Social Impact of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Central and Eastern Europe

Final Country Report

Turkey
April 2012

Authors:  Fikret Adaman
Ayhan Kaya

Neither the European Commission nor any person acting on behalf of the Commission may be held responsible for the use that may be made of the information contained in this publication.
Table of Contents

1. Socio-Economic and Political Overview ................................................................. 3
2. Main Emigration and Internal Migration Trends and Patterns .................................. 4
   2.1. Main Emigration Trends .................................................................... 5
   2.2. Main Internal Migration Trends ......................................................... 7
   2.3. Main Characteristics of Migrants ......................................................... 8
3. Nation-wide Labour Market and Social Development Trends under the Influence of Emigration ................................................................. 9
   3.1. Economic and Labour Market Developments .................................... 9
   3.2. Social security .................................................................................. 13
   3.3. Poverty and Social Exclusion ............................................................ 14
4. Labour Market and Social Development Trends in Net Migration Loss / Gain Regions ...................................................................................... 16
   4.1. Identification of Net Migration Loss / Gain Regions ............................ 16
   4.2. Labour Market Development in Net Migration Loss / Gain Regions ...... 16
   4.3. Poverty and Social Exclusion in Net Migration Loss / Gain Regions ...... 17
5. Impact of Migration on Vulnerable Groups ......................................................... 18
   5.1. Women / Children / Elderly ................................................................ 18
   5.2. Post-conflict Refugees and IDPs ......................................................... 19
   5.3. Roma ............................................................................................... 21
   5.4. Other Ethnic and Religious Vulnerable Communities ......................... 22
6. Policy Responses ................................................................................................. 25
   6.1. Encouragement of Circular Migration ................................................. 25
   6.2. Encouragement of Return Migration and Support of Integration of Returnees 26
   6.3. Reintegration of IDPs and Refugees ................................................... 29
   6.4. Development of Net Migration Loss/Gain Regions ............................. 30
   6.5. Support to Vulnerable Groups related to Migration ............................ 32
   6.6. Best Practice Examples of Policy Responses ...................................... 33
7. Key challenges and policy suggestions ............................................................... 33
   7.1. Key challenges of the social impact of emigration and internal migration .... 33
   7.2. Policies to be taken by different actors ................................................. 34
Bibliography ....................................................................................................... 37
APPENDIX ........................................................................................................ 46
1. Socio-Economic and Political Overview

Turkey is a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-denominational country, housing approximately 50 different Muslim and/or non-Muslim ethnic groups, some of which are Sunni-Turks, Alevi-Turks, Sunni-Kurds, Alevi-Kurds, Circassians, Lazis, Armenians, Georgians, Jews, Greeks, Arabs, Assyrians (Andrews, 1992). However, leaving aside the last decade of democratization attempts, the Turkish State has been far from recognizing the ethnically- and culturally-diverse nature of the Turkish society since the foundation of the Republic in 1923.

During the second part of the 1950s (after the 6-7 September 1954 events), the mid-1960s (after the first-wave of Cyprus events), and the second part of the 1970s (after the military involvement in Cyprus in 1974) various groups emigrated. Apart from these emigration patterns with cultural and ethno-religious nature, or simply because of the fear of raising nationalism, some other groups left the country due to ideological reasons after the 1960s and the 1980s military coups (Akçapar, 2009; İçduygu, 2009). After the 1960 left-wing military coup, the leading members of some tariqats (Muslims sects) left the country. Similarly, after the 1980 right-wing military coup, thousands of left-wing politically motivated intellectuals, activists, Alevis, Kurds, Circassians, etc. left Turkey.

Turkey in the first half of the 20th century was heavily an agrarian country, despite some attempts in the mid-1930s to boost her industry (Tekeli, 2009); the mechanization in agriculture as a result of Marshall aids (circa 1948) caused the unemployment of rural population and resulted in migration to urban areas. The railway investments increased the accessibility and mobility of the rural population, which caused the migration and the population agglomeration in urban areas. The squatter housing, land speculations related with private ownership, and unemployment in cities were the main problems of the period (Tekeli, 2009). The 1950s were also the years of the beginning of industrialisation. Together with the introduction of the multi-party system in 1946, Turkey was going through another narrative of modernisation shaped by domestic and international emigration.

Migration has always played a very essential role in the making of modern Turkey. The making of the contemporary composition of the Turkish population can be traced back to the late 19th century when the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire were shrinking in a way that led to the homogenization of the Anatolian population (Tekeli, 2007).

Urban migration and international emigration went in parallel in the 1960s and 1970s. The demise of the agricultural production in the rural space and the rise of industrial production in the urban space have radically changed the population dynamics within the country. On the other hand, emigration has also brought about new challenges for Turkey in the sense that several diasporic, or transnational, social-political formations were transmitted to Turkey from diaspora such as the mobilization of Alevi, Kurdish, Islamic, Armenian and Assyrian elements through the impact of diasporic networks. Nowadays, Turkey is becoming challenged again by migration phenomenon on a very different level. Turkey has recently become a net-migration country due to the changing global social-political-economic conditions, leading to the rise of transit migration and return migration. Turkey’s bridging position between several different worlds makes her vulnerable to various migration patterns. European integration process, democratization process, economic dynamism, and Turkey’s becoming a soft-regional power, and her strategic location on the global energy roads also make her an attractive destination for international direct investment.

Turkey has a sizeable refugee population abroad as well as an internally-displaced population (IDPs) inside the country. IDPs are mainly the Kurdish-origin individuals who have been forced to leave their villages and towns in the rural space either by the security forces or the PKK (Kurdish Workers Party). The social-economic and political situation of the IDPs cannot be evaluated without analysing the ongoing Kurdish issue of course. Jongerden (2007: 283) claims that the evacuation of thousands of villages and the displacement of hundreds of thousands or even millions of Kurds should be not viewed as collateral damage from a war of state forces against insurgents, but as one of its very objectives. The Kurdish population in Turkey is between 12 and 15 million. 75% of them are Sunni and 25% Alevi.
The majority of Kurds speak the Kırmançe (Kurmanji) dialect of Kurdish, and a minority speak Zaza.

Furthermore, Turkey has been positioned on the transit route for irregular migrants from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan since the 1990s (Kirişçi, 2003; İçduygu, 2009). Several different developments in the immediate neighbourhood of Turkey such as the Iranian revolution, political turmoil in the Middle East, end of the Cold War, the Gulf War, and Turkey’s geographical location as a transit space between the West and the rest of the world turned Turkey into a de facto country of first asylum. It should be noted that Turkey grants refugee status only to European asylum seekers. It has until recently ranked in the top three countries globally for resettlement of non-European refugees, with the main countries of destination for resettlement being the United States, Canada, and Australia (IOM, 2008: 31). Migration issues in Turkey are shaped by its efforts to become a member of the European Union, creating pressures on the revision of its immigration and asylum policies (Kirişçi, 2009). The efforts regarding the signing of the Readmission Agreement with the European Commission have come to the very last stage.¹

The return migration of the 1990s and 2000s is quite different from that of the 1970s and 1980s. The early returns were either the outcome of cyclical labour migration or of the assisted remigration programs as in 1984. Today, return migration has become a constant process of mobility for those transmigrants between the country of residence and the country of origin. Many Turkish emigrants who had previously settled in various European countries are returning to Turkey, but not all of them permanently. For some of them, we cannot even use the term “return” as they were born and raised in their countries of residence. Today, many of the first generation migrants who migrated in the 1960s and 1970s and later became retired have started living six months in Turkey and six months in Europe.

Turkey-EU relations have recently become very dynamic. Since the Association Agreement ("Ankara Agreement") was signed between the Community and Turkey in 1963 and the protocol added in 1970, the two sides are getting engaged in strengthening trade and economic relations and the establishment of a customs union. Another objective set forth in the Ankara Agreement was the free movement of workers. For socio-economic reasons however, it has not been possible to achieve this according to the timetable set. The EU is going through a political, social and economic crisis while Turkish economy is booming together with the fact that it has experienced the recent global financial crisis rather smoothly in comparison to European countries. With a large and dynamic population (for her key demographic indicators see Table 1), the country’s economy grew an average of 6.0% per year from 2002 through 2007 - one of the highest sustained rates of growth in the world; declined during the 2008-2009 crisis but recovered quickly in 2010 (with a growth rate of 6.8%); and the per capita income (adjusted by purchasing power parity) is 10.350 Euro (2009 figures).²

2. Main Emigration and Internal Migration Trends and Patterns

Starting from the second half of the 20th century Turkey was faced with a rapid process of both international and national migration. It may be said that within this process we may clearly see in operation the classical pull and push factors of sociological literature. Almost all factors such as industrialization and mechanization in agriculture as well as qualitative and quantitative superiority of various services like health and education in urban areas have always played an important role in migration towards cities in Turkey. Since the 1960s and 1970s various studies have focused on internal migration.³ Those push and pull factors at

² Unless otherwise stated, all data are from the official statistical institute of Turkey, TÜİK (www.tuik.gov.tr).
play on the internal scene are also important in relation to international migration from Turkey, mainly to European countries - as well as to North Africa and to Middle East.\footnote{See, for example, Abadan-Unat (1964, 1976, 1985), Abadan-Unat and Kemiksiz (1986), Kağıtçibaşı (1987), and Vassaf (1982).}

Turkey has so far experienced various migration patterns ever since the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire since the late 19th century in a way that had profound effects on socio-economic, cultural, demographic and labour market structures of the Turkish urban landscape. Tekeli (2007) mentions four different types of migration in the last 150 years. The first wave is what Tekeli calls “balkanisation migrations”. Here, Tekeli (2007: 449-455) refers to those migratory movements, which took place during the last days of the Ottoman Empire and the early period of the Republic. These are mainly related to the nationalist movements in and around Ottoman lands, which resulted in the movements of Muslim populations into Anatolia. This also covers the issue of population exchange between Turkey and Greece during the 1920s. The second wave of migration took place between 1945 and 1980. According to Tekeli, this has to be considered as part of the processes of “urbanisation” and late industrialisation of the Turkish society. It was a direct result of the dissolution of agriculture. This migration was from rural areas to urban centres and abroad. The third wave highlighted by Tekeli is migration movements among cities, which started after 1975. And the last wave mentioned is “multiple life roots”, a pattern whereby people have started to move more often than it was before.

2.1. Main Emigration Trends

Turkey has been subject to various forms of migratory and refugee flows. Turkey has been a country of emigration with large numbers of its citizens migrating to Western Europe, particularly Germany since the 1960s. Based on bilateral-labour agreements, Turkish workers migrated to West Germany (1961, revised 1964), and other countries such as Austria (1964), Belgium (1964), the Netherlands (1964), France (1965) and Sweden (1967); in addition, social security agreements were signed with the United Kingdom (1959), Switzerland (1969) and Denmark (1970) (Akgündüz, 2008). To illustrate the number of Turkish emigrants in the early period of recruitment one could recall the number of Turkish workers recruited by Germany: 7,199 in 1967, 41,409 in 1968, 98,142 in 1968, 96,936 in 1970, 65,684 in 1971, 65,875 in 1972, 103,753 in 1973, and 1,228 in 1974 (http://www.iskur.gov.tr). According to EUROSTAT, the total number of Turkish-origin emigrants residing in the European countries is currently about 4.5 million (see Table 2).\footnote{Also see the Ministry of Labour of the Republic of Turkey, External Relations and Services for Workers Abroad, http://www.diyih.gov.tr/yayinlar/dosyalar/pdf/diyih_2009_raporu.pdf, accessed 10 March 2011.}

Europe’s oil recession in the 1970s redirected the flow of the Turkish migrant labour force to the Middle East, and in the 1990s to the Russian Federation and Commonwealth of Independent States. Turkish economy has remained dependent on the remittance flows since the 1960s (IOM, 2008; World Bank, 2008) - on which more details will be provided below.

The World Bank (2011) estimates the number of emigrants, using data from census, population registers and other sources in the receiving countries. The total number of emigrants from Turkey was estimated to be 4.3 people in 2010 (emigration rate of 5.6%). According to these statistics, the most relevant population groups born in Turkey live in the following three countries: Germany (2.7 million), France (300,000) and the Netherlands (195,000).\footnote{Eurostat (Immigration by sex, age group and citizenship - online data code: migr_imm1ctz).} According to EUROSTAT, there is a declining tendency in the emigration rate of Turkish-origin emigrants heading towards the European Union countries. 2008 statistics display that 26,653 Turkish emigrants went to Germany, 4,996 to Austria, 3,299 to the Netherlands, and 1,458 to Sweden.\footnote{WorldBank (2011): Bilateral Migration Matrix (November 2010), in: http://go.worldbank.org/JTCC7NYTT0 (last access 31.05.2011).} Russia and the Middle Eastern countries became very
attractive for the Turkish contractual labour in the previous decade. For instance, as of 2008, the number of Turkish-origin workers in Russia was 130,437 (Ryazantsev, 2009: 160).

Emigration patterns vary in accordance with the social-economic and political changes in Turkey: a) cultural and ethno-cultural motivations; b) ideological motivations; and c) skill-oriented motivation. As explained above, most of the Turkish emigrants left the country on a temporary or permanent basis due to social-economic reasons. Accordingly, there are quite a number of people who left the country for various other reasons. Armenians, Greeks, Assyrians, Ezidis and some other groups, who are mostly non-Muslims, left the country in different waves when there were nationalist hate crimes directed against them. After the 1960s military coup, the leading members of some tariqats (Muslims sects) left the country. Similarly after the 1980 military coup, thousands of left-wing politically motivated intellectuals, activists, Alevis, Kurds, Circassians, etc. left Turkey. And finally, the last group of emigrants who left Turkey in the last couple of decades are those qualified people, mostly students, going abroad for post-graduate studies. Most of them have been going to countries like the USA, Canada, the UK and Australia (Akçapar, 2009; İçduygu, 2009).

Recently, a significant issue among Euro-Turks is the increasing number of spouses brought to Europe from Turkey. Such partners are known as “imported brides and bride-grooms”. Such arranged marriages are usually preferred by conservative families, who believe that brides from the homeland are culturally “pure” and thus capable of raising “better-educated” children (Akçapar, 2007; Straßburger, 2004). Apparently, this is the new emigration trend from Turkey. However, there is no available data on this matter.

Emigrants nowadays are very different from the way they were in the earlier years of emigration. In the 1960s, mainly manual labour left Turkey. In the 1970s, family members of those earlier emigrants joined them through family reunification. As already touched upon, the 1980 neoliberal military coup changed the profile of the emigrants in the 1980s, and mainly politically-oriented intellectual Kurds, Alevis, and Asyrians left the country. In the meantime, emigration of skilled people started towards the other countries such as the USA, Canada and Australia (Kaya and Şahin, 2005; İçduygu, 2009). Emigration of the highly skilled towards these three countries still continues (Akçapar, 2009; İçduygu, 2009). For instance, the highly skilled and educated profile of the Turkish community in the USA is changing in the recent years, as unskilled or semi-skilled Turkish labor workers also arrive in the country. Regular migration movements were often accompanied by irregular movements. For example, it is reported that labour migrants reached the USA leaving cargo ships illegally or overstaying their visa.

There have been around 2.5 million returnees in the early years of emigration between 1961 and 1974, when migration used to have a circular form, which mainly prompted males to emigrate. Another substantial return took place in 1984 when Germany introduced an attractive return scheme for those voluntary returnees. The number of returnees in 1984 and 1985 was around 300,000 (Hönekopp, 1990). Return migration in 1987 was around 150,000 but since then has been steadily declining as well (OECD–SOPEMI, various years). There is recently a new phenomenon, i.e. the return migration of qualified middle and upper middle class migrants of Turkish origin. It is estimated that around 8,000 Turkish-origin emigrants and mostly their children come to Turkey each year in order to be employed in international companies like Mercedes, Siemens and Bosch as well as in touristic resorts or international Call Centres. Inanç Kutluer, the Director of the Netherlands Migration Institute and himself a Euro-Turk, states that each year approximately 1,000 young Dutch-Turks attracted by the dynamic Turkish economy migrate to Turkey to be employed in international companies (personal interview, Utrecht, 28 March 2007). According to EUROSTAT, outmigration of Turkish citizens from Germany exceeded immigration of Turkish citizens to Germany since

---

8 There are recently several dissertations scrutinizing this newly emerging phenomenon. See Ehrsam (2011), Kaiser (2003), Bal et al. (2006), and Südas (2010).
2006. Last available figures state that 34,843 Turkish citizens emigrated from Germany, while 26,653 immigrated to Germany.\textsuperscript{9}

On the other hand, there is still an ongoing trend among the qualified young Turks to migrate abroad for higher education. Western Europe is not yet an attractive proposition for skilled labour from Turkey. For example, while only 5% of Turks migrate to European countries, almost 30% of educated Turks migrate to the “New World”. Similarly, 2007 OECD data indicate that 63% of the Turkish-trained medical doctors and nurses preferred to emigrate to the USA, and 28% to Germany. There are various reasons for this distinction, e.g. that educated migrants might perform better in these labour markets compared to European countries and that legal and social acceptance might be easier there (Özden, 2006: 8).

While Turkey continues to be a country of outmigration it is also becoming a country of immigration. In the year 2000 (latest data available for foreign born by country of origin) some 1.3 million or 1.9% of the 67 million inhabitants were foreign born. In the year 2000 the share of Germans in the foreign born population of Turkey amounted to 21.4% (273,500).

2.2. Main Internal Migration Trends

The increase in population over years went along with an increasing urbanisation of the population through migration from rural to urban areas (Figure 1 and 2). While the urban population (defined as those settlements populated 20,001 and more) was rather stable until after the World War II, it went from 25% in 1950 to 44% in 1980. It increased even faster in the following period approaching 80% in 2010 (see also Kiray, 1998). There is still room for further urbanisation considering the rates in other European countries (see Table 3).

More importantly, almost all internal migrants are somehow involved in the informal sector. As Tekeli (2007: 455) points out, when we talk about the notion of urbanisation we are actually talking about migration and in the case of Turkey it is mainly internal migration. Late-blooming Turkish industrialisation and the urbanisation opened up the way to development of informal networks and informal economy. It is not only the transformation of the urban and the rural structure of Turkey that has been effected by these massive migration movements, they have also been responsible for the emergence of a new culture of poverty and new survival strategies undertaken by those who live on the margins of urban life. In this respect, it has been argued that the sociological studies on migration and the related issue of integration of migrants into urban life focused mainly on three different areas. The first one was the housing issue and the studies in this area focused on gecekondu (squatter) housing (Tekeli 2007: 460). These studies did not limit themselves to Istanbul only as this unique type of squatter housing became almost a rule in the urban landscape of Turkey. The housing issue is discussed in detail for example by Erder (1996) in conjunction with the notion of the informal sector.

The second group of studies directed themselves to the issue of employment and informal networks as migrants cannot easily gain access to the formal labour market. In this context, the notion of informal has also become problematised. According to some commentators (Kongar, 1998; Işık and Pinarcıoğlu, 2001), the establishment of informal networks reached a point at which almost all Turkish social and economic life became corrupted. The third group of studies look into the cultural transformation of migrants and the emergence of new cultural forms (Stokes, 2000; Özbek, 1994). Within this new urban culture, various tensions have emerged (Aslan, 2005). Lack of access to formal social and economic life has produced not only a new form of culture of poverty but has also resulted in resistance, deprivation and the victimisation of migrants.

Internal migration can be divided into three historical categories: a) pre-1950 migration, b) 1950-1985 migration, and c) post-1985 (IDPs) (Akşit, 1998). In the first period, the political elite tried to back up the early industrialisation process with the recruitment of labour from

\textsuperscript{9} EUROSTAT figures on immigration and emigration of Turkish citizens to/from Germany see the following website: (Emigration by sex, age group and citizenship - online data code: migr_emi1ctz). http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_emi1ctz&lang=en
rural areas. The second period between 1950 and 1985 is characterized not only by rural-urban migration, but also by urban-urban migration. The first migration wave of this period was from the immediate hinterland of the big cities to the big cities such as Istanbul, İzmir and Ankara. Subsequent wave of migration in this stage was one from Central Anatolia and Black Sea region to the metropolitan cities. Eventually, the last wave was the migration from Eastern Anatolia and Southeastern Anatolia to the metropolitan areas of Western Anatolia. IDPs constitute the third phase of internal migration starting in the second half of the 1980s and becoming very intensive in the 1990s. These migrants, generally accepted to number around more than one million, left their rural homes to move to the suburbs of the big cities as a result of the armed conflict in south-eastern region either through state pressure or out of fear of staying in the middle of the conflict. The migratory routes of these groups in Turkey are subject to their economic and social capital (see Map 1). Those who had a good amount of economic capital wanted to go to Istanbul, İzmir or Ankara, as far as it could be from the South East. Those who had less money migrated to places like Mersin at the Mediterranean Region, where they didn't have to spend so much money for transportation and for heating in winter. Eventually, those with no capital had to evacuate their villages to go to the city centres in the region such as Diyarbakir or Van (Kaya et al., 2009).

One should also bear in mind the migration of the Christian minorities residing in the Southeast Anatolia due to the endemic violence in the region. Severely affected by the armed conflict and insurgencies as well as terrorist activities of the PKK in south-eastern Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s, the Assyrians migrated to Istanbul first, and from there to Europe, mostly to Sweden. According to their own statements, the number of Assyrians decreased to 3,000 in the south-eastern region and to 50,000 in Istanbul. Most of the Assyrians live in Sweden since they left Turkey in the 1970s as either workers or asylum seekers. Ezidis have also been subject to internal and international mobility due to the same reason.

2.3. Main Characteristics of Migrants

In the early stages of the migration (1960s), Turkish migrants were mainly men between the ages of 20 and 39, relatively skilled and educated in comparison to the average working population in Turkey, and from the economically more developed regions of the country (Abadan-Unat, 1976; Martin, 1991). The share of rural migrants in all migrants at this stage was just 17.2% (Gökdere, 1978). In the second half of the 1960s, however, recruitment consisted of low educated rural workers (Gökdere, 1978). Later on, with demands from the textile and electronics sectors for cheap female labour, it was conversely the women who first migrated to cities like Berlin in the late 1960s and early 1970s. By and large, most of the Turkish emigrants originate from Central Anatolia and Black Sea regions (Kaya and Kentel, 2005). Since 1973, the composition of the Turkish migrant population has tended to become a more general population migration in the form of family reunification and political asylum rather than mainly labour migration.

As stated above, emigration of skilled people started towards the other countries such as the USA, Canada and Australia and still continues (Akçapar, 2009; Kaya and Şahin, 2005; İçduygu, 2009). For instance, the highly skilled and educated profile of the Turkish community in the USA is changing in the recent years, as unskilled or semi-skilled Turkish labour workers also arrive in the country. They usually work in restaurants, gas stations, hairdressers, construction sites, and grocery stores although some of them obtained American citizenship or green cards and opened their own ethnic businesses (Akçapar, 2009; Kaya, 2003: 58). According to the USA Census 2000, the profile of Turkish people born in Turkey and living in the USA is as follows: 35,025 (44.7%) of them were naturalized citizens with more than half (21,080) entered the USA before 1980; whereas 43,350 (55.3%) were not USA citizen with the majority of them (33,030) entered the USA between 1990 and 2000. The gender distribution was 54.7% male (42,880) and 45.3% (35,500) females. As for ages of the sample data, the majority of them, 19,480 people (24.9%) were between 25 and 34 years old. As for educational attainment, overall 42.7% had a bachelor’s degree or higher.

---

10 This is a common pattern in several IDP situations. See Van Hear (2004).
and 14,935 (23.1%) of them were holding graduate or professional degrees. Recently, there is anecdotal but limited evidence that return migration is on the rise from the USA to Turkey (Akçapar, 2009).

Not only the profile of the emigrants, but also the profile of the returnees has radically changed either nowadays. Highly skilled men and women now prefer to come to Turkey, mostly to Istanbul or other big cities, to search for alternative life styles, to work in international companies, tourism sector, IT sector, or to study.

Returnees of older age are generally less educated and have weaker attachments to the labour force than the well-educated, full-time working emigrants and their descendants. This is true for men and women even after taking into account the effects of country of origin, era of migration, demographic factors and family ties (Yahirun, 2009). Atterhög (2005) and Yahirun (2009) find out that immigrants who have more successfully assimilated into the German labor market and have established credentials that allow for gainful employment in Germany are more likely to stay. Similarly, those who have managed to purchase homes in Germany are less likely to return than non-homeowners. For the last decade or so, returnees prefer the health services and pension systems of their countries of settlement, and often do not wish to give up their houses, and try to keep in contact with their relatives, who live both in Turkey and abroad (İçduygu, 2009).

As regards internal migrants and IDPs, a small group of these families who have been subject to the hardships of migration to the big cities such as surveillance, discrimination, xenophobia and exclusion returned to their hometowns in the region trying to hold on to the existing solidarity networks. Young female IDPs have been mainly accommodated in the textile sector in the big cities without having any social security and with inappropriate working conditions. Several sexual and physical harassments have so far been reported in such workshops. Males have usually been accommodated in the informal sectors such as construction sites with no social security valves. Majcher-Teleon and Bardak (2011) rightfully state that the expected value of high school or vocational school education could be lower than the value of home production for many women as the probability of completing a university education is low. Thus, among the poor segments of the society, there is no incentive to invest in education beyond the compulsory level and this creates a vicious cycle of low education, teenage marriage and low labor market participation for women. According to the Hacettepe University Demography Institute, two out of ten males and four out of ten females are illiterate among the IDPs. This is relatively high in comparison to the illiteracy rate of the overall Turkish population (HÜNEE, 2006: 30-32). Moreover, the extent of informality reinforces the under-participation trap because informal jobs make workplaces less valuable than home production by paying low wages, avoiding employment security and offering poor and unsafe working conditions.

3. Nation-wide Labour Market and Social Development Trends under the Influence of Emigration

3.1. Economic and Labour Market Developments

Turkey has a population of around 73 million people (see Figure 1), and its population growth rate for the most recent year is 15 per thousand. While this figure is high relative to other European countries, fertility rates have been consistently going down. The most recent figure is 2.06, and the figure was around 3 and 5 in the 1990s and the 1970s, respectively.

An important characteristic of Turkish population is the high rate of youth dependency (Figure 3). Although it is about half its values in the 1950s, the rate of 40 in 2010 is rather high. The downward trend is expected to continue for the years to come. In contrast, elderly dependency is expected to increase in coming years. Although one can infer that high youth dependency ratio is one of the driving factors behind the high rates of emigration, further analysis on the relationship between emigration and demographic dynamics cannot be conducted due to lack of data.

As to the labour market, Turkey has been a country with relatively low labour force participation and high unemployment. Labour force participation has been particularly low.
among women and has been decreasing over time. This development is related to migration because work opportunities are more available in rural locations for women. Cultural reasons do also create a barrier against labour force participation of women in urban areas (note that although the rate for men is 70.8% in 2010 (close to the European level of 77.6%), it goes down to 27.6% for women. Ongoing rural-urban migration and subsequent low education (skill) levels in urban labour markets (Dayioglu and Ercan, 2011) are distinguishing the labour market features of Turkey from the EU’s Mediterranean countries. The median education level is primary school (five years) in Turkey. For pertinent labour market indicator comparisons with the OECD countries, one is advised to use non-agricultural labour market rates. Otherwise, labour force participation and employment rates look “better”, although these better versions are also very low relative to the EU averages. Turkish labour force participation rate (LFPR) is 49% and the employment rate is 43% (2010, Figure 4).

Unemployment statistics before 1988 are controversial at best, based on a few questions asked in general census or non-standard ones in Labor Force Surveys. It was only after 1988 that reliable standard statistics were developed (see Bulutay 1995). Hansen (1989) analyzes official labor force statistics for the period and argues that unemployment level has been relatively low, in contrast with official estimates, until the second half of the 1970s. Considering controversial nature of these statistics we refrain here from relating those to migration.

Along with Istanbul, central east Anatolia has the highest unemployment rate in Turkey at 14.3% (2010). This is a case in point for the agricultural softening of labour market statistics. While agricultural and non-agricultural unemployment rates are the same in Istanbul, central east Anatolia has the highest non-agricultural unemployment rate in Turkey at 21.7% followed by the Mediterranean region (18.1%). The eastern Mediterranean cities of Adana and Mersin receive a great deal of migration from the east and the southeast of Turkey. The Western Marmara and Western Anatolia regions have lower non-agricultural unemployment rates (11.8% and 12.3%, respectively) than the national average of 14.8%.

The eastern Black Sea region has the highest LFPR (58.2%) and the lowest unemployment rate (6.1%) in Turkey, along with the neighbouring Northeastern Anatolia (TRA) at 8.2%. These almost represent robust European values. It is also important to consider agriculture’s influence (hazelnut, kiwi, and tea) because women are unpaid family workers. The region’s non-agricultural unemployment rate is 12.5%. Along with Southeastern Anatolia (TRC), these two regions are the proportionately largest out-migration regions. Southeastern Anatolia has the lowest LFPR in Turkey at 38%. Its employment rate is also the lowest at 33%, followed by its neighbour to the north, central east Anatolia (TRB) at 39%. Unlike the eastern Black Sea region, this arid region does not have much agricultural activity and consequently women simply do not exist in the labour force (Dayioglu and Ercan, 2011).

Although these proportions paint a bleak picture of Turkey’s east, three NUTS1 regions of eastern Black Sea and eastern Anatolia (Map 1) are the least populated regions. Their combined working age population of 5.6 million is less than the single regional values of Istanbul, Aegean, and the Mediterranean. With ongoing westerly migration, one may design suitable education and labour market policies to tackle the employability problem. As such, Italian experience to be discussed in this Peer Review could be instructive. Finally it is important to note, that Central Anatolia, where Ankara dominates, has the second lowest LFPR in Turkey at 45%, which is below the national rate of 49%. However, Ankara has insignificant agricultural employment, and despite the existence of Konya province in the same region, which is the breadbasket of Turkey, most of the labour force in the region is in industry and services.

Apart from the impact on labour market, migration has also affected the economy through remittances. As touched upon above, remittances as the earnings generated and sent back home by the migrant workers, have been an important source of revenue for developing countries. The case of Turkey shows no exception to this trend in the trajectory of remittances since the 1960s. Especially in the 1960s, the remittances were regarded as the major source of external financing catering for offsetting the trade deficits in particular.
5 shows the volume of the remittances in millions USD since 1964. Their share in the GDP fluctuated at around 2%, while reaching its maximum magnitude of 4.37% in 1973.

Turkey’s analytical balance of payments reveal that up until the 2000s, remittances constitute around 90% of current transfers item, which is counterbalancing the deficit in goods, services and income items of the current account (authors’ calculations using balance of payments data from Central Bank of Turkey, TCMB). The end of the 1990s and 2000s is the period where a sharp decline in the volume of remittances is observed. First the 1999 recession, and then the two economic crises in 2000 and 2001 could be regarded as important determinants of this substantial decline. Official remittance data for the case of Turkey reveal that remittance flows are adversely affected by weak economic conditions (FEMIP, 2006). In such an economic context, with an important decrease in the confidence of economic agents to the economy, Mouhoud et al. (2006) draw attention to the possibility of migrants’ preference to remit by using unofficial channels rather than the official ones or simply not to remit at least for investment motives. On the other hand, both Sayan and Tekin-Koru (2007) and Ülkü (2010) mention that the decline in the last decade in the volume of the official remittances could largely be attributed to a change in the convention by which the Turkish Central Bank has been reporting remittance data collected such that foreign exchange accounts held by migrant workers and money spent during visits to Turkey were excluded from remittance received but rather recorded in the tourism revenues item of the current account (FEMIP, 2006). In a broader context, it is likely that the decline in the volume of the remittances would also be related with the decline in the total number of Turkish migrants as well as the number of potential remitters consisting of Turkish migrants living abroad since those group represent 3rd or 4th generation migrants with weaker ties with the home country and thus less likely to remit.

There is a substantial line of economic (and mostly econometric) macro-research investigating the impact of remittances on the national economy in Turkey and analysing its determinants. Given that the majority of the remittance flows are from Germany, the analyses are mostly focused on the Turkish migrants in Germany. Naming a few, Sayan (2004), Sayan and Tekin-Koru (2007) and Durdu and Sayan (2008) show that remittances flows from Germany are procyclical with Turkey’s output, suggesting that Turkish migrants in Germany do not remit for altruistic reasons. The findings of Alper and Neyaptı (2006) and Aydaş et al. (2005) provide evidence that remittances are used for both consumption and investment spending in national accounts, although in both studies investment spending is argued to be more visible in the longer term. Akkoyunlu and Kholodilin (2008), on the other hand, show that remittances from Germany were procyclical with Turkey’s output until 1974, then becoming acyclical. Aydaş et al. (2005) show that not only the level of output in the host and home countries but also some other factors such as the market premium, interest rate differential, inflation rate, and military regime seemed to be effective in the determination of the volume of the remittance flows to Turkey.

An equally important question is whether the returnees had any interest in entrepreneurship upon their arrival. Unfortunately data is rather limited on this issue. Some clues may be obtained from Labour Force Survey (2008), which is asking respondents whether they lived longer than 6 months in a foreign country. Acknowledging that this constitutes a relatively weak indicator for returnees, we compared the distribution of returnees and general population into categories of salaried, entrepreneur, self-employed, and family workers. As shown in Table 4, we observe only a slight difference between the two groups. İçduygu (2009) points out that some of the return migrants directly become employment-seekers as they return with skills and work experience for which the labour market in Turkey has limited demand. However, nowadays the Turkish labour market is also providing such migrants, especially qualified middle and upper-middle class ones, with convenient grounds to practice their innovative plans in the communications, arts, culture and design sectors. So far Turkish returnees used to buy a taxi or delivery truck, build rental housing, or set up a small business and become part of the service economy, they now perform in different sectors ranging from arts and culture to telecommunications, engineering and banking (İçduygu, 2009; Mandel, 2008; Abadan-Unat, 2002).
Abadan-Unat (1991) and Gitmez (1991) both underline the fact that Turkish-origin returnees did not really bring about a remarkable social-economic impact on the Turkish society. Abadan-Unat (1991) states that returnees constructed either cooperatives in the rural space to market agricultural products to the outside markets, or companies accommodating labour in the cities. TURKSAN was the first and most successful Emigrant Workers Companies (İşçi Şirketleri) established in 1966 to produce wall paper and school notebooks. This successful example was followed by İŞBİR in 1970 to produce plastic products. However, other companies established by the emigrants did not really work out due to various reasons such as their lack of entrepreneurial expertise, wrong choice of the sectors, and bureaucratic problems. According to the data of the year 2000, 42 out of 229 companies were somehow functioning, while 42 of which lost their status, and 106 were closed down (Artukoğlu, 2005).11 Emigrant cooperatives were established in the rural areas to mobilize rural residents and producers to sell their products to the outside markets. These cooperatives have changed shaped in time. And now there are construction cooperatives initiated by the returnees to create venues to live together in communities.12 Both types of initiatives mostly failed. Similarly, Gitmez (1991) affirms that majority of the returnees did not get involved in the economy of the country upon their return to Turkey. Around 50% of 1.9 million returnees between 1974 and 1984 became involved in agricultural production. The rest was either not at the productive age, or failed in the businesses they decided to run.

As mentioned earlier under chapter 2.1, there is recently a new phenomenon, namely the return migration of qualified middle and upper middle class emigrants of Turkish origin (for the number of emigrants from Germany, Austria and the Netherlands in the last years see Table 5). To further exemplify our case, in a recent focus group we held in Istanbul, on the 2nd of April, 2011, at the premises of Bilgi University, a 38 year-old man, who came to Istanbul two years ago with communications and web design skills, stated that now he can implement his thoughts in Istanbul since Turkey has really developed so much in the last years.13

Several of the German-Turkish returnees, or transmigrants, interviewed in the focus group meeting expressed that they were somehow engaged in the activities of Manzara Istanbul either as a customer or as an employee.14 Seven returnees joined the focus group meeting, five of whom are Turkish citizens and two German citizens. Aged between 21 and 46, they all speak fluently both languages, German and Turkish, as well as English. Two of them even spoke a fourth language, one Greek and the other Arabic. Three of the interviewees, all women, came back to Turkey for university education as they felt discriminated in German education system blocking their road to higher education. The others came to Turkey in search of alternative life styles, and now working in different German-based companies like Lufthansa and Call Centres. They all argue that they are overqualified in their work places. What is expressed here by our interlocutor corresponds to what several scholars call “brain waste” (Offe, 2011). Their past experiences in Germany are very similar in the sense that they all complain about the rise of xenophobia, Islamophobia and discrimination facing immigrants and their children, particularly Muslim origin ones. Therefore, for late returnees with high human capital we observe that they are likely to prefer to come to Turkey, mostly to Istanbul or other big cities, to work in international companies, tourism sector, and IT sector - yet we do not have data to further substantiate this dimension.

11 For more information on the Emigrant Workers’ Companies, see Pennix and Renselaar (1979).
12 Ehrsam (2011), who is an MA student of Bilgi-Viadrina Double Degree Program in European Studies, talks about Sakarya Kooperatif initiated by the returnees in the city of Sakarya (northwest Blacksea region), where almost 200 returnee families reside together in a gated community.
13 One should be aware of the fact that many Euro-Turks who have recently migrated to Turkey were born and raised in the European countries. That is why, they cannot be called “returnees”, they are rather migrants, or even transmigrants. Transmigrant is a term coined by Schiller et al. (2004) to refer to the fact that a new kind of migrating population is emerging, composed of those whose networks, activities, and patterns of life encompass both their host and home societies.
14 Manzara-Istanbul is a German-Turkish agency attracting German tourists and German-Turkish returnees coming to Istanbul serving them accommodation, tours and cultural-artistic deals (http://www.manzara-istanbul.com/de/) (accessed on 25 October 2011).
3.2. Social security

Turkey has so far signed and ratified several multilateral agreements on the social security rights of migrant workers and their families (see Table 6). On the other hand, Turkey signed 22 bilateral social security agreements to date, first of which was with UK in 1961 and the last one with Luxembourg in 2006. Turkey has also been a party to the European Social Security Agreement since March 1, 1977. Outside the EU, Turkey has concluded bilateral social security agreements with Libya, Norway, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Macedonia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Canada, Quebec, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Israel, Serbia and Montenegro, and Uzbekistan.\(^\text{15}\)

Bilateral agreements with Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, France, Northern Cyprus, Macedonia, Romania, Czech Republic, Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania and Luxembourg do not only cover rights to long-term benefits such as pensions already acquired in Turkey by Turkish migrant workers, but also the right to short-term benefits in cases of sickness, maternity, job accident and occupational health problems (Fuat Boztepe, personal interview, 2 August 2011).

Both multiple and bilateral agreements signed by Turkey\(^\text{16}\) aim at providing access to coverage and entitlement to benefits on an equal footing with nationals, maintaining acquired rights when leaving the country including the export of benefits, benefiting from the accumulation of rights acquired in different countries and preventing multiple premium payments. According to these bilateral agreements, for instance, a migrant worker of Turkish origin in UK would be entitled to pension benefits upon his return to the country but neither the beneficiary nor his dependents would have access to health care while a similar work history in Germany provides pension and other insurance benefit entitlements\(^\text{17}\) to the migrant worker and his/her dependants.

Pensions received under these bilateral social security agreements are usually paid directly to the pensioner by the pension-paying institution either via international money order or into foreign-owned accounts in the former host country. In the former case pensions are ultimately paid in the local currency at the official exchange rate. In some cases, foreign pensions are also paid through the Turkish pension system.

As of 31 December 2010, 87,534 persons out of 328,320 German-Turks (Table 7), who receive pension payments from the German government, reside in Turkey. Those pensioners who reside in Germany receive on average 763.20 Euro, and those in Turkey receive 542.03 Euro. Accordingly, around 570 million € are annually being transferred to Turkey from Germany.

The main problems with respect to the bilateral agreements are the complicated legal provisions, which keep changing. As the issue is discussed among migrants, people are generally well informed. However, more informational material in Turkish language is needed (Holzmann et al., 2005).

As the social security system in Turkey is based on contributions both for pension and health care entitlements, any emigrant who started work in Turkey and then moved to a foreign country with bilateral agreement would be entitled to a benefit called “partial overseas pension”, the level of which is significantly low but grants health care entitlements to the migrant and dependents during their time in Turkey. Contributions made to the social security schemes in Turkey covers both pensions and access to health care services. Here, we emphasize that for individuals with contribution history in Turkey who moved out to a foreign country and are residing there, the bilateral agreement provides partial pension


\(^{16}\) Bilateral social security agreements are listed in Table 6 of the annex indicating date of ratification and coverage of the agreements.

\(^{17}\) The bilateral agreement with Germany modify lastly by the additional agreement which took effect in April 1987 covers pensions, benefits in case of work accidents, health care and maternity, child benefits for employees but does not include benefits in case of unemployment and long-term care.
payment and access to health care services during the time the migrant and dependants would spend in Turkey. This is especially relevant for their temporary visits to the country during holiday times etc. There are, of course, some extensions to these arrangements: for instance, the migrant workers in Germany are granted some special allowances to safeguard their income maintenance if they get unemployed and run-off their unemployment benefit entitlements in Germany. Then, these workers are provided with the “premium rebate” where all past contributions are paid as lump-sum rebate to the migrant and dependants (Holzmann et al., 2005). According to the agreement, this is paid by German Insurance when migrants are permanently leaving the host country and returning to their home country. The lump sum payment reflects only the contributions made by the migrant, but does not include the employer's part of contributions. Holzmann et al. (2005) mention that this provision is not much used by returning migrants, at least not since 1984 when Germany for the last time granted a subsidy for returning migrants who opted out of the German pension system via lump sum payments.

The social insurance system in Turkey also allows for double pension earnings for any migrant worker who would be willing to make the necessary payments. This means that regardless of the existence of bilateral agreements, migrant workers (holding Turkish citizenship) would engage into “indebtedness agreement” with the social security institution in Turkey, on a voluntary basis, declaring that they are willing to make the payment amounting to the value of their contribution history in the employment in the foreign country formally documented as if it had been in Turkey. As for the daily premium contribution amounts, lower and upper thresholds are set by the Social Security Institution so as to determine the level of pension benefits that the returnee migrant would be entitled to after the lump-sum payment of the value of the contribution history. The contribution history would be calculated as net of time spent out of employment.\(^{18}\) The number of pensioners who opted for this voluntary scheme is around 200,000 but most probably will increase substantially due to the agreement to prevent double tax liabilities of the pensioners that has been recently signed with Germany (http://www.sabah.com.tr/Eкономи/2011/11/21/gurbetci-turyiyede-emeklilik-istiyor). The average pension is around 700 TL (ca. 295 EUR).

Turkey recently goes through some problems in terms of the transfer of social security payments. Austria had unilaterally cancelled in 1996 the Austrian-Turkish bilateral social security agreement in order not to pay child benefits to the children of Austrian-Turks residing in Turkey. The new bilateral agreement put into force in 2000 does not include child benefits anymore. On the other hand, the Netherlands has also been taking precautions to prevent the transfer of supplementary non-contributory cash benefits amounting to 33 EUR per month to Turkey since 2000. Each time the Turkish Embassy and the relevant attaches in the Netherlands take these individual cases to the court, and the court has always decided favourably for the Turkish citizens. So far, these payments reached a total amount of 10 million Euro (Fuat Boztepe, personal interview, 2 August 2011).

3.3. Poverty and Social Exclusion

Official poverty figures are available only from 2003 to 2009 for absolute poverty (income below a particular fixed threshold determined through a joint work with World Bank) and from 2006 to 2009 for relative poverty (those earning below 60% of median income) (See Figure 6). The figures from 2003 onwards reflect a downward trend until 2006 in poverty, reflecting recovery from the financial crisis of 2000-2001 and high economic growth in the following period. Due to lack of data for earlier periods it is not possible to observe the impact of the mass emigration period on poverty through time with official data.

We could inquire about particular groups that may be at risk of poverty due to migration. One such group is the lone parents, mostly women, who are left behind as their husbands leave Turkey to find job. To compare poverty rates among such households (those with a single

\(^{18}\) This includes unemployment, vacation and any time that is spent out of the foreign country, which should be documented with the entry and exit records in the passport.
Social Impact of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Central and Eastern Europe
VT/2010/001

but married parent) we make use of the Survey of Income and Living Conditions (2007) and calculate relative poverty rate. We found relative poverty rate (those below 60% of median) to be higher among lone parents, 27.3%, compared to the national poverty rate, 23.5%. It should be noted however that this finding was based on very limited data since the ratio of such lone and married parents is less than 0.5% in the data.

Micro-research based on household level information on remittances is lacking in providing a coherent set of literature on the issue. Among the very few micro-level studies, Unan (2009) provides the micro-level econometric analysis of the determinants of remittances of Turkish migrants. She uses data from 197 Turkish migrants residing in France and finds that familial linkages and exchange motivation are the main determinants of their remittances. Ülkü (2010) conducted a survey in 2009 covering 590 Turkish migrant households in Berlin, Germany, the results of which show that the remittances are mainly motivated by exchange (informal trade with home country), familial linkages (support to family members), and investment purposes. On the average, the remittances sent constitute 7% of the migrant household income (Ülkü, 2010). The remaining micro-level studies focus on the impact of remittances rather than their determinants and they do not use up-to-date data. Much of the money coming from abroad has usually gone directly to the family or co-locals of the migrant to maintain the dependants left in the country (İçduyuğ, 2005). Earlier studies have shown that remittances were spent on basic household expenses while a little part used for improvement of the standard of living through better housing, education, additional consumption and loan repayment (Abadan-Unat et al., 1976; Russell, 1978). Later on, Koc and Onan (2004) employ nationwide household data collected in 1996 and conclude that remittances improve the welfare of recipient households. Their analysis shows that about 12% of the households surveyed are beneficiaries of some kind of remittances and that the remittances are used for mainly consumption. On average, 80% of remittance is used to improve the household’s personal consumption, 7% to pay medical bills, 4% to cover the costs of marriage and the remaining 3% is used to buy land or a house. Day and İçduyuğ (1999) use data from 234 individuals in Turkey during 1992-1993 and show that returned migrants and their relatives have a higher consumption pattern than non-migrants. FEMIP (2006) review of research and literature reveal that the use of remittances generally for unproductive purposes (primarily household consumption expenditure or “daily expenses”) is not specific to the case of Turkey but rather commonly observed in the other remitting countries of the Mediterranean region. Koc and Onan (2004) emphasize that remittances in general contributed to the household welfare where they generally make up a higher proportion of total income for poorer households.

Furthermore, their analysis reveals that daily expenses of households in less-developed regions mostly depended on remittances received by households. As for the so-called “unproductive” use of the remittances, it should be noted that the potential for using remittances for productive investments will vary per region: households with lower income per capita spend more on daily expenses than those with higher income. Thus, poorer regions will find it more difficult to allocate a portion of their remittance receipts into productive investments. In terms of the key economic characteristics of the recipient households, the analysis by Ülkü (2010) for remittances of Turkish migrants in Germany reveals that the recipient households that are poor and have heads who are not fully employed receive only marginally larger remittances compared to those with higher income and fully employed heads. Based on their analysis on remittances sent by Turkish migrants in Germany, Sayan and Tekin-Koru (2007) evaluate the poverty mitigating potential of remittances at a macro level based on the cyclicality analysis of remittances and sub-components of consumption spending (namely food and durable goods) and show that especially after 1992, remittances do not have major poverty alleviation impacts on household incomes.
4. Labour Market and Social Development Trends in Net Migration Loss / Gain Regions

4.1. Identification of Net Migration Loss / Gain Regions

We use Statistical Institute’s figures on net migration rates and the ratio to population at NUTS1 level regions to identify the regions with net in- and out-migration. These figures reflect changes in population, hence incorporating both internal migration and emigration. Table 8 provides the figures for periods 1975-1980, 1980-1985, 1985-1990, 1995-2000, and 2007-2010. 2007-2010 figures are based on new census methods and hence differences with earlier periods should be commented on with caution. As seen from statistics, western parts of the country, excluding Western Black Sea region, receive migration while the eastern parts provide migrants. Istanbul is the major destination for migrants. Among the sources of migration, northern parts rank first; we observe little difference across time in migration patterns. The only switch from out- to in- migration occurs with Western Marmara.

Eastern and western regions of Turkey differ considerably in terms of geographic, demographic and economic characteristics. Eastern regions have rough geographical structure, which restricts industrial investments as well as agricultural activities. Climate is harsh in eastern and south-eastern regions. Economic development level decreases considerably from western to eastern and to northern regions. Regional GDP statistics are available only for the period 1987-2001. Hence we display the figures for 1990 and 2000 in Table 9. In-migration regions have often more than double the GDP of out-migration regions.

Regarding demographics, Table 10 presents some statistics from the year 2009. We find in-migration regions to be highly urban compared to out-migration regions. While the ratio of youth is rather homogeneous and around the national average in in-migration regions, it varies considerably among out-migration states. Variation arises from the differences between the Black Sea region where the ratio of youth is small and other out-migration areas where the ratio of youth is high. Finally, we find variation in the ratio of elderly. It should be also noted that fertility rates are much higher in eastern and south-eastern regions compared to the western regions. Unfortunately, due to lack of data we are unable to put the possible links between emigration and age ratios.

4.2. Labour Market Development in Net Migration Loss / Gain Regions

Those regions with positive net migration had in 2010 labour force participation (LFP) rates which were close to the national average of 48%. In other regions we observe a wide variation. In Eastern Black Sea region, mostly because of agricultural employment (which constitutes 54% of employment) and high female workforce use in agriculture, we observe high labour force participation of 58%. These, however, are usually self-employed subsistence farmers. In Central, Central-Eastern and South-East Anatolia the share of agriculture in employment varies as 33%, 40%, and 27%, respectively; but LFP rate goes down to 45% for Central and Central-Eastern Anatolia, and 37% for South-East Anatolia (see Table 11; the figures are from Labor Force Statistics 2010, compiled by TÜİK).

The unemployment rate is higher in net positive migration regions compared to the net negative migration regions, though there are variations among the regions. In Istanbul the rate goes up to 14%, higher than the 12% figure of the national rate. Migration may be one of the reasons behind the difference. In Western Marmara region, another region of in-migration, it is only 8.8%. In out-migration regions we observe a similar variation as above where South-Eastern regions have a high and North-Eastern region have a low unemployment rate relative to the national average (see Table 11; the figures are from Labor Force Statistics 2010, compiled by TÜİK). These figures are largely related to the agricultural activities, female activities in rural areas and similar characteristics, and are not telling much as to the impact of migration. Indeed, the correlation across regions in 2010 between net migration rate and unemployment figures stay only at 0.14. The ones for labour force participation and the inactivity rate (which is the proportion of the population that is not in the labour force and when added together, the inactivity rate and the labour force participation rate will sum to 100 per cent) are similarly low at -0.09 and 0.09, respectively.
The education level in out- and in-migration regions may also be considered in the labour market context since educational attainment is usually a critical factor in labour force participation and employment. According to official statistics in 2010 (presented in Table 12), the ratio of those who do not know to read and write is below 10% in western regions but higher than that in eastern regions (national average is 7%). In south-eastern regions this even goes up to 15% of the population. The ratio of those with high school education or more is more than 40% of the population aged above 15 years old in western regions but lower than 30% in eastern regions (national average is 30%).

As to the current enrolment figures, even though primary education is compulsory, there exist some differences across regions in primary education enrolment. According to TÜİK, in 2010-2011 school year, the enrolment was 99.38% in Istanbul while it was 96.51% in Gümüşhane, a province in Eastern Black Sea region, and 92.38% in Hakkari, a province in South Eastern Anatolia. In secondary education the rate is 74.51% in Istanbul and 67.01% and 51.71% in Gümüşhane and Hakkari, respectively. TÜİK does not provide enrolment rates at preschool level.

This being said, Turkish employment statistics have been only recently made available at regional level. It is hence not feasible to track these numbers starting from earlier years and relate them to migration.

4.3. Poverty and Social Exclusion in Net Migration Loss / Gain Regions

We observe a similar picture regarding poverty. Relative poverty rates calculated with the threshold of 60% of median income at the country level show large disparities in poverty rates between Eastern and Western regions. The rate goes as high as 70% in Eastern regions (Table 13.) While these figures do not incorporate purchasing power parity, it is clear that large differences exist in poverty rates. This difference has been observed above in GDP figures as well and is likely to be one of the reasons for significant rates of migration. It should, however, be noted that this inequality is likely reinforced by migration.

Regional disparities have been always present in access to healthcare and education services in Turkey. Eastern regions had more limited human resources in healthcare relative to western regions with the exception of Black Sea regions. While the number of hospital beds display little correlation with migration rates, the number of physicians and specialists are rather small in eastern regions, in particular in Eastern Anatolia (Table 14).

This manifests itself in vaccination rates and mortality rates across regions as well (Table 15). Vaccination rates are higher in western regions with the exception of South Eastern Anatolia where additional incentives are used. More births take place in hospitals in western regions and a higher number of mothers receive antenatal care. This results in lower mortality figures in western regions compared to eastern regions. Among out-migration regions, the Black Sea region is exceptional in provision of health care services. Considering that health care provision is largely done by government, this likely reflects the fact that while job opportunities are missing in that region, it still is an attractive place for government employees due to its convenient location, mild climate and a relative safe environment unlike eastern parts of the country.

As to the education opportunities, the average class sizes in eastern regions are reported at pre-school, primary school, and high school levels in Table 16. This illustrates once more the particular situation of Black Sea region as an out-migration region. Despite its adverse economic conditions, the region is rather attractive for public workers (compared to Eastern regions that have been subject to anti-government insurgencies in the last three decades), and hence does not lack human resources for health and education. This, combined with significant out-migration, makes the resources even more abundant for remaining individuals. In Eastern regions, in contrast, public human resources are scarce, making it difficult for individuals to reach health and education services. This in turn is likely to fuel further migration.

As to the social support schemes, it is documented that most of the funds are allocated to Eastern regions (SYDGM, 2011). There is no study that we are aware of which makes the
comparison taking needs into account. It is therefore difficult to make a useful comparison. It is clear from the poverty figures discussed above that despite these funds Eastern regions suffer through widespread poverty. In addition to these aspects, we should mention that migration has apparently caused problems in housing in in-migration regions and resulted in “shanty towns”. This had an adverse impact on city planning and had further negative consequences regarding the life in big cities. The shanty towns generally house the “working poor”, the labour force that is in fact (though not permanently) working, but unable to meet their basic needs and thus living at or under the total poverty line. In addition to low wages, informal employment (which mostly means an irregular job and uncertain employment), fluctuating income (either because the employer does not pay regularly or the worker has to change jobs often) and the lack of social security networks may be the reasons for this situation (Adaman and Ardiç, 2008).

5. Impact of Migration on Vulnerable Groups

The social effects of migration amongst others consist of change in family composition, family separations and the abandonment of old people, child outcomes in terms of labour, health and education. For example, most of the households in Turkey only had women, children and elderly in the early period of emigration until 1974. One of the key social issues arising from the age and gender selectivity (mostly young men emigrating) of Turkish migration was family separations and the abandonment of many old people. Many women were separated from their partners. Children suffered too from the absence of their fathers.

In the migration context, remaining elderly members of the family must restructure their daily lives to accommodate the loss of proximal emotional support, status and role certainty, and the labor that the presence of more youthful family members had provided. They must also restructure their values and expectations to accommodate the contradictions involved in such major physical and cultural transitions that are the result of economic change and mass migrant flows (Coles, 2001).

5.1. Women / Children / Elderly

Emigration had a mixed impact on traditional gender roles in migrant households. When men emigrate, rural women can be empowered by their absence. When women move, this can change traditional roles, especially those surrounding the care of children and the elderly. Women had to take care of their children as well as of the elderly members of the family. As they have become the care takers of their families, and as they had to go to reading-writing programs to become literate their authority on the children was not questioned by the patriarchal in-laws.

At the same time, in some households, the burden on women as caretakers may increase, or, when a male migrant returns, traditional norms may come back into place. In the mean time, emigration of married men prompts their spouses to take care of the daily routine of the household in the homeland in a way that incorporates them into the public space despite their complaints (Abadan-Unat, 1977; Kalaycıoğlu et al., 2010; Fidan and Fidecioglu, 2010). Furthermore, such spouses also complain about the fact that they have to take care of the parents-in-law. Kalaycıoğlu et al. (2010) reveal in their field study held with the spouses of the men who emigrated from the rural parts of Konya (a central Anatolian town) to Germany that the cost of becoming more visible in the public space is too much for women as their burden in everyday life becomes frustrating.

The works of Barut (2001), Yıldırak et al. (2002), Özbekmezci and Sahil, (2004), Türkyılmaz (2004), Başak Kültür (2004), Eskişehir Municipality (2009), Yükseker and Kurban (2009), Kaya et al. (2009), Akdeniz Göç-Der (2011) all indicate that both children and women are forced to work as men are not equipped with proper qualifications to work in the labour market of the big cities. Women become caretakers, textile workers and cleaners, whereas children work in the other sectors of the informal market (i.e. catering, waiters, street sellers).
Migration has enabled households to invest in housing, agriculture, private enterprises and the education of male and female children. The relatively high and stable remittance income improves living standards of households. However, separation of families also made a traumatic effect on the children who remained back in Turkey. Mainly the absence of the father figure was felt by the remaining children. Scientific studies reveal that around 60% of the remaining families experience nuclear family life in Turkey after the emigration of the father, while only 30% had an extended family life (Martin, 1991). Probably, the most vulnerable group of children were those who were sent back to Turkey by their parents for schooling in the 1980s and 1990s. There is no statistical data about how many children were sent back to Turkey unaccompanied. However, the act of sending children to Turkey for schooling at the secondary level became very popular in the 1990s after five schools were opened in Turkey through the cooperation of German and Turkish states for the purpose of reintegrating returnee children. Some of these children had to stay with their grand parents, and some of them even had to stay alone away from parental control (Kaya, 2001).

Perhaps the most serious problem concerned elderly people who have lost their family and social support. Even though Turkish custom obliges the children to take care of their parents in their old age, migration breaks down the tradition. This very human aspect of the effect of Turkish migration has rarely been mentioned in the existing literature.

The 2008 Turkish Demographic and Health Survey (TDHS, 2008) reveals, that the proportion of persons under the age of 15 is greater in the rural population than in the urban population (30 and 27%, respectively). Similarly, the rural population has a greater proportion of the elderly than the urban population (10 and 6%, respectively). These data indicate that the rural space should not be underestimated as it conveys potential problems for the elderly as well as for the children.

5.2. Post-conflict Refugees and IDPs

One of the earliest studies conducted on the internal displacement in Turkey is the work held by İçduygu et al. (1999) deriving from the data of the Turkish Demographic and Health Survey (TDHS) held in 1993. The data provide the first reliable and representative figures on the situation of Kurds in Turkey. This work examines the effect that a poor structural context, what İçduygu et al. (1999) call an "environment of insecurity", has on the Kurdish ethnic nationalist mobilization in Turkey. Their key claim is that the Kurdish population in Turkey is relatively much worse off than the Turkish population in the country. This claim is strongly supported by the 2003 data as well as the 2008 data (TDHS, 2008).

The main vulnerable groups of forced migration resulting from terror, violence and political repression have always been women and children, who have suffered the most in times of violence and turmoil in the region (IDMC, 2009a: 61-68). IDMC’s report clearly reveals that children and women IDPs in Turkey are especially more vulnerable to changing circumstances during displacement and improved access to, and utilization of, community-based primary and reproductive health care services for them is always vital. This study indicated that children of IDPs are likely to suffer from changing conditions and many health indicators reflect that they are disadvantaged compared to overall population (IDMC, 2009a: 74). IDPs in Turkey have benefited from the “green card” (Yeşil Kart), which gives poorer people access to free health care, medication and other assistance, but many were ineligible since they owned property at their place of origin (IDMC, 2009b).\(^{19}\)

\(^{19}\) Those who cannot afford to pay health insurance premiums may have access to free health insurance if they satisfy the conditions for the Green Card program that is designed to cover health expenses of the poor. The threshold for free public health insurance is set at one-third of the minimum wage. Prior to being accepted to the program, candidates are thoroughly investigated. The card needs to be renewed every year. In 1992, when the program was initiated, it covered only inpatient health care expenditures. In 2004, outpatient expenditures and medication expenses were also included. As of April 2011, the number of (active) Green Card holders is about 9.3 million.
IDPs in Turkey cannot fully enjoy their right to education, partly because of the elements of the Turkish domestic law impeding full exercise of the right. Turkey’s interpretation of non-discrimination leaves internally displaced children at risk. Turkey’s minority and anti-discrimination laws date back to the Treaty of Lausanne signed in 1923, defining minorities as “Turkish nationals belonging to non-Muslim minorities”. Turkey has consistently interpreted this protection as applying to only three minority groups: Armenians, Greeks, and Jews. Apparently, this law falls short in including the Kurds who make up the vast majority of the internally displaced population.

The most apparent problems IDPs are facing are poverty and unemployment. Lack of education, which contributes to rising unemployment, is another major issue. A 2009 report found that more than 30% of the children of Kurdish IDPs living in Diyarbakir and Istanbul, and 77.8% of those living in Batman do not attend school, mainly due to the consequences of poverty (Briefing Paper, September 2010). Women and children, who make up the majority of IDPs in Turkey, often face additional obstacles in accessing education and other social services and are at increased risk for abuse. Women undertake most of the unpaid work involved in holding a community together, such as bearing and raising children, caring for the sick and elderly, fetching water, growing and preparing food and caring for livestock (Irvin, 2011).

All these are adversely affected by displacement, as women become isolated and are vulnerable to violence. These groups become more exposed to vulnerability in the urban space as they are more inclined to be imprisoned at home. Especially, women and children become more fragile and subject to domestic violence due to the patriarchal structure of these families. Their limited access to health, education and public services make them even more vulnerable than the men are. Children become street children, being subject to maltreatment, harassment, violence, drug addiction and abuse (Kaya et al., 2009; and Yükseker and Kurban, 2009). Young females starting from the age of nine are also exposed to similar treatment in the confectionery workshops where they are illegally employed without proper working conditions and social security (Kaya et al., 2009).

Scientific studies also reveal that most of the seasonal workers working in the agricultural fields are women and children originating from the southeastern and eastern Anatolia (Özbekmezci and Sahil, 2004). The total population of the Seasonal Migrant Workers in Turkey is estimated around 1 million. In Turkey, about 9% of the population are children under 9. However, this is very different for Southeast Anatolia, where almost all migrant workers come from. According to UNICEF figures (State of the Children in Turkey, 2011 - UNICEF website) the percentage of 0-9 children is about 14%. Therefore, we can estimate that there must be around 125,000 seasonal migrant worker children who are 8 and under (Bernard Van Leer Foundation, 2011). Typically poor and with low levels of education, seasonal migrants are one of the most disadvantaged groups in Turkey. They are not protected by labour laws and are often not paid a living wage. There are, however, opportunities to intervene. The European Union and the Office of the Turkish Prime Minister have both recently drawn attention to their needs. They also have similar problems like the IDP women and children in terms of having very limited access to education, health and public services.

According to the estimates made by UNICEF Turkey there are around more than 50,000 homeless and street children in Turkey, most of whom reside in Istanbul (http://www.unicef.org.tr). Those children who have no parents or guardians and thus live in the streets or parks are categorized as homeless children, whereas those who have guardian or parents but are forced to work or beg in the streets to contribute to family budget are categorised as street children. However, we believe that this number is far from reflecting the reality. One could see the high number of such children in the streets of Diyarbakır, Van, and Mersin who are exposed to the internal displacement (Kaya et al., 2009). While the number of homeless and street children is increasing, little is known concerning how these youth are handled by criminal justice and social welfare agencies.
As noted by the 2010 UNDP report, migration can have a mixed impact on traditional gender roles in migrant households. When women move, this can change traditional roles, especially those surrounding the care of children and the elderly. When men migrate, rural women can be empowered by their absence. At the same time, in some households, the burden on women as caretakers may increase, or, when a male migrant returns, traditional norms may come back into place (UNDP, 2010).

Turkey is one of the OECD countries with the lowest female labour force participation rate. This fact is very closely related to migration because work opportunities (although with little or no pay) are more available in rural locations for women compared to urban areas. Furthermore, the cultural dimension also creates a barrier against labour force participation of women in both rural and urban areas. Incompetence of especially the women and of the elderly of Kurdish origin in Turkish language makes them even more vulnerable in the big cities like Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara. Internally Displaced Persons in Turkey have gone through great difficulties in the last three decades in terms of having access to legitimate political grounds, labour market, education facilities and to the city. Urban tension between the Kurds and the other groups also makes it very difficult for the Kurdish origin women to have the right to the city.

5.3. Roma

There is little information regarding the numbers of Roma or other groups. It is estimated that their population in Turkey is around 2 million. The most effective overview of the Roma of Turkey has been produced by a Romani scholar, Anna Oprisan (2003), working closely with the Roman communities themselves. On the whole, the Roma of Turkey do not respond affirmatively to the suggestion that they constitute an ethnic group, as this is clearly seen to be outside of the identity matrix Turkish/Muslim/Roman and family/clan/mahalle (community). Historically speaking, the degree of integration experienced by Turkish-Roma has been greater until the establishment of the Turkish Republic. During the Ottoman Empire they were well respected by the state as they had strong guild associations. However, there are a number of legal impediments to the integration of Roma. Roma communities are very heterogeneous in the sense that they might be Sunni-Muslims, Alevi-Muslims, or even Orthodox Christians (Marsh and Strand, 2005). They are also very different from each other depending upon their location in the city and in the country. There are diverse Roma communities in Istanbul, for instance, who are not in touch with each other. On the other hand, the Roma communities in Edirne seem to be very well integrated into the urban space in comparison to their counterparts in different part of Turkey.

Many Roma in Turkey live in sub-standard accommodation. Unhealthy environments and lack of security of tenure are the chief problems of the Turkish Roma. The education situation of Roma in Turkey is remarkable. Low school attendance and attainment levels and early school leaving are the key concerns. Although there is no concept of segregated school classes in Turkey, Roma children are concentrated in schools where they constitute a significant proportion of the school population together with the other vulnerable groups like the Kurdish IDPs. Roma do not generally have access to formal employment or social security. The reasons for this exclusion are low educational level, lack of job skills demanded by the labour market, decline of traditional occupations, and prejudice and discrimination. Roma are involved in a variety of occupations in the informal economy, usually of a temporary nature. It is also reported that the health situation of the Roma is generally poor, and this is related to the substandard conditions of their accommodation. Furthermore, access to services such as health services is limited for Roma with no personal identification, the real extent of this problem being unknown. Roma suffer from prejudice and a stereotyped image in Turkish society, leading to rejection and discrimination when it comes to access to jobs, rental housing and education (Gitano, 2010).

---

20 The term “right to the city” was first used by Henri Lefebvre (1996). Lefebvre’s concept of the right to the city refers to social, legal and cultural inclusion of city-dwellers in decision-making processes.
Roma mostly work as musicians in show-business, or in night-clubs and restaurants. Moreover, street jobs constitute the most recurrent activities for them as well as ambulatory street vending (fruits and vegetables differing according to season, bottles of water, music tapes, toys, everyday accessories and gadgets, bus tickets; prepared meals, especially stuffed mussels, and rice with chicken, etc.); collecting used paper, cardboard, and cans for recycling; shoe-shining; weighing people, etc. In these conditions, although more than one member of the households are working, the income generated by each is so low that the overall household income remains low.

Some of the members of the Roma population travel across the country. They are mainly residing in the eastern parts of the country and they are engaged in stock raising through a constant process of migration in accordance with the seasonal conditions. Roma population residing in Thrace is manly engaged in agricultural sector. Some of the Roma communities migrate from the east and the south eastern for seasonal works in the northern parts of the country in order to do work in harvesting nuts, tobacco, and tea. Fruit and vegetable picking, and other cash crops are a mainstay form of income for many groups in Turkey, and especially Roma who rely upon this for the substantial part of their annual income. The daily rates of those labouring in the fields are extremely low; and they work in very poor conditions (Uzpeder et al., 2008).

One of the most debated issues recently is the impact of the so-called urban gentrification schemes on the Roma communities. Sulukule is a great example in this sense. Sulukule is a very historical district around the Byzantian City Walls surrounding the inner city of Istanbul. It is estimated that Roma community of Sulukule is the first settled community of Roma outside India dating back at least 1,000 years. Roma have traditionally eked out a living in a close-knit environment rendered all the more intimate by Sulukule’s network of low-rise houses. Now Turkish Public Housing Enterprise21 (TOKI, Turkish version of French habitation à loyer modéré, HML) is building several new four-storey blocks as well as 620 modern villas, a hotel and facelifts for 45 listed Ottoman houses. Sulukule’s 503 homeowners have been offered the new houses at discount prices by the local Fatih municipality, which is running the regeneration project along with the city council. But the Sulukule Platform, a protest group fighting to save the district’s heritage, says few residents can afford it (http://sulukulegunlugu.blogspot.com). “Most of [the Roma people] suffer from poverty and hunger. A history has been eradicated. Now, TOKI is building deluxe residences in Sulukule,” said Hacer Fogo, a member of the Sulukule Platform, who called on the institute to devote more effort to addressing issues faced by people living on the historic peninsula, rather than prioritizing the histories of its mosques and artifacts (Personal interview with Hacer Fogo, 15 March 2011).

5.4. Other Ethnic and Religious Vulnerable Communities

The ECRI report of the Council of Europe addresses at the Alevis, Kurds, Assyrians, Armenians, Greeks, Jews and Roma as the most vulnerable groups in Turkey (ECRI, 2011). As Kurds and Roma were already discussed in detail, this section will concentrate on the other groups namely Armenians, Assyrians, Alevis, Arabs, Balkan and Caucasian Muslims. Most of the non-Muslim populations either reside in Istanbul, or already emigrated abroad as their original homeland became insecure for them to survive. Gradual emigration of various ethno-cultural and religious minorities to European countries has also impacted the ones who stayed behind. Those who could not migrate abroad because of the lack of sufficient economic and social capital migrated to the big cities such as Istanbul in order to protect themselves from the ethnic, cultural and religious pressure in the rural space. It is quite common to see various groups of Armenians, Assyrians, and Alevis who followed this pattern.

---

Armenians: Armenians are one of the indigenous peoples living in Anatolia and are mostly Gregorian Orthodox, with fewer Catholic and Protestant. The Armenian population in Anatolia substantially decreased as a result of the atrocities during the 1915 exodus carried out by the “Union and Progress” government and of the streams of emigration. The Armenians who developed a distinct Armenian identity live mostly in Istanbul and number between 55,000 and 90,000 (UN, 2000). Gregorian Orthodox Armenians are committed to the Armenian patriarchate established by the initiative of Mehmet II in Kumkapı, Istanbul, in 1461.

Due to the historical reasons, there are almost no Armenians left in the eastern parts of the country. They either migrated to Istanbul, or abroad. Those who live in the big cities have mostly concealed their identity in the public space as they were discriminated in the labour market, education, public services. Non-Muslims could not still take important positions in the public service sector as i.e. in the Foreign Ministry although they are also fully-fledged citizens of the Turkish Republic. Armenians have become more vocal together with the deepening of the European integration of Turkey since the 1999 Helsinki Summit of the European Union. However, they were silenced again upon the assassination of the Armenian origin journalist Hrant Dink on 19 January 2007.

It is reported by the local authorities that thousands of Armenians illegally come to Istanbul from Armenia to work in informal sector. This has become a political debate in March 2010 when resolutions voted in the United States and Sweden to brand the World War I killings of the Armenians by the Ottomans as “genocide”.

Assyrians: There is a common belief in Turkey, shaped by the official discourse and internalised by the society, that the Treaty of Lausanne, by which non-Muslim minorities were officially recognised and acquired civil and cultural rights, mostly addresses those “three large minorities” among non-Muslim populations. On the other hand, Assyrians, Nasturis, Yezas, and Protestants are also non-Muslim populations living in Turkey. The civil and cultural rights of the latter minorities were secured by the Treaty as much as those of the “three large minorities”. Severely affected by the armed conflict and the terrorist activities of the PKK in South Eastern Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s, the Assyrians migrated to Istanbul first, and from there to Europe, mostly to Sweden. According to their own statements, the number of Assyrians decreased to 3,000 in the South Eastern region and to 50,000 in Istanbul. Throughout the last decade there is an increase in the number of Assyrians who are willing to return to their homeland, thanks to the European integration process of Turkey. In the mean time, it is also known that around 5000 Assyro-Chaldeans (Catholic Assyrians) escaping from the atrocities in Iraq in 1990s and early 2000s found a refuge in Istanbul next to their Assyrian kins (Danis, 2007; and Danis, Taraghi and Perouse, 2009). The main difficulties of the Assyrian returnees are the ongoing fights in the south-eastern Anatolia, which makes it insecure for them to settle back in their evacuated villages.

It is estimated that there are around 18,000 Assyrians in Turkey (UN, 2000). The situation for the Assyrians in the labour market, education and public services is not also very different from that of the Armenians. Assyrians have also concealed their identities in the public space for a very long time until recently as they also had a very strong belief of being stigmatized and discriminated.

Arabs: The official research on population indicates that there are approximately one million Arabs in Turkey. Of them, around 300,000-350,000 Arabs living in and around Mardin, Urfa and Siirt are Sunni, and around 200,000 Arabs living around Mersin, Adana and Antakya are Alevi. The rest of the Arab population are diffused throughout various parts of the country. Sunni Arabs do not challenge the superior Turkish identity with their religious identity, whereas Alevi Arabs residing in the South emphasise their Alevi identity based upon religious and ethnic difference.

---

Quite a number of Arab origin Turkish citizens also left Turkey to work abroad in the 1960s and 1970s. Arabs mostly migrated to the big cities like Istanbul in 1950s and 1960s to take part in the trading segments of the cities such. The remaining parts of the Arab population also preferred to go to the big cities (Istanbul, Izmir, Mersin, Gaziantep and Adana) since the 1980s following their predecessors due to their demographic disadvantage vis-a-vis the Kurds. Fahri Aral, the chief editor of Istanbul Bilgi University Press, claims that the main survival strategy of the Arabs in the urban space was rather to assimilate into the mainstream Turkish culture and to identify themselves as Turkish (personal interview with Fahri Aral, 10 August, 2011).

Alevis: Most of the Alevis are of Turkoman origin. The Alevi population is divided into four categories on the basis of the language they speak. The total population of Alevis living in Turkey is approximately 12 million, consisting of: 1) Alevis who speak the Azerbaijani dialect of Turkish. Their religious belief and practice is similar to the Shia religion in Iran. They live in Kars and constitute a small number of the population; 2) Alevis who speak Arabic (see above). Arab Alevi originate from the Nusayri community in Syria and live around Mersin, Adana and Antakya. They have no historical affiliation with other Alevis in Turkey and are different from them in identifying themselves with the Alevi identity prior to the Turkish identity; 3) Alevis who speak Turkish. This is the most influential and largest group. Although they are of Turkoman ethnic origin, they have the strongest sentiment of being a religious minority; and 4) Alevis who speak Zaza and Kurdish. The population of this group numbers nearly three million. It is also known that 25% of the Kurdish population are Alevi. They form a minority within the Alevi- and Kurdish-origin populations. There are several different groups of Alevis in the diaspora, mostly in Germany, France, Switzerland and the Netherlands. It is known that Alevi political mobilisation in Turkey owes a lot to the Alevi in diaspora (Kaya, 2009).

It is also known that Alevis are subject to ongoing discrimination in the labour market, education and public services. There are several groups of Alevis in the big cities, who migrated from the rural areas since the 1960s. Like Kurds, Alevis also constitute a kind of ethno-class in big cities, taking certain occupation mostly in the informal sectors such as construction. Alevis now challenge the Turkish state with regard to the compulsory religion and ethics courses taught in primary and secondary schools, because they believe that these courses are designed to simply promote Sunni Islam. In general Moslem religious minorities, such as the Alevis, seem to have less legal protection of their rights than non-Moslem groups. A major concern is the lack of will or ability on the part of the Turkish authorities to protect Alevis from harassment and other forms of abuse by Sunni extremists (Karimova and Deverel, 2001).

Balkan and Caucasian Muslims: Bosnians, Torbes, Pomaks and Albanians are ethnic minority people who originate from the Slavic Muslims and come from the Balkans and the Caucasus. Roma people who come from the same region at an unknown date can also be added to this group. Georgians are an ethnic minority group who come from the Caucasus. There are no certain findings proving that the Laz community comes from this region. Circassians and Georgians fled from Russia and migrated to Anatolia in the 19th century. It has been claimed that the number of the Circassians is around 2.5 million, and they speak the Adige language. Whereas the Balkan migrants do not have a particular consciousness of forming an ethnic minority, Circassians began to develop a separate identity in the 2000s with their cuisine, the declarations they publish in newspapers with regard to the conflicts in the Caucasus, the newspapers and magazines they publish such as Çveneburi, Pirosmani, Nart, Jineps and Ogni, and the Caucasian associations they establish (Kaya, 2005, 2011). Quite a number of Circassians also emigrated to European countries in the 1960s and 1970s.

After the dissolution of the USSR, hundreds of families returned to their homeland in the North Caucasus, and now they constitute a transnational space linking Turkey and the homeland. Trade, economics, politics and cultural linkages in the transnational space have become intensified in the last decade (Kaya, 2011).
6. Policy Responses

6.1. Encouragement of Circular Migration

One of the main problems of the Turkish emigrants is the obstacle before the right to dual/multiple citizenship. The right to dual citizenship provides emigrants with a symbolic power as well as legal power, which is likely to equip the migrant-origin individuals and their descendants with the chance to resist the processes of discrimination, mistreatment and exclusion in everyday life. However, in some countries the right to dual citizenship is not fully granted to emigrants. Germany is a good example. Despite the fact that the German citizenship law has extensively changed in 2000, the right to dual citizenship is not fully accessible. Those born and raised in Germany are given the right to acquire the citizenship of both countries until the age of 23. At the age of 23, they are obliged to make a choice between Turkish or German citizenship. If such people as well as those outside this category want to be granted German citizenship, then they have to decline their Turkish citizenship (Kaya, 2012). Turkey has been issuing a Blue Card (Mavi Kart, formerly called Pink Card) for such emigrants and their descendants since 1995. The bearers of the Blue Card are given a slightly compromised citizenship status that allows them most of the citizenship rights of the Turkish Republic excluding the right to elect and to be elected in the elections as well as the right to enter civil service. Owning and inheriting property remains unrestricted (Mandel, 2008; Mueller, 2006).

In terms of the policies implemented in Turkey to attract and channel remittances into economic activities, we take note of some development programs of 1970s. The development programs comprised of establishment of workers’ joint stock companies, creation of Village Development Cooperatives, and institutionalisation of State Industry and Workers’ Investment Bank. The first two failed to fulfil intended aims in channeling remittances to rural development and boosting productive investment in the rural areas - as most investors who lived many years abroad were ignorant about the market conditions in the country (Koc and Oran, 2004), while the latter did not manage to channel resources in the form of mixed enterprises as anticipated (İçduygu, 2005).

Turkey has also recently become more aware of the need to generate policies to regulate circular migration. Referring to the problems of the Turkish emigrants in Turkey, Mr. Kemal Yurtnaç, the President of the newly established Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities attached to the Prime Ministry, said: “These people can’t open bank accounts or buy property because their ID numbers are no longer active, but these citizens, who are estimated to number between 300,000 and 400,000, will no longer be treated like foreigners. They will not be registered in the Foreigners’ Registry but the Overseas Citizens’ Registry, which has been set up in the General Directorate of Population Affairs. That way, their ID numbers will be active, enabling them to exercise their rights...Turkish children born in Germany who do not have a record in Turkey’s registry will also be able to benefit from this policy.”

It seems that Turkish policy makers are now becoming more conscious about the difficulties of the Turkish emigrants’ rights in Turkey, which have so far been granted to those who had to relinquish their Turkish citizenship in another country by means of blue card (formerly pink card), which functions as a quasi-passport for those former Turkish citizens.

The Presidency of Turks and Related Communities Abroad was established on 6 April 2010, and it is affiliated to the Prime Ministry. It is established in order to coordinate the Turkish citizens living abroad and to strengthen the ties with related communities. According to the first section of law number 5978 declaring the formation of the department, the main objective of the organisation is to work with Turkish citizens living abroad and to help solve

---

23 For further details on Blue (Pink) Card, see the official website of the Turkish Security Department, http://www.egm.gov.tr/icerik_detay.aspx?id=132
25 The term “related communities” is rather vague, but it seems that all the communities who have been somehow in link with the Ottoman Empire as well as with modern Turkey.
their problems. The second section of the law gives detailed information about the services and the activities of the department. The organisation manages new social, cultural and economic activities with the Turkish citizens and descendents living abroad according to their needs and demands. It is mentioned that the activities of the organization are directed at not only Turkish citizens and descendents abroad, but also migrant organisations, non-governmental organisations abroad and professional organisations. In addition, it is worthwhile to mention that the department targets foreign students coming to study in Turkey as well; however, the main focus is the Turkish diaspora. It operates under three commissions: Consultancy Committee of Citizens Abroad (Yurtdışı Vatandaşlar Danışma Kurulu), Evaluation of Foreign Students Committee (Yabancı Öğrenci Değerlendirme Kurulu) and Cultural and Social Relations Coordination Committee (Kültürel ve Sosyal İlişkiler Eşgüdüm Değerlendirme Kurulu). There are six heads of departments, three of whose names are the same as the above-mentioned committees (http://www.ytb.gov.tr/).

The Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities will also take precautions to encourage Turkish emigrants to reside in Turkey, even those who relinquished their Turkish citizenship. Keeping an accurate record of those who have become citizens of those countries, the Presidency will pay close attention to the needs and questions of those people and will be able to function as a reference center when they come to Turkey. The Presidency is also willing to contribute to the resolution of the problem of adequate Imams to serve Turkish emigrants abroad. Kemal Yurtnaç says in this regard: “As part of the project, the children of Turkish citizens living in Germany will be able to study theology in Turkey and return to Germany after completing their studies to help meet the need for imams”. The Article 8 of the legislation of the Presidency states that the Presidency aims “to carry out activities (…) in order to protect the Turkish citizens living abroad and those who are not citizens anymore from discrimination, assimilation and from xenophobia and to cooperate with the people and institutions who act for the same purpose.” The legislation reveals that the Presidency is mainly designed to embody and control the lobbying activities in diaspora.

6.2. Encouragement of Return Migration and Support of Integration of Returnees

Return of the Turkish emigrants is an ongoing phenomenon since the beginning of the emigration process in the 1960s. Prior to the late 1970s, around two million emigrants experienced a cyclical form of migration through which they accumulated some capital to invest in their homeland. In the early 1980s, the Return Acts of the host governments encouraged substantial return migration to Turkey (Ayhan et al. 2000). For instance, there were some 310,000 returnees from Germany in the period of 1983-85, and some 10,000 returnees from the Netherlands in the period of 1985-86. However, in the late 1980s and afterwards, the levels of return migration from Germany declined sharply to 37,000 and from the Netherlands to 3,000 persons annually (Source Eurostat). These figures suggest that there has been a steady number of return migrants from Germany over the last two decades, stabilized at around 35,000 in recent years.

As discussed above, the first set of support measures were put into force in mid 1980s when thousands of German-Turkish families decided to return home from Germany upon the voluntary return scheme of the Kohl government in 1984. Accordingly, the German government encouraged repatriation with a decree between October 30, 1983 and June 30, 1984 by offering premiums of DM 10,500 plus DM 1,500 per dependent child if they left the country immediately. The German government also “guaranteed” the reintegration of repatriating children to the new conditions in Turkey by subsidising some adaptation schools and providing German teachers in these schools. There were five adaptation schools in Turkey as such: one in Ankara, one in Izmir and three in Istanbul. These secondary and high

26 Interview with Kemal Yurtnaç.
28 For a more detailed discussion on the lobbying rationale of the Presidency, see Çetin (2011).
schools are subject to the curriculum of the Ministry of National Education in Turkey. The schools are called Alman Anadolu Lisesi (German Anatolian Grammar School), where the language of education is German. These schools were formed under the joint Cultural Treaty signed between Turkish and German governments in 1984. By this treaty it was agreed that the German government would contribute to finance the education of the returnee children and to provide 90 German teachers. In the first year of their arrival in Turkey, students were placed in a prep-school where there were only returnees. Here, they were given intensive courses on Turkish language and literature, Turkish history, and Turkish geography. The following year they were placed in mixed classrooms with local students. The rationale behind the mixed classrooms programme was to assimilate them to the Turkish culture and way of life more easily (Abadan-Unat, 1988). The encounter of the children of German-Turkish origin with the Turkish educational system was very traumatic. The field research of one of the authors of this text, Ayhan Kaya, in Alman Anadolu Lisesi in Bahçelievler, Istanbul, in 1997, revealed that these pupils were in need of psychological and social assistance of the professionals. The programme came to an end in the early 2000s.

Similarly, the Netherlands generated a remigration scheme since 1985, and this was converted into legislation in 2000. Pursuant to this Act, migrants who return to their country of origin are entitled to a lifelong monthly benefit if certain conditions are met. Other Dutch benefits, including old age and disability pensions, are deducted from it. Migrants make little use of this legislation, for example because of the better health care available in the Netherlands or the fact that their children are born in the Netherlands and remain in the country. At the end of June 2006 the Dutch remigration scheme applied to about 10,000 returning migrants. This is a small group compared to the 1.6 million immigrants living in the Netherlands in 2006 (Franssen, 2006: 3).

Turkey has also recently become more aware of the potential contribution of the qualified scientists and scholars of Turkish origin residing abroad. Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TÜBİTAK) has generated several different programs to attract qualified researchers, scientists, PhD students of Turkish origin to come to Turkey providing them with financial sources for their research activities, under the project named “Target Turkey” (http://www.tubitak.gov.tr).

Turkish Research Space (TARAL) was designed in 2004 to foster the research and development facilities in the country. TARAL has radically increased the volume of expenses made on R&D, climbing up to 2.83 billion Euro in 2008 from 1 billion TL in 2002. This means that the volume of R&D expenses within the GDP is around 0.73% as of 2008 (1.87% in EU-27 in 2008). Tuğba Arslan Kantarcıoğlu from Marie Currie Contact Office at TÜBİTAK indicated that the 2007 Strategy and Action Plan of TÜBİTAK has almost tripled the number of full-time Research and Development (RD) staff in Turkey from 29,000 in 2002 to 74,000 in 2009 (Online Personal Interview, 25 April 2011). She also stressed that Turkey’s effort to substantiate the RD activities made her even more progressive than Sweden, Finland, Belgium, Austria, Switzerland, Mexico, Argentina and the Netherlands.

On the other hand, TÜBİTAK launched a program in the United States called “Destination Turkey: European and National Funding Opportunities for Brain Circulation, R&D Cooperation and Research Career” in collaboration with the European Commission, American National Science Foundation and Turkish Research and Business Organizations (TURBO) in 2010. TÜBİTAK organized two workshops in Boston (30 November) and Ann Arbor (2 December) with the participation of the representatives of several different Turkish universities and companies as well as Turkish-origin researchers residing in the USA. In workshops researchers were informed about the substantial support of the European Commission and Turkey in case they return to Turkey and continue their career there. The workshop series targeted a large number of researchers from any nationality in order to increase their awareness on mobility fellowships and grants towards Europe. Successful brain circulation requires not only brains but also suitable hosting institutions to attract the top-quality researchers. Hence, the event also aimed at presenting the most successful public and private Turkish hosting organizations and other snapshots from the suitable research climate. While many representatives from significant Turkish universities have
underlined the current developing research and development capacities of Turkey, some of
the largest Turkish industrial organizations and enterprises have informed the researchers on
new R&D opportunities available in their corporations. Furthermore, the researchers who
have attended the workshop stated that they have had good impressions about the current
level of Turkey’s research potential and the amount of R&D funds allocated to researchers in
Turkey (Tuğba Arslan Kantarcıoğlu, Personal interview, 25 April 2011).

Seda Göksu, who is also working at the National Contact Point of the Seventy Framework
Programs (FP7) of the European Commission in TÜBİTAK, stated that the Program 2232 of
TÜBİTAK (BİDEP, Support Office for Scientists) and Marie Curie Research Programs
(Figure 7) are two of these programs designed to attract researchers of Turkish origin to
carry on their work in Turkey (Personal online interview, 10 March 2011). Tuğba Arslan,
Marie Curie Desk at TÜBİTAK, has also pointed out that Turkey is very efficiently using the
Framework Programs (FP6 and 7) as well as the Marie Curie Programs to attract Turkish-
origin scientists residing in Europe to carry on their work in Turkey. TÜBİTAK organized
several information meetings abroad to update the Turkish-origin scholars about the recent
opportunities and developments emerging in the Turkish Research Space.29

After these meetings held in 2011, it is reported that 31 researchers residing in the USA have
contacted with TÜBİTAK EU FP7 National Coordination Office in order to deliver their
questions on application procedure. The application numbers show that there were 78
researchers who have applied to this grant making Turkey the most successful country in the
applications with respect to incoming researchers from 3rd countries. Furthermore, Turkey
ranked the second in EU FP7 Marie Curie Career Integration Grant Applications with 82
researchers in total. Marie Curie fellows of Turkish origin coming from abroad to work in the
Turkish higher education institutions are often employed by top universities as well as by
some prestigious private enterprises (Personal interview with Tuğba Arslan, 25 April 2011).

Turkish Academy of Sciences has also recently become active in designing programs within
the framework of newly established Young Turkish Academy to attract Turkish-origin
researchers abroad (http://www.tuba.gov.tr). Higher Education Council of Turkey (YÖK) has
also produced reports about the ways to attract graduates of Turkish origin to come back to
Turkey (YÖK, 2007). Growing number of Foundation Universities is also creating an
attractive ground not only for Turkish-origin scholars and researchers but also foreigners to
come and pursue their professional career in Turkey. As the medium of education of most of
these universities as well as some of public universities is English, it becomes more
attractive for international researchers and scholars to invest in their career in Turkey.

However, despite the fact that there is a growing trend of return of Turkish emigrants and
their descendants recently, Turkey has not set up any other particular scheme to support the
returnees and their families to reintegrate into the society. The “Target Turkey” program
initiated by the TÜBİTAK has so far attracted hundreds of skilled Turkish scientists residing
abroad, especially in the USA and Canada, to return to Turkey.

In the mean time, the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities is also
generating schemes to attract highly skilled to come to Turkey. Referring to the Central
Exam for Turkic Republics and Overseas Turks since 1992 (TCS), Metin Atmaca from the
Presidency underlines that they have recently established Foreign Students Office to attract
highly skilled students to come to Turkey in order to enjoy higher education opportunities:
“We no longer want Turkey to lose her brains, we want Turkey to recruit bright brains”
(Personal interview, 12 April 2011). The Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related
Communities is also now overtaking the Central Higher Education Exam for Turkish
Emigrants’ Children, which has been applied since 1992 (YÇS) to select successful Turkish-
origin students to come and enrol in Turkish higher education institutions in the fields of
engineering, medicine, and other disciplines. Now the Presidency is trying to increase the

29 Just to name a few of the meetings recently held abroad: 1. Helmholtz Association in Berlin (16
February 2011); 2. ENEA in Rome (23 February 2011); 3. TÜBİTAK & Turbo in Ankara (11 March
2011); 4. DTU in Lyngby, Denmark (22 March 2011); and 5. CEA in Paris (6 Nisan 2011). Similar
meetings were also held in the USA in collaboration with Harvard University and MIT.
contingent reserved for such candidates by universities. The Presidency is also willing to generate schemes in collaboration with both private and public enterprises to attract highly skilled children of Turkish emigrants to continue their professional career in Turkey.

Eventually, an active management of migratory flows should be undertaken by the European Union countries by means of policies that can enhance the role of migrants as actors of local development in their countries of origin. In this context the activities of the Netherlands Migration Institute (NMI) and the King Baudouin Foundation (KBF) can be mentioned as a way of underlining how receiving countries could prompt immigrants to actively contribute to the generation of local development projects in their countries of origin. Germany and Turkey established training centres in 1988 within the framework of the German Economic Institute with the collaboration of the German Ministry of Labour and the Koordinierungsstelle zur Förderung der Reintegration durch Qualifizierung und Existenzgründung gemeinnützige GmbH in Cologne to train the returnees for the Turkish labour market. All these initiatives aim at assisting emigrants who are willing to return to their homelands. Reintegration of returnees, training them in accordance with the needs of the labour market in the homeland, helping the children of returnees to have access to education in the homeland are some of the activities of these initiatives.

6.3. Reintegration of IDPs and Refugees

In 1998, with the support of international agencies such as the UNHCR, the European Council, and the European Commission, a “Return to Villages and Rehabilitation Project” (RVRP) was adopted by the Turkish government to meet the demands for return as the PKK activities were inclined to decline. Villagers who applied to the governor’s office for returning to their village were given in-kind aid (construction materials and/or animals) if there were no security hindrances to return to the village. Sometimes, the funds were used for repairing a village’s roads, electricity poles or water pumps if a significant number of villagers were returning (Ayata and Yükseker, 2005). The RVRP, which was administered by the Southeast Anatolia Project (GAP) Authority in some provinces and the Rural Services Directorate in others, prioritised the concentration of settlements and discouraged the resettlement of hamlets. At a later stage in 2004 upon the critiques coming from the European Commission, the government issued a Compensation Law to pay to those IDPs for the “damages resulting from terror and the fight against terror” will be within the framework of the “social risk” principle based on “objective responsibility.” The law rules that compensation will be awarded for losses resulting from physical damages to houses and agricultural and commercial property as well as losses resulting from lack of access to such income-bearing property through “peaceful means” (sulh yolu), that is, by mutual agreement between the applicants and the provincial committees, which will determine the value of the damages (Ayata and Yükseker, 2005). The awarded amount can be rejected by the applicant and is open to litigation. However, the Law does not include any provision about the compensation of non-pecuniary damages suffered by individuals (manevi tazminat). The law establishes an indirect link with the RVRP. The regulation explicitly states that in-kind compensation (such as building materials or housing projects) should be given priority over cash payments wherever possible. As such, the law’s spirit is not one of restitution of violated rights, but one of economic reparation (Ayata and Yükseker, 2005; Yükseker and

30 NMI is a Dutch public institute that tries to help the returnees to integrate into social and economic conditions of the country of origin. See the NMI website, http://www.nmigratie.nl/.
31 KBF is a Belgium-origin public foundation that aims to create global awareness on diversity, democracy and sustainable development. See the KBF website, http://www.kbs-frb.be/.
32 For further information on the assisted return programs for the European countries see the website of the European Reintegration Networking, http://www.reintegration.net/frame.htm.
33 For further detail on the reintegration of the German-Turkish returnees see the website of the Turkish State Planning Office, http://ekutup.dpt.gov.tr/iskucu/oik650.pdf.
34 The current RVRP was initiated by a prime ministry circular dated January 27, 1998 (İşleri Bakanlığı, Köye Dönüş ve Rehabilitasyon Projesi Bilgi Notu).
Kuban, 2009; Kaya et al., 2009). After the enactment of the Law on Compensation in 2004, the Van Action Plan was launched in 2006 in the Van region. These initiatives attempted to address the internal displacement situation in line with international standards, and the Van Action Plan was intended to be replicated in the 13 other provinces experienced internal displacement in Southeast Anatolia.

The Report of the IDMC (2009a) as well as the previous works on the issue (Ayata and Yükseker, 2005; HÜNEE, 2006; and Kaya et al., 2009) all clearly refer to the outstanding obstacles to sustainable return, including the upsurge in violence between the Turkish army and Kurdish militants since 2004 in south-eastern provinces, the continuing presence of around 60 thousand village guards36 and close to a million landmines in provinces bordering Syria and Iraq, and the under-development of the region. Despite the enactment of the policies of RVRP and Compensation, the state authorities never formally acknowledged their responsibility for forcibly evicting the citizens from their homes and for the human rights violations committed by the security forces during the displacement. Walter Kälin, who succeeded Francis Deng as the new Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations on Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, welcomed these policies and initiatives but pointed out that Turkey needs to do more. In a 2006 letter addressed to the government, Kälin recommended that “the Ministry of the Interior, in conjunction with other pertinent parts of Government and in consultation with civil society and internally displaced persons themselves, (…) develop a specific Plan of Action in order to turn the framework of the Integrated Strategy Document into concrete, practical measures of implementation.”37

Despite the ongoing urban violence in the metropolitan cities in Turkey, the number of the IDPs returning to their villages after almost 20 to 30 years remains very limited. According to the official figures announced in July 2009, there are around 150,000 IDPs who returned to their villages and towns (IDMC, 2010a). Others have commuted between cities and their villages of origin. The intermittent insecurity has discouraged returns and even threatened new displacement, and people have been discouraged by the continuing presence of village guard militias and of close to a million landmines in the provinces bordering Syria and Iraq. IDPs areas of origin also have fewer economic opportunities, social services and basic infrastructure.

Integration of the IDPs in the big cities poses a great challenge for the local authorities. However, there are various attempts held by universities, local governments and non-governmental organizations to incorporate the IDPs into urban life. Istanbul Bilgi University launched the Tarlabası Community Centre in Beygolu, Istanbul, in 2006 with a fund coming from the European Commission. The Centre is still running with the support of different international funds and the University. The rationale of the Centre is to resolve conflicts between the kurdish origin IDPs and the Roma residing in the neighbourhood. The Centre is providing the inhabitants of the neighbourhood with language courses, training, kindergarten facilities, legal advice, and social and psychological assistance (http://goc.bilgi.edu.tr/index.asp?p=0&lid=en).

6.4. Development of Net Migration Loss/Gain Regions

Turkey has become very much engaged in the Civil Society Dialogue Projects under the umbrella of the European Union. While the universities and research centres intend to use the Civil Society Dialogue to identify more effective policies on migration, there are organisations working with local communities focusing their dialogue on the ways to improve service provision to migrants. There are a few projects funded by the European Commission to provide some support to the solution of economic and social integration problems in cities being major internal migrant destinations. One of them was held by an international

---

36 The state started to arm civilians after 1985 in order to use them in its fight against the PKK; see Abdülkadir Aksu, the minister of interior, T.B.M.M. Tutanak Dergisi 97 (Dönen 22/1), June 24, 2003) - available from http://www2.tbmm.gov.tr/d22/77-0630c.pdf (accessed on 22 April 2011).
consortium run by De Leeuw in Ankara.\textsuperscript{38} Targeting to reduce urban disparities through enhanced economic, social and cultural opportunities for all citizens, this project aims to provide support to Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir and Bursa municipalities to increase institutional capacity to mitigate socio economic integration and environmental related problems derived from migration, and to rehabilitate and reintegrate street children in the targeted districts.

Another relevant project was run by Zeytinburnu Municipality in Istanbul together with an international consortium to remedy the difficulties faced by internal migrants in an urban space shaped by a constant process of migration.\textsuperscript{39} Zeytinburnu Municipality, in the heart of Istanbul, has a population of which more than 60\% can be described as migrants. To assist the most vulnerable parts of the migrant population, the Municipality is establishing an Integration Centre. This will be a unique structure for a Municipality, but in designing the function and services it will provide, Zeytinburnu has teamed up with local authorities in Germany and Belgium. These partnerships are enabling Zeytinburnu to build up the skills and knowledge of its staff and of the staff of the Istanbul NGOs also participating in the project. This capacity building is being carried out through a range of activities, including by the provision of formal training led by experienced practitioners from the EU partners, but also through a series of study tours to the city of Berlin and Belgium municipality of Beringen learning from the relevant European experiences. These projects often deal with the social and cultural integration of internal migrants into the urban space.

On the other hand there are some rural tourism projects recently undertaken in Turkey, aiming at the employment of the rural population at source. Rural Tourism issue has been fostered by the European Commission for every candidate and members to be included in the Rural Development Plans of the member and candidate countries. Rural Tourism is an supplementary activity under the Diversification of Economic Activities, for the micro-scaled farms which are not able to survive economically and have no chance to be competitive in the agricultural sector. Though it is not a purely income generating instrument, rural tourism is an important income generating activity. Rural Tourism measures take place under the “Diversification of Economic Activities Programme” of IPARD (Instrument for Pre-accession for Agriculture and Rural Development), which is carried out by Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs in the period covering 2007-2013. Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs with the aim of the related public and private sector representatives is expected to play a vital role in the near future for making significant contribution to the economic development of Turkey by exploring those areas that have never been used before by both domestic and foreign tourists.

Recently, TOKI (Turkish Public Housing Enterprise) is also active in the rural areas generating projects to contribute to the prevention of rural-urban migration. For instance the Agricultural Producer-Villages Project aims to create model rural settlements with all the modern infrastructure and social facilities; to encourage agricultural production and to promote the settlement in areas of rural production; and to prevent rural-to-urban migration.\textsuperscript{40}

Another best practice to tackle the negative constraints of migration in Turkey is the Regional Development Agencies established in the context of the Pre-accession Programme of the EU since 2006. Regional Development agencies have created funds to support the projects proposed by the local municipalities in collaboration with universities, NGOs and relevant agents to struggle against exclusion, poverty and unemployment of those social groups who are deprived of various rights. For instance, SODES (Social Support Programme) is an ongoing program provided by the Turkish Ministry of Development to fund those projects designed to combat the problems of unemployment, social exclusion, migration, poverty and

\textsuperscript{38} For more information on this project, see http://www.deleeuw.com.tr/web/docs/newsletter/ProjeOfisi_Eylul09.pdf (accessed on 23 April 2011). The impact assessment of this project is not yet made.

\textsuperscript{39} For more information on this project, see http://www.zeytinburnu.bel.tr/Sayfa/249/projeler/gocele-gelenlerin-entegrasyonu-projesi-tamamlandi.aspx (accessed on 5 March 2011). Similarly, the impact assessment of this project is not yet made.

\textsuperscript{40} See http://www.toki.gov.tr/, accessed on 10 August 2011.
inequality. So far more than 4,500 pieces of small-sized projects have been materialized mainly in the Eastern and Southeastern parts of Turkey. Projects on social inclusion, employment, and culture, arts and sports are prioritized by the Social Support Programme.\textsuperscript{41}

6.5. Support to Vulnerable Groups related to Migration

The children, women and the elderly among the IDPs are the most vulnerable groups related to migration in Turkey. Education, health, and employment problems stand apart from the other problems, as most families lack human capital to get employment in urban centres. The high rate of drop-outs among the children of IDP families, high number of street children, lack of awareness among the elementary school teachers regarding the special needs of those students, lack of awareness of education in mother tongue in the Turkish educational system, and low number of female students attending elementary schools are some of the major problems of the schooling of the children with internal-displacement background (Adaman and Ardıç, 2008; Kaya et al., 2009; IDMC, 2010b).

EU has so far financed two pilot projects within the framework of IPA (Instrument of Pre-Accession Assistance) 2002-2006. The one in 2005 was called EKOSEP, and the one in 2006 IGEP. Both projects dealt with the integration of internal migrants into the urban space. The former covered the cities of Gaziantep, Diyarbakır, Erzurum and Şanlıurfa; and the latter İstanbul, Ankara, Izmir and Bursa. EKOSEP is, “Technical Assistance for Supporting the Municipalities of Diyarbakır, Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa and Erzurum for the Solution of Economic and Social Integration Problems” Project adapting a multi sectoral approach at local level, aiming to mitigate adverse effects of migration for the first time in Turkey.\textsuperscript{42} IGEP aimed at providing support to İstanbul, Ankara, İzmir and Bursa municipalities to increase institutional capacity to mitigate socio economic integration and environmental related problems derived from migration, and to rehabilitate and reintegrate street children in the targeted districts.\textsuperscript{43}

In the mean time, there are several international organisations undertaking various projects to heal the problems of the vulnerable groups. International Organization for Migration (IOM), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNICEF Turkey, United Nations Development Fund (UNDP), International Labour Organization (ILO), Helsinki Citizens Assembly, Open Society Foundation, Heinrich Böll Foundation, Volkswagen Foundation, British Council, Swedish Research Institution, and Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA). These organisations initiate projects in collaboration with local partners such as universities, KAMER (Women Centre, \texttt{http://www.kamer.org.tr}), Sabancı Foundation, Eczacıbaşı, Boyner Holding etc. These joint projects mostly aim at improving the conditions of children and women who are exposed to the traumatic experience of forced migration in the urban space. Education of children of migrant origin, education of Roma children, physical and emotional treatment of women exposed to domestic violence, and training of men to qualify in certain fields are some of the projects undertaken by these institutions.

A newly established association called the “Association for the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Seasonal Agricultural Workers” is now raising awareness about the health problems and social rights of migrant farm workers in the Southeast provinces (\texttt{http://www.metider.org.tr/site/default_en.asp}). The head of the Association, Dr. Zeynep Şimşek, organized provision of health services for 225 thousand women and children working as seasonal migrant farm workers. The project was based at the Harran University in partnership with the Governor’s Office and Municipality, and funded by the Sabancı Foundation Grant Program. The program was eventually sustained by the Health Directorate

\textsuperscript{41} For further detail on the SODES program and the fields covered see \texttt{http://www.sodes.gov.tr/PortalDesign/PortalControls/WebcerKosterim.aspx?Enc=83D5A6FF03C7B4FCD8240C6BF32D70CF532CE0EA5920B8515F66963D527F8DD6} (last accessed on 5 June 2011).

\textsuperscript{42} For more information on the project see \texttt{http://www.ekosep.net/web/Home/tabid/36/language/en-US/language-tr-TR/Default.aspx} (accessed on 5 March 2011).

in Şanlıurfa. Following this successful program, the Ministry of Health and the Office of the Prime Minister issued an official circular for new policies that will protect the health and social rights of migrant farm workers.

International Organization for Migration (IOM) in Turkey is implementing a three-year joint project with the UN entitled “Growth with Decent Work for All: A Youth Employment Program in Antalya”. This project is funded by the Spanish Government under the Millennium Development Goal Achievement Fund with other partners including: Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), International Labour Organization (ILO) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The project's overall objective is to formulate and implement locally based employment policies benefiting the most vulnerable groups in the labour market migrating from the east to the west. The joint project moreover aims to reduce youth unemployment among vulnerable young members of migrant families and increase the participation of young women in the labour force.44

6.6. Best Practice Examples of Policy Responses

The projects funded by the EU aim to design a transferable and sustainable model that develops a new approach and strategies to cope with the results of the internal migration. EU funded projects include the efforts to increase the critical capacity of local administrations in ensuring the participation of migrants in urban life, consider the new roles and responsibilities foreseen for the local administrations. The projects improve inter-provincial collaboration for reducing the negative impacts of the internal migration on urban life, as well as supporting all governorships and municipalities for an effective and influential service provision. And they aim to design a reproductive and sustainable model that develops a new approach and strategy to cope with the results of the internal migration.

The projects briefly explained above are very successful initiatives, bringing the central authority and the local authorities together with the other local stakeholders such as the NGOs, migrant associations, fellowship organizations and universities. European integration process has been very instructive for the Turkish public as it has taught different stakeholders in Turkey to work together in order to produce sustainable projects.

One of the best practices of the Turkish state is to attract Turkish-origin scientists residing abroad to come and work in Turkey. TÜBİTAK has been very triumphant in coordinating the return of those scientists in collaboration with the European Commission as well as with the other international institutions such as MIT and Harvard University. Turkey’s growing success in FP7 projects and Marie Curie Fellowships is the sign of Turkey’s determination in fostering research and development projects.

7. Key challenges and policy suggestions

7.1. Key challenges of the social impact of emigration and internal migration

The net migration balance in Turkey is not negative anymore, that is to say that the number of in-coming migrants exceeds the number of emigrants leaving the country. This is a rather new phenomenon in Turkey. Hence, emigration does no longer pose a remarkable challenge for Turkey, except the highly qualified individuals attracted by developed countries such as the USA and Canada. The last point is certainly one of the manifestations of the globalizing world, and therefore is not something unique to Turkey.

The set of problems that emigrants currently face, albeit much lessened compared to earlier years through successful initiatives of host countries, are mainly related with their integration to their new home. Another problem that is of importance is to do with the use of remittances: The history of this flow of money in Turkey is unfortunately full of unproductive and unsustainable investments. Since successive governments have regarded this flow mainly, if not exclusively, a resource of foreign currency, no serious steps were undertaken towards its better usage. For the case of returnees, on the other hand, their reintegration issue remains

For further details on the relevant programs of the IOM, see http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/turkey, accessed on 5 August 2011.
as difficult as ever. A new phenomenon in this regard, that might alter the picture, is the fact that recently a new wave of highly-skilled and of younger generation is heading for Turkey, eager to engage in entrepreneurial activities. This is certainly a window of opportunity for Turkey.

Internal migration has always been a source of concern since the 1960s, creating various challenges such as poverty, exclusion, discrimination, unemployment and inequality. Rural-urban migration has brought about sharp demographic deficits across the geographical regions creating enormously big cities like Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Antalya and Bursa. Turkey is still trying to come to terms with these demographic deficits in a time when the big cities are going through a process of deindustrialization in a way that leads to the double-migration of the earlier unqualified and/or semi-qualified migrants to the neighbouring cities such as Istanbul-Gebze (Izmit) nexus.45

Nowadays, what is really essential for Turkey is to remedy detrimental effects of forced migration originating from the East and Southeast Turkey. So far, incentives such as “Return to Village” have not successfully worked out. There are recently some EU-funded projects designed to generate attempts to integrate the IDPs and their children into the urban space. One should also acknowledge that this problem cannot be separated from the larger Kurdish issue that the country has been so far unable to provide a long-lasting and sustainable solution, and therefore to the extent that the general problem continues to exist, IDPs’ specific needs may not be answered fully.

7.2. Policies to be taken by different actors

**International Migration:** Turkey’s major challenge with respect to the emigrants is the intensity of the debates about the lack of integration into their countries of settlement. The current tendency is reducing integration to cultural assimilation, which corresponds to a process portrayed by the return of assimilation and homogenization. One could challenge such a tendency in at least two ways: Firstly, one could say that this is a rather outmoded definition of integration, which fails to include structural, political, civic, marital, identificational, and behavioural components of integration. Secondly, one could also argue that the integration of migrants can no longer remain a one-way process in the age of globalization. It should rather be transnationalized with the involvement of not only the receiving country but also the sending country and supranational or international organizations like the European Union, Council of Europe and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (Kaya, 2009).

On the other hand, Turkey should also take active part in laying down the ground to promote circular migration, involvement of diaspora in economic development, and validation of skills acquired abroad.

1. Turkey should adopt a more flexible legal framework that offers legal migrants the possibility of free movement between Turkey and the countries of destination whilst preserving their immigration status in the country of destination. Blue Card system can be substantialized in this regard for those emigrants who relinquished their Turkish citizenship, permitting them to keep their social, economic, civil rights other than political rights;

2. In order to promote development, Turkey should try to have bilateral agreements with the countries of destination to launch training and Manpower-raising skills programmes, transfer of competence, know-how and flows of foreign capital and conduct development projects coupled with development-aid. Turkey should co-operate with destination countries to compensate the loss of skills through policies aimed at

---

45 The work of Tezcan (2011) is an excellent piece in the sense that it eloquently explains the way in which migrant families of Istanbul with various qualifications, or with no qualification, are recently migrating to Gebze, a district between Istanbul and the neighbouring city of Izmit towards the east. Tezcan portrays how industrial production shifts from Istanbul to the hinterland of the city.
promoting development in the country of origin through productive return flows, capital movement and effective know-how and technology transfer;

3. Turkey should endow their migrants with specific rights, protection and recognition with a view to maximizing the income stream from their remittances and to engage them in the broader development process; larger civil society's engagement into such engagements (such as chambers of commerce) should be promoted;

4. Turkey should encourage remittance flows through pro-active legislative and regulatory policy; specific measures are to be enacted to ensure the efficient as well as sustainable use of remittances. Turkey should collaborate better with the countries of destination to support the flow of migrants' remittances and their impact: refraining double taxation of international migrants; considering them as investors; creating of a proper legal/regulatory framework allowing effective use to be made of remittances in various investment areas; taking the necessary measures to allow migrants’ monetary and financial transfers to the country of origin to be made securely through adapted and transparent banking arrangements; encourage banks to make transfers of savings and welfare benefits in a spirit of genuine competition and at reasonable cost; simplifying the procedure for transfer operations conducted through post offices and non-private banks; and providing emigrants with financial incentives (special loans and interest rates) under economic and social development programs;

5. Turkey should build programs with the countries of destination on the skills and talents of diaspora communities and their members for the purposes of both achieving better integration in the countries of residence and development in the countries of origin;

6. Turkey should collaborate with the expatriate associations such as academic organizations and networks, without seeing them as lobbies, and implement specific projects with a view to encourage the return of skilled emigrants, should they so wish;

7. Turkey should be working on creating public awareness about the risks of arranged marriages abroad leading the partners to have traumatic experiences;

8. Turkey should also try to generate support services in collaboration with the countries of destination available to help women emigrants where necessary to overcome the emotional trauma of long term separation from their families whether in countries of origin or destination;

9. The role of Turkish diaspora as a bridge between countries of origin and host countries should be facilitated and strengthened through the academic and research support programs in Turkey, making available funds and resources to highly qualified academic and expert emigrants; and

10. Turkey should collect data on her scientific diaspora so that they might help newly emerging experts and skilled workers at home to benefit from their experiences abroad and develop transnational linkages fitting into the needs of the global economy.

Turkey has recently managed to generate some attractive schemes to prompt qualified and highly-skilled individuals of Turkish origin to return to Turkey. Such schemes should be increased. But one should be aware of the fact that the practice of return becomes a common tendency when the home country develops herself along with the process of democratization and liberalization, leading the country into a more prosperous, peaceful and progressive land with respect to human rights and human dignity. It goes without saying that the intensification of the Europeanization process of Turkey since 1999 Helsinki Summit has made it easier for many Turkish emigrants to return. Reintegration of returnees is likely to become an important issue since more and more returnees are expected to come in the course of time. The following items can be suggested for the improvement of the integration of returnees:

1. In order to facilitate the re-integration of migrants, countries of origin and destination should establish joint socio-economic development programmes in favour of the countries of origin. The programmes should include financial and technological provision;

2. Placement and job-finding aid for returning migrants, regardless of the return circumstances. ISKUR (Turkish Employment Agency, http://www.iskur.gov.tr/) may be instrumentalised in this respect;
3. Technical and financial support for economic activities such as micro, small or medium-size businesses, activity development programs for rural areas and for urban areas undergoing economic reorganisation (areas of industrial decay, redeployment and reclassification areas in central, eastern, southeastern and northern regions of Turkey);
4. Skills-acquisition and re-skilling courses jointly conducted by Turkey and destination countries can be set up;
5. Educational support and activities for children of school age, in particular to assist language learning (the language of the country of origin or the language of the parents’ immigration country); and
6. Social Assistance Centres can be set up to provide the returnees with welfare assistance and psychological support.

**Internal migrants and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs):** In order to lessen the negative impacts on migrants from the rural settlements to urban ones, measures are to be taken to promote development projects in the urban area. With a current one-fifth population ratio living in the rural areas as well as a continued migration trend, evidence suggest that many more newcomers will in the future suffer in the outskirts of big cities while searching for a proper job. It is thus vital to reconsider and tackle with the push factors of the rural so as to support the economic development of rural out-migration regions. Intelligently-designed rural projects may be of help, as we have a small but promising examples in that line: An obvious example would be promoting nature/health/eco-tourism (an increasing number of pensioners are being operational in the rural area, successfully attracting local and foreign tourists looking for spartan-clean-organic life style).\(^{46}\) Another way could be invest in the medical tourism potential of the rural parts of Turkey ([http://www.healthtourism.org.tr](http://www.healthtourism.org.tr)). It goes without saying that public services to the rural population (education and health, being the most obvious ones) should be increased. Hence,

1. Nature and eco-tourism should be promoted and subsidized to attract local and foreign tourists looking for a clean and organic life;
2. Medical tourism could be supported in outside the big cities in order to provide the denizens of the relevant regions with employment;
3. Organic agriculture should be promoted and subsidized in the rural areas in order to incorporate the rural segments of the population into the processes of globalization;
4. The massive production of high-storey buildings by the Turkish Public Housing Enterprise (TOKI, [http://www.toki.gov.tr/](http://www.toki.gov.tr/)) in rural places to provide the rural segments of the population with decent housing could be a way of preventing rural-urban migration;
5. Public services to the rural population (education and health, being the most obvious ones) should be increased in order to prevent them being attracted by the urban facilities; and
6. The capacities of the local stakeholders should be strengthened so that they could design and implement development projects and accede funding for them.

The greatest challenge Turkey faces recently with regard to migration is the state of IDPs and the lack of their integration to social, cultural, economic and political spheres of life in the urban space. One could phrase a set of proposals to peacefully resolve the negative externalities of the forced migration. This said, however, a reservation needs to be made that a successful solution much heavily depends on the larger problem of the Kurdish minority in the country.

1. Efforts needed to integrate the IDPs into the urban life rather than insisting on their return without having fully secured their places of origin;
2. Local and national authorities should generate projects and initiatives in collaboration with the IDPs and their representatives along with their economic, political and social participation as well as their access to housing, education and health services;
3. Local and national authorities should generate projects to cope with the psychological trauma facing the IDPs;

\(^{46}\) For a detailed account of the eco-tourism potentials of Turkey, see Şerefoğlu (2009).
4. Local authorities should assist the IDPs in building capacity to generate projects designed to contribute to the inclusion of the IDPs in public life;
5. Central state should offer tax exemptions to those entrepreneurs who are willing to make investment in the Southeast and East Anatolia, or those entrepreneurs who are recruiting IDPs in the urban space;
6. Ministry of Labour and Social Security should have surveillance on those working places recruiting IDPs and their children without appropriate working conditions and social security schemes;
7. Schools recruiting the children of the IDPs in the urban space should have schemes to provide such children with free of charge breakfast and lunch services in order to secure their healthy diet;
8. Village Guard System should be immediately abandoned in order to build up trust among the local inhabitants of the region;
9. Political Parties, local administrations, civil society organizations and respected individuals and institutions should take active part in repairing broken solidarities between Village Guard families/tribes and the others;
10. Rural and industrial development centres should be built up in the Southeast and East Anatolia in order to let the producers in the region have access to the outside markets;
11. Central state should comply with the UN regulations in dealing with the issue of IDPs; and
12. Eventually, Turkey should support all the local, national and international initiatives to build up a secure and prosperous environment in the Middle East in order to prosper the local population of the region in the Southeast and East Anatolia (Kaya et al., 2009).

Bibliography


Final Country Report Turkey 38


Oprisan, A. (2003). *Research on Roma dialects in Turkey (linguistic survey conducted with individuals from Istanbul - Tophane and Edirne)*, for the program conducted by Prof. Dr. Yaron Matras, Manchester University.


APPENDIX

Focus Group Meeting with German–Turkish Transmigrants/Returnees

2 April Saturday 10.00 – 14.00 hours

7 persons (4 females (30, 23, 21 years-old), 3 males (35, 42 and 46 years-old) interviewed by Fikret Adaman, Ayhan Kaya, Daniela Ehrsam (Research Assistant) and Ayşê Tecmen (Research Assistant);

Method: Voice Recorded

Place: Istanbul Bilgi University’s Santral Campus, Board of Studies Room

Indepth Interviews

Indepth Interview : Seda Göksu, Online interview (10 March 2011), TÜBİTAK FP7 Desk

Indepth Interview : Tuğba Arslan Kantarcıoğlu, Online Interview (25 April 2011), TÜBİTAK Marier Currie National Contact Person

Indepth Interview: Metin Atmaca, Online Interview (12 April 2011), Expert, Directorate for Turks Abroad and Communities of Kin, Ankara, Prime Ministry


Indepth Interview: Daniel Steinworth, Online Interview (7 April 2011), Der Spiegel, Hamburg.

Indepth interview: Kenan Kolat, (1 August 2011), The Director of the Turkish Community in Germany (TGD), Berlin.

Indepth Interview: Fuat Boztepe (2 August 2011), Telephone and Online Interview, Head of the Department of External Relations and Services for Workers Abroad at the Turkish Ministry of Labour and Social Security, Ankara


Indepth Interview, Fahri Aral (10 August 2011), Chief editor of Istanbul Bilgi University Press.
### Table 1. Key Demographic Indicators (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of Settlement</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>39.564</td>
<td>39.551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>28.897</td>
<td>28.972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1.789.159</td>
<td>1.762.822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>2.401</td>
<td>2.590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>220.750</td>
<td>220.750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>16.225</td>
<td>17.651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>1.188</td>
<td>1.701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>92.698</td>
<td>90.837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>110.678</td>
<td>110.678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>2.250</td>
<td>2250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>3.429</td>
<td>3.809</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>10.218</td>
<td>10.840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>52.332</td>
<td>52.332</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 2: Number of Turkish Citizens in the EU countries

Source: Eurostat. Note that those who are naturalized are not included in the figures given.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Highest incoming migration</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Lowest incoming migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>İstanbul</td>
<td>920.955</td>
<td>Bayburt</td>
<td>6.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ankara</td>
<td>377.108</td>
<td>Kilsis</td>
<td>7.157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>İzmir</td>
<td>306.387</td>
<td>Ardahan</td>
<td>8.791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bursa</td>
<td>180.171</td>
<td>Bartin</td>
<td>10.069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antalya</td>
<td>171.982</td>
<td>Iğdir</td>
<td>11.944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kocaeli</td>
<td>119.301</td>
<td>Hakkari</td>
<td>13.369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>İçel</td>
<td>117.894</td>
<td>Karaman</td>
<td>13.374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konya</td>
<td>107.316</td>
<td>Muş</td>
<td>13.379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adana</td>
<td>92.684</td>
<td>Gumüşhane</td>
<td>13.777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tekirdağ</td>
<td>88.618</td>
<td>Bingol</td>
<td>13.795</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3. First 10 cities with the highest and lowest rate of in-coming migration 1995-2000**

Source: 2000 Census.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Salaried</th>
<th>Entrepreneur</th>
<th>Self-employed</th>
<th>Family worker</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Returns</td>
<td>63.16</td>
<td>7.96</td>
<td>24.46</td>
<td>4.43</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4% of all</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96% of all</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4. Returnees in Comparison with the Rest of the Population: Occupations (2007)**

Source: Labour Force Participation Survey, TUIK, own calculations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of German Emigrants to Turkey</th>
<th>Number of Austrian Emigrants to Turkey</th>
<th>Number of Dutch Emigrants to Turkey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>35,612</td>
<td>2,470</td>
<td>1,125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>37,058</td>
<td>2,684</td>
<td>1,992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>34,595</td>
<td>2,976</td>
<td>1,987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>33,229</td>
<td>3,338</td>
<td>2,189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>32,172</td>
<td>3,292</td>
<td>2,335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>38,899</td>
<td>3,269</td>
<td>2,291</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 5. Number of Emigrants to Turkey since 2003**

Source: Eurostat. Note that the number include all the German, Austrian and Dutch citizens migrating to Turkey irrespective of their being ethnically Turkish or non-Turkish origin.
### Table 6. Bilateral Agreements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Principles</td>
<td>1-6</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old Age</td>
<td>44-51</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invalidity</td>
<td>37-43</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death and Death Benefits</td>
<td>44-51</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work Accidents</td>
<td>52-63</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maternity</td>
<td>18-36</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Care</td>
<td>18-36</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sickness and Cash Benefits</td>
<td>18-36</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>67-71</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Benefits</td>
<td>72-79</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Turkish Ministry of Labour and Social Security
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Monthly Payment Type</th>
<th>Number of those paid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disability</td>
<td>8.248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retirement</td>
<td>60.171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widow</td>
<td>17.125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orphan</td>
<td>1.990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum</td>
<td>87.534</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: The Number of German-Turks having social security assistance and residing in Turkey

Source: Turkish Ministry of Labour and Social Security,
### Table 8. Migration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Net (1000)</td>
<td>Rate (%)</td>
<td>Net (1000)</td>
<td>Rate (%)</td>
<td>Net (1000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TR1</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>73.4</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TR2</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td>-4.3</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TR3</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TR4</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TR5</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TR6</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TR7</td>
<td>-81</td>
<td>-30.5</td>
<td>-76</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>-184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TR8</td>
<td>-83</td>
<td>-21.1</td>
<td>-107</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>-225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRA</td>
<td>-151</td>
<td>-80.7</td>
<td>-130</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>-270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRB</td>
<td>-109</td>
<td>-48.4</td>
<td>-90</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>-176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRC</td>
<td>-104</td>
<td>-33.3</td>
<td>-81</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>-144</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute, TÜİK
Social Impact of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Central and Eastern Europe
VT/2010/001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUTS 1 Region</th>
<th>Urbanization Rate</th>
<th>Ratio of Youth</th>
<th>Ratio of Elderly</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Anatolia</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Marmara</td>
<td>83.8</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Marmara</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aegean</td>
<td>72.3</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-E. Anatolia</td>
<td>68.3</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Anatolia</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Black Sea</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-E. Anatolia</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Black Sea</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-E. Anatolia</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9. GDP per capita (1000 TL in 1987 prices)
Source: Turkish Statistical Institute, TÜİK

Table 10. Urbanization, Ratio of Youth and Elderly
Source: Turkish Statistical Institute, TÜİK
### Table 11: Regional LFP, Inactivity Rate, and Unemployment Rate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>LFP</th>
<th>Inactivity Rate</th>
<th>Unemployment Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Marmara</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aegean</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Marmara</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Anatolia</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Anatolia</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Black Sea</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Black Sea</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Eastern Anatolia</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Eastern Anatolia</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Eastern Anatolia</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Labor Force Statistics 2010, TÜİK
### Table 12. Education level of population

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute, TÜİK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Does not know how to read and write</th>
<th>Knows how to read and write but less than highschool</th>
<th>Highschool</th>
<th>More than highschool</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Marmara</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aegean</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Marmara</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Anatolia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Anatolia</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Black Sea</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Black Sea</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Eastern Anatolia</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Eastern Anatolia</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Eastern Anatolia</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 13. Relative Poverty: Regional Disparities-2007

Source: Own calculations from SILC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Relative poverty rates (based on 60% of national median income)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Marmara</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aegean</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Marmara</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Anatolia</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Anatolia</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Black Sea</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Black Sea</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-E. Anatolia</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-E. Anatolia</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-E. Anatolia</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUTS 1 Region</td>
<td>Hospital Beds per 10000 population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Anatolia</td>
<td>31.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Marmara</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Marmara</td>
<td>25.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aegean</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-E. Anatolia</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Anatolia</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Black Sea</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-E. Anatolia</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Black Sea</td>
<td>29.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-E. Anatolia</td>
<td>25.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 14. Health Services: Regional Disparities-2010 (I)
Source: Health Statistics-Ministry of Health

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUTS 1 Region</th>
<th>Vaccination Rate (DaPT+IPV+Hib)</th>
<th>Births at hospital</th>
<th>Antenatal coverage (min. 4 visits)</th>
<th>Mother Mortality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>99.8</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Anatolia</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>92.9</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Marmara</td>
<td>98.7</td>
<td>90.8</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Marmara</td>
<td>96.1</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean</td>
<td>97.5</td>
<td>87.8</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aegean</td>
<td>94.9</td>
<td>94.3</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-E. Anatolia</td>
<td>98.2</td>
<td>83.1</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>25.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Anatolia</td>
<td>93.1</td>
<td>91.1</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Black Sea</td>
<td>96.4</td>
<td>89.4</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-E. Anatolia</td>
<td>93.5</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>37.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Black Sea</td>
<td>94.1</td>
<td>91.5</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-E. Anatolia</td>
<td>92.1</td>
<td>80.1</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 15. Health Services: Regional Disparities-2010 (II)
Source: Health Statistics-Ministry of Health
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Pre-school</th>
<th>Primary School</th>
<th>High School</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>18.30</td>
<td>28.68</td>
<td>28.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Anatolia</td>
<td>18.08</td>
<td>19.97</td>
<td>20.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Marmara</td>
<td>22.27</td>
<td>20.59</td>
<td>20.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Marmara</td>
<td>19.88</td>
<td>18.68</td>
<td>17.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean</td>
<td>27.17</td>
<td>21.10</td>
<td>21.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aegean</td>
<td>25.35</td>
<td>18.31</td>
<td>18.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-E. Anatolia</td>
<td>26.75</td>
<td>27.56</td>
<td>34.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Anatolia</td>
<td>23.85</td>
<td>18.38</td>
<td>18.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Black Sea</td>
<td>23.38</td>
<td>16.88</td>
<td>17.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-E. Anatolia</td>
<td>27.07</td>
<td>23.29</td>
<td>25.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Black Sea</td>
<td>21.35</td>
<td>17.43</td>
<td>18.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-E. Anatolia</td>
<td>20.60</td>
<td>20.57</td>
<td>23.85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 16. Student Per Teacher, 2010
Source: Statistical Institute, TÜİK
FIGURES

Figure 1. Total Population of Turkey
Source: Turkish Statistical Institute, TÜİK
Figure 2. Urban Population of Turkey
Source: Turkish Statistical Institute, TÜİK

Figure 3. Youth and Elderly Dependency Ratios
Source: Turkish Statistical Institute, TÜİK
Figure 4. Unemployment and Labour Force Participation Rates
Source: Turkish Statistical Institute, TÜİK

Figure 5. Remittance Revenues
Source: Şimşek (2011)
Figure 6. Absolute and Relative Poverty
Source: Turkish Statistical Institute, TÜİK

Figure 7. Marie Currie Applicants in March and September 2010
Source: TÜBİTAK.
Map 1: Map of Turkey and NUTS 1 Level Regions