Abstract

The scope of this document is to demonstrate that the Baltic FAB can be implemented in a manner, which is acceptably safe. This is claimed through a series of arguments, supported by appropriate evidences. The Safety Case herein complies with the applicable regulatory requirements.

Keywords

FAB, Safety, Case, GSN, Argument, Evidence.

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Document change record

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### Abbreviations

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<tr>
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<td>Baltic Functional Airspace Block</td>
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<td>BFAB SC</td>
<td>Baltic Functional Airspace Block Safety Case</td>
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<td>EASA</td>
<td>European Aviation Safety Agency</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<td>SES</td>
<td>Single European Sky</td>
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<td>NSA</td>
<td>National Supervisory Authority</td>
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<td>BFAB CONOPS</td>
<td>Baltic Functional Airspace Block Concept of Operation</td>
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<td>BANC</td>
<td>Baltic Air Navigation Services Commission</td>
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<td>AAIIC</td>
<td>Aircraft Accidents and Incidents Investigator in Charge</td>
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<td>SCIAA</td>
<td>State Commission for Investigation of Air Accidents</td>
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<td>TEN-T</td>
<td>Trans-European Transport Network programme</td>
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<td>ECCAIRS</td>
<td>European Co-ordination centre for Accident and Incident Reporting System</td>
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<td>BSID</td>
<td>Baltic FAB Safety Management Systems Interface Document</td>
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<td>Goal Structured Notation</td>
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1 General information

1.1 Purpose

1.1.1 The Baltic FAB Safety Case (hereafter BFAB SC) is produced fulfilling the European Commission requirements set out in the Commission Regulation (EU) No 176/2011 on the information to be provided before the establishment and modification of a Functional Airspace Block, as well as requirements of Article 9a(2) of Regulation (EC) No 550/2004.

1.1.2 The aim of this Safety Case (SC) is to present to the European Commission (EC), the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), other Member States and other interested parties the information demonstrating that the Baltic functional airspace block (BFAB) implementation operation and its possible future modifications will be acceptably safe.

1.1.3 “Interested parties”, referred to in point 1.1.2., mean the neighbouring third countries to the FAB, relevant airspace users or groups of airspace users and staff representatives bodies as well as adjacent air navigation service providers (ANS) to those in the Functional Airspace Block.

1.1.4 The objective of the BFAB SC is to demonstrate that the Baltic FAB safety management and oversight arrangements are sufficient and appropriate to enable safe ANS provision in Baltic FAB airspace. Furthermore, in accordance with the requirements of the FAB Implementing Rule, the Safety Case provides other safety related information required before the establishment of a Functional Airspace Block.

Note 1. It should be noted that some of the required information is further detailed in other Baltic FAB documents and deliverables to which this document cross-references.

Note 2. Applicable SES regulations are listed in Chapter 3.

1.1.5 As per the relevant guidance material, prior to starting FAB operations and at the time of submission of the required information to the European Commission (in accordance with the FAB-IR), there cannot yet be a complete Safety Case (SC). Therefore, the Safety Case herein will be retained as a living document, updated at regular intervals or as may be required, to adequately support the overall claim.

1.1.6 A crucial aspect of the safety case management is the ongoing maintenance of the safety argument throughout life. Throughout the operational life of FAB, the corresponding safety case can be challenged by changing regulatory requirements, additional safety evidence and a changing design. In order to maintain an accurate account of the safety of FAB, all such challenges must be assessed for their impact on the original safety argument. The process for updating Safety Case together with responsibilities for maintenance of this document is described in section 1.6.

1.2 Structure

1.2.1 A safety case is a legal document, which provides structured and logical arguments, supported by evidence, to back up a claim regarding the safety of a
subject. In this safety case, the claim is that Baltic FAB is and will remain adequately safe as of December 2012.

1.2.2 The document is structured in two main parts:

- **Part I - Safety policy and Safety Management**: In this part overall safety management of the FAB and organisation, safety policy, safety achievement and assurance in accidents, incidents occurrence reporting and investigation, risk assessment and mitigation in respect of changes has been presented, according to the requirements of the FAB IR (EU) No 176/2011.

- **Part II - Baltic FAB Initial Safety Arguments**: This part contains collection of safety arguments and evidences that Baltic FAB safety management and oversight arrangements are sufficient and appropriate to enable safe provision of Air Navigation Services in the FAB airspace with description of the overall argument structure using Goal Structured Notation (GSN).

Further details of the claims, arguments and evidences are contained in **Chapter 6**.

1.3 Document layout

1.3.1 The content of each chapter is provided below:

- **Chapter 1** of this safety case contains general information and defines the purpose and structure of safety case report as well as the scope of the safety arguments, and the time boundaries that are being considered within that scope, maintenance of the report. This chapter also discusses limitations and assumptions related to the Baltic FAB.

- **Chapter 2** of this safety case provides with introductory description of the background and context for the Baltic FAB.

- **Chapter 3** lists European regulatory requirements, applicable ICAO requirements, bi-lateral arrangements and agreements that shall be taken into account while developing this SC.

- **Chapter 4** gives a reference to the Concept of Operations of Baltic FAB.

- **Chapter 5** provides, in concise and traceable manner, a set of safety related organisational arrangements on how safety in the Baltic FAB will be achieved and maintained in accordance with the requirements of the FAB IR (EU) No 176/2011.

- **Chapter 6**, using GSN model, contains the detailed decomposition from the higher level safety claim to the evidence required to demonstrate that the Baltic FAB is safe to implement.

- **Chapter 7** states the conclusion of the safety case.

1.3.2 This Safety Case represents the documented assurance (i.e. argumentation and supporting evidence) of the achievement and maintenance of safety in the Baltic FAB.

1.3.3 The SC is produced fulfilling the European Commission requirements set out in Commission regulation (EU) No 176/2011 on the information to be provided
before the establishment and modification of a functional airspace block, as well as requirements of Article 9a(2) of Regulation (EC) No 550/2004.

1.4 **Scope**

1.4.1 Whereas this Safety Case is designed to meet the specific requirements of European Commission, it is therefore limited to arguing that those elements of safety that are required to ensure compliance with all applicable safety regulations are adequately addressed within the Baltic FAB development, as of December 2012.

1.4.2 This Safety Case encompasses:

- The framework for safety regulation at State level;
- Safety oversight of the Baltic FAB ANSPs and arrangements for NSAs cooperation;
- Safety management arrangements at ANSPs level.

1.4.3 Whereas BFAB is regarded as the implementation of institutional changes, this Safety Case does not employ the methodologies normally used for assessing functional changes, but also those changes that are not subject to quantitative risk expressions.

1.4.4 The Safety case is addressing the “safety” organisational and managerial aspects within a FAB at State, NSA and service provider levels, with the objectives to demonstrate and provide the necessary assurance that the FAB will be established and managed safely.

1.4.5 The safety-relevant operational aspects will continue to be addressed outside the FAB Safety Case and in a conventional manner, i.e. through safety assessments, Unit Safety Cases or project safety cases.

1.4.6 The arrangements for maintenance of this safety case after the establishment of the FAB are described in chapter 1.6 (“Safety Case maintenance”).

1.4.7 The safety case has three levels:

- State level;
- NSA level;
- ANSP level.

1.5 **Limitations and assumptions**

1.5.1 The Baltic FAB airspace organisation will be developed and harmonised in accordance with the Single European Sky (SES II) Regulations and the European ATM Master Plan.

1.5.2 In Baltic FAB, PANSA and Oro Navigacija foresee no major operational changes in the current way of handling aircraft in terminal and en-route operation on 4th of December 2012s. The Baltic FAB service providers will continue to provide ANS/ATM services in the FAB airspace from the two existing ATM centres in Vilnius and Warsaw as it is described in BFAB CONOPS.
1.5.3 For the first reference period performance plans for Lithuania and Poland will be managed separately. In the next step, BFAB Contracting Parties will implement the Baltic FAB performance scheme and apply the Baltic FAB performance plan consistent with the EU-wide performance targets taking into account military needs. The Baltic FAB performance plan will be subject to consultation with the stakeholders concerned. (Ref. “BFAB States Agreement Chapter 7, Article 23”; “BFAB NSAs Cooperation Agreement Article 5”).

1.5.4 To harmonise and specify the methods of assurance of Safety Management System (SMS) within Baltic FAB, together with States, NSAs and ANSPs Agreements, a Baltic FAB SMS Interface Document (BSID) has been prepared as a description of detailed day to day procedures on ANSPs level. For the first period it is assumed that SMS assurance arrangements at States and NSAs levels are covered enough directly in State and NSA Agreements respectively.

1.6 Safety Case maintenance

1.6.1 According to the State Agreement, the “Safety Committee” is responsible for the identification of any changes resulting from regulatory requirements, changes in design of Baltic FAB and for preparation of the respective amendments to the BFAB Safety case.

1.6.2 The process flow for updating of Safety Case together with responsibilities for maintenance of this document is presented below:

Figure 1: Process flow for updating of Safety Case

1.6.3 BFAB Safety Case is unlikely to be amended/changed resulting from operational changes.
2 Introduction

2.1 Functional Airspace Blocks

2.1.1 The fragmentation of air traffic management (ATM) in Europe has long been recognised as an obstacle to improving performance in the provision of ATM services. Successive packages of Single European Sky (SES) legislation have sought to address this in a number of ways. One of the principal mechanisms in the legislation is the requirement that Functional Airspace Blocks (FABs) are established in European airspace. The basic concept of a FAB is that the regions of airspace in which it is managed are determined by operational requirements, rather than by national boundaries.

2.1.2 The first package of SES legislation, enacted in 2004, required Member States of the European Union to establish FABs in their upper airspace. It required the FABs to satisfy certain criteria. This requirement was enhanced in the second package of SES legislation (SES II), enacted in July 2009.

2.1.3 In the current legislation, Member States are required to take all necessary measures to ensure the implementation of FABs by 4th December 2012. FABs should be established with a view to improving capacity and efficiency, should be supported by a safety case, and justified by a cost-benefit analysis. Member States are encouraged to cooperate with each other to the fullest possible extent to achieve these aims.

2.2 Background

2.2.1 For many years Polish and Lithuanian bodies responsible for navigation and aviation have been cooperating with each other on both local and European level. The milestones such as Memorandum of understanding signed by the aviation authorities and ANSPs in 2003 and 2004 indicate that the cooperation was close, and cooperation was pursued through the medium of the Baltic Air Navigation Services Commission. The requirement to establish FABs by 2012 created a new impetus, and the bilateral relationship at the ministry level was strengthened in 2010 by signing a Letter of Intent between relevant ministries from both sides.

2.2.2 In 2009 Poland and Lithuania have agreed in principle to evaluate the feasibility of establishing a Functional Airspace Block (the Baltic FAB) in their joint airspace. The ANSPs of the two countries have applied for and been granted support from the Trans-European Transport Network program (TEN-T) for a feasibility study into the establishment of such a FAB, and PANSA has commissioned Helios and Ernst & Young to undertake this study to help the two governments and their ANSPs, and enable them to make appropriate decisions concerning the establishment of the FAB in time for the SES deadline in 2012.

2.2.3 Cooperation in ANS between Poland and Lithuania, embodied in a Functional Airspace Block in their joint airspace, is likely to bring benefits in a number of areas, although the benefits are inherently limited by their short common border, relatively little shared traffic, and disparate sizes. Spare capacity in Lithuania can be utilised to relieve resource shortages in Poland. Infrastructure replacement programmes can be coordinated, and certain activities provided jointly, bringing about long-term cost savings. Procedures can be implemented that save airlines’ costs and bring about environmental improvements. The very
process of working together will yield opportunities for learning from each other’s practices, and identifying where changing practices will bring about efficiency improvements.

2.2.4 The establishment of the FAB itself poses no fundamental legal or institutional challenge. However, achievement of some of the benefits might be constrained by the institutional status of the countries’ ANSPs, and the statutes under which they are governed.

2.2.5 The establishment of a FAB in the joint airspace of Poland and Lithuania is surely only the first step in bringing about improvements in ANS in the region. It is expected that further opportunities will be found in cooperation with all the neighbouring countries, and that there is the potential for Poland and Lithuania to act as a bridge between the European Union and non-members to the east. The potential for further cooperation will be addressed in subsequent reports.

2.2.6 On 27th July 2010 the Vice-Minister of Transport and Communications of the Republic of Lithuania and the Vice-Minister of Infrastructure of the Republic of Poland signed Letter of Intent on the cooperation with regard to the development of the Baltic Functional Airspace Block initiative. This formal act had great impact to the ongoing work and facilitated the process of completing the formal procedures for international tender for the procurement of a feasibility study for the future Baltic FAB.

2.2.7 The idea of involving a wide spectrum of experts in the work under this Initiative was implemented through the establishment of FAB working groups (FAB WG) comprising experts from both ANSPs, the Lithuanian Civil Aviation Administration, the Polish Civil Aviation Office, military experts and social partners. The FAB WG identified four areas of interest to be subject for further exploration. These areas are:

- Operational/Technical;
- Safety;
- Legal;
- Economic and Financial.
3 Regulatory requirements

3.1 For the establishment of the FABs following mandatory EC regulatory requirements are applied:

- Regulation (EC) No 549/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2004 laying down the framework for the creation of the single European sky (the framework Regulation);

- Regulation (EC) No 550/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2004 on the provision of air navigation services in the single European sky (the service provision Regulation);

- Regulation (EC) No 551/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2004 on the organisation and use of the airspace in the single European sky (the airspace Regulation);


- Regulation (EU) No 176/2011 “Information to be provided before the establishment and modification of a functional airspace block”.

3.2 EC regulatory requirements concerning service provision, safety oversight, investigation and prevention and Performance monitoring are:


- Commission Regulation (EU) No 691/2010 of 29 July 2010 laying down a performance scheme for air navigation services and network functions and amending Regulation (EC) No 2096/2005 laying down common requirements for the provision of air navigation services (Performance Scheme);


- Commission Regulation (EC) No 1794/2006 of 6 December 2006 laying down a common charging scheme for air navigation services (Charging Scheme);

- Commission Regulation (EC) No 1032/2006 of 6 July 2006 laying down requirements for automatic systems for the exchange of flight data for the purpose of notification, coordination and transfer of flights between air traffic control units;


3.3 Applicable ICAO requirements:

- Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation;
- The ICAO Annexes to the Chicago Convention;
- ICAO Doc 6685 (Registration with ICAO of Aeronautical Agreements);
- ICAO Assembly Resolution A36-13 (delineation of ATM airspaces).

3.4 Bilateral arrangements and agreements concerning regional cooperation / development FAB creation, functioning and safety oversight:

- Memorandum of Understanding for Harmonization and Integration of Components of the Air Navigation Services in the Baltic Sea Area between the ANSPs of Poland, Lithuania and Latvia (2003);
• Memorandum of Cooperation between the Civil Aviation Authorities of Poland and Lithuania (2004). On the basis of this Memorandum Baltic Air Navigation Services Commission (BANC) was created;

• Letter of intension signed by Lithuania’s and Poland’s Ministry of Transport Vice-Ministers on 28 July 2010;

• Agreement on the Establishment of the Baltic Functional Airspace Block between: The Republic of Lithuania and The Republic of Poland;

• NSAs Cooperation Agreement;

• ANSPs Cooperation Agreement of the Baltic FAB.
4 Concept of operations

4.1 Concept of operations CONOPS contains a medium-level description of the target concept to support the creation of the Baltic FAB as a PANSA and Oro Navigacija (ON) initiative to meet the growth forecast in air transport demand and meet the airspace users expectations for more flexible and cost-effective Air Traffic Management (ATM) services, while remaining sensitive to environmental issues.

ref: Baltic FAB Concept Of Operations (CONOPS)
PART I

BFAB Safety policy and Safety management
5 Safety related organisational arrangements

5.1 Overall Safety management of the FAB (organisation)

5.1.1 The Baltic FAB will have appropriate governance structure that will ensure that all necessary safety requirements for establishment and operation of the Baltic FAB will be continuously met. At the highest level, this will be ensured through the creation of the Baltic FAB Board and Safety Committee (ref.: BFAB Agreement, Articles 25, 26).

5.1.2 Baltic FAB Board is tasked to ensure the implementation of a common overall Safety Management System.

5.1.3 The Safety Committee will assist the Baltic FAB Board in implementing the Baltic FAB. Its tasks are drafted in ToRs and will include (not exhaustive):

- Implementation of the Baltic FAB Safety Plan;
- Developing and maintaining Baltic FAB SMS;
- Overseeing that the procedures for accident and serious incident investigation, including data collection, analysis and reporting are followed;
- Support in setting Safety Targets for the Baltic FAB;
- Performing Safety Assessments;
- Harmonization of safety assessment procedures and methodologies;
- Performing risk assessments of the planned operational changes;
- Performing the safety cases.

5.1.4 To support Safety Committee by drafting relevant procedures, Safety Working Group or task forces may be established by the Baltic FAB Board under the management of the FAB MO.

5.1.5 Assurance will be provided that no FAB related safety arrangements and decisions by BFAB Board are made without prior coordination between Safety Committee and other Committees, as well as consultations with BFAB parties concerned (States, NSAs, ANSPs).

5.2 Safety policy

5.2.1 A Safety Policy is agreed, accepted by all involved parties.

5.2.2 Proposed BFAB Safety Policy at the ANSPs level was endorsed by the Director General of ON and the President of PANSA. The Policy reflects requirements that the FAB will establish and maintain a high and uniform level of safety, which will contribute to overall aviation safety. It is also expected that the FAB establishment will contribute to enhancement of safety through closer cooperation and harmonisation of the SMS. The Policy states the responsibilities and accountabilities at the ANSPs level.

5.2.3 The Multi-level Baltic FAB Safety Policy has also been developed ensuring that all levels of Stakeholders of Baltic FAB are committing to create an integrated and highly transparent safety chain across the total aviation system, cost-effectively.
delivering a common and high level of safety across Baltic FAB, generating continuous safety improvement and leading enhancement of aviation safety throughout Europe. The Multilevel Baltic FAB Safety Policy provides details on commitments for all three levels, i.e. State level, NSA level and ANSP level and will be signed at appropriate level shortly.

Ref: Annex 1 of the Safety Case report

5.2.4 According to BFAB State Agreement Article 25 sub-para 7, the maintenance of the Safety Policy will be a responsibility of the BFAB Board with support of the BFAB Safety Committee. The mechanism of maintaining or updating the Safety Policy will be in line with the overall safety management of the FAB as presented in paras 1.6.2 and 5.1. of this Safety Case report.

5.3 Safety plan

5.3.1 Safety arrangements for BFAB pre-implementation/implementation phase are laid down in BFAB pre-implementation and implementation safety plan, which consists of a series of tasks to ensure all the safety management arrangements, necessary for timely BFAB implementation by 4th December 2012, have been accomplished. This plan covers all stages of common safety arrangements, including evaluation of existing safety legislation in both BFAB member states, SMS maturity in ON and PANSA, mapping of processes between NSAs and ANSPs, other activities, that necessary in order to meet requirements of Regulation (EU) No 176/2011 “Information to be provided before the establishment and modification of a Functional Airspace Block”.

5.3.2 Development of BFAB Safety plan for operational phase of BFAB (beyond 4th December 2012 will depend on input from BFAB strategy and decisions of BFAB Council, Board and/or MO.

Ref: Annex 1 of the BFAB Safety Case report.

5.4 Accidents / incidents / occurrence reporting and investigation


5.4.2 The accidents are investigated at state level by State Commission for Investigation of Air Accidents (SCIAA) in Republic of Poland and Aircraft accidents and incidents investigator in charge (AAIIC) in Republic of Lithuania. There is a process in place, describing the safety data collection, analysis and exchange at each State level. The requirements include also documented notification procedures and arrangements for investigation of accidents and serious incidents (A&SI), including data collection, exist for cross-border service provision. Arrangements exist for safety data analysis and exchange at State/Aircraft Accidents Investigation Board (AAIB) level.

Ref: Article 28 of Baltic FAB Agreement

5.4.3 Procedures are established for dealing with accidents and incidents reporting and investigation, as well as plans for safety data collection (including for cross-
border service provision), analysis and exchange at NSA level. The procedures include documented notification requirements and arrangements for possible NSAs staff participation in investigation of accidents and incidents.

Ref. Section IV Article 11 and 14 of Baltic FAB NSA Cooperation Agreement

5.4.4 ATM Occurrence reports received via the national NSAs reporting systems will be in the format of AST report based on ESARR 2 requirements or in the format of ECCAIRS which improves overall FAB safety awareness.

5.4.5 For the safety information dissemination NSAs concerned agreed to use common data repository.

Ref. Section IV Article 13 of Baltic FAB NSA Cooperation Agreement

5.4.6 Following Eurocontrol and European Commission recommendations and fulfilling the requirement of Regulation (EU) No 1216/2011 of 24th November 2011 amending Commission Regulation (EU) No 691/2010 laying down a performance scheme for air navigation services and network functions BFAB NSAs and ANSPs agreed on use of the same Risk Classification and apply Risk Analysis Tool (Eurocontrol ATM RAT) for the performance and analysis of investigations.

5.4.7 Occurrence investigation (except accidents) is part of SMS internal procedures addressed in the “Baltic FAB SMS Interface Document” (BSID). The procedures include the common tasks related to occurrence reporting, assessment and exchange (sharing) of safety occurrences information in the FAB at ANSP level.

Ref. Chapter 3.2 of BSID

5.4.8 The reporting procedures cover the interface with the military authorities in case of involvement of military aircraft in incidents.

5.4.9 A very important part of SMS is an Open Reporting / Just Culture environment. The measures supporting the enhancement of reporting are reflected in the SMM and in the Safety Policy of the FAB.

5.4.10 Detailed justification is provided in PART II Chapter 6 G-2 of this document.

5.5 Management of safety to avoid degradation in safety performance

5.5.1 Management of Safety is achieved by harmonised and coordinated SMS procedures ensuring the priority and effectiveness of safety management at all levels.

5.5.2 The procedures dealing with the unspecified future changes are included in the BSID in the ESARR 4 risk assessment procedure. Both ANSPs of Baltic FAB have SMS compliant with the regulatory requirements. Change management is applied in compliance with Regulations No 1035/2011 and No 1034/2011.

5.5.3 At NSA level, this is covered by arrangements for safety oversight, supervision and cooperation. The NSAs will exchange relevant information concerning planned changes.

Ref. Articles 9 and 11 of the NSA Agreement on Cooperation in Baltic FAB
5.5.4 At States level there is a commitment to harmonise relevant national rules and procedures for general air traffic and civil-military coordination within the Baltic FAB.

*Ref. Articles 9 BFAB State Agreement*

5.5.5 Adequate safety monitoring arrangements and procedures exist at the NSAs and the ANSPs level. The safety monitoring is described in the BSID for both ANSPs.

### 5.6 Safety Targets, Safety Oversight and Enforcement Measures

5.6.1 Responsibilities for setting Safety Targets in Baltic FAB will be established for the second reference period as stated in Chapter 7, Article 23 of Baltic FAB Agreement. Both States will jointly ensure setting of Safety Targets.

5.6.2 Safety targets in Lithuania are expressed in the form of Tolerable and Acceptable levels of Safety. Those targets are established in accordance with “Rules on establishment of Tolerable and Acceptable Safety Levels and appropriate Risk Classification Schemes” approved by the CAA Director order No. 4R-309 on 6th December 2011 (Žin., 2011, Nr.151-7136), which was created in full consideration of ESSAR 2, ESARR 4, ICAO Annex 11 and ICAO Doc. 9859 guidelines and requirements.

5.6.3 Conditions for monitoring safety targets in Lithuania are established in ANSP Certification rules approved by CAA director order No. 4R-135 on 14th June 2006 and in “Rules on establishment of Tolerable and Acceptable Safety Levels and appropriate Risk Classification Schemes” approved by CAA Director order No. 4R-309 on 6th December 2011 (Žin., 2011, Nr.151-7136).

5.6.4 The responsibilities for provision of coordinated Safety oversight in Baltic FAB are defined and allocated in Baltic FAB Agreement, Chapter 6 “Supervision”. Achievement of foreseen tasks is prescribed in the BFAB NSAs Cooperation Agreement Section III “Supervision and Safety Oversight in Baltic FAB”.

5.6.5 BFAB NSAs are responsible for supervising ANSPs certified by them independently from part of Baltic FAB airspace they have been designated for service provision.

5.6.6 Requirements, arrangements and conditions for safety oversight and enforcement measures on ANS in Lithuania are established in Law on Aviation, ANSPs certification rules, ANSPs certification manual, Code of Administrative Violations of the Republic of Lithuania and other national legislation. For detailed explanation see G4-4 PART II of this document.

5.6.7 Poland has not established safety targets yet. State Safety Program Task Force has been established in CAO. One of its tasks is to develop design of methodology for establishing and monitoring of safety levels, as well as proposal for a composition of a team, which shall establish safety levels.

### 5.7 Risk assessment and mitigation in respect of FAB related changes

5.7.1 Mechanisms for identifying changes to ATM system were defined and harmonised in the BSID in order to assure that changes are introduced safely and evidence is available in form of performed safety assessment. Proposed operational
changes in relation to the establishment of Baltic FAB will be subjected to a safety assessment based on the EUROCONTROL methodology (SAM 2.1).

5.7.2 The objective of Common Risk Assessment Mechanism is to ensure a specific risk assessment of changes in PANS-A and ON ATM systems which influence Baltic FAB operation to avoid degradation in safety performance. Within Baltic FAB, the safety assessment process is defined and described. The description of the safety process is available to all employees of both ANSP’s. Adherence to the safety process is an absolute must.

5.7.3 In addition, harmonisation of safety management processes in the areas of safety surveys, safety promotion, and audits will be conducted according to provisions stated in Article 9 of BFAB State Agreement.
PART II
Baltic FAB initial safety arguments
6 Baltic FAB initial safety argument

6.1 Top Level Claim

6.1.1 This chapter provides a brief description of the overall argument structure, and the use of Goal Structured Notation.

6.1.2 The Top-Level Claim (in Figure 1) supporting the Baltic FAB Safety Case asserts that Baltic FAB safety management and oversight arrangements are sufficient and appropriate to enable safe provision of Air Navigation Services in the FAB airspace.

6.1.3 To support the Top-level Claim, the Safety Case utilises the strategy of arguing that FAB safety regulatory framework, safety oversight and safety management arrangements meet the corresponding requirements of the FAB Implementation Rule.

Figure 2: Overall safety argument structure

Note. The Top-level Claim will remain valid as long as all assumptions associated with the environment of operations and with performance of all actors within the FAB will remain valid, and as long as operation of the FAB will comply with the given concept. The assessment of actual FAB performance, including safety, will become available not earlier than after a statistically significant period of actual operation.

6.2 Safety argument decomposition

6.2.1 Introduction

6.2.1.1 This section describes the strategy for each first level goal (G1 through G5) referred to in Figure 2 and provides the associated lower level details. The safety arguments are always defined with reference to the corresponding evidence provided in each table below.
6.2.1.2 The strategy mentioned in 6.1.2 encompasses usage of the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN), which is a graphical argumentation notation for presenting safety arguments. It acts as a communication means to describe how a particular claim has been shown to be true by means of evidence. An argument can be considered true if, and only if, each of its supporting sub-argument can be shown to be true.

6.2.1.3 In accordance with requirements stated in Regulation No 176/2011, Annex, Part II, Para 1, and applying the GSN principles, the Top Level Claim is decomposed into five basic arguments:

- **Argument 1** asserts that Baltic FAB has its Safety Policy.
- **Argument 2** asserts that Arrangements for reporting and investigation of Accidents and Serious Incidents, including data collection, analysis and exchange are adequate.
- **Argument 3** asserts that Safety performance is managed for continuous improvement.
- **Argument 4** asserts that Baltic FAB has established adequate arrangements and has assigned responsibilities for setting safety targets and safety oversight.
- **Argument 5** asserts that Operational changes resulting from FAB establishment and modification are subject to adequate safety assessment.
6.2.2 Argument 1 - Baltic FAB has its Safety Policy. (GSN Goal 1 – G1, Figure 2)

Figure 3: G1 safety argument structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>G1-1 The Baltic FAB Safety Policy is published:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FAB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E1 Multilevel (State, NSA, ANSP) Safety Policy Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E2 Updated NSAs and ANSPs manuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>G1-2 A process exist to modify Baltic FAB Safety Policy:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FAB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E3 State/NSA/ANSP agreements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E4 ToRs of BFAB Safety Committee, Updated NSAs and ANSPs manuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.2.3 Argument 2 - Arrangements for reporting and investigation of Accidents and Serious Incidents, including data collection, analysis and exchange are adequate. (GSN Goal 2 – G2)

Figure 4: G2 argument structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>G2-1 Safety investigation authorities exist:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FAB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E5 BFAB State agreement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Lithuania: Aircraft Accidents and Incidents Investigator in Charge (AAIIC) in Lithuania

Poland: State Commission for Investigation of Air Accidents (SCIAA) in Poland
Figure 5: G2-2 argument structure

G2-2 Provisions for reporting & investigation of Accidents and Serious Incidents as well as plans for safety data collection, analysis and exchange exist at the State level:

G2-2-1 AAIBs have documented procedures for Accidents and Serious Incidents Investigation, including data collection, analysis and reporting:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FAB</th>
<th>All interfaces between BFAB States concerning procedures for reporting &amp; investigation of Accidents and Serious incidents as well as plans for safety data collection, analysis and exchange are established in BFAB Agreement_Chapter 10 „Accidents and serious incidents“.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| Lithuania: |


| Poland: |

### G2-2-2 Documented notification procedures and arrangements for investigation of Accidents and Serious Incidents, including data collection, exist for cross-border service provision

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FAB</th>
<th>BFAB Agreement, Chapter 10: Accidents and serious incidents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Lithuania:**

| E7 | European Union Council Directive 94/56 EEC and ICAO Annex 13 provisions were implemented by “Regulation on civil aircraft accident and incident classification, investigation and reporting”.
| E8 | Terms of Reference (terms of action) MoT AAIB of Republic of Lithuania approved by MoT order Nr. 290 on 24-09-2001 (Žin., 2001, Nr.86-3016) |

**Poland:**

| E8 | State AAIB Terms of Reference (terms of action) approved by Minister of Infrastructure order Nr. 57 of 12-11-2008 r. (OJ MI 08.13.69) |

### G2-2-3 Plan / arrangements exist for safety data analysis and exchange at State/AAIB level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FAB</th>
<th>BFAB Agreement, Chapter 10: Accidents and serious incidents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Lithuania:**

| E9 | 15-01-2002 MoT order Nr. 3-25 “Regulation on civil aircraft accident and incident classification, investigation and reporting” Chapter I. 26-05-2005 MoT order No. 3-250 “On Civil aviation occurrences reporting” Chapter III. |
| E10 | Terms of Reference (terms of action) MoT AAIB of Republic of Lithuania approved by MoT order Nr. 290 on 24-09-2001 (Žin., 2001, Nr.86-3016). |

**Poland:**

| E9 | Regulation of the Minister of Transport of 18-01-2007 on air accidents and incidents, chapter 3-5 (OJ 07.35.225) Organisational Regulations of Civil Aviation Office, §22. |
| E10 | State AAIB Terms of Reference (terms of action) approved by Minister of Infrastructure order Nr. 57 of 12-11-2008 r. (OJ MI 08.13.69). |
Baltic FAB Safety Case

**G2-3** Procedures for dealing with A&I reporting & investigation and plans for safety data collection, analysis and exchange exist at CAA/NSA level.

**G2-3-1** NSA have documented procedures for dealing with A&I reporting and investigation, including data collection:

- **E11** Ref to NSA manuals

**G2-3-2** Documented NSA notification procedures and arrangements exist for dealing with reporting and investigation of A & I, for the case of cross-border service provision:

- **E12** Ref to NSA Agreement
- **E13** Ref to NSA manuals

**G2-3-3** Plans/arrangements exist for safety data analysis and exchange at NSA level:

- **E14** Ref to NSA Agreement
- **E15** Ref to NSA documents

**Figure 6: G2-3 argument structure**

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**G2-3** Procedures for dealing with A&I reporting & investigation and plans for safety data collection, analysis and exchange exist at CAA/NSA level:

**G2-3-1** NSA have documented procedures for dealing with A & I reporting and investigation, including data collection:

- **FAB** NSAs agreement

**Lithuania:**


- European Union Council Directive 94/56 EEC and ICAO Annex 13 provisions were implemented by “Regulation on civil aircraft accident and incident classification, investigation and reporting”.

- NSA manuals:

  - “Manual on information concerning civil aviation occurrences collection” approved by CAA director order No 4R-117 on 5-07-2005.

**Poland:**

- **E11** Civil Aviation Office Procedure upon receiving information of occurrence (ZIZL-01)

**G2-3-2** Documented NSA notification procedures and arrangements exist for dealing with reporting and investigation of A & I, for the case of cross-border service provision and G2-3-3 Plans / arrangements exist for safety data analysis and exchange at NSA level:

- **FAB** Baltic FAB NSA Cooperation Agreement Section IV Article 11 and 14 establishes procedures for dealing with accidents and incidents reporting and investigation, as well plans for safety data collection (including for cross-border service provision), analysis
and exchange. The procedures include documented notification requirements and arrangements for possible NSAs staff participation in investigation of accidents and incidents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lithuニアia:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E13</td>
<td>“Manual on information concerning civil aviation occurrences collection” approved by CAA director order No 4R-117 on 5-07-2005.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Poland:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E13</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

| FAB | Baltic FAB NSA Cooperation Agreement Section IV Article 11 and 14 establishes procedures for dealing with accidents and incidents reporting and investigation, as well plans for safety data collection (including for cross-border service provision), analysis and exchange. The procedures include documented notification requirements and arrangements for possible NSAs staff participation in investigation of accidents and incidents. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lithuニアia:</th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E15</td>
<td>“Manual on information concerning civil aviation occurrences collection” approved by CAA director order No 4R-117 on 5-07-2005.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Poland:</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 7: G2-4 argument structure

**G2-4** Procedures for accident and incident reporting and incident investigation, and plans for safety data collection, analysis and exchange exist at ANSP level

**G2-4-1** ANSPs have documented procedures for A & I reporting and incident investigation

- **E16** Ref. to ANSP SMMs

**G2-4-2** ANSPs have documented notification procedures and arrangements for incident investigation, including data collection for the case of cross-border service provision.

- **E17** Ref. to ANSP agreement and BSID
- **E18** Ref. to ANSP SMMs

**G2-4-3** ANSPs have plans/arrangements for safety data analysis and exchange

- **E19** Ref. to ANSP SMMs
- **E20** Ref. to ANSP agreement and BSID

**Baltic FAB Safety Case**

**Procedures for accident and incident reporting and incident investigation, and plans for safety data collection, analysis and exchange exist at ANSP level**

**Argue that FAB ANSPs have appropriate and documented arrangements & procedures for accident reporting incident investigation and safety data exchange**

**E16** ON Safety procedure SP201 ‘ATM Occurrences Reporting and Internal Investigation Procedure’, Order of ON Director General On civil aviation occurrences reporting.

**E17, E18** Baltic FAB SMS Interface Document para 3.2

**Lithuania:**

- **E16** Baltic FAB SMS Interface Document para 3.2

**Poland:**

- **E16** Baltic FAB SMS Interface Document para 3.2, updated Safety Procedure SP201 in ON.

**ANSP Agreement para 5.1:** Baltic FAB SMS Interface Document.

- **E17, E18** Baltic FAB SMS Interface Document para 3.2, updated PP-SMS-01 in PANSA.
### G2-4-3 ANSPs have plan/arrangements for safety data analysis and exchange

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FAB</th>
<th>ANSP Agreement para 5.1 Organisation – Baltic FAB ANSPs. Both ANSPs as Baltic FAB members are committed to jointly ensure improvement of safety occurrence reporting and enhancement of an open reporting, exchange of information concerning reported safety occurrences, safety data collection, internal investigation and analysis, harmonisation of safety occurrences severity assessment, integration and dissemination of safety data at European level.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E19, E20</td>
<td>Baltic FAB SMS Interface Document para 3.3., updated Safety procedure SP201 in ON.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E19, E20</td>
<td>Baltic FAB SMS Interface Document para 3.3., updated PP-SMS-01 in PANSA.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.2.4 Argument 3 - Safety performance is managed for continuous improvement. (GSN Goal 3 – G3)

Figure 8: G3 argument structure

G3-1 Baltic FAB ANSPs have SMSs compliant with the regulatory requirements

- FAB
  - Lithuania:
    - E22 ANSP Certificate No 1, issued by CAA on 21 December 2006
  - Poland:
    - E21 PANS A Safety Manual (P-SMS) approved by President of PANS A
    - E22 PANS A certified by Polish CAO

G3-2 Change management is applied in compliance with Reg. 1034/2011 & 1035/2011:

- FAB
  - Lithuania:
    - Safety procedure SP401 approved by ON DG order No.V-272 on 05 September 2006
    - Quality procedure VP-3-06 “Management of projects” approved by ON DG order No.V-329 on 29 November 2010
  - E24 ANSP Certification rules approved by CAA director order No. 4R-135 on 14 June 2006, Chapter IV.
    - ANSP Certification Manual approved by CAA director order No. 4R-23 on 31 January 2008 (last amendment 2009-05-13), Chapter VI.
  - E25 ANSP Certification rules approved by CAA director order No. 4R-135 on 14 June 2006 para 24
**G3-4** Safety management will be harmonised and enhanced

**FAB**

**E26** BFAB State Agreement Article 25, draft of ToRs of BFAB Safety Committee

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**G3-3** Adequate safety monitoring arrangements and procedures exist at NSA and ANSP level

**E27** On BFAB level overall safety monitoring is responsibility of the Baltic FAB Board – Agreement on establishment BFAB, Article 23 and Article 28.

**E28** NSA ToR para xx (TBD). Drafted ToR of BFAB safety committee.

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**G3-3-1** A monitoring body is designated:

| **E25** | G3-1 Baltic FAB ANSPs have SMS compliant with the regulatory requirements |
| **E26** | BFAB State Agreement Article 25, draft of ToRs of BFAB Safety Committee |

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**G3-3-2** Safety PI have been defined and performance plans established in line with regulation 691/2010:

- **E24** ANSP Ongoing Oversight Manual approved by President of Civil Aviation Office, ed. 2, 2 Feb 2012
- **E25** G3-1 Baltic FAB ANSPs have SMS compliant with the regulatory requirements
- **E26** G3-4 Safety management will be harmonised and enhanced
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FAB</th>
<th>Setting of Safety PIs is responsibility of the Baltic FAB Board – Agreement on establishment BFAB, Article 23 and Article 28.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E29</td>
<td>For the first reference period it was decided to establish Safety PIs for each provider individually. In Lithuania they were established in accordance with “Rules on establishment of Tolerable and Acceptable Safety Levels and appropriate Risk Classification Schemes” approved by CAA Director order No. 4R-309 on 6 December 2011 (Žin., 2011, 151-7136).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E30</td>
<td>Lithuania’s performance plan approved by CAA director order No. 4R-332 on 30 December 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E29</td>
<td>[Reference]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E30</td>
<td>[Reference]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G3-3-3 NSAs have adequate safety performance oversight arrangements and procedures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAB</td>
<td>Setting and monitoring PIs is a responsibility of the Baltic FAB Board – BFAB State Agreement, Article 23 and Article 28.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E31</td>
<td>BFAB NSAs Cooperation Agreement Section II and Section III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E32</td>
<td>Conditions for monitoring of safety performance in Lithuania are established in ANSP Certification rules approved by CAA director order No. 4R-135 on 14 June 2006 and “Rules on establishment of Tolerable and Acceptable Safety Levels and appropriate Risk Classification Schemes” approved by CAA Director order No. 4R-309 on 6 December 2011 (Žin., 2011, 151-7136).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E32</td>
<td>[Reference]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G3-3-4 ANSPs have adequate safety performance management arrangements and procedures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E34</td>
<td>ON DG order No.V-339 on 03 December 2010 on establishing performance KPIs and setting targets for 2010-2014. ON part in Lithuania’s performance plan approved by CAA director order No. 4R-332 on 30 December 2011.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E33</td>
<td>[Reference]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E34</td>
<td>[Reference]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.2.5  Argument 4 - Baltic FAB has established adequate arrangements and has assigned responsibilities for setting safety targets and safety oversight. (GSN Goal 4 – G4)

**Figure 10: G4 argument structure**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>G4-1 Responsibilities for safety target setting in BFAB are defined and allocated:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>FAB</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lithuania:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>E35</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Poland:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>E36</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>G4-2 Arrangements, processes and the interfaces for safety target setting are documented</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>FAB</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lithuania:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Poland:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>E37</th>
<th>Ref. Polish Performance Plan Chapter 2. National performance targets and alert thresholds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E38</td>
<td>State Safety Program Task Force has been established in CAO. One of its tasks is to develop design of methodology for establishing and monitoring of safety levels, as well as proposal for a composition of a team, which shall establish safety levels.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**G4-3 Safety Targets have been defined at State and/or FAB level:**

| FAB | Responsibilities for setting Safety Targets in Baltic FAB will be established for the second reference period as stated in Chapter 7, Article 23 of Baltic FAB Agreement. Both States will jointly ensure setting of Safety Targets. |

**Lithuania:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>E39</th>
<th>Procedure for setting of safety targets are established in “Rules on establishment of Tolerable and Acceptable Safety Levels and appropriate Risk Classification Schemes” approved by CAA Director order No. 4R-309 on 6-12-2011 (Žin., 2011, 151-7136).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E40</td>
<td>Ref. Lithuania’s Performance Plan Chapter 2. National performance targets and alert thresholds, including ON part.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Poland:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>E39</th>
<th>State Safety Program Task Force has been established in CAO. One of its tasks is to develop design of methodology for establishing and monitoring of safety levels, as well as proposal for a composition of a team which shall establish safety levels.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E40</td>
<td>Ref. Polish Performance Plan Chapter 2. National performance targets and alert thresholds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### G4-4 Safety Oversight in Baltic FAB will be provided in a coordinated manner:

**FAB**

- The responsibilities for provision of coordinated Safety oversight in Baltic FAB are defined and allocated in Baltic FAB Agreement, Chapter 6 “Supervision”. Achievement of foreseen tasks is prescribed in the BFAB NSAs Cooperation Agreement Section III “Supervision and Safety Oversight in Baltic FAB”.

**Lithuania:**

- E41 Lithuanian’s and Poland’s NSA Cooperation Agreement, Section III “Supervision and safety oversight in Baltic FAB”.

- E42 Baltic FAB Agreement, Chapter 6 “Supervision”.

**Poland:**

- E41 Lithuanian’s and Poland’s NSA Cooperation Agreement, Section III “Supervision and safety oversight in Baltic FAB”.

- E42 Baltic FAB Agreement, Chapter 6 “Supervision”.

### G4-4-2 Safety oversight arrangements are adequate and documented:

- E43 Baltic FAB Agreement, Chapter 6 “Supervision”;

- **FAB** Lithuanian’s and Poland’s NSA Cooperation Agreement, Section III “Supervision and safety oversight in Baltic FAB”.

**Lithuania:**

- E44 ANSP Certification rules approved by CAA director order No. 4R-135 on 14-06-2006.
  ANSP Certification Manual approved by CAA director order No. 4R-23 on 31-01-2008.
  “Rules on preparation of annual ANSPs safety oversight programme” approved by CAA director order No. 4R-154 on 24-07-2006.

**Poland:**
**G4-4-3** Arrangements roles and responsibilities for imposition and follow up of enforcement measures at FAB level are defined:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>E45</strong></th>
<th><strong>FAB</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FAB Agreement, Chapter 6 “Supervision”; Lithuania’s and Poland’s NSA Cooperation Agreement, Section III “Supervision and safety oversight in Baltic FAB”.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Lithuania:**

| **E46** | Code of Administrative Violations of the Republic of Lithuania para 116(4); Law on Aviation approved on 2000-10-17 No. VIII-2066 (Žin., 2000, Nr. 94-2918), Article 75; ANSP Certification rules approved by CAA director order No. 4R-135 on 14-06-2006, Chapter III, para 36-40. |

**Poland:**

| **E46** | Regulation of the Minister of Infrastructure on certification of activity in civil aviation, 6 May 2003, as amended. Regulation of the Minister of Infrastructure on control of observing provisions and decisions in civil aviation, 2-09-2003, as amended. ANSP Ongoing Oversight Manual approved by President of Civil Aviation Office, ed. 2, 2 Feb 2012 |

**G4-4-4** ANSPs have documented procedures to support proper oversight and implementation of enforcement measures.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>FAB</strong></th>
<th>Lithuania’s and Poland’s NSA and ANSP cooperation agreements.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lithuania’s and Poland’s NSA and ANSP cooperation agreements.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Poland:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>E47</strong></th>
<th>Lithuania’s and Poland’s NSA/ and ANSP cooperation agreements.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lithuania’s and Poland’s NSA/ and ANSP cooperation agreements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>E48</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.2.6 **Argument 5 - Operational changes resulting from FAB establishment and modification are subject to adequate safety assessment. (GSN Goal 5 – G5)**

![Figure 12: G5 argument structure]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>G5</th>
<th>Operational changes resulting from FAB establishment and modification are subject to adequate safety assessment:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G5-1</td>
<td>ANSPs apply documented procedures for identification and assessment of operational changes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAB E50</td>
<td>Baltic FAB Agreement; BFAB SMS Interface Document, article 3.4. List of FAB induced operational changes is under development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E50</td>
<td>According to BFAB CONOPS – no ops changes are foreseen before establishment of Baltic FAB and after in short and medium term period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E49</td>
<td>PP-SMS-04 “Aviation Incidents and Accidents Risk Assessment and Analysis Procedure”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E50</td>
<td>According to BFAB CONOPS – no ops changes are foreseen for short and medium term period.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| G5-2 | Arrangements and processes exist for safety assessment of operational changes having cross-border impact. |
| FAB | NSAs Cooperation Agreement, Article 9; |
### Lithuania:

- **E52**
  - ANSP Certification rules adopted by CAA director order No. 4R-135 on 14-06-2006, Chapter IV “Oversight of Changes”.
  - ANSP Certification Manual, Chapter VI, approved by CAA director order No. 4R-23 on 31-01-2008.
  - Drafted amendment of ON Safety procedure SP401 “ATM Safety and Risk Assessment, Analysis and Mitigation Processes Management Procedure”.

### Poland:

- **E52**
  - ANSP Ongoing Oversight Manual approved by President of Civil Aviation Office, ed. 2, 2-02-2012.
  - ANSP Certification Manual approved by President of Civil Aviation Office, ed. 2, 2-02-2012.

### G5-3 Operational changes will have been assessed and appropriate mitigation measures identified and implemented.

### FAB

- No ops changes are foreseen before establishment of Baltic FAB and after in short and medium term period. However, measures are in place and presented as E49, E51, E52.

### Lithuania: covered by E51, E52

### Poland: covered by E51, E52

- **E53**
  - N/A to date.

- **E54**
  - N/A to date.

### G5-4 Safety cases are subject to adequate endorsement and approval process.

- **FAB**
  - NSA Cooperation Agreement Article 9, BFAB SMS Interface Document, part 3.4.

- **E55**
  - NSA CC ToR

### Lithuania:

- **E56**
  - ANSP Certification rules adopted by CAA director order No. 4R-135 on 14-06-2006, Chapter IV “Oversight of Changes”.
  - ANSP Certification Manual, Chapter VI, approved by CAA director order No. 4R-23 on 31-01-2008.

- **E57**
  - Drafted amendment of ON Safety procedure SP401 “ATM Safety and Risk Assessment, Analysis and Mitigation Processes Management Procedure”.

### Poland:

- **E56**
  - ANSP Ongoing Oversight Manual approved by President of Civil Aviation Office, Ed. 2, 2-02-2012.
  - ANSP Certification Manual approved by President of Civil Aviation Office, Ed. 2, 2-02-2012.

- **E57**
7 Overall safety case conclusions

7.1 The SC has shown that all reasonable actions have been identified to ensure that the implementation of the Baltic FAB will be safe.

7.2 It has been demonstrated that:

- The safety process applied relating to the implementation of the Baltic FAB is trustworthy.
- The Safety Regulatory requirements in relation to the FABs will be met at all levels of stakeholders, including States, NSAs and ANSPs.
- The safety in the FAB will be cultivated, developed, effectively managed and overseen.
- The risks associated with the foreseen operational improvements will be lower if implemented in the framework of the FAB.
- FAB relevant ATM/ANS changes will be further assessed prior to actual implementation, on a case by case basis, in accordance with a defined and documented process.

This conclusion does not release any stakeholder from the commitment to continue applying safe practices during the further development and operational phases.
ANNEX 1

BFAB Safety Policy
BFAB SAFETY POLICY (multilevel)

Safety is the overarching objective of the Baltic FAB.

Therefore, all level of Stakeholders of Baltic FAB are committing to create an integrated and highly transparent safety chain across the total aviation system, cost-effectively delivering a common and high level of safety across Baltic FAB, generating continuous safety improvement and leading enhancement of aviation safety throughout Europe.

State level commitment:

1. Accredited respective state bodies of Poland and Lithuania both commit to ensure and keep the political decision making process between States that will ultimately provide the legal framework for the FAB institution demonstrating their political commitment to improving the performance of air navigation services using a common approach.

State NSA level commitment:

2. Both Polish CAO and Lithuanian CAA will establish harmonised, adopted standards of safety objectives and requirements in terms of safety levels, will agree on common safety performance indicators and targets (identify clear and measurable Key Performance Areas and related Performance Targets), on supervisory mechanism in common FAB area.

States ANSPs level commitments:

3. Both ANSPs have committed themselves to give the highest priority to safety over economic, organisational and social pressures.

4. While carrying out this safety policy and without prejudice to their respective organisational safety policies, PANSA and Oro Navigacija in close cooperation with each other are striving to build and keep the high matured ATM Safety Management Systems, covering the personnel, equipment and procedures.

Authorised to sign on behalf of Republic of Poland:

Authorised to sign on behalf of Republic of Lithuania:

Authorised to sign on behalf of Polish CAO:

Authorised to sign on behalf of Lithuanian CAA:

Authorised to sign on behalf of PANSA:

Authorised to sign on behalf of SE Oro Navigacija:
ANNEX 2
SAFETY PLAN (Strategy)
(FAB PRE-/IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS)