

Efficient, Fair and Simple: An Integrated System of Income Taxes and Social Security Contributions in Germany

Max Löffler Andreas Peichl Nico Pestel
Hilmar Schneider Sebastian Sieglöch

Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Brussels, November 21, 2012

Recent Policy Debate I

- Germany implemented several major policy reforms in the early 2000s
 - ▶ Income tax system (tax base and schedule, “Tax Reform 2000”)
 - ▶ Labor market policy (“Hartz I, II and III”)
 - ▶ Unemployment and social assistance (“Hartz IV”)
- However, ongoing debate on the need for further reforms
 - ▶ Income taxation is too complex and insufficiently transparent
 - ▶ High tax burdens for middle income earners
 - ▶ Negative work incentives for secondary earners
- Similar problems in other European countries.

Recent Policy Debate II

- Several proposed policy reforms (mainly concentrated on tax schedule)
- But: Conflicting goals
 - ▶ Positive employment effects (higher employment rate)
 - ▶ Positive distributional effects (lower income inequality)
 - ▶ Neutral or positive budget effects (no revenue losses)
- None of the proposals met all of these goals.
- Main problem: Most reform proposals neglect the importance of social security contributions and the interaction between SSC and income taxation in Germany.

Reform Proposal

- Much broader definition of income (e.g., we reduce tax deductions and include capital income, pensions and imputed rents of owner-occupied housing).
- Individual instead of joint taxation for married couples.
- Integration of social security contributions into the income tax system.
 - ▶ Will possibly create new entitlements to benefits.
 - ▶ We address this issue in “Variante 2”.
- Benefit rules, transfer payments and corporate taxes remain unchanged.


Tax Schedule

Household Income	Marginal Tax Rates	
	Variante 1	Variante 2*
0 EUR ... 20,000 EUR	25 %	30 %
20,000 EUR ... 30,000 EUR	30 %	35 %
30,000 EUR ... 40,000 EUR	40 %	45 %
40,000 EUR ... 60,000 EUR	50 %	55 %
60,000 EUR ...	60 %	65 %

* Higher revenue for potential additional benefit entitlements.


- But: Non-deductible tax credit of 10,000 EUR and 2,000 EUR tax allowance for wage earnings.

Marginal tax rate single



Note: Cut-off at 80%.

Average tax rate single



Public Revenue (in billion €)

	Variante 1			Variante 2		
	Morning After	Labor Supply	Labor Demand	Morning After	Labor Supply	Labor Demand
Taxes	160.5	157.6	157.0	208.8	203.4	202.9
SSC	-155.2	-152.5	-153.4	-155.2	-153.2	-154.0
Transfers	-0.6	1.9	1.0	-0.8	1.4	0.7
Total	4.1	6.5	4.1	52.1	51.0	49.0

Source: Own Calculations with IZAΨMOD.

Labor Supply and Employment

	Variante 1		Variante 2	
	Labor Supply	Labor Demand	Labor Supply	Labor Demand
Full-time equivalents (in 1,000)	837.4	525.5	672.0	422.9
Participation (in 1,000)	771.2	497.0	755.6	537.5
Participation rate (in %-points)	2.1	1.3	2.0	1.4

Source: Own Calculations with IZAΨMOD.

Distributional Effects (in %-points) I

	Relative to mean income			Difference	
	Status quo	Var. 1	Var. 2	Var. 1	Var. 2
Poorest 10 %	40.2	41.5	43.1	1.3	2.8
Decile 2	51.1	52.5	54.2	1.4	3.1
Decile 3	60.2	62.7	64.1	2.5	3.8
Decile 4	70.2	72.9	73.9	2.7	3.7
Decile 5	79.5	82.8	83.7	3.3	4.3
Decile 6	91.0	95.1	95.8	4.1	4.9
Decile 7	104.4	110.2	110.5	5.8	6.1
Decile 8	120.8	125.0	124.9	4.2	4.1
Decile 9	145.1	146.7	145.5	1.6	0.4
Richest 10 %	246.8	219.7	213.0	-27.1	-33.8


Source: Own Calculations with IZAΨMOD.

Conclusion

- There is a need for further reforms in Germany. But: Not only with respect to the tax schedule.
- We propose a comprehensive reform and an integrated system of income taxation and social security contributions, which meets all three goals:
 - ▶ Higher Employment
 - ▶ Lower income inequality
 - ▶ Neutral effect on public revenues
- However:
 - ▶ Huge reform
 - ▶ Marginal tax rates above 50 %?
 - ▶ Proposal shows the direction

Marginal tax rate couple with two children


Only one earner



Note: Cut-off at 80%.

Average tax rate couple with two children

Only one earner



Distributional Effects II

	Income Inequality			Difference	
	Status quo	Var. 1	Var. 2	Var. 1	Var. 2
Gini	0.300	0.285	0.275	-0.015	-0.025
P90/P10	3.531	3.570	3.391	0.040	-0.140
P90/P50	1.938	1.907	1.862	-0.031	-0.076
P50/P10	1.822	1.872	1.821	0.051	-0.001

Source: Own Calculations with IZAΨMOD.