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Social Impact of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Central and Eastern Europe

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**Authors: Marek Okólski
Irena Topińska**

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Contents

Abbreviations and acronyms	2
1. Socio-economic and political overview	3
2. Main emigration and internal migration trends and patterns	4
2.1. Main emigration trends	4
2.2. Main internal migration trends.....	7
2.3. Main characteristics of migrants.....	8
3. Nation-wide labour market and social development trends under the influence of emigration	10
3.1. Economic and labour market developments	10
3.2. Social security	13
3.3. Poverty and social exclusion.....	17
4. Labour market and social development trends in net migration loss / gain regions.....	20
4.1. Identification of net migration loss/gain regions.....	20
4.2. Labour market development in net migration loss/gain regions.....	21
4.3. Poverty and social exclusion in net migration loss / gain regions	23
5. Impact of migration on vulnerable groups	25
5.1. Women.....	25
5.2. Children	26
5.3. Elderly	27
5.4. Roma.....	28
5.5. Other ethnic and religious vulnerable communities.....	28
6. Policy responses	29
6.1. Encouragement of circular migration	29
6.2. Encouragement of return migration and support of integration of returnees.....	31
6.3. Support of the development of net migration loss/gain regions	33
6.4. Support to vulnerable groups related to migration.....	34
6.5. Best practice examples of policy responses	35
7. Key challenges and policy suggestions.....	36
7. 1. Key challenges of the social impact of emigration and internal migration.....	36
7. 2. Policies to be taken by different actors.....	37
References.....	39
Statistical Annex	45

Abbreviations and acronyms

BAEL	Badanie Aktywności Ekonomicznej Ludności [Labour Force Survey, LFS]
BDL	Bank Danych Lokalnych [Local Data Bank] of the Central Statistical Office
CSIOZ	Centrum Systemów Informacyjnych Ochrony Zdrowia [Centre for Healthcare Information Systems]
EEA	European Economic Area
FPE	Fundacja Prawo Europejskie [European Law Foundation]
ESF	European Social Fund [Europejski Fundusz Socjalny, EFS]
GUS	Główny Urząd Statystyczny [Central Statistical Office, CSO]
HBS	Household Budget Survey
IPiSS	Instytut Pracy i Polityki Społecznej [Institute of Labour and Social Policy]
IPS UW	Instytut Polityki Społecznej Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego [Institute of Social Policy, University of Warsaw]
ISP	Instytut Spraw Publicznych [Institute for Public Affairs]
KRUS	Kasa Rolniczego Ubezpieczenia Społecznego [Social Insurance Fund for Farmers]
LTC	Long-term care
MG DAP	Ministerstwo Gospodarki, Departament Analiz i Prognoz [Ministry of Economy, Department of Research and Forecast]
MPiPS	Ministerstwo Pracy i Polityki Społecznej [Ministry of Labour and Social Policy]
MSWiA	Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych i Administracji [Ministry of the Interior and Administration]
NSR	National Strategy Report on Social Protection and Social Inclusion 2008-2010
NFZ	Narodowy Fundusz Zdrowia [National Health Fund]
OBM	Ośrodek Badań nad Migracjami Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego [Centre for Migration Research of the University of Warsaw, CMR]
OHP	Ochotnicze Hufce Pracy [Voluntary Labour Corps]
POKL	Program Operacyjny Kapitał Ludzki [Human Capital Operational Programme, HCOP]
RPD	Rzecznik Praw Dziecka [Ombudsman for Children]
RPO	Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich [Ombudsman / Ombudswoman]
ROPS	Regionalny Ośrodek Pomocy Rodzinie [Regional Centre for Family Support]
SED	Structured Electronic Document
SEZ	Special Economic Zone [Specjalna Strefa Ekonomiczna]
ZDS PRM	Zespół Doradców Strategicznych Prezesa Rady Ministrów
ZUS	Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych [Social Insurance Institution]

1. Socio-economic and political overview

Before 1989, for more than 40 years, Poland belonged to the USSR-controlled block of countries where for ideological reasons international mobility of people was heavily repressed by the state.

Poland was the first former communist country to initiate the transition from the totalitarian state and centrally planned economy to the western-type democracy and market economy. The symbolic date is June 4th, 1989, the date of parliamentary elections won by the non-communist opposition. This breakthrough, however, was preceded by a long process of liberalization of the communist regime, in which instrumental were continuous grass-root pressures and finally the independent workers' union movement known as *Solidarność* (Solidarity).

Shortly afterwards, Poland became the member of the Council of Europe (1991), and other international organizations of the western hemisphere: OECD (1996), NATO (1999) and the European Union (2004). Those political changes led to other politically-inspired openings that more directly affected the international movements of population.

Practically unlimited freedom to leave Poland was granted to its citizens already in 1988. In 1990 (and the following years) a number of countries lifted a visa requirement for incoming Polish citizens. In the same year Germany (followed by a number of other western countries) concluded a bilateral agreement with Poland on the employment of migrant workers. The government of Poland was very active in restoring 'normality' in the area of free mobility of people and, especially, labour. Within few years the Polish citizens acquired wide possibilities to travel to a majority of western countries and in many instances to seek legal employment in those countries. Circular mobility of the false Polish tourists who engaged in clandestine economic activities like petty trade or odd jobs took a mass scale in the 1990s. Parallel to this were large inflows of foreign citizens, mostly from Eastern European countries, to Poland.

After the accession to the EU, Poland does not actively support migration for work of its citizens. In the policy documents it is tacitly or explicitly assumed that emigration belongs to fundamental human rights and no government should interfere with the free will of individuals in this respect. On the other hand, the accession required from Poland respecting of the *acquis communautaire*, which, among other things, started to regulate the legal aspects of international movements of the Polish citizens.

The period 1990-2010 saw radical structural changes in many areas of the Polish economy and society. The changes related to the transition of Poland were significantly reinforced by its accession to the EU.

After two initial years when real GDP contracted, its level was constantly on relatively rapid rise (between 4 and 7% annually), with only one short break marked by a strong slowdown (barely over 1% in 2001 and 2002). Even during the recent recession real GDP kept increasing and although in 2009 the rate of growth was exceptionally low (1.7%), still it was higher than in any other EU country (Figure 1.1). Between 1990 and 2008 the level of GDP per capita (in terms of PPP) more than doubled and reached 17,300 USD (approximately 9,500 €). In 1990-2010 Human Development Index (HDI) increased by 16.4%, which placed Poland among the top 20 per cent countries and in the category of countries being at *very high level of development*. One of components of HDI, the life expectancy at birth, which stagnated since the mid-1960s, after 1991 displayed a consistent rise. In effect, in 2010 it was by more than 5 years higher than in 1991. The wide spread of modern information technologies might be mentioned as example of many other favourable developments. For instance, the rate of internet users, which until 1993 was below 0.1 per 100 population, in 2010 reached the level of nearly 60 per 100 population. Costs of reforms and progress in the economic performance and the quality of life were in many respects painful. One of them was a high level of unemployment; the respective rate grew from 5.5% in 1990 to 19.7% in 2002. In the period 2003-2008 the rate sharply declined (to 6.7%) but in two recent years that trend was reversed. More data can be found in Table 1.1 (also in Figures 1.2 & 1.3).

The high unemployment, particularly among the young (and well educated) people entering labour market, stimulated the outflow of Poles to richer countries of Europe in search for work. The unfavourable situation in the labour market in Poland by and large stemmed from sectoral and regional rigidities, skill mismatches and generally low employment rates. That was the case despite fast shrinking of natural increase of the working age population.

On the other hand, the accession involved easier entry of the Polish citizens into legal employment in a number of European countries, which led to further substantial rise in the migration flows of Poles. On May 1st, 2004 free access to labour market was granted by the United Kingdom, Ireland and Sweden, and in 2006 by Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal, Finland and Iceland. In 2007 those countries were joined by the Netherlands and Luxemburg. By May 1st, 2011 all EU and EEA countries lifted the last restrictions. In addition, free international movements of Polish citizens were made even easier thanks to entering the Schengen area by Poland on December 21st, 2007.

2. Main emigration and internal migration trends and patterns

2.1. Main emigration trends

Poland has traditionally been a country of out-migration. Large waves of the outflow of people to other countries were initiated in final decades of the nineteenth century and continued until the present time, interrupted by short spells of contraction in the number of emigrants. Two basic forms and at the same geographical directions of the migratory flows were observed throughout that period: overseas settlement migration, mainly to the Americas and temporary or circular (often of seasonal character) movements, mainly to Germany and other nearby countries. Despite obstacles, mentioned in part 1, Polish people migrated in large numbers also in the period of the communist rule.

Between 1989 (the first year after the citizens of Poland were granted freedom to emigrate) and 2009, around 510,600 people emigrated. In addition, it is estimated that around 1,870,000 de jure residents of Poland had the status of temporary migrants at the end of 2009 (GUS, 2010 a, b). Some of the latter left Poland long time ago (but – with insignificant exceptions – not before 1989), some other very recently (but at least three months before the date of this estimate). This suggests a rough estimate of some 2,400,000 Polish emigrants in 1989-2009, which is an equivalent of 6.3% of the total resident population at present¹. Except for war-related involuntary movements of population, this was probably the most intense outflow of people in the Polish history.

In order to adequately deal with emigration from Poland, one has to consider two categories of outflow, which are in use in that country, namely 'emigration' and 'temporary migration'. In the real world 'emigration' reflects the outflow de jure, which is reflected in the official records of international migration². Any outflow that is not recorded officially is termed as 'temporary

¹ The World Bank estimate of the migrant stock from Poland (living in other countries) suggests for 2010 much higher number, i.e. 3,155,500 (8.2% of the resident population of Poland). It is based on definitions of international migration adopted in the receiving countries, which sometimes differ substantially. How misleading such exercise might be shows the following example. According to the above quoted estimate, the fourth largest receiving country for migrants from Poland is Belarus (with 235,800 emigrants from Poland). In reality, however, the residents of Poland have never voluntarily emigrated to Belarus. The only outflow of people from Poland to what is now Belarus took place in 1945-1948 when – within the framework of ethnic cleansing action – it solely embraced the residents of non-Polish affinity. See: <http://go.worldbank.org/JITC7NYTT0> (accessed 31 May 2011).

² The official count of international migration is exclusively based on information on the changes in permanent residence (de jure). Such count is regularly made by the Central Statistical Office (CSO, in Polish GUS). Only recently (2011), the CSO introduced additional count of international flows of migrants based on the relevant Eurostat recommendations. In accordance with those recommendations, 'emigration' denotes the action by which a person, having previously been usually resident in the territory of a Member EU State, ceases to have his or her usual residence in that Member State for a period that is, or is expected to be, of at least 12 months. 'Usual residence' is the place at which a person normally spends the daily period of rest, regardless of temporary absences for purposes of recreation, holiday, visits to friends and relatives, business, medical treatment or religious pilgrimage, or, in default, the place of legal or registered residence. See: http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_emi2&lang=en (accessed 12 April 2011).

Social Impact of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Central and Eastern Europe VT/2010/001

migration' provided that a migrant from Poland stays in any foreign country for more than three months³. It might be added that among the Polish temporary migrants those who meet the criteria of international (recommended by UN) definition of long-term migrant (more than one year of absence in Poland) and, as emigrants de facto, can legitimately be combined with emigrants (de jure), constitute a significant proportion (in recent years – a clear majority) of that group of people.

The data concerning emigration come from registers of residence while sources of the estimates of temporary migration are diversified. In the latter case it is most frequently labour force survey (LFS)⁴ and population census (conducted recently in 1988, 2002 and 2011). The estimates of temporary migration often use a combination of sources: population census, Polish LFS and LFS in major countries of destination.

The outflow of people from Poland in 1989-2009 displayed no obvious trend. Over time emigration de jure presented a pretty flat line with the annual number of departures between 20,000 and 25,000⁵ (Figure 2.1). In contrast, the net flows (and stocks) of temporary migrants tended to frequently change their temporal pattern. It follows from Figures 2.2 and 2.3 that in 1994-1998 the stock of temporary migrants calculated on the basis of Polish LFS (which tends to underestimate temporary migration⁶) was steadily declining and the quarter-to-quarter increments were more often negative than positive. Since 2000 that stock displayed a rapid increase and its increments in many quarters were remarkably positive, especially after the mid-2004, i.e. after EU accession. The trend was abruptly reversed in 2007 when a decline in the stock of 'temporary migrants' begun and the increments turned to highly negative. It should be mentioned that the most recent decrease (since 2007) affected predominantly short-term migrants.

The estimates of complete stock of the temporary migrants (based on mixed sources of data), which are available only for 2002-2010, point to its steady increase up until 2007 – from 786,000 to 2,270,000, followed by stabilization in 2008, rapid decrease in 2009 – to 1,870,000 and return to increase in 2010 – to 1,990,000⁷ (Table 2.1).

Strikingly, Poland's accession to the European Union was hardly reflected in the official (de jure) emigration statistics⁸. However, it seemed to have a tremendous impact on temporary migration from Poland. Within the three-year period (2005-2007) the stock of temporary migrants more than doubled (in absolute terms it rose by approximately 1, 270,000).

It should be noted that a sharp increase of the outflow after the accession appeared first in the category of long-term 'temporary migrants'. A similar increase in the category of short-term migrants took place within a time of just one year. Furthermore, when the stock of short-term migrants started to decline in the middle of 2007, the stock of long-term migrants kept increasing, up until early 2008 and even past that date its decline was rather moderate.

³ Until 2007 the lower time limit used in defining 'temporary migration' in Poland was two months.

⁴ In Poland LFS is called *Badanie Aktywności Ekonomicznej Ludności* (in short BAEL). It is being carried out (by the CSO) four times a year. Since 1993 the Polish LFS includes a set of questions designed to capture 'temporary' out-migration. It covers all households in which at least one member (aged 15 years or more) is registered as permanent resident at any address in Poland and stays there at the time of survey.

⁵ 2006 and 2007 were a distinct exception when, respectively, 46,900 and 35,500 emigrants were recorded. Apparently a large part of that change was due to the increase in cancellations of permanent residence in Poland by 'temporary migrants' in their strive to avoid double income taxation. The increase was almost entirely caused by 'emigration' to the United Kingdom (and Ireland), and at that urban residents (who in Poland are more often taxpayers than the residents of rural areas).

⁶ It is so for two major reasons. Firstly, LFS does not capture migrants belonging to the households whose all members were residents of a foreign country at the time of survey, and, secondly, it – intentionally – does not cover persons aged below 15. Still, the data on migration extracted from LFS are considered highly reliable. For a discussion of this issue, see: Grabowska-Lusińska, Okólski, 2009.

⁷ All estimates as of December 31.

⁸ Not only that the annual average in the post-accession period (2004-2009) did not significantly differ from the average in 1989-2009 but – rather surprisingly – in 2004 and 2005 the number of de jure emigrants declined relative to 2002 and 2003. In turn, the average in 1989-2009 was only a little lower than the average in 1974-2009 (Figure 2.1). All this may suggest that emigration de jure was largely independent on the degree of freedom of international travelling and access to foreign labour markets.

Social Impact of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Central and Eastern Europe VT/2010/001

Thus, the recent economic crisis nearly exclusively affected the size of short-term temporary migration. The number of short-term migrants shrunk from nearly 300,000 in the 2nd quarter 2007 to 90,000 in the 2nd quarter 2009.

It is plausible to argue that a large part of those who potentially and actually constitute the category of short-term migrants, and in fact are circular migrants, delayed their subsequent migration up until the date of improvement of economic situation in richer countries of the EU.

According to a household survey named *Diagnoza społeczna*, which since 2000 inquires into the quality of life in Poland (Czapiński, Panek, 2009)⁹, a sample in 2009 included proportionately more ex-migrants than in 2007. It was found in 2009 that 4.0% respondents (persons staying in Poland at the time of survey) worked abroad some time in 2005-2009 while in 2007 3.2% respondents declared doing so in 2005-2007. A large majority of those ex-migrants had spent less than 12 months in a foreign country. One third of those who returned to Poland since the beginning of 2008 did so due to the termination or loss of a job and additional 7% because of lack of employment opportunities or worsening of wage rates.

It follows from a recent round (March-April 2009) of the survey¹⁰ that increasing return migration and a decreasing number of new departures were accompanied by substantial changes in the composition of migrants. A striking new phenomenon seems a deep decline in the proportion of migrants originating from the rural areas, a further increase in the share of young adults (aged 20-34) and further improvement of the education of migrants. Finally, regarding geography of the places of destination, the USA became even less popular than in the immediately post-accession period (Czapiński, Panek, 2009)¹¹.

The difference between emigration (de jure) and temporary migration from Poland is also visible with regard to some other characteristics of those movements, especially their geographical directions. Traditionally, Germany is the main country of destination for Polish de jure emigrants (63% in 1990 and 42% in 2009). The second position was recently taken by the United Kingdom (less than half per cent in 1990 and 19% in 2009). Another major host country in the relevant statistics remains the United States (13% in 1990 and 11% in 2009). Quite different picture ensues when it comes to target countries in case of temporary migration. As follows from Table 2.1, in 2002 Germany by far predominated (37%) while all other EU-15 countries accounted for only 20% with Italy (5%) being the most important among them. The United States were the second most attractive destination at that time (20%)¹². Unlike for de jure emigration, in 2006 top positions were changed. The main target country became the United Kingdom (30%), followed by Germany (22%) and Ireland (7.5%). USA and three EU countries (Italy, the Netherlands and Spain) were the next, with almost equal share of 4.5-5%¹³.

It might be concluded that in the course of time, especially after the accession to the EU, the flows of migrants from Poland, both de jure emigrants and temporary migrants, became more and more diversified with regard to their geographical directions. The influence of the

⁹ In 2000-2009 it was carried out five times under the auspices of the Council for Social Monitoring and University of Finance and Management (Warsaw), and it is a continuation of a survey *Jakość życia Polaków w czasie zmiany społecznej* conducted by the Institute for Social Studies (University of Warsaw) in 1991-1997.

¹⁰ Conclusions to follow were drawn from the comparison of two consecutive rounds of the survey: one conducted in 2007 which inquired into migration that took place in 2005-2007 and another conducted in 2009 where the focus was on migration initiated (and eventually ended) in 2005-2009, and those conclusions can only be treated as approximate.

¹¹ In 2007 *Diagnoza Społeczna* found that in the immediately post-accession period Germany attracted many more Polish migrants than Britain, which appears doubtful (or even dubious) in the light of the Polish LFS and statistical sources in the both host countries. A similar degree of under-estimation in *Diagnoza Społeczna* seems also be the case of Ireland.

¹² In as many as 16% cases no destination country was established.

¹³ Anacka (2010) based on LFS found that in 2002-2008 the propensity of temporary migrants to return to Poland was relatively high in case of those for whom the destination country was Germany (and to a lesser degree Italy) and it was relatively low for migrants who headed to the United Kingdom and Ireland (and to a lesser degree the USA).

accession, in particular the pioneering decision of countries like Britain and Ireland to encourage the freedom of labour flows should not be overlooked here.

2.2. Main internal migration trends

Measured in official terms, the intensity of internal migration has been very low since at least the beginning of the transition period (11-12 per 1,000 inhabitants in 1991-2009¹⁴). In fact, its volume¹⁵ has been declining since early 1980s (895,000 changes of residence in 1980, 530,000 in 1990 and between 390,000 and 430,000 in 1995-2009¹⁶). As demonstrated in Figure 2.4, in 1980-2009 the number of internal migrants displayed a similar trend in rural and urban areas – a decline until early or mid-1990s (stronger in the urban areas) and relative stability at a similarly low level since then.

It is argued that officially registered migrations reflected mainly the movements related to the change in family (marital) status (especially, 'permanent migration') or educational mobility (especially, 'temporary migration'), while the share of migration for work was rather small. This was predominantly due to a low level of labour mobility in Poland and the fact that a great part of employment-related mobility traditionally takes a form of commuting and occurs within the boundaries of regions or even smaller administrative units (Mijal, 2010).

A distinct feature of internal migration in several recent decades is a great predominance of net outflow regions which supply a relatively small number of other regions with their out-going migrants. The net sending regions cover the whole territory of Poland whereas the net receiving regions are in fact small (in terms of their space) 'islands' scattered all around the country¹⁷. Characteristic of the latter are their high level of urbanization and metropolitan role or superior administrative and economic functions fulfilled towards surrounding regions (Gawryszewski, 2005).

As already observed, internal mobility of the Polish population is rather low and decreasing over time. This pattern is common to a large majority of territorial units. Moreover, in the course of time cross-territorial differences tend to diminish.

Recently Ghatak, Mulhern and Watson (2008) have evidenced the very low (by international standards) level of inter-regional migration in Poland. Shortage of housing was pointed to as a major factor responsible for this. Nevertheless, they found out that the existing, albeit very low, regional mobility can be plausibly explained by means of a conventional economic analysis. According to their conclusions (p. 220), 'GDP per capita and unemployment have a strong effect on internal migration. However, in GDP per capita in the donor province has a stronger influence than in the destination province. Unemployment has a stronger impact on migration in destination rather than donor provinces.' This asymmetry has been attributed to imperfect information.

In recent decades Poland has gone through a major change in the urban-rural population distribution. The share of rural population decreased from 63.1 per cent in 1950 to 39.0 per cent in 2009. This was accomplished mainly thanks to massive population transfers from rural to urban areas. Still, it is believed that despite such impressive urbanisation many people have been stuck in the rural areas; they economically gravitated towards urban centres but were unable to move and settle there. This is principally the case of regions located in eastern Poland whose large part of (redundant) rural population was so to speak transformed into peasant-workers during the period of so-called socialist industrialisation.

¹⁴ Compare, for instance, with 30 per 1,000 in 1961-1970.

¹⁵ The volume of internal migration denotes here the total number of migrants who changed their permanent residence. In general, the definition of a 'migrant' is based on her/his registration in an appropriate unit of territorial administration according to which the registration of a temporary residence leads to the recognition of 'temporary migration' whereas the registration of permanent residence brings about an entry in the register of 'permanent (otherwise – settlement or long-term) migration'.

¹⁶ Except for three years when it was either lower (2001) or higher (2006 and 2007).

¹⁷ According to an estimate that pertains to the pre-transition period but seems to roughly hold nowadays, 1.7 per cent of Poland's territory inhabited by 12.9 per cent of the national population absorbed more than a half (53.0 per cent) of all net inflows. The share of Poland's territory with net outflow was 85% (Gawryszewski, 2005, pp. 399-400).

Atrophy of housing facilities and underdevelopment of municipal infrastructure and services in developing industrial centres offered to those people jobs with no prospects of migration that would involve the settlement, i.e. prompted them to commuting. In turn, because of generally very low pay, those commuters were also part-time employed in their subsistence-oriented family plots. With a gradual development of enclaves of modern economy, including farming, many small peasant holdings become less and less effective or competitive, and condemned (together with the employed persons) to the vicious circle of backwardness. The remnants of such arrangement continue to bear heavily on the present (Okólski, 2001).

It should be explained that the level of urbanisation of 39 per cent or so has already been attained in the late 1980s and after that time it did not change considerably; as a matter of fact, between 2000 and 2009 a small but systematic increase was noted (from 38.1 to 39.0 per cent). This is mainly attributed to the so-called sub-urbanisation, to the growth of suburbs on the outskirts of metropolitan areas at the expense of their centres (big cities) (e.g. Korcelli et al. 2008). Moreover, some authors argue that the data on urban-rural distribution of the population are increasingly misleading because the changes in administrative status of several settlements (villages) more and more lag behind the changes in their functional character (e.g. Węclawowicz, 2010). Nonetheless it might be concluded that much of the migratory potential of urbanisation has already been exhausted in Poland.

In the entire post-WWII period the urban-rural migration balance has been estimated at around six million¹⁸ to which migration of the transition period hardly contributed anything¹⁹. The volume of rural outflow to cities in the 1990s was already low (131,000 per year, as compared with 237,000 in the 1980s) and kept declining in the first decade of this century (up to 90,000 in 2009). In a striking contrast to this, inflows of urban population to the rural areas were relatively high compared to earlier periods; after a small decline in the 1990s the inflows were growing to reach the level of 131 thousand in 2009, which not only was considerably higher than annual averages for the 70s, 80s and 90s but it also by far exceeded the level of rural outflow to the urban areas (Table 2.2).

Generally, empirical evidence suggests that, over recent quarter-a-century or so, internal migration in Poland has been low and to a large degree substituted by international mobility. For instance, Korcelli (1994) and Kupiszewski (2006) established that regions with relatively low rate of internal migration had relatively high rate of outflow to other countries, while Jaźwińska and Okólski (2001) observed a transition from inter-regional commuting to circular migration for work abroad, and Grabowska-Lusińska and Okólski (2009) found over-representation (relative to all international migrants) of those from relatively low-urbanised regions (and rural areas in particular) at the time when foreign labour markets became widely open to the citizens of Poland. Thus it might be argued that the relatively low level of internal migration, and of rural-to-urban outflow stems from (or is related to) insufficient absorptive capacity of the Polish economy with its inefficient labour market and poorly developed infrastructure (in terms of housing, roads, public transportation and municipal facilities, etc.).

2.3. Main characteristics of migrants

Because the selective opening of the labour market to Polish workers after EU accession was one of the main factors conducive to recent (post-1989) migration from Poland (see section 2.1), we will resort here to the description of two groups people taking part in the outflow: the pre-accession migrants and the post-accession migrants. Such characteristic will be based on a special CMR²⁰ database extracted from the Polish LFS²¹, which embraces

¹⁸ Based on Gorlach (2000) and GUS (2010a).

¹⁹ The urban-rural migration balance from highly negative (until late 1980s) turned to close to zero in the transition period and very recently (from 2000 onwards) became positive.

²⁰ CMR (in Polish OBM) stands here for Centre of Migration Research, the University of Warsaw.

²¹ The survey is believed to be the most reliable source on the data concerning labour market behaviours of people in Poland. It covers nearly 25,000 household selected by means of random sampling to represent the whole country; it started on November 1991 and is being carried out on quarterly basis.

Social Impact of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Central and Eastern Europe VT/2010/001

'temporary migrants'²² who emigrated in 1999-2003 and 2005-2006, respectively (Grabowska-Lusińska, Okólski, 2009)²³.

First of all, the male share among the post-accession migrants was higher than among the pre-accession migrants; the proportion of men in all migrants increased from 57% to 65%. Secondly the post-accession migrants were generally younger than the pre-accession migrants; the median age decreased by 1.5 years and the share of the migrants aged 20 to 34 years increased from 48% to 68%. Thirdly, the post-accession migrants were better educated than the pre-accession migrants; the percentage of those who completed secondary or post-secondary education increased from 52% to 61% (those with university diploma from 10% to 16.5%).

Migrants proved to be highly selective with respect to the three personal characteristics discussed above. The proportion of men in the total population (aged 15+) was much smaller than among the migrants; the sex-related selectivity of migrants became stronger in the post-accession period. Migrants older than 50 (and younger than 20) were strongly under-represented relative to the resident population (8-10% vis-à-vis 40% in the group 50+) and migrants aged 20-39 were strongly over-represented, whereas hardly any selectivity was observed in the group 40-49 years. Finally, migrants with vocational education and full secondary education were over-represented while those with lower educational attainment were under-represented. In case of the most highly educated, the under-representation was observed in the pre-accession period but later it gave way to the over-representation (Grabowska-Lusinska, Okólski, 2009).

In case of the both groups (pre- and post-accession migrants), some regions of Poland (Podkarpackie, Podlaskie, Świętokrzyskie, Małopolskie and Lubelskie) were greatly over-represented in the outflow while some others (Łódzkie, Śląskie and Mazowieckie) continued to be severely under-represented²⁴. A general tendency in the post-accession period were on the one hand an intensification of outflows of people from those regions whose contribution to overall outflow was relatively low in the pre-accession period (below the share of those regions in the total resident population) and on the other hand decreases in almost all opposite cases. In other words, in the post-accession period migrants became much more evenly distributed by region of their residence than they were in the preceding period.

In both periods, the migrants originating from rural areas constituted the largest group with respect to categories of settlement, followed by migrants from big cities (with more than 100,000 inhabitants), medium-sized towns (10,000-100,000 inhabitants) and small towns (less than 10,000 inhabitants). Only the two largest of those groups underwent clear change after the accession. The share of big city residents increased while the share of residents of the rural areas decreased. This, however, did not seriously affect the finding that the city dwellers were moderately under-represented and the villagers moderately over-represented.

It is easy to notice more than one 'profile' when it comes to splitting all post-accession migrants into two or more groups of destination countries; for instance, quite different characteristics display those migrating to the United Kingdom and Ireland than those migrating to Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. For instance, compared to the former, the latter are significantly older and less highly educated, and in addition they more often originate from rural areas than from towns (Grabowska-Lusińska, Okólski, 2009)²⁵.

²² As explained above in 2.1, temporary migration constitutes a by far predominant part of the outflow of people from Poland.

²³ Due to the nature of LFS data (explained in Grabowska-Lusińska, Okólski, 2009), only those migrants who passed the age 15 will be considered.

²⁴ In this report by region we understand a basic NUTS2 unit (*voivodship* or *województwo* in Polish).

²⁵ For illustration, among the post-accession migrants the share of relatively younger (20-29) was 37% in case of those who left for Germany and 72% in case of the United Kingdom, the share of the most highly educated (with university diploma) was 6% and 22.5%, respectively, and the share of residents of large towns (above 100,000 inhabitants) was 18% and 28%, respectively.

Social Impact of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Central and Eastern Europe VT/2010/001

Personal characteristics of Polish migrants had also a strong impact upon the propensity to return to the home country²⁶. It follows from the data extracted from LFS²⁷ that in 2002-2008 the least highly prone to return were migrants aged 20-29; their share among those who returned to Poland was 40% compared to 51.5% share of that category in the total outflow from Poland. In turn, the incidence of return among the 30-39-year old was significantly higher than in case of their contribution to the out-migration. Migrants above the age of 40 were also over-represented among all those who returned home. With regard to other characteristics of migrating persons, it might be mentioned that those with vocational (or lower) education were over-represented while all other educational categories were under-represented. Similarly, in contrast to all categories of towns, the share of residents of rural areas among all return migrants was higher than in the total outflow (Anacka, 2010).

3. Nation-wide labour market and social development trends under the influence of emigration

3.1. Economic and labour market developments

Outflow of the labour force

As argued above, the massive outflow of people, particularly strong after May 1st 2004 was highly selective. It depleted human resources to various degrees with regard to age (and physical and social ability to work), skills, region and type of residence and many other characteristics of those resources. By this it might affect in a more or less remote future Polish labour markets. The relevant estimates have been made by Kaczmarczyk and Okólski (2008a).

It follows from those estimates that in the period 2004-2006, the loss in population aged 15+ was 4.4% in males and 2.2% in females. According to age, the greatest loss, of 9.3%, was recorded in the group 25-29-year old (in the group 20-24 – 8.8% and in the group 30-44 – 3.8%). The male population with secondary education declined by 5.8%, the one with vocational education by 5.4%, the one with tertiary education by 5.0% and the male population who did not complete even vocational education decreased by 1.4%. In the female population the loss was proportionately lower, the highest among those with tertiary education (3.3%).

Characteristic of the post-accession migration is the so-called brain waste which manifests itself in a large over-representation of the highly educated among migrants and at the same a very high proportion of the Polish migrants who are employed in very simple and unskilled jobs in destination countries. This may lead do the deskilling of migrants. For instance, as many as 82% of migrants who went to the United Kingdom (by far the most important target country in the post-accession period) had completed at least secondary school but in that country between 80 and 90% of migrants from Central and East European 'accession countries' (with Poland accounting for about 70% of those migrants) were hired for occupations that need no professional qualifications (Grabowska-Lusińska and Okólski, 2009; Kaczmarczyk, 2008). Regional analyses conducted in recent years concerning the return migrants point to the female labour as particularly affected in a negative way by migration. For instance, while abroad almost all women who returned to the Lubelskie region were employed much below their formal skills and upon their return a large majority of them remained economically idle or unemployed (Markowski, 2010).

Migration and labour market characteristics

Recent studies on the relationship between migration and labour market lead to a conclusion that, in broad terms, the situation on labour market strongly affects out-migration from Poland and the workers' outflow to foreign countries has a minimal impact on the Polish labour

²⁶ Sex of migrants, however, seemed to be a rare 'neutral' variable in case of that phenomenon.

²⁷ The relevant database (created by CMR) includes migrants aged 15+ who returned to Poland after three-month stay in a foreign country.

Social Impact of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Central and Eastern Europe VT/2010/001

market (e.g. Kaczmarczyk and Okólski, 2008a)²⁸. There might be, however, exceptions to this general rule that pertain to specific categories or sub-sectors of the labour market; some of them will be listed below.

Before highlighting any hypotheses or analytical findings concerning the way in which international migration affects labour market in Poland, it should be stressed that the relationship under consideration is for a variety of reasons enormously complex. Two of those reasons, probably the most important, might be mentioned here: the immaturity of institutions of the Polish labour market which, among other things, is reflected in its over-regulation and the fact that the development of labour market in Poland since 1989 has taken place in a very unstable and (so to speak) demanding environment²⁹.

The most general 'migration – labour market' relationship in the period 1994-2007 is presented in Figure 3.1. The picture, however, is rather ambiguous. In 1994-1998, with the improvement of the labour market situation (declining unemployment rate), the stock of 'temporary migrants' was declining, and logically since 1999 when the unemployment rate was strongly on the rise, migration started to increase. Shortly before Poland's accession to the EU the situation on the labour market improved, which – quite surprisingly – did not affect the migration trend. On the contrary, from 2004 the outflow of Polish people was further intensified even though the unemployment rate kept falling down (Kaczmarczyk and Okólski, 2008b).

Another aspect of the migration impact upon the labour market is reflected in the transitions (flows) between various statuses on the Polish market: employment, unemployment and non-participation. Fihel (2004) found that seasonal migration to Germany (in 1991-2002), which was by far the largest documented migrant worker's flow from Poland in that period, exerted a small influence on migrants' position (status) on the Polish labour market. Similar conclusion was reached by Budnik (2007) who analysed the transitions in 1994-2006 between four statuses: the three mentioned-above and employment in a foreign country. She concluded that although the status changes after 2004 were a little stronger compared to the pre-2004 period, in the both periods continued to be very low³⁰. In brief, short-term (or circular) migration hardly resulted in the deterioration of migrants' position on the labour market upon their return to Poland; in fact its impact was negligible.

Some light on the relationship under consideration has been thrown by the results of a CMR study on the situation of Polish firms (in terms of availability of labour) in the period of massive outflow of Polish workers (Janicka-Żylicz, 2009; Kaczmarczyk and Okólski, 2008b). It follows from that study that after 2004 some firms (above all in the construction sector) were affected by labour scarcities and the number of those firms was growing over time. In general terms, the number of vacancies, especially in construction and trade became considerable after 2004. On the other hand, no impact on wage rates offered to workers was observed, even in the sectors claiming shortages of labour.

Emigration of specialists: the case of physicians

Finally, the way migration influences labour market in case of some specialised professions is worth discussing. Kaczmarczyk and Okólski (2005) inquired into this problem focusing on the outflow of the highly skilled and pointed to risks of 'brain drain' (or even the deficit of labour) in case of some tangible skills (e.g. physicians). Altogether, the outflow of other than medical professionals (e.g. scientists, IT specialists, etc.) is believed to be considerable but

²⁸ It is plausible to argue that more visible effects of the on-going labour outflow need a bit more time than actually elapsed after the Polish workers acquired an EU-wide freedom of choice in searching for jobs. Of relevance here might be the fact that the post-accession migrants were above all those coming from under-developed regions of Poland, with considerable surpluses of labour.

²⁹ By this we have in mind labour market changes under a mix of pressures – from the continuously transforming economy and challenges that stem from competitive external economies, the requirements and expectations that result from the EU membership (and a convergence with the EU economy), and – very recently – the world economic crisis.

³⁰ According to her estimates, a large majority (much above 90%) of migrants maintained 'old' status in the Polish labour market despite migration.

Social Impact of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Central and Eastern Europe VT/2010/001

with respect to the post-2004 period no quantitative information is available³¹. Therefore, emigration of physicians will be paid special attention.

In case of health specialists, a proxy variable that indicates their propensity to migrate is the number of European certificates of professional qualifications issued in Poland (by the medical chamber) to the representatives of that profession. Possession of a valid certificate that testifies the skills is a prerequisite of the employment of foreign physician in the EU (Murdoch, 2011). Between 2004 and 2009 as many as some 6,880 physicians, 800 dentists and 9,900 nurses requested such certificate, which represented, respectively 5.8, 2.6 and 3.4% of all active professionals in Poland³². The most highly prone to emigration seem anaesthesiologists (18.8% requested certificates), chest surgeons (16.0%), plastic surgeons (15.4%), specialists in emergency medicine (13.1%) and pathomorphologists (11.8%)³³.

Assessment of the impact of emigration of physicians on healthcare provision still remains an issue. After an extensive analysis of the recent migration trends – both general practitioners and specialists – Murdoch (2011, p. 179) notes that there is no necessary data in Poland that would allow making clear conclusions about this impact. Available statistics are, in a sense, ambiguous. They show that after 2004 the number of physicians was lower than in the previous decade. The same regards dentists and nurses. In 2009, the number of doctors was by 10% lower than in 1994 or 1999, and by 11.5% lower than in 2003³⁴. The decrease was visible in 1998-2000, when it was equal to 1%-3% a year, and in 2004-2005, just after the EU accession, when it reached as much as 7% and 9% (decline by 5,945 persons and 7,326, respectively).³⁵

The outflow of medical specialists (especially physicians) might have resulted in a growing understaffing of hospitals and an increasing number of vacancies in Poland. However, in general, the proportion of vacancies relative to the total stock of specialists remained rather low (e.g. in case of physicians 3.5% in 2006). The distribution of vacancies was uneven across professions and regions. The most highly affected professions were: anaesthesiologists and specialists in intensive care, internal and emergency medicine whose representatives displayed relatively strong propensity to work abroad. In turn, regions with the largest number of vacancies in case of medical doctors were: Mazowieckie and Lubelskie. This phenomenon met with a limited inflow of foreign doctors (mainly from Ukraine)³⁶ but above all with a tendency to better compensate medical specialists in Poland (Kautsch and Czabanowska, 2011).

It should be also noted that the number of candidates for work in medical professions in other EU countries, after initial sharp rise in 2004-2007 (up to 5.5% of all physicians) stabilised and hardly displayed further increase in 2008 and 2009 (Kaczmarczyk et al., 2010). In fact, as a recent study concludes (Kautsch and Czabanowska, 2011, p. 443), 'health professionals have been returning to Poland since 2007, attracted by salary increases resulting from

³¹ The estimates for early transition years (1992-1996) imply that only around 0.2-0.3% of the employed scientists emigrated each year, which was much lower proportion than observed e.g. in 1981-1984 (1.1%) (Hryniewicz, Jałowicki, Mync, 1997).

³² WHO study (Buchan, Perfilleva, 2006: 12) argued that migration of the health professionals from Poland immediately after the Poland's accession to the EU was 'not as big as it was foreseen'.

³³ Data from EU-15 countries indicate that the inflow of Polish medical professionals started well before the date of EU accession by Poland and at the same time strongly confirm the tendency to rapidly increasing of such inflow after the accession. For instance, by around 2000 all those countries registered the stock of some 1,500 Polish physicians. The number of new registrations in 2000-2003 was 356 and in 2004-2007 nearly 3,000 (Kautsch and Czabanowska, 2011).

³⁴ Figures in this paragraph come from various editions of the *Statistical yearbook of the Republic of Poland*, Table I, by the Central Statistical Office www.stat.gov.pl

³⁵ The decline in 1998-2000 could have partly resulted from the implementation of the health reform in 1999. In this year, four important reforms, concerning regional administration, pension, education and public health care system were introduced. In the latter case, health insurance replaced budgetary financing. Strengthening the role of private providers was one of the effects of this reform.

³⁶ The share of foreign physicians practicing in Poland in 2009 was only 0.6% of the total stock (Kautsch and Czabanowska, 2011).

attrition and migration, increased demand for medical services [in Poland] and changing currency exchange rates’.

Altogether, access to medical services has not deteriorated over the last decade. In 2003-2005, indicators showing unmet medical needs were stable and they clearly improved in 2004-2009. In 2005, 59% respondents of the survey *Diagnoza Społeczna* indicated no change in meeting medical needs compared to the previous period (58% in 2003) and 3% indicated improvement (4% in 2003).³⁷ And according to the EU-SILC, 7% of Polish respondents reported unmet medical needs in 2004 and 2005, 5.8% in 2006, 4% in 2007 and 2.7% in 2008 and in 2009.³⁸

3.2. Social security

EU coordination and bilateral agreements

In the case of Poland, provision of social security benefits for migrants and their families results either from bilateral agreements or – since the Polish accession to the European Union in May 2004 – from the EU coordination rules. If they do not apply, benefits are granted based on given country regulations.

At present, EU coordination involves 27 member states plus Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. Bilateral agreements on social security cover³⁹ Australia (since October 2010), Canada (since October 2009), FYR Macedonia (since July 2007), South Korea (since March 2010), and the United States (since March 2009). Also, the agreement set in 1958 with Yugoslavia involving Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia is still effective. The same regards selected articles of the bilateral agreement with Austria (of September 1998) and with Germany (of October 1975 with the Federal Republic of Germany, and of December 1990).

The above list contains main destination countries of the Polish emigration flows. This allows it to conclude that a substantial share of Polish migrants is covered by the coordinating rules. However, European migrants are in a better position than the other ones (under bilateral agreements) for the scope of the EU coordination⁴⁰ is larger. Namely, while bilateral agreements are restricted to pensions and related benefits (such as funeral grants)⁴¹, EU coordination considers also monetary benefits paid in respect to: sickness (including LTC), maternity (and paternity), unemployment, work accidents and occupational diseases, and family status (child benefits). Social assistance and some specific types of support (for war and terror victims, for instance) are not subject to the EU coordination, neither to bilateral agreements. On the other hand, healthcare (and maternity care) is transferrable - with some restriction - within the European countries (EU27, EEA, H), for anyone insured /covered by a statutory social security scheme, or - with more restrictions – for the holders of European Health Insurance Card (EHIC). Polish migrants and travelers who move across European countries are rather familiar with their rights to the health protection. In practice, they may encounter various problems: shortages, quality of service, etc.

From the perspective of emigrants and their families in the country of origin, the importance of various types of social security benefits differs. For returnees, especially if they are old or disable, the role of pension coordination looks crucial. For circular migrants, transferring sickness and unemployment benefit may be vital. For those who emigrate and leave their family members behind, agreements on family related benefits are certainly essential. In the

³⁷ Czapiński, Panek (2005), Table 4.7.18.

³⁸ 2004-2009 figures are JAF indicators (code tsdph270) available at:

<http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tsdph270>.

³⁹ According to the information available on the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy website www.mpips.gov.pl, specifically at: <http://www.mpips.gov.pl/index.php?gid=1215>. See also the website <http://powroty.gov.pl/> and the website of the Polish Social Insurance Institution www.zus.gov.pl.

⁴⁰ Throughout the text, the term “EU coordination” will sometimes be used to denote the social security coordination covering 27 EU member states plus Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway and Switzerland.

⁴¹ See information on www.zus.gov.pl in the forms of leaflets, guides (in part – in English), FAQs, etc. covering respective countries; See also ZUS quarterly bulletins: *Biuletyn Informacyjny* 2009 No. 3 (Canada) and No. 4 (Australia and South Korea), and 2010 No. 2 (USA) and No. 4 (Australia).

Social Impact of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Central and Eastern Europe VT/2010/001

later case, Polish emigrants who leave Europe may face problems of benefit transferability. Existing bilateral agreements would not be actually very helpful. If a specific support such as social assistance is needed, local laws would apply exclusively in all cases.

Payment of child benefits

Migrants residing in any of the EU (EU27+4) countries may claim child benefits based on the coordination rules. For this, E401 - E411 forms⁴² are used (following EU regulations 883/2004 and – since 2010 – following 987/2009 with the use of SED of series F). In Poland, these forms are processed by 16 regional agencies of the social assistance system (called Regional Centres for Family Support - Regionalne Ośrodki Pomocy Rodzinie, ROPS) located in each voivodship. Coordination tasks of ROPS are supported by much more numerous local social assistance centres.

From the point of view of families left behind by emigrants, E411 form seems the most important. Reported in Poland, it indicates the claim for a family benefit made by a Polish migrant who currently lives in some EU country and whose family members reside in a country of origin⁴³. Polish national statistics show that during the first years of the EU coordination enforcement, the number of child benefits claimed by the emigrants was very small – if not to say minuscule – but it was fast growing. Altogether, only 4921 E411 forms were processed in 2004 (May to December), 11,609 in 2005, 29,680 in 2006 and 54,831 in 2007 (Drozdowicz, 2008). Detailed figures for 2007 (Table 3.1) show – not surprisingly – that the majority of forms came from the main destination countries of Polish emigrants: United Kingdom (35%), Germany (25%) and Ireland (10.5%).⁴⁴

Statistics for 2008-2010 (Table 3.2) are not fully comparable with the previous period figures and their breakdown by sending regions is still lacking. Nevertheless, they allow it to draw some conclusions as regards the actual use of child benefits based on the coordination rules. First, the number of benefits claimed remains significant and quite stable.⁴⁵ This shows that the system is well settled but the overall number of claims looks surprisingly small comparing to the number of children left behind⁴⁶. Second, each year the largest share of child benefits has been claimed from Germany (28%). In 2008-2009, Netherlands, UK and Ireland followed Germany but in 2010 Ireland's share has shrunk dramatically (from 12% down to 4%), UK and the Netherlands to the lesser extent. At the same time, the share of child benefits claimed from Norway increased rapidly (from 8% in 2008-09 to 16.5% in 2010). These changes reflect the move of Polish migrants within Europe and indicate that the EU coordination in the field of child benefit provision works properly. One may add that, since benefit rates in main destination countries of Polish emigrants are much higher than the rates effective in Poland, Polish residents benefitting from the coordination rules are in a better position than those relating on the national system exclusively.⁴⁷

But implementation of the EU co-ordination rules has involved some problems, too. For instance, *loci laboris* rule has not always been understood or – maybe – it was treated in a

⁴² In the social security (3.2), the names of benefit forms are often referred to because statistical information in Poland is organized alongside with forms.

⁴³ This is a simplified interpretation of E411 (discussed with MPiPS officials). Strictly speaking, E411 form is the request for information on entitlement to family benefits in the Member States of residence of the members of the family (www.mpips.gov.pl).

⁴⁴ They also show that, in fact, main sending regions benefited the most. This may be seen when E411 figures are “standardized” (divided by the overall population). In Opolskie voivodship as much as 50 child benefit related forms per 10,000 were processed, in Podkarpackie 25. But relatively low number of applications for child benefits was reported in Podlaskie, only 8 per 10,000, while the country average reached 14. This could have resulted from the specific forms of migration from this region (possibly - short term or circular, for taking unregistered work, etc.). This should be investigated in more detail.

⁴⁵ In 2008, almost 44,000 E411 forms from EU countries were processed in Poland (plus over 2,000 for local payments). In 2009, this number went down to 41,600 but it reached 43,200 in 2010. For 2008-2010, data on the use of other E4xx forms and forms related to the provision of alimonies are also available but they will be not discussed in this report.

⁴⁶ See estimates discussed in Section 5.2.

⁴⁷ Sometimes, this has been perceived as unfair by the recipients of Polish benefits leading eventually to certain ostracism of beneficiaries in their local community.

loose way leading to a number of errors and possibly frauds as well. The same regards the rules of the birth grant provision, they could have looked unclear for some applicants (only one type of a grant is subject to co-ordination) once again resulting in errors / frauds. In fact, claiming a benefit in two countries or not reporting incomes earned by a migrant residing abroad has been sometimes noticed and it happened that benefits already granted had to be returned. Such cases were extensively covered by media and were widely discussed⁴⁸ but exact statistics are hard to find. Nevertheless, according to the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy officials they were not that numerous⁴⁹.

Unemployment benefits

Following the EU coordination, payment of unemployment benefits takes a form of either benefit transfer (with the use of E303, already replaced by SED) or of benefit re-calculation based on the sum of employment/insurance periods in the EU (E301, now SED). In Poland, relevant procedures are implemented by the regional labour offices.

Statistics show, not surprisingly, that using the EU co-ordination is less common for unemployment than for child benefits (Tables 3.2 and 3.3). They also show that benefit transferring is less common than aggregating employment periods (2010: about 4,700 E303 forms, over 18,000 E301). The overall number of the unemployment benefits based on the coordination peaked in 2009 (20,900 E301), almost doubling the number of forms processed in 2008. This could have been related to the economic breakdown of this period.

As expected, the largest number of claims comes from the main destination countries of Polish migrants (UK, Netherlands, Ireland, and Germany). In recent years, however, their ranking has been changing, possibly as a result of the economic crisis which affected various regions unequally. Nevertheless, UK has always been in the first place, submitting over 40% (2008-2010) of the total number of E301 forms processed. In 2007-2010, the number of unemployment benefits claimed by migrants who previously worked in Ireland or in the Netherlands has been growing, while of those sent from Germany was declining.

Distribution of E301 and E303 forms across regions does not reveal any clear pattern reflecting either migration or unemployment trends (Table 3.4). In 2008-2010, the largest share of these unemployment related forms was processed in Dolnośląskie and Wielkopolskie voivodships which are not the main sending or unemployment regions. Relative to the population, Dolnośląskie goes ahead too but this time it is followed by Warmińsko-Mazurskie (high unemployment), and Podkarpackie (high unemployment and high net loss as regards migration).

Overall assessment of the implementation of the coordination rules with respect to unemployment is ambiguous. It is not clear, for instance, why some regions benefit more than the others. Is it related to the migration type (circulating, returning) or to the way the labour offices work? This question would require more detailed investigation.

Pensions and related benefits

In the case of Poland, pension coordination concerns over 35 countries (EU/EEA/H plus bilateral agreements). Applications are processed by the Social Insurance Institution (Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych, ZUS), and in the case of farmers by the Social Insurance Fund for Farmers (Kasa Rolniczego Ubezpieczenia Społecznego, KRUS). Both institutions are quite well prepared for transferring pensions (separate departments established, leaflets for users printed, etc) although SEDs in electronic versions have not been implemented yet. Migrants are rather familiar with the procedures but – since pension systems and rules are rather complicated and differ from country to country – their implementation involve various problems, such as insurance periods aggregation, transferring contributions collected in private pension funds, taxation, and alike (Godłozą, 2010; IpiSS, 2010; Szybkie, 2010).

⁴⁸ http://praca.gazetaprawna.pl/artykuly/437661.rodzice_oddaja_zasilki_na_dzieci_gdy_jeden_z_nich_pracuje_w_ue.html,
http://praca.gazetaprawna.pl/artykuly/481373.masz_prace_w_unii_musisz_oddac_polski_zasilek_na_dziecko.html,
<http://www.polskatimes.pl/stronaglowna/5208.bez-becikowego-bo-tata-w-wielkiej-brytanii.id.t.html>

⁴⁹ MPiPS, personal communication (M. Drozdowicz).

Social Impact of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Central and Eastern Europe VT/2010/001

Frauds happen as well. The most typical consists in not reporting pensioner's death and collecting pensions by family members.

Each year, there are thousands of people contacting insurance institutions⁵⁰ for receiving information on the pension application procedures resulting from the EU coordination, and their number is fast growing, from 77,300 in 2005 up to 140,700 in 2009 (Table 3.5). Each year ZUS grants several thousand pensions based on the EU coordination and bilateral agreements and this activity is quickly expanding. The number of pensions paid in Poland was equal to 17,400 in 2005, over 28,500 in 2009, and 35,400 in 2010. These numbers look high but in fact they are moderate comparing to the number of Polish pensions granted each year (2009: 9.3 million, ZUS alone 7.5 million). Altogether, the total spending of ZUS on benefits resulting from international agreements, i.e. on pensions and benefit grants, is only 0.5% of its overall expenditure. One may add that the average pension based on the coordination is lower than based on the Polish rules alone⁵¹. In 2006-2007, the former did not reach 80% of the Polish pension. In 2009-2010 this ratio was slightly higher (above 80%).

At the same time, ZUS pays also pensions granted by foreign institutions but these payments do not seem to be important (Table 3.6). In 2005, only nine countries were involved. In 2009, only six have remained. Pensions come mainly from Germany but each year the number of German pensions decreases (6912 in 2005, 2894 in 2009). French pensions are the next but they are shrinking, too (1207 in 2005, 267 in 2009). Other countries are negligible. Certainly, foreign pensions may also be transferred directly to the bank account of a beneficiary but no statistics are available on such cases. Sometimes, recipients of foreign pensions face various bureaucratic barriers. For instance, problems with receiving so called "life certificate" which should be regularly presented to the pension provider have been recently reported. Eventually, it was solved by ZUS⁵². But this example shows that difficulties with payments of foreign pensions exist.

Healthcare

In Poland, healthcare is generally provided for those covered by the health insurance, including dependent family members and groups whose contributions are paid by the state budget (registered unemployed, social assistance beneficiaries, farmers) or for some vulnerable groups (children under 18, pregnant women, patients with certain infectious diseases, alcohol addicts, etc). Under the coordination rules, access to the healthcare services for family members of migrants subject to the health protection in some European (EU/EEA/H) country requires using E106 form (certifying entitlement to sickness and maternity insurance benefits in kind for persons residing in a country other than the competent country), E109 form (registration of family members), or E120 and E121 for pensioners. Returnees do not have specific rights and they have to follow general rules.

In 2010, regional agencies of the Polish National Health Fund (Narodowy Fundusz Zdrowia, NFZ) issued 26,586 E106 and 8,695 E109 forms certifying entitlements to the public healthcare in Poland⁵³. In 2008 – 2010, these figures were similar. Altogether, there were as much as 81,821 E106 and 21,044 E109 certificates valid in 2010 (46,806 and 17,177 in 2008). Given the emigration scope, these numbers look marginal. Most forms were registered in the west and south-west regions (Śląskie, Opolskie, Dolnośląskie, Zachodniopomorskie, Wielkopolskie, Małopolskie). They are all close to the EU neighbouring countries and are either regions of high emigration (Opolskie, Małopolskie) or high population (Śląskie, Wielkopolskie).

⁵⁰ Only the main institution, ZUS, is considered in this report. All statistics in this sub-section come from ZUS quarterly bulletins ZUS (2007-2011), [*Kwartalna*] *Informacja o świadczeniach pieniężnych z Funduszu Ubezpieczeń Społecznych oraz o niektórych innych świadczeniach z zabezpieczenia społecznego*, www.zus.gov.pl.

⁵¹ Data available for the researchers do not help explaining where such a relation comes from. Possibly, the difference of the employment/insurance period considered plays an important role in this case.

⁵² This case was widely covered by media. See the newspaper *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 22. and 23.09.2011, and TV news.

⁵³ All figures in this paragraph come from NFZ (2011), chapter V, Table V.2. Also, previous editions of this document have been referred to.

One should notice, however, that administrative procedures for accessing the health care which involve the use of forms/certificates are not always clear for migrants: What are exact rules to be applied? Which form should be chosen in a given case? What agency should be contacted? And, as the discussions show, healthcare providers (medical personnel in out-patient facilities and hospitals) may face problems, too⁵⁴.

3.3. Poverty and social exclusion

Poverty development and migration

Poverty in Poland is moderate by European standards. In 2009, relative poverty rate was equal to 17.3%⁵⁵, and it has been declining since 2003 (Figure 3.1). In 1993-2000, poverty was growing but it stabilized at the end of the decade. During the transition period, as various studies show, poverty trends followed closely variations in the labour market, mainly the unemployment trends (World Bank, 2003). This has not changed after the accession. Also, residence (living in rural areas – Figure 3.1), education (less than secondary) and family status (more than three dependent children in a household – Figure 3.2) have always been found as important poverty factors in Poland. But given the migration perspective, poverty among single parents and the elderly - who might be left behind by emigrants – should also be considered.

Relative poverty rates for single parents living with dependent children are higher than the average but they do not look very high⁵⁶, especially if compared with the rates for multi-children families (Figure 3.2). The difference between single parents' rates and the average poverty rate has never reached 6 pp whereas the rates for multi-children families have been almost three times the average. Such a finding is reported regularly in official CSO publications and is often referred to. It inclines policy makers to pay more attention to families with many children than to the single parents with dependent children. Actually, the latter group seems better supported at present, given various privileges it may enjoy – such as provision of benefits from the Alimony Fund or tax privileges⁵⁷, for instance. In some cases, specifically if an emigrating parent cannot be traced, such a support may be important for those left behind.

Contrary to rather high poverty among the single parents with children, poverty among the elderly is definitely low in Poland. It was visibly lower than the average in 1997-2004 (CSO estimates) and it has remained low in recent years, despite a considerable poverty increase. In 2005, at-risk-of-poverty-rate of people aged 65+ was by almost 13 pp lower than the average (7.3% versus 20.5% – Table 3.7). In 2010, this difference diminished to 3.4 pp (14.2% and 17.6%, respectively). Nevertheless, the elderly are still in a better position than the others. This relatively good situation of the elderly is mostly due to the quite generous pension system. Recently, however, its rules become tighter with a significant impact on poverty trends.

⁵⁴ See chats, Q&A, and discussions on the Internet – for instance: http://f.kafeteria.pl/temat.php?id_p=3798342 or http://www.polska-anglia.co.uk/leczenie_i_ubezpieczenie_w_anglii.htm and others.

⁵⁵ Figure 3.1 displays expenditure based poverty rates derived from the household budget surveys, following the CSO methodology. For these rates, poverty threshold is set at the level of 50% of the mean equivalent expenditure (scales: 1.0/0.7/0.5). The use of the CSO figures allows tracing poverty rates back to 1993, as well as analyzing rural-urban differences. This would be impossible with the at-risk-of-poverty rates provided by Eurostat. The latter are available only from 2005. Overall, CSO and Eurostat estimates are similar although some differences (by household type, for instance) still hold.

⁵⁶ Notice that income based at-risk-of poverty rates for single parents with dependent children derived from EU SILC are considerably higher. In 2007, for instance, CSO reported 19.1%, Eurostat estimate reached 31.0% (overall rates were equal). Such a huge discrepancy cannot be attributed to the various methodologies alone. It may indicate a substantial difference between the level of expenditures (used by CSO) and incomes (used by Eurostat) for these types of households, possibly resulting from (irregular) private transfers.

⁵⁷ Alimony benefits are paid to a single parent (usually, mother) caring for a child who - following a court sentence - should receive alimony from a spouse. If the court sentence is not executable – and under a variety of additional conditions, including an income test - alimony benefit may be granted at a maximum rate of PLN 500 or over € 100 per month. As regards the tax system, single parent can calculate the tax due assuming his/her income is shared with a dependent child (some conditions should be met).

Social Impact of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Central and Eastern Europe VT/2010/001

Social exclusion of the elderly remains below the average, too. The share of the poor or socially excluded among the old constantly decreases (Table 3.7). This shows that material and/or financial deprivation is not the major problem of the old people in Poland. Difficulties that the very old people may face relate rather to their health, as well as psychological and emotional condition. Therefore, one may assume that the elderly left behind by migrating young need rather adequate provision of medical care and everyday care than the pure financial assistance.

At the country level, international migration or emigration does not seem to play any visible role in shaping poverty trends⁵⁸. It does not have any noticeable impact on unemployment (Kaczmarczyk et al., 2010; Kaczmarczyk, 2010) and it has a negligible impact on the overall structure of population by rural-urban residence. On the other hand, emigration may influence the structure of population by family type (increasing the number and share of single parents with dependent children, at least temporarily) but its poverty effects have not been studied so far. Possibly, nationwide effects are positive (due to remittances) but rather moderate (given a relatively small share of parents who bring up their children alone due to emigration of a spouse).

This is not to say that emigration does not influence poverty at the local or micro levels. In the localities with very high emigration intensity its influence would be noticed. Also, families of emigrants may be pulled out of poverty due to remittances and/or due to savings brought back by returnees. In fact, remittances play a crucial role in changing material conditions and/or poverty of selected groups.

Remittances and their role at the macro level

Overall amount of (formal) remittances is estimated based on the national balance of payments according to the IMF methodology and relevant figures are available on the websites of international organisations. Although criticised for underreporting, they are often referred to, especially for international comparisons. In the case of Poland, the inflow of formal remittances shows a very rapid increase in 2004 – 2007/2008, just after the EU accession, and a slight decline in 2008 – 2010, during economic crisis (Figures 3.3 and 3.4). Altogether, Poland is ranked as 12th in the world for its overall amount of remittances (WB, 2011). In its peak, the share of remittances inflow in GDP reached 2% and over 45% of FDI (MPI, 2010). Solid empirical studies on the impact of remittances on the economic and social development are not available for Poland although this issue has been discussed and approached internationally. Ministry of Economy indicates that remittances allow for various investments (in education, real estate, small business) but given their limited scope this impact is small (MG DAP, 2007). For this, no clear empirical evidence or analysis is provided.

The role of remittances in the view of micro-surveys of migrants

On the other hand, micro/ethno-surveys carried out in selected districts and/or among selected migrant communities provide more information about the social impact of remittances. In this respect, situation of the ethnically specific region of the west of Poland (Opolskie) inhabited at large by the population with some German background – i.e. by people holding Polish-German citizenship, with German relatives or of German origin – is the most recognized (Jończy, 2006, 2010). According to the estimates based on the 2006' survey (over 4,000 questionnaires of migrants from 55 rural localities) and on some author's assumptions, people from this region working in Germany spent less than 20% of their earned income in the host country, over 66% in Poland, and they saved the rest (Jończy, 2010). In other words, they sent or brought back home PLN 580 or about EUR 165 (per inhabitant, per month), adding almost 80% to the average disposable income in theirs

⁵⁸ Adams and Page (2005) used data set from 71 developing countries (Poland included) and econometric modelling to single out the impact of migration poverty. They have found that on average both the increase of the share of international migrants and the increase of international remittances would lead to a decline of people living in poverty, for less than \$1.00 a day. This "global" result is not transferable to specific countries (Poland including) where in fact it is hard to find people living for less than \$1 a day.

Social Impact of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Central and Eastern Europe VT/2010/001

localities of origin (Jończy, 2010). Similar estimates of the shares spent by migrants in hosting (Germany) versus sending localities were derived from some other surveys of migrants conducted earlier (Fihel, Kaczmarczyk, 2007; Hirsfeld, 2001; Kaczmarczyk, 2004). Small differences between estimates may be attributed to the year of the survey, the population covered or to some other methodological considerations. Also, estimates of the level of individual income transfers by surveyed migrants allows for evaluating their total amount for a given region and population. Relevant figures are provided by some studies (Jończy, 2010; Kaczmarczyk, 2004; see also Table 3.8) and they are often referred to in various publications.

Empirical information on the way remittances are spent seems even more useful for the analysis of social impacts of emigration than the level statistics alone. Spending issue has been covered by most micro surveys already referred to (e.g. Jończy, 2010; Kaczmarczyk, 2004), as well as by some others (Korczyńska, 2003; Leśniak-Moczuk, 2007; Wieruszewska, 2007). Although results are not fully comparable they all show that income transferred from abroad finances, first, the current expenditure, such as food, communication and energy bills, some clothing etc. (over 40% of the total, depending on the survey, Jończy, 2010, p. 262; Kaczmarczyk, 2004, p. 182), next, housing construction and repairs (shares vary) and also cars, durables and recreation. Less attention is paid to education. This shows an important impact on the individual standard of living and – possibly – on inequality in the sending locality. Importantly, remittances are rarely used for investments (small business etc, Jonczy 2010: less than 3%, Kaczmarczyk 2004: 4%-6%). On the other hand, spending of remittances generates the increase of demand, development of the local retail market and – eventually – the price increase (analysis and estimation by Jończy, 2010 and Jończy, Rokita-Poskart, 2011).

Inequality impact of remittances and inter-household transfers

So far, the impact of remittances on inequality at the national level – with the use of solid methodology (strict concept of remittances and proper techniques such as econometric modeling) – has not been investigated in Poland. However, some indirect evidence of this impact may be provided. It may refer to (i) international studies covering Poland, and (ii) findings derived from the research on inter-household transfers⁵⁹.

Ebeke and Le Goff (2009) in their study of 80 developing countries (incl. Poland) over the period 1970-2000 have found that “remittances tend to be favorable to a reduction of income inequality in countries that have a relatively high level of development” and that small distance between the country of origin and the main destination of migrants would possibly work in the same direction. In the light of these results and given the characteristics of Polish migration one may conclude that in fact remittances would tend to reduce inequality in Poland. But it is hard to say whether this impact would be fairly strong. Looking at the results of the research on inter-household transfers may prove helpful at this point.

According to the CSO survey of 2009, inter-household transfers (in-kind and in-cash, received) amounted to 3.9 % of the disposable income of an average household⁶⁰. In previous years, this share was higher, and it was increasing in 2000-2003, from 4.7% up to 5.7%, and then it was steadily declining. Interestingly, single parents with children have always derived much more than the others from private transfers (19.3% of income in 2009⁶¹). Since transfers received include remittances, one can assume that foreign remittances would not reach the level just reported. Possibly, this share would be significantly lower.⁶² But quite possibly, remittances would fluctuate in the same way as private transfers taken together do.

⁵⁹ Notice also the results mentioned in the previous paragraph and a study on regional convergence quoted in section 4.3.

⁶⁰ GUS (2010), *Household budget surveys in 2009*, Tables 12-13, Table 1, p. 227 and own computation.

⁶¹ See footnote 56 assuming such a high share of transfers and discussing its possible effects.

⁶² Kalbarczyk (2008) using the SHARE database shows that quite possibly only 12.5% of the cash private transfers between children and parents aged 49+ can be seen as remittances.

Having set a benchmark level for the share of remittances in household income, one may ask what the impact of remittances on income inequality would be. Once again, results regarding private transfers may cautiously be used for making some conclusion. Clearly, the income share of private transfers decreases with increasing income and this gives some evidence of their equalizing effect⁶³. More rigorous studies carried out in Poland show that in fact private transfers reduce inequality although their role is not spectacular (Kalbarczyk, 2008; Topińska, 1991). Quite possibly, remittances would produce a similar equalizing effect. But certainly this effect would be weaker. Not only the amount of remittances is smaller than of all inter-household transfers taken together but also characteristics of families involved (more entrepreneurial) and motives of remittances (less altruistic) are rather specific.

4. Labour market and social development trends in net migration loss / gain regions

4.1. Identification of net migration loss/gain regions

According to official data on international migration, almost all regions⁶⁴ of Poland suffer from small excess emigration. Typically, in recent years (2004-2008) net emigration was around 1,000 persons annually, with five exceptions (of 16 regions altogether); in two regions net emigration was below 500 but in two other regions it was within 3,000-4,000 whereas in just one region net immigration was observed (usually below 1,000)⁶⁵. Such diversity does not allow us to distinguish between migration loss and gain regions; not only that the differences seem too small for this but also to a large degree they represent a statistical artefact⁶⁶. The situation changed in 2009 when the number of emigrants became almost equal to the number of immigrants, and the net migration was close to zero. A half of the regions recorded net immigration and another half net emigration. Traditionally, the three regions of Silesia (notably Opolskie and Śląskie) noted the excess of emigration and among those with the excess immigration Małopolskie and Mazowieckie were the most important⁶⁷.

Since the official migration statistics greatly underestimate real migration flows, we have to focus on the movements of those persons who in the official statistics are recognised as temporary migrants. The description below will refer to the CMR database extracted from the Polish LFS, which embraces 'temporary migrants' who emigrated in 1999-2003 and 2005-2006 (Grabowska-Lusinska, Okólski, 2009).

As explained in part 2, in the both periods (called here: 'pre-accession' and 'post-accession', respectively) all regions suffered net migration losses. In the pre-accession period Opolskie with relatively large share of binational (German-Polish) population, and three regions of eastern and south-eastern Poland (Małopolskie, Podkarpackie and Podlaskie), characterised by the long-standing tradition of emigration and highly developed migratory networks, displayed distinctly higher intensity of the outflow than other regions⁶⁸. In turn, in the post-accession period migrants became much more evenly distributed by region of their residence than they were in the preceding period. Still some regions (Podkarpackie, Podlaskie, Świętokrzyskie, Małopolskie and Lubelskie) were greatly over-represented whereas some others (Łódzkie, Śląskie and Mazowieckie) continued to be severely under-represented. For instance, in the post-accession period, the migrants from Mazowieckie constituted only 7% of the total outflow from Poland while the share of that region in the total population was as high as 13%. Quite conversely, the proportion of Podkarpackie in the total outflow was 12% and only 5% in the total population.

⁶³ GUS (2010), *Household budget surveys in 2009*, Table 11 and own computations.

⁶⁴ The definition of region is given in note 19 (2.2).

⁶⁵ In relative terms, in all regions it was less than 0.2% of the total region's population (in most cases less than 0.1%).

⁶⁶ This is because the official emigration count is significantly underestimated as it does not include temporary migration (see 2.1).

⁶⁷ Even the extreme relative values, however, were very low, in the range from -0,03% to +0,02% of the total population.

⁶⁸ See a map of Poland (Figure 4.1).

**Social Impact of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Central and Eastern Europe
VT/2010/001**

By means of the analysis based on the Migration Selectivity Index (Anacka, Okólski, 2010) we may conclude that in the cross-regional perspective the propensity to emigrate was inversely correlated with the level of urbanisation (Figure 4.1). In other words, the higher the share of urban population in region, the lower intensity of international migration from that region (the higher under-representation of that region in the total Poland's outflow).

The effects of those regional differences in terms of the loss of demographic and economic potential were very diversified. The most severely affected was male population at age 15 years or more. The loss due to the post-accession outflow in that group of population was in excess of 8.4% in Podkarpackie (in urban and rural areas) and in Podlaskie and Świętokrzyskie (only in urban areas). On the other hand, female population aged 15+ encountered the lowest loss – below 2% in Mazowieckie and Śląskie (in urban and rural areas), Opolskie (only in urban areas) and Wielkopolskie (only in rural areas). Some regions might have lost much more in some, the most highly affected groups of the population. It was estimated that the population of rural residents aged 20-24 of Podkarpackie and urban residents aged 25-29 of Podlaskie and Warmińsko-Mazurskie declined due to the post-accession migration by more than 20% (Anacka, Okólski, 2010).

Summing up, the following regions were identified as particularly exposed to a high outflow of people⁶⁹: Podkarpackie, Podlaskie and Świętokrzyskie (and, but less highly, Lubelskie and Małopolskie). For quite different reason Opolskie⁷⁰ should also be included in this group (see Figure 4.2)⁷¹.

4.2. Labour market development in net migration loss/gain regions

The situation on all regional labour markets in the post-accession period evolved in accordance with the national trend. Everywhere in 2004-2008 the unemployment rate displayed a spectacular decline whereas after 2008 it rose. From this point of view, as seen from Figure 4.2, the position of high loss regions was initially (in 2004) differentiated and in the both sub-periods changed at different pace. Similar observation might be made concerning the low loss regions. Generally, the pace of decline in unemployment (between 2004 and 2008) seemed slightly slower in the high-loss regions and the pace of increase (between 2008 and 2010) hardly differed between the two groups of regions but no obvious regularity can be found in this respect, as the figures to follow (change of the unemployment rate in percentage points⁷²) indicate:

Region	2004-2008	2008-2010
<i>high-loss regions</i>		
Podkarpackie	-6.1	+3.3
Świętokrzyskie	-8.6	+1.0
Podlaskie	-6.4	+3.5
Lubelskie	-6.6	+1.8
Małopolskie	-7.5	+2.9
Opolskie	-10.2	+3.0
<i>low-loss regions</i>		
Mazowieckie	-7.4	+2.1
Łódzkie	-10.3	+2.9
Śląskie	-12.7	+3.0
Wielkopolskie	-9.5	+2.8

In 2004-2008 the improvement in terms of the unemployment was generally stronger in those regions where the outflow of people was rather insignificant. Or rather, not-so-strong outflow

⁶⁹ We still refer to the post-accession migration of population aged 15+.

⁷⁰ It was one of two major regions of large out-migration immediately before the accession to the EU. In the post-accession period, this region, though lagging behind the 'top losers', still ranked among the regions who recorded the migration-related net loss of population

⁷¹ In contrast, Mazowieckie, Śląskie, Łódzkie and Wielkopolskie belonged to regions the least affected by out-migration.

⁷² Changes in the official unemployment rates as observed at the end of respective year.

Social Impact of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Central and Eastern Europe VT/2010/001

occurred because of faster decline in the unemployment rate. In turn, the changes in the unemployment rate in the period of economic crisis (2008-2010) did not display any consistency.

Furthermore, a juxtaposition of regions according to the rate of unemployment at the time of Poland's accession to the EU and the intensity of migration in the post-accession period (Figure 4.3) clearly suggests that the outflow was loosely (if at all) related to the situation on regional labour market. In particular, four regions whose population belongs to the most highly prone to emigration (Podkarpackie, Lubelskie, Podlaskie and Małopolskie) found themselves among the six regions with the lowest rate of unemployment.

What might be pertinent to the analysis of labour market situation in a cross-regional perspective, is that the unemployment rate in Polish regions in 2008 was generally positively related to the labour market capacity of largest regional agglomeration expressed by the unemployment rate in that agglomeration (see Figure 4.4). High regional rates coincided with high unemployment in the largest regional labour market while the low regional rates were observed in regions where unemployment in the main agglomeration was very low (usually below 5 per cent). It is very likely that it was labour market situation in a major regional agglomeration that mattered for regional outflow of people rather than the regional level of unemployment itself.

A thorough analysis of the performance of local labour markets in Poland covering the period 2000-2005 sheds more light on the specificity of the migration high-loss regions (Bukowski, 2007). First of all, it follows from that analysis that the situation in regional labour markets is immensely diversified; e.g. the inter-regional variation of the rate of unemployment does not strongly differ (in fact, it is a little lower) from the intra-regional variation that reflects the differences between sub-regions⁷³. In turn, the decisive factors which allow one to distinguish between various categories of the sub-regions are closely related to sub-regional GDP per capita, functions played by those units in regional and national economy and the degree of pro-development institutional arrangements introduced. At sub-regional level Polish economy can be perceived from the perspective of 'functional clusters', with six such clusters: 1. Development centres; 2. Sub-urban areas (surrounding the development centres), 3. Main cities (other than located in the development centres), 4. Areas with predominance of the former state farms, 5. Areas with predominance of low-productivity farms, and 6. Areas characterised by mixed (mainly agricultural and industrial) activities. In addition, sub-regional economies seem to be seriously affected by being (or not) the place of functioning of Special Economic Zone (SEZ, in Polish SSE)⁷⁴. In 2006 there were 14 such zones in Poland, which encompassed 99 sub-regions (26% of all sub-regions). In brief, in 2000-2005, the economic (including labour market) performance⁷⁵ was by all means the best in sub-regions that were classified to cluster 1 (4.5% of all sub-regions), followed by those belonging to clusters 2 (12%) and 3 (11%). In respect of all variables but one (the unemployment rate⁷⁶) the worst situation was observed in clusters 5 (24.5%) and 6 (22%). Furthermore, the spatial distribution of SEZs is rather uneven; almost a half of those zones are located in sub-regions that belong to cluster 4 whereas hardly any SEZ was established in eastern Polish sub-regions⁷⁷.

⁷³ At the regional level, basic unit of the analysis was sub-region (*powiat*, NUTS4).

⁷⁴ SEZs are specifically delimited administrative areas (embracing one or few neighbouring sub-regions) where economic activity receives preferential treatment, mainly by means of tax exemptions and credits. They were created with a purpose of revitalizing of economically backward or declining areas by attracting capital investment and entrepreneurship.

⁷⁵ The list of indicators of economic performance included, among others: unemployment rate, variation of unemployment, ratio of unemployed-to-vacancies, employment rate, activity rate, share of urban population, share of population with university diploma, share of employment in agriculture (also in industry and services), change in the number of employed in agriculture (also in industry and services), average wage rate, municipality own income per capita, etc.

⁷⁶ The rate in those clusters was generally lower than in all other clusters (except cluster 1).

⁷⁷ No SEZ exists in two eastern regions: Podlaskie and Lubelskie (2 SEZs have been set up in Podkarpackie).

Bearing in mind the above description, the migration high-loss regions hardly included sub-regions belonging to clusters 1 and 2, the exceptions being city of Krakow in Małopolskie and city of Opole in Opolskie⁷⁸. The largest part of population of Podkarpackie, Świętokrzyskie, Opolskie and Małopolskie lived in sub-regions allotted to cluster 5, while in Podlaskie and Lubelskie population of cluster 6 predominated. In addition, as already alluded to, the development of those regions was insufficiently supported by means preferential institutional measures, such as SEZ. All these suggest that the regions characterised by the highest intensity of outflow of their population were structurally underdeveloped and/or lacked institutional pro-development support, and their high out-migration rate – due to a strong reliance on family-based peasant economy – was loosely related to the employment opportunities in the local labour markets.

The analysis at regional level (*województwo*; NUTS2) generally confirms that the level of development measured by GDP per capita seems to be particularly strongly associated with the intensity of outflow. The average GDP per capita for 2007-2009⁷⁹ in the high migration loss regions was by 20-30% below the national level whereas in the low loss regions⁸⁰ it was above that level (in case of Mazowieckie by as much as 60%). Stepping down to NUTS4 level (*powiat*), it might be noticed that the high loss regions lacked a regional well-developed sub-region capable of playing the role of attraction pole for migrants from poorer (surrounding) areas. The highest level of sub-regional GDP per capita in those regions, though higher than the respective regional level, was still lower than the national average (by 10-20 percentage points). In stark contrast to this, each of the low loss regions possessed at least one sub-region with a remarkably high development level, which possibly could absorb large numbers of job-seekers (migrant workers) from region's less-better-off areas⁸¹.

Less obvious was the impact (association) of other socio-economic factors (GUS, 2003). For instance, according to the 2002 population census, one high migration loss region (Podlaskie) displayed a very high proportion of households whose primary source of living was the employment in agriculture (13.4%) but in the other that proportion ranged between 4% and 9%. With the exception of Śląskie (1.0%), however, in the low loss regions it was not significantly lower (between 6 % and 9%). The same holds for the labour force participation rates (in general and by age). A bit more straightforward conclusion ensues from the analysis of influence of the population education. In the high loss regions the proportion of the best educated (completed tertiary education) among those aged 13+ was a little lower than the national average whereas it was a little higher in the low loss regions (+1-4 points relative to -1-3 points). By the same token, the proportion of the lowest educated (elementary or lower) was above the Poland's average (by 3-7 points) in case of the low loss regions whereas it was around that level in case of the low loss regions (between -3 and +7 points).

4.3. Poverty and social exclusion in net migration loss / gain regions

Poverty by region

The pattern of poverty by region is depicted in Figure 4.5. The figure covers 2001 but, in fact, regional poverty pattern has been pretty stable over last years. The east of Poland, namely Warmińsko-Mazurskie, Lubelskie, Podkarpackie and - more towards the centre – Świętokrzyskie voivodships have always been the poorest. They were closely followed by Podlaskie, located in the east as well. In other words, poverty rates in these regions have been the highest. Not surprisingly, these very regions belong to the group of migrants' senders, with the highest levels of the net migration loss (exception, Warmińsko-Mazurskie). One should add that all of them are rural regions.

⁷⁸ They (except for a small part of Podkarpackie and Podlaskie) did not include sub-regions in cluster 4 either.

⁷⁹ Conclusions presented in this paragraph are based on official data published on 31 October 2011 (http://www.stat.gov.pl/gus/5840_12117_PLK_HTML.htm; accessed on 9 December 2011).

⁸⁰ Except for Lodzkie where it was by 8% lower than the national average.

⁸¹ For instance, in Mazowieckie the highest sub-regional GDP per capita was by 200 (!) percentage points above the Poland's average while in Wielkopolskie – by 100 points, in Śląskie – by 45 points, and in Lodzkie – by 20 points.

Social Impact of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Central and Eastern Europe VT/2010/001

However, there are two additional sending regions – namely Małopolskie (south) and Opolskie (south-west) voivodships – which do not reveal high poverty rates. On the contrary, their poverty has been always low compared to other regions (particularly in Opolskie). These regions are rather urbanized (especially Opolskie) and carry specific features: Opolskie – with considerable German ethnic minority, Małopolskie – with a long tradition of emigration, quite a touristic region at present (Cracow, Tatra mountains). These features rather than poverty seem important in explaining regional emigration in Opolskie and Małopolskie.

Regions with the lowest poverty levels, Mazowieckie, Łódzkie, Śląskie, Opolskie and Małopolskie, are all located in the central belt, going from the north-east to the south. All of them are urbanized (mainly Śląskie), three belong to the group of low migration loss (exception already listed: Opolskie and Małopolskie voivodships).

Changes of regional poverty and migration trends

Has emigration changed the ranking of regions by the poverty level or has it changed the poverty rates in Polish regions? Evidence is really hard to provide without rigorous studies, and they are virtually absent. But one can just have a look at changes in poverty confronting them with migration trends.

Changes of relative poverty rates in 1999-2009 and 2004-2009 by region are displayed in Table 4.1. Regions with poverty changes worse than the overall (higher increase than the average or lower reduction than the average) are marked with red. One can see that three sending regions belong to this group, namely Lubelskie, Podlaskie and Świętokrzyskie but certainly not Opolskie. Changes of poverty in Mazowieckie and Łódzkie (low net migration loss voivodships) were rather positive but Śląskie has not been improving that clearly. Moreover, other regions make this picture even fuzzier. Much more detailed investigation would be needed for making conclusions on the impact of migration trends on regional poverty.

On the other hand, some evidence regarding the impact of emigration on inter-regional inequalities may be provided. Strictly speaking it regards the convergence and the growth issues but it says something about inequality impact as well. The rigorous research by Wolszczak-Derlacz (2009), with the use of CSO data for 1995-2006 (permanent migration only) shows that “the migration flows are not the factor reducing [regional] disparities, on the contrary in the long-run the out migration flows influence negatively the origin region’s growth what is the challenge for regional policy makers”.

Social exclusion in the light of rural-urban and regional statistics

Recent studies give evidence of much worse living conditions, or higher social exclusion, in rural than in urban areas. This regards poverty, access to services, education status and many other characteristics. Since sending regions are rural (skipping atypical Opolskie and Małopolskie) while the others ones are rather not, rural-urban together with the regional breakdown may be useful in studying social exclusion versus migration patterns.

In rural regions, poverty has always been much higher than in urban areas (relative rate, 1997: 23% rural, 10% urban; 2003: 31% rural, 14% urban; 2009: 26% rural, 12% urban – GUS 1998 and 2010c; see also Figure 3.1). Since 2003, rural-urban poverty difference has been diminishing, from 17.7 down to 14.3 percentage points, but it still remains substantial.

Access to some services also illustrates large rural-urban disparities. This may be seen, for instance, through the share of children aged 3-6 in kindergartens (2000: 63% urban, 35% rural areas; 2008: 78% urban, 43% rural areas⁸²). In recent years, these indicators clearly improved and this improvement was more pronounced in urban than in rural regions making urban-rural gap each year larger (28 pp in 2000, 35 pp in 2008). Regional statistics show, not

⁸² Administrative data from GUS (2001 and 2009), *Rocznik statystyczny województw 2001 [2009]*, Table 30(135) and 24(128), respectively. Statistics reported refer to all childcare facilities for children aged 3-6 (kindergartens, pre-school and smaller facilities etc).

surprisingly, that in most sending regions enrolment rates and changes of these rates are below the national average⁸³. This regards all “rural” voivodships, namely Lubelskie, Podkarpackie, Podlaskie and Świętokrzyskie. Świętokrzyskie is in the worst position with the lowest country rate (43.8% children of age 3-6 enrolled in 2000, 54.9% in 2008) and one of the lowest changes of all. But in two “urban” voivodships which also belong to the net migration-losers, in Opolskie and Małopolskie, the situation is quite the opposite. In fact, access to childcare facilities in Opolskie is far better than in any other voivodship in Poland and it has improved considerably (enrolment was equal 62.9% in 2000 and 77.9% in 2008). On the other hand, access to kindergartens in low migration loss regions, measured with the enrolment rate, has always been above the national average. In Śląskie, this rate has remained among the highest in Poland (56.7% in 2000, 71.4% in 2008).

Quite surprisingly, according to the survey statistics, access to healthcare perceived by inhabitants of rural areas looks better than in urban areas, at least as regards the primary care. A survey of over 2,000 respondents conducted in 2008 shows that almost all residents of villages (94%) found access to services granted by general practitioners easy, while only 40% of large cities' residents shared this opinion (CSIOZ, 2009, p. 2). Moreover, situation in the large cities deteriorated over time. In 2008, fewer residents than in the past found it easy to reach GP. The conclusion that healthcare provision has relatively improved in rural areas while this is not necessarily true for urban regions may be also drawn from the survey *Diagnoza Społeczna* (Czapiński, Panek, 2005). But it seems that all this may be attributed to the healthcare reform of 1999 and is not related to the migration process. Looking at the regional statistics of medical personnel one can notice that while in 2003-2009 the number of physicians diminished in a country as a whole, voivodships were not equally affected. Those sending fewer migrants (first of all Wielkopolskie and Śląskie) lost relatively more physicians than the others (BDL figures), except of Łódzkie. This, however, does not necessarily mean that access to medical services has worsened there⁸⁴.

Housing deprivation, in terms of poor equipment of dwellings in basic facilities, has always been much more pronounced in villages than in towns or in the cities. This has not changed despite the recent improvements in this field. In 1995, 14% of urban dwellings had no bathroom, 22% did not have central heating and 12% lacked indoor WC. These figures for rural dwellings amounted to – approximately – 39%, 50% and 43%, respectively. In the last years, these shares declined rather quickly, especially in villages, down to 24%, 35% and 25% in 2009 (towns/cities: 8% no bathroom, 15% no central heating and 7% no indoor toilet)⁸⁵. But most changes occurred before the EU accession. After 2004, when emigration expanded, they were very small in rural and almost invisible in urban areas. Examination of the regional (voivodship) statistics confirms this finding. Since 2004, almost nothing has changed as regards dwelling equipment in bathroom or in central heating in urban areas of high population loss (Lubelskie, Małopolskie, Podkarpackie, Podlaskie, Opolskie, Świętokrzyskie) and slight improvement was visible in the rural areas of these voivodships. But the same may be said about other regions of Poland, including the low migration ones (Mazowieckie, Łódzkie or Śląskie)⁸⁶.

5. Impact of migration on vulnerable groups

5.1. Women

In Poland, the impact of emigration on women who stay in the country of origin is not paid special attention. This issue is approached almost exclusively in the context of childcare provision. Reports on children left behind mention the role of women as mothers,

⁸³ Regional statistics (administrative data) come from Local Data Bank [Bank Danych Lokalnych] of the Central Statistical Office and are available at: www.stat.gov.pl.

⁸⁴ Compare discussion on healthcare in section 3.3.

⁸⁵ GUS (1996), *Living conditions of the population in 1995*, Table 46 and Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Poland 2010, Table 17(222).

⁸⁶ Administrative figures derived from Bank Danych Lokalnych [Local Data Bank] of the CSO: http://www.stat.gov.pl/bdlen/app/dane_podgrup.hier?p_id=581117&p_token=1149167072.

grandmothers or caregivers enumerating how many of them are involved in child-caring (Walczak, 2008b), but detailed studies in this field are not available. Certainly, it is also recognized that women living in the country of origin have to take individually various family, business and work related decisions. They may feel abandoned (overuse of alcohol is sometimes reported⁸⁷) or become more independent – for this anecdotal evidence may be provided⁸⁸. But exhaustive studies are hard to find. Altogether, it does not seem that the women's role has changed drastically due to the very process of migration.

On the other hand, the situation of migrating women and returning women is quite recognized. Although quantitative data are rather scarce, qualitative information is widely available.

Migration-driven loss in the female population is less pronounced than the loss in the population of male (see section 3.1) but Polish women migrate quite intensively, primarily the young and not-married. Married women are less mobile, especially if they bring up their children. Moreover, Polish society is rather traditional and mothers who migrate and leave their off-springs aside are often considered as misbehaving or even immoral (Urbańska, 2009).

Women, many of them uneducated, migrate to the EU and non-EU countries (Germany, Italy, Spain, Netherlands, US) to look after the elderly, as seasonal workers, or taking various junk-jobs, such as dirty cleaning under short-term contracts, for instance. Very often they are moonlighting (Kindler, Napierała, 2010; Napierała, 2010; Slany, 2009 and Feminist Think Tank project on migrating women⁸⁹). Importantly, this has an impact on their situation if they decide to return. Although they are usually fairly satisfied with coming-back (Kawczyńska-Butrym, 2011; Markowski, 2010), they may face more problems than men in finding a job, they have less chance to use social security benefits (including those based on the co-ordination rules), they are more prone to financial failures, etc. In order to help returning women, specially designed programmes have recently been implemented⁹⁰.

There is yet another aspect of women migration visible in some sending regions which is occasionally reported. Their migration from rural localities of the east of Poland (of Podlaskie and Warmińsko-Mazurskie voivodships) has resulted in a disproportionately low number of young females living there. Unintentionally, this has interfered – as some argue – with the process of family formation making women residing in these particular localities more attractive (ZDS PRM, 2009, p. 242). This kind of situation has never been reported as regards men. Neither its impact on the regional birth rates has been noticed.

But an acute demographic effect of the outflow of the young women in the form of a deficit of births in the country of origin has already been found. A recent estimate claims that in 2004-2009 in Great Britain alone approximately 65,000 children were born to residents of Polish citizenship. In addition, in 2009 this country hosted some 50,000-60,000 Polish children who were born in Poland (Iglicka, 2011). In fact, increasing number of young Polish women bear children in foreign countries where they actually live.

5.2. Children

The impact of emigration on children is paid significant attention in Poland. This is in part due to the commitment of the Polish Ombudsman [RPO] and the Ombudsman for Children [RPD] financing studies, reports, conferences etc (RPD, 2008; RPO, 2009). As a result, a nationwide representative survey on children left-behind by emigrating parent(s) has been conducted in 2008 (Walczak, B., 2008b, 2009), complementing previous local studies.

⁸⁷ For the overuse of alcohol, see: <http://goniec.com/mama/rodzina/4202.zony-emigrantow-naduzywaja-alkoholu/>. It may be noticed that this type of opinions are often presented by conservative groups. The one reported refers to the statement by a Catholic priest.

⁸⁸ See for instance <http://praca.wp.pl/title,Zony-emigrantow,wid,10486048,wiadomosc.html?ticaid=1c26a> presenting a story told by a woman whose husband emigrated. More similar stories may be found.

⁸⁹ See http://www.ekologiasztuka.pl/think.tank.feministyczny/articles.php?cat_id=25 for a number of project reports (by T. Święćkowska, D. Sobolewska-Bielecka, W. Kloc-Nowak).

⁹⁰ See for instance POKL project in Lubelskie mentioned in section 6.4.

Carried out (i) in the local government agencies, (ii) among school teachers, (iii) among children of age 9-18, it provides information on the number of children affected by emigration, on their psychological and social problems (at school, at home, in their local communities), and – to some extent – on the awareness of these issues for the local agencies. Overall, the total number of children who experienced separation with at least one parent in the last three years has been estimated at 1.1 – 1.6 million, or 26%-29% of children aged 9-18 (Walczak, B., 2009). However, about 40% of cases cannot be treated as the result of “true” emigration (for separation lasted less than 2 months), and this brings the estimate down to 660-960 thousand. Interestingly, the structure of emigrants bringing up children differs from the overall, showing higher percentage of migrating men (Walczak, B., 2009). Based on the teachers’ opinions, the study provides also some information on the share of students with various problems at school, such as lower grades, absences, misbehaviour etc. (Walczak, B., 2008b, 2009, Balicki et al. 2009). But it also shows that schools and school teachers are not well aware of the scale of the issues and are not prepared to handle them properly.

Interestingly, as the 2008 research shows, the share of misbehaving pupils among children left behind, of those with lower grades, revealing “party-going” life-style, overusing alcohol or drugs is not statistically different from the overall. However, older children aged 14-18 whose parents both emigrated were absent from the classes more often than the others. Also, the incidence rate of criminal offenses leading to the court sentence was found higher among the left behind (4.1%) than among the total population of pupils (1.5%). About 40% of children left behind were seeking help from a teacher or a counsellor but over 60% of them did not receive any support⁹¹.

At the same time, yet another nationwide study (survey) on the issue of “euro-orphans” was conducted. It was aimed at the recognition of the scale of the issue, and was also treated as the awareness campaign (FPE, 2008). Estimates derived from this survey show that in 2008 it was about 110,000 single-parent or parentless families of emigrants bringing up children (Potrykowska, 2009) and this gives certainly more (two times more?) children affected. These figures seem underestimated, given results discussed in the previous paragraph.

Unfortunately, results of the surveys of 2008 say nothing about the previous periods. They allow assuming that although the issue of euro-orphans is not that new, its scale was possibly much smaller. Census results show that in 2002, the number of families with children under 24 with emigrant members (absent for more than 2 months) was equal to 199 thousand, while the number of single parents with emigrant members amounted to over 100 thousand (Kostrzewska, Szalys, 2009). But, given different methodologies, i.e. concepts and definitions, census 2002 figures and survey estimates cannot be directly compared.

5.3. Elderly

Older people migrate rarely. In 2007, Eurostat registered only 978 Polish emigrants of the age 65+, or 2.8% of the total emigration flow. In 2006, this share was even lower (2.2%), and it was not that much higher in 2004-2006.⁹² This means that while the youth are migrating, the elderly usually stay in the country of origin. One should add that – given the overall population structure by age and sex – those who stay are mainly older women. But the exact number of the elderly who actually are left behind is hard to estimate.

In general, the situation of old people left behind by migrants is not paid special attention in Poland and there are no studies on their specific situation⁹³. Their role as caregivers and sometimes as legal guardians of children is acknowledged and somehow recognized (Walczak, B., 2008a, b). The survey of 2008 shows that even when only one parent is absent due to emigration, grandparents quite often (15.8%) become main caregivers of children

⁹¹ Results quoted are from Walczak, B. (2008b), pp. 36, 28, and 26-27, respectively.

⁹² Emigrants leaving his/her usual residence for a period that is, or is expected to be, of at least 12 months. Figures come from http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/statistics/search_database (data on emigration, accessed in April 2011). See also section 1.2 of this report for additional figures on migration by age.

⁹³ This finding is confirmed but a number of experts who in fact see the need for studying situation of the elderly left behind.

(Walczak, B., 2008b, p. 23)⁹⁴. But seniors residing in the country of origin who themselves need care and support are not that much noticed.

While there are a number of studies on the economic and social condition of the elderly, on family ties etc⁹⁵, the only information regarding the impact of emigration on the elderly left in the country of origin comes from the explorative work done among the Polish immigrants in Austria and a small survey conducted recently in Iceland (Krzyżowski, 2010, 2011). Krzyżowski has found that although the distance is an important factor influencing the form of contacts between migrating adults and their old parents, intensity of contacts and supporting activities remains high. 66 per cent of Polish emigrants to Iceland who left their parents behind reported providing necessary care of some form, 56% declared sending money transfers (remittances) at the average amount of PLN 800 or EUR 200 per month.⁹⁶

These conclusions look optimistic. But results of local studies (ISP, 2011) and opinions of social workers (IPiSS and IPS UW, 2010) are quite different. They rather indicate that the elderly are not supported in an adequate way by their emigrating children, if not to say that they are often abandoned. Findings from research on inter-household transfers also suggest that transfers usually go from the old to the young or, in other words, the elderly are mostly net givers but not net takers of transfers.⁹⁷ Altogether, gains of the elderly from the emigration process are rather debatable.

5.4. Roma

Roma population is really marginal in Poland. Their total number is estimated at about 13,000 – 35,000, depending on the data source (Harwas-Napierała, 2008; Mazur, 2010; Topińska, 2003, 2011; Walczak, M. et al., 2008)⁹⁸. Altogether, this is less than 1‰ of the total Polish resident population (0.03 % - 0.09 % out of ca. 38 million). The Polish Roma community belongs to four ethnic groups (Polska Roma, Bergitka, Kelderari and Lovari). They live mainly in urban areas (approx. 93%, according to the 2002 Census), in towns rather than in the large cities. The largest population of Roma resides in the very south of Poland (Małopolskie). All southern regions taken together (Małopolskie and Śląskie in the centre, Dolnośląskie and Opolskie in the south-west, Podkarpackie in the south-east) account for about half of all Roma living in Poland.

At present, all Roma in Poland are sedentary. Except of Bergitka, they were nomadic until the end of the sixties of the 20th century. In 1964, Roma were forced by law to settle but a few migrating carts were sometimes spotted already in the mid-seventies. Today, they migrate occasionally and their migration process – which is rather temporary - has intensified after the EU accession in 2004. Many of them follow typical directions of the Polish migration flows towards the UK and Germany. On the other hand, some cases of recent immigration of Roma – mainly from Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria, less from the FSU – have been reported. Altogether, discrimination against Roma and social exclusion of Roma (including immigrants) remains an issue. While the exact poverty figures are not available, health related problems, low level of education and miserable housing conditions are often reported (MSWiA, 2010; Topińska, 2011).

5.5. Other ethnic and religious vulnerable communities

Since years, Polish population has been fairly homogeneous as regards religion and ethnicity. At present, Catholics account for almost 88.5%, Orthodox for 1.3%, the next group

⁹⁴ This share depends on the length of stay abroad and sex of migrating parent (mother or father).

⁹⁵ See for instance Kalbarczyk (2008), Szukalski (2009), UNDP (1999) but the literature on these issues is abundant.

⁹⁶ Krzyżowski (2011), based on 40 in depth interviews and 235 questionnaires received through the Internet.

⁹⁷ Kalbarczyk (2008) or UNDP (1999), ch. 5.

⁹⁸ Higher estimates by International Organization for Migration (42,000) or (50,000 – 60,000) Minority Rights Group of the European Council are very rarely referred to – see Mazur (2010), p. 140 and 141.

includes Protestants and is about three times smaller than the latter.⁹⁹ Buddhists, Muslims (mostly immigrants and/or refugees) are virtually absent. Jews was the largest minority before the Second World War but holocaust and to certain extent three after-war emigration waves (the latter at the end of the sixties of the 20st century), turned their number down to a few thousand. As regards ethnicity, Germans (153,000 to over 200,000) constitute the most important ethnic minority group in Poland¹⁰⁰. Ukrainians (7,000-31,000) and Belarusians (4,600- 48,000) are ranked next¹⁰¹.

None of these groups is strictly speaking vulnerable but the impact of their emigration attitudes is worth noticing. Germans / ethnic Germans holding quite often dual citizenship, live mostly in the west of Poland, in Śląskie and Opolskie voivodships. They migrate intensively to Germany (sections 2.3 and 4.1), sending remittances while abroad or bringing their savings with them after coming back to Poland (section 3.3). This certainly improves their living conditions at home, as well as the standard of living of their communities. Belarusians and Ukrainians live in the eastern regions (Belarusians in Podlaskie, Ukrainians in Warmińsko-Mazurskie and Podkarpackie). Despite some restrictions, they often commute to the neighbouring Ukraine, Belarus or Russia (for cross-border trading and alike) and this allows for improving their material standard in Poland.

6. Policy responses

6.1. Encouragement of circular migration

Circular migration is becoming more and more a significant form of international mobility of labour. The factors that are conducive to its development include first of all a rapid growth of transportation and communication networks, and policies of the host countries who are increasingly less willing to admit new long-term residents from the third countries. Considering the case of Poland in recent few decades, one might notice a number of other and specific factors. First of all, until May 1st, 2011 the Polish workers encountered barriers in the access to labour markets of the EU countries (except, since May 1st, 2004, the British market and increasingly few others). The barriers were by far more effective with regard to the long-term than circular migrants¹⁰². Secondly, Poland is located in the closest neighbourhood of Germany, the largest European labour market, and not far of many others, which makes circular mobility technically and economically easy. Thirdly, Poland has a long-standing tradition of circular labour mobility, especially directed to Germany (but also to the Czech Republic, Austria and few other countries), what implies the access to direct contacts with employers and wide social networks. Fourthly, in the 1980s and 1990s Polish migrants mastered a special form of circular mobility, called 'incomplete migration', which enabled them to economise on the differences in the cost of living between the host countries and Poland, and 'transfer' low wage received abroad into high real income in Poland (Okólski, 2001). Incomplete migration, although less popular than before May 1st, 2004, is still practised by a large number of Poles.

After 1989 (until 2004) Poland actively promoted circular migration as (among other reasons) a means of alleviating the deficit of jobs. A major instrument of that policy was entering bilateral labour agreements with countries within the reach of Polish workers and enhancing their effectiveness. In the early 1990s the agreements were concluded with Germany,

⁹⁹ GUS (2010) *Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Poland*, Table 29 (144) and own computation. Data refer to 2009. Notice that the Church gives 95.7% as the share of the Catholic population - see GUS (2010), *Statistical Yearbook*, Table 30 (145). The difference comes from different estimates of the total Polish population.

¹⁰⁰ Higher figure is based on the number of members of various German associations – See GUS (2010) *Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Poland*, Table 28(143). Lower figure comes from the Census 2002.

¹⁰¹ Lower figures relate to the members of main associations – See GUS (2010) *Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Poland*, Table 28(143). Higher numbers circulate in reports and Parliamentary committees documents. The reported number of Byelorussians and Ukrainians disregards substantial, often illegal, immigration from the FSU countries.

¹⁰² Until the moment of accession to the EU, the exceptions which allowed Polish migrants to take regular employment in western countries (mainly provided for by respective bilateral agreements) almost exclusively pertained to circular (short-term) migrants.

Social Impact of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Central and Eastern Europe VT/2010/001

France, the United Kingdom¹⁰³, Belgium, Switzerland, Luxemburg and (in 2002) Spain. The formal basis for this was the Association Treaty between Poland and the European Communities and their member-countries, signed on December 16th, 1991¹⁰⁴.

In addition, the government of Poland on a number of occasions strived for simplification of the rules of admission of Polish workers in various countries. Those activities were often successful, as the example of such countries as the Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, Ireland and Norway may suggest¹⁰⁵.

As much as the implementation of those agreements or special privileges is concerned, the agencies of the government, especially of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, became involved in spreading information, counselling, recruitment and vocational training. Those agencies included regional employment offices, regional branches of OHP (from *Ochotnicze Hufce Pracy*; English: Voluntary Labour Corps), the organisation dedicated to promotion of youth employment, and local (town and *powiat* level) consultants. In this, after the accession to the EU they were supported by a network of counsellors organised within the European Employment Services (EURES).

Highly effective proved to be the bilateral agreement concerning seasonal employment in countries like Germany (up to 3 months), Spain (up to 9 months) and to lesser extent France (up to 6 months). At the peak of the movements of seasonal workers to Germany (2003-2004) as many as around 300,000 persons were involved; they represented around 90 per cent of all foreign seasonal workers and around 3 per cent of Polish labour force. However, the expectation that the circular mobility might directly facilitate the labour market policy in Poland¹⁰⁶ has not been confirmed. That was because the recruitment of workers was mainly based on the personally addressed job offers, and the Polish employment agencies had very little room for pursuing preferences of the government. On the other hand, the recruited migrants typically originated from Polish regions hit the most hardly by unemployment. A side effect of this kind of labour mobility was that workers involved in seasonal migration quite often became the unemployed (or inactive) in Poland in periods between subsequent migrations (Okólski, 2004).

In reference to the programme of circular worker migration based on the German-Polish bilateral agreement, it might be argued that on the one hand, it was a success story. It resulted in more jobs for Polish workers, especially those being in precarious situation in Poland and higher incomes (and higher consumption) of many households in the areas of strong outflow. In short, it served as a buffer absorbing shocks and alleviating rigidities of the early phase of economic transition in Poland (Kaczmarczyk, Łukowski, 2004; Okólski, 2004).

The success was mainly due to institutional simplicity (highly limited and easy administrative procedures), very low fees (paid both by workers and employers) and efficient recruitment¹⁰⁷. On the other hand, the ensuing social costs should not be neglected. They included above all, step-by-step gradual social and economic marginalisation of Polish migrant workers. Most of them found themselves unemployed again after the migratory period. And in the long-run the migrants, especially those whose circulation involved multiple journeys, became subject to double exclusion from mainstream of the social life, either in the destination country or in Poland (Kaczmarczyk, Łukowski, 2004).

After 2004, when principal obstacles to international mobility of Polish workforce were removed, Poland withdrew from active encouragement of circular mobility of its labour. The

¹⁰³ Limited territorially to the island of Jersey.

¹⁰⁴ As a matter of fact, the agreement with Germany was signed in 1990.

¹⁰⁵ Those countries applied quota system to the Polish workers, usually specified for selected categories of migrants (students, trainees), professions or economic sectors.

¹⁰⁶ One of the fundamental aims of that policy was the protection of labour markets in economically ailing areas (sub-regions, towns) and counteracting the unemployment in those areas. The promotion of circular migration of the unemployed or people at risk of job losing was explicitly formulated as an instrument of that policy in related government documents.

¹⁰⁷ To large degree facilitated by well developed networks of Polish migrants.

bilateral agreements, which were concluded earlier remained in force until May 1st, 2011 when finally they became obsolete.

6.2. Encouragement of return migration and support of integration of returnees

Key issues and main actors

Policies for returnees have been developed both at the central and local levels. However, they are neither exhaustive (central level) nor very common (local levels). Despite a widespread opinion that reinforcement of the labour market is crucial for preventing massive emigration and for making returns more attractive, the most recognized policies and programmes have been focused on information campaigns and counselling rather than on the labour related issues. The later, if present, often take form of short term, locally implemented projects. Some of them may be given as good practice examples (section 6.6).

At the central level, the emigration issues were touched upon by some government strategies of the last decades (such as *Poland 2030 – National Development Strategy* launched in 2009, *National Strategy Report on Social Protection and Social Inclusion 2008-2010*) but a single comprehensive programme has not been developed¹⁰⁸. Also, selected aspects of the emigration/ return policies have been handled by a number of projects financed by ESF through the *Human Capital Operational Programme 2007 – 2013* [Program Operacyjny Kapitał Ludzki, POKL]. Although most POKL projects are local or regional, central projects are visible, too.

Only recently, in April 2011, the draft *Polish Migration Policy* (MSWiA, 2011) was submitted. Although this document is focused on the immigration questions it contains a half-page section (very short, indeed) on emigrants and returnees. It lists five policy areas that should be developed, namely: (i) information policy on the Polish labour market, (ii) strengthening civil rights of emigrants living abroad, in terms of their voting rights in Poland, (iii) support for children of returnees for their adaptation to the Polish education system, including development of their language skills, (iv) support for the families left behind in the country of origin, esp. for euro-orphans, and (v) strengthening contacts with Polish organizations of emigrants and development of activities aimed at the improvement of the conditions and image of Polish emigrants, and at combating discrimination against them. However, none of these proposals has been discussed in more detail.

Government information programme

“Do you P^Lan to return?” [Masz P^Lan na powrót?] is the most spectacular programme developed at the central level. It is aimed at strengthening information capacity of the government targeted at emigrants and returnees. The programme was established in 2008 and it is run by the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy and its agencies. It mostly provides information and counselling for returnees, thru the website, guidebooks, and leaflets. At the end of 2008, following the programme, a portal www.powroty.gov.pl was established. Strongly promoted by the government officials it has become quite know to the public. Overall, the portal has been well received by the users and experts and is worth mentioning as a good practice example (see Section 6.5 for detail).

Programme activities, including portal establishment and its administration, have been widely supported by ESF thru the POKL project untitled “Activities aimed at the Polish migrants – trainings, counselling, and information campaign”.¹⁰⁹ The project was run from 01.08.2008 until 31.12.2009 by the government agency Centre for Development of Human Resources

¹⁰⁸ Notice that the need for setting a comprehensive migration policy has been suggested by experts and government officials since years (IpiSS, 2004; Golinowska, 2008a; Kolarska-Bobińska, 2007; Rajkiewicz, 2008) and it was present in the current debates as well (IpiSS and IPS UW, 2010; RPO, 2009).

¹⁰⁹ Project 1.42 “Działania ukierunkowane na osoby migrujące z i do Polski, w zakresie szkoleń, doradctwa, kampanii informacyjno-promocyjnej” within the Priority 1 (Employment and social integration), Activity 1 (Support for the development of the labour market institutions) – see. <http://www.crzl.gov.pl/projekty-mainmenu-5/migracje-mainmenu-70/projekt-142-mainmenu-74> and http://www.efs.gov.pl/Strony/lista_beneficjentow_POKL.aspx

Social Impact of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Central and Eastern Europe VT/2010/001

[Centrum Rozwoju Zasobów Ludzkich, CRZL], and it absorbed over PLN 2.5 million or over EUR 0.62 million¹¹⁰.

Tax and social security

Besides, there are also some other government activities that should be paid attention. Unfortunately, they are not numerous. First, the government responded positively to many complaints regarding unclear and/or unfair regulations of the personal income taxation. Under the old rules, incomes earned abroad might have been double-taxed. In order to avoid it, a number of tax related bilateral agreements have been implemented. They cover 87 countries, including all EU/EEA Member States and Switzerland¹¹¹. They were mostly concluded in the last two decades (some important exceptions of earlier agreements: Canada, France, Italy, US). Moreover in 2008, tax abolition for emigrants (and returnees) earning their incomes abroad in 2002-2007 and subject to the Polish tax system was enforced¹¹². Second, the government regularly adapts social security and health legislation in order to keep it consistent with coordination rules and to reflect the situation of emigrants and returnees. This may be seen through the amendments to legal acts on family benefits, on social assistance, on labour market etc. This type of activity is not spectacular but it is definitely needed.

Local and non-government initiatives

At the same time, some local governments and NGOs developed own programmes supporting emigrants' return back to Poland. In this respect, regions of the west of Poland are more active.

For instance, the region of Opole known for its high emigration figures has implemented a programme "Opolskie – Tutaj zostaję" [Opolskie – I will stay here] mixing the promotion of the region with the information campaign and active labour market instruments for returnees.¹¹³ In Poznań, foundation Barka ran a programme targeted at "losers", offering shelters for the homeless returnees from London (see 6.5 – good practice example). In Dolnośląskie, officials from the social security co-ordination unit of the regional labour office organized the outreach meetings. The main idea was to help the unemployed returnees filling-out forms, answer questions etc. This type of activity is really important because regional offices dealing with returnees are not numerous and direct contacts with officials from these offices are difficult.¹¹⁴ Finally, examples of labour activation projects targeted at the returnees may be given. They concern specifically validation of qualifications: (i) „Validate your professional qualifications” [“Potwierdź swoje kwalifikacje zawodowe”] implemented in Poznań by Poznańskie Centrum Edukacji Ustawicznej i Praktycznej, and (ii) „Return – Programme for validation of qualifications for returnees into the labour market in podlaskie: training, counseling, exams” [„Powroty – program potwierdzania kwalifikacji osób powracających na podlaski rynek pracy poprzez szkolenia, poradnictwo i egzaminy zawodowe”], implemented by Podlaskie Forum Doradztwa Kariery.¹¹⁵

Also, in November 2008, the association of Poles living in UK "Poland Street" implemented a project "12 Miast" [12 Cities] with a logo "Wracać? Ale dokąd?" [Go back? But where?]. The main aim of the project was to involve twelve Polish cities, namely Białystok, Bydgoszcz, Gdańsk, Katowice, Kraków, Lublin, Łódź, Poznań, Rzeszów, Szczecin, Warszawa and

¹¹⁰ Through the text, the exchange rate 1 EUR = 4 PLN is used. Actual rate was fluctuating in the range approx. 3.8-4.4 PLN /EUR.

¹¹¹ See the Ministry of Finance website: <http://www.mf.gov.pl/dokument.php?const=3&dzial=150&id=9741>.

¹¹² See Ustawa z dnia 25 lipca 2008 r. o szczególnych rozwiązaniach dla podatników uzyskujących niektóre przychody poza terytorium Rzeczypospolitej Polski (Journal of Laws, 2008, No.143, item 894, www.sejm.gov.pl), specifically Article 14.

¹¹³ http://umwo.opole.pl/tutaj_zostaje/.

¹¹⁴ Bieńkowska, Ułasiński, Szymańska (2010), p. 100.

¹¹⁵ Both projects are described by Bieńkowska, Ułasiński, Szymańska (2010), p. 120-30. Consult also: www.kwalifikacjeczawodowe.pl.

Wrocław, in promoting the return of Polish immigrants back to Poland. This has been done through a series of meetings organized with municipal representatives in the UK.¹¹⁶

Overall assessment of the government and self-government programmes is ambiguous. Emigrants seem overloaded with information and expect more active solutions (job offers, housing support, etc). NGOs proposals are better received but expectations towards them are usually smaller.

6.3. Support of the development of net migration loss/gain regions

The activities aimed at the development of economically ailing communities or regions are numerous and comprehensive. Those activities are substantially supported by the structural funds of the EU. Rarely, however, they are specifically addressed to the regions of net migration loss although quite often the underdeveloped areas happen to undergo strong outflow of labour. Nevertheless, so far no attempts have been made at the assessment of influence those activities exert on people mobility. Moreover, it became very common in Poland that the programmes that promote the development of regions in need, focus on the identification of problems and instruments or procedures to be used and hardly pay attention to the process of implementation of those programmes and, especially the assessment of their effects.

In some regions specific programmes are being implemented that address migration as such or migration in the context of regional labour market. One of those programmes, which pertains to a transborder Czech-Polish-Slovak area, has been launched on April 1st, 2008. It is placed within EURES-T structure and its name is EURES-T Beskydy (see: www.eures-tbeskydy.eu). The main goal of the programme is enhancing the effectiveness of the respective regional (transborder) labour market through the exchange of information and counselling with regard to employment opportunities, living conditions and other aspects relevant to labour mobility. That partnership was carefully designed and practically prepared through a four-year long series of tripartite projects attended by labour market institutions of the three countries and finances from national EURES subsidies. At present (December 2011) major instrument of the programme is a four-language webpage¹¹⁷, which offers practical information for four target groups (employers, employees, job seekers and students), present major characteristics of the regional labour market, inform about employment opportunities (and vacancies) and depict or announce current and future activities of the programme. In our view, however, the present contents of the webpage is rather limited¹¹⁸.

The list of recently completed or on-going projects supported by the European Social Fund and carried out within *Human Capital Operational Programme (Program Operacyjny Kapitał Ludzki, POKL)* includes 15 migration-related activities that focus on regional problems¹¹⁹. These projects were or are conducted in 8 (of 16) regions. Main themes were as follows: support of economic activity through the management of migration, local instruments of discouraging people from migrating for work, making use of return migrants' potential for regional development and adaptation of return migrants to regional labour market. Unfortunately, the impact of those projects is not systematically monitored and their effects are not evaluated.

In 2009-2011 POKL projects that focused on the migration and labour market nexus were completed in four regions (*województwo*; NUTS2): Lubelskie, Pomorskie, Śląskie and Zachodniopomorskie¹²⁰. Each of those projects inquired into migration-related development

¹¹⁶ http://www.polandstreet.org.uk/?page=sekcja_ogolna&dzial=7&kat=11 , www.polandstreet.org.pl , <http://oxford.infolinia.org/news/2293/wracac-ale-dokad-porozmawiajmy-o-konkretach.html>

¹¹⁷ Apart from the Czech, Polish and Slovak languages, also English version is available.

¹¹⁸ For instance, in the first week of December 2011 no jobs were offered in the Czech and Polish parts of the region whereas in the Slovak part only 10 vacancies were available.

¹¹⁹ http://www.efs.gov.pl/Strony/lista_beneficjentow_POKL.aspx

¹²⁰ For details, see:

http://www.efs.gov.pl/AnalizyRaportyPodsumowania/baza_projektow_badawczych_efs/Strony/Migracje_szansa_woj_lubelskiego_wspieranie_pozytywnych_trendow_adaptacyjnych_na_regionalnym_ryнку_pracy_2010.aspx,

issues at sub-regional (*powiat*, NUTS4) level. The projects were commissioned and coordinated by respective Regional Labour Office whose major aim was to acquire better knowledge on actual and potential impact of migration (both internal and international) on local labour markets and on factors that might enhance the efficiency of those markets through facilitating and managing of labour mobility. The final outcome of the projects is a rich and comprehensive picture of migration in the sub-regions, and the inter-relations between mobility and the situation on respective labour markets¹²¹. Due to a short time from the completion of the projects it is only to be seen to what extent and how successfully this knowledge will be exploited by the local authorities (above all Regional Labour Office) in their pursuit of policies that promote the regional development.

6.4. Support to vulnerable groups related to migration

Women and elderly

Migration-related supporting programmes for these two vulnerable groups are hard to find in Poland. In fact, none of them is recognized as vulnerable. This is especially true as regards the elderly. They are not covered by any type of programme related to migration (except of pension co-ordination). One may add that, generally, not that much is provided for senior citizens, besides pensions and healthcare (of a questionable quality). The most challenging is the lack of well developed long-term care provision but other problems of the elderly (activation, housing) are not solved either, despite some recent efforts in this field¹²².

Women are in a somehow better position, partly because their family roles are very much appreciated and supported. Also, their migration attitudes have turned attention. As a result, some programmes for female migrants and returnees have been implemented (see 5.1 and 6.4). Some other may be found, too. For instance, on 2009 CARITAS Polska implemented the project “Legalna praca Polek w Niemczech” [Legal work of Polish women in Germany]. The project is aimed at providing legal work (insurance covered, with proper labour rights) for Polish females working as housekeepers or carers of the elderly. This includes help in finding a job, in filling out forms, some language trainings, etc. One of the activities considers also enabling or facilitating contacts of women working in Germany with their family members who stay in Poland. This means that, indirectly, those who are left behind are supported, too¹²³.

Children

Quite surprisingly, despite the recognition of the issue, comprehensive measures addressing various problems of emigrants’ children left in the country have not been developed (see NSR 2008-2010; Balicki et al., 2009, p. 73, and others). In fact, only two questions have been somehow approached, namely (i): child benefit payments resulting from the EU coordination rules and (ii) some aspects of education.

Education issues are approached in two ways. First, the government strongly supports the development of Polish schools (with relevant curricula) for children of emigrants living abroad, with the intention of strengthening their country (Polish) affiliation. This may help returning children in their adaptation to life in Poland if they eventually come back. A number of school projects have been implemented. POKL “Open School” [“Otwarta szkoła”] may be

http://www.efs.gov.pl/AnalizyRaportyPodsumowania/baza_projektow_badawczych_efs/Strony/Wspieranie_aktynosci_zawodowej_poprzez_zarzadzanie_zjawiskiem_migracji_analiza_w_woj_slaskim_2010.aspx,
http://www.efs.gov.pl/AnalizyRaportyPodsumowania/baza_projektow_badawczych_efs/Strony/Zagraniczne_migracje_zarobkowe_2009.aspx,
http://www.efs.gov.pl/AnalizyRaportyPodsumowania/baza_projektow_badawczych_efs/Strony/migracje_szansa_woj_pomorskiego_trendy_adaptacyjne_2009_07022011.aspx.

¹²¹ Only in one of those regional projects (Slaskie region) explicit recommendations for the regional authorities were attempted. Those recommendations concerned activities and policy measures aimed at increasing labour mobility, improving regional labour demand/supply balance and reducing skill mismatches.

¹²² See the report by the parliamentary working group led by the senator Mieczysław Augustyn (Augustyn, 2009).

¹²³ The project is implemented in 16 archdioceses. See: <http://www.caritas.pl/news.php?id=11160&d=6> or <http://ekai.pl/wydarzenia/polska/x21789/caritas-pomoze-polkom-pracujacym-w-niemczech/>.

mentioned in this respect.¹²⁴ Second type of support for children consists in teachers' training. It is intended to provide knowledge of the problems faced by children of migrating parents' and of possible ways to address them. A guidebook for teachers (Kozdrowicz, Walczak, 2008) has been prepared and it is easily accessible. This type of activity is widely supported by Ombudsman for Children, by other government agencies (Ministry of Education) and by non-government organizations.

All these, however, may be insufficient. Children who have not reached school age are somehow neglected. Also, child benefit provisions – mainly regarding birth grant – may be difficult to interpret (discussion in the newspaper *Polska the Times*) and this may lead to frauds and errors (discussion in the UK and in the Polish newspapers, and Czepulis-Rutkowska 2010). Moreover, problems of family reunification, of sharing legal responsibility still remain (Potrykowska, 2009, p. 41, quoting Carby-Hall's report).

Roma and other groups

Given its rather small scope, Roma migration is not covered by specific policies, although there are two large-scale programmes – namely national Programme for the Roma Community in Poland and so called “Roma component” of the Human Capital Operational Programme – aimed at social inclusion and activation of the Roma (MSWiA, 2010; Walczak, M. et al., 2008, Topińska, 2011). They consider mainly education and culture, health, housing conditions as well as labour issues. They are well recognized and highly evaluated but their overall impact is limited. Still, many Roma live in extreme poverty and suffer severe material deprivation. Moreover, Roma ethnic group is visibly discriminated against. This may be seen through the current media news, chats and also reports.¹²⁵

While emigration of Roma does not seem to attract attention in Poland, migration of ethnic Germans (mainly from Opolskie and Dolnośląskie) is seen as an issue and a challenge. People of German origin cannot be treated as a vulnerable group but the scale of their migration calls for reaction. As a result, a regional programme for encouraging migrants to return (“Opolskie – tutaj zostaję”, mentioned in 6.2) has been already implemented but it is quite a unique proposal.

6.5. Best practice examples of policy responses

Policies addressing social problems faced by families left behind by emigrants are not well developed and there is hard to find examples of a good practice. Policies related to returnees look much better and good practices are quite easy to find.

First, example of the portal www.powroty.gov.pl established in 2008 with a support of ESF, within the framework of the government programme “Do you have PPlan to return?” may be given. For over two years, the portal was linked to the official Ministry website www.mpips.gov.pl. Currently it has been moved to the website <http://zielonalinia.gov.pl/> of the Employment Services Centre for Information and Consultation (called Zielona Linia). It serves its users (mainly emigrants and return migrants) really well offering updated information (including practical advice, regulations with comments, and alike) answering FAQs, connecting organizations etc. It is frequented very often and criticism is marginal. In fact, there are only some suggestions how to improve it (such as: using more friendly language, bringing more information about regions)¹²⁶.

At present, information/advisory streams of the “Powroty” portal cover several fields, such as legal steps before the return, labour, running business, taxes, family, health, social benefits, and psychological problems. The portal makes access to regulations, provides comments

¹²⁴ Consult www.polskaszkoła.edu.pl, www.spzg.pl and also discussions at the Parliament with the Ministry of Education officials www.sej.gov.pl.

¹²⁵ See for instance current news from Poznań: <http://www.mmpoznan.pl/321941/2011/2/16/romowie-dyskryminowani-przez-poznanskich-restauratorow?category=news>, as well as chats on the Internet: http://forum.gazeta.pl/forum/w.93930.121429298.121429298.Dyskryminacja_Romow_w_Polsce.html.

¹²⁶ See www.powroty.gov.pl and Bieńkowska, Ułasiński, Szymańska (2010), pp. 90-96 for statistics and comments.

and interpretation of legal acts, facilitates the exchange of information, distributes a newsletter, etc. Portal administrator encourages users to submit questions and promises handle them within a few days. Until July 17, 2010, there were 4,195 questions posted by the users. Almost one third of them (32%) focused on social benefit problems. Next issues handled concerned taxes (17%) and family (11%). Only 7% considered legal steps after the return and even less (5%) legal steps before the return. Quite surprisingly, while only 7% of questions touched upon running business, labour issues were virtually absent.¹²⁷

Second example of a good practice concerns the establishment of consultative desks for returnees by local institutions, working in partnership. The most spectacular example comes from Elbląg, a medium size city located in Warmińsko-Mazurskie in the north-east of Poland. A Department of Enterprise of the Municipal Office together with District (*powiat*) Labour Office, local Tax Office, Society of Social Housing, Labour and Assistance Centre established such a desk [punkt konsultacyjny], aimed at supporting the returnees mainly through advisory and information activities. Similar local consultative desks [Lokalne Punkty Konsultacyjne, LPIK] have been established in four *gminy* (the smallest administrative units) of the Skarżysko Kamienna *powiat* (Świętokrzyskie, one of the important sending regions). They all have proved quite successful.¹²⁸

Third, an example of activities of the Barka foundation (located in the city of Poznań) may be given as a good practice example. Its programme is rather unique for it is targeted at the losers, at those emigrants who have not managed to find a job and lead a normal life in the host country. In 2006, Barka with its affiliate in London (Barka UK) established a programme for the homeless immigrants living in London, encouraging them to return and offering support after the return. At first, it covered Polish immigrants (for them, a small network of reintegration centres has been created in Poland), then it has been extended to all Eastern Europeans. In the UK, the programme is called "Reconnection" and operates in the London borough of Hammersmith and Fulham, in City & Tower Hamlets (since 2008) and in some other locations. Each year, it covers dozens of homeless people. In 2008, 147 homeless were reconnected (33 sent to Barka communities in Poland). In 2009, these figures amounted to 369 and 29, respectively, and in 2010 they reached 620 and 38 (plus 19 sent to partner organizations).¹²⁹ Barka activities are recognized both in Poland and in Europe¹³⁰. In 2009, Barka Foundation was one of the winners of the World Habitat Awards for its former state farm revitalisation project aimed at socially excluded.¹³¹

7. Key challenges and policy suggestions

7. 1. Key challenges of the social impact of emigration and internal migration

Key challenges may be enumerated keeping in mind that emigration and internal migration involve certain consequences for the country / region of origin which are not adequately recognized or handled. In the case of Poland, their list includes:

- *Strategic role of migration* in restructuring of the depopulating or under-developed (and non-highly urbanised) areas – such as micro-regions or regions – is not fully recognized, despite some steps undertaken recently. Such recognition is essential for designing strategies of sustainable development and for proper migration/emigration policies.
- *Situation of the elderly*. Given the ageing process and the migration process (the young migrate) one should look more carefully at the old population, and this issue has not been approached in Poland. Both the migration of the old (reasons to stay – move, etc) and

¹²⁷ Bieńkowska, Ułasiński, Szymańska (2010), and www.powroty.gov.pl.

¹²⁸ Examples provided by Bieńkowska, Ułasiński, Szymańska (2010), pp. 101-104. See also: www.info.elblag.pl/5,13650,Punkt-informacyjny-pomoze-wracajacym-z-Wysp.html for Elbląg and www.pupskarzynsko.pl for Skarżysko Kamienna.

¹²⁹ <http://www.barka.org.pl/>, <http://www.barkauk.org/>, <http://www.barkauk.org/news/reconnections/> (leaflets and annual reports). See also AntiPOVERTYMAG No. 132/2010, available at: www.eapn.eu.

¹³⁰ See AntiPOVERTYMAG No. 132/2010, available at: www.eapn.eu and media coverage (*Gazeta Wyborcza*, *Wysokie Obcasy*) in Poland.

¹³¹ www.worldhabitatawards.org

Social Impact of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Central and Eastern Europe VT/2010/001

policies for the elderly left-behind should be considered. Research in this field should be commissioned as soon as possible. Moreover, Poland is still lacking the general long-term care strategy, and in fact its development covering also migration aspects seems crucial.

- *Health and healthcare.* There are at least two problems related to the emigration process that have not been approached so far: (i) health condition of migrants and those who are left behind, including psychological disorders, (ii) healthcare provision which is important for mobile workers and their families and is threatened by the migration of physicians. Both issues should be properly handled.
- *Return migration.* Poland encounters a difficulty in coping with the issue of return migration. In view of aggravating demographic situation (rapid ageing of the population and decrease of the workforce in the years to come) it seems essential that people who recently emigrated consider their return to Poland as a viable and attractive option. Quite often, however, returnees struggle with various hardships in the process of re-adaptation to life in Poland. On the other hand, the EU employment and social arrangements facilitate long-lasting (if not life-long) secure movements between countries of the EU that are better-off than Poland and ultimately the settlement in one of those countries.

Also, there arise some methodological problems which may be seen as challenges, namely:

- *Data gaps.* Despite a solid bulk of research in Poland, data gaps are numerous. There is an abundance of qualitative information: on emigrants, on children left behind, on returnees. However, they do not allow for a comprehensive examination of social exclusion, of the impacts of remittances or of the policy effects. Quantitative data are scarce and those which may prove useful (EU SILC, HBS) are not explored.
- *Lack of policy evaluation.* While there is a number of (e)migration policies and projects recently implemented, very few have been adequately evaluated, using proper and conclusive evaluation instruments. As a result, efficiency / effectiveness, strengths / weakness of various programmes are not well recognized. Unfortunately, it does not refer to the migration related policies alone but to other programmes or projects as well.

7. 2. Policies to be taken by different actors

First, there is a need to establish a government body / agency at the central level responsible for developing (and implementing?) policies related to emigrants and their families left-behind. Such an agency should at least coordinate activities of other institutions and it should necessarily monitor current incidents and outcomes. In the case of immigrants, such an agency may be found in Poland (a department in the Ministry of Interior and Administration). But the issues related to emigrants and their families are rather “spread over” various institutions, even at the central level: Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, two social insurance institutions, Central Statistical Office, and the Prime Minister advisory groups working with strategies.

Second, more active migration-related policies would be welcome at the regional level. In particular, in the high-loss regions (Podkarpackie, Świętokrzyskie and Podlaskie), which recently have been relieved of much of their workforce surpluses, policies aimed at a better allocation of labour (e.g. encouraging people movements from the rural areas to regional growth centres through the launching of housing and public transportation projects) might substantially contribute to the improvement of labour market efficiency and to the increase in economic activity of the population.

Third, it may prove useful to put in practice the idea of “one stop shop” for families of emigrants and for returnees, both at the regional and local levels. There is a need to (i) enlarge responsibilities of regional offices – currently dealing mostly with the EU coordination topics – and to assign them some employment related tasks, and (ii) establish cooperation between social assistance and labour offices at the given level. The latter, however, is not that easy as previous (unsuccessful) attempts demonstrate.

**Social Impact of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Central and Eastern Europe
VT/2010/001**

Fourth, involvement of the non-government sector in supporting / taking care of families left behind should be strengthened. This involvement is surprisingly low at present (exception: children). In this respect, focus on the very old people left alone is really crucial in Poland. In fact, since the situation of the elderly in the migration process is neither well recognised nor handled, it should attract more attention. Using ESF financed projects within the framework of relevant programmes may be a good option, assuming their long-term results are visible. Unfortunately, in many cases the impact of the project disappears after the project termination.

Fifth, policies and programmes aimed at strengthening the ties of emigrants with their country of origin should be reinforced. Such a need is mentioned in the Polish Migration Policy of April 2011 and is supported by some government officials (Ombudswoman). It assumes that emigrants may not necessarily be willing to return but supporting their country ties might open various options (returning in the future, circulating, promoting home country while residing abroad, etc). Specific activities should focus on education, culture and economic issues. Its implementation should involve various government agencies (ministries, consulates) and non-government organisations (religious organisations, including Catholic Church – important for the Polish people).

Finally, two questions of a rather technical nature – namely, gaps in the information database and noticeable lack of programmes' evaluation – should be handled. It seems obvious that in order to develop proper policy measures addressing returnees and/or family members left behind by emigrants, both questions should be handled. As regards the database, the following suggestions may be considered: (i) collecting quantitative data should be given priority, (ii) areas which have not been adequately covered – such as situation of the elderly or the health conditions of migrants, family members and returnees – should necessarily be dealt with, (iii) needs and opinions of applicants or participants of social security programmes related to returnees/emigrants should be recognised. The latter information – not available so far – would also be useful for programme evaluation which is clearly underdeveloped at present. Evaluation and monitoring should necessarily follow the implementation of every policy, programme or project.

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**Social Impact of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Central and Eastern Europe
VT/2010/001**

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
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Statistical Annex


Figure 1.1. Real GDP growth rate. Poland and EU-27, 1996-2010, and individual EU countries, 2009



Source: <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/printTable.do?tab=table&plugin=1&language=en> (accessed 02.10.2011).


**Social Impact of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Central and Eastern Europe
VT/2010/001**

Figure 1.2. Selected indicators of economic development. Poland, 1990-2010



Source: Central Statistical Office of Poland (see Table 1).


Figure 1.3. Life expectancy at birth (in years) and Human Development Index (HDI), 1990-2010



Source: Central Statistical Office of Poland; UNDP (2010).


**Social Impact of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Central and Eastern Europe
VT/2010/001**

Figure 2.1. Official estimates of emigration, immigration and migration balance, 1974-2009



Source: GUS (2010a).


Figure 2.2. Stock of temporary migrants by duration of stay, according to LFS; 1973-2009 (quarter-by-quarter), in thousand



Source: LFS/CMR database.


**Social Impact of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Central and Eastern Europe
VT/2010/001**

Figure 2.3. Increase in the stock of temporary migrants according to LFS: seasonality and trends, 1994-2010 (quarter-by-quarter), in thousand



Source: LFS/CMR database.


Figure 2.4. Internal migration, outflows from urban and rural areas and rural net loss, 1966-2009



Source: GUS (2010a).


**Social Impact of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Central and Eastern Europe
VT/2010/001**

Figure 3.1. Temporary migrants from Poland aged 15+ (thousands; the right-hand scale) and the unemployment rate (%; the left-hand scale); 1994-2007 (LFS data)



Source: Kaczmarczyk and Okólski (2008b).


Figure 3.1. Relative poverty rates (%): overall, urban and rural areas, 1997-2009



Source: Based on figures from the annual publications by the Central Statistical Office.
Note: Poverty rates are derived from HBS expenditure data. Notice break in series in 2003.


**Social Impact of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Central and Eastern Europe
VT/2010/001**

Figure 3.2. Relative poverty rates (%) by household type, 1997-2009



Source: Based on figures from the annual publications by the Central Statistical Office.
 Note: Poverty rates are derived from HBS expenditure data. Notice break in series in 2003.


Figure 3.3. Remittance inflow to Poland, 1990-2009 (US \$ million)



Source: <http://www.migrationinformation.org/datahub/remittances/Poland.pdf> (accessed 7 April 2011).


**Social Impact of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Central and Eastern Europe
VT/2010/001**

Figure 3.4. Remittance inflow to Poland, 2003-2010 (US \$ million)




Source: World Bank (2011), p. 206.

Figure 4.1. Selectivity of the post-accession outflow of people and the level of urbanization by region




Source: Anacka and Okólski (2010), p. 154.

Figure 4.2. The rate of unemployment by region, 2004, 2008 and 2010



Source: http://www.stat.gov.pl/gus/5840_1487_PLK_HTML.htm?action=show_archive (accessed 5 April 2011).


Figure 4.3. Regions in 2004 by the rate of unemployment and the intensity of post-accession outflow of people (per 100 population aged 15+)



Source: LFS/CMR data base; http://www.stat.gov.pl/gus/5840_1487_PLK_HTML.htm?action=show_archive (accessed 5 April 2011).


**Social Impact of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Central and Eastern Europe
VT/2010/001**

Figure 4.4 The unemployment rate in 2008, in regions and largest agglomeration of region



Source: http://www.stat.gov.pl/gus/5840_1487_PLK_HTML.htm?action=show_archive (accessed 5 April 2011).

Figure 4.5. Relative poverty rate by region, 2001



Source: World Bank (2003), Vol.1, Ch.4, Fig. 4.1 (Notice: the source figure is displayed).

**Social Impact of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Central and Eastern Europe
VT/2010/001**

Table 1.1. Selected indicators of socio-economic development in 1990-2010

Year	Real GDP per capita growth rate ^a	Unemployment rate ^a	Life expectancy at birth ^b	Rate of Internet use ^c	Human Development Index (HDI) ^d
1990	-12	5,5	71	0	0,683
1991	-7	10,4	70,7	0	
1992	2,6	13,7	71,2	0	
1993	3,8	14,8	71,7	0,1	
1994	5,2	14,3	71,8	0,3	
1995	7	13,7	72	0,7	0,71
1996	6	12	72,1	1,3	
1997	6,8	10,2	72,5	2,1	
1998	4,8	10,4	73,1	4,1	
1999	4,1	13,9	73,2	5,4	
2000	4,3	15,1	73,9	7,3	0,753
2001	1,2	18,5	74,3	11	
2002	1,4	19,7	74,6	23	
2003	3,9	19,3	74,7	23,2	
2004	5,3	18	74,9	27,6	
2005	3,6	16,7	75,1	32,6	0,775
2006	6,2	12,2	75,3	36,6	
2007	6,8	8,5	75,5	44,1	
2008	5,1	6,7	75,6	49	
2009	1,7	8,5	75,8	52	0,791
2010	3,8	9,4	76	58,5	0,795

^a In per cent; ^b in years of life; ^c per 100 population; ^d takes values from 0 to 1 (according to a method refined in 2010)

Source: Central Statistical Office of Poland (various publications), UNDP (2010).

Table 2.1. The stock of *de jure* residents of Poland being 'temporary migrants' (a), on 31 December (in thousand)

Destination	Population Census (May 2002)	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Total	786	1	1,450	1,950	2,270	2,210	1,870	1,990
<i>of which:</i> European Union								1,615
(b) <i>of which:</i> United Kingdom	451	750	1,170	1,550	1,860	1,820	1,570	
Germany	24	150	340	580	690	650	555	560
Ireland	294	385	430	450	490	490	415	455
Italy	2	15	76	120	200	180	140	125
Netherlands	39	59	70	85	87	88	85	92
Spain	10	23	43	55	98	108	84	108
France	14	26	37	44	80	83	84	50
Austria	21	30	44	49	55	56	47	55
Belgium	11	15	25	34	39	40	38	32
Sweden	14	13	21	28	31	33	34	45
Denmark	6	11	17	25	27	29	31	37
Greece	17	19	20	19
	10	13	17	20	20	20	16	16
		<i>major non-EU destination country of Europe:</i>						
Norway	36	38	45	46

(a) I.e. staying abroad for at least three months (before 2007 – two months);

(b) Since 2007 including Bulgaria and Romania.

Source: GUS (2011b).

**Social Impact of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Central and Eastern Europe
VT/2010/001**

Table 2.2. Urban-rural migration in Poland; 1981-1990, 1991-2000, 2009 and 2010

Year	Rural to urban		Urban to rural		Rural balance		Rural loss to gain ratio (%)
	number of persons (thousands) (a)	per 1,000 rural population	number of persons (thousands) (a)	per 1,000 rural population	number of persons (thousands) (a)	per 1,000 rural population	
1981-1990	236.9	15.8	102.4	4.6	-134.4	-8.9	230.5
1991-2000	131.1	8.8	94.7	4.0	-36.4	-2.4	138.4
2009	90.4	6.0	131.5	5.7	41.1	2.7	68.7
2010	93.8	6.3	139,7	6.0	45.9	3.1	76.9

(a) annual average

Source: GUS (2011a)

Table 3.1. Child benefits subject to coordination by country and voivodship, 2007

	Number of E411 from EU/EEA countries processed by Regional Agencies for Family Support																TOTAL
	Dolnośląskie	Kujawsko-pomorskie	Lubelskie	Lubuskie	Łódzkie	Małopolskie	Mazowieckie	Opolskie	Podlaskie	Podkarpackie	Pomorskie	Śląskie	Świętokrzyskie	Warmińsko-pomorskie	Wielkopolskie	Zachodnio-pomorskie	
Austria	89	18	36	22	30	1226	38	217	20	175	25	337	86	17	46	15	2397
Belgium	45	37	54	44	23	56	53	26	367	22	49	77	39	62	84	30	1068
Bulgaria						1											1
Cyprus	1		2	1	2				2	2				1			11
Czech Republic	609	3	3		4	29	10	15		3	2	290		4	5	1	978
Denmark	24	74	23	24	49	21	22	35	7	13	96	77	47	41	123	157	833
Estonia												4					4
Finland	16	21	13	8	11	8	7	1	1	6	10	22	6	5	10	12	157
France	14	23	11		20	22	9	2	6	37	9	13	8	4	17	4	199
Germany	1151	454	460	649	341	873	361	3686	371	430	696	1902	301	492	836	830	13833
Greece				1		2			2								5
Hungary	1				1	1	2	1				2			2		10
Iceland							1		6			2		1			10
Ireland	547	340	285	215	267	425	338	47	89	496	691	765	229	241	397	374	5746
Italy	31	15	84	15	28	55	130	8	36	77	18	65	36	21	8	11	638
Latvia	1											4	1	1	1	1	9
Lichtenstein																	0
Lithuania					1		4		5								10
Luxembourg	3	3	1	1	1	3	3	6			6		2	1			30
Malta															1		1
Netherlands	153	257	143	267	145	131	80	748	60	132	237	1169	76	115	562	225	4500
Norway	115	172	163	48	86	375	218	61	94	305	880	258	185	162	158	924	4204
Portugal			1		1			1									3
Romania							1										1
Slovakia		1	1	1	2	22		1		2		4				2	36
Slovenia						1		1		4					1		7
Spain		1	2		5	5	41		8	2	2			2	2	1	71
Sweden	39	34	24	23	27	44	57	15	43	32	70	38	10	39	34	82	611
Switzerland	5	13	90	1	11	16	2	1	3	26	4	4	3	4	16	7	206
United Kingdom	1454	1320	1072	713	1155	2190	1545	313	601	1184	1337	2387	829	850	1262	1040	19252
Total	4298	2786	2468	2033	2210	5506	2922	5185	1721	2948	4132	7420	1858	2063	3565	3716	54831
<i>Per 10,000 population</i>	<i>15</i>	<i>13</i>	<i>11</i>	<i>20</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>17</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>50</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>25</i>	<i>19</i>	<i>16</i>	<i>15</i>	<i>14</i>	<i>11</i>	<i>22</i>	<i>14</i>

Note:

Methodology of collecting and displaying statistics in 2004-2007 and 2008-2010 differs

Net migration loss regions (voivodships) are shaded in yellow.

Regions the least affected by emigration are shaded in blue

Source:

Drozdowicz (2008) - corrected - and authors' computations.

Population data are from GUS (2008): *Population. State and structure by territorial division*. As of 30 June 2007, Table 5,

http://www.stat.gov.pl/gus/5840_1863_PLK_HTML.htm.

**Social Impact of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Central and Eastern Europe
VT/2010/001**

Table 3.2. Child allowances subject to EU/EEA coordination, 2008 - 2010

	Number of E411* forms processed in Poland					
	2008		2009		2010	
	For payment in Poland	Received from EU/EEA countries	For payment in Poland	Received from EU/EEA countries	For payment in Poland	Received from EU/EEA countries
Austria	65	2957	53	3124	70	3023
Belgium	52	1475	79	1704	109	2352
Bulgaria	1	0	3	0	1	0
Cyprus	1	19	1	7	1	9
Czech Republic	30	740	26	637	9	611
Denmark	62	2413	150	2211	89	2274
Estonia	0	17	2	10	0	2
Finland	7	425	20	255	5	211
France	13	168	26	185	19	230
Germany	838	12323	919	12618	786	14548
Greece	1	11	1	2	6	1
Hungary	1	4	2	8	0	11
Iceland	2	24	13	20	5	30
Ireland	92	1816	372	246	346	208
Italy	26	707	32	647	47	690
Latvia	0	0	0	0	0	0
Liechtenstein	0	0	0	0	14	0
Lithuania	2	8	3	9	0	3
Luxembourg	1	24	5	34	4	25
Malta	0	1	0	0	0	1
Netherlands	603	6782	569	6372	374	6452
Norway	99	7251	247	5647	199	6271
Portugal	0	1	0	1	0	1
Romania	1	0	2	7	0	9
Slovakia	5	17	0	17	3	18
Slovenia	0	10	0	9	1	20
Spain	14	20	34	6	34	7
Sweden	13	497	56	703	40	376
Switzerland	9	248	13	286	25	440
United Kingdom	276	6000	564	6872	637	5356
Total	2214	43958	3192	41637	2824	43179

Note:

Methodology of collecting and displaying statistics in previous years (2004-2007) differs

* E411 and relevant SED in 2010

Source:

Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, Department of Family Benefits, personal communication.

**Social Impact of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Central and Eastern Europe
VT/2010/001**

Table 3.3. Unemployment benefits and the use of EU/EEA coordination rules by country, 2007 - 2010

	Number of benefits transferred from EU / EEA to Poland (E303 / SED U001)				Number of benefits claimed based on the sum of employment periods (E301 / SED U002)			
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2007	2008	2009	2010
Austria	10	30	37	39	57	58	118	77
Belgium	5	3	14	13	28	72	132	117
Bulgaria	0	0	0	0	0	3	3	4
Cyprus	1	2	7	27	76	559	139	113
Czech Republic	2	1	8	9	695	443	2145	672
Denmark	8	6	19	40	59	167	650	476
Estonia	0	0	0	0	1	5	1	7
Finland	4	5	23	11	18	70	172	134
France	9	24	34	68	259	287	374	372
Germany	158	312	584	422	1201	1036	1119	1329
Greece	4	9	10	45	13	95	35	59
Hungary	0	0	0	0	4	5	5	7
Ireland	72	883	3967	2971	589	777	1697	3199
Island	2	138	471	356	162	386	553	182
Italy	2	9	19	9	233	438	386	354
Latvia	0	0	0	0	1	5	3	0
Lichtenstein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Lithuania	0	0	1	1	4	8	25	11
Luxemburg	0	0	1	1	7	3	2	13
Malta	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1
Netherlands	1	6	18	103	342	1040	2907	2850
Norway	2	10	186	263	36	62	225	213
Portugal	0	3	4	1	1	11	17	6
Romania	0	0	0	0	0	1	6	2
Slovakia	0	0	0	0	21	25	45	41
Slovenia	0	0	0	0	5	8	8	9
Spain	13	33	33	36	680	660	669	312
Sweden	10	3	19	11	45	65	142	116
Switzerland	0	6	6	8	33	75	140	113
United Kingdom	2	26	276	254	1190	4285	9182	7267
Total	305	1510	5737	4688	5761	10650	20900	18057

Source:
Ministry of Labour and Social Policy,
<http://www.mpips.gov.pl/index.php?gid=1720> (accessed in May 2011).

**Social Impact of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Central and Eastern Europe
VT/2010/001**

Table 3.4. Unemployment benefits and the use of EU/EEA coordination rules by voivodship, 200 -2010

	Number of benefits transferred from EU / EEA to Poland (E303 / SED U001)				Number of benefits claimed based on the sum of unemployment periods (E301 /SED U002)			
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2007	2008	2009	2010
Dolnośląskie	15	119	500	441	1374	2057	3853	2438
Kujawsko-pomorskie	15	66	249	215	434	701	1713	1218
Lubelskie	8	63	221	224	73	163	405	308
Lubuskie	3	26	136	127	76	150	483	83
Łódzkie	16	71	193	169	113	312	572	433
Małopolskie	22	149	772	607	248	679	1519	1963
Mazowieckie	33	121	369	348	137	367	730	721
Opolskie	58	245	493	318	302	495	996	682
Podkarpackie	14	146	442	333	359	1064	1774	1674
Podlaskie	4	22	154	139	96	171	344	283
Pomorskie	33	108	406	306	397	656	1283	1265
Śląskie	42	132	717	607	247	685	2106	1967
Świętokrzyskie	7	56	189	173	125	500	768	802
Warmińsko-mazurskie	7	41	254	194	648	830	1403	1177
Wielkopolskie	19	71	348	263	956	1413	2272	2357
Zachodniopomorskie	9	74	294	224	176	407	679	686
Total	305	1510	5737	4688	5761	10650	20900	18057

Note:

Net migration loss regions (voivodships) are shaded in yellow.

Regions the least affected by emigration are shaded in blue.

Source:

Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, <http://www.mpips.gov.pl/index.php?gid=1720>.

Table 3.5. Pensions and funeral grants resulting from the EU/EEA coordination and bilateral agreements processed by the Polish Social Insurance Institution (ZUS), 2005 – 2010

I. International* coordination

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Pensions						
Number of pensions (avg, per month)		39045	43200	47303	53532	62365
paid in Poland		17364	20333	23691	28506	35376
paid abroad		21681	22867	23612	25026	26989
Funeral grants (after the death of a pensioner)						
Number of grants (annual)		815	934	1084	1198	1198
paid in Poland		628	723	832	934	934
paid abroad		187	211	252	264	264

II. EU/EEA pension coordination**

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Pension applicants (contacting ZUS agencies)	77285	78143	92626	106738	140679	
Pension applications submitted						
for Polish pensions	19937	30510	34817	39346	45567	
for foreign pensions	7838	5722	5532	7743	6071	
Number of pensions (avg, per month)	30811	34451	39068	43939	49704	
paid in Poland	15006	17364	20333	23691	28136	
paid in EU/EEA countries	15805	17087	18735	20248	21568	

Note:

Data for 2005 (upper panel) and 2010 (lower panel) are not available. All figures refer to the Polish pensions paid by ZUS small number of pensions is also processed by the Social Insurance Fund for Farmers (KRUS)

* Resulting from EU/EEA coordination and other agreements

** EU27 plus Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway and - since 2006 – Switzerland. Notice also the following: (i) Each year, ZUS pays also a certain number of foreign pensions, mainly German. (ii) A small number of pensions is also processed by the Social Insurance Fund for Farmers (KRUS)

Source:

EU/EEA coordination (upper panel), Godłoza (2010),

International coordination (lower panel), ZUS (2007-2011), *[Kwartalna] Informacja o świadczeniach pieniężnych z Funduszu Ubezpieczeń Społecznych oraz o niektórych innych świadczeniach z zabezpieczenia społecznego*, www.zus.gov.pl.

**Social Impact of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Central and Eastern Europe
VT/2010/001**

Table 3.6. Foreign pensions paid by the Polish Social Insurance Institution (ZUS), by the source country, 2005-2010

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Belarus	99	88	82	73	68	62
Brazil	6	5	7	7	7	
Bulgaria	118	97				
France	1207	326	274	258	128	267
FYR Macedonia	3					
Germany	6912	6190	4560	3828	3313	2894
Serbia* and Montenegro	34	31	33	36	40	39
Slovenia	3					
Ukraine	117	106	99	91	82	76

Note:

Monthly average number of pension payments. Figures refer to pensions paid in euro or in US dollars by foreign institutions. "Blank" indicates that pension figures are no longer provided for a given country

* Since 2008 - Serbia and Voivodina

Source:

ZUS (2007-2011), [Kwartalna] Informacja o świadczeniach pieniężnych z Funduszu Ubezpieczeń Społecznych oraz o niektórych innych świadczeniach z zabezpieczenia społecznego, www.zus.gov.pl.

Table 3.7. At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion of the elderly and overall, 2005-2010

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
<u>At-risk-of-poverty (%)</u>						
Total population	20.5	19.1	17.3	16.9	17.1	17.6
Adults 65+	7.3	7.8	7.8	11.7	14.4	14.2
<u>At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (%)</u>						
Total population	45.3	39.5	34.4	30.5	27.8	27.8
Adults 65+	39.3	32.5	27.3	26.9	25.8	24.4

Note:

Both rates are derived from EU SILC, according to the Eurostat methodology. Poverty rates are income based, using the threshold = 60% of median equivalent income (equivalence scale 1.0/0.5/0.3). Poverty or social exclusion concerns people who are at risk of poverty or live in households with very low work intensity or are severely materially deprived.

Source:

Eurostat website, accessed 17 December 2011.

**Social Impact of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Central and Eastern Europe
VT/2010/001**

Table 3.8. Estimated flows of remittances of the Polish seasonal workers from Germany to Poland, 1991-2004

Year	Total number of the Polish seasonal workers in Germany	Total amount of remittances (PLN, thousand)	Total amount of remittances (EUR, thousand)
1991	68 516	172 410	43 103
1992	131 020	329 692	82 423
1993	139 824	387 031	96 758
1994	124 860	439 868	109 967
1995	164 864	705 254	176 314
1996	191 055	865 370	216 343
1997	189 424	900 882	225 221
1998	201 681	1 009 925	252 481
1999	218 403	1 099 157	274 789
2000	238 160	1 198 588	299 647
2001	261 133	1 314 204	328 551
2002	282 830	1 423 399	355 850
2003	302 544	1 522 613	380 653
2004	320 000	1 610 464	402 616

Note: According to CMR survey
Source: Kaczmarczyk (2004), p. 178.

Table 4.1. Relative poverty rate by voivodship: 1999, 2004, 2009

Voivodship (Region)	1999	2004	2009	1999-2009	2004-2009
	Per cent			Change (percentage points)	
Dolnośląskie	15.9	21.5	17.0	1.1	-4.5
Kujawsko-pomorskie	18.6	23.4	18.4	-0.2	-5.0
Lubelskie	18.9	21.1	26.0	7.1	4.9
Lubuskie	12.1	18.2	13.8	1.7	-4.4
Łódzkie	14.8	19.5	13.4	-1.4	-6.1
Małopolskie	15.7	20.9	17.5	1.8	-3.4
Mazowieckie	12.8	15.8	12.4	-0.4	-3.4
Opolskie	14.4	14.8	11.9	-2.5	-2.9
Podkarpackie	23.7	23.7	21.4	-2.3	-2.3
Podlaskie	21.5	24.6	23.3	1.8	-1.3
Pomorskie	19.6	22.1	17.6	-2.0	-4.5
Śląskie	10.3	16.7	14.2	3.9	-2.5
Świętokrzyskie	24.3	26.5	25.7	1.4	-0.8
Warmińsko-mazurskie	24.1	29.5	20.5	-3.6	-9.0
Wielkopolskie	17.5	19.6	19.1	1.6	-0.5
Zachodniopomorskie	16.4	20.6	15.6	-0.8	-5.0
Poland – Total	16.5	20.3	17.3	0.8	-3.0

Note:

Poverty rate according to the Central Statistical Office methodology. HBS expenditure based. Poverty threshold is set at the level of 50% of the mean equivalent expenditure (scales: 1/0.7/0.5). Break in series in 2003 (correction of weights, after the 2002 Census).

Net migration loss regions (voivodships) are shaded in yellow

Regions the least affected by emigration are shaded in blue

Source:

GUS (2000), *Living conditions of the population in 1999*, Warsaw: Central Statistical Office, pp. 105, 110-112.

GUS (2004), *Sytuacja gospodarstw domowych w 2003 r. w świetle wyników badania budżetów gospodarstw domowych*, Warsaw: Central Statistical Office, p.17

GUS (2010), *Zasięg ubóstwa w Polsce w 2009 r. na podstawie wyników badania budżetów gospodarstw domowych* Warsaw: Central Statistical Office.