended to increase the EU’s visibility. The evaluation examines the defining characteristics with the exception of visibility, which remained outside the scope of this assignment.

**Most aspects of the rationale for setting up the EUTF have been justified.** The EUTF is large and cost-effective, reaching a large number of beneficiaries at a comparatively low cost. The multi-sectoral and multi-partner approach has been successful in recipient countries, and the focus of interventions have largely been relevant to the identified needs of beneficiaries. The EUTF has allowed the EU to operate flexibly despite operational challenges. The EUTF has also successfully matured and evolved over time to be more inclusive of the host country contexts and adaptive to the overall dynamics of the region. The EUTF increasingly shows signs of closer coordination with host country priorities and processes, with regional frameworks such as the Regional Refugee Response Plan, and with EU processes such as the Joint Humanitarian Development Framework. The evaluation also found that the EUTF has generated added value, compared to the efforts EU Member States could have undertaken themselves.

At the same time, however, the EUTF has been found to be slow in responding to changes on the ground that evolved quicker than the Fund could adapt to. Given quickly shifting needs in the region, the EUTF's lengthy contracting processes compromised performance. Cost-effectiveness ambitions meant insufficient administrative and human resource investments, which created bottlenecks. In addition, the regional/multi-country approach has not produced the intended synergies in implementation across countries but has instead resulted in delays as the approach was adapted for each country context. The regional aspects have, however, been useful in generating lessons and for sharing learning between implementing partners in and across consortia. Finally, the EU’s intention to leverage funds through a single, pooled financial instrument has only been partially achieved. With 12% external donor funding to the €1.4 billion EUTF, this aspect deserves further attention to fully justify the EUTF set-up.

**Findings**

**Relevance**

The evaluation found that EUTF interventions are relevant and address the needs of beneficiaries in all countries. Refugee, host community and internally displaced persons (IDPs) are appropriately identified and targeted, drawing on the experience of implementing partners and following EUTF criteria; and the sectors of intervention are consistent with beneficiaries’ resilience and early recovery needs. The evaluation found, however, that due to rapidly changing contexts, beneficiary needs may change as Actions are being contracted, with some interventions experiencing delays in contracting processes that impacted on the initially-identified needs at project design stage.

**EUTF interventions are also relevant to host country needs.** The evaluation found evidence of a positive trajectory from an initially centralised project identification process managed in Brussels to a more inclusive, decentralised process that is aligned with host country plans and contexts. These alignment processes fall within the broader regional approach of EUTF, which allows for more streamlined and cost-effective management processes. Nonetheless, host governments and implementing partners expressed a preference for country-level programming, which the EUTF is increasingly shifting towards to take account of the particularities of each context.

Relevance was also examined in relation to Member States, who view the EUTF as a tool for strengthening European presence and weight in responding to the Syria crisis. On this front, there is a desire for ensuring that alignment to host country needs continues to involve and draw on the experience of European bilateral aid agencies and NGOs.
Given the complexity of the operating context in responding to the Syria crisis, the consortia model of implementing partners is seen to help widen the reach of interventions, both on sectoral and geographical bases. Some gaps are noted in the current level of inclusion of national stakeholders in host countries as partners. The regional approach was found to be relevant in relation to sharing of best-practices and learning of lessons for advocacy, which are elements that are valued by implementing partners.

Effectiveness

While too early to assess effectiveness of EUTF interventions, the evaluation was able to assess current trends and the trajectory of the EUTF. It found that, in Turkey and Jordan, education and infrastructure for schools and WASH facilities are viewed more positively than other sectoral interventions in terms of their effectiveness, for example, in developing infrastructure with long-term benefits that will extend beyond the lifetime of the EUTF. To ensure effectiveness and achievement of results in the area of livelihoods, implementing partners and donors emphasised the importance of interventions being linked directly with the potential for securing employment, whether through grants or technical and vocational education and training (TVET). Interventions that are providing continuous support and services to beneficiaries are also generally considered to be effective, particularly in the education sector and, to a lesser extent, in health.

The evaluation found that factors influencing the effectiveness of interventions are linked to country-level political will, which can be a facilitating or hindering factor. Other factors include the EUTF option of tackling several sectors in parallel or sequentially, which allows for more comprehensive and multi-faceted approaches; country experience with outsourcing external services to implement activities, which allows for rapid implementation but may negatively impact on capacity at national level to absorb these services; and the timeframe available for implementation, which in some cases is insufficient for achieving expected results.

Efficiency

The evaluation found that the EUTF achieves the managerial and efficiency objectives of EU trust funds, but at a cost to performance. Compared to other EU trust funds, the EUTF is relatively large and fast. At half the size of the EU Emergency Trust for Africa and seven times the size of the Békou Trust Fund, the EUTF had an implementation rate of 36% versus 22% and 29% for the Africa and Békou funds respectively. As of March 2018, the EUTF had contracted and transferred more than one third of the pledges received over the life of the Fund, a best-in-class result. Despite this status, implementing partners and EUTF expressed concerns about contracting times, often frustrated by the multi-country, multi-partner set-ups which require extensive negotiations for contracting and project amendment. Project identification and selection has been decentralised over the course of the EUTF operations, in part owing to increased staff capacity at EUD level, which should improve efficiency.

The EUTF guidelines allow for 3% for management fees, but less than 1% of the EUTF volume has been allocated to administration and management of the EUTF because contributions from the EU budget cannot be used for management fees. The evaluation found the EUTF is operating with a very lean structure, both financially and in terms of staff capacity, which directly affected the performance of the Fund. Interviews confirmed that limited staff resources have created significant bottlenecks, as well as contracting and implementation delays.

The evaluation found that the EUTF Boards work well. Communication from the EUTF management team to the Operational Board could be improved by offering further detail on project pipelines, which was introduced at the time of conducting this evaluation.

The EUTF monitoring and evaluation system started only late, partly due to the overwhelming funding volume managed by an initial team of three persons and partly because the initial focus was on project identification, selection and contracting. The EUTF staff capacity only reached operational levels in late 2016. The focus on M&E has since grown and, by December 2017 a contract with an external M&E provider eventually came into force. The initial reports provide timely and useful insights on the state of the EUTF interventions.
Sustainability
The evaluation assessed whether the beneficiaries are likely to be increasingly resilient as a result of the EUTF contribution, and whether their improved condition is likely to be sustainable. While it is too early to assess sustainability of EUTF interventions, there is evidence of a positive trajectory in this respect, particularly in the field of education and in cases where there is a focus on leveraging and strengthening national capacity. **Interventions which feature strong nationally-driven processes are more likely to contribute to resilience.**

The evaluation also examined the EUTF’s positioning in relation to the humanitarian-development nexus as an illustration of the linking of relief, recovery and resilience. The EUTF is generally seen as effective in bridging the humanitarian-development divide, particularly where it coordinates with humanitarian and development actors on how to best capitalise on synergies, as illustrated by the Joint Humanitarian Development Framework. Nonetheless, EUTF’s positioning on the humanitarian-development divide is also conditioned by country contexts and engagement, including readiness of host governments to respond to refugee and displacement situations.

Impact
The EUTF aims to positively impact the resilience of refugees and their host communities, while also contributing to peace and regional stability, ambitions that may take years to be seen. Of the 47 EUTF projects contracted to date, three projects were initiated two years prior to the start of the evaluation, and sixteen projects started one to two years before the evaluation. **The evaluation did not, as anticipated, find evidence that the EUTF had yet contributed to the intended global impact but there are indications of intermediate impact, especially on human capital through basic and higher education, and skills training under livelihoods.**

Coherence, coordination and complementarity
The evaluation found the EUTF to be **internally coherent in that the chosen modalities generally have enabled the EUTF to deliver according to the objectives and criteria set for the Fund.** The EUTF is also externally coherent, and the synergies and coherence between DG ECHO and the EUTF are particularly strong. The multi-sector approach calls for **strong coordination with other actors, ensuring complementarity.** The evaluation found that the EUTF’s planning and governance mechanisms have enabled such coherence. As EUTF colleagues have gradually increased in number at the EU Delegations, this has also helped improve coordination with other actors.

Added value
The evaluation found that the EUTF offers added value in four ways. Firstly, through its governance mechanism, the EUTF ensures a **joint response by engaging EU Member States actively.** Secondly, by its scale and scope it reaches a larger group of beneficiaries. Thirdly, the EUTF **exerts strategic influence over the focus and approach of the programming,** enabling Fund contributors and host countries to agree on shared objectives. Finally, the EUTF has made **deliberate effort to bring coherence to the response to the Syrian crisis while acknowledging country specificities, principally by insisting on multi-sector, multi-country programming.**

Cross-cutting issues: gender-responsiveness and conflict sensitivity
The evaluation found that **gender appropriate indicators and targets** are included in the EUTF planning, contracting and reporting documents; and some interventions are gender-specific. However, **not all programmes are gender responsive and/or can be strengthened in this regard.** Even though targets include gender- and age-disaggregated groups, some interventions can integrate further consideration of how activities can better incorporate gender-sensitive elements to enhance results, for instance in relation to securing work permits after skills training is provided, or addressing cost, transport and childcare barriers that can impact on participation levels in activities. The evaluation found that **children are recognised as a particularly**
vulnerable group and stakeholders recognise that concerted efforts are needed to address concerns such as child labour, child marriage and out of school children. There is positive evidence that these issues are on the agenda and actively being incorporated into multi-faceted responses and planning.

In terms of conflict-sensitivity, the evaluation found that, even though conflict analysis was not explicitly undertaken for some EUTF-funded interventions, evidence and processes are largely conflict sensitive. EUTF interventions are cognisant of and adapt to the context of each country, potential sensitivities surrounding targeting of beneficiaries along refugee and host community lines, and alignment of initiatives with host country needs. Further areas for reflection on conflict sensitivity include ensuring greater participation of national stakeholders. Consideration of conflict sensitivity is now more systematic in recent contract negotiations and through the Joint Humanitarian Development Framework in Jordan and Lebanon.

Conclusions and recommendations

Key conclusion: The protracted crisis is expected to continue, and it is not foreseen that host country and EU policies will change substantially, thereby providing a framework that could respond to the needs of beneficiaries. It is also unlikely that other funding instruments could adequately fill the gap if the EUTF ceased its operations. Most of the assumptions presented during the set-up of the EUTF have held, and the raison d’être for the EUTF remains broadly justified. In addition, the EUTF has generally performed satisfactorily across the criteria assessed by the evaluation, and the EUTF has clearly generated added value, compared to the efforts EU Member States could have undertaken themselves.

Recommendation 1: The evaluation team recommends that EUTF is extended beyond December 2019 to allow stakeholders to continue to respond to beneficiaries’ and host countries’ needs as the protracted crisis continues. Action: EUTF, Trust Fund Board.

Recommendation 2: If the EUTF is extended, the evaluation team recommends that the Fund is refreshed to improve governance and implementation issues, thus addressing the shortcomings identified by the evaluation. This process should be initiated immediately, in November 2018. Action: EUTF, Trust Fund Operational Board, EC.

Key conclusion: The evaluation found strong evidence that the EUTF team is under-staffed in view of increasing responsibilities and portfolios, particularly at EUD level. The evaluation further found that it is challenging for EUTF staff, particularly at EUD level, to hold different responsibilities at the same time, including identification negotiations with host country stakeholders, in-country coordination of EUTF, policy dialogue at overarching level on crisis response, sector-specific policy dialogue, management of relations with implementation partners, follow-up of implementation, communications, and monitoring and evaluation responsibilities.

Recommendation 3: Given that overheads are lower than what is allowed for EU Trust Funds, the evaluation team recommends that a functional review is conducted to assess staffing needs and staffing is increased to match the administrative and management requirements of the EUTF portfolio, both at headquarters (HQ) level and in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. This should be ensured by February 2019. Action: EC, EUTF.

Recommendation 4: The evaluation team further recommends that staff recruitment processes are streamlined to allow for quicker recruitment, including consideration of setting up a cadre of experts that can be deployed within two weeks, particularly for roles that have been identified as being vulnerable to workload pressure in

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3 As requested by the EUTF Management Team, where possible the recommendations are addressed to specific EU offices with proposed timelines and specific actionable tasks.
the functional review. This recommendation should be instated within three months of completing the functional review. **Action:** EC, EUTF.

**Recommendation 5:** The evaluation team recommends that, in order to increase efficiency, staff responsibilities are differentiated to allow focus on discrete aspects of programme cycles, geographic locations and/or sector responsibilities as deemed appropriate following the functional review. These changes should take place within three months of these recommendations. **Action:** EUTF Management.

**Key conclusion:** The centralisation of decision-making, especially on contracting and on negotiations with implementing partners, can sometimes slow down processes and decrease EUD ownership.

**Recommendation 6:** The evaluation team recommends that decision-making is further decentralised to EUD level so that EUTF staff based in EUDs can directly negotiate programme changes with implementation partners within a budget threshold of 25% of the overall contract value. **Action:** EUTF Management.

**Recommendation 7:** The evaluation team also recommends that coordination is increased between EUDs and the EUTF to assess and respond to human resource needs on an ongoing basis in response to the requirements of the EUTF portfolio and EUD staff workloads. **Action:** EUTF, EUDs.

**Key conclusion:** EUTF stakeholders hold a range of perceptions about project identification and selection, which would benefit from ensuring continuing communication and clarification. The evaluation also found varying levels of awareness and knowledge among Trust Fund and Operational Board members about the work of EUTF, despite EUTF ongoing efforts to provide information and reporting during Board meetings.

**Recommendation 8:** The evaluation team recommends that the detailed, justified selection choices and project pipeline continue to be presented at Operational Board meetings; and that the EUTF team also presents monitoring data from interventions to share insights on best practices, lessons learned, challenges and results. This action should be undertaken at every Operational Board meeting. **Action:** EUTF, Operational Board.

**Recommendation 9:** The evaluation team recommends that MS keep clear lines of communication with their development agencies on an ongoing basis to ensure that information on project pipelines, selection and identification are conveyed as appropriate. **Action:** MS.

**Key conclusion:** Overall, the multi-partner, multi-sectoral implementation model is working well, but the evaluation identified concerns relating to the multi-country/ regional dimension of projects.

**Recommendation 10:** The evaluation team recommends that the EUTF continues to ensure that multi-country programmes are tailored to each implementation country. **Action:** EUTF, Operational Board.

**Recommendation 11:** The evaluation team further recommends that all concept notes detail in a comparative and comprehensive manner how the project will take into account each host government’s capacity and the needs of the beneficiaries, including conflict sensitivity. **Action:** EUTF, Operational Board.

**Recommendation 12:** The evaluation team also recommends that the regional aspect of each project is limited to knowledge sharing, lesson learning and advocacy and that this expectation is clearly communicated to the implementing partners by the next Operational Board meeting and on an ongoing basis where appropriate. **Action:** EUTF, Operational Board.

**Key conclusion:** Beneficiary needs are recognised across all EUTF countries, although the greatest needs relative to the country context are in Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan.
**Recommendation 13:** Assuming no major changes in the patterns of displacement from the Syria crisis, the evaluation team recommends that the EUTF focuses on Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan for the next phase of the EUTF. **Action:** Trust Fund Board, EUTF.

**Recommendation 14:** The evaluation team recommends that the Fund phases out in Turkey before the renewal of EUTF comes into place, as most funding there has been from the Turkey Facility and ex-IPA. **Action:** Trust Fund Board, EUTF.

**Recommendation 15:** The evaluation team recommends that the Fund phases out in Serbia before the renewal of EUTF comes into place, given shifting needs in country. **Action:** Trust Fund Board, EUTF.

**Key conclusion:** Gender responsiveness is evident in programming as well as in reporting requirements but varies depending on context and capacity.

**Recommendation 16:** The evaluation team recommends that EUTF continues to monitor its programming for gender responsiveness and ensures corrective measures are taken where implementation proves challenging. **Action:** EUTF.

**Recommendation 17:** The evaluation team recommends the appointment of an EUTF gender focal point to support implementing partners in adapting and implementing gender responsive programming, as agreed in their Action documents. The focal point should be appointed within three months of these recommendations. **Action:** EUTF.

**Key conclusion:** The EUTF undeniably generates added value compared to the efforts EU Member States could have undertaken themselves.

**Recommendation 18:** The evaluation team recommends that EU Member States demonstrably increase their contributions, thereby allowing the Fund to deliver greater leverage while also allowing it to increase its administrative spending, which would resolve several efficiency hindrances. **Action:** MS.

**Recommendation 19:** The evaluation team recommends that EU Member States agree on a percentage return to be reinvested in EUTF relative to their national agency and NGO incomes from EUTF. This increase should be announced in advance of the extension of the EUTF in December 2019. **Action:** MS.

**Key conclusion:** As the crisis in Syria continues, operations in the country are not envisaged until a political settlement is underway. Now, however, is the appropriate time to consider future options.

**Recommendation 20:** The evaluation team recommends that an early assessment is carried out of beneficiary needs in the country to determine whether the governance and set-up of the EUTF would be adequate and suitable for the Syria context. This assessment should be carried out by March 2019. **Action:** EUTF, Trust Fund Board, EU.

**Recommendation 21:** The evaluation team also recommends that the EUTF gives due consideration to the consequences that shifting support to Syria would have on neighbouring host countries and identifies what instruments would be available to continue to address beneficiary needs there in the event of decreased EUTF support. This identification process should be ongoing. **Action:** EUTF, Trust Fund Board, EU.
1. **Introduction**

1.1. **Background to EUTF**

Europe is leading the funding response to the Syrian crisis. As of April 2018, the EU and its Member States have provided €10.6 billion of humanitarian, development, economic and stabilisation assistance to affected communities since the beginning of the conflict in 2011. Starting in 2014, an increasing proportion of non-humanitarian aid has been channelled through the EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis (EUTF). According to its Constitutive Agreement, assistance under EUTF must be complementary with the EU’s humanitarian assistance in Syria and the region. The EUTF also aims to operate in coherence with the EU’s overall non-humanitarian aid, funded through EU budget lines, including the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) or the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) and the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI). Furthermore, the EUTF seeks to complement other mechanisms such as the Syrian Recovery Trust Fund (SRTF) and the Facility for Refugees in Turkey (the Facility).

The EUTF facilitates donations from 22 EU Member States (MS), Turkey and the EU regular budget aiming to address the needs of refugees, internally displaced persons and returnees, and provide assistance to host communities and administrations in countries neighbouring Syria to enhance resilience and early recovery.

This set-up is intended to improve aid effectiveness through economies of scale, efficiency and leverage. Most interventions are carried out in Turkey, followed by Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. Initially, the EUTF was aimed at refugees and host communities in these four countries and in Egypt. However, recognising the impact of the crisis on third countries, the EUTF was amended through Decision C (2015) 9691 to provide support to the Western Balkans, responding to resilience needs of migrant or refugee populations there, and to clarify the inclusion of internally displaced people (IDPs) as beneficiaries in Iraq. By April 2018, 38 Action Documents worth €1.2 billion focusing on education, resilience, socio-economic support, health and water, and waste management have been approved by the EUTF Operational Board. This has allowed the EC to contract €920 million across 47 projects to implementing partners (IPs) in the region.

1.2. **Background to the evaluation**

1.2.1. *Scope*

In February 2018, the European Commission (EC) commissioned a team of external experts to conduct an independent Strategic Mid-term Evaluation of the EUTF.

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5 The Constitutive Agreement states that the overall objective of the Trust Fund is “to provide a coherent and reinforced aid response to the Syrian crisis on a regional scale, responding primarily in the first instance to the needs of refugees from Syria in neighbouring countries, as well as of the communities hosting the refugees and their administrations, in particular as regards resilience and early recovery
The evaluation is formative, thus assessing current and past programming with a view to influencing present and future programming. Specifically, the evaluation provides an independent assessment of the governance structure, the project selection process and the overall rationale of the EUTF. The evaluation is intended to contribute evidence and analysis for the decision on whether to extend the EUTF beyond its current end date in December 2019.

The evaluation covers the period from the establishment of the EUTF in December 2014 until April 2018. The geographical scope includes Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq and to a lesser extent, Egypt, the Western Balkans and Armenia.

The thematic scope of the evaluation reflects EUTF’s areas of intervention and results framework, which include: access to basic education; access to higher and further education; resilience and local development, including livelihoods and social cohesion; access to health services; access to WASH services; and protection.

1.3. Evaluation method

This section outlines the key evaluation approaches and methods, including the reconstructed intervention logic, and the evaluation criteria and questions. Early in the evaluation, the evaluation team (ET) produced an inception report detailing these methods.

1.3.1. Approaches

The evaluation is theory-based, drawing on contribution analysis and it applies participatory, conflict-sensitive, and gender-responsive approaches. The method was designed specifically to respond to the evaluation objective and scope. The approach combined the need for a coherent framework to guide the evaluation process that incorporated both governance and implementation levels, while allowing the evaluators to identify where and how the EUTF has made a contribution, based both on its assumptions and the enabling or hindering factors, including unintended ones.

The EUTF intervention logic represents the evaluation team’s understanding of how the EUTF has been expected to lead to the target results identified in the Constitutive Documents. Grounding the evaluation in this intervention logic provided the evaluation team with a basis for developing a robust analytical framework for assessing progress, change and contributing/hindering factors against the assumptions, and intended outcomes of the EUTF. This analytical framework encompasses the evaluation questions (EQs) (see Table 1) and an evaluation matrix (see Annex 4), which ensures that there is consistency and coherence between the intervention logic and the focus of the evaluation; and that data sources are matched to the relevant evaluation criteria and areas of evaluation focus.

The contribution analysis method has allowed the evaluation team to identify how the EUTF is aiming to contribute to improving the resilience and self-reliance of refugees and host communities at the level of implementation, focusing on all the interlocking elements that lead to that contribution: the variety of Actions that are identified and funded (multi-country, multi-sector, multi-partner); the context within which they operate (e.g. national contexts, in parallel to other interventions); the differences in EUTF contributions per sector and type of intervention (i.e. whether related to infrastructure, provision of services or facilitation of access to services); and other factors that contribute to or hinder progress (e.g. possibilities for sustainability of interventions within a protracted crisis situation, government ownership and/or prioritisations). The evaluation team also assessed the EUTF’s contribution and added value in relation to other EU tools and instruments and other donors, as well as regional and country response frameworks.

The contribution approach has also been applied in examining the EUTF’s governance structure and consequent operations. This approach has facilitated the examination of changes in procedures over time; the way in which EUTF has adapted to its growing portfolio; and the gaps or challenges that still remain, for example related to...
staffing, centralisation of decision-making and sharing of information with relevant stakeholders, particularly at Operational Board level, as it will be further illustrated in the report.

The evaluation team has utilised mutually reinforcing approaches, guided by a strong participatory element through frequent and constructive interactions with the EUTF Management Team. From the start of the evaluation, the evaluation team has engaged in detailed exchanges in order to ensure a comprehensive understanding of the evaluation task. This understanding was further specified in the inception report, which was approved by the Management team. In setting out the evaluation methodology, the evaluation team also interviewed several members of the Operational and Trust Fund Boards and EUDs. These early conversations helped reveal and confirm issues which were not apparent in the available documentation and allowed them to refine the focus of the evaluation questions.

Secondly, the team adopted a conflict sensitive approach, which was essential for understanding the environment EUTF is operating in, the interaction between the EUTF and that environment, and to identify potential conflict points in the relationship between the EUTF and its context. This context is both internal to the EU, as well as external in relation to grantees, other international actors, host governments, and ultimately the beneficiaries of EUTF-funded projects. Building conflict sensitivity from the outset has allowed for a robust starting point to monitor the progression of conflict factors throughout the evaluation process and to identify corrective measures that the EUTF Management Team could integrate to minimise negative impacts and maximise positive ones, including both internal communications with donors, for example; as well as via the incorporation of sensitivities related to targeted beneficiaries and areas of intervention at the implementation level.

Finally, throughout the study, the evaluation team maintained an awareness of the differences in culture, local customs, beliefs and practices, personal interaction and gender roles, disability, age and ethnicity while being mindful of the potential implications of these differences in planning, conducting and reporting on the evaluation.

1.3.2. Evaluation process

The evaluation was undertaken in three phases over four months between March and June 2018.

During the **inception phase** the evaluation team refined its understanding of the Terms of Reference (ToR). The evaluation methodology, intervention logic and evaluation matrix were developed as part of an iterative process that included initial consultations with selected stakeholders to confirm the scope and focus of the evaluation, including scoping visits to Lebanon and Jordan. Project mapping and portfolio analysis were also conducted. This phase is documented in the inception report.

During the **interim phase** the evaluation team undertook detailed desk-based data collection and analysis, followed by field visits in Jordan, Lebanon, Serbia and Turkey. This led to the drafting of an interim report, whose preliminary findings were presented to donors in Brussels in April 2018.

The **synthesis phase** was dedicated to an in-depth analysis of field and documentary data, and to the drafting of the final evaluation report. During this phase, the evaluation team presented the evaluation findings at the June 2018 Operational Board meeting in Brussels. Incorporating comments from the meeting, this report itself will be distributed to Trust Fund Members in October 2018.
1.3.3. **Intervention logic**

Given that the evaluation is theory-based, it presumes that the EUTF is conceived and operates through an inherent reasoning, in evaluation parlance an *intervention logic*. Such a reasoning is seldom explicit, and the evaluation team has thus reconstructed the logic based on a thorough review of relevant documentation.

The intervention logic suggests that the EUTF, with its core characteristics, can provide an input to the Syria crisis which, through an expected chain of events, will lead to increased resilience among refugees and their host communities, while also contributing to peace and stability in the region. This intervention logic rests on a set of assumptions that are necessary to facilitate the achievement of increased resilience.
FIGURE 1 – INTERVENTION LOGIC

**RATIONAL FOR ENGAGEMENT OF EU Member States, EU and Turkey**

To support longer term economic, educational and social needs of Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries such as Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and Iraq.
To assist overstretched host communities and their administrations
To contribute to stability and human security, and to addressing the drivers of displacement.
To allow partners to carry out programming they would otherwise be unable to implement.

Streamlining EU approach towards more coherent and integrated response to the crisis, and to strengthen its position in the region.
To coordinate the response of stakeholders and capitalise on synergies between actors on the ground.

**Timeframe:**
- 2014-2019

**Budget:**
- €1.4 billion through contributions and pledges from 22 EU Member States, the EU budget and Turkey (8 Dec 2019)
- More than €915 million have been contracted in over 45 projects in the Trust Fund and implementing partners on the ground until February 2018

**Financing modalities:**
- Contracts and grants
- Delegated authority

**Human resources:**
- MAADH: Fund Manager – Birzeit
- EJDs in countries of operations
- Entities in host communities

**Technical inputs:**
- Cooperation and dialogue among implementing partners, donors and donor coordination

**Outputs**

- Increased access of refugee children and youth to equitable formal and non-formal education programmes
  - Enhanced human and infrastructure capacities of educational institutions at primary, secondary, higher and vocational education
  - Raised awareness on right to education and inclusion

- Strengthened individual capacities of children and youth:
  - To respond to market needs
  - To continue education in host communities and wider
  - Life skills and dealing with trauma and integration
  - Through improved services in education, mental health and psychosocial support, life skills education, child protection and gender-based violence, etc.

**Outputs**

- Human capital strengthened:
  - (through improved education and competencies, empowerment of Syrian refugees/host communities)

**Outcomes**

- Empowered and integrated children and youth through improved educational opportunities

**Intermediate Impacts**

- Improved employability and entrepreneurial behavior

**Global Impacts**

- Resilience of refugees and host communities to vulnerabilities posed by Syrian conflict

- Peace and regional stability

**Evaluation questions**

**ASUMPTIONS**

- EU organizational structures in place, staff sufficiently informed, have capacity to programme/implement funds. Systems in place to define allocations
- Systems in place to monitor and report on results.
- EU interventions based on the extent possible, on dialogue with partner countries.
- Procedures allow for timely delivery. Funds are used as intended.

- Educational institutions in host communities ready and capable to improve quality and access to refugees
- Institutions in host communities institutions committed to address priorities for economic, educational, health and social needs of Syrian refugees to allow more effective response to protracted crisis
- Issues addressed by the Fund allow for regional, multi-partner responses.
- Synergies between different areas covered by the Fund and also the other donor interventions.

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1.3.4. Evaluation criteria and questions

The evaluation follows the OECD-DAC criteria for evaluating development assistance, namely relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. In addition, it assesses coordination, complementarity and coherence and the added value of the EUTF, as agreed in the evaluation inception phase. To operationalise the criteria and link them to the Fund’s underlying logic, the evaluation team developed and posed a set of eight evaluation questions.

**Table 1 - Evaluation questions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation questions</th>
<th>Relevance</th>
<th>Efficiency</th>
<th>Coordination, Complementarity and Coherence</th>
<th>Impact Prospects</th>
<th>Sustainability Prospects</th>
<th>Added Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EQ 1 To what extent do the identification and formulation processes reflect the needs of the targeted beneficiaries?</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ 2 To what extent do the identification and formulation processes reflect the host country needs?</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ 3 To what extent does the EUTF deliver results against its mandate and objective, and specific EU priorities? What have been drivers/hindering factors?</td>
<td>✓ ✓ ✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ 4 To what extent has the EUTF contributed to changes on the ground and what have been the key factors in this?</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓ ✓ ✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ 5 To what extent are intervention results likely to sustainably facilitate beneficiaries’ increased resilience as the crisis continues?</td>
<td>✓ ✓ ✓ ✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ 6 To what extent do the EUTF actions provide coherence, complementarity and synergies?</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ 7 How and to what extent has the EUTF actions contributed to be a bridge between the EU humanitarian assistance and longer-term development cooperation?</td>
<td>✓ ✓ ✓ ✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ 8 Where the EUTF is operating in the same field as other donors or partners, does it offer added-value in terms of size of engagement, particular expertise, and/or particular weight in advocacy?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These eight evaluation questions were refined from those listed in the Terms of Reference (see Annex 8) as overarching questions to guide the inquiry process. The remaining questions were developed into indicators, which can be consulted in the evaluation matrix presented in Annex 4.

1.3.5. **Evaluation tools**

Empirical information was collected and analysed using both qualitative and quantitative methods to strengthen the reliability of data, improve the validity of the findings, and enhance the robustness of recommendations. The use of the methods listed below allowed for triangulation to confirm findings and address inconsistencies.

![Table 2 - Data Collection and Analysis Methods](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Qualitative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Analysis of the EUTF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Through desk-based research and interviews, the ET analysed in detail the EUTF setting, including its creation, objectives, funding mechanisms, governance structure and working methods.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landscape analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To understand the context where EUTF is intervening, the ET conducted an analysis of other EU policies and instruments used in conjunction with EUTF; regional Trust Funds of the EU and others; and, interventions by other donors and relevant cooperation mechanisms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholders analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ET mapped out the different actors that are either funding, or implementing the EUTF programmes, to understand their key interests, how they interacted and what their relation structures were.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-depth review and analysis of Trust Fund documentations and literature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ET analysed a significant amount of secondary documentation, including EUTF-specific documents e.g. EU internal policies, and operating procedures, Action Documents, and EC-internal monitoring and financial reports. Other sources included EU programming documents, host country policies, national response plans, and relevant studies. See Annex 5 for the full list of consulted documentation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review of portfolio of Actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Throughout, the ET reviewed the EUTF Actions and analysed them by sectors, country, partners involved, and delivery mechanisms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sampling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ET closely examined a sample of ten interventions during field visits. These projects provided a reference set for the EUTF governance and selection processes, as further explained in section 1.3.7.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultation with the EUTF management team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultations were held to exchange information about progress and coordinate access to stakeholders and documentation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Key Informant semi-structured interviews
Throughout, interviews were conducted with relevant informants including members of the Board and Operational Board, EU staff in Brussels and within EUDs, implementing partners, government officials and other international stakeholders.

### Field Visits
Field missions to Jordan, Lebanon, Serbia, and Turkey took place, to collect additional data, validate the formulated hypotheses and explore the evaluation questions within the sample of projects.

### Quantitative

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cost-effectiveness analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The ET used existing secondary data, including both processed data and raw data, to measure cost-effectiveness and other variables relevant to the measurement of effectiveness and economy.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 1.3.6. Data collection and analysis

The evaluation questions were the basis for the development of the evaluation matrix in Annex 4, which in turn framed the development of the interview tool for data collection (see Annex 6), and the evaluation team’s approach to the document review.

The interview tool was employed by the evaluation team to collect data during field visits. The interview template ensured comparability of data collected across the evaluation criteria and case study countries in line with the evaluation matrix, and data analysis was undertaken by consolidating interview templates across countries. Figure 2 below provides the steps of the data collection and analysis process for this evaluation.

**FIGURE 2 - SCHEMA OF REFINEMENT OF EVALUATION CRITERIA AND TOOLS DEVELOPMENT**

The evaluation team employed three methods of triangulation in analysing collected data:

- **Cross-method triangulation**, meaning checking data from different evaluation methods for corroboration of findings.
- **Within-method triangulation**, comparing information from the same method source across countries, i.e. comparing information from interviews in Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey and/or from different types of stakeholders, e.g. implementing partners, EUD staff, and so forth. This method was adopted where it was not possible to triangulate across methods.

- **Analysis triangulation**, which involved discussion of data collected by the team as a group to ensure findings and conclusions were interpreted in the same manner by all members of the evaluation team and minimise potential bias.

The inception, interim and final reports for the evaluation underwent internal and external quality assurance processes. Internally, they were reviewed by the Evaluation Manager and the Manager of the Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning Division at Landell Mills. In addition, an external reviewer provided timely feedback for the inception and interim report, and engaged in a fully-fledged quality assurance review for the draft final report.

### 1.3.7. Project sample

The EUTF had contracted 47 interventions by April 2018. In order to limit the scope of this evaluation, and in agreement with DG NEAR, the evaluation team selected a sample of ten interventions that informed the overall analysis with regard to EUTF governance and selection processes. These interventions were employed as a basis for defining the scope of the project document review and for engaging with stakeholders in field visits, and they represented an illustration of the EUTF in relation to the evaluation criteria and questions. Unless otherwise stated, the findings presented throughout the report are informed by this document review and by the engagement with stakeholders from this sample. Where time and availability allowed, stakeholders associated with out-of-sample additional interventions were interviewed to broaden the evidence base for the findings, and where this is the case, it is indicated in the report.

The evaluation did not, however, look specifically at project-level as this was outside the scope of the evaluation. By reviewing nearly a quarter of the interventions, the evaluation covered the full scope of the EUTF within the resource limits set for the evaluation. The sample selection was guided by three main criteria, which in turn was based on a portfolio analysis undertaken in the inception phase:

(i) **Actions per country.** The sample of interventions focuses equally on Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon (75% of those contracted), whereas Iraq is covered by three actions and Serbia by one action in the sample; 6

(ii) **Priority coverage.** 7 The evaluation team identified six priority areas for contracted interventions based on the EUTF Results Framework 2018-19: resilience and local development (28%), access to basic

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6 Armenia represents a small portfolio and is not seen to be representative of the overall EUTF approach. We therefore prioritised Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq given the volume of work in those countries; and Serbia as an illustration of the Western Balkans.

7 The EUTF uses several sector categories, which do not all align. The EUTF 2018-2019 Results Framework uses the following 6 sectors: 1. Access to Basic Education; 2. Access to Higher and Further Education; 3. Resilience and Local Development; 4. Access to Health Services; 5. Access to Wash Services; and, 6 Protection. In comparison the Masterfile ‘20.03.2018 Madad management and financial planning MIS forecast’, used and shared by EUTF with the Evaluation Team for the portfolio analysis, categorises contracts according to the more than 20 sectors associated with the London Pledge. As a result, the evaluation team introduced an ‘others’ category to reflect the fact that certain interventions were associated with the ‘London pledge sectors’ that did not align with the 6 Results Framework sectors. In addition, mapped across the Results Framework, the above sector distribution was identified for the 47 EUTF interventions. Note that several interventions were classified under numerous sectors, due to their sector association...
education (16%), health (11%), access to higher education (9%); WASH (7%), protection (7%), and others (including multi-sector aid and food security) (21%); and,

(iii) **Type of implementing partner**, divided in three categories: Governmental actors (national agencies, ministries), non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and international organisations (IOs).

Table 3 below lists the sample. A more detailed overview of the sample of projects can be found in Annex 3. The sample is representative of criteria (i) and (ii) above, and includes four interventions led by government actors, three by NGOs, and three by IOs. Furthermore, the sampling approach took into account EUTF contributions to interventions, which range from €7 million to €90 million in the sample. It also considers the number of months since the Action started (as of April 2018, four have started less than twelve months ago). Finally, the criteria consider whether the Action is implemented by one or several partners, and in one or several countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3 - Selected sample for case studies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Title</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2  QUDRA: Resilience for Syrian refugees, IDPs and host communities in response to the Syrian and Iraqi crises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3  Education for all in times of crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4  Reducing Economic Barriers to Accessing Health Services in Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5  Strengthening the Resilience and Empowerment of Women and Girls and Host Communities in Iraq, Jordan and Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6  Increasing access to inclusive quality primary, secondary and higher education opportunities for Turkish and Syrian children, youth and students</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

from the London Pledge (e.g. resilience and education). Therefore, the sector percentages included are derived from a total of 57 sector classifications.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Cost (€ million)</th>
<th>Implementing Organisation</th>
<th>Implementing Country(s)</th>
<th>Sector(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Back to the Future: School readiness, inclusion and retention for child victims of the Syrian Crisis in Lebanon and Jordan</td>
<td>€12</td>
<td>Fondazione AVSI</td>
<td>Lebanon and Jordan</td>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providing Lebanese and Jordanian communities hosting Syrian refugees with improved WASH infrastructure and facilities at community, institutional and households level</td>
<td>€12</td>
<td>Agence d’Aide à la Coopération Technique et au Développement (ACTED)</td>
<td>Jordan, Lebanon</td>
<td>WASH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening the capacities in managing the migration/refugee crisis in the Republic of Serbia</td>
<td>€7</td>
<td>Ministry of Labour, Employment, Veteran and Social Affairs, Serbia</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>Migration, multi-sector aid for reception and protection services</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 1.3.8. Limitations

The evaluation team faced a number of limitations in conducting this assignment. These limitations are listed below, along with the ways in which the evaluation team mitigated and minimised their impact.

- The evaluation was undertaken over a four-month period, with compressed timelines for designing the methodology and conducting fieldwork. In order to mitigate this limitation, the evaluation team ensured that field visit agendas provided comprehensive coverage of relevant actors, and additional remote interviews were conducted where gaps were identified.

- During the evaluation process, the evaluators engaged with a wide range of stakeholders: EUTF teams both in headquarters (HQ) and EUDs, other EUD staff, members of the Boards, MS bilateral agencies, host governments and implementation partners. However, the evaluation focused on a sample of ten projects to provide an illustration of the identification and selection processes. The evaluation team recognises that the focus on these ten projects may have biased some of the findings to the experiences of partners involved in them. In order to mitigate this limitation, the evaluators ensured that stakeholders reflected on their general experience with EUTF in addition to their Action-specific experiences; and also conducted a detailed portfolio analysis to gauge overall trends.
• The evaluation team was unable to conduct field visits to Iraq owing to duty of care considerations. To minimise the impact of this limitation, the evaluation team engaged with Amman-based Iraq stakeholders. However, the data on Iraq remains limited compared to that of other countries, and this should be taken into account in reading the report.

• In order to define the scope of the evaluation, scoping visits were undertaken to Lebanon and Jordan in March 2018; and some exploratory interviews were also conducted with other stakeholders. Later in the process, some interviewees highlighted that they had already engaged with the evaluation team. The team made sure to clarify to stakeholders that the scoping missions were to define the scope of the evaluation, and that subsequent field visits were focused on collecting data relevant to the final evaluation questions. Overall, there was no major impact stemming from this limitation as most stakeholders who were engaged twice were willing to provide their time and insights.

• For a range of reasons, the evaluation team faced some difficulties engaging with government stakeholders in some countries. Factors which affected their participation included their previous engagement at an earlier stage of the evaluation during the March 2018 scoping visits, and the short timeframe within which to arrange interviews. This made it difficult and at times not possible for the evaluator to arrange interviews with the relevant officials in ministries. The evaluation has drawn on primary data from interviews where appropriate and has complemented gaps with documentary analysis.

• Even though every effort was made to ensure that data was triangulated across methods, there are instances where the evaluation team has relied on interview data alone to evidence its findings, and particularly where no complementary documentary evidence was available for corroboration (e.g. where informants refer to interactions experienced during negotiation or implementation processes). To minimise the impact of this, the evaluation team has triangulated interview data across countries (within-method triangulation) and between team members (analysis triangulation); and has indicated in the report where findings are drawn solely from one method of data collection.

• Being a strategic evaluation, this assignment clearly delineated the relevant stakeholders that would be engaged in the evaluation process. These did not include local actors and beneficiaries, which is a limitation in considerations related to relevance, effectiveness, sustainability and impact criteria. To minimise the impact of this limitation, where relevant, the evaluators have drawn on Results-Oriented Monitoring (ROM) reports and on documentary evidence to complement their findings.

• This evaluation was commissioned soon after the EUTF’s contract for ongoing external monitoring and evaluation was initiated. From the beginning of this assignment, the evaluation team made contact with the external contractor, but the technical assistance team only produced their first results late in the evaluation process (after the desk phase). In the revision of the final evaluation report, however, the reports produced by the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) contractor were able to be used for triangulation purposes.

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8 The first two reports were issued on 20 April 2018 and 20 June 2018.
2. Origins and structure of EUTF

2.1 Assumptions

The EUTF was conceived in 2013-2014 when it was recognised that the Syria crisis would likely be protracted, that Syria’s neighbours were strongly affected by the crisis, and that the EU’s existing response mechanisms were considered inadequate for responding effectively. Within a year of its outbreak in 2011, the Syrian crisis evolved from civilian protests against the government to armed insurgency, which soon transformed into a civil war and a multi-dimensional and protracted political, security, and social crisis affecting also Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Turkey and eventually also Egypt and the Western Balkans. The violence in Syria resulted in high numbers of persons forcibly displaced with nearly a quarter of Syria’s population ultimately fleeing the country. Neighbouring host countries’ willingness to host large number of Syrian refugees placed pressure on them, and they soon requested external support to manage the consequences of the influx.

The EU responded through a variety of efforts, but it was determined that the required scope of assistance could not be met by existing instruments. Humanitarian assistance focussed on immediate relief, development assistance on poverty reduction, and the instruments that covered early recovery and resilience could not cope with the scale of the needs. In Lebanon in 2012, for example, the EC creatively invoked ‘special measures,’ which allowed for reprogramming of funds, originally allocated to Syria but yet unspent. Instead they were directed towards Syrian refugees and their host communities in Lebanon. These served as a model for subsequent interventions, but it soon became clear that something bigger and different was needed.

At the same time, parallel to the unfolding Syria crisis, the EC established the conditions for creating European Union trust funds. A pooled funding vehicle appeared suited to the situation. According to EU officials engaged in defining a response mechanism, they thus initiated a series of conversations with EU Member States on the prospect of a trust fund for the Syrian situation. Some MS were opposed to the idea, some were uncertain, and yet enough were in favour – so that more than one year later the establishment of a “European Union Regional Trust Fund in response to the Syrian crisis, the ‘Madad Fund’” was agreed with MS in December 2014.

The Madad Fund, or the “EUTF”, sought to overcome three main challenges that were undermining an effective response to the Syria crisis. Firstly, the various Union instruments and Member States’ programmes worked in parallel through various bilateral channels, thus not living up to the European Council’s request for better coordination. The proper response to this challenge would be a mechanism that was comprehensive as regards the range of needs, the geography covered, and the stakeholders involved with the Syrian crisis. In other words, a multi-sectoral, regional, and multi-partner approach.

Secondly, appeals for funding were not fully met. To respond to the expected scale of needs, a “further significant additional effort” was required. Apart from “dealing effectively with the increasing flow of refugees and build up their resilience”, such extra funding should also ensure that the EU’s “contribution, relevance and

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9 By end 2013, the EC had allocated €228 million to the response in Lebanon. Brorsen, P. and Garcia, V. Evaluation of ‘Support to medium and long Term needs of Host Communities and Syrian Refugees in Lebanon I and II’ Italtrend, 2014.

10 EU Financial Regulation, 2013, Article 187(1)

leveraging capacity”\textsuperscript{12} would not be undermined. To meet this challenge, the EU would need to confirm its commitment through a truly \textbf{large fund} with \textbf{large programmes}. Ideally, such scale should also lead to improved \textbf{cost-effectiveness through economies of scale}.

Thirdly, providing assistance in crises areas posed a series of programming and operational challenges, and the European Council had called on the EC to develop “further measures to improve the effectiveness of EU support”.\textsuperscript{13} To meet this challenge, the new mechanism would principally feature \textbf{flexible and rapid approaches} which could \textbf{evolve over time} in accordance with developments on the ground.

In sum, as the EUTF was established, it was defined by ten characteristics, each of which aimed to help overcome challenges that had been identified in the first years of assistance to the Syria crisis. The EUTF was set up to be \textbf{large scale, cost-effective, and with a multi-sectoral, regional, multi-partner, rapid and flexible approach that evolved over time}. The evaluation judges whether the EUTF delivered on the aims envisaged by these defining characteristics. At the time of its creation the EUTF was also expected to generate \textbf{leverage}, i.e. multiply the effect of individual Member States or the EU, or both. Finally, the EUTF was also intended to increase the EU’s \textbf{visibility}. The evaluation examines the defining characteristics with the exception of visibility, which remained outside the scope of this assignment.

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid, p. 3.
2.2 Governance structure

2.2.1 Boards

As per the Constitutive Agreement, two governing bodies of the EUTF are established, namely: i) a Trust Fund Board, which shall establish and review the overall strategy of the Trust Fund, and ii) an Operational Board, which shall decide on the allocation of funds to individual Actions. The Agreement notes that the EUTF management serves as secretariat of the Trust Fund Board and of the Operational Board. The EUTF management is in charge of managing the implementation of the actions under the Trust Fund.14

The Trust Fund Board is composed of representatives of the Donors, of the Commission acting on behalf of the European Union, and, as observers, representatives of non-contributing EU MS, the European Parliament, the Syria Recovery Trust Fund and, since 2016, the World Bank15 under a condition of reciprocity (‘Observers’). In addition, Jordan, Lebanon, and as relevant Iraq, are represented as observers through their ambassadors. Furthermore, the European External Action Service (EEAS) always takes part in the Board meeting. The Trust Fund Board is tasked to meet as often as necessary and at least once a year. Meetings of the Trust Fund Board may be called by the Chair at any time or at the request of at least one third of Donors.

The Operational Board is composed of: i) the Commission's representative to the Operational Board, acting on behalf of the European Union as a Chair; ii) a representative of each Donor or pool of Donors (the ‘Members’) contributing with at least €3m16; iii) observers invited by the Chair and the Deputy Chairs, as appropriate; and iv) as a permanent observer, a representative of the Syria Recovery Trust Fund, to ensure that the level of assistance the Trust Fund provides inside Syria is in agreement with the SRTF. In addition, Jordan, Lebanon, and as relevant Iraq, are represented as observers through their ambassadors. Furthermore, EEAS always takes part in the Operational Board meeting. As per the Constitutive Agreement, the EUTF Manager shall also be represented in the meetings of the Operational Board and shall provide the secretariat for the Operational Board. The Operational Board should meet several times yearly and as often as necessary. Further, meetings of the Operational Board may be called by the Chair at any time or at the request of at least two Members which account for not less than one third of the Members' voting rights at the date of the request.17

2.2.2 HQ- and Delegation-based EU officials

The Trust Fund is managed by the Commission, on behalf of the donors and the European Union, under the responsibility of the authorising officer by delegation appointed by the Commission (the Director-General, who

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14 Agreement Establishing the European Union Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis, 'The Madad Fund', and its Internal Rules; Part II – Governance provisions, Article 4.

15 The participation of the World Bank is not part of the legal agreement delineating the governance structure, but a decision of the Commission Representative, as Chair of the Board that decides to invite observers.

16 As per the Constitutive Agreement, representatives of donors to be members of the Operational Board are those who: (i) have provided a signed Contribution Certificate for an amount of at least equal to the minimum Contribution of the equivalent of EUR 3 000 000; and (ii) are current with all undertakings contained in the Contribution Certificate applicable to them.

17 Agreement Establishing the European Union Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis, 'The Madad Fund', and its Internal Rules; Part II – Governance provisions, Article 6.
in turn appoints the Trust Fund Manager). The Annex to the Constitutive Agreement defines a centrally managed structure (secretarial tasks for the Trust Fund Board and Trust Fund Operational Board, sound financial management, managing the implementation of actions, annual reporting). The EUTF follows the DEVCO Companion Guidelines on EU Trust Funds. Figure 3 below shows the management structure of the EUTF management, as of April 2018.

**Figure 3 - The EUTF Management Structure**

*Additional EU staff (HQ and EUDs/ECHO Country Office) provide expertise and project management capacity to the Fund*

Source: EUTF Management Structure, undated. Received by email from Trust Fund Manager on 10 March 2018.

In addition to EUTF employed staff, the EUTF also engages DG NEAR staff. Several DG DEVCO and EEAS staff employed by the EUDs, and DG ECHO field offices staff, as well as DG NEAR country desks, also lend project management support and expertise to the EUTF, whilst reporting to their respective supervisors.

Throughout the project cycle, the EUTF team aims to coordinate with host governments. Through communication between EU Delegations in host countries, the intention is to ensure complementarities with other funding channels e.g. direct budget support provided by the EU, through bilateral cooperation or through humanitarian assistance provided by ECHO to beneficiaries. In addition, by aligning EUTF support to national response plans, the intention is to increase government ownership and to fill critical gaps in the national responses related to the Syria crisis, for example in the education sector in Turkey. In Serbia, meanwhile, the EU works closely with the Serbian government on its medium and long-term strategy to address the needs of the refugees and migrants. The EUTF support for Lebanon is aligned with the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan, which was developed as a joint plan between the government and its international and national partners, with the aim to respond to challenges in a holistic, comprehensive manner through longer-term, multi-year planning. In Jordan, the support falls within the Jordan Response Plan (JRP), which was developed as a strategic...
partnership mechanism for the development of a comprehensive refugee, resilience-strengthening and development response to the impact of the Syrian crisis on Jordan.\textsuperscript{22}

The EUTF operates with two management modes, namely indirect and direct management, as introduced by the 2013 EU Financial Regulation.\textsuperscript{23} Under indirect management, the EUTF entrusts budget implementation tasks to international organisations or development agencies of EU Member States. Under direct management, the EUTF is in charge of all EU budget implementation tasks, which are performed directly by departments either at headquarters or in the EU delegations, which implies awarding grants to NGOs or service contracts to commercial implementers. When the indirect management mode is applicable and appropriate, it is preferable to the EUTF. This is partly because it lowers the administrative burden, with MS development agencies and international organisations having greater capacity to deliver at scale.\textsuperscript{24} Additionally, the Annex to the EUTF Constitutive Agreement notes that it is “the preferred option wherever it will offer an appropriate response in terms of the cost, effectiveness and European visibility”.\textsuperscript{25} Hence, the EUTF is inherently inclined to engage MS development agencies and international organisations, as opposed to other types of implementing partners, such as international non-governmental organisations or firms.

### 2.3 Identification and formulation processes

The EUTF was established to contribute to a coherent and comprehensive EU response to the Syrian crisis by adopting a multi-sector, regional approach. The EUTF thus applies a comprehensive range of EU funding modalities, including grants to NGO projects, budget support and financing agreements with partner countries, delegation agreements with MS development agencies and other pillar assessed organisations, and fast-track contracting procedures for crisis situations under EU Financial Regulations.\textsuperscript{26}

The Constitutive Agreement specifies the procedures for decision-making within the Trust Fund Board and the Operational boards. As defined, the identification and formulation of Action Documents is a neat and efficient process. In practice, however, the drafting, the consultations, and the subsequent revisions can make this process both lengthy and cumbersome, depending on the complexity of the Action (see section 3.1.1).

In principle, the workflow of operational committees laid out in Figure 4 below shows the process of identification of Action Documents, their approval at the board meetings, contracting and implementation. The process also includes the quality review by thematic and geographic experts at HQ.\textsuperscript{27} The diagram below presents the standard project cycle, which may vary when Action Documents are defined with a specific purpose but do not have a defined implementing partner.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{22} http://www.jrpsc.org
\item \textsuperscript{23} The EU Financial Regulation and its Rules of Application came into force on 1 January 2013.
\item \textsuperscript{24} Interviews with EUTF staff.
\item \textsuperscript{25} Constitutive Agreement, Annex I, page 7. The Annex is not legally binding but provides guidance.
\item \textsuperscript{26} Annex to the Communication from Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council, 29 September 2015. COM(2015) 490 final/2.
\item \textsuperscript{27} This process was confirmed in the note ARES(2014)2510330, adopted on 29 July 2014 to help simplification of the QSG1 process.
\end{itemize}
The Trust Fund Board deals with strategic decision making and direction rather than engaging in operational details of individual projects. The Operational Board, on the other hand, receives detailed information and updates on projects.

Regarding actions themselves, the Constitutive agreement is rather general and does not provide details on the criteria and procedures for selection of projects. The Constitutive agreement provides only a general account of the programming process which is understandable bearing in mind that the EUTF was created to respond to a spectrum of needs, allowing for flexibility in responding to needs as they arise arising from the Syria crisis. The EUTF management elaborated Operational Criteria to guide potential applicants. In addition, there is a standardised quality review process in reviewing Action Documents with several EU services (DG NEAR, DG DEVCO, DG ECHO, DG HOME, EEAS, EUDs) before submitting them to the Trust Fund Operational Board for approval.

The project identification and selection processes were initially performed through negotiated procedures that allow direct awards (i.e. no tender procedure) to implementing partners (NGOs, Member States’ national agencies and international organisations). The first 18 projects of the EUTF were the result of an information campaign by EUTF in the form of published messages on its website, indicating that interested implementing partners were welcome to submit concept notes. Based on that – when critical mass was reached – ad hoc evaluation committees were appointed to assess all received concept notes. The evaluation was done on the basis of the open window for submitting concept notes to the EUTF in 2015/16, and projects were selected based on the Operational Criteria28 adopted by the Operational Board in May 2015. However, this approach was discontinued as the relevance of the applications was not always adequate, and the capacity of EUTF increased to allow for closer dialogue and coordination at country level, and to coordinate directly with more players on the ground.29 Also, with the evolution of the national ownership and growing interest in the EUTF, there was a

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28 Criteria for Concept Notes/Proposals: 1- Relevance of the action; 2- Added value elements of the action.

Criteria for Action Documents: 1- Reconfirmation of overall relevance and added value elements for the Madad Fund; 2- Design of the action; 3-Sustainability of the action; 4- Budget and cost-effectiveness of the action; 5- EU visibility.

29 Oversight and Management of the EU Trust Funds, Democratic Accountability Challenges and Promising Practices, 8 February 2018.
recognition of the need for more targeted interventions within the development of the portfolio. Some interviewees raised their concerns with the initial approach of identifying projects through an open invitation via the EUTF website, noting that it was not a very transparent process which allowed some extent of lobbying by donor MS. Adherence to criteria allowed to ensure that the most mature projects were confirmed for funding. According to the EUTF Management, however, this approach was adopted due to the limited host government engagement at the time. In addition, the process allowed greater opportunities for MS national agencies to be selected, in accordance with the EUTF mandate to increase the visibility of European efforts.  

At the end of 2016, in place of open invitation for submission of concept notes, the identification process was shifted to be more closely coordinated with host governments, thus ensuring that actions were based on the needs and priorities stated in national response plans. This shift was also a result of the Joint Humanitarian Development Framework (JHDF) processes in Jordan and Lebanon, which aimed to enable complementarity and links between the EU’s humanitarian response by ECHO, the EUTF and the ENI instrument. This approach helped increase host government ownership and relevance of Actions. JHDF are well elaborated documents that present contextual challenges based on the priorities that are selected for further support by relevant actors. These documents are very useful tools for the EUTF but also DG ECHO and ENI instruments to respond to priorities selected in close consultation with host governments. They also assist in ensuring coordination, harmonisation and alignment of EU support, for the purpose of leveraging resources and defining exit strategies in line with overarching mandates of the instruments proposed and used. The review of documents from Board meetings, interviews with the EUTF team, host government representatives and other stakeholders confirm that the JHDF documents have created a strong evidence-based programming tool, which can also be used by other donors as a starting point for any proposal or new project. The resulting shift in project identification and formulation was positive as it has enhanced inclusion of national stakeholders and their priorities.

30 Constitutive Agreement, article 8.
3. Evaluation findings

3.1. Relevance

The evaluation assesses the relevance of the EUTF for its beneficiaries and host countries. In addition, it considers relevance in relation to the EUTF’s operations, in terms of the EU and other donors and instruments, and in terms of gender responsiveness and conflict sensitivity.

3.1.1. Relevance for beneficiaries

The EUTF beneficiaries encompass members of host communities, Syrian refugees in countries neighbouring Syria and further afield in the Balkans, Egypt and Armenia, IDPs in Iraq, as well as Palestine refugees from Syria and those in implementation countries such as Lebanon and Jordan who are considered host communities too. The needs across these beneficiary groups are great: the Regional Refugee Response Plan (3RP) target population for 2018 is of 5.3 million registered refugees from Syria and 3.9 million host community members.\(^31\)

Respondents in all field countries fully recognise that the beneficiary needs in the countries where the EUTF is operating are great, and that the sectors addressed by interventions are relevant. Stakeholders interviewed in Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon and Serbia (i.e. implementing partners in sample projects, donors and government stakeholders) consider that it is useful to conceptualise the EUTF addressing beneficiary needs in terms of what would be the case if there was no such tool. The Syrian crisis is now protracted, and the EUTF provides support in linking relief, rehabilitation and development in line with the Joint Humanitarian Development Framework. The EUTF is found to be entirely consistent with regional initiatives such as the 3RP, as well as with national plans in its countries of focus (JRP, LRP and country chapters for Iraq, Egypt and Turkey).

Host government, implementing partner and donor stakeholders interviewed in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan particularly highlight achievements in the field of education. In Turkey, 8,000 scholarship applications have been received under the YTB Turkiye Burslar Program, indicating a high demand of Syrian youth beneficiaries for the EUTF-funded higher education scholarship projects. Support to school enrolment in Lebanon, and rehabilitation and building of schools in Jordan are seen to alleviate the pressure on host countries as well as helping to provide access to education to refugees. The June 2018 EUTF Results Report indicates that overall results for access to basic education across countries of intervention is 101.6% of target beneficiaries, and 47.8% for higher and further education.\(^32\) In Serbia, there was consensus between government stakeholders and implementing partners that interventions in primary healthcare supported by EUTF allowed for the mitigation of public health risks for displaced populations from Syria who could no longer continue their journey onwards to other European countries after borders were closed in 2016. According to the EUTF Results Report of June 2018, beneficiaries of access to primary health care were nearly triple the original target in Serbia (278.4%).\(^33\)

The identification of beneficiaries is often drawn from implementing partners’ experience of operating in the field. Organisations, including UNICEF, AVSI and GIZ cited practices from previous programmes as feeding into EUTF-funded interventions. UN WOMEN and UNICEF have specific tools to identify beneficiaries based on vulnerability rather than nationality, which is argued by other interlocutors as potentially a valuable tool for selection of beneficiaries in that it identifies vulnerabilities that may not otherwise be

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\(^32\) Particip (2018) EU Regional Fund in Response to the Syria Crisis: 2nd Results Reporting, June 2018.

\(^33\) Ibid.
identified through criteria that focus on nationality alone. The possibility for capitalising on the experience and tools that implementing partners possess is generally seen as a positive feature of EUTF interventions and one that is facilitated by the multi-partner and multi-sectoral model. The EUTF’s preference for consortia is seen to allow for complementarity in responding to beneficiary needs; and cooperation between consortia members is seen as being conducive to identifying these needs where the experience and comparative advantage of implementing partners can be capitalised on.

This complementarity is evident not only in the tools employed by implementing partners, but also in relation to consortia members’ expertise to implement multi-sectoral interventions. For example, implementing partners in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey emphasised that members of consortia were chosen because of their expertise in the implementation of interventions. The Description of Action (DoAs) for the sample projects included in this evaluation corroborate this approach, for instance consortia led by AVSI, World Vision and GiZ make reference to previous experience of partners in the region, specific countries and/or sectors being addressed. Interviewees stressed the importance of multi-sectoral approaches ideally being implemented together, for example by providing health and livelihoods to the same cohort of beneficiaries to effectively address their needs in an integrated manner. EUTF team members note that this is already happening and/or is being actively planned on existing projects, and sample DoAs examined for this evaluation do not contain a differentiation per location and sector that would indicate otherwise.

Interviews conducted for this evaluation note that relevance to beneficiaries can be compromised in some cases. One aspect that was consistently raised across countries and by most stakeholders is that the situation on the ground changes rapidly, but that negotiations from appointment of a negotiation team after an approval of an Action to contract signing are often lengthy. This means that there are cases where beneficiary needs identified
at the design stage of proposals are not as relevant anymore by the time contracts come into place and there is less time to implement them. This can be because the situation on the ground changes and/or the priorities of host governments shift leading to activities no longer being suitable. For instance, in Turkey the refugee response initially focused on community-based centres in the spirit of providing temporary protection. As the crisis moved into a protracted stage this kind of intervention became less relevant since Syrian refugees have been moving into the labour market and attending schools, so new models of social cohesion are needed in EUTF programmes. The strategy underlying the development of a cash assistance programme in Iraq, which was under contracting negotiations at the time of interviews, was seen as no longer valid. This was because the design was initially based on IDP needs identified in Mosul, but the crisis there had shifted from displacement to return, and therefore the demographic (and their needs) had changed, needing a review of the relevance of the initial design. Similarly, the Youth RESOLVE programme, initially conceptualised in 2015, is perceived by some interviewees to have lost relevance due to the project only starting in September 2017 in Lebanon and at the time of writing this report in Jordan, by which time the needs assessment on which the design phase was based is no longer relevant. One Action that did not face this loss of relevance to the same extent was ACTED’s WASH programme, where the design planned the identification of beneficiaries at project start. Section 3.3.3 on contracting speed provides further detail on this aspect.

3.1.2. Relevance for host countries

In examining the relevance of EUTF interventions for host countries, there is a noted trajectory for the EUTF from being more prescriptive to becoming more inclusive and participatory for host government stakeholders. Interviews with host government stakeholders in Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan suggest that the identification of interventions has moved from being a centralised, top-down from Brussels approach to one that more readily integrates the governments of host countries. This shift is, on the one hand, supported by the elaboration of the 3RP, the Lebanon and Jordan Response Plans, and country chapters for Iraq, Egypt and Turkey, which points to country ownership of interventions; and on the other hand, by the increased presence of EUTF staff in European Union Delegations in the region (with the exception of Iraq), and as EUTF evolved and found a strategic presence in the relevant EUDs.

Alignment with host country needs, however, exhibits different patterns and focus depending on the country. In Turkey, following the 2016 coup attempt, there have been difficulties in securing the registration of NGOs, and approved projects were shifted back into the pipeline, according to EU officials. In addition, they note that needs assessments were not fully owned by the Government of Turkey, which occasionally led to conflicting views on the relevance of programming. The portfolio analysis conducted for this evaluation indicates the type of implementing partners in Turkey: UN agencies are the lead partner in ten out of twenty ongoing or completed projects; five projects are led by NGOs and the remaining five are led by government agencies and private sector stakeholders. Based on interviews in Turkey (and ROM reports, UNICEF, and UN agencies in general, have had solid and well-established working relations with relevant ministries. UNICEF projects, for example, have been designed in view of five-year country plans. Education projects were thus seen to be addressing the needs of Turkey and the final beneficiaries. Meanwhile, the evaluation found that the QUDRA programme (managed by Expertise France, which was sub-grantee of GIZ) was not registered in Turkey and had no prior working relations with the ministries existed), also failing to adequately consult with ministry officials. This was partly due to the political environment and time pressure for signing the EUTF contract. As a result, ministry officials questioned the project’s relevance in addressing host country needs. There is now a noted improvement in coordination and ownership since the responsibility for EUTF shifted to the Prime Minister’s Office.

Serbia stakeholders generally noted a high degree of inter-ministerial coordination, and the government was generally receptive to the EUTF intervention. In Jordan, the JRP offers a framework for aligning with the country’s priorities, and interviewees make consistent reference to it in referring to their alignment with Jordan’s needs. EUTF interventions in Jordan are specifically aligned to the JRP and the approval process from the Jordanian government’s perspective involves assigning interventions to JRP areas. The picture is somewhat different in Lebanon, where inter-ministerial relations are more fragmented than other countries and there is no option for budget support. As a result, relations with some ministries have started to develop, particularly with the presence of EUTF staff on the ground. These relationships come against the backdrop of the tendency of
some international agencies in Lebanon to implement programmes without engagement with systems change. The EUTF team highlights that they have been active in their efforts to forge relationships with line ministries to shift this trend. In Iraq, in addition to the absence of a focal point based in the region, there is reference to lack of government counterparts given the instability in the country.

**Host countries are generally keen to highlight that EUTF programmes should be designed as country-specific interventions**, which is at odds with EUTF’s regional approach. For instance, QUDRA was perceived by specific donor stakeholders to have been designed based on implementing partners’ experience in Jordan. In Turkey, government stakeholders and implementing partners see QUDRA as relevant overall, but the project initially faced resistance on Specific Objectives that were seen to need further tailoring to the context there. The World Vision project included in the sample for this evaluation also faced issues due to the inclusion of NGOs and it therefore had to drop the Turkey component. Beyond the project sample, LEADERS also faced difficulties in relation to aspects of interventions that were unsuitable depending on context. Nonetheless, there is evidence that some interventions are highly tailored to countries’ specific needs, for example the IMC project in Lebanon, which takes into consideration the health system in the country and barriers faced by beneficiaries to secure health access.

The extent of alignment of EUTF programmes with host country needs may also depend on who the implementing partners are and how the country refugee response is itself structured. Implementing partners that have country strategies, such as UN agencies and bilateral cooperation agencies, consider themselves to have good alignment with host country needs, particularly in Jordan and Turkey. In the case of Serbia, there was strong involvement of government counterparts and therefore strong ownership. In Lebanon, the EUTF team has highlighted that they have invested considerable efforts to foster stronger relationships with government counterparts and steer away from predominantly emergency/humanitarian response. Government counterparts there corroborate that coordination is improving, for instance through the provision of service contracts to the Ministry of Social Affairs and frequent discussions between the EUTF team and Lebanese government stakeholders on inter-sectoral priorities. In Iraq, plans for refugees are limited to the Kurdistan region and the IDP policy is under development, which means that the implementation of programmes draws on the experience of implementing partners and agencies operating there.

There is also variation between countries on involvement in, and awareness of, selection criteria and processes. Projects approved more recently in Turkey, such as KfW, UN WOMEN and UNICEF, have undergone consultations/endorsements with line ministries through AFAD; this was corroborated through the relevant stakeholder interviews conducted there by the evaluation team. In Serbia, the government was involved in the design of the grant and in the identification of priorities and gaps that needed to be filled by the intervention, which included support to secure access to health and social services for refugees and remote communities. In Lebanon, government counterparts interviewed included the education, social affairs and health sectors. Two out of three interviewees outlined a positive trajectory in becoming more involved in selection processes, although in one case they noted that the government should be more closely consulted on project selection criteria. The EUTF team in Beirut note that they have close interaction with Lebanese government counterparts, and line ministries endorse proposed actions and projects.

Some interviewees expressed concerns that responding to host country needs may at times compromise the ability to address the needs of beneficiaries. For instance, the JRP establishes a ratio of beneficiaries for programmes classed as resilience interventions of 70% Jordanians to 30% Syrians. For some implementing partners and donors interviewed in Jordan this ratio is not representative of beneficiary needs. Also, in Jordan, interviewed government stakeholders stated a preference for budget support, for instance for education and health infrastructure. In some instances, the infrastructure identified for rehabilitation by the government in the WASH, health and education sectors was contested by implementing partners as not being the most adequate to address beneficiary needs, and two implementing partners stated that they had to negotiate with government to change identified facilities from well-maintained ones or ones not accessed by refugees to others that would be
more suitable to the aims of their respective projects. Several implementing partners working in these sectors for the selected projects expressed concern that, in some cases, this approach to selection could compromise delivery of services to intended populations. The evaluation team was unable to corroborate whether this has happened in the selected projects. Coverage of health priorities in Lebanon is currently not seen to be adequate due to constraints posed by the context where health provision is highly privatised. The IMC project model, which is a pilot, is seen to be promising. In going forward, IMC is exploring further ways of collaborating with the World Bank, as well as the potential to bring UNICEF on board in future iterations of the intervention in order to cover primary health care, maternal and child care and vaccinations.

3.1.3. **Relevance to operations context**

Relevance in relation to the operations context is assessed with respect to two main elements: the implementation model focused on consortia, and decision-making at HQ and field levels.

One of the ten characteristics of the EUTF is the multi-partner model. In some cases, this model is seen to increase the ability of consortia to reach beneficiaries in terms of numbers, geography and sectors. However, the configuration of implementing partners responds to each country context. In Turkey, the difficulties encountered in registering NGOs has meant that some programme components had to be cancelled, as was the case for World Vision’s Youth RESOLVE programme; or that there is a skew to work with UN agencies (as our portfolio analysis suggests, half of the interventions there have been implemented by UN agencies). Some programmes in Jordan, for example the one being implemented by UN WOMEN that was sampled for this evaluation, draws on established and new partnerships with national NGOs; and in Lebanon the UN is a dominant player sometimes seen not to be entirely aligned with the priorities of the EU and other donors. Even though these varying configurations do not necessarily compromise the relevance of EUTF-funded programmes in terms of content, they do suggest the range of capacities implementing partners have and consortia models across countries that allow adaptation to each context.

A common concern of some government and implementing partner stakeholders in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan relates to the absorptive capacity of some smaller NGOs, on the one hand, and on the other the overheads of UN agencies and larger NGOs, which detract from funds that can be dedicated to project components. There is a suggestion, for example, that smaller NGOs in consortia could potentially pilot components of programmes that are relevant but without over-stretching capacity, whereas other suggestions included strengthening the capacities of national NGOs and counterparts to take over certain aspects of programmes. For QUDRA, for example, this includes the provision for national counterparts to take responsibility for the maintenance of rehabilitated schools (although they are not partners in the consortium). The UN WOMEN project in our sample incorporates local NGOs as partners in both Jordan and Turkey. However, this is not the case in all the projects sampled for this evaluation: of the ten projects sampled, six are being implemented by consortia and only two of these list national stakeholders as partners and co-applicants.

Another concern raised by interviewees relates to perceived lobbying for projects at HQ level by a range of stakeholders, especially during the first rounds of project identification and selection. In one particular instance, a project that was lobbied for and approved was seen to lead to compromises in the relevance of interventions funded under the EUTF due to the timing at which this intervention was introduced, and EUD advice against its introduction. This incident was corroborated with EUTF interviewees who highlight this particular intervention accounts for 0.1% of the Fund, and is seen to be of strategic importance and fully endorsed by government counterparts. However, knowledge of this incident may have influenced the perception that there is lobbying at HQ level, even though the evidence suggests it may be an isolated incident. The evaluation team notes that the EUTF team is in continuous communication with donors and implementing partners; and the processes for project selection and implementing partner choice generally follows a transparent and merit-based model, with suggestions that greater communication would be conducive to addressing concerns on selection and implementation.
3.1.4. Relevance to EU and Member States

Member States that contribute to the EUTF, as well as EU stakeholders, are generally in agreement with the rationale for having created it. However, there is some concern with the trajectory that the EUTF has taken. In moving towards greater coordination with government, and in funding stakeholders such as UN agencies, some interviewees feel that the EUTF has veered off course on specific elements that were key to its creation, mainly the strengthening of European presence through Member State agencies and organisations and their role in the Syria crisis response.

The type of implementation partner supported through EUTF can be contentious. Some stakeholders are intent on EUTF funding more European organisations to increase European presence and its role in the crisis response. Several members of the Operational Board highlighted that the conception of EUTF as a tool that would facilitate a stronger EU role in the Syrian crisis was a main driver for their decision to contribute to the EUTF. There is some disagreement with EUTF funding going to large international organisations, for example, instead of European NGOs or bilateral aid agencies. However, stakeholders interviewed from the EUTF teams across countries and in Brussels highlight that considerations on partners are not limited to their provenance (i.e. to whether they are European or not), but rather to their capacity. In some cases, European organisations wishing to receive EUTF funds have been assessed to not have the necessary capacity to implement Actions.

Member States’ development cooperation agencies note that their experience on the ground in implementation host countries is not reflected in the identification and selection of projects. They see their presence and work in host countries as potential sources for the EUTF team to draw on for identifying and selecting relevant programmes. There is a perceived lack of clarity from some bilateral aid agencies in-country and European capitals on how decisions on what programmes to fund are taken. The reason for this may be rooted in the lack of in-depth sharing of information internally between capitals and their agencies, and as such it is beyond the control and scope of the EUTF. The approach that EUTF teams have instituted on the ground, i.e. increasing coordination with host governments in identifying and selecting projects could be extended to incorporate MS agencies where appropriate and avoiding conflict of interest. The evaluation team understands this is already being done in Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey, where regular meetings are conducted with EU development councillors on EUTF pipeline projects, including considerations on potential implementing partners.

In terms of relevance in relation to other EU instruments and frameworks, Turkey offers interesting insights. In Turkey, the relevance of EUTF is compared to IPA funding, and it is also assessed against the Facility for Refugees in Turkey (the Facility). EUTF is seen to be quicker and more flexible than IPA, and therefore more likely to respond to changes in needs and context. However, there is some confusion in dealing with EUTF and the Facility: some interviewees note that the changes in requirements as EUTF came to fall under the Facility were confusing and EUTF loses visibility under the Facility. However, the EUTF team highlights that, in the interest of the EU, it was decided that EUTF visibility would be conditioned by the Facility. In comparing on flexibility and speed, the Facility achieves better results than the EUTF. While the EUTF is seen to be more flexible in relation to adapting project content (for instance for the KfW solar energy project), in general the Facility’s identification, negotiation and contracting is seen as shorter due to the available capacities and its decentralised management structure.\(^\text{34}\) As of May 2018, the EUD Turkey organogram shows

\(^\text{34}\) “The full Facility envelope of EUR 3 billion was committed and contracted through 72 projects by the end of 2017. Disbursements reached more than EUR 1.85 billion, or 62% of the total envelope, with the balance to be paid in the course of implementation of Facility projects, and no later than by the end of 2021.” The Second Annual Report on the Facility for Refugees in Turkey, May 14, 2018.
a total of 26 staff allocated to the Facility in operations, finance and contracts, monitoring and evaluation, press and information, migration policy, and administration roles.

**EU stakeholders assess EUTF’s relevance in comparison with other tools and instruments.** For example, EUTF is seen to sit between DG ECHO on one end of the (EU) spectrum on rapidity and flexibility, and DG NEAR on the other. EU stakeholders consider that the EUTF as a transition tool will continue to be relevant as long as DG ECHO is present in implementation countries: DG ECHO’s exit should happen before EUTF’s, and EUTF is seen as the natural continuation of DG ECHO interventions. For example, secondary health care in Lebanon was shifted from DG ECHO to EUTF, as well as the response to the Mosul/Ninevah military intervention in Iraq (although DG ECHO continues to be strongly engaged in the country). Furthermore, the JDHF supports this approach to ensuring sustainable responses across the intervention sectors, e.g. water and sanitation.

In Jordan and Lebanon, coordination between ECHO, the EUTF team and development colleagues has been strengthened over time, particularly in relation to the JDHF. In Lebanon, there is inter-sectoral coordination within EUD to take stock of how humanitarian and development elements come together, with a yearly review of how EUTF fits with JDHF. In Jordan, the latest JDHF was revised in conjunction between EUTF and ECHO teams. These exchanges are considered to strengthen the relevance of the EU’s position and coordination.

There is some criticism of instances where the EUTF is supporting programmes that are not considered to fall in the transition category. This is particularly felt in Jordan, where budget support and the implementation of programmes where construction work is part of the components, for example building schools or hospitals, is seen as beyond the scope of EUTF relevance and clearly falling in the ENI or Neighbourhood Investment Platform portfolio. In these instances, donors and EU stakeholders question whether EUTF should be involved in these, and whether in contexts such as Jordan and Turkey the transition/protracted crisis needs are being compromised.

3.1.5. **Gender responsiveness and conflict sensitivity**

Stakeholders overall agree that the EUTF requirements include that gender appropriate indicators are included in Actions Documents and at contract level, and that the EUTF team ensures that gender responsive indicators and targets are included in logframes and in Quarterly Information Notes (QIN). The latest version of the EUTF Results Framework has now also further incorporated specific gender-sensitive indicators. Some programmes, such as UNICEF’s Girls Safe Centres and UN WOMEN’s gender, resilience and livelihoods programme in Jordan, Iraq and Turkey, have specific gender components or are specific to gender. Other programmes include gender-sensitive activities: for example, health services in Lebanon target mostly women through reproductive health interventions; and ACTED has a project activity for a female plumbers’ club in order to address the concerns of female-headed households of letting male plumbers in.

Nonetheless, not all programmes are gender responsive. For example, YTB’s scholarship programme does not have a gender component. There are challenges in addressing women’s employment, for instance in Jordan where home businesses are prohibited. Programme components sometimes do not consider gender issues around activities, for examples whether and how females will be able to attend and participate in events; whether women will be able to access work permits once they receive training, which was a challenge particularly faced by the LEADERS programme; or if they will be able to afford transport or childcare.

In addition, despite successful interventions in the field of education, implementing partners from sample projects interviewed for this evaluation note that the situation of children is noted to have worsened over the past eight years, particularly in Lebanon: there are mental health issues, child marriage and child labour that are not being appropriately addressed in programmes. EUTF tackles issues of child protection through cooperation with UNICEF, with an investment of 22 million EUR for Lebanon, and this is a good practice that should be followed to reach children as part of a multi-faceted approach. Other EUTF team members note that it is strategically important for implementing partners to ensure that these cross-cutting issues are addressed in interventions.
The evaluation noted that conflict analysis was not explicitly undertaken for some of the EUTF funded programmes sampled in this evaluation. The evaluation also found, however, that EUTF teams address conflict sensitivity during JHDF elaboration, and there is ever increasing attention to discussion and information exchange with selected or prospective implementing partners. Specifically, the evaluation found that:

- In all countries, access to livelihoods is a contentious area and recognised as one of the most difficult to design interventions in, particularly where there are difficulties in securing work permits. In Iraq livelihoods is challenging more generally for all beneficiary groups due to the economic crisis.

- In most countries, other than Iraq, the ratio of refugees to host community beneficiaries is a potential conflict point. EUTF programmes overall seem to incorporate this concern by targeting members of both communities, although tensions continue to exist most noticeably in Lebanon but also in Turkey. In both of these countries, interviews with implementing partners and EUTF teams suggests that conflict sensitivity is increasingly being taken into account, and attention is given to addressing concerns over ratios between host communities and refugees, e.g. for the UNICEF and UNHCR projects included in the sample. Jordan seems to have somewhat offset this tension by requesting resilience programmes to target 70% Jordanians to 30% Syrians. Palestinian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon are also susceptible to tensions with Syrian refugees, particularly following cuts in funding to UNRWA.

- Burden on infrastructure is a common concern of host communities. EUTF funding has strived to address the latter point of tension by covering school maintenance costs, rehabilitation of WASH infrastructure and social development centre facilities, as well as needs assessments for local government infrastructure.

- For Syrian refugees in Turkey, language is a strong barrier both for social integration and for accessing services and employment opportunities.

- In relation to the Turkish and Jordanian government, both countries would have a preference funding to be provided directly to ministries. Turkey is also an EU candidate country and not part of the Jordan/Lebanon (neighbourhood) region.

- There is a sense that local NGOs should be more present in EUTF funded programmes, in particular for their knowledge of the working context and greater sensitivity to conflict points, but also because they are seen to possess relevant skills and their involvement would likely be conducive to greater ownership and sustainability.

- The geographical focus of refugee response programmes within Jordan is a potential conflict point. Most refugee response interventions by international actors are in the North and the Southern governorates feel left behind. EUTF funds interventions in Southern governorates too and this is seen as a positive feature to address conflict sensitivity.

- Social cohesion is an EUTF focus, but in Iraq it is not seen as appropriate in terms of its timing. Active/ongoing displacements and returns do not allow for communities to consolidate social cohesion.
3.2. Effectiveness

The evaluation examined EUTF effectiveness with regard to whether projects are attaining objectives, and the facilitating and hindering factors contributing to these achievements, or lack thereof.

3.2.1. Effectiveness in attaining objectives

It is important to note from the outset that most stakeholders interviewed for this evaluation across intervention countries considered that it was too early to measure the effectiveness of EUTF due to the long-term nature of focusing on resilience, a view that is also shared by the evaluation team. Nonetheless, the document review and stakeholder interviews elicited some findings on the current trajectory of EUTF-funded interventions so far.

**Effectiveness depends on the sector and type of intervention.** According to implementing partners in countries such as Turkey and Jordan, education and infrastructure for schools and WASH facilities are generally seen as likely to be more effective than other sectoral interventions, as well as support provided by EUTF that alleviates immediate “humanitarian plus” needs. The reason for the perception on facilities in particular is that infrastructure interventions are more straightforward to implement than longer-term interventions that require systemic change; they facilitate access to school and WASH facilities for beneficiaries once infrastructure is in place; and if facilities are well maintained, their benefits are likely to be sustained over time. Nonetheless, the June 2018 EUTF Results Report suggests that results in WASH at regional level, both in terms of beneficiary targets and services, are low (5.1% and 2.5%, respectively); and in the education sector, whilst beneficiary targets perform very well for basic education at regional level (101.6%), results stand at 3% for services. In these kinds of infrastructure interventions, the EUTF is considered to be building a firm foundation for ongoing benefits, because infrastructure can continue to be used beyond the programme’s timeline – and in this sense it links with sustainability and impact. This encompasses rehabilitation, for example in Jordan where programmes such as QUDRA are rehabilitating schools; and ACTED will improve WASH infrastructure and facilities. In Serbia improvements were made to asylum centres; and in Iraq the Dohuk hospital neo-natal ward was rehabilitated and is noted to be contributing to results according to EUD stakeholders interviewed for this evaluation and corresponding ROM reports. Interventions falling under this category also include the construction of new facilities, such as schools by KfW. For these examples, interventions provide for immediate benefits in providing increased capacity to absorb and provide services to beneficiaries, and the facilities have the potential for ongoing use in the future, either for the same purposes, e.g. in the case of schools, or for other purposes such as in Serbia where asylum centres that were improved under EUTF could potentially provide services to vulnerable groups in those areas.

Interventions in sectors such as livelihoods and health, or social protection that focus on long-term, systemic change are recognised by the EUTF team and by stakeholders interviewed for this evaluation as requiring longer timeframes to yield results. Effectiveness in terms of results is, therefore, more difficult to assess at this stage of EUTF’s lifetime.

Several implementing partners and donors in Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey considered the EUTF to be less effective in livelihoods compared to other sectors. Results reporting for livelihoods activities falls under Resilience and Local Development, and it combine KPIs that measure participation in outreach activities, improved infrastructure and services, cash assistance and skills development, among others. Results related to income generation are low. For example, the number of beneficiaries who benefitted from rapid employment schemes stood at 0.7% of the target; community members reporting increased access to income generating activities.

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36 AISPO ROM report, March 2018
activities was 0.2% of the target; and employment days generated by project delivery were 0.9%. In the livelihoods sector, results are dependent on a number of factors, many of which are beyond the control of implementing partners or of the EUTF itself, which may impact in the longer term on the effectiveness of interventions examined in this evaluation. These include country contexts, employment regulations and work permit structures, and the time available for implementation.

For livelihoods, in assessing effectiveness, implementing partners and donors interviewed for this evaluation stress the need for interventions to be linked directly with the potential for securing employment, whether through grants or technical and vocational education and training (TVET). The general impression in this sector is that, unless livelihood interventions are linked to employment more specifically, it will be difficult to secure results in this area. Some concerns were raised in terms of the focus on training large numbers of beneficiaries or providing a set number of working days as targets for programmes, but not paying attention to the quality of the intervention. One example provided by an implementing partner in the project sample cohort in terms of working days is that sometimes this can be reported as a high figure, but may in fact be comprised of beneficiaries who are engaged in employment for one day only. The EUTF Results Report of June 2018 reports the number of workdays created for beneficiaries at 10% of the target.

**Evidence of effectiveness in the health sector is mixed.** Results reporting suggests that targeting of beneficiaries has been highly effective in Serbia and Iraq, with percentages reaching 278.4 and 803.2%, respectively. Results so far in Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan range between 23 and 35%; and in Egypt, so far, no beneficiaries have been targeted. Stakeholder interviews conducted with stakeholders outside the sample project cohort who have experience and knowledge of the health sector suggest that for Lebanon, where the health system is highly privatised, effective access to health services hinges on systemic changes to avoid results being limited to time bound interventions. Results reports for Lebanon on access to health services puts the figure of targeted beneficiaries at 23.9% of the target; and in Jordan this figure stood at 35.9%. In Jordan, implementing partners who were familiar with the health sector and/or part of consortia working on health, as well as EUD stakeholders, expressed concern about the context too, where the requirement for payment for health services represents a barrier likely to limit effectiveness of interventions in the long term without systemic change to support sustainability.

In health, interventions that provide services for the programme lifetime are important for facilitating access to these services. However, where health is largely privatised, such as in Lebanon, support is unlikely to continue beyond the lifetime of the programme, unless funding is renewed, the programme expanded and/or there are systemic changes through which the Lebanese government is able to widen access to these services for beneficiary populations.

Health programmes are mainly organised at local level with limited scope and reach, usually to a number of target communities. For example, the programme funded under IMC can provide services in selected locations, but it has a limited reach that is bound to the number of services that can be provided under the allocated funding. This intervention includes a well-designed service package which benefits both host communities and refugees and complements ongoing efforts of the government. However, these services are not available throughout the country, which limits its potential uptake and sustainability, and it does not resolve the issue of limitations to health access imposed by cost.

**Interventions that are providing continuous support and services to beneficiaries are generally considered as effective.** These types of interventions are focused in the education sector, and to a lesser extent

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38 Particip (2018) EU Regional Fund in Response to the Syria Crisis: 2nd Results Reporting, June 2018.
in health. In Lebanon, the evaluation found that support to school enrolment through UNICEF is successful - a view government counterparts hold in particular. In Jordan, results in relation to provision of schooling are considered a success, as well as interventions in Turkey in support of access to higher education. In Serbia, the provision of mobile medical services in remote areas such as Sjenica and Bolisegrad is seen to have been effective in reaching both migrants and local communities at a time of need, and strengthening government capacity; and some interventions in Iraq also fall under this category, such as decontamination and demining. In these cases, effectiveness contributes to access to specific services, and the Results Report of June 2018 is largely in line with these findings from interviews conducted for the evaluation.

3.2.2. Factors contributing and hindering effectiveness

The effectiveness of interventions is linked to several contributing and hindering factors. The effectiveness of interventions can depend on political will. Government counterparts in Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon are supportive of interventions in specific sectors (e.g. education), as well as measures that aim to strengthen systems and infrastructure. However, effectiveness in outreach at community level in Turkey is hindered by the policy on civil society engagement, particularly after the coup attempt. In Serbia, interviewees acknowledged that a high degree of inter-ministerial coordination was key to effectiveness.

Another contributing factor is the possibility for tackling more than one sector or approach under EUTF. The interventions supported by the Trust Fund incorporate measures from humanitarian assistance, recovery and development; this offers the opportunity to address different sectors, but also to address them depending on needs in each context. Many reviewed interventions offer holistic approaches to tackling needs and priorities of host communities and refugees.

Country context is also important. For example, regulation of access to the labour market is generally seen to hinder the effectiveness of livelihood opportunities, as well as the privatisation of health in ensuring access to health services. For example, refugees in Lebanon are not allowed to work in most sectors, limiting the access but also effectiveness of interventions. While this situation may, in the short and medium term, help Lebanese citizens gain work, it will in the long term, and particularly upon the eventual end of the crisis, result in a high number of qualified but unemployed persons due to lack of need for such services. For refugees, such restrictions do not help improve the livelihood situation of the qualified workforce, while also limiting the reach and scope of assistance to refugee communities. However, these constraints are sometimes beyond the scope of EUTF as they require changes to policies and legislation that carry sensitive political considerations for host countries. These can be tackled through advocacy components that some EUTF projects have, such as LEADERS, as well as efforts by EUTF teams to address needs in systems change to support interventions. An equally important determinant is the general socio-economic situation in host countries, with Iraq being noted by implementing partners with extensive experience of working in Iraq as a particularly difficult context to implement livelihoods support given the economic crisis there. Finally, for Turkey specifically, restrictions on NGOs to operate there impose limitations on the types of consortia and multi-partner interventions that can be designed.

Another factor that is influencing effectiveness is the outsourcing of external services to implement activities as some programmes rely on service providers to implement certain components. Implementing partners interviewed for this evaluation noted that, within consortia, there had been a push for trying to engage local communities in implementation to boost ownership of initiatives, but this approach was not favoured by some consortia members due to concerns related to capacity. On another level, the provision of TVET by external providers in the case of Jordan, for example, does not allow for systems strengthening. In these cases, effectiveness is linked with the longer-term dimension of initiatives. However, some interviewees noted that the engagement of external service providers ensures a smoother implementation process at times, particularly where timelines are tight, or where national providers may not be open/able to offer services to beneficiaries.

39 It is important to note that in the field of education, non-formal and informal education continue to be seen as a gap.
Lastly, the timeframe available for implementation is a significant influencing factor in effectiveness. The general sense is that EUTF programmes are favoured by implementing partners because they offer longer timeframes for implementation than humanitarian assistance programmes that may only cover a six-month timeframe. However, most interviewees experienced delays in the start of implementation due to negotiations with the EUTF team, as well as in some cases within consortia to agree on changes and revisions, which have then not been reflected in the project start date for some of the implementing partners interviewed for the evaluation, both from the sample of projects and from interviews conducted with additional consortia. In these cases, interviewees noted that the shortened timeframe has a negative impact on the effectiveness of interventions. EUTF team members note that a decision has been made to allow implementation beyond December 2019 for contracts signed from mid-2017 onwards. In addition, the QIN reports for some programmes suggest there have also been delays in approving partner, component or budget changes once Actions are underway, which cause severe delays in implementation and hence compromise the effectiveness of interventions as there are shorter timeframes to achieve intended results.

3.3. Efficiency

Efficiency is the measure of how the EUTF governance, mechanisms and business processes are conducive to delivery of results. The evaluation has assessed the cost-effectiveness, the staffing capacity, the decision-making processes, monitoring and evaluation, and communication in relation to the EUTF.

3.3.1. Cost effectiveness analysis

One rationale for establishing the EUTF is that, in pooling funds, in a similar way to other EU trust funds, it is a cost-effective way of reaching strategic objectives that are otherwise difficult to achieve Article 187.3(a) of the EU Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the Union conditions the creation of EU Trust Funds to them bringing ‘managerial advantages’, without further details on this objective.

The evaluation team assessed the cost effectiveness of the EUTF by benchmarking it against other EU Trust Funds. By funding volume, the EUTF is the second largest trust fund, as noted in Table 4 below. As of March 2018, the EUTF compares well with other trust funds on implementation rates, currently achieving nearly two-thirds implementation, relative to contracted amount.

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Table 4 - Basic comparative indicators across the four EUTFs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EUTF Africa</th>
<th>EUTF Madad</th>
<th>EUTF Bekou</th>
<th>EUTF Colombia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contributions pledged</td>
<td>€2,986 m</td>
<td>€1,435 m</td>
<td>€226 m</td>
<td>€89 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committed Amount</td>
<td>€2,417 m</td>
<td>€1,240 m</td>
<td>€155 m</td>
<td>€36 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contracted Amount</td>
<td>€1,643 m</td>
<td>€920</td>
<td>€102 m</td>
<td>€36 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation rate of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the contracted amount</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paid Amount</td>
<td>€644 m</td>
<td>€521 m</td>
<td>€65 m</td>
<td>€10 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall implementation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rate of paid amount</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Monthly report on the multiannual implementation of the EU Trust Funds, March 2018

For the EUTF, the average project length is 29 months across the 38 approved Action Documents, and the average project volume is €18 million. Furthermore, for the 47 countersigned contracts (as of April 2018), the average negotiation period between adoption of Action Document and contract signature is 9.2 months long. The contracting speed has fluctuated considerably over the EUTF lifetime, as detailed in section 3.3.3 below.

The choice of a regional approach is noted by the Trust Fund Management team as also related to cost effectiveness considerations. For instance, several of the signed contracts are with consortia, which allows for negotiating and managing a smaller number of contracts with a larger range of parties. This constellation allows for accommodating lower administrative and management fees. Furthermore, the EUTF management team has highlighted that the average project budget volume that would be possible for bilateral projects would be substantially smaller than what it currently is (potentially €3 million).

Article 187.7 of the EU’s Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the Union states that the European Commission is allowed to “withdraw a maximum of 5% of the amounts pooled into the Trust Fund to cover its management costs.” Across the four EU Trust Funds, this appears to cover mostly contract agents in Brussels and in European Delegations, excluding permanent officials working for the Commission and outsourced to the Trust Fund.41

The guidelines for management fees in the EUTF, specifically, are detailed in article 7.3 of its Constitutive Agreement. The EC is authorised to withdraw a fee of 4.5% for total contributions exceeding €50 million and 3% for total contributions to the Trust Fund exceeding €200 million. Given current extra-EC contributions to the EUTF, the Commission may thus charge a 3% management fee, currently equal to €4.6 million. Management contributions coming from EU budget sources amount to €6.2 million (around €5 million from the ENI line and around €1 million from the IPA).42 This adds up to a total of €10.8 million available for Trust Fund management, in effect less than 1% of the total EUTF volume. Given current human resources, this is sufficient funding but does not allow for much increase in staffing.


42 Direct communication from the Madad Fund’s management team to the evaluation team.
Looking ahead, the EUTF has spent €4.5 million on administrative costs, which is almost entirely comprised of staff costs for 20 contract staff positions. To guarantee this management structure up to 14 December 2021 (current estimation of durations of actions implemented under the EUTF) total costs are estimated at €9.9 million, leaving €0.9 million as a margin for additional recruitments. Specifically, the salaries of the Trust Fund Manager and Deputy Manager are covered by the Commission, not by Trust Fund contributions. In addition, there are other EU staff in HQ and Delegations who contribute directly or indirectly to the management of the EUTF projects, but they are not paid by the EUTF. Generally, for the EUTF however, contributions from the EU budget cannot be used for management fees, as the EU budget already has a fixed percentage dedicated to contract staff, negotiated every year with the Council and the European Parliament. In other words, when funds are shifted to the EUTF, the associated staff do not move along with the funds but remain in their ‘home’ office. This limits the overall amount available for administration, and for the EUTF these costs are thus below 1% of overall contributions to the EUTF (EU and extra-EU). Hence, structurally, the EUTF has been set up to channel large budgets but with limited personnel to manage the funds.

3.3.2. Staffing capacity

All interviewees confirmed that staffing capacity had held back the performance of the EUTF. At start-up, three officials were assigned to manage the EUTF, which was deemed appropriate given the EUTF allocations (in May 2015, €40 million). As the migration consequences of the Syria crisis physically reached European countries during the summer of 2015, funds quickly poured into the EUTF (reaching €597 million by end 2015). Thus, due to lack of staff capacity, EUTF contracting was partially frozen in 2017. Recruitment, however, was slow and the Management Team in Brussels was only fully in place by late 2016. EUTF performance has since improved but inadequate staffing continues to create bottlenecks into 2018. The EUTF team notes that recruitment processes in the EU are lengthy and that it took considerable time for the EUTF to become established through EUD-based staff.

As of April 2018, the Trust Fund organisational chart shows a total of 24 staff, including four managerial positions. Additional staff, employed by the EUDs but effectively working on EUTF projects, are not listed in the diagram (see section 2.2.2). They provide expertise and project management capacity to the EUTF. Overall, the evaluation found considerable burden on EUTF staff in EUDs, who have significant portfolios but are under-resourced to manage all steps in the project cycle. Particularly the changes in project identification and formulation, which now demand more and deeper consultative processes, as well as the current portfolio of projects under implementation (and the need for monitoring) place a significant workload on the EUTF team members in EUDs. The evaluation found that other EUD staff in some EUDs are very active in providing support to the EUTF. For example, in Lebanon, the EUD team is very engaged and active in providing support to EUTF-funded projects within their sectoral expertise, and in Jordan the EUD team is recognised to provide regular information and support to implementing partners as needed. This is a driver of efficiency and helps overcome human resource limitations to respond to the huge portfolio of projects, but it is unlikely to be sustainable. At the time of evaluation, there are plans for the recruitment of a total of three additional staff for Turkey, Lebanon and Iraq EUDs.

3.3.3. Contracting speed

As discussed above, implementing partners were concerned that due to contracting delays, confirmed by EUTF staff, the EUTF projects have not always met the needs of the beneficiaries as they evolved. The evaluation team notes that contracting times have improved, as staff capacity has increased, although other DG NEAR demands also resulted in contracting delays, for example a priority focus on the Turkey Facility projects during part of 2017. Figure 5 below provides detail of the average number of days between approval of Actions and
signature of contracts, which also suggests that contracting has improved relative to number of Action Documents negotiated.

**Figure 5 - Average number of days between Action Document approval and contract signature**

Some distinctions can be made in average contracting times by lead partner. As Figure 6 below suggests, the shortest contracting times on average are for IFIs (116 days) followed by UN agencies (233 days), and CSOs (448 days), with host government partners (415 days) having the longest contracting times.43#

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43 Due to limited information available, the evaluation team did not compare contracting times of the EUTF to those under normal EU external aid development instruments. For example, within the most recent evaluations of the EU’s largest external aid development instruments e.g. ENI, DCI, EDF, IPA, contracting speeds are not dealt with to the same extent as above, partly due to the different programming cycles between the different financial instruments.
3.3.4. Identification and selection process

Evidence collected through desk review and interviews with key informants from MS and EU show that the identification and selection process is generally well organised, with sufficient time and space for consultation and inputs from different parties, which improves the relevance of initiatives but at times adds to the length of the programming process. The evaluation found some Trust Fund Board members and other interviewees requesting more information to be provided by the EUTF management team on the selection process. This reveals issues with internal communication gaps within the MS represented in the Trust Fund and Operational boards, whereby sometimes not all information is shared internally between MS agencies/representatives in the Operational and Trust Fund board. This is beyond the control of the EUTF team but contributes to a lack of clarity with regard to selection criteria and how decisions on projects are arrived at. There is an acknowledgement of closer coordination and dialogue between EUTF teams in EUDs and host governments, but interviewees from the Operational Board (as well as the Trust Fund Board) were not always aware of the details of such exchanges; again, an indication that the EUTF management team may need to continuously inform the boards about their respective roles and the EUTF processes. Evidence collected from other sources (desk review, interviews with EUTF management team, EUDs and implementing partners) shows that the JHDF has been developed as a basis for humanitarian and development planning and programming, and helps increase the relevance of EUTF interventions.
The most positive shift in the programming process as noted by key informants from EUTF team, EUDs, governments and implementing partners, is the opportunity and encouragement for the EUTF team and consortia of potential implementing partners to have a close dialogue with country authorities and EUDs, prior to submitting a concept note, with rooting in the JHDF. This ensures that the future actions are responsive to agreed priorities and allows for stronger focus on actions that will enable EUTF to bridge humanitarian and development assistance. Such an approach may also be favourable for strengthening sustainability of results and stronger equity in provision of given services (ensuring that both refugee and host populations benefit equally from stronger and more equitable services). In 2016, out of 22 projects approved, 17 resulted from direct requests and dialogue with host governments and the EUDs, while only five were selected after a competitive evaluation based on proposals from organisations.

Another concern raised by the majority of interlocutors regards the speed in which the projects are conceived, approved and contracted. In theory, EUTF should be a rapid and flexible instrument that allows a speedy and comprehensive response to the crisis. However, being housed in DG NEAR, EUTF follows principally DG NEAR procedures, which even with some facilitation are still slow and cumbersome. For the EUTF the average project length is 29 months across the 38 Action Documents adopted by the Board), and the average project volume is €18 million. Furthermore, for the 47 countersigned contracts (available as of April 2018), the average negotiation period between the appointment of the negotiation team adoption of Action Document and contract signature is 9.2 months long. The duration of the negotiation period may be longer if there is preference for a consortium to implement a project, which in some cases takes a lot of time as consortia are ‘custom made’ to respond to the EUTF’s requirement, and in some cases, partners do not have a history of working together. In such cases, it takes a considerable time for consortia to agree upon internal procedures, sectors and responsibilities. In some cases, a challenge is that MS/UN agencies continue to negotiate specific contract terms, which unnecessarily delays the process, e.g. WHO agreed different terms with DEVCO and insisted on respective application in DG NEAR. Upon finalisation of these details, back and forth negotiation with the EUTF management towards contracting takes further time until contracts are signed. In some cases, interviews reveal that it took up to one year to finally close the contract for Actions. The EUTF team suggests that timeframes for finalising contracting have been improving, particularly since a business process was put in place in order to address the length of the process and define timelines for each step, at both the level of Action Document and level of contracting.

A concern by many key informants relates to the choice of multi-partner, multi-country/regional projects. According to the EUTF management team, this approach has been adopted for cost-effectiveness considerations. Contracts finalised include those to be implemented either by one implementing partner or by a consortia, the latter of which allows for negotiating and managing a smaller number of contracts with a larger range of parties. This results in lower administrative and management fees. Furthermore, the data collected through desk review and interviews with EUTF management team highlights that the average project volume that would be possible for bilateral projects would be substantially smaller than what it currently is (potentially €3 million). However, interlocutors agree that insisting on multi-partner, multi-country/regional projects adds complexity to the negotiation and contracting stages, with consequent slower contracting. Whilst representatives of the Trust Fund Board and the Operational Board, some EUD staff, and some implementing partners note that the choice of multi-partner, multi-country/regional projects may result in efficiency or effectiveness gains due to greater coordination and visibility, fewer direct implementing partners and fewer contracts (less than 50 as opposed to 300 estimated by the EUTF Management without the consortia model); many of them also noted that this approach can result in problems during the implementation phase. For example, the Project Addressing Vulnerabilities of Refugees and Host Communities in Five Countries Affected by the Syria Crisis implemented under leadership of the Danish Red Cross consortium has faced significant challenges despite the fact that all consortium members are Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, which should in theory facilitate cooperation. The EUTF Management Team interlocutors highlight, however, that they consider it the responsibility of consortia to be creative and put in place appropriate working practices to support implementation.

For some interviewees, there is also a concern with volume over quality of the interventions. For example, TVET in Jordan is seen as relevant and potentially an area where linkages to private sector opportunities can be made. However, striving to train large numbers of people without an assessment of whether the training will indeed lead to better employment opportunities detracts from the relevance of the intervention. In addition, and
linked to sustainability, even if a TVET intervention is outsourced to specific providers without strengthening countries’ TVET systems, relevance to beneficiaries will be programme-bound and limited.

### 3.3.5. Boards

The evaluation team generally heard positive comments from Member State Trust Fund Board representatives. In their views, the Trust Fund Board offers space for donors to engage in discussions on strategic directions of the EUTF and remain informed on parameters and priorities of the EUTF. The inclusiveness and participation of the partners/beneficiary countries of the EUTF as observers (e.g. Iraq, Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan) is seen as an added value of the EUTF. Initial findings indicate that Trust Fund Board members request improved communication between the Management Team and the Trust Fund Board, and better access to more technical information. The evaluation team notes, however, that the Trust Fund Board’s mandate is exclusive of technical discussions.

The Operational Board Members note that this Board is generally fulfilling its mandate, i.e. deciding on the allocation of funds to individual Actions and providing an oversight over the implementation of the EUTF’s assistance. Operational Board meetings are generally dynamic and are an efficient venue to discuss different actions proposed for the EUTF, as well as programming and implementation issues. The Operational Board has access to detailed and technical information, not available to the Trust Fund Board, as envisaged by the governance set-up.

The interviews undertaken by the evaluation team, along with the review of Operational Board meeting minutes and related documentation, point to a proactive working environment. For example, the Operational Board met twice in 2015, three times in 2016, and twice in 2017. The EUTF Management team also organised two informal meetings in 2017 with the members of the Operational Board “to offer a conducive forum for discussion on issues regarding the EUTF, for which the more formal Board meetings may not always be the best occasion”.44 There is general satisfaction with the level of preparation and follow-up of Board meetings, as well as the process in which information and inputs for decisions are managed. Yet, several interviewees recommended that communication and decision-making with regard to project selection and implementation is revisited to offer insight into all stages of project identification and selection.

### 3.3.6. Monitoring and evaluation

The EUTF M&E system started late and very slowly with the first ROM mission undertaken only in 2018 after more than two years of Fund operations. The EUTF Management justified this decision as a question of prioritisation, but also by the fact that first funded projects started implementation from 2015. In the initial months, the funding volume grew exponentially, and the staff capacity remained low during the first year of operations. The focus was thus on identification of interventions, selection of projects and contracting, not monitoring. Since December 2017, the EUTF Results Framework provides a number of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) that allow for a better reporting of the results and better understanding on the level of impact of the EUTF funded projects and programmes. The focus is placed on the six target sector areas: basic education, higher education, resilience and local development, health, WASH, and protection. To ensure that the reports of implementing partners provide quality inputs for higher level analysis, the EUTF has developed an EUTF system for internal Monitoring by EUTF project managers at HQ and EUDs. EUTF teams work closely with implementing partners on systematic logframe revision during negotiations and alignment of projects'
indicators. The EUTF uses QINs\textsuperscript{45} templates for the collection of cumulative data, as per project indicators and accompanying Guidelines (which are annexed to each contract with IPs), and implementing partners are also tasked with conducting final evaluations at the end of their interventions.

Summary results reports at the level of the EUTF are prepared semi-annually, providing an overview of current achievements with regard to the EUTF Results Framework output key performance indicators, KPIs, in all six priority areas, aggregated from data received through action-level monitoring provided by implementing partners, through the QINs. In this sense, QIN templates also allow for integration of a brief narrative update on the key aspects of implementation. This is particularly useful for one-year contracts which do not include interim/progress reports.

In 2017, the EUTF M&E Framework was set up with the aim of enabling assessment, across various levels, of the degree to which the overall objective and targeted results of the Trust Fund are being achieved. The framework was established to provide information on aggregated key results achieved with EUTF assistance. The main rationale is to strengthen the framework for ensuring effectiveness of EUTF financed actions, and to demonstrate to external stakeholders how the EU contributes to development progress in the countries and regions to which it provides development assistance. At the same time, the framework helps provide relevant information to inform internal management decisions.

Despite the delay in the introduction of a comprehensive M&E system, at the time of this evaluation it appears that the pace in the management of the M&E activities has improved. A new Technical Assistance project has put in place the EUTF Strategy for Evaluation, EUTF ROM Handbook (EUTF-tailed Monitoring Reports and Monitoring Questions Reports), further revisions of the EUTF Results Framework, and the EUTF ROM six-monthly work-plan. It also conducts monitoring of projects according to the Results Oriented Monitoring (ROM) methodology.\textsuperscript{46} Thus far, five ROM Monitoring Reports and 5 Monitoring Questions Report have been conducted for the following interventions: AISPO, IOM, MoLEVSA, QUDRA Lebanon and QUDRA Turkey, AVSI and, at the time of finalisation of this evaluation report, ROMs for UNHCR Lebanon and GVC Lebanon were underway. Moreover, two sectoral evaluations under higher education and livelihoods were under progress aiming to guide future rounds of programming to better respond to changing context and needs.

Still, feedback from key informants who are members of the Trust Fund Board, suggest a general criticism for the lack of information on the progress and challenges of EUTF-funded projects. This may be due to unclear understanding of the M&E requirements that the EUTF Management team places on grantees, as well as changes introduced, and adaptation needed, as the M&E system was put in place. A review of Board meeting documentation shows that Board members were informed about the M&E processes. Nevertheless, interviews with some board members point that while the technical assistance to support the EUTF on monitoring was welcomed by some, not all Trust Fund Board members were aware of this initiative. This comes despite that M&E plans having been presented at several meetings.

There have been measures to ensure stronger coherence between the EUTF and the Facility for Refugees in Turkey which, amongst other things, resulted in the alignment of shared KPIs, and common results reporting requirements.

\textsuperscript{45} According to the Special Conditions for MADAD contracts: "4.2 (4.3) In accordance with the Article 2.3 (for grant agreements) or Article 3.4 (for the delegation agreement) of Annex II, the Coordinator (for grants)/Organisation (for delegation agreements) will submit quarterly narrative information notes.

\textsuperscript{46} The TA contract for the External Monitoring and Evaluation for the EUTF was signed in December 2017 for a duration of 25 months.
3.4. Communication and decision-making

Interviewees from across the Fund noted that the flow of information and communication within the EUTF Management Team affected Fund management efficiencies. The Constitutive Agreement does not specify the roles and tasks of the EUDs but has evolved over the duration of the EUTF lifetime. Some interviewees raised concerns about the matrix structure, whereby EUD-based EUTF team members report concurrently to the Trust Fund Management in Brussels and to the EUDs, leading to lack of clarity with regard to responsibilities and reporting. This structure, however, is intended to also contribute to coordination and complementarity with other EU instruments managed and monitored by EU colleagues at Delegations.

Most EUTF project management functions are located in Brussels. According to Brussels-based interlocutors, this increases central control and oversight, and it strengthens consistency. In the view of non-Brussels interviews, however, such centralisation also delays contracting, makes communication cumbersome, and favours quantity over quality. In Brussels, the evaluation team noted an active intent to keep decision-making light and flexible, whereas Delegation colleagues would prefer an increase in the type and number of procedures that were predetermined, thereby affording more predictability and autonomy to Delegation-based actors.

3.5. Sustainability

The OECD-DAC definition for evaluating sustainability in international aid programmes is concerned with whether the benefits of an activity are likely to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn. For this evaluation, the criterion has been further nuanced given the specificities of dealing with refugee populations. Hence, this report aims to assess the extent to which intervention results are likely to sustainably facilitate beneficiaries’ increased resilience as the crisis continues. In other words, will beneficiaries be increasingly resilient as a result of the EUTF contribution, and will their improved condition be sustainable?

Stakeholders interviewed for the evaluation point to instances of increased resilience in specific sectors. From members of host-communities and governments to the refugees, IDPs and other included beneficiaries, several stakeholders noted the positive contribution of the EUTF, particularly in the field of education.

In Jordan, education officials note that EUTF funded programmes relieve “pressure on the spot”. They provide temporary support, allowing Jordan to cope with and absorb the increased refugee influx and pressure on the provision of some services, particularly in the field of education. Here, in addition to increased child school enrolments, the provision of school supplies and rehabilitation/building of infrastructure is seen as contributing to resilience.

Similarly, the UNHCR and UNICEF interventions fill gaps in national education funding, and thus aim to maintain overall refugee and host community human capital. In addition, several projects in Lebanon for example, including Youth Resolve, LEADERS, FURSA, BADAEL, QUDRA, SPARK and HOPES focus specifically on youth programmes. The engagement of youth and the replication of evidence informed principles across as many community projects as possible could potentially contribute to resilience.
On livelihoods, and particularly employment, stakeholders noted that longer time investments, including on identifying social norms and continuous capacity building and strengthening, are needed to build resilient systems and institutions. On TVET, interviewees suggest that there is an inherent tension between contributing to programmes that strengthen the national capacity for TVET intake and enlisting private providers to maximise the individual beneficiaries enrolled in TVET. While the latter is more feasible, it compromises contribution to the resilience and sustainability of the sector. Evaluation interviewees recommended that the focus on beneficiary target numbers should not compromise sustainability considerations. In response, EUTF staff note that an increasing amount of resources during 2016 focused on reaching children, also outside formal education, through non-formal education, vocational training, social stability and peacebuilding activities.

By contrast, interviewees commended the EUTF’s interventions in Lebanon that helped reach and contribute to the resilience of refugees and host communities. Concretely, enlisting Lebanese government institutions to target host communities and refugees, and engage local banks to provide cash-cards, was an appropriate form to leverage local capacity, while simultaneously strengthening them. As Lebanon does not have a history of proving social protection programmes, this was an opportunity to start a national social protection system, planned by the government itself. Assistance programming in the form of analysis, targeting, banking infrastructure systems to be used to serve the poor, provided better targeting for both Syrians and Lebanese.

In this light, the evaluation team concludes that interventions which featured strong nationally-driven processes, are more likely to contribute to resilience. Implementing partners in Jordan are shifting the focus to vulnerability and systems change rather than on crisis response, and the government is receptive to this approach. Similarly, in RDPP, the main focus is now on the prevention of further deterioration and relieving of pressure, thereby allowing host communities and countries to absorb shocks. In sum, shifting to working with government structures and localising efforts has helped to increase national ownership, which has a direct impact on resilience questions. In this light, the evaluation team welcomes calls made by the EUTF Manager for stronger bilateral approaches with national governments to solidify the resilience of beneficiaries, through increased national ownership.
3.6. Impact

The intervention logic for the EUTF suggests that EUTF interventions will contribute to (i) increased resilience of refugees and host communities who are left more vulnerable by the Syrian crisis, and (ii) peace and regional stability. These Trust Fund ‘global impacts’ are interlinked and represent the final step in a results-chain whose prior link encompasses stronger human capital and sustainable livelihoods. The evaluation sought to assess the criterion of impact by reviewing the sample of projects and gather an overall assessment of the condition affecting the refugees and their host communities. In the results chain, the intermediate impacts include (a) strengthened human capital and (b) sustainable livelihood, job and business opportunities.

While project interventions generally produce outputs that can be measured immediately, such as children attending school, evidence of the eventual impact which is, here defined as increased resilience, may take years to appear. For this evaluation, the project start dates make impact evidence highly unlikely. Of 47 projects contracted by April 2018 to date, three projects were initiated two years prior to the start of the evaluation, and sixteen projects started one to two years before the evaluation.

The evaluation sample contains one project which has run for two years and seven projects that have run for one to two years. As anticipated, the evaluation did not find evidence that the EUTF had yet contributed to the intended global impact but there are indications of intermediate impact, especially on human capital.

In Jordan, officials and implementing partners noted that it was not yet possible to detect impact because projects remain at an early stage of implementation. The size of the programming, however, made eventual impact likely. In Lebanon, interviewees welcomed the EUTF's help in shifting the aid focus to development issues because it was likely to produce resilience. Again, however, it was too early to assess broader impact. In Turkey, the focus on higher education received the most positive comments related to impact. Outside most other assistance schemes, such programming delivers a high probability of increased human capital, and eventually resilience.

Implementing partners and officials noted that several factors continue to hinder greater impact of EUTF interventions. Political, economic and security policies in host countries and in Europe limit the options for refugees to restart their lives and sustainably increase their resilience. Similarly, the April 2018 Brussels II Conference highlighted the importance of host countries providing access to livelihoods and for countries outside the region to offer legal pathways for resettlement.

3.7. Coordination, complementarity, coherence (3Cs)

The EUTF aims to provide a “coherent and reinforced aid response to the Syrian and Iraqi crises and the massive displacement resulting from them on a multi-country scale.”47 Within that context, EU and international donor assistance through the Trust Fund shall enable a comprehensive response package commensurate with the challenges. The response package is envisaged to contribute to mitigating the spillover effects of the Syrian crisis, by bringing together the EU, its Member States’, and other donors’ funds and instruments in order to address the immediate and medium-term needs in a coordinated and comprehensive manner. The EUTF’s Constitutive Agreement also stipulates that the Trust Fund shall act in coherence with relevant EU and international guidelines and policies48, as well as to EU humanitarian assistance on the basis of Council

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47 Revised Constitutive Agreement, 2016, p. 7.

48 These guidelines and policies include the Conclusions of the EU Foreign Affairs Council on the “EU regional strategy for Syria and Iraq as well as the ISIL/Da'esh threat” adopted on 16 March 2015; the Co-hosts declaration from the
Regulation (EC) No 1257/96 of 20 June 1996 concerning humanitarian aid. Given this mandate, this evaluation assesses whether EUTF lived up to its promise.

The evaluation defines coherence as a measure of the degree to which the EUTF interventions are consistent with each other (internal coherence) and with the EU and host country policy frameworks at large (external coherence). Coordination is defined by this evaluation as management processes involving interrelating activities performed by a network of actors, in an effort to be as effective and/or as efficient as possible with the resources dedicated to any portion of a management cycle in order to generate specific outputs, outcomes and effects. Complementarity is considered an effect of good coordination management practices and cannot be reduced to the simple strategy of avoiding overlaps in official development assistance (ODA) efforts between Member States and the Commission.

Within these 3Cs, the assessment also looks at the EUTF’s approach and extent to which it creates synergies or overlaps, and how it coordinates with other EU or donor interventions. Specifically, the evaluation assesses the degree of coherence, coordination and complementarity between actions funded by the EUTF and other EU and MS-supported measures operating in similar areas, i.e. the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey, the Syria Recovery Trust Fund based in Gaziantep, and the EU Regional Development and Protection Programme.

Coherence, coordination and complementarity with other bilateral and multi-donor support were also explored within the scope of this evaluation.

3.7.1. Internal coherence

With regard to the internal coherence between the EUTF’s objectives and actions, the evaluation found coherence at implementation level, particularly when it came to the core characteristics of the EUTF (i.e. multi-sectoral and multi-partner approach, and its ability to evolve over time).

The projects in the evaluation sample align with the overall Fund objectives, and the assessment of the funded interventions shows coherence with devised priorities of the Fund. The EUTF uses a comprehensive range of EU funding modalities that enable a regional (multi-country), multi-sectoral and multi-partner approach (grants to NGO projects, budget support/financing agreements with partner countries, and delegation agreements with EUMS national agencies). This comprehensiveness is highly welcomed across the range of stakeholders interviewed for this evaluation.

Formally, the EUTF enables fast-track contracting procedures for crisis situations, to ensure flexibility and rapid response. Decisions are generally considered to be consistent with the specific objectives of the instrument. In comparison with other internal EU instruments, EUTF is recognised as more flexible and rapid than other internal tools, and therefore on an internal coherence level consistent with that objective (on an external level, this is more contested, as it has been discussed in other sections.)

Stronger coherence is mainly found with projects designed to address national level, versus those at regional level. This is mainly due to better programming processes and better sector and partner concentration.
and dedicated efforts from EU Delegations and HQ, in addition to stronger engagement from national government stakeholders. There are also examples of Actions aimed at consolidating previous support programmes, which is positive for continuity and for building on previous achievements.

**The coherence between national and regional initiatives is more challenging in terms of synergies,** although there are efforts by the EUTF team and implementing partners to ensure alignment and to avoid duplication. The EUTF combines bilateral and multi-country/regional projects, but the evaluation did not find evidence that this also leads to operational synergies.

### 3.7.2. External coherence

Evidence collected through interviewees and the document review points to efforts to ensure synergies and coherence between the EUTF and other EU-funded programmes. Interviews with the EUTF team and other EU interlocutors emphasised that both formal and informal mechanisms are in place across the EUTF and DG NEAR structures to avoid overlaps and ensure synergies between EU-funded programmes. Synergies are sought particularly with the Facility in Turkey and the European Regional Development and Protection Programme as well as EU IPA interventions in the Western Balkans and Turkey and EU ENI programmes in the Middle East. In addition, the EUTF contributed to rolling out the Lives in Dignity policy as well as other international agendas and policies on durable solutions to forced displacements, including the Global Compact for Refugees and the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF).

**Particularly strong synergies and coherence are found between the EUTF and DG ECHO.** There is agreement among interviewees that the synergies and coherence are strong, as noted also in section 3.8 below. For DG ECHO, the EUTF is practically the “missing link” between emergency response and development needs, particularly in the context of protracted crises. One of the reasons for good cooperation and coherence is the fact that procedures (e.g. annual programming) in DG ECHO and the EUTF are closer to each other than with other services. Areas of intervention of DG ECHO (emergency) and the EUTF (bridge between humanitarian and development cooperation) are naturally building on each other. There are cases where the EUTF projects build on results of DG ECHO interventions, particularly in WASH (e.g. the GVC project to Promote Sustainable Management of Water Services and Resources in Lebanon).

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49 European Regional Development and Protection Programme is supported by platform of eight European donors: European Commission (DEVCO), Ireland, The Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic, Switzerland, Norway and Denmark. Denmark manages the programme through the Programme Management Unit with offices in Beirut and Amman. The current budget for the RDPP stands at Euro 41.6 mill.

50 COM (2016)234
The DG ECHO field presence and ongoing consultation is also mentioned as key to ensuring synergies and information sharing on projects, results and challenges ahead. DG ECHO is also always invited to observe the Board meetings, and information is shared consistently as both parties make efforts to keep each other informed. This is particularly critical as DG ECHO has exited from several sectors in Jordan and Lebanon, and there is a plan to further decrease DG ECHO presence in Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and Western Balkans. DG ECHO plans to phase out from some interventions due to the fact that, in many targeted areas, it is no longer a humanitarian but a protracted crisis, meaning that the EUTF is better suited to address also issues tackled by DG ECHO through its multi-faced approach. An example is the cash assistance in Lebanon where the World Food Programme will implement a ‘social assistance’ project, and some health activities have already been transferred.

3.7.3. Complementarity and coordination

The EUTF has sought to work alongside the 3RP established in December 2014, which coordinates international appeals for the Syrian crisis and helps structure the humanitarian and resilience-based response plan in the region.\(^{51}\) Coordination with the 3RP is mentioned in the EUTF’s Strategic Orientation document,\(^ {52}\) and in the

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EUTF’s operational criteria for project selection. At the UN 2016 London Conference Supporting Syria and the Region, which sought support to the 3RP, the EU and its Member States pledged over €3 billion for 2016. The EU reiterated its support in the 2017 Brussels Conference on Supporting the Future of Europe and the Region, pledging an additional €560 million for 2018 for Lebanon, Jordan and Syria. Overall, the number of donors pledging multi-year funding has increased from two at the Kuwait III 2015 conference to 25 at Brussels in 2017, with the international community confirming USD3.7 billion for humanitarian, resilience and development activities for 2018-2020.

The Agreement stipulates that the Trust Fund’s activities have to be very closely coordinated with other existing aid programmes and pooling mechanisms to avoid duplication and competition for funding. Article 5.1.3 and Annex I.2 of the EUTF Constitutive Agreement enables the EUTF to invite representatives of relevant pooling mechanisms as observers to Board meetings to ensure the additionality and complementarity of the EUTF. For example, the EUTF activities inside Syria are coordinated and in agreement with the Syria Recovery Trust Fund, which is an observer on its Board meetings. The SRTF was established in September 2013 by the United Arab Emirates, the United States of America, Germany, and the Syrian opposition as represented by the National Coalition of Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (SOC). The SRTF now comprises 12 contributing members pledging a total of €202 million, focusing on recovery and reconstruction activities in areas controlled by the SOC. Other relevant pooling instruments include the World Bank Lebanon Syria Crisis Trust Fund set up in 2014 to help mitigate the impact of the Syrian crisis, and the World Bank multi-donor trust fund, the Emergency Services and Social Resilience Program, which intends to help Jordanian municipalities and host communities to address immediate service delivery impacts of Syrian refugee inflows.

Interviews with stakeholders indicate that these efforts to ensure coordination among donors are useful and bring more coherence. The coordination is steered particularly by efforts of the EUTF team in the HQ and in the field. There is potential for improving coordination at national level, particularly at project level, to ensure overlaps are avoided and complementarities sought. At the same time, coordination with national authorities, especially of those beneficiary countries hosting Syrian refugees, is maintained through bilateral discussions and by their observer/member status in the EUTF’s Board. The national response plans and actions are also developed in close consultation and in response to host countries priority needs.

Overall, the EUTF has been proven to adhere to the 3Cs, also thanks to its defining characteristics, particularly the multi-sector, multi-partner and to lesser extent the regional approach. The multi-sector approach helps designing interventions in holistic manner, covering multi-dimensional needs of host communities and refugees, thus bringing a more coherent response. At the same time, the multi-sector approach also ensures a more coordinated approach (less actors-more focus), enabling more clarity on who does what within the EUTF and other related EU/MS funded interventions, as well as with other donors. Implementing


55 The Board consists of Donor Members, the Republic of Turkey, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Trustee (KfW), the Management Unit (MU) as Ex-Officio, and is chaired by the representative of the National Coalition represented by Syrian Interim Government. The donors include the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Arab Emirates, the United States of America, the United Kingdom/The Netherlands, Japan, the State of Kuwait, the French Republic.

partners generally agree that the EUTF has facilitated interactions and exchanges between stakeholders that allow for innovative thinking, lesson learning and knowledge sharing; and they attribute that in part to EUTF and to the EUTF teams allowing the establishment of those linkages. In a small number of instances there were suggestions that these exchanges could be further strengthened with clearer communications and increased interaction platforms.

3.8. Humanitarian-development bridge

The evaluation examined how and to what extent the EUTF is bridging the humanitarian-development divide. Findings on this evaluation question are mixed, and they depend on the country, the type of stakeholder involved, and in some cases the sector of interventions. Another important factor is beneficiary identification and targeting.

The context of intervention countries varies, as illustrated in previous sections of the report. The EUTF’s positioning on the humanitarian-development continuum depends on the country’s approach to responding to the Syrian and Iraqi crises as well as the way in which programmes are negotiated with government counterparts. Where there is more government involvement and coordination, the perception tends to be that the EUTF is bridging the divide but leaning to the development side of the equation, for instance in Jordan. There, the government adheres to the Jordan Response Plan (JRP), and procedures have been put in place for approving and following up on programmes responding to the Syria crisis. The Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation is the focal point for liaising with the EUTF team, and line ministries are assigned for projects. These projects must be registered on the Jordan Response Information System and they go through a 12-step approval process before implementation begins. In other words, Jordanian government counterparts are part and parcel of the EUTF processes, and projects that have begun implementation, for instance QUDRA and LEADERS, or programmes that are due to start imminently, such as Youth RESOLVE, refer to regular coordination and communication with line ministries.

The opposite is also the case: where a country has less government engagement, such as in Iraq and to a lesser extent Lebanon, the EUTF interventions are perceived as more humanitarian in nature. In Iraq, for example, there is less engagement with government and a more prominent role for NGOs operating there. Stakeholders working there highlight the humanitarian and emergency needs are still relevant in that context. The programmes they design for EUTF funding are in this vein (e.g. cash support) and leaning towards recovery.

In Lebanon, there is a more fragmented government with weak inter-ministerial coordination. As a result, the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan is a national strategy that not all ministries are engaged with. There is less opportunity to work on development programming, although the EUTF team there is trying to increasingly engage in this type of work, as has been discussed earlier in this report.

The assessment of whether and how the EUTF is bridging the humanitarian-development divide also depended on the type of stakeholder interviewed. Stakeholders more heavily engaged in humanitarian response clearly see the EUTF as effective in bridging the humanitarian-development divide, whereas those who are active in development question whether the EUTF is overlapping with other instruments, rather than being a unique instrument.

For example, the EUTF is seen as offering options for incorporating emergency and development components not afforded by other donors; and it is resoundingly assessed as being a bridging instrument in relation to ECHO. In Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey, the EUTF is seen as a successor to ECHO and interviewees across the board agree that it would not make sense for the EUTF to exit a country before ECHO does. Similarly, implementing partners who have experience of programming and implementation in emergencies believe that the EUTF is providing an alternative between humanitarian response and development cooperation. They particularly emphasise the multi-sector and multi-country approach, and timeframes that are over one year as the characteristics that allow the EUTF to play that bridging role, although several interviewees suggested that there is a need for repeat cycles to effectively move along the humanitarian-development continuum.
Other stakeholders who have experience of development programming are more sceptical about the EUTF’s ability to act as a humanitarian-development bridge, particularly bilateral cooperation agencies. This assessment is more pronounced where the EUTF programmes are funding infrastructure components that are typically seen as part of development programming; and they make the qualification that the EUTF should instead be funding rehabilitation as a transition tool. On the other hand, some host governments such as Jordan prefer budget support and having a development slant to programming that ensures their involvement and ownership and help to secure their support and engagement. In general, the evaluation finds that EUTF has successfully navigated the context in each country to deliver on the humanitarian-development bridge. The flexibility of the EUTF to straddle this divide is coherent with the spirit of initiatives in the humanitarian and development sectors to ensure greater coordination between them.\(^57\)

The EUTF’s ability to bridge the humanitarian-development divide is also qualified depending on the intervention sector. **Interventions in the field of education and WASH infrastructure are considered to more closely align to a longer-term development approach, whereas livelihoods and health are less likely to be sustainable given certain country contexts.** In Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey there seems to be a good level of engagement with government counterparts in the education sector. In Lebanon, the Ministry of Education is engaged with UNICEF, for example, in the approval of its work plan. In Turkey, higher education work is considered to be outside of the humanitarian realm by some interviewees, and interventions are therefore seen as more grounded in development. In Jordan, interventions in the field of education are focused on school rehabilitation and maintenance, as is the case in QUDRA, and building of schools by KfW; and WASH infrastructure to schools and households provided under the ACTED programme are also seen as longer-term interventions.

Livelihoods and health are more contested sectors. In the field of livelihoods, training and cash support for starting or scaling up businesses are included in some EUTF-funded programmes. However, constraints in terms of work permits or permissions for home businesses, for example, constrain the possibility for moving from assistance to longer-term solutions; these interventions are likely to be time-bound given the country context. In Lebanon, EUTF support helps the health system to develop accessible services to refugees in the medium term. This is particularly important bearing in mind the problems refugees faced in accessing health services. Stakeholders working in the health sector argue that without systemic changes health services delivery will continue to be fragmented and limited in scope, particularly in Lebanon. They would welcome an EUTF intervention currently under negotiation to reinforce the role of the Ministry of Health and to institutionalise its governance role.

Finally, the EUTF’s ability to be a bridge for humanitarian aid and development cooperation hinges on beneficiary identification and targeting. **The EUTF’s inclusion of host communities, refugees and IDPs in its programmes is seen as contributing to the ability to bridge the humanitarian-development divide.** It also conforms with discourses and global initiatives, such as the CRRF and the Global Compact for Refugees, which emphasise the importance of ensuring that the response to displacement situations brings together these three groups of beneficiaries to increase the likelihood of durable solutions.\(^58\) The EUTF brings together populations that tend to be targeted separately in humanitarian and development interventions. Nonetheless, given the framing of the EUTF in relation to resilience, some stakeholders suggest that criteria of vulnerability rather than nationality would be more pertinent for targeting and supporting beneficiaries.

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3.9. Added value

The evaluation assessed the added value of the EUTF in terms of size of engagement, particular expertise, and/or particular weight in advocacy. The evaluation compared the Fund’s added value to bilateral interventions by MS and other donors; its success in leveraging funds, allowing delegated authority, and creating consortia; specific additional outputs/outcomes from joint approaches; and the ability to creating EU global visibility and political weight that would not be achieved through other instruments and tools.

3.9.1. Engagement

Desk review and interviews with relevant stakeholders and partners provide evidence that the EUTF offers added value through its governance mechanism. Interviewed MS representatives and implementing partners agree that the EUTF’s added value comes from ensuring joint response to the Syria crisis through engaging with both MS and target countries in the EUTF. This is, in part, thanks to the EUTF’s defining characteristics, particularly the multi-sector, multi-partner approach and, to a lesser extent, the regional focus. The EUTF manages to engage MS by ensuring strong governance mechanisms through which they can contribute to the response to the crisis, even if they do not provide extensive funds. Several countries are also engaged in governance structures as observers and interlocutors, and the evaluation finds this as an important investment in governance, but also towards increased relevance of the EUTF to respond to the crisis. While there are different inputs on how governance structures (Boards) can be further supported to enhance their effectiveness, all interlocutors agree that these Boards provide strong mechanisms and incentives for stakeholders to engage in the design and delivery of interventions.

Stakeholders almost unanimously recognised the added value of the EUTF and its essential contribution to generating unique results and benefits for refugees and local populations in targeted regions, although variations are visible between Western Balkans and other countries/regions. The majority of implementing partners and all the EU and MS representatives consulted for this evaluation emphasised that the results and benefits stemming from the EUTF actions would (either probably or definitely) not materialise without the support of the EUTF or bilateral MS or EU funding. When scrutinising the reasons why comparable benefits would not be generated, the lack of budget to fund similar actions of such scope and reach appears to be the main reason, according to both MS representatives and implementing partners. Interviewees agree that the EUTF investment of substantial funds through multi-sector, multi-partner and, to lesser extent, the multi-country approach allows it to implement more, with larger programmes, thus extending its reach. Beneficiaries explain that there are no national/regional programmes available to fund similar actions, confirming that the EUTF’s defining characteristics (multi-sector, multi-partner) are well chosen ones. A large share of interlocutors interviewed for this evaluation also stated that interventions funded by the EUTF generate better results and more benefits than comparable national/regional interventions of other donors. Interlocutors agree that the concept of a trust fund is very useful for all parties engaged, particularly the MS, as it promotes coherence and longer-term results. Interlocutors compare it with bilateral and EU funds which are heavier and more bureaucratic, making them slower than the EUTF. However, the main concern raised is that the EUTF is still slow and at times inefficient, particularly in the programming phase in which there is potential for improvement in many areas. This is an important finding regarding EUTF’s defining characteristics, of flexibility and rapid response. The main variation to this, in the Western Balkans, relates to the fact that funds for the EUTF come from the national IPA envelope. This, for some interlocutors, is acceptable although there is also a concern that funds could have supported other types of intervention are being directed towards the refugee crisis instead, thus leaving a gap in funding for other priorities.

3.9.2. Strategic influence

Closely linked to engagement is the added value of strategic influence of the EUTF. Stakeholders’ feedback is largely positive and confirms the added value of the EUTF in defining the distinctive roles of partners, gaining their commitment to shared strategic objectives and encouraging them to allocate their resources
accordingly. A majority of MS representatives and implementing partners consulted for this evaluation stressed that the EUTF enables MS representatives and partners to discuss and decide upon shared objectives even for complex programmes, and then to allocate resources to them. This is the foundation of the EUTF and is a factor that is seen as contributing to the visibility of the EU as a supporter of lasting solutions to the crisis.

The EUTF has required the creation of consortia for implementation of more complex interventions demanding a multi-sector approach. The added value is the deliberate effort to bring coherence to the response to the Syrian crisis while acknowledging country specificities. Some interlocutors note that the regional component is not isolated: it responds to the desire to have a coherent sub-regional approach to the Syria crisis and foster learning across countries. Having the vision and flexibility to have a regional component to enrich and bring together country components makes the EUTF different to other types of assistance and responses to the crisis.

Actors provided mixed feedback on their experiences with consortia. Interlocutors recognise consortia as providing added value when the internal governance mechanisms, division of roles and areas of intervention are more apparent. In these cases, contributions to desired objectives are clearer. However, there are cases where internal division of roles, responsibilities and governance mechanisms are not entirely elaborated, leading to issues with project implementation in the field and delays. Some interlocutors account these weaknesses to lack of time for consortium partners to discuss interventions in detail as well as lack of familiarity with each other, which are limiting factors to their improved effectiveness. This is an important finding in terms of improving the added value of the EUTF’s defining characteristic of applying a multi-sector and multi-partner approach. Lately, the EUTF team’s measure of negotiating the projects with implementing partners has been important to ensure that consortia have more time to discuss their roles, and areas of intervention and, most importantly, logic of intervention as a whole; and how the contribution of each component will ultimately feed into the achievement of higher level of objectives. The evaluation finds this to be a good and promising measure.

3.9.3. Strategic leadership and catalyst

Another important value added of the EUTF is seen in its ability to articulate and communicate development needs in the intervention areas, based on which opportunities and solutions are devised and implemented in cooperation with partners and stakeholders. An in-depth review of documentary evidence and interviews with stakeholders suggests that the EUTF is fulfilling its role as a catalyst by piloting services and approaches to generate and share best practices for responding to needs of both refugees and host communities in an equitable manner. The Fund provides scale that other donors would not be able to mobilise under a more neutral EU umbrella.

The EUTF governance mechanisms ensure consultation on needs and priorities and how they should be tackled. The processes for selection of implementing partners has improved and the monitoring to check their work will bring about change. The EUTF has put into place preconditions to ensure that the bridge between humanitarian and development context is created through investing in more lasting and sustainable solutions to the protracted crisis through a multi-sector approach. The duration and size of projects also helps in moving from an emergency response mode to a more developmental perspective, while ensuring that basic needs of beneficiaries are tackled. In this regard, the EUTF holds a special position, as only a few instruments focus on early recovery, and it is generally difficult to attract funding to this space. The EUTF holds an advantage by operating in that recovery space and by focussing not only on the household level interventions but also at community level. Finally, the EUTF serves a critical role when it focuses on strengthening systems, in particular due to the scale and consequent leverage it can exert with its counterparts. The evaluation finds that such results would be difficult to achieve in the absence of the EUTF.
4. Conclusions

Since its creation, the EUTF has supported the needs of beneficiaries and host governments affected by the Syria crisis. The EUTF is recognised by the majority of stakeholders engaged in this evaluation as an important instrument for responding to emerging and continuing needs of affected populations.

4.1 Fund rationale conclusions

Most aspects of the rationale for setting up the EUTF have been justified, and yet other aspects have not been met, pointing to a need for revised approaches for which recommendations have been developed (see section 5).

The evaluation concludes that the EUTF is large and cost-effective, thus reaching a large number of beneficiaries at a comparatively low cost, although the reduced administrative expenditures have created bottlenecks and impaired the Fund’s performance, as detailed in the section on efficiency above.

The multi-sectoral, and multi-partner approach has been successful in recipient countries, and the focus of interventions has largely been relevant to the identified needs of beneficiaries. The regional/multi-country approach has been valuable where interventions are tailored to specific country contexts and needs, and where it allows for sharing of best practices and knowledge to feed into advocacy. Where it is less successful is in producing intended implementation synergies across countries, which has caused delays where tailoring to each country context was necessary. The evaluation also concludes that the EUTF has allowed the EU to operate flexibly despite operational challenges. Here, the evaluation found that the EUTF is most effective in the education sector. Health and livelihoods are recognised to be somewhat more challenging, particularly with regard to sustainability and contributions to resilience.

Yet, the EUTF has not been found to be rapid. Given the quick changes of needs in the region, the Fund’s contracting processes left it occasionally too slow to respond effectively, especially due to lengthy negotiation procedures with consortia, as specified in the efficiency section above. The evaluation team concludes, however, that the EUTF has matured and has been able to slowly evolve over time to the overall dynamics of the region. The EUTF increasingly shows signs of closer coordination with host country priorities and processes, with regional frameworks such as the 3RP, and with EU processes such as the JHDF. The evaluation also found that the EUTF has generated added value, compared to the efforts EU Member States could have undertaken themselves.

Finally, the EU’s intention to leverage funds through a single, pooled financial instrument has only been partially achieved. With 12% external donor funding to the €1.4 billion EU Fund, this aspect deserves further attention to fully justify the trust fund set-up.

4.2 Evaluation criteria conclusions

Relevance

The evaluation found that EUTF interventions are relevant and address the needs of beneficiaries in all countries. Refugee, host community and IDP beneficiaries are appropriately identified and targeted, drawing on the experience of implementing partners and following EUTF criteria; and the sectors of intervention are consistent with beneficiaries’ resilience and early recovery needs. The evaluation found, however, that due to rapidly changing contexts, beneficiary needs may change as Actions are being contracted, with some interventions experiencing delays in contracting processes that impacted on the initially-identified needs at project design stage.
**EUTF interventions are also relevant to host country needs.** The evaluation found evidence of a positive trajectory from an initially centralised project identification process managed in Brussels to a more inclusive, decentralised process that is aligned with host country plans and contexts. These alignment processes fall within the broader regional approach of EUTF, which allows for more streamlined and cost-effective management processes. Nonetheless, host governments and implementing partners expressed a preference for country-level programming, which the EUTF is increasingly shifting towards to take account of the particularities of each context.

Relevance was also examined in relation to Member States, who view the EUTF as a tool for strengthening European presence and weight in responding to the Syria crisis. On this front, there is a desire for ensuring that alignment to host country needs continues to involve and draw on the experience of European bilateral aid agencies and NGOs.

Given the complexity of the operating context in responding to the Syria crisis, the consortia model of implementing partners is seen to facilitate widening the reach of interventions, both on sectoral and geographical bases. Some gaps are noted in the current level of inclusion of national stakeholders in host countries as partners. The regional approach was found to be relevant in relation to sharing of best-practices and learning of lessons for advocacy, which are elements that are valued by implementing partners.

**Effectiveness**

The evaluation assessed current trends and trajectory in relation to effectiveness, even though it is too early to assess effectiveness of EUTF interventions. The evaluation found, that in Turkey and Jordan, education and infrastructure for schools and WASH facilities are viewed as likely to be more effective than other sectoral interventions. EUTF is considered to be setting the foundation for continued benefits to be reaped since infrastructure can continue to be used beyond the programme lifetime. For livelihoods, in assessing effectiveness, implementing partners and donors stressed the need for interventions to be linked directly with the potential for securing employment, whether through grants or TVET. Unless livelihoods are linked to employment more specifically, it will be difficult to secure results in this area. Interventions that are providing continuous support and services to beneficiaries are generally considered as effective. These types of interventions are focused in the education sector, and to a lesser extent in health.

The evaluation found that factors influencing the effectiveness of interventions are linked to country-level political will, which can be a facilitating or hindering factor. Other factors included the EUTF option of tackling several sectors in parallel or sequentially, which allows for more comprehensive and multi-faceted approaches; country experience with outsourcing external services to implement activities, which allows for rapid implementation but may negatively impact on capacity at national level to absorb these services; and the timeframe available for implementation, which in some cases is insufficient for achieving expected results.

**Efficiency**

The evaluation found that the EUTF achieves the managerial and efficiency objectives of EU trust funds, but at a cost to performance. Compared to other EU trust funds, the EUTF is relatively large and rapid. At half the size of the EU Emergency Trust for Africa and seven times the size of the Bêkou Trust Fund, the EUTF had an implementation rate of 36% versus 22% and 29% for the Africa and Bêkou funds, respectively. As of March 2018, the EUTF had contracted and transferred more than one third of the pledges received over the life of the Fund, a best-in-class result. Despite this status, implementing partners and EUTF expressed concerns about contracting times, often frustrated by the multi-country, multi-partner set-ups which require extensive negotiations for contracting and project amendment. Project identification and selection has been decentralised over the course of the EUTF operations, in part owing to increased staff capacity at EUD level, which should improve efficiency.
The EUTF guidelines allow for a 3% for management fees, but less than 1% of the EUTF volume has been allocated to administration and management of the EUTF because contributions from the EU budget cannot be used for management fees. The evaluation found the EUTF is operating with a very lean structure, both financially and in terms of staff capacity, which directly affected the performance of the Fund. Interviews confirmed that limited staff resources have created significant bottlenecks, as well as contracting and implementation delays.

The evaluation found that the EUTF Boards work well. Communication from the EUTF management team to the Operational Board could be improved by offering further detail on project pipelines, which was introduced at the time of conducting this evaluation.

The EUTF monitoring and evaluation system started late, partly due to the overwhelming funding volume managed by an initial team of three persons and partly because the focus initially was on project identification, selection and contracting. The EUTF staff capacity only reached operational levels in late 2016. The focus on M&E has since grown, and, by December 2017, a contract with an external M&E provider eventually came into force. The initial reports provide timely and useful insights on the state of the EUTF interventions.

Sustainability

The evaluation assessed whether the beneficiaries are likely to be increasingly resilient as a result of the EUTF contribution, and whether their improved condition is likely to be sustainable. While it is too early to assess sustainability of EUTF interventions, there is evidence of a positive trajectory in this respect, particularly in the field of education and in cases where there is a focus on leveraging and strengthening national capacity. Interventions which feature strong nationally-driven processes are more likely to contribute to resilience.

The evaluation also examined the EUTF’s positioning in relation to the humanitarian-development nexus as an illustration of the linking of relief, recovery and resilience. The EUTF is generally seen as effective in bridging the humanitarian-development divide, particularly where it coordinates with humanitarian and development actors on how to best capitalise on synergies, as illustrated by the Joint Humanitarian Development Framework. Nonetheless, EUTF’s positioning on the humanitarian-development divide is also conditioned by country contexts and engagement, including readiness of host governments to respond to refugee and displacement situations.

Impact

The EUTF aims to positively impact the resilience of refugees and their host communities, while also contributing to peace and regional stability, ambitions that may take years to be seen. Of the 47 EUTF projects contracted to date, three projects were initiated two years prior to the start of the evaluation, and sixteen projects started one to two years before the evaluation. The evaluation did not, as anticipated, find evidence that the EUTF had yet contributed to the intended global impact but there are indications of intermediate impact, especially on human capital through basic and higher education, and skills training under livelihoods.

Coherence, coordination and complementarity

The evaluation found the EUTF to be internally coherent in that the chosen modalities generally have enabled the EUTF to deliver according to the objectives and criteria set for the Fund. The EUTF is also largely externally coherent, and the synergies and coherence between DG ECHO and the EUTF are particularly strong. The multi-sector approach calls for strong coordination with other actors, ensuring complementarity. The evaluation found that the EUTF’s planning and governance mechanisms have enabled such coherence. As EUTF colleagues have gradually increased in number at the EU Delegations, this has also helped improve coordination with other actors.
Added value

The evaluation found that the EUTF offers added value in four ways. Firstly, through its governance mechanism, the EUTF ensures a joint response by engaging EU Member States actively. Secondly, by its scale and scope it reaches a larger group of beneficiaries. Thirdly, the EUTF exerts strategic influence over the focus and approach of the programming, enabling Fund contributors and host countries to agree on shared objectives. Finally, the EUTF has made deliberate effort to bring coherence to the response to the Syrian crisis while acknowledging country specificities, principally by insisting on multi-sector, multi-country programming.

Cross-cutting issues: gender-responsiveness and conflict sensitivity

The evaluation found that gender appropriate indicators and targets are included in the EUTF planning, contracting and reporting documents; and some interventions are gender-specific. However, not all programmes are gender responsive and/or can be strengthened in this regard. Even though targets include gender- and age-disaggregated groups, some interventions can integrate further consideration of how activities can better incorporate gender-sensitive elements to enhance results, for instance in relation to the securing of work permits after skills training is provided, or addressing cost, transport and childcare barriers that can impact on participation levels in activities. The evaluation found that children are recognised as a particularly vulnerable group and stakeholders recognise that concerted efforts are needed to address concerns such as child labour, child marriage and out of school children. There is positive evidence that these issues are on the agenda and actively being incorporated into multi-faceted responses and planning.

In terms of conflict-sensitivity, the evaluation found that even though conflict analysis was not explicitly undertaken for some EUTF-funded interventions, evidence and processes are largely conflict sensitive. EUTF interventions are cognisant of, and adapt to, the context of each country, potential sensitivities surrounding targeting of beneficiaries along refugee and host community lines, and alignment of initiatives with host country needs. Further areas for reflection on conflict sensitivity include ensuring greater participation of national stakeholders. Consideration of conflict sensitivity is now more systematic in recent contract negotiations and through the Joint Humanitarian Development Framework in Jordan and Lebanon.
5 Recommendations

5.1 Extension

**Key conclusion:** The protracted crisis is expected to continue, and it is not foreseen that host country and EU policies will change substantially, thereby providing a framework that could respond to the needs of beneficiaries. It is also unlikely that other funding instruments could adequately fill the gap if the EUTF ceased its operations. Most of the assumptions presented during the set-up of the EUTF have held, and the *raison d’être* for the EUTF remains broadly justified. In addition, the EUTF has generally performed satisfactorily across the criteria assessed by the evaluation, and the EUTF has clearly generated added value, compared to the efforts EU Member States could have undertaken themselves.\(^{59}\)

**Recommendation 1:** The evaluation team recommends that EUTF is extended beyond December 2019 to allow stakeholders to continue to respond to beneficiaries’ and host countries’ needs as the protracted crisis continues. **Action:** EUTF, Trust Fund Board.

5.2 Refresh

**Key conclusion:** Provided that the EUTF is extended beyond 2019, the following recommendations are presented for consideration to ensure that the issues and challenges identified in this evaluation are addressed, and that the strengths and opportunities are capitalised on.

**Recommendation 2:** The evaluation team recommends that the Fund is refreshed to improve governance and implementation issues, thus addressing the shortcomings identified in this regard by the evaluation. This process should be initiated immediately in October 2018. **Action:** EUTF, Trust Fund Operational Board, EC.

**Key conclusion:** The evaluation found strong evidence that the EUTF team is under-staffed in view of increasing responsibilities and portfolios, particularly at EUD level. The evaluation further found that it is challenging for EUTF staff, particularly at EUD level, to hold different responsibilities at the same time, including identification negotiations with host country stakeholders, in-country coordination of EUTF, policy dialogue at overarching level on crisis response, sector-specific policy dialogue, management of relations with implementation partners, follow-up of implementation, communications, and monitoring and evaluation responsibilities.

**Recommendation 3:** Given that overheads are lower than what is allowed for EU Trust Funds, the evaluation team recommends that a functional review is conducted to assess staffing needs and staffing is increased to match the administrative and management requirements of the EUTF portfolio both at HQ level and in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq by February 2019. **Action:** EC, EUTF.

**Recommendation 4:** The evaluation team further recommends that staff recruitment processes are streamlined to allow for quicker recruitment, including consideration of setting up a cadre of experts that can be deployed within two weeks, and particularly for roles that have been identified as being vulnerable to workload pressure in the functional review. **Action:** EC, EUTF.

**Recommendation 5:** The evaluation team recommends that, in order to increase efficiency, staff responsibilities are differentiated to allow focus on discrete aspects of programme cycles, geographic locations and/or sector

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\(^{59}\) As requested by the EUTF Management Team, the recommendations are addressed to specific EU offices with proposed timelines and specific actionable tasks.
responsibilities as deemed appropriate following the functional review. These changes should take place within three months of these recommendations. **Action:** EUTF Management.

**Key conclusion:** The centralisation of decision-making, especially on contracting and on negotiations with implementing partners, can sometimes slow down processes and decrease EUD ownership.

**Recommendation 6:** The evaluation team recommends that decision-making is further decentralised to EUD level so that EUTF staff based in EUDs can directly negotiate programme changes with implementation partners within a budget threshold of 25% of the overall contract value. **Action:** EUTF Management.

**Recommendation 7:** The evaluation team also recommends that coordination is increased between EUDs and the EUTF to assess and respond to human resource needs on an ongoing basis in response to the requirements of the EUTF portfolio and EUD staff workloads. **Action:** EUTF, EUDs.

**Key conclusion:** EUTF stakeholders hold a range of perceptions about project identification and selection, which would benefit from ensuring continuing communication and clarification. The evaluation also found varying levels of awareness and knowledge among Trust Fund and Operational Board members about the work of EUTF, despite EUTF ongoing efforts to provide information and reporting during Board meetings.

**Recommendation 8:** The evaluation team recommends that the detailed, justified selection choices and project pipeline continue to be presented at Operational Board meetings; and that the EUTF team also presents monitoring data from interventions to share insights on best practices, lessons learned, challenges and results. This action should be undertaken at every Operational Board meeting. **Action:** EUTF, Operational Board.

**Recommendation 9:** The evaluation team recommends that MS keep clear lines of communication with their development agencies on an ongoing basis to ensure that information on project pipelines, selection and identification are conveyed as appropriate. **Action:** MS

**Key conclusion:** Overall, the multi-partner, multi-sectoral implementation model is working well, but the evaluation identified concerns relating to the multi-country/regional dimension of projects.

**Recommendation 10:** The evaluation team recommends that the EUTF continues to ensure that multi-country programmes are tailored to each implementation country. **Action:** EUTF, Operational Board.

**Recommendation 11:** The evaluation team further recommends that all concept notes detail in a comparative and comprehensive manner how the project will take into account each host government’s capacity and the needs of the beneficiaries, including conflict sensitivity. **Action:** EUTF, Operational Board.

**Recommendation 12:** The evaluation team also recommends that the regional aspect of each project is limited to knowledge sharing, lesson learning and advocacy and that this expectation is clearly communicated to the implementing partners by the next Operational Board meeting and on an ongoing basis where appropriate. **Action:** EUTF, Operational Board.

**Key conclusion:** Beneficiary needs are recognised across all EUTF countries, although the greatest needs relative to the country context are in Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan.

**Recommendation 13:** Assuming no major changes in the patterns of displacement from the Syria crisis, the evaluation team recommends that the EUTF focuses on Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan for the next phase of the EUTF. **Action:** Trust Fund Board, EUTF.
Recommendation 14: The evaluation team recommends that the Fund phases out in Turkey before the renewal of EUTF comes into place as most funding there has been from the Turkey Facility and ex-IPA. **Action:** Trust Fund Board, EUTF.

Recommendation 15: The evaluation team recommends that the Fund phases out in Serbia before the renewal of EUTF comes into place given shifting needs in country. **Action:** Trust Fund Board, EUTF.

**Key conclusion:** Gender responsiveness is evident in programming as well as in reporting requirements but varies depending on context and capacity.

Recommendation 16: The evaluation team recommends that EUTF continues to monitor its programming for gender responsiveness and ensures corrective measures are taken where implementation proves challenging. **Action:** EUTF.

Recommendation 17: The evaluation team recommends the appointment of a EUTF gender focal point to support implementing partners in adapting and implementing gender responsive programming, as agreed in their Action documents. The focal point should be appointed within three months of these recommendations. **Action:** EUTF.

**Key conclusion:** The EUTF undeniably generates added value compared to the efforts EU Member States could have undertaken themselves.

Recommendation 18: The evaluation team recommends that EU Member States demonstrably increase their contributions, thereby allowing the Fund to deliver greater leverage while also allowing it to increase its administrative spending, which would resolve several efficiency hindrances. **Action:** MS.

Recommendation 19: The evaluation team recommends that EU Member States agree on a percentage return to be reinvested in EUTF relative to their national agency and NGO incomes from EUTF. This increase should be announced in advance of the extension of the EUTF in December 2019. **Action:** MS.

**Key conclusion:** As the crisis in Syria continues, operations in the country are not envisaged until a political settlement is underway. Now, however, is the appropriate time to consider future options.

Recommendation 20: The evaluation team recommends that an early assessment is carried out of beneficiary needs in the country to determine whether the governance and set-up of the EUTF would be adequate and suitable for the Syria context. This assessment should be carried out by March 2019. **Action:** EUTF, Trust Fund Board, EU.

Recommendation 21: The evaluation team also recommends that the EUTF gives due consideration to the consequences that shifting support to Syria would have on neighbouring host countries and identifies what instruments would be available to continue to address beneficiary needs there in the event of decreased EUTF support. This identification process should be ongoing. **Action:** EUTF, Trust Fund Board, EU.
### ANNEXES

## 1. Data collection tools

The following table provides an overview of the different data collection methods used for the evaluation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planned Step</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Conducted</th>
<th>Limitations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inception phase</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>None. The early conversation with the EUTF team in HQ has proved very useful in setting the basis for this assignment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Scoping discussion with Madad team</td>
<td>To inform understanding of evaluation subject and elaboration of evaluation framework and method steps</td>
<td>Three detailed discussions with the entire Management Team at the inception and throughout the evaluation, in addition to specific conversations with individual Management Team members.</td>
<td>None. The early conversation with the EUTF team in HQ has proved very useful in setting the basis for this assignment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Landscape analysis</td>
<td>To understand the context where Madad is intervening and other factors playing on the conceptualisation and operationalisation of the Fund</td>
<td>Review of the Facility, RDPP, ECHO, 3RP, UN Security Council Resolutions on Syria, Commission communications and Council &amp; Parliamentary conclusions on Syria and the region</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Stakeholders analysis</td>
<td>To map out the different parties involved in the Madad Fund and their different stakes and roles</td>
<td>Review of the EUTF governance and partnership set-up via interviews and document review</td>
<td>Due to limited time available, the stakeholder analysis only focussed on the actors (implementing partners) actively contributing to and/or benefitting from Madad Fund for the ten sampled projects, and not the broader project portfolio or beneficiaries or other communities indirectly impacted,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Preliminary desk research - review of background and strategic level documents</td>
<td>To inform an initial understanding of evaluation subject and contribute to the elaboration of evaluation framework and method steps.</td>
<td>Preliminary review of key EUTF documents, EUTF DoA, EU programmatic documents for partner countries, and key external sources regarding the Syrian crisis response.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td><strong>Scoping interview on the field</strong></td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>Inception interviews (field): <strong>Jordan:</strong> 5 EUD representatives 1 ECHO representative 4 Implementing Partners (2 UNICEF, 2 AFD) 2 government representatives 2 donor representatives <strong>Lebanon:</strong> 3 EUD representatives 2 ECHO representatives 2 government representatives 1 donor representative</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td><strong>Mapping of projects</strong></td>
<td>To provide overview of funded interventions</td>
<td>43 projects mapped in the Inception Phase. During the rest of the implementation, new information has been made available and led to a total of 47 projects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td><strong>Portfolio analysis (43 interventions)</strong></td>
<td>To guide the selection of the Action sample.</td>
<td>Analysed all projects by the following criteria: sectors, country, partners involved, and delivery mechanisms. See appendix for more information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td><strong>Sampling</strong></td>
<td>To sustain, triangulate, illustrate and validate the evaluation findings through sample-level results</td>
<td>10 sampled projects selected as per the following criteria: 1) Actions per county; 2) priority coverage; 3) Type of implementing partner.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Interim and synthesis phases**

| 9 | **In-depth review and analysis of Trust Fund documentation and literature** | To develop in-depth understanding of Madad functioning, structure and evolution over time. | A variety of documents have been reviewed, See annex 5 for the full list of documents consulted. | None. |
| 10 | **In-depth review of sampled interventions documents** | To develop understanding of sample projects prior to field visits | A variety of documents of the sample projects have been reviewed. Key documents included:  
- Programming documents for projects  
- Project/implementing agency Websites  
- Madad website information on projects  
- External sources re. projects  
- 3RP and country response plans  
- Implementing partners’ sources re. projects  
- Monitoring reports  
- QINs  
- Evaluations (e.g. GIZ QUDRA project)  
- Results Reporting  
- Facility related documents (e.g.: Facility projects, Facility Factsheet, Second Annual Report of the Facility, Needs Assessment Report, EUD Organigram, Turkey PMO Organigram, etc.)  
- Contextual documentation (situation analysis in countries, socio-economic analysis reports, etc.) | None. |

| 11 | **Review of intervention-level documents outside of the sample** | Provide evidence outside of the evaluation sample | Additional documentation on other projects implemented by funded IPs in the relevant sector, geographic area and time (e.g. Danish Red Cross across the region, GVC WASH project in Lebanon, AISPO in Iraq) | None, within the limitation set by a very condensed evaluation period. |

| 12 | **Key Informant semi-structured interviews in the field** | To gain in-depth information and collect perceptions from various field-based stakeholder groups | 103 interviews:  
- **Lebanon:**  
  5 EUD representatives  
  1 ECHO representative | The project sample had a representation of all sectors, although we had more limited examples in WASH followed by health. This may have 27 our findings on these two sectors. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>EUD representatives</th>
<th>ECHO representatives</th>
<th>UN representatives</th>
<th>Government representatives</th>
<th>NGOs</th>
<th>MS Implementing Agencies</th>
<th>Donor representatives</th>
<th>Local NGO representatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>IOM, WHO, UNICEF, UNHCR</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>GIZ, Expertise France, kfW</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>GIZ, UNHCR, ACTED, RDPP, UNICEF, AVSI, World Vision</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mercy Corps, Danish Refugee Council, World Vision</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Key Informant semi-structured interviews in Brussels</td>
<td>To gain in-depth information and collect perceptions at HQ level</td>
<td>10 interviews with key EUTF staff in HQ.</td>
<td>None.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>--------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Cost-effectiveness analysis</td>
<td>To measure cost-effectiveness and other variables relevant to the measurement of effectiveness and economy, including time between proposal submission and disbursement, overhead costs management costs and implementation rate.</td>
<td>Cost-effective analysis conducted.</td>
<td>None.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## 2. Interview questionnaire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview question areas</th>
<th>Interview questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Introduction</strong></td>
<td>Can you please tell us what your role/relationship is with the Madad Fund?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Framing question</strong></td>
<td>Do you think that the Madad fund is a flexible and rapid tool to respond to the evolution of the Syria crisis over time?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Do you think that the Madad fund is successful in supporting a multi-sectoral and regional approach?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relevance</strong></td>
<td>How does the identification process of project reflect the needs of beneficiaries?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How does the formulation process of projects reflect the needs of beneficiaries?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Do you think the identification of beneficiaries is gender-responsive?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How does the identification of projects incorporate host country needs?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How does the projects formulation process reflect the needs of host countries?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Are you aware of how any potential tensions between stakeholders are addressed as part of project formulation and identification? (conflict sensitivity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Effectiveness</strong></td>
<td>How has Madad contributed to changes on the ground?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Does contribution to change vary between different beneficiary groups?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;What is Madad's contribution per sector? Are there differences in effectiveness per sector? [Health, Education, Livelihoods, Social Cohesion, Migration Management]&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Do you think that there are other intervening factors contributing to these changes?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Do you think that there are factors that hinder the achievement of results on the ground?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Do you think that any potential tensions are appropriately addressed?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sustainability</strong></td>
<td>Do you think Madad interventions are contributing to beneficiaries' resilience?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>If so, is resilience likely to be sustained as the crisis continues beyond project lifetime?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How does contribution to resilience differ between sectors?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Do you think beneficiary resilience is being addressed in a gender responsive manner?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Coordination and coherence** | Do you think Madad interventions are conflict sensitive in relation to beneficiaries?  
Are EU Madad actions coherent and complementary to other EU external actions?  
Does the EU Madad fund integrate EU policy priorities such as gender and human rights?  
How does Madad stimulate synergies with other EU instruments?  
Does Madad contribute to bridging the humanitarian-development divide? If so, how? |
|---|---|
| **Impact** | What is Madad's added value in relation to other donors?  
What is Madad's added value in terms of size of engagement?  
Do you think Madad can offer added value in terms of advocacy?  
Does Madad contribute to bridging the humanitarian-development divide? If so, how? |
| **Added value** | What are your thoughts on the Madad fund potentially operating inside Syria?  
Do you think that the Madad Fund should continue operating beyond its current cycle ending in December 2019?  
Do you have any thoughts or comments we have not discussed that you would want to add? |
### 3. Sample projects overview

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Reference number</th>
<th>Action title</th>
<th>Description of Action</th>
<th>Project amount (EUR)</th>
<th>EU TF contribution (EUR)</th>
<th>Funds from other donors (EUR)</th>
<th>Amount disbursed (EUR) 08/03/2018</th>
<th>Start date</th>
<th>Duration (mths)</th>
<th>Priority area of support</th>
<th>Type of lead project partner</th>
<th>Lead project partner</th>
<th>Country of project lead partner</th>
<th>Associated implementing partners</th>
<th>Countries of implementation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>TF-MA DAD/2015/5/4.13</td>
<td>GENERATION FOUND - EU-UNICEF Partnership</td>
<td>Provide access to inclusive quality education, psychosocial care, protective services, and opportunities for civic engagement, and entrepreneurship initiatives for Syrian refugee and host community children and youth.</td>
<td>137,005,940</td>
<td>90,000,000</td>
<td>47,005,940</td>
<td>81,000,000</td>
<td>01.12.2015</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>IO</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Ministry of National Education Turkey, Ministry of Education Lebanon</td>
<td>Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>TF-MA DAD/2016/6/4.15</td>
<td>QUDRA: Resilience for Syrian refugees, IDPs and host communities in response to the Syrian and Iraqi crises</td>
<td>Strengthen the resilience of host communities, refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) by: Improving school facilities; Increasing social cohesion and dialogue between refugees and host communities; and Supporting state and local administration to provide better support to host communities, refugees and IDPs.</td>
<td>78,000,000</td>
<td>74,600,000</td>
<td>3,400,000</td>
<td>49,697,628</td>
<td>15.06.2016</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Resilience (social cohesion livelihoods)</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)</td>
<td>DE</td>
<td>Expertise France, AECID Spain, CFI Cooperation Medias, FIIAP Cooperación Espanola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TF-MA-DA-D/2017/T-04.5</td>
<td>&quot;Reducing Economic Barriers to Accessing Health Services in Lebanon&quot;</td>
<td>Reducing Economic Barriers to Accessing Health Services in Lebanon</td>
<td>31,852,672</td>
<td>31,852,672</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13,028,325</td>
<td>01.01.2018</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Health</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>International Medical Corps (IMC)</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Première Urgence, Fundación Promoción Social de la Cultura</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TF-MA-DA-D/2017/T-04.7</td>
<td>Strengthening the Resilience and Empowerment of Women and Girls and Host Communities in Iraq, Jordan and Turkey</td>
<td>To strengthen the resilience and empowerment of Syrian women and girls and host communities in Iraq, Jordan, and Turkey through addressing economic vulnerability and violence by increased access to recovery and livelihood opportunities, comprehensive protection services and support to national justice structures to promote accountability</td>
<td>12,500,000</td>
<td>12,500,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5,951,155</td>
<td>19.12.2017</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Resilience (livelihood)</td>
<td>IO</td>
<td>UN WOMEN</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Turkey, Jordan, Iraq</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TF-MA-DA-D/2017/T04.43</td>
<td>Increasing access to inclusive quality primary, secondary and higher education opportunities for Turkish and Syrian children, youth and students (Human Resources Development)</td>
<td>Increasing access to higher education for Syrian refugees - Overall objective: to cater to displaced persons’ longer-term resilience in Turkey - Specific objective: to increase access to inclusive quality higher education opportunities for Syrian students</td>
<td>12,352,942</td>
<td>12,352,942</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3,255,315</td>
<td>01.08.2016</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Higher Education</td>
<td>IO</td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Presidencia for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB)</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TF-MA-DA-D/2017/T04.76</td>
<td>Providing Lebanese and Jordanian communities hosting Syrian refugees with improved WASH infrastructure and facilities at community, institutional and households level</td>
<td>To improve WASH infrastructure and facilities at community, institution, and household level</td>
<td>13,224,488</td>
<td>11,902,039</td>
<td>1,322,449</td>
<td>7,083,722</td>
<td>11.07.2017</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>WASH</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>ACTED</td>
<td>FR</td>
<td>Action contra el hambre, Action contre la faim, INTERSOS</td>
<td>Jordan, Lebanon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TF-MA D/2017/T04.17</td>
<td>Youth RESOLVE: Resilience, Education, Social Cohesion, Opportunities for Livelihoods and reduced Violence in Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq</td>
<td>To strengthen youth resilience and empower youth as leading actors in post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation.</td>
<td>12,796,826</td>
<td>12,796,826</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6,532,546</td>
<td>01/09/2017</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Multi-sector aid for youth</td>
<td>IO</td>
<td>World Vision</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>CAFOD, Caritas Lebanon, Generations for Peace, Islamic Relief, Questscope</td>
<td>Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TF-MA D/2016/T04.28</td>
<td>Strengthening the capacities in managing the migration/refugees crisis in the Republic of Serbia</td>
<td>Strengthening the capacities in managing the migration/refugees crisis in the Republic of Serbia</td>
<td>7,299,999</td>
<td>7,299,999</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5,839,999</td>
<td>13.01.2017</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Migration, multisector aid for reception and protection</td>
<td>Gover</td>
<td>nment</td>
<td>Ministry of Labour, Employment, Veteran and Social Affairs</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>SRB</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. Evaluation matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation Question (EQ)</th>
<th>Judgement criteria</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Sources of Information</th>
<th>Data collection methods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>FRAMING QUESTION:</strong> Does the EUTF’s functioning reflect the reasons for its creation as a multi-sectoral, regional, flexible and rapid tool to respond to the Syria crisis and its evolution over time?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EQ 1.</strong> To what extent does the identification process (i.e. needs analysis, stakeholder consultations, selection of actions, implementing partners and the negotiation thereafter) reflects the needs of the targeted beneficiaries?</td>
<td>JC1.1 Specific objectives and design of the EUTF align with and respond to the needs of refugees, host communities and IDPs</td>
<td>Indicator 1.1.1 List of beneficiaries’ needs addressed by the EUTF</td>
<td>EU and MS strategic documents relating to the Syrian and refugee crisis; EUTF programming documents; EUTF Reports; Needs assessments and contextual analysis on refugees’, host communities’ and IDPs’ needs.</td>
<td>Document analysis; Key Informant Interviews.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Indicator 1.1.2 Instances of the Fund’s mechanisms and procedures taking into account beneficiaries’ needs (i.e. needs analysis, stakeholder consultations)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EQ 2.</strong> To what extent does the identification process (i.e. needs analysis, stakeholder consultations, selection of actions, implementing partners and the negotiation thereafter) reflects the needs of the host country needs?</td>
<td>JC2.1 Specific objectives and design of the EUTF align with and respond to EU, MS and host countries (Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, and Western Balkans) policies/priorities for responding to the Syria crisis</td>
<td>Indicator 2.1.1 List of EU and MS policies/priorities addressed by the EUTF</td>
<td>EU and MS strategic documents relating to the Syrian and refugee crisis; Target countries’ strategy documents and policies; EUTF programming documents;</td>
<td>Document analysis; Key Informant Interviews.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Indicator 2.1.2 Instances of the Fund’s mechanisms and procedures taking into account host country needs (i.e. needs analysis, stakeholder consultations)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ 3 To what extent does the EUTF deliver results against its mandate and objective, and specific EU priorities?</td>
<td>JC 3.1 The EUTF governance, mechanisms and business processes are conducive to delivery of results</td>
<td>Indicator 3.1.1 The applied identification and formulation processes (from commitment via negotiated procedure to contract) are efficient Indicator 3.1.2. The EUTF allows for enough flexibility to change and adapt to the fluctuating context and changes on the ground Indicator 3.1.3. The EUTF governance mechanisms in place facilitate efficient delivery Indicator 3.1.4 EUTF Action Documents and related projects are designed and implemented in close consultation with the MS and partner countries’ governments to ensure ownership Indicator 3.1.5 The EUTF procedures and decisions are transparent Indicator 3.1.6 Mechanisms in place for efficient information sharing with MSs on projects, results and challenges Indicator 3.1.7 Collaborative leadership of the cooperation with direct and tangential stakeholders is efficient and effective, with transparent and timely decision-making</td>
<td>EUTF Reports. EUTF programming documentation. Steering Committee meetings minutes; Reports and documentation regarding selection procedures; Key Informants. Document analysis; Key Informant Interviews.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 3.1.8</td>
<td>Workload assessment evaluates human resources and capacities (management, technical, administrative) within the EUTF unit as adequate for the management of the instrument</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 3.1.9</td>
<td>Monitoring mechanisms in place for timely, adequate and efficient reporting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 3.1.10</td>
<td>Monitoring and evaluation information effectively feeds into management decisions on strategy and future programming.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 3.1.11</td>
<td>Communication Strategy and structures in place for effective communication and visibility of the EUTF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 3.1.12</td>
<td>Degree to which communication with stakeholders contributes to their awareness of the Fund’s outcomes and activities and investment in the sustainability of the Fund’s results</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| JC 3.2 | Extent to which the EUTF achieved/ is achieving envisaged results |
| Indicator 3.2.1 | Evidence of progress towards objectives stated in programming and strategic documents. |
| Indicator 3.2.2 | Evidence of visible achievements stemming from project delivery. Prevailing observed changes in: |
| Increased access | of refugee children and youth to **equitable formal and non-formal education programmes** |
| | | Annual Fund reports; Project documentation; Key Informants. |
| | | Document analysis; Key Informant Interviews; Site observations. |
Host communities and refugees capacitated/equipped to address challenges of social tensions through engagement and communication and integration initiatives

Vocational and entrepreneurship capacity of Syrian refugees and host communities enhanced, as well as financial literacy and enterprise management

Improved WASH, socio-economic infrastructure and services in host communities

Improved availability of medical services for Syrian refugees, migrants, and asylum seekers at the transit sites and medical centres

Improved land safety through mine action in rural and urban areas

Improved awareness on crisis and response in both the EU and host/affected communities

**Indicator 3.2.3** Design and methodologies, e.g. multi-country, multi-partner, multi-sector, allow for effective crises response

**EQ 4.** To what extent has the EUTF contributed to durable solutions to protracted crises (e.g.

**JC 4.1** Extent of The EUTF’s contributions to

**Indicator 4.1.1.** EUTF contributes to durable solutions to protracted crises (e.g.

Annual Fund reports;

Document analysis;
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EQ 5. To what extent are intervention results likely to sustainably facilitate beneficiaries’ increased resilience as the crisis continues?</th>
<th>JC 5.1 Extent to which there are credible prospects of sustaining support (within specific actions and as strategic priority) to facilitate increased resilience solutions within the framework of protracted crises</th>
<th>Indicator 4.1.2 Type, quality/quantity of intended and unintended outcomes, specifically attributable to the specific thematic areas of the EUTF.</th>
<th>Indicator 4.1.3 EUTF has contributed to economies of scale.</th>
<th>Project documentation; Key Informants; QUINs.</th>
<th>Key Informant Interviews; Site observations.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EQ 6. To what extent do the EUTF programmes provide coherence, complementarity and synergies?</td>
<td>JC 6.1 The EUTF set up and processes are conducive to promote coherence, complementarity, and synergies</td>
<td>Indicator 6.1.1. Number and % of Action Documents of The EUTF taking into account issues of complementarities and synergies</td>
<td>Indicator 6.1.2 EUTF complements and stimulates synergies with other instruments</td>
<td>Indicator 6.1.3 There is evidence of the EUTF complementarities and synergies with other EU external actions</td>
<td>Indicator 6.1.4 EUTF is consistent with EU external actions (including Joint Humanitarian Development Framework)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 6.1.5</td>
<td>EUTF integrates EU policy priorities (e.g. gender, human rights, governance, etc.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 6.1.6</td>
<td>EUTF promotes the principles of aid effectiveness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**EQ 7.** How and to what extent has the EUTF programs contributed to be a bridge between the EU humanitarian assistance and longer-term development cooperation?

**JC 7.1** The EUTF set up and processes are conducive to bridging EU humanitarian assistance and longer-term development cooperation.

| Indicator 7.1.1 | EUTF contribute to enhance the role of the EU in contributing to coordinating the international response to the Syrian and Iraqi crises in countries hosting refugees and IDPs |

**EQ 8.** Where the EUTF is operating in the same field as other donors or partners, does it offer added-value in terms of size of engagement, particular expertise, and/or particular weight in advocacy?

**JC 8.1** EUTF adds value compared to bilateral interventions by Member States or other key donors.

| Indicator 8.1.1 | EUTF programmes have been successful in leveraging funds, allowing delegated authority, and creating consortia, (not possible under other EU instruments). |
| Indicator 8.1.2 | Evidence of specific additional outputs/ outcomes from joint approaches |
| Indicator 8.1.3 | Evidence of EUTF’s value added in creating EU global visibility and political weight not possible through other instruments and tools. |

**Document analysis;**
**Key Informant Interviews;**
**Steering Committee meetings minutes;**
**Annual Fund reports;**
**Project documentation;**
**Key Informants.**
5. Bibliography

EU Sources

EUTF documents

AISPO ROM Report, 14 March 2018

Draft Concept Note - Informal meeting of members of the Operational Board, EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis - the 'Madar Fund', 12 June 2017.

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Madad Fund, 2017 Annual AOSD Report for EU Trust Funds


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"West Irbid Waster Water Network Construction with EBRD” adopted on 6 December 2017 – Amount: € 53.200.000.

"Support for Syrian Refugees in Armenia” adopted on 20 June 2017 - Amount: €3.000.000.


"External Monitoring and Evaluation for the EUTF in Response to the Syrian and Iraq Crises, the 'Madad' Fund” adopted on 6 December 2016 - Amount: €1.850.000. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/neighbourhood/countries/syria/Madad_en

"EU Contribution to the Concessional Financing Facility for Jordan and Lebanon (CFF)” adopted on 6 December 2016 - Amount: €5.000.000. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/neighbourhood/countries/syria/Madad_en


"Regional Education and Protection programme for vulnerable Syrian refugee and host community children and adolescents" adopted on 1 December 2015 - Amount: €120.000.000.


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UNICEF, Towards increased access to inclusive, quality education, a protective environment and positive youth engagement opportunities for Syrian and Turkish children and youth, 10 September 2015.

UNICEF, GENERATION FOUND - EU-UNICEF Partnership, 1 December 2015.

DAAD, HOPES: Higher and further education opportunities and perspectives for Syrian, 27 April 2016.


Danish Refugee Council, LEADERS: Promoting inclusive local economic empowerment and development to enhance resilience and social stability, 1 June 2016.

Search For Common Ground, Supporting the livelihood and social stability of Syrian refugees and host population, 2 July 2016.

UNHCR, Increasing access to inclusive quality primary, secondary and higher education opportunities for Turkish and Syrian children, youth and students, 1 August 2016.
UNRWA, Maintaining the resilience of Palestine refugees from Syria in Jordan and Lebanon, 14 August 2016.

SPARK, Post-conflict reconstruction of Syria and integration in host communities, 15 August 2016.

AISPO, Support to the Emergency / Critical care Services and Maternal and Child Health in Duhok Governorate to respond to the Syrian Crisis, 17 September 2016.

German Jordanian University, Vocational education and training & higher education programme for vulnerable Syrian youth, 1 October 2016.

GVC, Promoting sustainable management of water services and resources in countries affected by the Syrian crisis, 17 November 2016.

Danish Red Cross, Addressing Vulnerabilities of Refugee and Host Communities in five countries affected by the Syria Crisis, 15 December 2016.

IOM, EU support to managing the migration/refugees crisis/Balkan route, 17 December 2016.

AFD, Promoting inclusive local economic empowerment and development to enhance resilience and social stability, 23 December 2016.


KfW Development Bank, Education for all in times of crisis, 30 December 2016.

Serbian Ministry of Labour, Employment, Veteran and Social Affairs, Strengthening the capacities in managing the migration/refugees crisis in the Republic of Serbia, 13 January 2017.

ACTED, Providing Lebanese and Jordanian communities hosting Syrian refugees with improved WASH infrastructure and facilities at community, institutional and households level, 11 July 2017.


UNHCR, Providing essential life-saving care to refugees in Lebanon, 1 August 2017.


MAG, Integrated mine action to enhance the resilience of conflict-affected communities in Northern Iraq, 1 October 2017.

Particip, External Monitoring and Evaluation for the European Union Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis, the Madad Fund, 1 October 2017.

OXFAM, Building Alternative Development Assets and Entrepreneurial Learning, 1 December 2017.

ASAM, Enhanced Support to Refugees and Asylum Seekers Affected by the Syrian and Iraqi Crises in Turkey, 6 December 2017.

Government of Jordan, Budget Support to the Jordanian Ministry of Education to deal with the Syrian refugee crisis, 14 December 2017.

UN WOMEN, Strengthening the Resilience and Empowerment of Women and Girls and Host Communities in Iraq, Jordan and Turkey, 19 December 2017.

SPARK, Higher education for Syrians under temporary protection and disadvantaged host communities in Turkey, 19 December 2017.

ILO, Job creation and entrepreneurship opportunities for Syrians under temporary protection and host communities in Turkey, 20 December 2017.

TOBB, Living and Working Together: Integrating Syrians under Temporary Protection to Turkish Economy, 26 December 2017.


Italian Cooperation, Strengthening the resilience of host communities and Syrian refugees in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraqi Kurdistan, 1 January 2018.


Serbian Ministry of Labour, Employment, Veteran and Social Affairs, EU Support to Serbia in Migration Management, 13 January 2018.

UNDP, Turkey Resilience Project in response to the Syria Crisis, 1 February 2018.

IMC, Reducing Economic Barriers to Accessing Health Services in Lebanon, 1 January 2018.

Key EU programming documents for partner countries


Council of the European Union, JOIN 41 final, Joint proposal for a Council Decision on the Union position within the Association Council set up by the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, of the other part, with regard to the adoption of EU-Jordan Partnership Priorities and annexed Compact, 2016. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:a9fac374-7e47-11e6-b076-01aa75ed71a1.0001.02/DOC_1&format=PDF

Council of the European Union, JOIN 41 final Annex 1, ANNEX to the Joint Proposal for a COUNCIL DECISION on the Union position within the Association Council set up by the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, of the other part, with regard to the adoption of EU-Jordan Partnership Priorities and annexed Compact, 2016. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:a9fac374-7e47-11e6-b076-01aa75ed71a1.0001.02/DOC_2&format=PDF

[https://www.avrupa.info.tr/fileadmin/Content/2016_April/160804_NA_report_FINAL_VERSION.pdf](https://www.avrupa.info.tr/fileadmin/Content/2016_April/160804_NA_report_FINAL_VERSION.pdf)


**Relevant EU policy documents**


European Court of Auditors, Special Report - The Bêkou EU trust fund for the Central African Republic: a hopeful beginning despite some shortcomings, 2017

Monthly Report on the Multiannual Implementation of the EU Trust Funds (EUTFs), March 2018

External sources


OCHA, Policy Development and Studies Branch, New Way of Working, OCHA Policy Development and Studies Branch.


6. List of interviewees

European Commission

**DG NEAR HQ - EUTF Management Team**
Manager EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis, the 'Madad Fund', 25 May 2018
Deputy Manager EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis, the 'Madad Fund', 3 May 2018
Operational Officer, EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis, the 'Madad Fund', 30 May 2018
Partner & Donor Relations Officer, EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis, the 'Madad Fund', 2 March, 9 March, 23 May 2018
Task Manager, EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis, the 'Madad Fund', 23 May 2018

**DG NEAR**
Communication and Outreach Lead, 28 May 2018
Director, Directorate B, 20 May 2018
Head of Finance and Contracts, B-1, 24 May 2018
Head of Unit, B-1, 1 June 2018

**EUD JORDAN**
Attaché-Programme Manager (a), Madad Fund, 22 March 2018
Attaché-Programme Manager (b), Madad Fund, 22 March 2018
Attaché-Programme Manager (c), Madad Fund, 22 March 2018
Programme Manager for Education and Youth, 21 March 2018
Head of Cooperation, 22 March 2018

**EUD LEBANON**
Attaché-Trade and Economic, 14 May 2018
Attaché-Migration, Health Cooperation Sector, 20 March 2018, 14 May 2018
Attaché-Programme Manager (a), Madad Fund, 20 March 2018, 14 May 2018
Attaché-Programme Manager (b), 14 May 2018, 22 May 2018
Head of Section, Governance, Security Social Development and Civil Society, 20 March 2018
Relief and Recovery Officer, 14 May 2018

**EUD TURKEY**
Head of Section, Facility for Refugees, Turkey, 21 May 2018
International Cooperation Officer (a), Facility for Refugees, Turkey, 26 April, 3 May, 21 May 2018
International Cooperation Officer (b), Facility for Refugees, Turkey, 3 May, 21 May 2018
Monitoring and Evaluation Assistant, Facility for Refugees in Turkey, 21 May 2018
Monitoring and Evaluation Manager, Facility for Refugees in Turkey, 21 May 2018
Programme Coordination Manager, 10 May 2018
Programme Manager, Infrastructure, Facility for Refugees, Turkey, 21 May 2018
Programme Manager, Civil Society and Fundamental Rights Judiciary and Home Affairs, 10 May 2018
Project Officer- Socio- Economic Development- Facility for Refugees in Turkey, 21 May 2018
DG ECHO
Refugee Regional Syria Crisis, Team leader, ECHO, 24 May 2018

DG ECHO JORDAN OFFICE
Technical Assistant, 22 March 2018

DG ECHO LEBANON OFFICE
Head of Office, 20 March 2018, 14 May 2018
Programme Officer, 20 March 2018

DG ECHO TURKEY OFFICE
Head of Office, 10 May 2018

EUD SERBIA
EEAS EU Trust Fund Officer, 23 March 2018, 7 May 2018

EUTF Board

Agency for International Development, Spain Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Consejera Técnica – Jefa Área de Oriente Próximo y Asia, Departamento de Cooperación con el Mundo Árabe y Asia, 22 March 2018
Agency for International Development, Spain Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Head of Department for cooperation with Arab and Asian states, 22 March 2018
Austrian Development Agency, 21 March, 23 March 2018
Austrian Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs, Minister Plenipotentiary, Head of Unit, “Development Cooperation Instruments of the EU”; 23 March 2018
Common Foreign and Security Policy Department Slovakia, Development Cooperation (CODEV, ACP) and COHAFA contact point, 22 March 2018
Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in Jordan, Head of Cooperation, Jordan, 21 March 2017
Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in Lebanon, Counsellor, Head of Development Cooperation, Lebanon, 20 March 2018
Italian Development Cooperation, Emergencies and Fragile States, 28 March 2018
KfW Development Bank, Senior Project Manager, Economic and Social Development, Middle East, 22 March 2018
Regional Development and Protection Programme (RDPP), Liaison and Project Manager, Jordan, 21 March 2018
RDPP coordinator for Denmark, Denmark, 21 March 2018
United Kingdom, Policy and International Engagement Manager, Syria Team, 5 April 2018
Implementing partners

International organisations
ACTED, Director, Lebanon, 17 May 2018
AVSI, Chief of Party Back to the future Project, Lebanon, 17 May 2018
Danish Red Cross, Head of MENA Region, Lebanon, 17 May 2018
Expertise France, Programme Manager, Turkey, 16 May 2018
GIZ, Project Manager, 14 May 2018
GIZ, Module Team Leader, “Social Cohesion“ / Focal Point QUDRA Turkey, Turkey 16 May 2018
IOM, Country Director, Serbia, 8 May 2018
IMC, Country Director, Lebanon, 17 May 2018
kfw Development Bank, Project Manager Municipal Infrastructure- South East Europe and Turkey, Turkey, 21 May 2018
kfw Development Bank, Senior Project Coordinator, Turkey, 21 May 2018
Red Cross, Regional Grants coordinator, Lebanon, 17 May 2018
UNHCR, Assistant Education Officer, Turkey, 14 May 2018
UNHCR, Associate Programme Officer, Donor Relations Unit, Turkey, 14 May 2018
UNHCR, Head of Donor Relations Unit, Turkey, 14 May 2018
UNHCR, Representative, Serbia, 8 May 2018
UNHCR, Senior Education Officer, Turkey, 14 May 2018
UN Habitat, Head, Lebanon, 15 May 2018
UNDP, Chief Technical Advisor, Stabilization and Recovery Program, Lebanon, 15 May 2018
UNICEF, Chief of education, Lebanon, 15 May 2018
UNICEF, Child Protection Specialist, Lebanon, 15 May 2018
UNICEF, Deputy Representative, Serbia, 8 May 2018
UNICEF, Deputy Representative, Turkey, 15 May 2018
UNICEF, Financial Officer, Lebanon, 15 May 2018
UNICEF, Programme Officer, Turkey, 15 May 2018
UNICEF, Reports Specialist/Chief of Partnerships, Country Office, Jordan 22 March 2018
UNICEF, Representative Country Office, Jordan, 22 March 2018
UN Women, Gaziantep Centre Coordinator, Turkey, 17 May 2018
UN Women, Migration Consultant, Turkey, 17 May 2018
WFP, Deputy Country Director, Lebanon, 25 May 2018
WHO, Representative, Serbia, 8 May 2018
World Vision, Project Officer, Lebanon, 17 May 2018

Local organisations
Association for Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Migrants (ASAM), General Coordinator, Turkey, 17 May 2018

Governmental actors

Jordan
Director of International Cooperation Department, Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, Jordan, 21 March 2018
Head of Syrian Refugees Department, Directorate of Policies and International Cooperation, Ministry of Labour, Jordan, 22 March 2018
Lebanon
Advisor at the Ministry of Higher Education, Lebanon, 16 May 2018
Advisor to the Minister for the Refugee Portfolio & General Supervisor of the LCRP, Ministry of Social Affairs, Lebanon, 20 March 2018, 16 May 2018
Director General, Ministry of Public Health, Lebanon, 20 March 2018; 16 May 2018
Head of the Social Health & the Primary Health Care department, and the Manager of Immunization and Essential Drugs Program; Ministry of Public Health, Lebanon, 16 May 2018
Program Manager at the Program Management Unit - Reaching All Children with Education / R.A.C.E; Ministry of Education and Higher Education, Lebanon, 16 May 2018

Serbia
Advisor to the Minister, Ministry of Labour, Serbia, 7 May 2018
Head of Commissariat for Refugees and Migration Serbia, 7 May 2018
MADAD Project officer, Commissariat for Refugees and Migration Serbia, 7 May 2018
MADAD 2 project manager, Ministry of Labour, Serbia, 7 May 2018
State Secretary Ministry of Labour, Serbia, 7 May 2018

Turkey
Communication Expert, Construction Department, Ministry of National Education, Turkey, 22 May 2018
Coordinator, Department of Immigration and Emergency Training, Ministry of National Education, Turkey, 22 May 2018
Expert, Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD), Turkey, 18 May 2018
Expert, Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities, Turkey, 14 May 2018
Head of Budget Group, Prime Ministry Office, The EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRIT I-FRIT II) Project Coordination Office, 14 May 2018
Head of Monitoring and Evaluation, Prime Ministry Office, The EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRIT I-FRIT II) Project Coordination Office, 14 May 2018
Head of Strategy Development, Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities, Turkey, 14 May 2018
Prime Ministry Expert, Prime Ministry Office, The EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRIT I-FRIT II) Project Coordination Office, Turkey, 14 May 2018
Section Chief- Directorate General for Family and Community Services, Ministry of Family and Social Policies, Turkey, 16 May 2018

Member States representatives

Agence Française de Développement (AFD), Director for Lebanon & Syria, Lebanon, 15 May 2018
AFD, Director for Jordan and Iraq, Jordan 21 March 2018
AFD, Project Officer, Jordan, 21 March 2018
Embassy of Denmark in Lebanon, Deputy Head of Mission, Lebanon, 15 May 2018
Embassy of Sweden in Turkey, Second Secretary, Turkey, 18 May 2018
Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in Jordan, Head of Cooperation, Jordan, 21 March 2018
Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in Lebanon, Counsellor, Head of Development Cooperation, Lebanon, 20 March 2018

Italian Development Cooperation Office in Lebanon, MADAD focal point, 28 March 2018, Lebanon, 15 May 2018

Regional Development and Protection Programme (RDPP), Liaison and Project Manager, Jordan, 21 March 2018

The United Kingdom’s Department for International Development Lebanon, Humanitarian Advisor, Lebanon, 15 May 2018
7. Evaluation Team

The evaluation was conducted by Landell Mills, in partnership with Linpico and International Organisation Development Ltd (IOD Parc).

The core team comprised of three Senior Experts (Peter Brorsen as Team Leader/ Evaluation in FCAS Expert; Nur Abdelkhaliq Zamora as Senior Migration and Refugee Evaluation Expert; Zehra Kacapor-Dzihic as Senior Fund and Western Balkans Evaluation Expert) and one Medium Expert (Firuzan Silahsor as Education and Middle East Evaluation Expert). In addition, the team was supported by one Junior Expert serving as Migration and Data Analysis Expert (the junior expert position was initially filled by Etienne Berges, replaced by Jacob Lindenbauer half way through the assignment).

Together, the team members’ skills and expertise covered the thematic sectors of Madad, geographic specificities and relevant language, in addition to long-lasting experience in complex evaluations and data collection and analysis.

Throughout the project implementation, the team was supported by an Evaluation Manager (Diletta Carmi). To complement its internal quality assurance, Landell Mills appointed an external quality assurance reviewer (Teresa Hanley) to ensure the robustness of the findings and strengthen the independence and impartiality of this evaluation.
8. Terms of Reference

FRAMEWORK CONTRACT COM 2015
EuropeAid/137211/DH/SER/Multi
Strategic Mid Term Evaluation of EUTF Madad

MODEL OF SPECIFIC TERMS OF REFERENCE

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1  MANDATE AND OBJECTIVES

Systematic and timely evaluation of its programmes, activities, instruments, legislation and non-
spending activities is a priority of the European Commission in order to demonstrate accountability
and to promote lesson learning to improve policy and practice.

The overall objectives of the evaluation are:

- to provide an overall independent assessment of the strategic positioning, based on underlying
assumptions of its creation, and functioning of the EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the
Syrian Crisis—the ‘Madad Fund’ (hereinafter EUTF Madad).

- to identify key lessons and to produce recommendations to improve current and inform future
choices of the EUTF Madad.

2  EVALUATION RATIONALE AND SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES

The specific rationale for undertaking this evaluation is to conduct a mid-term strategic evaluation of
the EUTF Madad, three years after its creation, on the basis of its specific five-year mandate defined
by its Constitutive Agreement (Commission Decisions) and directions given by its Boards.

The assignment is to assess EUTF Madad with regards to its relevance, effectiveness, efficiency,
impact and sustainability, added value, coherence, consistency, complementarity and synergies,
transparency and accountability as well as to its leverage, which includes the following tasks:

a) Review and evaluate the EUTF governance structure in view of its set up, management and
underlying assumptions as stipulated in the legal documents establishing the EUTF

b) Review and evaluate the identification and selection of priorities (sectors and programmes)
and how those priorities are translated into commitments (Actions Documents) and projects.

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3 COM (2011) 637 “Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change”

4 According to DG BUDG Note related to EUTFs, the Trust Fund Managers are entitled to sign contracts until
the end date of the EUTF (for Madad, December 2019) with implementation period beyond the end date.

c) Draw conclusions and develop recommendations in view of enhanced impact on the ground, including possible operations inside Syria.
3 BACKGROUND

The Syrian conflict has triggered the world’s largest displacement crisis since World War II, with over 5.4 million Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries and the wider region, and more than 6 million internally displaced persons (IDPs). Seven years after the outbreak of the conflict in Syria, the region is in a protracted crisis and the initial humanitarian challenges have altered to also affect the capacities of the host communities, their development and social stability.

The European Union is the leading donor in the international response to the Syrian crisis with an overall total of €10.2 billion from the EU budget and Member States collectively allocated in humanitarian and development assistance since the start of the conflict in 2011. The European Commission’s support in response to the Syrian crisis has now exceeded €4.7 billion, including both immediate humanitarian assistance, and non-humanitarian aid.

The primary objective of the EUTF Madad is ‘to provide a coherent and reinforced aid response to the Syrian and Iraqi crises and the massive displacement resulting from them on a multi-country scale. In pursuit of this objective, the Trust Fund shall address the needs of three groups: refugees, internally displaced persons, and returnees, and provide assistance to the communities and the administrations in which those groups find themselves, as regards resilience and early recovery’.

The constitutive agreement defines it mandate including the need for flexibility and envisages the following four-pronged added value:

- bring economy of scale that individual countries or organisation or the EU alone cannot achieve;
- enhance the role of the EU in contributing to the international response to the crisis;
- be a funding instrument with regional scope, to allow for quick and flexible response; and
- provide sustainable and predictable funding of a medium to long term crisis response.

The EUTF is a multi-donor instrument with contributions from 22 EU Member States, regular EU budget instruments and Tukey. The current total amount of committed contributions is close to EUR 14 billion, with EUR 1.2 billion adopted by the Board as concrete actions and EUR 872 million contracted to implementing partners for projects on the ground.

Please find more detailed information in Annex II and IV.

4 SCOPE

4.1 Legal scope

The EUTF Madad was created by Commission Decision C(2014)9615 of 10 December 2014 amended 2015; C(2015) 9691 of 22 December 2015. The EUTF Madad is defined by Article 187 of the EU

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7 Defined as a situation in which 25 000 or more refugees of the same nationality have been in exile for five years or longer in a given asylum country (UNHCR).
Financial Regulation as an ‘emergency’ trust fund. It was established by Italy and the European Commission for 60 months.

The operational Board of the EUTF Madad has since 2015 committed Actions\(^8\) worth about EUR 1.3 billion.

4.2 Temporal scope
The evaluation covers the EUTF Madad since its creation in December 2014 until present.

4.3 Thematic scope
The EUTF Madad portfolio focuses on access to basic, higher and further education, resilience and local development, access to Health and WASH services as well as protection\(^9\).

4.4 Geographical scope
The assignment will cover the countries benefiting from the EUTF Madad. The evaluation will focus on the direct neighbouring countries to Syria: Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey, and to a less extent on the Western Balkans. The emphasis will reflect the size of the EUTF’s portfolio in the respective country.

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\(^8\) [ec.europa.eu/neighborhood-enlargement/news_comer/key-documents_en?field_file_theme_tid%5B%5D=191&field_file_country_tid=All](https://ec.europa.eu/neighborhood-enlargement/news_comer/key-documents_en?field_file_theme_tid%5B%5D=191&field_file_country_tid=All)

5 EVALUATION ISSUES AND CRITERIA:
The service provider will be responsible for methodology and implementation of this Mid-term evaluation including its desk study-oriented phase and its field exercises.

This Mid-term evaluation will complement the regular monitoring of ongoing projects and programmes, carried out by the Madad management team, external monitoring agent as well as the internal monitoring conducted by the project implementing partners.

Based on this, the scope of the service is to provide evidence-based information to enable strategic decision-making. Moreover, observations and recommendations done within this Mid-term evaluation may feed into a request for an extension of the Madad Fund.

The contractor has to ensure that Mid-term evaluation reflects on all strategic priorities, relevance to needs and to the main stakeholders, as well as to the regional dimension of the crisis. The Mid-term evaluation will assess the Madad Fund as a bridge between Humanitarian and Development response to address the protracted Syrian and Iraqi crisis.

Specific issues to be addressed by the evaluation are captured in the List of Evaluation Questions in Annex 1.
6 RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF THE EVALUATION

Nadim KARKUTLI - the EUTF Madad Manager - is responsible for the management and supervision of the evaluation. The progress of the evaluation will be followed closely by a Steering Group/Management Group consisting of the Madad management team (Joanna ATHLIN, Paola PALLOTTO, and Anton STEMBERGER).

Its principal functions will be to:

- discuss and comment on the these Terms of Reference;
- discuss draft reports produced by the evaluation team;
- ensure the evaluation team has access to and consults all relevant information sources and documentation on activities undertaken;
- discuss and comment on the quality of work done by the evaluation team;
- provide feedback on the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation.

7 PROCESS AND DELIVERABLES

The overall guidance to be used is available on the web page of the DG DEVCO Evaluation Unit

7.1 Process

The basic approach to the assignment consists of three main phases in a non-chronological order. It will be a combination of 1) desk study, 2) mission to the countries concerned and 3) synthesis of the material.

The table below summarises the work plan:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Expert Senior 1</th>
<th>Expert Senior 2</th>
<th>Other experts</th>
<th>Tentative dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kick off meeting with the Madad team</td>
<td>Brussels, VC connection to the EUDs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19 February</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desk review of EUTF Madad and its portfolio and field mission preparation including interviews (telephone, skype, face2face) with EU-based donors and stakeholders</td>
<td>Home office</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20 – 28 February</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicative duration and locations of 1st round of field missions</td>
<td>Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2 – 23 March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debrief of mission and submission of inception report</td>
<td>Brussels, VC connection to the EUDs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>25 March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis of findings</td>
<td>Home office</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>27 March – 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is expected that the length of field missions (no of working days) in the respective countries is reflecting the share of the Madad portfolio. Hence, Turkey is expected to have the biggest share of field days, followed by Lebanon and Jordan. Iraq and Western Balkans is to follow thereafter.

All reports will be written in English.

7.2 Deliverables

Expected deliverables are as follows:

I. An inception report will be presented after the first field exercise. This report will present the structure, index and punctuation of expected content of the interim report.

II. The interim report will be submitted beginning of April. The draft interim report (submitted by the 2nd of April 2018) will cover the desk study, the first round of missions and the initial synthesis.

- the strategic positioning of the EUTF including relevance to country context,
- the underlying assumptions of its creation and how these assumption are translated in the portfolio,
- governance structure, and
- identification, formulation and implementation of its portfolio.
The report shall be of such quality that it can be presented to a qualified audience in light of the upcoming Syria conference in Brussels scheduled for tentatively late April 2018.

III. The final report will be submitted by mid-June 2018. Taking into account comments and useful suggestions, the report may include all field missions’ findings as well as additional desk study and synthesis to complement what was already identified within the interim report.

It shall draw - amongst other things - conclusions on the relevance and efficiency of the EUTF Madad as a crisis response tool in achieving its primary objective “to provide a coherent and reinforced aid response to the Syrian and Iraqi crises and the massive displacement resulting from them on a multi-country scale. In addition, the report shall formulate recommendations on ways to improve the EUTF Madad in order to enhance the impact on the ground.

7.3 Reporting requirements
The Contractor will submit the following reports in English. The Executive Summary of the final report also needs to be translated into Arabic.

- Inception report (electronic copy only) of maximum 6 pages
- Interim report (electronic copy only) of maximum 40 pages (executive summary of 3 pages, main text including conclusions and recommendations) excluding annexes, submitted electronically on the 2 April 2018.
- Final report (one original and electronic copy) the report shall build on the interim report and shall include a deeper analysis, taking into account comments received and follow up actions done. The report shall be a maximum of 50 pages and include graphs and visual material. The final report shall be submitted mid June 2018.

The final report will require 75 bound coloured copies and 75 USB with electronic copies (with graphics and photos).

7.4 Submission and approval of reports
The reports referred to above must be submitted to and approved by the liaison officer Ms. Joanna ATHLIN. The final report is to be approved by the Trust Fund Manager.

8 THE EVALUATION TEAM

The evaluation team should comprise a minimum of 4 experts. Two of these experts have to be senior evaluation experts. The team is expected to possess expertise in:

- evaluation methods and techniques in general and evaluation in the field of external relations and development cooperation in particular;
- identification and implementation of multi-country/donor/sector/partner programmes and Trust Funds;
- EU communication policies and strategies for external actions;
- post-conflict scenarios and responses to protracted crisis and forced displacements including Humanitarian-Development Nexus;
• knowledge of EU aid instruments, policies and responses in the countries concerned;

• thematic areas targeted by the Trust Fund as outlined in the results framework;¹⁰

• Arabic and Turkish language on working level;

• the Syrian and Iraqi crises and the consequences of the refugee influx in neighbouring countries is an advantage;

• project identification and implementation in Middle East and Western Balkan will be an advantage.

The offer should clearly state the category of each team member and which tasks the proposed team members are supposed to take responsibility for and how their qualifications relate to the tasks (if this is not self-evident from their profile). A breakdown of working days per expert must also be provided.

The team members must be independent from the programmes/projects/policies evaluated. Should a conflict of interest be identified in the course of the evaluation, it should be immediately reported to the Evaluation manager for further analysis and appropriate measures.

The team will have excellent writing and editing skills. The Contractor remains fully responsible for the quality of the report. Any report which does not meet the required quality will be rejected.

During the offers evaluation process the contracting authority reserves the right to interview by phone one or several members of the evaluation teams proposed.

9 TIMING

The project implementation is due to start mid-February 2018 at the latest. The expected duration is of 5 months. As part of the technical offer, the framework contractor must fill-in the timetable in the Annex III. This table shall not start by a precise date but by “day/week 1”.

10 OFFER FOR THE ASSIGNMENT

The financial offer will be itemised to allow the verification of the fees compliance with the Framework contract terms.

The total length of the technical offer (excluding annexes) may not exceed eight (8) pages; a CV may not exceed four (4) pages. References and data relevant to the assignment must be highlighted in bold (font minimum Times New Roman 12 or Arial, 11).

11 TECHNICAL OFFERS SELECTION CRITERIA

The selection criteria and their respective weights are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation and methodology</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Understanding of ToRs</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation of tasks (division of tasks, timing, quality control mechanisms)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation approach, working method, analysis*</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub total</strong></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EXPERTS/EXPERTISE</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senior expert 1</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior expert 2</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remaining team members</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub total</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overall total score</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
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* The submitted offers will be evaluated against the understanding of the task, clarity in the description of the approach and suggested methodology. It will also take into account the evaluation methodology suggested as regards the functioning of the EUTF Madad internally (governance) and externally (i.e. bridge between Humanitarian and Development response).

12 ANNEXES

The contracting authority reserves the right to modify the following annexes during the FWC implementation.
ANNEX I

List of evaluation questions

This mid-term evaluation shall be carried out in line with the Better Regulation Guidelines on evaluations introduced by the Commission in 2015.

The assignment is to conduct a mid-term evaluation of the EUTF Madad with regards to its relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability, added value, coherence, consistency, complementarity and synergies, transparency and accountability as well as to its leverage, which includes the following:

A. Review and evaluate the EUTF governance structure in view of its set up, management and underlying assumptions as stipulated in the legal documents establishing the EUTF

Information sought in this area includes:

Relevance

1. To what extent have the underlying assumptions (please see 3.3 ToRs) proven right? Have the documents (i.e. constitutive agreement) been respected?

2. To what extent do the overall objective and design of the EUTF Madad respond EU priorities and beneficiary needs (i.e. national and international response plans/standards) identified at the time the EUTF Madad was created (2014) and as of today?

3. To what extent is the design and scope of the EUTF Madad allowing for enough flexibility to adapt to the fluctuating context?

4. To what extent is the EUTF Madad aligning its priorities to the Joint Humanitarian Development Frameworks (Jordan and Lebanon)?

Effectiveness, impact, sustainability

5. How adequate is the set up of the EUTF to deliver results against its mandate and objective, and specific EU priorities?

6. To what extent does the EUTF Madad integrate EU policy priorities (e.g. gender, human rights, governance, etc.)?

7. To what extent is the EUTF Madad flexible enough to respond to changing scenarios (e.g. changed policy priorities, changed contexts)?
8. To what extent is the EUTF Madad contributed to durable solutions to protracted crises?

9. To what extent are interventions under EUTF Madad likely to be sustainable?

10. To what extent does the EUTF Madad promote the principles of aid effectiveness?

Efficiency
11. To what extent has the EUTF Madad governance (management, staffing, coordination and communication) been cost-effective and delivered efficiently?

12. Is the ratio of administrative costs to overall budget adequate to enable efficient delivery?

13. How timely adequate and efficient is the reporting and monitoring set up?

14. How appropriate and efficient is the communication Strategy and structure to ensure effective communication and visibility of the EUTF Madad?

Added value
15. Is there and what is the added value of the EUTF Madad?

Coherence, consistency, complementarity and synergies
16. To what extent does the EUTF Madad complement and stimulate synergies with other EU external actions?

17. How are gaps between EU humanitarian assistance and development cooperation (JHDF) identified and assessed?

18. How and to what extent has the EUTF Madad contributed to be a bridge between the EU humanitarian assistance and longer term development cooperation?

19. To what extent is the EUTF Madad consistent with EU external actions?

Leverage
20. To what extent has the EUTF Madad leveraged support or structural response to the crises?

21. To what extent has the EUTF Madad contributed to economies of scale?

22. To what extent has the EUTF Madad contributed to unexpected changes on the ground and what have been the key factors in this?
B. REVIEW AND EVALUATE THE IDENTIFICATION AND SELECTION OF PRIORITIES (SECTORS AND PROGRAMMES) AND HOW THOSE PRIORITIES ARE TRANSLATED INTO COMMITMENTS (ACTION DOCUMENTS) AND PROJECTS.

Information sought in this area includes:

Relevance

23. To what extent does the identification process (i.e. needs analysis, stakeholder consultations, selection of actions, implementing partners and the negotiation thereafter) reflects the needs of the targeted beneficiaries?

24. To what extent does the identification process (i.e. needs analysis, stakeholder consultations, selection of actions, implementing partners and the negotiation thereafter) reflects the country needs?

Effectiveness, impact, sustainability

25. To what extent does the EUTF Madad deliver results against its mandate and objective, and specific EU priorities?

26. To what extent does the design and methodologies, e.g. multi-country, multi-partner, multi sector, allowed for effective and sustainable crisis response?

27. Are there prospects of the EUTF Madad contributing to durable solutions to protracted crises?

28. Are there prospects of the EUTF Madad ensuring sustainability of its interventions?

Efficiency

29. How efficient is the applied formulation process (from commitment via negotiated procedure to contract)?

30. To what extent have EUTF Madad programs been cost-effective?

31. To what extent are the costs associated with the intervention proportionate to the benefits it has generated (please select samples)?

32. To what extent are the following in place and functioning:
a. appropriate monitoring processes of the performance of the EUTF Madad

b. appropriate strategy to ensure effective communication and visibility of the EUTF Madad?

Added value

33. Where the EUTF Madad is operating in the same field as other donors or partners, does it offer added-value in terms of size of engagement, particular expertise, and/or particular weight in advocacy?

34. To what extent has the EUTF Madad contributed to enhance the role of the EU in contributing to coordinating the international response to the Syrian and Iraqi crises?

Coherence, consistency, complementarity and synergies

35. To what extent are the EUTF Madad programs coherent?

36. How and to what extent has the EUTF Madad programs contributed to be a bridge between the EU humanitarian assistance and longer term development cooperation?

37. To what extent does the EUTF Madad complement and stimulate synergies with other instruments?

38. To what extent have EUTF Madad interventions allowed to react quickly to changes and adapt?

Leverage

39. To what extent have the EUTF Madad programs leveraged funds?

C. DRAW CONCLUSIONS AND DEVELOP RECOMMENDATIONS IN VIEW OF ENHANCED IMPACT ON THE GROUND, INCLUDING POSSIBLE OPERATIONS INSIDE SYRIA

Information sought in this area includes:

40. What are the recommendations to enhance effectiveness and efficiencies of its policy objectives?

41. What are the recommendations to improve the selection and formulation methodology of the EUTF management and how can programs improve their impact and sustainability?
42. What are the recommendations as regards to the EUTF Madad governance structure and its potential engagement inside Syria?
ANNEX II

List of relevant documents

1. EUTF documents
   - Revised Constitutive Agreement
   - Strategic Orientation Paper
   - Operational Selection Criteria
   - Action Documents adopted by the EUTF Board
   - List of EUTF Madad contracts
   - EUTF overall Results Framework
   - EUTF Factsheet
   - Minutes of Strategic and Operational Board of the EUTF Madad
   - Joint Humanitarian Development Framework for Lebanon and Jordan

2. Relevant policy documents
   - A Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU's External Action - Council conclusions, 13 November 2017.11
   - Operationalising the Humanitarian-Development Nexus - Council conclusions (19 May 2017).12
   - Supporting the future of Syria and the Region - Brussels conference, 4-5 April 2017, co-chairs declaration and outcome documents13
   - Elements for an EU Strategy for Syria, 14 March 201714
   - EU-Lebanon Compact, 15 November 201615, and EU-Jordan Compact, 19 December 2016.16
   - The Co-hosts declaration from the Supporting Syria & the Region Conference, held

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in London on 4 February 2016.\textsuperscript{17} The EU-Turkey statement of 18 March 2016\textsuperscript{18} and Joint Action Plan of 15 October 2015.\textsuperscript{19} the 2016 Conclusions of the EU Foreign Affairs Council\textsuperscript{20} on the 2015 "Elements for an EU regional strategy for Syria and Iraq as well as the ISIL/Da'eesh threat" adopted on 18 March 2013, mapping out a comprehensive EU approach in response to the conflict and its consequences both in Syria and its neighbouring countries as well as relevant conclusions on the Syria crisis of the EU Foreign Affairs Council.

- The UN-led Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan (RRP) in Response to the Syria Crisis\textsuperscript{21}
- The Declaration of the High-level Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean - Western Balkans Route on 8 October 2015.\textsuperscript{22}
- Managing the refugee crisis – European Commission Communication, 23 September 2015\textsuperscript{23}
- The UN Security Council Resolutions 2139, 2165, 2191, 2254 and 2258 on Syria.
- The Berlin Communiqué of the Conference on the Syrian Refugee Situation – Supporting Stability in the Region on 28 October 2014.\textsuperscript{24}

3. Partner country documents
- Jordan Response Plan (JRP)
- Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCP)
- Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRiT)
- Needs Assessment for Turkey (FRiT)
- National Response Plan Turkey
- Humanitarian Response Plan Iraq

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{17} http://www.supportfor2016.com/news/co-hosts-declaration-of-the-supporting-syria-and-the-regional-conference-london-2016/
\item \textsuperscript{19} http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-5860_en.htm
\item \textsuperscript{20} Council conclusions on the EU Regional Strategy for Syria and Iraq as well as the ISIL/Da'esh threat
\item \textsuperscript{21} http://www.3pyramid.org/the-3p/
\item \textsuperscript{22} "34. The EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis can improve efficiency, flexibility and speed of delivery of EU support across the neighbouring countries affected by the Syrian crisis in order, inter alia, to increase resilience of affected communities. The extension of the scope of the Trust Fund to the Western Balkans is being proposed and additional contributions are being considered." (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015-10-08-western-balkans-route-conference-declaration/)
\item \textsuperscript{23} http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5700_en.htm
\item \textsuperscript{24} https://www.yzyxnetiges-sm.de/en/Newsroom/1d1028.berliner-arkivservice/266444
\end{itemize}
ANNEX III

TIMING

Columns 1, 2 and 4 of the table below (Evaluation Phases and Stages; Notes and Reports; and Meetings/Communications), are to be filled in by the evaluation manager based on the content of chapter 7 of these Terms of Reference.

Column 3 (Dates) of the table below is to be filled by the contractors and submitted as part of their technical offer.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation Phases and Stages</th>
<th>Notes and Reports</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Meetings/Communications</th>
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ANNEX IV

Regional background

The Syrian conflict has triggered the world’s largest displacement crisis since World War II, with over 5.4 million Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries and the wider region, \(^{25}\) and more than 6 million internally displaced persons (IDPs). Seven years after the outbreak of the conflict in Syria, the region is in a protracted crisis\(^ {24}\) and the initial humanitarian challenges have altered to also affect the capacities of the host communities, their development and social stability.

Countries bordering Syria are hosting the majority of refugees: Lebanon hosts almost 1 million Syria refugees and has, along with Jordan, the largest per capita refugee population in the world. Turkey is currently hosting more than 3.4 million Syrian refugees, the largest number of Syrian refugees in one country in the world. Almost 250,000 refugees are situated in Iraq and 126,291 refugees in Egypt. In addition, since late 2013, the intensification of the


\(^{24}\) Defined as a situation in which 25 000 or more refugees of the same nationality have been in exile for five years or longer in a given asylum country (UNHCR).
Conflict in the north and centre of Iraq has resulted in 3.1 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) across the country, over half living in camps.27

While ongoing violence in many parts of the country led to large-scale displacement, other areas witnessed a relative decrease in violence compared to previous years. Against this backdrop, there was no large-scale arrival of refugees into neighbouring countries over the past year. However, the number of registered refugees increased from 4.8 million this time last year to 5.4 million this year due to the registration of an additional 570,000 Syrian refugees across the region. This primarily reflects newly registered Syrians (including new arrivals) as well as newborns in the five 3RP countries.

The living situation for Syrian refugees across the region continued to be extremely challenging in 2017. Many of the refugees have now been in the host country for four or more years and struggle to make ends meet. While the vast majority of Syrian refugees continue to be geographically integrated with host communities in urban, peri-urban and rural areas, they are increasingly vulnerable and face extremely high rates of poverty. In Turkey, over 64 per cent of refugee households living outside of camps live below the poverty line; 80 per cent of Syrian refugees living outside of camps in Jordan are living below the poverty line; more than 76 per cent of Syrian refugees are below the poverty line in Lebanon; and 82 per cent of

27 See ECHO/HIP for Iraq 2017
registered Syrian refugees in Egypt are either highly or severely vulnerable, meaning they are unable to afford the minimum requirements for a dignified life. While the overall situation for refugees in Iraq is somewhat better, the situation is deteriorating particularly for those who do not have the ability to obtain an income - and 37 per cent of refugees are now below the poverty line.

Refugees continue to face a number of specific challenges across the region, including limited livelihood opportunities, exhaustion of savings, and the adoption of negative coping mechanisms, which further exacerbates the residual protection risks they face. Broader political and social pressures can also affect stability between displaced populations and host communities in countries across the region.

Countries background

Lebanon

In Lebanon, one in five people is a refugee. With the highest number of refugees per capita in the world, Lebanon is the country with the closest historical and economic ties to Syria, and arguably most affected by the war in Syria. In the crisis, existing structural vulnerabilities of the country – ranging from weak economic growth to an unequal education system – are being exacerbated.

In response to the crises, the EU and Government of Lebanon adopted Partnership Priorities\textsuperscript{28} and the EU-Lebanon Compact. The core objectives of the EU-Lebanon Compact are to provide an appropriate and safe environment for refugees and displaced persons from Syria, during their temporary stay in Lebanon, and to provide support for host communities.

The EU programmes are aligned with priorities in the Lebanese Government’s response plan to the consequences of the influx of refugees from Syria, and integrated in the various documents such as "RACE" strategy (‘Reaching All Children with Education in Lebanon’) launched by the Minister of Education to ensure vulnerable school-aged children affected by the Syria crisis access quality formal and non-formal learning opportunities.

Jordan

Jordan has been severely affected by the Syrian crisis at the political, economic and social level since its outbreak in 2011. One in 15 is a refugee in Jordan. Despite or in response to this shock, the country has established itself as a hub for international assistance and has attracted significant international support. In this context, Jordan has benefited from significant additional EU allocations to help the country deal with the burden imposed by the Syrian conflict.

Within the framework of the EU – Jordan Compact, the Government of Jordan has issued a proposal for a "holistic approach" to address the consequences of the Syrian crisis. Jordan has

\begin{itemize}
  \item The priorities and the compact were adopted on 11 November 2016.
\end{itemize}
proposed a number of specific requests to the EU to increase the impact of aid and to revamp growth and employment in the country. In exchange for this, the Jordanian Government is granting Syrian refugees work permits to participate in certain sectors of the labour market.

**EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis, the 'Madad Fund'**

Actions adopted by the Board for a total of €1.213 billion - breakdown by country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>481,839,060 €</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>337,203,403 €</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>211,883,422 €</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>107,505,824 €</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Balkans</td>
<td>48,950,210 €</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional/other</td>
<td>26,423,000 €</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

**Turkey**

As the main host-country of Syrian refugees and with a common border to both Syria and the EU, Turkey is considered the prime partner to the EU in tackling the refugee flows stemming from the Syrian crises. The EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan, agreed on 29 November 2015, and the EU-Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016 is thereby the guiding framework for joint refugee response.

As a result of these agreements, the Facility for Refugees in Turkey (hereinafter the Facility) was created as a platform to channel funds in support of Syrian refugees in Turkey. Funding allocations under the Facility are based on the comprehensive needs assessment conducted in April 2016.

The EUTF Madad is one of the instruments through which the Facility support to refugees in Turkey is implemented. The Madad measures in Turkey are therefore designed in alignment with overall and specific objectives of the Facility, as outlined in the Facility Results Framework.\(^{29}\)

**Iraq**

- \(^{29}\) The Facility Results Framework is aligned with the EUTF Madad Results Framework.
Iraq has also suffered from the effects of the Syrian crises. The weak political consensus and sectarian tensions the country witnessed in the aftermath of the US lead invasion in 2003, had left Iraq with weak institutions and a political class being at odds with itself.

With the territorial creation of Da'ash and its expansion, the Syrian crisis spilt over to Iraq and accelerated inner Iraqi frictions. In response, the EU adopted a Regional Strategy for Syria and Iraq in March 2015 that included measures to counter the Da'ash threat. A review in May 2016 confirmed the strategy. This strategy – together with the Humanitarian Response plan – serves as the guiding policy for the Madad’s engagement in Iraq.

The EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis, the ‘Madad Fund’

The European Union is the leading donor in the international response to the Syrian crisis with an overall total of €110.2 billion from the EU budget and Member States collectively allocated in humanitarian and development assistance since the start of the conflict in 2011. The European Commission’s support in response to the Syrian crisis has now exceeded €47 billion, including both immediate humanitarian assistance, and non-humanitarian aid.

The EUTF Madad was created by Commission Decision C(2014)9615 of 10 December 2014 amended 2015; C(2015) 9691 of 22 December 2015. The EUTF Madad is defined by Article 187 of the EU Financial Regulation as an ‘emergency’ trust fund. It was established by Italy and the European Commission for 60 months.

The primary objective of the EUTF is ‘to provide a coherent and reinforced aid response to the Syrian and Iraqi crises and the massive displacement resulting from them on a multi-country scale. In pursuit of this objective, the Trust Fund shall address the needs of three groups: refugees, internally displaced persons, and returnees, and provide assistance to the communities and the administrations in which these groups find themselves, as regards resilience and early recovery’.

The constitutive agreement defines its mandate including the need for flexibility and envisages the following four-pronged added value:

- bring economy of scale that individual countries or organisation or the EU alone cannot achieve;
- enhance the role of the EU in contributing to the international response to the crisis;
- be a funding instrument with regional scope, to allow for quick and flexible response; and
- provide sustainable and predictable funding of a medium to long term crisis response.

The EUTF Madad is expected to bring efficiency gains, including by operating with overhead costs of far less than three percent.

The EUTF is a multi-donor instrument, with contributions from 22 EU Member States, regular EU budget instruments and Turkey. The current total amount of committed contributions is close to EUR 1.4 billion, with EUR 1.2 billion adopted by the Board as
concrete actions and EUR 872 million contracted to implementing partners for projects on the ground.

EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis, the ‘Midad Fund’
Actions adopted by the Board for a total of €1.213 billion - breakdown by sectors

- Livelihoods/Resilience: 411,585,000 €; 34%
- Health: 133,000,000 €; 11%
- Water & municipal services: 263,620,000 €; 17%
- Migration management in the Western Balkans: 109,230,000 €; 9%
- Primary and secondary education: 251,708,000 €; 24%
- Higher education: 58,459,000 €; 5%
- Monitoring, Evaluation and Audit: 1,850,000 €; 3%

Assistance under the Trust Fund is complementary to European Union humanitarian assistance that is provided on the basis of Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/96 of 20 June 1996 concerning humanitarian aid.

Related programmes and donors activities

- The EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey
- Syria Recovery Trust Fund (SRTF)\(^{10}\) based in Gaziantep
- The EU Regional Development and Protection Programme
- The World Bank Global Concessional Financing Facility
- Bilateral and multi-donor support

\(^{10}\) Established under the ‘Friends of the Syrian People’, co-founded by Germany, the UAE, and the US, and contributions from France, the UK, Italy, Denmark, Sweden, Netherlands, Finland, Japan and Kuwait.