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This action is funded by the European Union

ANNEX 2

of the COMMISSION DECISION

of 1.8.2017

amending Commission Decision C(2017) 2579 of 27 April 2017 on the 2017-2018 Action Programme of the African Peace Facility in favour of the African Union Commission and allocating funds of the African Peace Facility from the 11th European Development Fund for the support to the G5 Sahel Joint Force

of the Commission Decision allocating funds of the African Peace Facility from the 11th European Development Fund for the support to the G5 Sahel Joint Force

1. Title/basic act/ CRIS number	"Support to the G5 Sahel Joint Force"			
2. Zone benefiting from the action/location	The action shall be carried out in the following locations: Niger, Mali, Chad, Mauritania, Burkina Faso			
3. Programming document	2017-2018 Action Programme of the African Peace Facility			
4. Sector of concentration/ thematic area	Peace and Security			
5. Amounts concerned	Total estimated cost: EUR 50 000 000 Initial EDF contribution: EUR 50 000 000			
6. Aid modality(ies) and implementation modality(ies)	Project Modality Indirect management with Expertise France, Delegation Agreement (PAGODA)			
7 a) DAC code(s)	15230 Participation in International Peacekeeping Operations			
b) Main Delivery Channel				
8. Markers (from CRIS DAC form)	General policy objective	Not targeted	Significant objective	Main objective
	Participation development/good governance	<input type="checkbox"/>	X	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Aid to environment	X	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

	Gender equality (including Women In Development)	X	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Trade Development	X	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Reproductive, Maternal, New born and child health	X	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	RIO Convention markers	Not targeted	Significant objective	Main objective
	Biological diversity	X	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Combat desertification	X	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Climate change mitigation	X	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Climate change adaptation	X	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
9. Global Public Goods and Challenges (GPGC) thematic flagships	N/A			
10. Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)	SDG 16: Promote just, peaceful and inclusive societies			

SUMMARY

In order to address the increasingly deteriorating security situation in the Sahel region, notably in Central Mali and in the northern areas of Burkina Faso, Heads of States of the G5 Sahel countries decided on 7 February 2017 to establish a G5 Sahel Joint Force. The Concept of Operations (CONOPS) of the Joint Force was validated by the G5 Sahel Chiefs of Staff in Bamako on 8 March 2017 and endorsed by the African Union Peace and Security Council (AU PSC) on 3 April 2017.

The CONOPS mandates the force to " (i) combat terrorism, drug trafficking and human trafficking in order to create a secure environment by eradicating the actions of terrorist armed groups and other organized criminal groups; (ii) contribute to the restoration of state authority and the return of displaced persons and refugees; (iii) facilitate humanitarian operations and the delivery of aid to the affected populations and (iv) contribute to the implementation of development actions in the space of the G5 Sahel"¹.

The G5 Sahel Joint Force will be composed of 5000 units, including 91 gendarmes and policemen. Its area of operations covers a border strip of 50 km on each side of the five countries' borders, in three zones of the G5 Sahel (West, Centre and East). The first cross-border operations are expected to start in autumn 2017 in the central zone, which is understood to be a priority for the G5 Sahel countries.

While the force is partially deployed in the sense that the national contingents composing it are already engaged in the area of operation, it lacks the necessary command and communication structure, tactical transport equipment, protective infrastructures and logistics to sedentarize the already mobilized battalions and make the cross-border operations permanent within the framework of the joint force.

This action will contribute to restore a safe and secure environment in the areas affected by armed terrorist groups and organized criminal groups by addressing the priority needs of the joint force, therefore enabling its deployment and operationalization. By providing key infrastructures, transport and communication assets as well as logistic and protection capacities to the G5 Sahel Joint force, the action will put the joint force central command in a position to coordinate operations among operational battalions in their respective area of operation. This should in turn prevent armed terrorist groups and criminal organizations from taking advantage of their ability

1. CONTEXT

1.1. Regional Context

Since the beginning of the 1990s, the Sahel is confronted with a surge of armed terrorist groups and a constant increase of transnational organized crime activities as well as armed banditry. The insecurity generated by these correlated developments has been exacerbated by the 2011 Libyan crisis, which induced new armed groups and terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), Boko Haram, Ansar al-Islam and Jamaat Nosrat al-Islam. The deteriorating situation of the region has culminated into the occupation of the northern part of Mali in 2012. The interventions of the French-led operation Serval and of the ECOWAS forces (and Chad), in support of the Malian army, ended this occupation and considerably reduced the influence of armed terrorist groups. The subsequent deployment of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), coupled with the actions undertaken by the French-led operation Barkhane, successor of operation Serval and commenced in August 2014, and the armies of the G5 Sahel countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, Mali and Niger) contributed to the partial dismantling of the armed terrorist groups.

In reaction, terrorist armed groups changed their modes of operations and continued to thrive, sustaining insecurity in the region. As a matter of illustration, during 2016 and for the sole Liptako Gourma area (at the borders between Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso), 27 terrorist attacks have been registered, leading to 114 deaths and more than 200 wounded, coupled with important material damage.

The main objective of these armed terrorist groups in the Sahel is to seize power from democratic institutions. Against the governments of the G5 Sahel countries, they engage in attacks against the positions held by defence and security forces as well as against infrastructures and governmental symbols to discredit the state in the eyes of the population and the international community. Building on their ethnic and socio-cultural ties with the poor and uneducated populations of the region, they feed nationalistic claims that undermine the social fabric of these countries. When resistance to their ideology is encountered, they use violence as a means of intimidation, taking populations hostage in clear violation of basic human rights.

Entertaining politico-ideological ties with international terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and the Islamic State, they benefit from logistic and financial support that allows them to engage in transnational organized crime, including drug

trafficking and human smuggling, hence reinforcing their nuisance capacity. The interconnections between the armed terrorist groups, the porosity of borders as well as the weak capacities of states, make the border areas of the Sahel a playing field for armed groups and other criminal groups despite the presence of numerous military operations.

In order to respond to the above threats and in light of the increasingly deteriorating security situation in the region, notably in Central Mali and in the northern areas of Burkina Faso, Heads of States of the G5 Sahel countries decided on 7 February 2017, at the third Summit of the G5 Sahel in Bamako, to establish a G5 Sahel joint force, in line with the declarations already made in December 2015 at the second N'Djamena G5 Sahel Summit. The objective of such an initiative is to mutualize G5 Sahel member states' efforts in the fight against common security threats, with the view of ensuring a favourable environment for the socio-economic development of the region.

The concept of operations (CONOPS) of the joint force was validated by the G5 Sahel Chiefs of Staffs in Bamako on 8 March 2017 and endorsed by the African Union Peace and Security Council (AU PSC) on 3 April 2017.

The CONOPS foresees that the joint force will be composed of 5000 units, including 91 gendarmes and policemen and will be mandated to:

- fight terrorism, drug trafficking and human trafficking in view of creating a secured environment, free of armed terrorist groups and criminal groups, in order to restore peace and security in conformity with international law;
- contribute to the re-establishment of state authority and to the return of displaced persons and refugees;
- facilitate, within the limits of its capacities, humanitarian operations and the delivery of aid to affected populations;
- contribute to the implementation of development actions in the Sahel.

The area of operations covers a border strip of 50 km on each side of the five countries' borders, in three zones of the G5 Sahel (West – border between Mauritania and Mali, Centre – border area between Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, and East – border between Niger and Chad) on which seven battalions will be deployed. Each contingent of the force intervenes on its own territory but in coordination with the other contingents across the border when necessary.

The conduct of the first cross-border operations within the framework of the G5 Sahel joint force is expected to start in autumn 2017.

1.1.1. Public policy assessment and EU policy framework

The G5 Sahel joint force intervenes within the wider framework of the G5 Sahel Security and Development strategy, revolving around four strategic axes, including defence and security.¹ The latter aims to reinforce the security of persons and properties and to "combat terrorism, organized crime, smuggling and illegal migration in respect of human rights"². These are all objectives reflected in the adopted CONOPS.

¹ The three other strategic axes being (i) governance; (ii) infrastructure; (iii) resilience and human development. *Stratégie pour le développement et la sécurité des pays du G5 Sahel*, September 2016.

² *Stratégie pour le développement et la sécurité des pays du G5 Sahel*, September 2016, p.22.

The EU is firmly engaged to support the G5 Sahel in its efforts. The main reference strategic documents in this regard are the EU Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel³ (2011, extended in 2014 to Burkina Faso and Chad, thus reflecting the composition of the G5 Sahel), the Sahel Regional Action Plan (RAP), adopted in April 2015⁴ and reviewed and updated in June 2016⁵. The RAP has fast-tracked the implementation of the strategy by identifying actions and initiatives for years to come, in coordination with Member States' activities, and now constitutes the main framework for the EU's action in the Sahel region. The four priorities of the RAP are (i) the prevention and countering of radicalisation; (ii) the creation of appropriate conditions for youth; (iii) migration and mobility as well as (iv) border management, fight against illicit trafficking and transnational organized crime. The EU support to the joint force is thus in aligned to the priorities of the RAP.

Such documents are complemented by the EU-G5 Sahel Roadmap, adopted at the N'Djamena Summit in November 2015, which identifies areas of cooperation between the EU and the G5, namely security, border management, the fight against terrorism, organised crime and illicit traffics; migration and mobility; and the prevention and fight against violent extremism.

The G5 Joint Force will operate in countries where three Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions are-deployed (EUTM Mali, EUCAP Sahel Mali and EUCAP Sahel Niger) which are already (EUTM) or will be (two EUCAPs) supporting the building up of the Joint Force, in full respect of their mandate and within means and capabilities. The current process of regionalisation of the CSDP missions in the Sahel could also be an opportunity. Moreover, the G5 battalions will operate in close coordination with the French Barkhane operation and, when necessary, with its support.

At the Continental level, the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES), adopted in Lisbon in 2007⁶, defined peace and security as one of the eight areas of partnership (the Africa-EU Peace and Security Partnership). The intent of the partnership is to support “African solutions for African problems”. The JAES and its successive Action Plans were renewed at the third Africa-EU Summit in Tripoli in 2010. The fourth Africa-EU Summit held in Brussels in April 2014 adopted the Roadmap 2014-2017⁷, which refocused the implementation of the JAES on five priority areas, including peace and security.

The African Peace Facility⁸ is the main tool for implementing the Africa-EU Peace and Security Cooperation. This cooperation consists of the following three inter-linked priorities:

- Enhanced dialogue on challenges to peace and security;
- Operationalisation of the African Peace Security Architecture (APSA);
- Support to Peace Support Operations (PSOs) in Africa.

³ European External Action Service Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel, http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/africa/docs/sahel_strategy_en.pdf

⁴ Council Conclusions on the Sahel Regional Action Plan 2015-2020 (7823/15), <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/fr/press/press-releases/2015/04/20-council-conclusions-sahel-regional-plan/>

⁵ Council Conclusions on the Sahel (10393/16), <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/06/20-fac-sahel-conclusions/>

⁶ http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/97496.pdf

⁷ <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2014/04/pdf/fourth-eu-africa-summit-roadmap-2014-2017/>

⁸ http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/africa/continental-cooperation/african-peace-facility_en

The APF is a pan-African instrument by nature. Undertakings at national levels (e.g. training and funding of purely national actors) are not eligible for funding. Instead, the financial support must be requested by and provided to the AU and/or RECs/RMs or sub-regional organisations carrying out a peace and security operation with an AU PSC mandate. In the latter case, the request emanating from the sub-regional organization must be endorsed by the AU before being submitted to the European Commission.

The present action falls within the scope of the APF since it supports a Peace Support Operation mandated by the African Union Peace and Security Council and implemented by a multinational force (the G5 Joint Force). A G5 Sahel request to support the G5 Sahel Joint Force was received by the European Commission on 5 June 2017. The AUC endorsement of this request was received by the European Commission on 15 June 2017.

The PSC found the principle of providing support to the G5 Sahel Joint Force through the APF politically appropriate on 01 June 2017.

1.1.2. Stakeholder analysis

G5 Sahel: The current Chairman of the G5 Sahel (represented by Mali until February 2018) ensures the control of the G5 Sahel Joint Force at the political level, while the Defence and Security Committee of the G5 Sahel (gathering the Chiefs of Staff of the five member states) ensures its strategic control.

The Joint Force: The force has only a military component. At the operational level, the force will operate under the authority of a Force commander, within the framework of centralized command and control structure, with the headquarters based in Mopti/Sévaré (Mali) and three command posts positioned in each zones of the area of operation (West, Centre, East).

Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs): Mali, Niger, Chad, Mauritania, Burkina Faso. The TCCs are responsible for the generation and transfer under the authority of the Force Commander of their battalions; they equip, deploy and sustain their contingents in the mission area with the additional support provided by external partners under the umbrella of the G5.

AU PSC: Being the primary Peace and Security body for the AU, it provides political and policy guidance to the AUC. It is also AU's link to the UN Security Council (UNSC). It is responsible for authorising the mission and renewal or liquidation of a mission's mandate. It meets on a regular basis, taking stock of a report from AUC Chairperson, prepared by the Peace and Security Department (PSD).

United Nations: The United Nations, through its mission in Mali could potentially support the force within the framework of the renewal of the MINUSMA mandate in June. As it stands, the mandate of the MINUSMA focusses on key tasks related to the implementation of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali; good offices and reconciliation.

EU Member States: France might provide operational support to the force through operation Barkhane as well as training and mentoring combined with bilateral in-kind support to some of the battalions composing the force. Germany might provide in-kind support and training to the Nigerien battalion. Other EU Member States (Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Denmark and Czech Republic) have already expressed their interest in supporting the G5 joint force, but without having yet identified the nature of their support.

1.1.3. Priority areas for support/problem analysis

The serious degradation of the security situation of the central zone of the Sahel and more particularly the centre of Mali (Mopti-Gao axis) and the north of Burkina Faso calls for an urgent intervention. The risk of a wider destabilisation of Mali and by extension of the Sahel exists.

While the decision of the G5 heads of state to create a joint force proves their awareness of the urgency of the situation and their willingness to work together against transnational threats, a number of challenges will need to be tackled to ensure a positive outcome to the intervention of the joint force.

The most urging one is related to the ability of the force to deploy itself and function in a coherent way to conduct its first cross-border operations in autumn 2017. To that end and fulfilling its role of triggering actor, the EU will focus its intervention on:

- supporting the command structures of the force – i.e. rehabilitation and support to the functioning of the force headquarter in Mopti/Sévaré and the three command posts in their respective zones as well as setting up of a communication network linking units of a given zone to their command post and the headquarters;
- supporting the force's means of operation – i.e. tactical aerial and terrestrial mobility; ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance); casualty evacuation as well as counter-IED equipment;
- supporting the settling of battalions in the area of operation – i.e. infrastructures (renovation of existing infrastructures or constructions of canvas camps, wells, etc.) and equipment (canvas, furniture, mobile kitchens, mobile showers, generators, etc.).

2. RISKS AND ASSUMPTIONS

Risks	Risk level (H/M/L)	Mitigating measures
1. Goods, services and works not delivered in time to enable the deployment of the force;	High	Contracting of an experienced implementing partner, already present in the area.
2. Insufficient funding to cover the full costs of the operation;	Medium	Political effort to rapidly set up a donor conference and secure pledges by other international partners. Political will by TCCs to cover part of the costs.
3. Human Rights violations by G5 Joint Force troops.	Medium	Establishment of mitigating measures designed to implement HR provisions of the CONOPS.
Assumptions		
Continuous commitment of the G5 countries to cooperate within the framework of the G5 Sahel joint force.		
Continuous in-kind and advisory support to the force by EU MS already engaged in the area of operation – i.e. French-led operation Barkhane and the EU through its CSDP missions.		

3. LESSONS LEARNT, COMPLEMENTARITY AND CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES

3.1. Lessons learnt

The African Union has a specific mandate to lead the implementation of peace and security operations in Africa. For the past years, it has gained considerable experience in doing so through the management of a number of PSOs such as AMISOM or MISCA.

In spite of the above, the evaluation of the APF, concluded in 2013, highlighted organisational weaknesses in the AU as one of the reasons constraining timely funding and implementation of PSOs. The AU has presently an appropriate system to manage PSOs the costs of which mostly consist on the payment of troop allowances (AMISOM). However, it has struggled to deliver in time when the support to be provided consisted on services, goods and works. A case in point is the APF action in support to the Multi National Joint Task Force against Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin area, for which no equipment/service has been delivered by the AUC 10 months after that the EU disbursed the first payment for the action.

Taking the above into account and in view of urgent need to support the G5 Sahel Joint Force in order to halt the rapid deterioration of the security situation in central Mali, the AU requests the procurement of goods, works and services under the present action to be managed by a third operator contracted by the EU Commission. Expertise France the identified organization is already implementing a programme funded by the EU Trust Fund⁹ for Africa in Mali and has also been contracted by the UN mission in that country to perform tasks similar to the ones it will have to deliver for the benefit of the G5 joint force. It therefore has a setup in place that will allow it to deliver the support required in spite of an extremely difficult security environment.

3.2. Complementarity, synergy and donor coordination

Given the diversity of challenges in the zone, it is essential for the G5 Sahel joint force to be part of an integrated strategy enabling the return of the state in the region and the satisfaction of the population needs, allowing the military intervention to be efficient and limited in time.

The EU support provided by the APF to the G5 joint force will therefore be part of an integrated approach, mobilizing a number of external cooperation instruments and tools such as CSDP missions, the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) in last resort as well as the EU Trust Fund for Africa.

CSDP missions in the Sahel should in the short run provide training to the staff officers of G5 countries that will integrate the command structures and advice to the Malian presidency of the G5 to plan the deployment of the force and the identification of priority needs. In the medium-term and within the framework of strategic reviews to be approved by EU MS, CSDP missions could provide further advice to the military staffs and battalions leadership deployed as well as further specialized training to relevant military units. Such trainings could be further included in the regional plan of CSDP in the Sahel, once approved by EU Member States.

⁹ https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/africa/eu-emergency-trust-fund-africa_en

In line with the intervention strategy and operational framework of the EU Trust Fund for Africa (Sahel and Lake Chad window) a number of actions have been approved already and currently are at the first stages of implementation in the area of operation of the G5 Sahel Joint Force, particularly in the central zone. As a whole, the EU Trust Fund integrated approach aims to accompany the return of state institutions in the three-borders zones (Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger), support the resilience and food security of the most vulnerable populations, support local authorities and the delivery of basic services, reinforce the capacity of internal security forces as well as prevent radicalization and violent extremism.

The most relevant actions in the security domain are currently in their formulation phase and include:

- Mali: PARSEC (Programme d'Appui au Renforcement de la Sécurité dans les régions de Mopti et de Gao et à la gestion des zones frontalières, EUR 29 000 000, implemented by Expertise France (and GIZ)) which supports the Malian government in re-establishing adequate security conditions in the centre and along the borders with Niger and Burkina Faso, including via strengthening the capacities of its internal security forces.
- Burkina Faso: ProGEF, (Programme Gestion Intégrée des Espaces Frontaliers au Burkina Faso, EUR 25 000 000, implemented by GIZ (and Expertise France)) which aims to i) enhance national legal frameworks for a more effective border management; ii) strengthen the capacities of relevant actors (internal security forces, etc.); iii) encourage the socio-economic development of the communities living in border areas.
- Niger: AJUSEN (Appui à la Justice, Sécurité et à la Gestion des Frontières au Niger, EUR 30 000 000, budget support + technical assistance) supports Niger in developing and implementing robust policies in the field of security, justice, migration and border management.
- G5 Sahel Member States + Senegal: GAR-SI (Groupes d'Action Rapide – Surveillance et Intervention, EUR 41 600 000, implemented by FIIAPP with expertise from gendarmeries of ES, FR, PT and IT), supports the establishment of Rapid Action Groups in the G5 Sahel countries and Senegal to ensure better control of national territories and borders and therefore tackle the threats posed by traffickers and terrorist groups.

All these actions will be articulated with the deployment of the G5 Sahel Joint Force. In particular, components of some of them –i.e. GARSI and PARSEC – can be reoriented from a geographical of operational standpoint to create a favourable environment for the deployment of the Joint Force.

The action will also complement the Regional Indicative Program (RIP) for West Africa¹⁰, signed with ECOWAS, of which several G5 member states are part and which provides funding for the implementation of the ECOWAS strategy for the Sahel.

The EU will also complement efforts being made by EU Member States and international partners. France has developed a support plan to assist the G5 Sahel joint force, which will combine (i) an operational support to the force through Barkhane; (ii) training and operational preparation of the force's general staff and the battalions that will compose it as well as (iii) provision of equipment through the delivery of tactical mobility means, the renovation of the

¹⁰ European Union – West Africa Regional Indicative Programme 2014-2020, https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/eeas-2015-rip-west-africa_en.pdf

Niamey command post and the setting up of a communication network between that command post, the force's HQ and the three battalions operating in the central zone. Germany's support will focus on (i) the delivery of tactical mobility equipment to the Nigerien contingent and on (ii) the rehabilitation of the Niamey airport as well as (iii) training support to the war school of Nouakchott.

The EU support will finally be complementary to other international partners' efforts (US, CANADA, UN for example) that still need to be identified.

While the EU intends to provide the impulsion allowing the joint force to deploy, it doesn't intend to be the sole contributor. A real effort of coordination with other partners will be made in order to ensure the predictability and sustainability of financing to the joint force.

3.3. Cross-cutting issues

The CONOPS includes provisions for four cross-cutting issues:

- *Humanitarian liaison*: the G5 Sahel joint force will facilitate humanitarian actors' access to the zones requiring urgent humanitarian assistance;
- *Protection of civilians*: the contingents of the joint force will ensure the respect of human rights as well as the application of humanitarian international law principles, in particular the protection of civilians, with specific attention to women and children;
- *Gender*: the G5 Sahel joint force will ensure that appropriate mechanisms are set up to investigate and prosecute cases of sexual exploitation and abuses, and will elaborate reports on mitigating measures implemented on a regular basis. It will also work in coordination with humanitarian organisations to facilitate support to the victims of armed terrorist groups;
- *Conduct and discipline*: the G5 Sahel joint force will set up a framework allowing it to ensure that its troops are conducting themselves professionally and respect international humanitarian laws, laws of armed conflicts as well as local customs, and laws compliant with international law.

4. DESCRIPTION OF THE ACTION

4.1. Objectives/results

The overall objective of the action is to contribute to the re-establishment of effective state control over areas affected by armed terrorist groups and criminal groups in order to create favourable conditions for the socio-economic development of the G5 Sahel region.

The specific objective of the action is to support the G5 Sahel joint force to effectively conduct joint multinational operations in the Area of Operations (AO) in order to ensure the redeployment of the state and to restore a safe and secure environment enabling the socio-economic development of the region.

The results of the action will be:

1. The G5 Sahel joint force headquarters and the three command posts are adequately manned and equipped to perform the duties assigned by the CONOPS.
2. The G5 Sahel joint force has the means to conduct the operations specified in the CONOPS

4.2. Main activities

In relation to result 1: "The G5 Sahel joint force headquarters and the three command posts are adequately manned and equipped to perform the duties assigned by the CONOPS".

1.1. Rehabilitating and supporting a functional headquarters in Sevaré for 90 staff and support staff as well as rehabilitating and supporting the command posts in their respective zones (West, Centre, and East) for 30 staff and support staff. This will include the renovation of infrastructures, the provision of equipment but also the covering of functioning costs of the HQ and PCs.

1.2. Establish a strategic communication link between the force's headquarter, the three command posts, the battalions and their companies.

In relation to result 2:" The G5 Sahel joint force has the means to conduct the operations specified in the CONOPS".

2.1. Providing ground transportation equipment at the force level.

2.2. Facilitate casualty evacuation through the provision of a CASEVAC service.

2.3. Providing small counter-IED equipment at the force level.

2.4. Building or renovating forward operational bases in the area of operation.

4.3. Intervention logic

This action will contribute to restoring a safe and secure environment in the areas affected by armed terrorist groups and organized criminal groups by addressing the priority needs of the joint force, enabling its deployment. By providing key infrastructures, transport and communication assets as well as logistic and protection capacities to the G5 Sahel Joint force, the action will put the joint force central command in a position to command and control operations among operational battalions in their respective areas of operation. This should in turn prevent armed terrorist groups and criminal organizations from taking advantage of their ability to uncontrolledly move across borders when fighting uncoordinated trans-border operations by any of the TCCs.

5. IMPLEMENTATION

5.1. Indicative implementation period

The indicative operational implementation period of this action, during which the activities described in section 4.2 will be carried out and the corresponding contracts and agreements implemented is 18 months from the date of adoption of the amendment 1 to the Action Programme 2017-2018 of the African Peace Facility.

5.2. Implementation modalities

5.2.1. Indirect management with a member state agency – Expertise France

This action will be implemented in indirect management with Expertise France in accordance with Article 58(1)(c) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 applicable in accordance with Article 17 of Regulation (EU) No 323/2015. This implementation entails the delivery of goods, services and works to the G5 Sahel Joint Force by Expertise France. This implementation is justified because of the particular capacity of Expertise France to operate in the highly insecure environment prevalent in the area of intervention – Expertise France is currently implementing the PARSEC programme under the EU Trust Fund for Africa and is currently delivering similar type of services to MINUSMA.

While the African Union has a specific mandate to lead the implementation of peace and security operations in Africa, it has requested the support to the G5 Sahel Joint Force to be managed by/through the European Union, as it lacks sufficient capacity to procure and deliver goods, services, and works to the G5 Sahel Joint Force with the urgency required to address the rapid deterioration of the security situation in the targeted area.

Expertise France will carry out the following budget-implementation tasks: managing and enforcing contracts, procurements, making payments, accepting and respecting agreed deliverables, enforcing checks and controls and recovering funds unduly paid.

5.3. Scope of geographical eligibility for procurement and grants

The geographical eligibility in terms of place of establishment for participating in procurement and grant award procedures and in terms of origin of supplies purchased as established in the basic act and set out in the relevant contractual documents shall apply.

The Commission’s authorising officer responsible may extend the geographical eligibility in accordance with Article 22(1)(b) of Annex IV to the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement on the basis of urgency or of unavailability of products and services in the markets of the countries concerned, or in other duly substantiated cases where the eligibility rules would make the realisation of this action impossible or exceedingly difficult.

5.4. Indicative budget

This funding is requested to meet the G5 Sahel requirements to support the joint force. The activities related to both the expected results of the action will be implemented through a Delegation Agreement (PAGODA) with Expertise France.

	EU contribution (amount in EUR)	Indicative third party contribution (Amount in EUR)
1. Delegation Agreement (PAGODA) with Expertise France.	50 000 000	
Total	50 000 000	

5.5. Organisational set-up and responsibilities

Expertise France is responsible for the implementation of the Action. Expertise France will ensure the procurement and delivery of the required resources to the G5 Sahel Joint Force and report to the G5 and to the European Commission.

The concrete and detailed organisational set-up will be described in Annex I to the Delegation Agreement (PAGODA) with Expertise France

5.6. Performance monitoring and reporting

The day-to-day technical and financial monitoring of the implementation of this action will be a continuous process and part of the implementing partner's responsibilities. To this end, the implementing partner shall establish a permanent internal, technical and financial monitoring system for the action and elaborate regular progress reports (not less than annual) and final reports. Every report shall provide an accurate account of implementation of the action, difficulties encountered, changes introduced, as well as the degree of achievement of its results (outputs and direct outcomes) as measured by corresponding indicators, using as reference the logframe matrix. The report shall be laid out in such a way as to allow monitoring of the means envisaged and employed and of the budget details for the action. The final report, narrative and financial, will cover the entire period of the action implementation.

The Commission may undertake additional project monitoring visits both through its own staff and through independent consultants recruited directly by the Commission for independent monitoring reviews (or recruited by the responsible agent contracted by the Commission for implementing such reviews).

5.7. Evaluation

Bearing in mind that an external evaluation of the African Peace Facility was carried out in 2013 and that a new external evaluation is currently ongoing, a final evaluation is not foreseen for this action or its components. The Commission may, during implementation, decide to undertake such an evaluation for duly justified reasons either on its own decision or on the initiative of the partner. The financing of such an evaluation shall be covered by another measure constituting a financing decision.

The evaluation reports shall be shared with the partner countries and other key stakeholders. The implementing partner and the Commission shall analyse the conclusions and recommendations of the evaluations and, where appropriate, in agreement with the partner countries, jointly decide on the follow-up actions to be taken and any adjustments necessary, including, if indicated, the reorientation of the project.

5.8. Audit

Without prejudice to the obligations applicable to contracts concluded for the implementation of this action, the Commission may, on the basis of a risk assessment, contract independent audits or expenditure verification assignments for one or several contracts or agreements.

As for all the actions financed by the African Peace Facility (APF), the Commission will conduct an external financial audit of the operation after the action has been completed to verify the eligibility of the costs incurred and financial and administrative management of procedures put in place for the implementation of the action.

The financing of the audit shall be covered by another measure constituting a financing decision.

5.9. Communication and visibility

Communication and visibility of the EU is a legal obligation for all external actions funded by the EU.

This action shall contain communication and visibility measures which shall be based on a specific Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action. The implementing partner shall provide a Communication and Visibility Plan, within one month of the signature of the contract.

In terms of legal obligations on communication and visibility, the measures shall be implemented by the Commission, the partner country, contractors, grant beneficiaries and/or entrusted entities. Appropriate contractual obligations shall be included in, respectively, the financing agreement, procurement and grant contracts, and delegation agreements.

The Communication and Visibility Manual for European Union External Action shall be used to establish the Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action and the appropriate contractual obligations. Confidentiality of some of the outputs and activities might lead to specific arrangements restricting their circulation and information thereon.

APPENDIX - INDICATIVE LOGFRAME MATRIX

The activities, expected outputs and all the indicators, targets and baselines included in the logframe matrix are indicative and may be updated during the implementation of the action without an amendment to the financing decision. When it is not possible to determine the outputs of an action at formulation stage, intermediary outcomes should be presented and the outputs defined during inception of the overall programme and its components. The indicative logframe matrix will evolve during the lifetime of the action: new lines will be added for listing the activities as well as new columns for intermediary targets (milestones) for the output and outcome indicators when it is relevant for monitoring and reporting purposes. Note also that indicators should be disaggregated by sex whenever relevant.

	Intervention logic	Indicators	Baselines	Targets	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions
Overall objective	Contribute to the re-establishment of effective state control over areas affected by armed terrorist groups and criminal groups in order to create favourable conditions for the socio-economic development of the G5 Sahel region.	(a) Number of terrorist attacks (b) Number of seizures deriving from illicit trafficking conducted by the Joint Force	27 registered terrorist attacks in the Liptako-Gourma area in 2016	10 % decrease in terrorist attacks by December 2018 Number of seizures to be determined during contractualization phase (talks with	Expertise France reports, G5 JF reports.	Authority to conduct operations effectively transferred to Force Commander by TCCs

		(c) Number of civilians wounded or killed by armed groups in the AO		G5 JF). 30% decreased in civilians wounded or killed by armed groups in the AO		
		(d) Number of weapons from terrorist/criminal groups seized by the Joint Force		500 weapons seized by end 2018		
Specific objectives	Support the G5 Sahel joint force to effectively conduct joint multinational operations in the Area of Operations (AO) in order to ensure the redeployment of the state and to restore a safe and secure environment enabling the socio economic development of the	(a) Number of troops effectively and jointly deployed in the AO	None as of May 2017	5000 troops effectively deployed in the AO	Expertise France reports, G5 JF reports	No national chain of command interferes with the work of the Joint Force Command.
		(b) Number of cross-border operations conducted	None as of May 2017	Number to be determined during the		

	region.			contractualization phase (talks with G5 JF)		
Outputs	1. The G5 Sahel joint force headquarters and the three command posts are adequately manned and equipped to perform the duties assigned by the CONOPS".	(a) Number of command posts renovated/operationalized (including communication network.)	None as of May 2017	1 HQ and 3 PCs renovated/operationalized (including communication network)	Expertise France reports	Expertise France able to timely deliver assets to the Joint Force.
		(b) Number of staff deployed in HQ and PCs	None as of May 2017	90 staff and support staff deployed in HQ, 30 staff and support staff deployed in PCs		
	2. The G5 Sahel joint force has the means to conduct the operations specified in the	(a) Number of ground equipment delivered to the force.	None as of May 2017	Number of pick-ups, ambulances, repair trucks delivered to		

	CONOPS			the joint force to be determined during the contractualization of the operator.		
		(b) number of CASEVAC conducted with the CASEVAC service provided by the EU	None as of May 2017	50 CASEVAC conducted		
		(c) Number of counter IED equipment provided to the force	None as of May 2017	Number of small counter IED equipment delivered to the force to be determined during the contractualization of the		

		(d) Number of forward operational bases build or renovated in the area of operation	None as of May 2017	operator. Number of forward operational bases build or renovated in the area of operation to be determined during the contractualization of the operator.		
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