Social Impact of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Central and Eastern Europe (VT/2010/001)

Synthesis Report

On behalf of the European Commission
DG Employment,
Social Affairs and Inclusion
This report reflects the views of its authors and these are not necessarily those of either the European Commission or the Member States.

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<td>ADB</td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
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<td>AL</td>
<td>Albania</td>
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<td>ALMP</td>
<td>Active Labour Market Policy</td>
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<td>AM</td>
<td>Armenia</td>
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<td>Austria</td>
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<td>AZ</td>
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<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<td>BG</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
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<td>BY</td>
<td>Belarus</td>
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<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
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<td>CoE</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
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<td>CR</td>
<td>Country Report(s)</td>
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<td>CZ</td>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
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<td>DE</td>
<td>Germany</td>
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<td>DK</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
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<td>EaP</td>
<td>Eastern Partnership</td>
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<td>EE</td>
<td>Estonia</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<td>EIF</td>
<td>European Fund for the Integration of non-EU immigrants</td>
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<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<td>EL</td>
<td>Greece</td>
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<td>ENP</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood Policy</td>
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<td>EP</td>
<td>European Parliament</td>
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<td>ESF</td>
<td>European Social Fund</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU-2</td>
<td>Countries which joined the EU in 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania)</td>
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<td>EU-8</td>
<td>All Eastern and Central European countries which joined the EU in 2004 (without Malta and Cyprus)</td>
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<td>EU-8+2</td>
<td>All Eastern and Central European countries which joined the EU in 2004 and 2007</td>
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<td>EU-12</td>
<td>All countries which joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 (incl. Malta and Cyprus)</td>
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<td>EU-15</td>
<td>All EU Member States before 2004</td>
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<td>EU-27</td>
<td>All current EU Member States</td>
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<td>EU MS</td>
<td>EU Member States</td>
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<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investments</td>
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<td>fYRoM</td>
<td>former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
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<td>Reference</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>GE</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>HR</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
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<td>HRD</td>
<td>Human Resources Development</td>
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<td>HU</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and Communication Technologies</td>
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<td>IDP(s)</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person(s)</td>
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<td>IPA</td>
<td>Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance</td>
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<td>IT</td>
<td>Italy</td>
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<td>LFS</td>
<td>Labour Force Survey</td>
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<td>LSMS</td>
<td>Living Standards Measurement Survey</td>
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<td>LT</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
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<td>LV</td>
<td>Latvia</td>
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<td>MD</td>
<td>Moldova</td>
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<td>ME</td>
<td>Montenegro</td>
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<tr>
<td>MK</td>
<td>former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO(s)</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation(s)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Aid</td>
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<tr>
<td>OMC</td>
<td>Open Method of Coordination</td>
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<td>PAYG</td>
<td>Pay-as-you-go</td>
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<td>PL</td>
<td>Poland</td>
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<td>PPP</td>
<td>Purchasing Power Parity</td>
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<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td>Research &amp; Development</td>
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<td>RDP</td>
<td>Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons</td>
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<td>RO</td>
<td>Romania</td>
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<td>RS</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
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<td>SF</td>
<td>Structural Funds</td>
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<td>SFRY</td>
<td>Socialist Former Republic of Yugoslavia</td>
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<td>SI</td>
<td>Slovenia</td>
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<td>SK</td>
<td>Slovak Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>SME(s)</td>
<td>Small and Medium Enterprise(s)</td>
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<td>SSA</td>
<td>Social security agreement(s)</td>
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<td>TR</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
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<td>trESS</td>
<td>Training and reporting on European Social Security</td>
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<td>UA</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo*</td>
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<td>XK</td>
<td>Kosovo*</td>
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* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/99 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of Independence.
1 Introduction

The present study has been undertaken on behalf of the European Commission within the framework of the PROGRESS programme for employment and social solidarity 2007-2013. It seeks to provide a comparative knowledge assessment on international and internal migration in Central and Eastern Europe and a policy-oriented analysis of the impacts of migration on employment and the social and territorial cohesion of the migration source countries in the region in the last two decades.

So far, analyses of the social impacts of migration have primarily focussed on migration destination countries, in particular as regards the consequences of migration for the labour markets and social protection systems of the receiving countries, without taking much into account the point of view of migration source countries. One of the most researched topics in relation to migrant source countries are remittances sent by migrants to their families and relatives at home. Aspects relating to the development potential of the Diaspora and return migration as well as to the impacts of migration on migrants’ skills have also attracted growing attention in recent years. Besides this, trends and patterns of migration have been relatively well studied so far - despite the lack of reliable data - and some research on employment, poverty and social inclusion in the migrant-sending countries in the scope of this study also exists. A linkage between migration and the situation of poverty and social inclusion in the migration source countries, however, has not been made and a more comprehensive analysis on the social impacts of migration has been missing to date.

The findings of the analysis help to bring the perspectives of the migration source countries into the EU migration debate(s) and to identify the key challenges of migration relevant for (the EU Common Objectives for) social protection and social inclusion, in particular in terms of poverty eradication, participation in the labour market, accessible social protection and social services, and social cohesion On the basis of identified challenges, the report provides policy suggestions for addressing the impacts of migration which might be taken into account by the national and regional authorities of migration source countries and by the EU in setting priority policies for the forthcoming programming period and preparing investments within the Multi-Annual Financial Framework for 2014-2020.

The results of the research are compiled into a Synthesis Report, which is based on 25 country reports elaborated by expert teams of the respective countries in the period from November 2010 until April 2012. It encompasses the 10 countries of Central and Eastern Europe which joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia)1, the candidate countries and potential candidates of the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo2, Montenegro, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia) and the countries of the Eastern Partnership region (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine) as well as Greece and Turkey.

The transition from state-planned to market economies, decreasing or low employment rates, a shrinking agricultural sector and deteriorating socio-economic conditions during transition as well as (mass) (e)migration of significant parts of the labour force are all shared phenomena, not only in the countries which joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 but also in the countries of the Western Balkans and the Eastern Partnership (EaP).

As regards the EU-8+2, the collapse of the Communist regime in Central and Eastern Europe led to a reshaping of the geo-political map in Europe at the beginning of the 1990s, when Slovenia, the Baltic countries, and finally the Czech and Slovak Republic became independent. This caused population movements of an ethnicised nature between old and

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1 This country group will be referred to as EU-8+2 in the report.
2 *This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/99 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence. Further in the report we refer to Kosovo*.
new states, as parts of the population becoming minorities in the new states decided to relocate to their ethnic homelands. With the breakdown of the Soviet Union, the Baltic countries suffered a significant loss in markets for goods and in subsidies from the Soviet Union, while undergoing a transition from a one-party, centrally planned economy to a market economy with a multi-party political system. All countries of the now EU-8+2 were confronted with a deterioration of the economic activity and productivity and a retrenchment of the former welfare state based on state and company services. After several decades of restricted travel and movement across borders, travel liberalisation also generated population movements towards Western Europe, which partly transformed into migration of an irregular nature in many cases, particularly when migrants were able to realise better employment than in their home countries. Some legal channels of labour migration were introduced quickly in the context of organised seasonal and contract work schemes. Recovery and growth in the region turned into positive trends in the second half of the 1990s and accompanied the progressive path towards EU integration. As wages still remained low compared to the neighbouring EU, migration persisted at a high level and partly increased in the region, taking new directions, especially after EU accession in 2004 and the full opening of labour markets in some of the old EU countries. While eight of the analysed Member States have been enjoying free movement of persons since May 2011, Romania and Bulgaria, who joined on 1 January 2007, are still subject to transition periods with restricted intra-EU labour mobility.

Within the Western Balkans, the Yugoslav successor states had already experienced important migration within the framework of guest worker programmes in the 1960s and 1970s, whereas Albania, on the contrary, faced total isolation during the decades preceding transition. While Albania as an already independent state remained in the same borders during the last 20 years, the process of dissolution of Yugoslavia was accompanied by disputes about borders and the resurgence of ethnic tensions, leading to armed conflicts in Croatia (1991-95), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-95) and between Kosovo and the remainder of Yugoslavia (1999) and a destabilisation of the situation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2001) and again in Kosovo before self-proclamation of independence (2008). The building of new nation states induced waves of large-scale forced migration, involving both migration across borders (refugees) and internal movements (Internally Displaced Persons - IDPs) in the context of collapsing economies. In Albania, the economic and financial crash after the fall of the Communist regime transformed the country into a land dominated by agriculture, with soaring unemployment and poverty leading to mass emigration. During the 2000s, the political and macro-economic situation stabilised somewhat in the region, with the countries experiencing reforms and economic growth induced partly by the perspective of EU accession, but migration remained at high levels. On their way to the EU, the countries have taken an uneven pace, with Croatia being the first country set to join in July 2013.

The Eastern Partnership countries (EaP), which all formed parts of the Soviet Union and became independent in 1991, comprise the Eastern neighbours to the EU Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine and the three states of the Southern Caucasus, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. The break-up of the Soviet Union severely affected the economies of these countries, which in the initial post-Soviet years were characterised by a radical downsizing, privatisation and restructuring of the industrial sector and price liberalisation, leading to massive lay-offs, inflation and a sharp wage decline. The employment and living conditions worsened at a tremendous pace, generating massive outflows of people abroad. At the same time, the privatisation of land created the opportunity and the bad economic situation created the incentive to move to rural areas and engage in (subsistence) agriculture. The transition process was marked by civil unrest and the revival of conflicts about contested borders: Moldova lost control over the region east of the Dniester river (Transnistria) in a struggle that escalated to military engagement in 1992; between 1991 and 1994 Armenia and Azerbaijan were trapped in an armed conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region, which fell under Armenian control, while in Georgia simmering disputes within the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, erupted into violence and wars and a de facto independence from Georgia in
2008. The regional conflicts have caused large scale displacement of persons within and between the countries. Economic recovery and high GDP growth in the EaP countries came along in the mid 1990s and stabilised during the 2000s, with on-going political and economic reforms at quite different pace in the individual countries. With a view to strengthening prosperity, stability and security in the neighbouring region, the EU started a process of increased cooperation with the six countries within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004, which was even more tightened with the launch of the Eastern Partnership in May 2009. Alongside the support to political, institutional and economic reforms based on EU standards, the ENP aims to facilitate trade and increase mobility of persons between the EU and the Partner States.

In addition to the aforementioned 23 countries, the study also covers Greece and Turkey. These countries, unlike the States of Central and Eastern Europe, have not faced transition from state-planned to market economies; however, similarly to them, they have been confronted with high levels of emigration as well as internal rural-urban movements, which took place in an earlier period, starting already in the 1960s and lasting throughout the 1970s. The big migration waves in both countries had been fuelled by structural problems in particular in the agricultural sector, which accounted for high unemployment among the rural population. Furthermore, Greece and Turkey both underwent a period of political turbulences shaped by the installation of authoritarian regimes, followed by transition to multi-party democracies and liberalisation, which went along with strong economic growth, rising political stability and growing integration or orientation towards the EU. As from the 1970s already, Greece and Turkey also became destination countries of immigration and experienced rising flows of return migration. Greece finally joined the EU in 1981, while Turkey, which had already been an associate member to the EU since 1963, was granted the status as candidate country in 1999. For the purpose of the analysis, Greece and Turkey are studied as “reference cases”, in order to facilitate the identification of causal effects, similar experiences and policy examples. For this reason, these two countries will not be systematically integrated into the analysis to the same extent as the other countries throughout each chapter, but will be referred to occasionally, in order to illustrate specific issues, highlight policies and practices and learn from experiences.

Labour mobility is considered as being one of the main drivers of growth and competitiveness of the EU in the context of the Europe 2020 Strategy. One of the priorities set in the strategy is that of inclusive growth, fostering a high-employment economy that delivers economic, social and territorial cohesion. For the assessment of its achievement the EU has defined common headline targets for inclusive growth in the fields of employment, educational attainment and poverty reduction and has put forward three flagship initiatives to support achievement of these targets. Among the actions identified under the initiatives “An Agenda for new Skills and Jobs” and the “European Platform against Poverty and Social Exclusion”, two are of particular relevance for the present study, as they provide some guidance in identifying key aspects for the present comparative analysis:

“To facilitate and promote intra-EU labour mobility and better match labour supply with demand with appropriate financial support (...) and to promote a forward-looking and comprehensive labour migration policy which would respond in a flexible way to the priorities and needs of labour markets” (An Agenda for new Skills and Jobs)

“To design and implement programmes to promote social innovation for the most vulnerable, in particular by providing innovative education, training, and employment opportunities for deprived communities, (...) and to develop a new agenda for migrants’ integration to enable them to take full advantage of their potential” (European Platform against Poverty and Social Exclusion)

These two actions put migration within the EU at the core of employment and social policies, suggesting that intra-EU labour mobility is one of the keys to a better functioning of the EU labour market, while at the same time the promotion and use of the full potential of (labour) migrants will support both their integration and their social advancement. At the same time, however, it recognises that migration might be the source of new or increasing vulnerabilities
The study is also to be placed in the context of the evolving policy of the EU towards migration towards third country nationals. Since the adoption of the first programme for common (im)migration policy, based on the conclusions of the Tampere Council in 1999, the EU has gradually taken a more holistic and comprehensive approach to migration, shifting it from a mere security-centred view towards an approach increasingly taking into account the development impact of migration in the migration source countries. The idea also emerged that the challenges arising from demographic shifts needed to be addressed at a more international level and called for the necessity to emphasise migration in the external relations and policies with third countries, based on a partnership approach. This has shaped the development of a **Global Approach to Migration** by the EU, which was explored in the earlier Communication released in December 2002 (EC, 2002) and expanded in the Communication “Migration and Development: Some concrete orientations” of September 2005 (EC, 2005). In the course of time, the approach to migration, first centred on African countries, was extended to the Eastern regions neighbouring the EU. Within the Global Approach to Migration, the Mobility Partnerships, reciprocal cooperation agreements concluded between migration source countries and EU Member States, constitute one of the main instruments of implementation of the EU policy. They are seen as commitments and concrete steps to strengthen the link between migration and socio-economic development. As stated in the 2008 Commission Communication “Strengthening the Global Approach to Migration: Increasing Co-ordination, Coherence and Synergies” (EC, 2008), Mobility Partnerships are expected to mark a paradigmatic “shift from a primarily security-centred approach focused on reducing migratory pressures to a more transparent and balanced approach”.

In its most recent Communication on a “Global Approach to Migration and Mobility” in November 2011 (EC, 2011), the EU extends the scope of its policy framework to a broader concept of migration, including the various forms of temporary short-term migration across external EU borders. In its introduction the necessary linkage between migration and the EU’s labour market needs is clearly expressed. The promotion and “maximising (of) the development impact of migration and mobility” is pursued as one of the four priorities (pillars) of the migration approach for the coming years, with Mobility Partnerships as one preferential implementation tool to be upgraded, based on the experiences made with the pilot mobility partnerships. The Communication broadens the agenda for migration development beyond the topics of remittances and Diaspora development. A further focus of attention is turned on combating the “downsides” of migration through a joint approach of destination and source countries towards the promotion of migrants’ rights, of mobility options and circular migration, of migration governance and the mainstreaming of migration into development and sectoral policies. The emphasis on external relations and increased development cooperation, the shift towards a focus on the needs of the EU labour market and the social costs of migration in source countries suggest that migration is no longer a question of security policy alone but an integral part of foreign, employment, development and social policy.

Finally, the present study is embedded in the context of European initiatives and policies to **modernise social protection schemes and promote social inclusion policies**, not only in the EU Member States, but also in the candidate countries and potential candidates and the neighbouring countries. The EU process of mutual exchange and learning in the field of social protection and social inclusion integrated into the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) is not limited to the EU Member States, but should also help to improve cooperation with other neighbouring countries of the European Union. The promotion of social protection and social inclusion is also a priority of the Eastern Partnership, within whose framework the EU more intensively provides support to the partners’ individual reform efforts towards the eradication of poverty and social exclusion. The studies on social protection and social inclusion commissioned by the European Commission for the countries of the Western Balkans and the EaP are to be placed in this context. The underlying understanding of this enhanced cooperation is that economic, social and political stability in the Eastern
neighbouring countries is of vital interest for the European Union and that support in this respect will bring these countries closer to the EU.

The Country Reports are based on an analysis of available national and international data and research on issues of international and internal migration, labour market and human development, poverty, social inclusion and social protection, complemented by interviews with experts and policy makers. The Synthesis Report draws on policy documents issued by the EU and incorporates findings of various research efforts and studies carried out by European and international organisations dealing with migration and development (such as IOM, ETF, World Bank, OECD, United Nations, etc.) and the scientific community.

In order to allow for better comparability and taking into account both the geo-political location and the different policy orientations and financial instruments available to the EU, the 25 countries in the scope of the study have been grouped into three different country clusters. All Central and Eastern States which have joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 have been grouped together in the EU-8+2 cluster. Greece is added to this cluster as a reference case where appropriate. The countries of the Western Balkans, which all enjoy an accession perspective, form the group of the candidate countries and potential candidates and are grouped accordingly. The candidate country Turkey is added to this cluster as a reference case where appropriate. Those countries at the verge of the EU borders which are embedded within the regional cooperation framework of the Eastern Partnership make up the third group. All chapters of the synthesis report are structured alongside these country clusters. Chapter 2 describes the main migration trends among each country cluster focusing on trends and characteristics of both migration abroad and internal migration. Explanations about data are provided in the Annex. Chapter 3 presents and analyses the effects of migration on the social development of the countries studied. After providing a short overview on the socio-economic development in the context of transition, it concentrates on the evolution of the labour markets under the influence of migration and the potential role of migration and remittances for poverty and social inclusion. Further, it takes a closer look at regional effects of migration and shows how migration has contributed to exacerbating regional discrepancies and shaping geographical areas of deprivation. Chapter 4 addresses issues of social security coverage of migrants (and their families left behind). Chapter 5 focuses on specific groups of the population (children, elderly, IDPs and refugees, etc.) and presents to which extent they have been more affected by migration, creating or aggravating existing vulnerabilities. The focus taken under each country cluster in this respect might vary according to the groups identified as being particularly vulnerable to migration. Chapter 6 presents the various policies and measures implemented at EU level and in the sending countries to date in order to tackle the challenges resulting from migration for the social development of the sending countries and discusses their impact. Chapter 7 identifies the key challenges of the social impacts of migration and presents some distinct policy suggestions according to the three country clusters for addressing these challenges. Where relevant and deemed useful, additional explanations, particularly topical issues and examples of good (and bad) practice, are presented throughout the different chapters in text boxes.

The analysis and understanding of the social impact of emigration and rural-urban migration encounters some limitations, which partly form the main novelty of the present study. Indeed, as suggested above, the existing literature has largely neglected the interconnection between migration and its social impact(s) for the sending countries, thus making the presentation of the state of the art in this respect a challenging task. Moreover, at the empirical level, the identification and analysis of this linkage is complicated by existing gaps as regards availability, comprehensiveness, reliability and comparability of statistical information and data. Firstly, the armed conflicts and the building of nation states partly based on new borders has both left an incomplete statistical picture of the situation over the period studied in some cases and hampered the comparability of data due to manifold modifications in definitions and concepts over time. Secondly, even where national official statistical data is used, the concepts behind it still diverge widely between countries of the same region and many indicators are not yet aligned with European standards. Thirdly, the
level of disaggregation of data used, i.e. in the field of migration, is not necessarily the same as for data used to analyse poverty and social inclusion, thus making it more difficult to draw clear conclusions about causal effects. For the purpose of the study, data sets of Eurostat and other key international organisations (incl. ILO, UNDP, World Bank, etc.) have been utilised together with data from independent research institutes where necessary and available.

2 Understanding Main Migration Trends

2.1 Introduction

The introduction has set the scene: This report seeks to identify examples of successful policies and practices that promote the positive impact of migration for countries or regions which have lost population because of out-migration, or that seek to heal negative side-effects of such population declines. This chapter sketches main trends in international and internal migration from 1990 to the present in the EU-8 and EU-2 Member States, in candidate countries and potential candidates and in the Eastern Partnership countries. It describes patterns that have to be recognised when seeking to identify promising policies and practices.

The analysis of trends and patterns is hampered by the unavailability of reliable data, particularly with regard to international migration. “Generally, international migrants are difficult to count in their country of origin because of their absence”, as a UN Commission bluntly states the key problem (UN Economic Commission for Europe-Eurostat, 2010: 12; see textbox Data availability in the annex).

An additional complication has to be taken account of: Most states under analysis in this study were not independent in the present form at the beginning of the 1990s, but belonged to the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia or Czechoslovakia. While international migration means the movement of people over borders, in the dissolution of states, borders moved over people. As a consequence, movements that would have been internal migration in the old borders became international migration in the new ones. To the best possible extent, the analysis refers to the same geographical area, even if it had been part of a larger state in the past.

**Definitions**

*Migration* can be defined as the change of the usual place of residence – that is the place in which a person normally spends the daily period of rest. Temporary travel for purposes such as recreation, visits or business does not change a person’s usual residence (UN 1998, 18). In the context of internal migration, we speak of out-migration and in-migration, to differentiate it from international migration. If migration involves taking up residence in another country, the migrants are called ‘emigrant’ from the perspective of the country of origin and ‘immigrant’ from the perspective of the receiving country. In some languages, emigration carries the notion of a long-term or permanent stay. Also in Eurostat definitions, the change of residence is only called ‘emigration’ if undertaken with an expected length of stay of at least 12 months. However, there is few data to follow up length of stay and expected length of stay in the time frame of our analysis, so we use emigration as change of residence over international borders.

Many categorisations of emigrants do not depend on their actual movement, but on their legal situation. First of all and most importantly, emigrants may be differentiated according to their *citizenship* into own citizens and foreign nationals. As this study takes a country of origin perspective, the emigration of own citizens is the main focus of analysis. *Nationality* is often used as synonymous with citizenship, but in the context of states of the former Soviet Union, nationality refers to the self-declared and officially registered belonging to groups that would rather be called ‘ethnic group’ in international debates on such issues.

Ethnicity refers to social constructions of (shared) descent and culture (Fenton 2010, 3). Two special cases of ethnic minority migration are important for this study. *Co-ethnic emigration* means the emigration of ethnic minorities to the countries where their ethnicity is in the majority, e.g. Romanians
from the Hungarian minority to Hungary. Sometimes, such migration movements are considered as 'return', while returnees in the context of this study only means the return of own citizens who have emigrated before in their own lifetime. Secondly, the migration of Roma concerns minority groups with no ‘mother country’ to turn to. The term Roma is used for different groups who share a relation to the Romani language, and also for other groups with a similar history of marginalisation in European societies, such as the Sinti, Travellers, or Kalé (EC 2010c, Footnote 6).

Irregular migrants live in a state without the necessary documents or permits (for details see (Vogel et al. 2011)). If the receiving state establishes the identity of irregular migrants and removes them to their country of origin, they are forced returnees from the point of view of the country of origin. Temporary and permanent emigration refers mostly to the status as indicated by the legal documents of the receiving country. Receiving states may allow a limited (temporary) stay or an unlimited or extendable (permanent) stay. The duration of stay as indicated by status documentation does not fully overlap with other notions. Migrants’ intended length of stay may differ from the duration foreseen in their residence status, and their de-facto length of stay may differ from both. In this study, it is indicated whether temporariness refers to the de jure, de facto or intended length of stay. The term ‘circular’ is used to describe repeated temporary movements, no matter under which legal arrangements (de facto circular migration), but also for migration in legal frameworks that specifically enable such forms of migration (EMN 2011, 20).

2.2 EU Member States (EU-8+2)

At the turn of the 1980s to the 1990s, the communist rule in Central and Eastern Europe broke down and new regimes emerged in the political and economic field. While Poland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria continued to exist in the same borders as in communist times, other Member States became independent states in the present shape only at the beginning of the 1990s: Slovenia had been part of Yugoslavia (until 1991), the Baltic States acquired independence from the former Soviet Union (1991) and Czechoslovakia split into the Czech and Slovak Republic in the so called ‘velvet divorce’ (1993).

Table 2.1 gives an overview over the absolute size of the population of the countries and the changes over the last two decades. While they include changes due to birth and death, most of the difference is caused by international migration, return migration and – to a smaller extent – by new immigration. The most affected states were the Baltic States and Bulgaria, which have experienced considerable population losses between 12% (LT) and 16% (LV). The population decline in Romania is also relatively high (8%) and of outstanding absolute relevance (nearly 2 million people). For the other states, international population numbers indicate a moderate decrease (Hungary 4%) or increase of 3% (SI, SK). While there is somewhat contradictory evidence on the size of net outflows of citizens from some countries, it is uncontested that there have been net outflows to EU-15 Member States for all countries, which were accompanied in some countries (SI, CZ) by inflows, mainly from third countries.

---
3 EU-15 refers to those Member States that formed the EU before 2004. EU-8 refers to those EU Member States which joined the EU in 2004 and to which transitional arrangements applied (all states joining the EU in 2004 except Malta and Cyprus). EU-2 refers to those 2 Member States that joined the EU in 2007.
4 Country abbreviations follow the Eurostat country codes.
5 For example, Holland et al. (2011b, 51) indicate a nearly 5% of population outflow of Czechs to EU-15 Member states from 1998 to 2009, while the Czech country report points to low migration rates.
Table 2.1: Population (in thousands) and population change (in %) in EU-8+2 countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>8,767</td>
<td>8,149</td>
<td>7,505</td>
<td>-7%</td>
<td>-8%</td>
<td>-14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech R.</td>
<td>10,362</td>
<td>10,267</td>
<td>10,533</td>
<td>-1%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>1,571</td>
<td>1,367</td>
<td>1,340</td>
<td>-13%</td>
<td>-2%</td>
<td>-15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>10,375</td>
<td>10,200</td>
<td>9,986</td>
<td>-2%</td>
<td>-2%</td>
<td>-4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>2,668</td>
<td>2,364</td>
<td>2,230</td>
<td>-11%</td>
<td>-6%</td>
<td>-16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>3,694</td>
<td>3,487</td>
<td>3,245</td>
<td>-6%</td>
<td>-7%</td>
<td>-12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>38,038</td>
<td>38,254</td>
<td>38,200</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>23,211</td>
<td>22,430</td>
<td>21,414</td>
<td>-3%</td>
<td>-5%</td>
<td>-8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak R.</td>
<td>5,288</td>
<td>5,379</td>
<td>5,435</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>1,996</td>
<td>1,990</td>
<td>2,050</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>10,121</td>
<td>10,931</td>
<td>11,310</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The population decline may be even more pronounced than displayed by this data, as a share of emigrants is still presented as resident of their country of origin, even during prolonged stays abroad. Preliminary results from the Census 2011 imply that the decline in population since the last Census in 2001 was even more severe in the Baltic States and Romania (EE: -6%; LT: -12%; LV: -13%, RO: -7%; see Annex 2).

Figure 2.1 sets the population changes of the three country clusters into perspective, using UN population data, showing that there are countries with considerable population declines of more than 10% in all country groups (LV, BG, EE; BA; GE, MD, AM, UA). In contrast, Greece, Turkey and Azerbaijan faced considerable population growth, in the case of Greece and Turkey mainly due to inflows from other countries discussed in this study and in the case of Azerbaijan mainly due to high birth rates.
2.2.1 International Migration

The EU Member States have implemented a migration regime of free mobility of persons and virtually free movement of labour among each other, except for Romanian and Bulgarian citizens, who are still faced with restrictions during the transition period until 2014. People may decide spontaneously to seek opportunities in other EU countries, or return to their countries of origin after a period of migration, but there is no need to rush to migration opportunities as they may also be realised in the future. The free movement regime allows for migration with an open time perspective, so that temporary and permanent migration cannot be distinguished by the entry status. All migrants follow a regular path to inclusion and receive a permanent resident status after typically five years of residence. The path towards EU accession has led to an increasing concentration of emigration towards Member States.

Four phases of migration may be distinguished in the new Member States, although with considerable variations and overlaps. Generally, Romania and Bulgaria, which joined the EU in 2007, followed with a time-lag the developments of the Member States joining in 2004.

*Early 1990s:* After decades of emigration and travel restrictions, travel became easy to realise. Citizens of the new member states travelled in large numbers to Western Europe, and a share of these travels turned into irregular stays. Support in the asylum system was initially relevant for all ethnicities at the beginning of the 1990s, later mainly for Roma. Permanent emigration options were mainly accessible on the basis of ethnic or family ties, while labour migration opportunities were limited to some newly designed temporary workers programmes, such as the seasonal workers programme between Poland and Germany, which was already signed in 1990 (CR PL).

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7 Estimates about Romania exemplify the dimensions: There were about 250,000 Romanian asylum seekers in Germany from 1990 to 1993 (UNHCR, 2001, p.: IX, 61). According to official estimates, about 60% (150,000) were Roma (Bade 2002, 424). However, for only few of the applicants the refugee status was granted and many of the asylum seekers were repatriated to Romania (CR RO).
State-building had transformed members of large population groups into ethnic minorities in the newly formed states. This contributed to driving people to move to the country where their ethnic group constituted the majority and where favourable conditions were offered. There was population exchange particularly between Russia and the Baltics and the Czech and the Slovak Republic. In addition, Jews emigrated to Israel, German minorities to Germany, Hungarian minorities to Hungary, Ingrian Finns from Estonia to Finland and Turkish Bulgarians to Turkey, while other regular and mostly permanent emigration was enabled by family ties. Roma minorities\(^8\) were even more severely affected by the transformation than the majority population, but they had no majority country to turn to.

Mid 1990s to 2003: In the second phase, labour migration gained importance under the conditions set by EU-15 Member States: As a rule, free travel opportunities preceded the possibilities of free mobility. In connection with the economic restructuring in the EU-8+2 and labour demands in the EU-15, this created strong incentives for irregular migration of a mostly circular character with repeated returns to countries of origin.\(^9\) Emigrants were able to find work in the informal household sector and other expanding low-paid sectors in the West, particularly in agriculture and construction. In addition, labour migrants continued to use regular organised labour market opportunities such as seasonal and contract workers programmes.\(^10\) There are indications that repeated migration increased the length of stay (CR LT). Student migration multiplied several times for most countries.\(^11\) There were also increasingly favourable conditions for highly qualified persons in demand.

2004 to 2008: The third phase is characterised by an increase of emigration dominated by intra-EU mobility\(^12\), and shifts in main receiving countries and regularisations. The registered stock of EU-8 and EU-2 nationals residing in the EU-15 countries tripled over the period 2003-2009, increasing from about 1.6 million in 2003 to about 4.8 million in 2009 (Holland et al. 2011a: 49). However, population increases overestimate total emigration in this period, as they also include regularisations. For most states, regularisation was an immediate side effect of the EU accession, with particularly Romanian and Bulgarian citizens profiting from regularisation programmes in Southern Europe. This may also explain the increase of inflows of EU-2 migrants to Italy and Spain. However, legal residence did not necessarily lead to legal work. The UK, Ireland and Sweden immediately opened their regular labour markets to the EU-8 accession states, while other states limited labour mobility in the transition phase, at least temporarily.\(^13\) Germany and Austria did not lift all restrictions until May 2011. For EU-8 countries, a redirection of mobility streams from the restrictive to the more open countries was observed, particularly from Germany to the UK and Ireland (Holland et al. 2011a: 15). However, the strong increase in migration to the UK and Ireland even started before 2004 and can, therefore, also be partly attributed to strong labour demand, flexibility of the labour market and language issues. This shift does not only concern labour migration. OECD-Data also show a declining relevance of Germany (and partly France, but not Austria) and increasing relevance of the UK for international students from EU-8 and EU-2. Figure 2.2 exemplifies this for Polish students.

\(^8\) Particularly in RO, BG, CZ, SK, HU.
\(^9\) In Lithuania, shares of undeclared migration were estimated with surveys. About 60% of all emigrations in the period 1990-2000 were undeclared, and shortly before EU accession this share increased to up to 90% (CR LT).
\(^10\) At the peak of the movements of seasonal workers to Germany (2003-2004) as many as around 300,000 persons were involved; they represented around 90% of all foreign seasonal workers and around 3% of Polish labour force (CR PO).
\(^11\) Foreign student enrolled in tertiary education. OECD online education Database, data extracted on 18 January 2012.
\(^12\) Due to the legal framework after accession of EU-8 in 2004 and EU-2 in 2007, the term ‘(intra-EU) mobility’ is preferentially used where migration from EU-8+2 is directed only to EU-15.
End of 2008 up to the present\textsuperscript{14}: The fourth phase is marked by the economic crisis. The global financial and economic crisis led to a decline in workers’ mobility in 2008-2009, due to a sharp increase of unemployment rates among migrants from the EU-8+2 in the receiving EU-15 countries, as migrants were overrepresented in those sectors which are more sensitive to economic fluctuations such as construction and often had less secure contractual arrangements. In particular Romanian and Bulgarian immigrants in the EU-15 have been hit by increasing unemployment, although there is no evidence of massive return migration (OECD, 2010: 97). Some country reports indicate increasing numbers of returning temporary migrants (PL, SK), while others notice no increases in returns and even see intensified mobility to EU-15 (LV, LT). The country report Romania found indications of a somewhat lower movement to EU-15 but no signs of significantly increased returns. During the recession, foreign citizen populations from EU-8 and EU-2 continued to increase in most EU-15 receiving states, although at a slower pace than in previous years. However, the impact of the crisis on mobility from specific sending states, particularly small sending states, is not conclusive.\textsuperscript{15}

Greece was mainly an emigration country until the 1980s. The number of Greek emigrants between 1946 and 1977 reached approximately 1,300,000. Of the estimated 638,000 emigrants to European countries, the largest number – 83% – went to West Germany. The majority of Greek emigrants were of young working age, resulting, in the 1960s, in a reduction of the economically active age group of the Greek population by 11% (CR EL). During the last two decades, Greece has become an immigration country, facing considerable immigration, particularly from other countries discussed in this study (particularly AL, BG, GE). Germany, as the most important immigration country in Europe, registered a declining population of Greek citizens and negative migration saldos in the first

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\textsuperscript{14} Most of the analysed data was available until 2010. The publication was finalised in 2012.

\textsuperscript{15} Holland et al. (2011a,38) compiled full bilateral matrixes of population, using different data sources, cautioning readers to be aware of a "high degree of uncertainty and a wide margin of error". Particularly after 2004, results are highly influenced by UK data, which are estimated from LFS-samples, which are not reliable for small sending states. For example, it seems implausible that the Estonian population in the UK increased from about 4,000 to 14,000 from 2008 to 2009, while the Lithuanian population decreased from 91,000 to 81,000, the Bulgarian population decreased from 48,000 to 26,000 while the Romanian increased from 53,000 to 80,000. We recommend not to interpret such differences between sending countries for example using LFS based mobility rates, even if cautiously framed as in the European Commission (2011d, 253).
decade of this century, with a change in trend in 2011 in the face of the severe economic crisis in Greece.

The combination of these recent developments with earlier emigration streams has led to highly diverging patterns of emigrant populations. Table 2.2 identifies the most relevant receiving countries worldwide in a long-term perspective, taking World Bank data about foreign born as an indicator, and the most relevant EU receiving countries in the last two decades, taking most recent Eurostat data on foreign nationals as an indicator. For some countries, there are considerable deviations between both data sources. World Bank data include older, naturalised and state-building related emigrants that had moved prior to the 1990s and indicate the relevance of Russia (particularly for the Baltic countries) and overseas emigration countries as traditional destinations. The second column identifies the four most important EU Member States, according to the most recently recorded number of foreign nationals. This data is more relevant for recent migration since the mid 1990s, as large scale migration to EU Member States became only possible after the opening of the border. In the case of the Czech Republic, for example, the US is among the four main receiving countries measured in terms of foreign born, while Spain is among the four main receiving countries measured in terms of foreign nationals, indicating a shift in migration directions. Similarly, in the case of Latvia and Lithuania, Ireland is the most relevant receiving country measured in foreign nationals, whereas it ranks only fourth among foreign born, which include earlier migration waves.

Besides showing the high relevance of the respective neighbouring countries, the overwhelming relevance of the four big migration attractors (DE, UK, ES, IT) is obvious. In addition, specific Baltic patterns with the high relevance of Finland for Estonia and Ireland for Latvia and Lithuania are visible.

Table 2.2: Main receiving countries of EU-8+2 Member States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Four countries with most foreign born (2010)</th>
<th>Four EU Member States with most foreign nationals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slovak Republic</td>
<td>CZ, UK, DE, US</td>
<td>CZ, DE, UK, AT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>DE, HR, AT, CA</td>
<td>DE, AT, IT, ES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>DE, UK, US, BY</td>
<td>DE, UK, IT, ES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>DE, US, CA, AT</td>
<td>DE, AT, ES, IT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>IT, ES, HU, IL</td>
<td>IT, ES, DE, HU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>RU, FI, SE, US</td>
<td>FI, DE, IE, UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>RU, PL, UK, IE</td>
<td>IE, UK, DE, ES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>RU, US, UK, IE</td>
<td>IE, DE, UK, ES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>SK, DE, AT, US</td>
<td>DE, ES, AT, SK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>TR, ES, DE, EL</td>
<td>ES, DE, IT, EL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>DE, US, AU, CA</td>
<td>DE, BE, UK, NL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) Sorted by most relevant residence country of foreign born
b) World Bank (2011b): Bilateral Migration Matrix (November 2010), in: http://go.worldbank.org/JITC7NYTT0 (last access 31.05.2011)

According to own calculations with World Bank data, between 55% (CZ) and 77% (SK). While most emigration that is recorded in the World Bank (estimates of foreign born) is due to recent emigrants, some is linked to much earlier migrations, as particularly the Polish-born population in Belarus is mainly due to an outflow within the framework of ethnic cleansing actions immediately after World War II (CR PL).

This includes older data, particularly from Greece (2001), the UK (2005) and France (2005).

As in the case of Greece, which had no relevant out-migration to other EU member states in the covered time frame, population numbers in other EU member states are of minor importance (DE:297,668 (2010); BE (15,182).
Roma from EU countries originally often applied for asylum when migrating to Western destinations. They also participated in regular and irregular labour migration, with a main direction from Romania to Italy, Spain and France (OSCE, 2008: 30). There are no reliable estimates on the total extent of emigration of citizens of Roma origin. In the Czech Republic for example, estimates for total emigration in the last two decades range from 100,000 to 250,000, while total Roma emigration is estimated by the government to be 35,000 to 70,000 (CR CZ). Emigration of Roma minorities influenced international relations, particularly when Canada withdrew visa-free entrance for citizens of some Eastern European states. Roma migration was faced with resistance from the receiving countries when large groups without adequate levels of subsistence lived in informal settlements or were associated with increases in criminality, or when applying for asylum.19

LFS data give an indication of the relevance of established versus recent and circular migrants in the EU-15 Member States. As far as EU-10 nationals living in another Member State are concerned, around two thirds arrived in the destination country after the 2004 enlargement, with this percentage rising to nearly 80% in Sweden and Belgium and to around 90% in Ireland and the UK. EU-2 migration is on average more recent, with about 60% having immigrated after 2004, but also to a large extent prior to their accession in 2007. In Italy and Spain, more than 80% arrived prior to EU accession (EC, 2011d: 254).

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**Cross-border commuting**

In the case of favourable infrastructure, short- and long-distance commuting patterns developed internally, but also particularly across international borders from new to old Member States, with people responding to labour market opportunities without changing their residence (CZ, EE, HU, PL, SI, SK). Cross-border commuting programmes had been introduced in the 1990s in most regions bordering old Member States. Today, support from EURES services encourage job search along EU borders, informing about job opportunities and institutional conditions. While the majority of jobs concerns daily cross-border commuting, there are also indications of double jobs and long distance-patterns. The Hungarian country report gives the example of doctors with main positions in Hungary and commuting for weekend services to Germany or the UK.

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Table 2.3 below shows the share of males among citizens from the new Member States in four recently relevant receiving states.20 The blue fields highlight countries in which there is a high male dominance (60% and more males) and the pink fields highlight countries in which there is a high female dominance from a specific citizenship (40% and less males). Two things are immediately visible:

- Much of the recent migration is female led and dominated. The traditional pattern with males leading migration and females staying behind or joining later (as in EL) has lost relevance. Particularly Italy draws mainly women from Central and Eastern European Member States.

- While the generally higher importance of women in Italy and men in Ireland already point to the influence of occupational demand structures, the high gender variation within one receiving country indicates that bilateral patterns are shaped by other factors such as family and ethnic networks and cultural affinities (e.g. 30% of Estonians in Germany are male, but 60% of Hungarians; 19% of Czechs in Italy are male, but 53% of Slovenians).

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19 Canada imposed visa-obligations after rising numbers of asylum applications in 1998, reintroduced visa-free entrance in 2008 and reimposed visa obligations again after steep increases in 2009 and 2010 (CR CZ). Similar developments were faced by HU.

20 Data is not available for all Member States, e.g. there is no data for the UK.
### Table 2.3: Share of males among foreign citizens from EU-8+2 in selected Member States (2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Share of males among foreign citizens (in %)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak Republic</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: highlighted in blue: male share 60% and more; highlighted in pink: male share 40% and less

Age-specific migration patterns are found all over the world with some variations and have been extensively documented by migration research (see e.g. already Wagner, 1989). As a rule, persons in the main education and employment age are more prone to migrate than older people, and this is not different for persons from the new Member States.

Table 2.4 displays the educational attainments of citizens of EU-8+2 residing in their country of citizenship or residing in EU-15 Member States on the basis of 2008 LFS data. While most migrants have medium qualifications as most non-migrants, the share of persons with medium qualifications is lower among migrants than among the non-migrant population. Shares of migrants with lower qualifications are higher (except for HU, LV) as well as shares of migrants with higher qualifications (except for EE, LT, SI) – coloured grey in Table 2.4.

Aggregated data for 2010, however, indicate that only people with lower qualifications are overrepresented among recent intra-EU migrants with 7 years of residence and less, leading to the following conclusions (EC 2011d:271): “Therefore, as far as sending countries are concerned, there does not seem to be a strong brain drain effect given that the share of the high-skilled persons among the EU-10 recent movers is lower (22%) than the share in the origin countries’ active population (25%). This is even more so where EU-2 recent movers are concerned, with a highly educated share of 14%, much below the 19% in the origin countries’ active population.” A more thorough data triangulation across years and sources (including census 2011) is advisable before putting too much trust in the statement that emigration of the highly skilled is really no issue.

This is a quite different situation to the emigration from Greece to the North-West in the 1950s and 1960s, when two thirds of those who migrated abroad were agricultural workers and the owners of small and scattered pieces of farming land, mostly with low educational qualifications (CR EL).
Table 2.4: Educational attainment of the resident population of the EU-8+2 and migrant population from the EU-8+2 to the EU-15, 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Resident population</th>
<th></th>
<th>Migrant population</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Czech Rep.</strong></td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Estonia</strong></td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hungary</strong></td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Latvia</strong></td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lithuania</strong></td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Poland</strong></td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Slovak Rep.</strong></td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Slovenia</strong></td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bulgaria</strong></td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Romania</strong></td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Holland et al., 2011a. Derived from Eurostat LFS series
2.2.2 Internal Migration

The transformation of the economies in the early 1990s led to an unusual period with regard to internal migration. Internal migration levels are relatively low in Central and Eastern European Member states. After an increase immediately after the beginning of the transformation, internal migration levels mostly declined in the 1990s, but then increased again in the 2000s, although on a low level. In some countries, the combination of high ownership rates with not yet functioning housing markets led to a lock-in effect, reducing internal migration (HU, CZ).

In most countries, employment levels in agriculture had already declined to low levels, with considerable variation in its absolute importance. Current levels of urbanisation were already reached at the beginning of the 1990s, with little change afterwards. Table 2.5 shows that the main decline of populations in rural areas took place before the 1990s. Country differences are highly dependent on definitions, so they should not be over-interpreted.

Table 2.5: Rural population (as % of total population)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>30.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>31.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>32.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>38.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>59.7</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>45.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak Republic</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>43.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>52.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>38.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In some countries, a short period of intensified urban to rural migration was observed (LV, LT, HU, BG, RO). Subsistence agriculture helped to support families when employment broke down and living costs in cities increased rapidly. This tendency was promoted by agricultural reforms and laws offering favourable conditions for regaining ownership of houses.

From the late 1990s, suburbanisation trends emerged, resumed or intensified. In nearly all countries, the areas around big cities experienced the most intensive growth, notably from

---

21 For an analysis of EU-8 in 2004, see World Bank, 2007b.
22 For example, Romania and the Slovak Republic have similar shares of rural populations. However, the Slovak country report notes that some 18% of Slovak settlements with less than 2,000 inhabitants had an urban structure of inhabitants. About 10% of the Slovak population lived in these rural settlements which can be characterised as suburban.
the cities themselves that in turn attracted new inhabitants from abroad or less developed regions.

As everywhere, young adults moved in response to educational opportunities, mainly to cities. Educational mobility to cities is often the first step to a permanent change of residence to cities or the surrounding areas or to later emigration. Some countries report that Roma were forced to migrate to rural areas (near cities) in response to rising housing costs (HU, CZ). In many countries, Roma live in the same major regions as majority populations, but in segregated neighbourhoods within these regions.

In most states (with exception of SI), most regions have experienced net population losses due to migration, except for the regions around big cities. However, some regions are severely affected. Peripheral rural regions are particularly concerned, where low intensity agriculture, lack of commuting opportunities and no relevant touristic infrastructures limit the participation in living standard increases. While high birth rates may initially encourage migration from such regions, high out-migration rates lead to decreasing birth rates, which accelerate population decline and ageing. In some countries, such regions cover substantial parts of the whole territory (e.g. BG, LT, LV, RO). For these regions, migration impacts considerably on regional development, which is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.

Results of the analysis of LFS data (2004) suggest that the probabilities of both commuting and internal migration are highest among men, among younger workers, among single or separated/ widowed workers and among workers that are relatively more educated (World Bank, 2007b: XIII). However, the age composition differs by migration flows. Young people dominate in urban-ward moves, people in the family ages are most likely to suburbanise, while both people in family ages and older people are over-represented in counter-urban moves.23

For most countries, internal migration does not seem to be the main mechanism to cope with increasing regional disparities. Commuting and temporary or permanent migration to other Member States have been the favoured options over internal migration. Circular migration patterns seem to directly connect regions in the Central and Eastern European countries with specific regions in the receiving countries. There are some indications that a share of the returnees prefers to resettle to cities rather than their rural origin municipalities, as has been the case in Greece.

23 This description in the Estonian country report seems to summarise neatly what happens in most countries.
2.3 Candidate Countries and Potential Candidates

This chapter deals with the non-EU countries in the region known as the Western Balkans, which includes the former Yugoslav states (except Slovenia) and Albania. Only Albania was an independent state in the same borders as today during the last two decades. The other states became independent in the process of the dissolution of Yugoslavia. The wars of the Yugoslav succession involved complex struggles over the borders and nature of new nation states, with the rise of ethnicised nationalism leading to many deaths and a number of waves of large-scale forced migration, involving both refugees (who crossed internationally recognised borders) and Internally Displaced Persons (who moved within these borders).

The new states introduced ethnicised citizenship regimes, with Bosnia and Herzegovina divided into two entities after the Dayton Peace Agreement of 1995. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, after internal conflict, was stabilised, in part, through the Ohrid Agreement which gave increased autonomy to those areas where ethnic Albanians constituted a majority.

The Thessaloniki European Council summit of 2003 made it clear that all the successor states had prospects of joining the European Union. At the time of writing (March 2012), Croatia has signed the accession treaty and should join on 1 July 2013. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia are candidate countries while the other states and territories are potential candidates for EU membership.

Changing borders in the Western Balkans

The dissolution of Yugoslavia involved peaceful separations and violent wars. The most northern republic Slovenia, declared independence on 25 June 1991. After a ten-day war, the country was quickly on the path to EU integration (see above under EU Member States). Macedonia declared independence after a referendum in September 1991, and was admitted into the UN in April 1993 under the provisional name of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Croatia declared independence at the same time as Slovenia but faced a long and protracted war with about a quarter of the territory not under Croatian government control until military actions in 1995, and a peaceful reintegration process in Eastern Slavonia which was completed in 1998. Bosnia and Herzegovina declared independence in March 1992 but suffered from a long and bloody war which only ended after the Dayton Peace Agreement in December 1995. The agreement created a weak central state, vesting most powers in two entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (further divided into cantons) and Republika Srpska.

The war for the independence of Kosovo from the remainder of Yugoslavia began in 1998 and lead to a de-facto separation after NATO-intervention in 1999 and a formal declaration of independence in 2008. However, Kosovo*’s status under international law is at the time of writing still formally governed by the interim solution of the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of June 1999. Part of Northern Kosovo* remains de facto under Serbian control with intermittent skirmishes regarding movement of goods and people.

Serbia and Montenegro, which had re-constituted themselves to be the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro in 2003, peacefully separated in 2006.

These complex developments highly influenced migration streams and simultaneously limited capacities to observe such streams in scientific data. Population numbers are politically sensitive, and external and internal migration streams cannot be clearly differentiated when borders are changing and contested. In parts of the region, there has been no reliable and valid census data since 1981. In addition, in the context of the conflicts and the creation of new states, a significant number of persons, mainly Roma, remained stateless, while many others obtained citizenship of more than one of the successor states.

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24 Serbia is the last country which has obtained EU candidate status on 1 March 2012.
25 With changing borders, receiving country data are also only rough indicators, as residents may still be observed as citizens of the former state.
Total population changes in the Western Balkan states are shown in Table 2.6 below, covering total changes from migration, birth and death, according to international data (which are partly estimated). The comparison clearly shows that Bosnia and Herzegovina was most severely affected. It lost nearly a quarter of the population between 1990 and 1995, regaining it partially after the war from the neighbouring states who were net receiving regions of forced migrants during war time and from states of refuge. Similarly, Kosovo* lost about 16% of the population in the second half of the 1990s with return in the 2000s. For Albania, Table 2.6 shows population declines in spite of high fertility rates throughout the 1990s, while in the 2000s the population started to grow again.

Table 2.6: Population and population change in the Candidate Countries and Potential Candidates (in thousands)

<table>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>4,308</td>
<td>3,332</td>
<td>3,694</td>
<td>3,760</td>
<td>-23%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>-13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>7586</td>
<td>7738</td>
<td>7516</td>
<td>7293</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>-3%</td>
<td>-3%</td>
<td>-4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>3,289</td>
<td>3,141</td>
<td>3,072</td>
<td>3,204</td>
<td>-5%</td>
<td>-2%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>-3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>4,517</td>
<td>4,669</td>
<td>4,506</td>
<td>4,403</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>-4%</td>
<td>-2%</td>
<td>-3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo*</td>
<td>1,862</td>
<td>2029</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>1,815</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>-16%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>-3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>609</td>
<td>643</td>
<td>633</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>-2%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
<td>1,909</td>
<td>1,963</td>
<td>2,009</td>
<td>2,061</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>54,130</td>
<td>58,865</td>
<td>63,628</td>
<td>72,752</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Population in 1990 refers to the former Yugoslav republics or regions.

http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do

2.3.1 International Migration

In the 1960s and early 1970s, Yugoslavia sent large numbers of labour migrants to Northern and Western Europe, particularly to Germany, Switzerland and Austria and particularly from the Northern Republics of Slovenia and Croatia. During the 1970s and 1980s, the resulting populations stabilised through family reunification, while return migration continued, creating lasting links between sending and receiving regions which also influenced the direction of refugee streams in the 1990s. Emigration from the former Yugoslav states can be structured in three phases:

First half of 1990s: The early 1990s are characterised by mass population displacement and population exchange between the former Yugoslav republics. The protracted war between Croatia and Serbia from 1991 to 1995 lead to several waves of forced migration from the contested regions. The Bosnian wars from 1992 to 1995 displaced about half of the entire population of the country, which sought refuge internally, in the neighbouring states and states where labour migrants from earlier periods resided. Croatia received large numbers of forced migrants fleeing the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, many of whom later received
Croatian citizenship. In total, more than 2 million people were uprooted by the wars of the early 1990s.

**Second half of the 1990s:** Repatriation from Northern and Western Europe started immediately after the end of the wars in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia and resulted in large scale returns. However, return to the areas of origin was often not possible and created a new vulnerable group of internally displaced persons, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Meanwhile, a new war in Kosovo* in 1998/1999 displaced large numbers of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo*, particularly to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Albania. By August 1999, 850,000 ethnic Albanian refugees returned to Kosovo* and around 100,000 ethnic Serbs, approximately half of the ethnic Serbian population, fled to Serbia (CR XK), as well as significant numbers of Roma and Egyptians.

**2000 to the present:** The first decade of the new century was characterised by a normalisation of migration movements. Labour migration gained importance in this decade, and student migration to the European Union also increased considerably. At the same time, return migration of long-term labour migrants from Western Europe resumed, although on a low level. At the end of 2011, UNHCR welcomed regional efforts to find final solutions for the remaining 74,000 persons which had been displaced in the early 1990s. Visa-free entrance agreements with the European Union made travel to the EU easier for all except Kosovars. An increase of asylum applications was observed, mainly due to Roma (from RS and MK).

Major impacts of the economic crisis on the development of long-distance migration are not reported. However, temporary labour migration within the region seems to be reduced, mainly from Bosnia and Herzegovina to Croatia and Slovenia.

In contrast to the former Yugoslavian states, Albania had virtually no emigration until the collapse of the socialist regime. The transition crisis in one of the poorest countries of Europe resulted in large scale emigration in the early 1990s, mostly through irregular entries by boat to Italy and by land to Greece. After a short period of stabilisation, the unsustainable ‘pyramid saving schemes’ - promising unrealistically high returns on investments - lead to violent riots and a second peak of emigration in 1996/1997. During the 2000s, emigration slowed down and migration streams ‘normalised’ as in the former Yugoslav republics. The economic crisis affected Italy and Greece massively and, thus, also Albanian migrants in these countries, reducing emigration without considerably increasing return (CR AL).

Turkey has been subject to various forms of migratory and refugee flows, the latter particularly from ethnic or religious minorities. Large numbers of its citizens migrated to Western Europe, particularly Germany, since the 1960s. Europe’s oil recession in the 1970s redirected the flow of the Turkish migrant labour force to the Middle East, and in the 1990s to the Russian Federation and Commonwealth of Independent States. Turkey has recently become a net-immigration country, being the destination of temporary migrants from Eastern neighbours (ETF 2011), transit migrants, return migrants from earlier emigration waves and transnational migrants changing residence regularly, for example aged migrants changing twice a year between Turkey and the country to which they had emigrated (CR TR).

---

26 From December 2009 (HR, RS, MK, ME) and from December 2010 (BA, AL).
Table 2.7 identifies the most relevant receiving countries worldwide in a long-term perspective, taking World Bank data about foreign born as an indicator, and the most relevant EU receiving countries in the last two decades, taking most recent Eurostat data on foreign nationals as an indicator (see also explanations on Table 2.2). Albanian migration abroad is highly concentrated in the two main receiving countries Italy and Greece, the latter being particularly relevant for short-term temporary migration in addition to more long-term permanent migration. While migration in the 1990s was mostly irregular and accompanied by forced repatriations, regularisations enabled more regular family migration in the 2000s. The originally mostly male-led migration became more balanced. Voluntary returns increased.

The main receiving countries of the other Western Balkan states were less influenced by vicinity and more influenced by the links through earlier labour migration movements from Yugoslavia. This is particularly the case for Germany, Austria and Switzerland, but also France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden. Croatia is relevant for Bosnia and Herzegovina due to ethnically based emigration and recent labour migration.

According to estimates of the Council of Europe, former Yugoslav republics are among the main residence countries of larger amounts of Roma (OSCE, 2008: 83). Roma mainly went to the same destination countries as other emigrants from these countries, as labour migrants and during the wars as refugees. However, their return was considerably more difficult than the return of person belonging to other ethnicities, both internally and from abroad, due a combination of factors including reluctance to return to a discriminatory environment and lack of documents. As most temporarily protected refugees had returned in the 1990s and early 2000s under the pressure and with assistance of the receiving countries, particularly Germany, the remaining population has become increasingly dominated by Roma (OSCE, 2008: 31).
Table 2.8: Share of males among foreign citizens from candidate countries and potential candidates in selected EU Member States (2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Share of males among foreign citizens (in %)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo*</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia, Montenegro (and former Serbia and Montenegro or Yugoslavia)</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Share of males among foreign citizens (in %)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: highlighted in blue: male share 60% and more; highlighted in pink: male share 40% and less

The gender distribution of foreign nationals in selected EU Member States is much more balanced for foreign citizens from Western Balkan states than for citizens from EU-8+2, being influenced by established minorities with male-led migration and accomplished family reunification and refugee movements involving whole families. For Albanians and Turks, there is still a considerable male dominance in some countries. As the large generations of labour migrants are ageing in the receiving countries, emigrant populations of Western Balkan states in the European Union are not always younger than the populations in the countries of origin (e.g. CR HR).

Emigrant’s characteristics have changed over time. Legal labour emigrants in the 1960s were mostly low-skilled young men, recruited from rural areas or the least developed urban regions. The proportion of skilled migrants rose over time (e.g. CR XK). For Albania, which had not experienced high migration waves before the 1990s, international migrants are predominantly young and more educated than the overall population of Albania. 47% of long-term migrants during the period 1990-2002 had completed high school or university studies, compared to 31% of the non-migrating population (CR AL).

Looking at Turkey today may serve as a means to get an idea of some future developments. Turkey has long-lasting close migration relations to the EU and an increasingly peaceful and democratic development. With the Turkish economic boom, migration relations did not only involve the return of labour migrants from the 1960s and 1970s, but also qualified migration towards Turkey, often by the offspring of earlier emigrants.

2.3.2 Internal Migration

Before the 1990s, the Western Balkan states were characterised by rural-urban migration which was, particularly in the case of Albania, limited by state efforts to control internal migration. In the state-formation phase in the 1990s, formerly internal migration turned into international migration and has been described above.
### Table 2.9: Rural population (in % of total population)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>68.3</td>
<td>66.2</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>52.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>72.8</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>51.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>42.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>73.1</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>40.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia (incl. Kosovo*)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>47.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>30.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In contrast to EU-8+2 countries, which had relatively stable rural-urban shares throughout the last two decades (Table 2.9), rural shares continued to decline considerably in the countries of the Western Balkan region and Turkey (with the exception of Croatia, where the decline was low). The wars intensified rural-urban migration in the 1990s, as rural areas were more affected by wars and the destruction of houses, and also in Turkey, internal migration to cities included people moving away from conflict areas in the East. In the 2000s, rural-urban migration was dominated by educational and occupational motives.

The Western Balkan states are characterised by large regional disparities. Some regions are depopulating, particularly smaller villages in mountainous border regions. High emigration is accompanied by low birth rates in such regions where young females are more likely to migrate than young men (HR, BA, MK). In the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the female share is considerably high, reaching 70% of overall internal migrants, which is attributed to education, marriage and family reunification (CR MK). Thus, the profile of the population in the high migration loss regions is characterised by rising shares of elderly, declining shares of children and a male dominance.

Regions around major cities show the biggest growth in all of the countries, albeit taking different forms. This growth seems to be mostly influenced by rural-urban migration rather than suburbanisation tendencies. The surrounding areas of Albania’s capital Tirana and Kosovo’s capital Pristina are growing fast and in an uncontrolled way, with poor informal settlements appearing at the verges of the capitals. In Turkey, too, internal migrants mostly moved into **gecekondu** (squatter) housing and are somehow involved in the informal sector. Particularly in the 1990s, internal migrants included IDPs, generally accepted to number around more than one million, who left their rural homes to move to the suburbs of the big cities as a result of the armed conflict in south-eastern regions, either through state pressure or out of fear of staying in the middle of the conflict (CR TR).

Internal migration is linked in several ways to international migration. Before the 1990s, rural migrants often chose international instead of internal rural-urban migration, while currently different patterns coincide, with internal migration to cities in the interior preceding international migration, or temporary international migration serving to earn funds for internal moves (CR AL). Returnees are often not returning to villages but to cities.

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27 Population changes around Zagreb are compatible with suburbanisation tendencies.
2.4 Eastern Partnership Countries

The Eastern Partnership countries formerly belonged to the Soviet Union and became independent in 1991. At the verges of the large Russian state, the Eastern Neighbours Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova are bordering the European Union. The mountainous land between the Black and Caspian Sea, bordering Turkey and Iran in the South, is subdivided into the three Southern Caucasus states Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. As in the Western Balkans, state-building increased the salience of ethnic divisions, particularly when there were wars over contested border areas. Only Belarus and Ukraine remained in the same borders which they had as Soviet republics and have not been involved in armed territorial conflicts.

Contested borders in the Eastern Partnership countries

Moldova and Georgia lost control over regions in wars in the early 1990s (MD: Transnistria; GE: Abkhazia and South Ossetia). The de-facto independence of these regions is backed up by Russia but not internationally recognised. The conflict between Georgia and Russia over the separated regions flared again into a war in August 2008. Armenia and Azerbaijan were involved in a war from 1991 to the cease-fire in 1994 over the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh and adjacent regions. The internationally non-recognised independence of the region is backed up by Armenian forces.

Ukraine is by far the largest state in the Eastern Partnership countries, with a population of about 46 million, while the other states are much smaller with about 3 (AM) to 10 (BY) million inhabitants. Before the migration movements of the 1990s, the Eastern Neighbours were characterised by an ageing and declining population, while the Southern Caucasus had relatively stable (GE, AM) or rapidly growing (AZ) populations (Abazov, 2009: 5-6).

Table 2.10: Population and population change in the Eastern Partnership countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>5,460</td>
<td>4,746</td>
<td>4,352</td>
<td>-13%</td>
<td>-8%</td>
<td>-20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>4,364</td>
<td>4,107</td>
<td>3,573</td>
<td>-6%</td>
<td>-13%</td>
<td>-18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>3,545</td>
<td>3,076</td>
<td>3,092</td>
<td>-13%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>-13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>51,645</td>
<td>48,892</td>
<td>45,448</td>
<td>-5%</td>
<td>-7%</td>
<td>-12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>10,260</td>
<td>10,058</td>
<td>9,595</td>
<td>-2%</td>
<td>-5%</td>
<td>-6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>7,212</td>
<td>8,111</td>
<td>9,188</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


From 1990 to 2010, only Azerbaijan showed a strong and continuous growth of the population, influenced by high birth-rates and net gains from migration in some periods, co-existing with considerable temporary and permanent emigration. The other states experienced massive population declines, particularly in Armenia and Georgia in the last decade of the 1990s and in Moldova in the first decade of the new century. Country reports indicate that the decline according to international population estimates as in Table 2.10 understate the real scale of population decline. The population decline is mainly due to large-scale emigration. The rates of population decline in Georgia, Moldova, Armenia and Ukraine are comparable to those in Bulgaria and the Baltic countries and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
2.4.1 International Migration

During the Soviet times, migration had been highly regulated. Local registration was obligatory and a change of registration was subject to state permission. This registration was the precondition for access to jobs, housing and services (Propiska-system). However, there was also unregistered migration for labour and trade purposes from the Eastern Partnership countries to Russia (Abazov, 2009: 9). The sudden transition to a market economy led to a decade-long recession with reductions of the domestic products to less than half of the earlier size and high unemployment, with considerable improvements starting earlier in the oil-rich Azerbaijan and later in the other states. Some general trends can be tentatively established (Abazov, 2009):

**Early 1990s:** Migration trends from Soviet times were reversed, mainly between Russia and the EaP states. A large number of earlier migrants and their offspring returned to their titular homeland states where their ethnic group constituted the majority, both in the newly independent states and beyond. For the EaP countries, this involved a net loss of population, particularly the educated population. These movements were triggered by wars and discrimination of minorities in the residence countries on the one hand, and promoted by liberal regulations on the acquisition of citizenship in the receiving states on the other hand. Armenia received returnees who had been evacuated to other republics after an earthquake in 1988. Ukraine experienced the return of Crimean Tatars, who had been deported under Stalin, and their offspring.

Jews from all states moved to Israel, Georgians to Greece, Ukrainians to Germany, and Moldovans to Romania. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict led to a mutual eviction of the ethnic minorities of the neighbouring state. By early 1991, the entire Azerbaijani community of Armenia (estimated to be more than 200,000 people), and most of the Armenians living in Azerbaijan, some 330,000 people, had fled violence from Armenia and Azerbaijan respectively (CR AZ).

Beyond these permanent movements on the basis of ethnic ties, commercial shuttle migration (Chelnoki) to Western states, Turkey and Russia emerged. Asylum applications in Western states increased.

**Mid to late 1990s:** Beyond the immediate transition shock, economic development in the late 1990s was still slow and hampered by the Russian financial crisis at the end of the century. Trade shuttle migration was followed by mostly irregular labour migration, both to Russia and to the West. The new visa-free travel zone of the former Soviet republics as well as cheap transport costs enabled temporary and circular migration patterns, even for the poorest inhabitants of Eastern partnership countries (Abazov, 2009: 19). This includes Roma from the Ukraine and Moldova.

Ukrainians and Belarusians also profited from cheap and easy travel opportunities to their immediate neighbours in the West, until visa-free entrance was revoked on the eve of the EU accession in 2003. Southern European countries attracted mainly females for work in the informal economy. Student migration to EU countries increased. From 1998, asylum applications increased again after declines in the mid 1990s.

**2000s:** While all countries experienced economic growth and increasing work opportunities in the 2000s, this is particularly true for Azerbaijan. The oil-rich country developed fast, attracting own citizens working irregularly abroad as well as foreign citizens, while simultaneously (temporary) labour migration of own citizens persisted.

Political developments promoted the changing direction of migration flows, particularly for Georgians. While Turkey allowed visa-free entrance in 2006, Russia introduced visa requirements in 2001 and closed the border entirely after the 2008 war (CR GE).

Particularly females from the Eastern Neighbours profited from regularisations in Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal. According to surveys, the share of labour emigrants without proper registration dropped from the majority to about a quarter (CR UA, MD). While asylum
applications rarely led to acceptance and permanent residence, they still offered temporary perspectives for citizens from the Eastern partnership countries and remained significant with changing levels.

The flourishing economy of neighbouring Turkey made it gain relevance as a receiving country of regular and irregular migration, without offering perspectives of permanent stay, particularly during the last years of the economic crisis. Apart from that, the crisis seems to have slightly reduced emigration intensity, without inducing substantial return migration or changing major trends. Thus, the crisis has more severe effects on remittances than on migration numbers (see Chapter 3).

Table 2.11: Main receiving countries of emigrants from Eastern Partnership countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Countries with most foreign born(a)</th>
<th>Countries in the EU with most foreign nationals(b)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>RU, US, UA, AZ</td>
<td>ES, DE, F, BE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>RU, AM, UA, KZ</td>
<td>DE, F, SE, AT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>RU, UA, PO, KZ</td>
<td>DE, IT, LT, CZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>RU, AM, UA, EL</td>
<td>EL, DE, ES, F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>RU, UA, IT, RO</td>
<td>IT, PT, ES, DE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>RU, PO, US, KZ</td>
<td>IT, DE, CZ, ES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:


Table 2.11 identifies the most relevant receiving countries worldwide in a long-term perspective, taking World Bank data about foreign born as an indicator, and the most relevant EU receiving countries in the last two decades, taking most recent Eurostat data on foreign nationals as an indicator (see also explanations on Table 2.2).

World Bank estimates of foreign born from Eastern partnership countries show the high relevance of relations to other former Soviet republics, which is the most striking difference to other groups discussed in this report (Table 2.11). Russia is the most important receiving country in the Eastern partnership countries, while other significant foreign-born populations result from population exchange immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union and from earlier times. Particularly, foreign-born populations in EU countries result from long-term migration relations, as in the case of Belarus and Ukraine to Poland, Georgia to Greece and Moldova to Romania. What is still not showing up in the data is the recently high relevance of Turkey and Greece, particularly but not only, for Azerbaijanis and Georgians (see country reports).

EU data on foreign nationals by citizenship give an impression of more current relevance for the European Union. Ukraine sends large numbers of immigrants to Italy, Germany and the Czech Republic. For the smaller states, migration patterns differ strongly, with Azerbaijanis nearly exclusively and Belarusians and Georgians to a high proportion going to Germany, while Moldovans and Armenians are mostly residing in the Southern EU Member States.

Table 2.12 shows the high relevance of women for migration into the EU Member States: In many states, above all in Italy, women represent by far the majority, whereas in other states the gender balance is approximately equal, while there is no strong male dominance anywhere. In contrast, migration to Russia and other states in the region are strongly male-dominated (see country reports).
Table 2.12: Share of males among foreign citizens from the Eastern partnership countries in selected Member States (2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Ireland</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Italy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: highlighted in blue: male share 60% and more; highlighted in pink: male share 40% and less


As everywhere, outgoing migrants are younger than the resident population, with considerable proportions in the early working age. With regard to the educational attainments, country reports indicate a high relevance of educated emigration (see Chapter 3). Census data about international migrants with a permanent address in Belarus can illustrate how the level of education depends on the country of destination (CR BY). The average share of people with tertiary education working at the place of residence in Belarus is 25%. People with tertiary education form just 16% of labour migrants to Russia and 15% of those to Lithuania. In contrast, labour migrants to Western destinations are much more likely to have a university education than the average Belarusian (CZ 38%, IT 40%, DE 55% and US 72%). The educational level of Belarusian labour migrants also has a gender dimension: the average educational level of female labour migrants is higher than the male one. There are some indications that increasing educational levels stimulate return (CR UA).

The situation in the small country of Moldova, situated between Ukraine and Romania, is comparatively well researched. Surveys in this high-emigration state have covered migration intentions, returnees and information on absent household members. They show significant differences in migrant characteristics, depending on the direction of migration. Migrants leaving for CIS countries are younger, mostly men, less educated, from rural areas with employment mostly in construction. Persons leaving for the EU are mainly women, of older average age than men, with higher and often tertiary qualifications and employment mostly in private households (CR MD).

With a highly negative migration saldo in almost all regions of the countries, both rural and urban regions contribute to net emigration. While in already highly urbanised countries urban regions make a stronger contribution to emigration (AM), in less urbanised countries rural emigration feeds temporary and permanent international migration to a larger extent (MD).

2.4.2 Internal Migration

Large shares of the populations in the Eastern partnership countries have internally migrated during their lifetime. This is largely due to internal displacement because of wars and disasters. The catastrophe in the atomic plant of Chernobyl displaced hundreds of thousands in the Ukraine and Belarus. Armenia suffered an earthquake in 1988, leading to the temporary evacuation of entire regions. These disasters and the wars in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia accelerated net out-migration from the most concerned regions to internal and external destinations and simultaneously contributed to the growth of capital regions. According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre of the Norwegian Refugee Council, internal displacement declined in Armenia to at least 8,000 and remained high in Azerbaijan.
(up to 593,000) and Georgia (up to 258,000), where around 100,000 people are still living in collective centres (IDMC, 2011).

Apart from internal displacement, work and education are the main reasons for internal migration, and internal migrants are predominantly young.

At the beginning of the 1990s, the Eastern partnership countries were characterised by highly diverging degrees of urbanisation. International data indicate that Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova can be characterised as still largely rural, while Armenia, Belarus and Ukraine had already reached high urbanisation rates in the 1990s.

In the early 1990s, all countries experienced a phase with returns to the rural areas. Land restitution at the beginning of the 1990s was accompanied by strong fragmentation of land, shifting ownership from large-scale former collective farms to households who engaged themselves in (semi-) subsistence agriculture as a coping strategy against poverty (Macours et al., 2008). After the transition, international data show a rapidly declining share of rural populations for Belarus and a slowly declining share for Ukraine, whereas the rural share is increasing in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova (Table 2.13). However, official data may overestimate the rural population share because migrants remain registered at their original place of residence while working on a temporary or even permanent basis in the capital or abroad (CR MD, UA).

Table 2.13: Rural population (in % of total population)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>36.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>47.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>47.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>67.9</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>58.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>31.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


While some cities lost nearly entire populations as soon as subsidisation in the planned economy stopped, the capital regions and other industrial centres gained population. This population growth in capital regions took highly different forms. In Belarus, the state actively developed housing and encouraged industrial development around the capital Minsk (CR BY), whereas the growth of the Azerbaijani capital Baku is largely unregulated. It involves the settlement of richer strata of the capital city, but also informal settlements without infrastructure fed largely by rural-to-urban migration (CR AZ). Although there are some indications of increasing numbers of commuters (CR UA), the relevance of commuting is low compared to temporary and permanent migration. High net migration loss regions of the Eastern Partnership countries are mostly located in border regions, either in mountain regions with harsh climate conditions (GE, AM, AZ), in regions suffering dramatic declines in industries (GE, BY, UA) or in predominantly agricultural areas (AZ, BY, UA, MD).
3 Labour Market, Social and Regional Developments, and Migration

3.1 Introduction

Migration trends in Central and Eastern Europe after 1991 are closely related to the socio-economic developments in the context of transition from a central planning to a market economy. In order to understand the complexity of the nexus between migration and development, we start with a description of the economic, labour market and social developments during the last two decades which – besides the removal of restrictions for free movement (see Chapter 2) and other factors (family reunification, economic situation in the receiving countries, etc.) - are among the main determinants of external and internal migration.

After this, we look at the economic and labour market developments under the influence of migration. Effects of outflows on the labour markets in the countries of origin can be manifold, depending on the situation of the labour market at the moment of migration and return, on the employment status of the migrants before their migratory period and on their skill levels. Consequences of out-migration may include a decline in unemployment rates, labour shortages in specific sectors and a corresponding pressure on wages, and, ultimately, may result in immigration of foreign labour. Based on the country reports and other publications and surveys, this chapter describes the main effects of emigration and internal migration on the supply and demand side of the national, sectoral and regional labour markets in the sending countries. It further looks at the impact of migration on the skill development of the migrants themselves, although information is limited and often based only on micro-surveys. The linkage between migration and poverty and social exclusion is examined, both in terms of the way in which poverty levels may act as an incentive to migration and, conversely, how migration impacts on the poverty and social exclusion of those ‘left behind’.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Brain drain, brain gain and brain waste</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>We use the term “brain drain” to describe large-scale permanent or long-term emigration of the highly skilled and educated people who represent an important element of the labour force of a country. Brain drain can be detrimental for a country’s social and economic development by weakening the human potential if it is not offset by welfare gains or feedback effects from remittances, technology transfer, investments or trade. On the other hand, a “brain gain” occurs if the sending country experiences net benefits from the emigration of the skilled (for example in terms of welfare or increased investment in education). Referring to the migrants themselves, “downskilling” or “brain waste” may occur when migrants’ qualifications are not adequately used in the receiving country and the migrants are employed in occupations for which they are over-qualified. The effect of “brain overflow” occurs when there is an oversupply of educated professionals in the sending country. In this case, the brain drain effects are limited (for further discussion on the effects of out-migration of highly educated and skilled people, please see European Integration Consortium, 2009b).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Further, this chapter will analyse the volume and the impact of remittances\(^\text{28}\) which are sent back by migrants to their families on the countries’ economies and the households’ living standards. Even if remittances do not directly contribute to the sending countries’ economy by increasing the national income or influencing investment rates, they might have an indirect positive effect on the economy by raising households’ income, alleviating poverty and boosting private consumption. However, remittances also have potential negative effects such as inflationary pressure, growth in inequality between remittance receiving and non-

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\(^{28}\) The term ‘remittances’ covers workers’ remittances and compensation of employees and comprises current transfers by migrant workers and wages and salaries earned by nonresident workers. This definition follows the IMF and World Bank methodology.
remittance receiving households or a decline in incentives to engage on the domestic labour market (Kaczmarczyk and Okólski, 2008).

Special attention will be drawn to the impact of out-migration in a regional perspective and we will look at employment and social developments in those regions which are particularly affected by above-average out- or inflows.

3.2 EU Member States (EU-8+2)

3.2.1 Economic, Labour Market and Social Developments in the Context of Transition

The transition from central planning to a market economy after the collapse of the Communist Regime was accompanied by a decline in economic activities and productivity and, consequently, had dramatic labour market and welfare repercussions in the EU-8+2. Firm closures, privatisation and restructuring led to a decline in activity and employment rates, as people quit the labour market, and also to a considerable increase in unemployment rates. Only starting from the mid 1990s, economic growth in most of these countries turned positive and reached levels of 5% or even more. However, expectations that the labour market situation would improve once GDP began to grow did not materialise. Low income levels and high unemployment rates have persisted and have been key push factors behind mobility from EU-8+2 before and after accession (see country reports). In 2000, GDP per capita (PPS) in most of the EU-8+2 was still below 50% of the EU-27, although it developed much more positively in the EU-8+2 than in the EU-15. It is to be highlighted that those countries with the lowest GDP per capita, namely Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Romania were also those countries with highest population decrease (see Table 3.1 below). Moreover, intraregional differences in GDP levels and growth dynamics remained significant and even increased over time. Job creation and employment opportunities in the period of economic recovery were clustered around capital cities and large urban conglomerations, particularly those which are regional centres, whereas rural or remote areas and deindustrialised regions tended to be left behind. These subnational differences were most striking in Bulgaria and Romania but were also important in other countries of the EU-8+2 (UNICEF, 2009).
Table 3.1: GDP per capita in PPS (EU-27=100) and GDP change (in %) 2008-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>-15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>-21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>-10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>65</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>-3.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slovak Republic</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>60</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>91</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-27</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-15</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>-2.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: b=break in series; p=provisional
Source: Eurostat database,
(accessed 25 April 2012)

It is only since the beginning of the new millennium, in some cases later, that employment rates in the EU-8 have been increasing constantly in most countries. The recent and current crisis reversed this trend and, all in all, with the exception of the Czech Republic and Slovenia, employment rates still remain below the EU average. In general, Hungary being a notable exception here, the EU-8+2 Member States with the lowest employment rates have in general seen the largest outflows (see Table 3.2).

At the same time, although employment in agriculture considerably decreased between 2000 and 2009, in some of the EU-8+2 the agricultural sector still accounts for considerable employment shares, in particular in Romania (32.6%), Bulgaria (19.9%), and Poland (12.7%), but also in Greece (11.6%). A large amount of smaller and inefficient agricultural production in the EU-8+2 led to a decline in income and to the shedding of agricultural employment, simply because of the incapacity to benefit from economies of scale. The increase in incomes in this sector in real terms has been minimal and the income per worker in the agricultural sector is equal to slightly over 30% of the average wage in the total economy in the EU-12 (EC, 2010a; 48). These developments contributed to out-migration, in particular from predominantly rural areas into the cities, suburban areas or abroad, with severe implications for the economic and human potential for these regions, as will be seen under Chapter 3.1.4.

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29 Between 2000 and 2009 agricultural employment decreased by 31% in the EU-12. For comparison, in the same period of time, agricultural employment decreased by 17% in the EU-15 (EC, 2010a, 2).  
Table 3.2: Activity, employment and unemployment rates, age group 15-64 (LFS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>BG</th>
<th>CZ</th>
<th>EE</th>
<th>LV</th>
<th>LT</th>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>62.5</td>
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<td>67.7</td>
<td>69.7</td>
<td>59.6</td>
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<tr>
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<td>73.8</td>
<td>73.2</td>
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<td>Employment Rates</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>56.8</td>
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<td>2005</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>62.6</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>65.3</td>
<td>63.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>59.7</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>66.2</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>64.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment Rates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EUROSTAT database, tables: lfsi_act_a, lfsi_emp_a, une_rt_a

In the context of transition, all countries undertook fundamental reforms of their social security systems, which under the communist system had been based on universal entitlements institutionalised as a right of citizenship. As a consequence, contribution-based systems were introduced and entitlements to social protection benefits became conditional. Health care reforms were introduced aimed at increasing efficiency and effectiveness in the sector through reorganising and cutting or privatising hospital capacities and defining basic benefit packages. User fees have become a common feature for prescription of drugs, dental care and rehabilitation services. Despite the efforts undertaken to provide equal access, informal out-of-pocket payments are still relevant in all countries, albeit to a varying degree. In the field of old-age security most states introduced (mandatory) second and third pillar funded schemes along with the reform of the first (statutory) pillar. Although adequacy of pensions in general is not (yet) a topic of public concern, poverty of the elderly already is an issue, due to low pensions, and will become more acute in the future, due to interrupted employment records, low indexing and increasing privatisation.31

In terms of poverty and social exclusion, the broad pattern, over time, has been that the Central (Višegrad) European countries have recovered, after significant shocks in the early 1990s, and tend to have lower levels of poverty and exclusion compared to the Baltic States and, in particular, Bulgaria and Romania. The partial exceptions to this are Poland, which has somewhat higher levels of deprivation, and Estonia, with somewhat lower levels. There appears to be a strong correlation, in fact, between levels of deprivation and the nature of social protection systems, with the Central European countries having more inclusive and extensive social protection systems. On the whole, the crisis has been less intense and recovery rather quicker in these countries, particularly when compared to the Baltic States. Romania and Bulgaria, together with the Baltic States, with the partial exception of Estonia, as well as Hungary and Poland, have been described as “resource-poor” having both high material deprivation and above-average poverty risk (Lelkes and Gasior, 2012: 5). The same countries spend considerably less as a percentage of GDP on social protection, compared to

31 For further information on social security reforms in the enlarged EU, see Fuchs et al., 2008, and Golinowska, 2007.
the EU-27 average of 26.4% - with Latvia spending only 12.6% of GDP, Lithuania 16.2%, Bulgaria 15.5%, and Romania only 14.3%.\textsuperscript{32}

When it comes to the relationship between migration and poverty, it is clear that the three Baltic States, which have experienced significant population losses including out-migration in the period, have low overall GDP, higher-than-average at-risk-of-poverty rates (except EE), and higher-than-average rates of severe material deprivation. They were also hardest hit by the economic and financial crisis between 2008 and 2010. At the same time, between 1995 and 2007, they experienced higher than average growth in GDP. Whether the recent crisis will impact on future migration rates is an open question, although it may be that the recovery evidenced in 2010 will mitigate this. Whilst some out-migration in the period may have been induced by economic opportunities in richer countries, a great deal of out-migration was to the Soviet Union, largely based on linguistic and citizenship ties.

Bulgaria and Romania, which joined the EU in 2007 and which had both a significant population loss between 1990 and 2010 (especially BG) and an important emigration between 1998 and 2009 (especially RO), exhibit very high levels of severe material deprivation, high at-risk-of-poverty rates, and are the poorest of the EU Member States. Here, there is perhaps a clearer case for suggesting that poverty and low GDP has contributed, and may well contribute in the future, to significant levels of emigration. The picture regarding the Central European countries is harder to interpret. The Slovak Republic and Poland, which have made significant improvements in GDP, were not particularly hit by the crisis. Both have above-average levels of material deprivation, and have experienced waves of significant out-migration. It is the case that extremely low levels of out-migration have occurred in Hungary and Slovenia, whereas the Czech Republic, also with levels of GDP closer to the EU average, experienced high out-migration, primarily to the Slovak Republic.

The countries which have experienced higher levels of out-migration tend to have relatively higher levels of in-work poverty and poverty amongst the working-age population compared to other countries. At the same time, working-age poverty rates tend to be lower than the overall national poverty risk, so that generalisations, and the impact of cause and effect relations, are hard to specify. There are noticeably higher levels of child poverty and older people poverty rates in the same countries, perhaps indicating that those left behind are in a more vulnerable position.

Whilst the linkages are not direct, it is worth noting that some of the larger countries in this sub-cluster which have set ambitious targets for a reduction of poverty and social exclusion under the Europe 2020 Strategy are also the countries which have tended to face significant levels of out-migration\textsuperscript{33}. Examples include Poland, which has pledged to reduce poverty and social exclusion by 1.5 million people, Romania (580,000 less), Bulgaria (260,000 less), and Lithuania (170,000 less). Whilst these countries do not refer directly in their National Reform Programmes to the linkage between migration and poverty, it is clear that one side effect of reaching the Europe 2020 target is the expectation that out-migration rates may fall.


### Table 3.3: Europe 2020 Indicators on poverty and social exclusion, in % of total population, 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>At risk of poverty 2010</th>
<th>Severe material deprivation 2010</th>
<th>Low work intensity</th>
<th>At risk of any of 3 indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>41.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>38.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>33.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>29.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak Republic</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>27.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-15</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-27</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 3.4: In-work poverty and poverty by age group (in %), 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>In-work Poverty</th>
<th>Poverty 25-49 year olds</th>
<th>Poverty 18-64 year olds</th>
<th>Poverty under 18</th>
<th>Poverty over 65</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>32.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak Republic</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-15</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-27</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.2.2 Labour Market Developments under the Influence of Migration

The effects of emigration for the economic and labour market development in the EU sending countries have been assessed only recently in some studies on labour mobility within the EU (Barell et al., 2007; 2010; Holland et al. 2011a; European Integration Consortium, 2009). One of the consequences to be highlighted is that outflows of the most productive share of the population may aggravate demographic imbalances in the EU-8+2, which already today face the problem of ageing societies and a decline of their population. This is especially true for the countries with large outflows such as Bulgaria, Romania and the Baltic States. Consequently, in the long run, impacts on the economic potential of the countries can be expected.34

It is commonly acknowledged that the national labour markets have been much more affected by the economic transition in the country itself than by emigration. However, effects of emigration on regional and sectoral labour markets seem to be larger, as will be shown later in this report. In all EU-8+2, the large outflows of population coincided with a massive restructuring of the economy, which in turn led to economic growth, privatisation of state-owned companies, inflow of FDI and other changes such as technological change, reforms of the educational system, etc. All these factors primarily influenced the domestic labour markets in the EU-8+2, and others, including migration, seem to play only a marginal role. Furthermore, we have to take into account that migration from EU-8+2 has a predominantly temporary character, which further minimises impacts on the domestic labour market (European Integration Consortium, 2009a; Holland et al., 2011a).

There are some indications that emigration alleviated unemployment in the Central European countries, particular in low-demand regions and sectors. This is confirmed by a series of country reports (BG, PL, RO, SK). In addition, in the Baltic States, the rate of unemployment would have been much higher at the beginning of the 1990s if the massive emigration (return migration) of the Russian minority would not have taken place (CR EE, LT). Simulations of macro-economic effects of outflows from EU-8+2 on the unemployment rate have been undertaken in the context of the above mentioned studies on labour mobility in the EU and confirm a slightly positive effect of out-migration on unemployment in the countries of origin.35

In the past decade, along with high unemployment rates, some EU-8+2 Member States have also seen increasing job vacancy rates, albeit to a different degree and in different sectors. It is important to note that labour shortages cannot be attributed exclusively to labour migration, and other factors such as longer education periods, insufficient geographical mobility, and ageing have to be taken into account. Moreover, structural problems of the labour markets in these countries might be underpinned by labour and skill shortages. However, a study on labour shortages in Lithuania, conducted in 2007, i.e. before the crisis, revealed that 41% of surveyed companies considered emigration as the main reason impeding staff retention and recruitment (CR LT). Hungary, a country with a much lower mobility rate, also reports on labour shortages, particularly in the western regions bordering Austria, where commuting and short-term temporary migration is a widespread phenomenon (CR HU). Also, Romania and Bulgaria experience an increasing deficit in labour supply,

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34 Holland et al. (2011a; 14) estimated the macro-economic impact of population outflows in the EU-8+2 to the EU-15 since 2004 and comes to the conclusion that Bulgaria, Romania and Lithuania may expect the biggest reduction in the potential level of output (5-10%), while estimations for Estonia and Latvia are lower (3%).

35 The European Integration Consortium (2009a) analysed the effect of out-migration from EU-8 on the unemployment rate in these countries in the time period 2004-2008 and found out that due to out-migration the unemployment rate slightly declined (by 0.42 p.p.) in the short run in all countries except Slovenia, while the long-run impact was nearly neutral. Looking at the effect of out-migration of low-skilled migrants only, the short-term decline was larger and nearly doubled (European Integration Consortium, 2009a: 74). The impact of recent mobility on unemployment rates has been analysed only for Lithuania and Poland, where unemployment rates have fallen by 1 percentage point and 0.5 percentage points respectively (Barrell et al., 2010).
especially in the industry, construction and hotel sectors (CR RO, BG). This trend is confirmed by Kaczmarczyk and Okólski (2008), who state that vacancy rates considerably increased in Poland and the Baltic States after accession in 2004 along with increasing migration rates. Shortages of workers became particularly serious in manufacturing, trade, hotels and restaurants, as well as construction.

The migration of highly educated people is becoming a substantial element of global economic processes, involving forms such as scholarships, scientific internships, mobility within multinational companies, etc. All country teams of the EU-8+2 report on out-migration of highly educated people and, in particular, refer to the out-migration of scientists, technical professionals such as engineers and ICT specialists, and physicians. It is commonly acknowledged that the EU-8+2 Member States are negatively affected by the outflow of highly educated persons. In almost all countries, the share of highly educated individuals is higher among the migrants than the corresponding share of the resident population, with largest differences in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and the Slovak Republic (see Table 2.4). At the same time, most of the EU-8+2 Member States have experienced an increase of the share of highly skilled people and a boost in tertiary enrolment in recent years. For example, Poland has not been able to provide employment conditions that correspond to the qualifications and wage expectations of the graduates, and in the post-accession period it was the only country of the EU-8 that faced high unemployment rates of the highly qualified (European Integration Consortium, 2009b). Against this background it seems to be more appropriate to speak of ‘brain overflow’ rather than ‘brain drain’ (Kaczmarczyk and Okólski, 2008). In addition, many new mobile workers plan to work in another EU Member State only for a limited period and return back to their home country, so that negative effects might be offset by return migration, and it might be rather appropriate to speak about ‘brain circulation’ rather than ‘brain drain’ (Holland et al., 2011a). This is also confirmed by the country reports from the Czech and the Slovak Republic, which underline the temporary nature of migration of highly skilled people and the increase of human and social capital of the migrants.

It is evident that destination countries do not tap the full potential of migrants’ skills, since employment below qualification, also labelled as downskilling, is a quite common phenomenon among EU-8+2 migrants in the EU-15 countries. Some country reports (PL, LT) state a significant gap between the educational attainment of the migrants and the occupations the migrants work in. This is especially true for the Polish post-accession migrants in the UK, where 82% had at least completed secondary education but the majority of all migrants were hired for jobs that do not require any occupational qualification. The share of migrants employed below their qualification seems to be higher among female migrants (CR PL). The phenomenon of downskilling is confirmed by Holland et al. (2011b), who analysed the skill structure of EU-8+2 nationals working in EU-15 Member States and put this in relation to the occupations in which they work. The employment below qualification is also pronounced in the case of migrants from Bulgaria and Romania: while the share of highly skilled Bulgarians and Romanians working in EU-15 is 21% and 12% respectively, the share of Bulgarian and Romanian migrants working in occupations requiring high skills amounts only to 11% and 2% (Holland et al., 2011b: 22-24, 42-43). It is assumed that migrants tend to accept lower-skilled jobs than they would have accepted in their home country, since most of them migrate only for a limited duration to the EU-15. But downskilling might also point to the lack of information on the value of qualifications or skills acquired in the home country and difficulties to have them formally recognised (EC, 2011d).
Health professional mobility

Effects of highly skilled migration in the sending countries are clearly visible at the sectoral level and in particular in the health care sector. While health professional mobility may help to fill deficits in the receiving countries\(^{36}\), it may have a negative impact on the composition of the domestic health workforce and, in turn, on the performance of the health systems in the sending countries. However, it is important to note that many other factors such as new technologies, feminisation of the workforce, training capacities and working conditions interact with health workforce mobility (WHO, 2011).

Before enlargement in 2004, several studies pointed to a high migration potential of medical professionals from EU-8+2. And indeed, looking at the registration data of recognition certificates issued by medical chambers or governmental authorities in these countries, the will to leave the home country was especially high upon accession. In Estonia, for example, 7.6% of the total number of physicians applied for a certificate in the years 2004-2005. Rates have gone down in the years of economic boom as a result of rises in wages, but slightly increased again during the crisis. As regards nurses, in 2010 still more nurses left Estonia than had graduated from the education system (CR EE).

There are also some indications that the loss was dramatic among some specific medical professions in the early years of EU membership. In Poland, in the period between May 2004 and June 2006, the Polish Chamber of Physicians issued certificates to 15.6% of all active anaesthesiologists and 14.7% of all plastic surgeons (Kaczmarscyk and Okoński, 2008: 62). In Romania, the number of physicians emigrating has been constantly increasing during the last two decades, starting from 4% of total number of doctors up to nearly 10% in 2004 (Barghava et al., 2010). A recent WHO study on health professional mobility confirms that Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Romania had faced initial strong outflows upon EU accession, followed by a drop or by a more contained development. However, intention-to-leave data for Romania suggest continuing high outflows of health professionals: in 2010, 300 certificates were issued to Romanian physicians each month, which is attributed to the measures undertaken following the economic crisis, including a 25% decrease in salaries and staff reduction in the health sector (WHO, 2011: 42).

Motivational factors for health professional mobility include considerable wage differentials between the sending and receiving countries, dissatisfaction with working conditions including access to good infrastructure and medical equipment, incomplete health reforms or low social status. It seems that health professional mobility in some countries is mainly of a temporary nature. WHO reports on extreme short-term mobility between the UK and Eastern Europe (a few weeks or months) or commuting of health care professionals, e.g. EE – FI, SK – AT, or HU – AT (WHO, 2011).

A clear interdependence can be discerned between migration intentions and income levels in sending countries. There are some indications that requests for certificates were strategically used as a means of enforcement of wage demands (CR CZ). In the case of Estonia, Poland and the Slovak Republic, the same time as wage levels of health professionals were increased, requests for diploma recognition certificates lowered.

The impacts on the health system and service delivery in the sending countries are difficult to capture, due to the absence of reports or studies. In the case of Poland, data suggest that the scale of outflow of health professionals is not large enough to cause a threat to the health care system in Poland in the short term. This is mainly due to the fact that the number of graduates from the Polish educational system in the health sector is still higher than the potential outflow of health professionals. Thus, as already mentioned above, we can speak also here of a brain overflow rather than a brain drain. However, looking at regional markets and at certain specialities (surgeons, anaesthesiologists), the outflows of health professionals may result in serious problems, in particular under the condition of a lack of deep reforms in the Polish health sector (Black et al. (eds), 2010). Also, the country reports for Estonia, Romania and Lithuania consider the outflow of health professionals, along with regional imbalances, as a considerable threat to the sustainability of the domestic health system, including staff shortages, lower quantity, quality and access to services, particularly in rural areas (see chapter 3.2.4).

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\(^{36}\) The impact of health professional mobility on the receiving countries is not subject of this study. We refer to a recent publication of WHO which analysed the impact of health professional mobility also on receiving countries. As stated there, it is obvious that health professional mobility from the EU-8+2 helps the EU-15 Member States to fill their deficits. This can be easily shown in the case of Italy which experiences a considerable shortage in nursing staff and an even higher demand for the so-called badanti, i.e. providers of elderly care and home-care workers. The highest share of foreign nurses comes from Romania and Poland. But also in Austria, nurses from the EU-8+2 and in particular from the Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic helped to fill in the rising shortage of home care (for more information, see WHO, 2011).
3.2.3 Remittances

Although remittances in many of the EU-8+2 Member States are high, they are not outstanding as a percentage of GDP (Table 3.5).37 Before the crisis in 2008, the highest rates were reported for Romania and Bulgaria, followed by Lithuania, and the lowest for the Czech Republic and Slovenia. It should be noted that remittances in most of the EU-8 Member States experienced a sharp increase in the years 2004 and 2005, i.e. shortly after accession, while they had already been high in Bulgaria and Romania prior to accession. Due to the economic crisis, remittances as total volume and as share of GDP decreased markedly in most of the countries, starting in 200938. This is related to return migration and to the fact that many migrants working in sectors which were the first hit by the economic downturn, such as construction, became unemployed or faced considerable decreases in earnings. Reductions in GDP share were considerably pronounced in Bulgaria and Romania. While the total volume of remittances did not decrease in Bulgaria, it considerably fell in Romania. In the Baltic Countries, remittances as share of GDP – after two years of decline - started to increase again in 2009 and 2010, which might be related to the persisting low economic output in these countries following the crisis.

It is to be highlighted that in Bulgaria, Romania and Poland, remittances represent an important source of foreign exchange and make a substantial contribution to balancing negative current accounts. According to EUROSTAT, without remittances the current account deficit recorded by Bulgaria and Romania in 2010 would have been 158% and 45% higher respectively (Eurostat, 2012b).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3.5: Workers’ remittances and compensation of employees received by EU-8+2 Member States, in % of GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Eurostat tables [bop_remit], [nama_gdp_c], own calculations
Note: As part of the balance of payments, two main kinds of transactions related to the temporary or permanent movement of people are defined and measured in line with the IMF methodology: namely workers’ remittances and compensation of employees. Workers’ remittances are defined as transfers made by migrants employed and resident in the compiling economy to their relatives in their country of origin. Workers’ remittances include household-to-household transfers in cash and in kind. Funds sent by migrants to their country of origin to purchase real estate or invest in local business are recorded not as remittances but as foreign direct investment transactions. Compensation of employees refers to gross wages, salaries and other benefits earned by individuals in economies other than those in which they are resident, for work performed and paid for by residents of those economies. Compensation of employees includes salaries paid to seasonal and other short-term workers (less than one year), to the employees of embassies and of other territorial enclaves that are not considered part of the national economy and to cross-border workers (Eurostat, 2012b).*

37 Remittances recorded in the balance of payments undervalue transfers between migrants and their families, since a considerable share of migrants use informal channels to transmit remittances.
Micro-surveys on the usage of remittances suggest that more than half of remittances are used for current expenditure such as food and clothing, durable goods, housing construction and repairs. Only a marginal share is used for education of the migrant him/herself or for a family member or for business investments (CR BG, HU, PL, RO, SK). However, in the case of Romania, findings from a survey conducted in 2006 suggest that returnees or households with migrants are more prone to engage themselves in entrepreneurial activities than non-migrant households (CR RO). Remittances, thus, tend to increase consumption in the sending countries, which might offset the negative effect of out-migration in these countries in the short run but should not have any long-term effect.

Looking back to the intense period of migration in Greece in the 1960s and 1970s, remittances represented 4-5% of the Gross National Income and played an important role in the Greek economy at that time. They contributed to a 3% increase in consumption and a 4% increase in production, mainly due to their investment in construction and locally produced consumer goods. They accounted for more than half of the GDP growth rate and supported employment, mainly in the mining, construction and manufacturing sectors (CR EL).

Whilst, in general terms, remittances tend to play a role in poverty reduction, both directly, through increasing consumption levels of those households on or below the poverty line, and indirectly, through acting as a source of credit for liquidity-constrained households, the impact of remittances on inequality is more mixed, depending very much on who remits to whom. In any case, given the relatively low levels of remittances in this region, the impacts are likely to be limited. In Bulgaria, some 7% of households are dependent on remittances, accounting for between 30% and 35% of their consumption and income, slightly higher in rural households (World Bank, 2009). As the Bulgarian country report shows, remittances did not fall as a result of the economic and financial crisis. Had they done so, the impacts on absolute poverty would have been significant, with estimates that a 25% decline in remittances could lead to significant increase in consumption basket absolute poverty and a doubling of extreme poverty (from 3.8% to 7.4%) (World Bank, 2009).

A detailed comparative study of the impact of remittances on inequality, poverty and social exclusion in four countries (CZ, HU, PL and SI) (Giannetti et al., 2009), using rather old EU-SILC 2005 data and having to make a number of assumptions about which transfers are remittances, was able to show the broad effects of remittances, even though, of course, such ‘one-off’ studies cannot show the longer-term impacts on households. The study showed that, given the low levels of remittances compared, for example, to social transfers (which the authors term ‘welfare transfers’), impacts are limited. Nevertheless, remittances tended to be received by those in the lower income quintiles, and there is a positive correlation between receipt of remittances and receipt of ‘welfare transfers’ in all of the countries, except the Czech Republic. Table 3.6 and 3.7 below show the main findings of the study. Hungary has the highest proportion of households receiving remittances but the amount of remittances is lower than in the other countries. In Poland, the average amount of annual remittances per household recipient is more than 3.5 times the average amount of welfare by recipient. In the other countries it is only slightly higher or, as in the Czech Republic, slightly lower. Remittances are progressive, having an impact in reducing inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, except in Slovenia, where remittances are regressive. At the same time, the changes in the Gini coefficient are small, less than 1%, and much less than changes through social transfers. A similar picture emerges regarding poverty, with remittances having a small impact on poverty reduction in all four countries, again much less than the reduction through social transfers. The exception here is Poland, with social transfers having a relatively small role in reducing inequality and poverty. A similar picture emerges in terms of reductions in the poverty gap, with remittances in Poland reducing that gap by 7.8%, compared to a reduction of 8.8% as a result of social transfers. Elsewhere, whilst remittances reduce the poverty gap between 2.9% and 10.9%, the impact of social transfers is much greater.

Whilst remittances are relatively significant in the Baltic States, there are no studies so far reporting on their impact on poverty. One study, however, notes that in Estonia and Latvia, in particular, a high proportion of remittances were workers’ compensation not transfers.
(Kaczmarczyk and Okolski, 2008), although the impacts at other than the broad macro-economic level are not known.

Table 3.6: Remittances and social transfers in four “new” Member States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>Czech Republic</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
<th>Slovenia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of households receiving remittances</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of households receiving welfare transfers</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>45.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of households receiving both</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average remittance / total population (in €)</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>66.2</td>
<td>45.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average remittance / recipient (in €)</td>
<td>744.2</td>
<td>596.7</td>
<td>410.5</td>
<td>1067.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average welfare transfer / total population (in €)</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>154.7</td>
<td>189.3</td>
<td>371.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average welfare transfer / recipient (in €)</td>
<td>195.3</td>
<td>468.4</td>
<td>475.4</td>
<td>825.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average equivalent household income $Y$</td>
<td>3,145</td>
<td>4,747</td>
<td>3,880</td>
<td>9,122</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Giannetti et al., 2009, 10; authors’ calculations based on EU-SILC 2005 data. % are households; incomes in €. Inter-household transfers are imputed as remittances, except where the reference household is a divorced woman, in which case they are imputed as alimonies.

Table 3.7: Impacts of remittances and social transfers on inequality and poverty in four “new” Member States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Change in Gini coefficient through remittances (%)</th>
<th>Change in Gini coefficient through welfare transfers (%)</th>
<th>Change in poverty rate through remittances (%)</th>
<th>Change in poverty rate through welfare transfers (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
<td>-2.6</td>
<td>-6.3</td>
<td>-10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
<td>-7.1</td>
<td>-5.7</td>
<td>-28.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
<td>-8.5</td>
<td>-4.9</td>
<td>-28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>+0.6</td>
<td>-6.4</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
<td>-18.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ibid; 12 and 14. Poverty defined as 60% of equivalised median income
3.2.4 Disadvantaged Regions

Looking at the EU-8+2 Member States, the picture of disadvantaged regions affected by high out-migration is rather complex. As already mentioned under Chapter 2, large-scale rural-urban migration had come to an end in most countries in the 1980s and was replaced by a strong suburbanisation trend. The latter is observed in the EU-8 countries in particular, while rural-urban migration in the EU-2 is still significant. However, the country reports clearly state that, despite this change of trends, there are regions which have traditionally suffered high out-migration and do so still nowadays. They either represent remote rural areas or deindustrialised regions which were strongly subsidised in former times. What is common for all of them is that they lack an attractive growth pole nearby and, consequently, suffer structural underdevelopment and lack of employment opportunities. A World Bank Study on internal labour mobility in Central Europe and the Baltic States (2007b: ix) suggests that the economic liberalisation has led to growing regional disparities in economic and labour market indicators “with the inequality increasing with the level of disaggregation (from county to district level and from district to community level)”.

In most cases, these regions are predominantly rural regions which are not well connected to regional economic centres and lack accessibility via public transport and social infrastructure. In the case of the Czech Republic, the high out-migration regions are either located in border regions (with the exception of the German border) or along regional borders and cover a zone stretching from Northern Moravia westwards to Eastern and Northern Bohemia (CR CZ). In the case of the Slovak Republic, those regions with higher than average out-migration are located mostly in the East (Prešov region) and South East (Banská Bystrica and Košice regions) of the Slovak Republic, bordering Poland, Ukraine and Hungary. In Hungary, the highest net migration loss region is to be found in Northern Hungary, which was the most industrialised region (mining and heavy industry) and suffered severe decline in industrial production during the transition (CR HU). Migration loss regions in Hungary and the Slovak Republic also display a higher than average Roma population. As in the Czech Republic, they are also characterised by a lower level of urbanisation and less developed infrastructure (CR SK). Also, in Poland, the high migration loss areas lack a “well-developed sub-region capable of playing the role of attraction pole from poorer surrounding areas” (CR PL). They are mainly based in the South and East of Poland, but also include Opolskie voivodeship at the Western border to Germany, which is traditionally characterised by high out-migration to Germany. Some of the migration loss regions mainly base their income on low-productivity farms, while the other part has mixed (industrial and agricultural) activities. Only one of these regions – namely Podlaskie voivodeship in PL - has a high proportion of households whose primary source of income is employment in agriculture (CR PL).

The Baltic States display a slightly different picture, since the high migration loss regions have been industrialised regions and strongly oriented towards the Russian market. Along with substantial out-migration, directed mainly to Russia, these regions encountered severe problems of adaptation and mostly suffered from the economic recession. This applies to the Ida-Viru county in the North East of Estonia, to the Utena county in the East of Lithuania and to the Latgale region in the South East of Latvia (CR LV, LT, EE).

In Bulgaria and Romania, it is mainly the remote rural areas located in border areas which suffered significant internal and external out-migration in the past decade. In both countries, the share of agricultural employment in the high migration loss regions is higher than the national average. In Bulgaria, the net migration loss regions are those in the North West (mainly district Vidin), which is also the poorest region, and in the North Central part (districts Silistra, Razgrad). According to the Bulgarian country report, depopulation of some villages in the North West reached 70-80% during the last two decades. In the North Central part it is also the Turkish population which considerably contributed to high out-migration rates – mainly in Razgrad and Silistra (CR BG). In Romania, the regions with the highest net migration losses are located in the North East (Botosani, Vaslui), South East (Tulcea, Vrancea), South (Teleorman, Giurgiu) and South-West Oltenia regions (Olt).
It is confirmed by all country reports that the level of development measured by GDP per capita seems to be strongly related to the intensity of out-migration. In all migration loss regions, GDP per capita is much lower than the national average of the respective country and far below the EU-27 average (see Table 3.8.).

Out-migration of the younger working-age population combined with continuous natural decrease of the population has accelerated the ageing process in these regions. This trend is reported in nearly all country reports. The situation is similarly acute in rural areas in Bulgaria and Romania (CR BG, RO). Macours et al. (2008) attribute this development to the fact that land restitution in both countries was accompanied by urban-to-rural migration of elderly people who concentrated land ownership in older households. According to the Bulgarian country report, every third individual in rural areas is above the age of 60. The situation in the net migration loss areas is even worse: at the end of 2010, 50% of the population in rural areas of the Vidin district (North-West) was above 60 years of age. The old-age dependency ratio for this district (rural and urban) is projected to reach 52.25% in 2020 and 74.66% in 2050\(^{39}\). Accelerated ageing is also observed among the agricultural workforce and there is a special need to provide incentives for young people to stay in the countryside and engage themselves in the agricultural sector.

In this context it is worth looking back to the large migration waves in Greece, when the predominantly rural Northern regions of Greece (Macedonia, Thrace, Epirus) also suffered above-average out-migration. In the migration period 1950-1970, 80% of emigrants from rural areas were in the age group 15-39 years and the share of the age group over 65 in the rural population nearly doubled from 7% in 1951 to 13.2% in 1971. The outflow of a predominantly economically active population reduced the workforce in agriculture, leading to severe shortages in the 1960s (CR EL).

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Table 3.8: Characteristics of selected net migration loss regions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions, NUTS III (NUTS II)¹</th>
<th>Degree of rurality²</th>
<th>GDP per capita at current prices (% of EU-27 average), NUTS III, 2008³</th>
<th>Employment rate, 15 – 64 years, NUTS II, 2010³</th>
<th>Unemployment rate, 15 years and above, NUTS III, 2010³</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BG Vidin district (North-West)</td>
<td>Predominantly rural</td>
<td>10% Bulgaria: 19% National average: 59.7%</td>
<td>13.0% (2009) national average: 6.8% (2009)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU Northern Hungary</td>
<td>Intermediate and predominantly rural counties</td>
<td>26% Hungary: 42% National average: 55.4%</td>
<td>16.0% national average: 11.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LV Latgale region (Latvia)</td>
<td>Predominantly rural</td>
<td>22% Latvia: 41% National average: 59.3%⁴</td>
<td>17.6% national average: 17.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL Podkarpacie voivodeship</td>
<td>Predominantly rural</td>
<td>26% Poland: 38% National average: 59.3%</td>
<td>11.7% national average: 9.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RO Botosani (North East)</td>
<td>Predominantly rural</td>
<td>13% Romania: 26% National average: 58.8%</td>
<td>4.6% (2009) national average: 6.9% (2009)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK Prešov (Eastern Slovak Republic)</td>
<td>Predominantly rural</td>
<td>28% Slovak Rep.: 48% National average: 58.8%</td>
<td>16.3% (2009) national average: 12.0% (2009)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ The high migration loss regions have been identified by the country teams at NUTS III level, except in Hungary and Poland (NUTS II)
³ Eurostat tables [nama_r_e3gdp], [lfst_r_lfe2emptr], [lfst_r_lfu3rt], based on EU Labour Force Survey
⁵ Eurostat table [ilc_li41]

In nearly all of the migration loss regions of the EU-8+2, employment rates are lower than the national average and often even the lowest in the country. There are a few exceptions (e.g. Botosani in RO) where employment rates are higher, which is caused by high shares of self-employed and family workers engaged in subsistence and semi-subsistence agriculture. In Romania, the share of population (self-) employed in agriculture in high migration loss regions considerably exceeds the national average (27.6%) and reaches levels between 40% and 50% in Botosani and Teleorman. However, employment in agriculture does not safeguard from poverty, which can be seen from working poor rates⁴⁰, which are the highest

⁴⁰ Working poor is defined as a person aged 15 or more who self-declares “employed” as the main activity status in the month prior to the survey and lives in a household with consumption expenditure per adult equivalent below the absolute poverty line.
among the self-employed in agriculture and even increased considerably from 9% in 2003 to 16% in 2006 (Stănulescu, 2008). The share of the working poor is 9% and 7% in the North East and South West regions respectively, compared to a national average of 4.8%.

Unemployment is generally higher than the national average in the net migration loss regions. High unemployment rates are due to industrial decline and the decline in agricultural production. A special feature is above-average high long-term unemployment rates. It seems to be a common development that the jobs lost in industry and agriculture as a consequence of economic restructuring were not compensated by job creation in other sectors in migration loss regions. Further, the lack of lifelong-learning and re-training activities in peripheral areas foster persistent unemployment.

During the crisis, the regional disparities even worsened, as can be seen in shrinking employment, rising unemployment and long-term unemployment rates in the migration loss regions. Disadvantaged regions, including rural areas, which have experienced significant out-migration and a net loss of population, have higher than average poverty risks. A recent report notes both the problems of sub-national poverty statistics and, using EU-SILC data, shows how the gap between poverty rates in 'rural areas, towns and suburbs' compared to 'large urban areas' is significantly larger in the EU-8+2, particularly in Romania, Bulgaria and Lithuania (European Union, 2011: 16). The nine 'poorest' NUTS II regions (using GDP at PPS) were all located in Bulgaria and Romania, with a number of Polish, Romanian and Hungarian regions making up the remainder of the bottom 20 in the ranking (ibid). As Table 3.9 below shows, in those countries where there are NUTS II regions, in most cases, the areas of high net population loss and of high net out-migration are also those with high or the highest rates of poverty risk.

Poverty, social exclusion, and limited access to essential social services forms part of what has been described as a "vicious circle" of poverty, amplifying the very problems which originally caused poverty and social exclusion (EC, 2008c). The absence of a harmonised definition of rurality, combined with the well-known problems of defining poverty and social exclusion, are compounded by the tendency to take NUTS II regions as the principal point of departure, thus failing to capture the extent of poverty in smaller spatial settlements and/or in spatial zones which cut across NUTS II regions.

The accession of post-communist countries to the European Union in 2004 and 2007 involved countries with significant rural areas as well as those with lower overall levels of income. The relevance of past and contemporary processes of out-migration, urbanisation and migration to 'growth pole' urban centres, and the selective nature of return to rural areas, all combined to increase poverty in net migration loss areas and to increase inequalities between predominantly urban and predominantly rural areas. Whilst rurality per se is not equivalent to decline and to increased poverty and social exclusion, a cycle of disadvantage involving significant out-migration, especially of the better educated, higher skilled, and working-age population, is. The EU rural poverty study (EC, 2008c) suggests that the gap in poverty rates between rural and urban areas is higher in the new Member States than in Western Europe, with rates of between two and three times higher noted in Poland, Romania, Lithuania and Hungary in 2005 (ibid.: 75). The proportion living in extreme poverty was, in some countries, even greater than this.

There is evidence of high and continuing regional inequalities in poverty and social exclusion which are traceable to differences in GDP and in demographic structures, including migration. In Romania, in 2009, at-risk of poverty levels were 28.3% in rural areas compared to only 8.7% in urban areas. Significantly, whilst poverty rates among the self-employed were 32.9% when agricultural workers were excluded, they rose to 40.6%. At the NUTS III level, the highest poverty rates are in areas which have suffered from significant out-migration, including South-West and North-East Oltenia (37.4% and 31.5% respectively) (CR RO). Although data is older, from 2004, Bulgaria has a pattern of significant differences between poverty in the capital (4.3%), compared to urban centres (12.2%), and especially compared to other urban areas (17.0%) and villages (17.9%) (Gotcheva, 2010).
Variations in rates of severe material deprivation are quite pronounced in Poland, Bulgaria and Romania (Table 3.10 below). In the Slovak Republic, the area with the highest poverty risk is also the area of highest severe material deprivation and the area singled out as suffering from high levels of out-migration. There is evidence from large data sets such as UNICEF’s TransMONEE Project\(^4\) and UNDP’s Human Development Reports\(^5\) of large and, in many cases, growing disparities between capital cities and large urban centres and other parts of the new Member States, particularly rural areas, isolated areas, and micro-regions which had been previously reliant on single industries which have ceased working or reduced capacity considerably.

There are particular issues in terms of social exclusion, coping strategies, and access to essential services, which are particularly acute in rural and deprived areas of the EU-8+2. Something of this can be gathered from the European Quality of Life Survey (European Foundation, 2009), although it discusses the 10 new Member States together with Malta and Cyprus, both very small states. In the (new) EU-12 more households produced food for their own consumption (46%) compared to the EU-15 (15%), even though the report notes that this is less the case in Cyprus and Malta. The differences are even starker when we compare rural to urban areas with 70% of households in rural areas in the new Member States producing food for their own consumption compared to 21% in urban areas. Only 21% of rural households in the EU-15 do this (ibid.: 12). The starkest indicator of rural disadvantage is in terms of housing quality and access to an indoor flushing toilet. In the EU-12, 15% of all households lack an indoor flushing toilet, including 24% of rural households and only 5% of urban households. The figures for the EU-15 are between 1 and 2%, regardless of whether households are urban or rural (ibid.: 43). An early Quality of Life Study (European Foundation, 2006) gives the breakdown by individual country showing that the rural-urban differences are particularly pronounced in the Baltic States and Bulgaria and Romania. In Romania, 63% of rural households lacked access to an indoor flushing toilet compared to only 12% in urban areas. In Bulgaria the corresponding figures were 51% and 8%. In the Baltic States between 33% (Estonia) and 45% (Lithuania) of rural households lacked an indoor toilet compared to between 7% and 13% of urban households. The later report suggests that, whilst people in rural areas were more likely to report difficulties in accessing health care services, this was not so pronounced, not so different between the old and new Member States, and less of an issue than differences based on actual health status or on income. The report found some urban-rural disparities in terms of access to and satisfaction with public transport but these were not particularly significant.

There is evidence of unequal access with regard to education, as well as educational outcomes, between rural and urban areas. The greatest differentiations can often be found at pre-school level. In Poland, for example, rates of pre-school enrolment of 3-5 year olds are 58.9% in urban areas and only 8% in rural areas. Pre-school education is hit by migration and changing demographic structures, so that the nearest pre-school, as well as the nearest secondary school, is often some distance away. The same overview report suggests that levels of illiteracy tend to be higher in rural areas, and that the quality of staff and infrastructure is lower (European Foundation, 2009). The problems of rural schools needing to combine different age groups in a single class are also noted in some reports. Whilst concrete evidence is lacking, there is a sense that higher education in the EU-8+2 tends to be more centralised with larger universities, with the highest reputations, located in the capital or other major cities. This is important because many people move to enter university and never return to their original homes.

In terms of access to social and health care services, the issues of the distance to services as well as the quality of services in disadvantaged, rural and remote areas are raised in many of the country reports. These are particular issues for areas which face demographic ageing and where older people and those with long-term health issues face particular

\(^{41}\) [http://www.transmonee.org/](http://www.transmonee.org/)
problems in terms of receiving adequate home care or community-based services (see Chapter 4). In environments where health and social services have been decentralised, to an extent, poorer regions tend to have poorer services. In many of the new MS, however, the principle of centralised funding and/or linking the number of trained professionals in each region to the size of population limits this to an extent. Nevertheless, in all cases, out-migration, particularly of the working-age, skilled, and younger population, often leads to a worsening quality of health and social care services in disadvantaged, rural and isolated areas.

Table 3.9: Poverty rates in selected new Member States at NUTS II LEVEL, 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions, NUTS III (NUTS II)¹</th>
<th>At-risk-of poverty rate, NUTS II, 2010</th>
<th>National Poverty Rate</th>
<th>Highest Regional Poverty Rate</th>
<th>Lowest Regional Poverty Rate</th>
<th>No of NUTS II regions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BG Vidin district (North-West)</td>
<td>30.6%</td>
<td>20.7%</td>
<td>30.6% (North West)</td>
<td>9.0% (South West)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE Ida-Viru county (Estonia)</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU Northern Hungary (Great Plain and North – NUTS I)</td>
<td>17.1% (Great Plain and North)</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>17.1% (Great Plain and North)</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LV Latgale region (Latvia)</td>
<td>21.3%</td>
<td>21.3%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL Podkarpackie voivodeship</td>
<td>24.1%</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>30.7% (Lubelskie)</td>
<td>12.4% (Slaskie)</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RO Botosani (North East)</td>
<td>29.5%</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
<td>30.7% (S W Oltenia)</td>
<td>3.1% (Bucharest)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK Prešov (Eastern Slovak Republic)</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>15.8% (Eastern Slovak Republic)</td>
<td>5.1% (Bratislava)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


¹ The high migration loss regions have been identified by the country teams at NUTS III level, except in Hungary and Poland (NUTS II). At-risk-of poverty rates are available only for NUTS II regions, except in Hungary and Estonia, where they are available at NUTS I level only.
Table 3.10: Severe material deprivation rate by NUTS II regions, 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions, NUTS III (NUTS II)¹</th>
<th>NUTS II Severe Material Deprivation</th>
<th>Highest Material Deprivation NUTS II</th>
<th>Lowest Material Deprivation NUTS II</th>
<th>Severe Material Deprivation Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BG Vidin district (North-West)</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>44.2 (North-Central)</td>
<td>26.6 (South-West)</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU Northern Hungary (Great Plain and North – NUTS I)</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>25.0 (Great Plain and North)</td>
<td>17.9 (Transdanubia)</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL Podkarpackie voivodeship</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>26.9 (Lubuskie)</td>
<td>8.6 (Wielkopolskie)</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RO Botosani (North East)</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>40.0 (South-East)</td>
<td>19.4 (Centre)</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK Prešov (Eastern Slovak Republic)</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>15.0 (East)</td>
<td>9.3 (Bratislava)</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


¹ The high migration loss regions have been identified by the country teams at NUTS III level, except in Hungary and Poland (NUTS II). Severe material deprivation rates are available only for NUTS II regions, except in Hungary, where they are available at NUTS I level only.
3.3 Candidate Countries and Potential Candidates

3.3.1 Economic, Labour Market and Social Developments in the Context of Transition

Migration pressures in the candidate countries and potential candidates originated in armed conflicts and collapsing economies, following the end of the communist regime in Albania and the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Turkey’s migration waves in the 1960s and 1970s were partly induced by political reasons after the military coup and partly by structural economic problems, mainly in the agricultural sector. The conflicts in Croatia (1991-95), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-95), in Kosovo and Serbia (1999), and the instability in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2001) left processes of state-building unfinished with ongoing territorial disputes (EC, 2009). The break-up of Yugoslavia cut economic links and networks and even relatively peaceful states, as the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, were deeply affected. In Albania, it was the collapse of the economic and financial infrastructure that transformed the country into a predominantly agrarian economy (ETF, 2007a).

Economic performance in the Western Balkans has been relatively strong since 2000, with average GDP growth rates of 4.3%. The crisis turned GDP growth rates into negative in most countries in 2009 (with the exception of Albania and Kosovo*, who were relatively insulated from global market pressures), but recovery started in the second quarter of 2011. However, despite macroeconomic stabilisation policies and the recovery growth, (formal) employment levels remained stagnant and are still far below the EU-27 level, ranging from 54.1% in Croatia to 26.1% in Kosovo*. During the crisis, labour market conditions further weakened in Croatia and Serbia in the first quarter of 2011 but stabilised in the remaining countries (EC, 2011a).

A study on labour costs and labour taxes commissioned by the World Bank suggests that the share of informal employment in the Western Balkans ranged between 27% in Montenegro and 75% in Albania in 2005, a considerable share of which is agricultural employment (Arandarenko, 2008: 12). In most of the countries, the agricultural share in total employment is still very high, in particular in Albania, although the proportion of the gross value added generated through agriculture has considerably declined during the last years. The agricultural sector faces many deficits, among them the high land fragmentation, low mechanisation and the limited use of modern technologies. Subsistence and semi-subsistence agriculture reappeared around 1990 as a consequence of the process of economic transition, coupled with restructuring and shortening of the economy.

Unemployment rates are far above those of the EU-27 and in most of the countries only slightly decreased, compared with the level of 2000. It is in particular worrying that unemployment rates have been very high among the youth (under the age of 25), ranging from 73% in Kosovo*, 55% in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and 25.1% in Croatia in 2009, compared to 20.1% in the EU-27. As in the EU-27, this trend even worsened during the crisis (Eurostat, table cpc_pslm).

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43 Croatia and Kosovo* were not included in this study.
### Table 3.11: Socio-economic data, 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EU-27</th>
<th>AL</th>
<th>BA</th>
<th>HR</th>
<th>XK</th>
<th>MK</th>
<th>ME</th>
<th>RS</th>
<th>TR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Real GDP growth rate</strong></td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GDP growth 2008-2010</strong></td>
<td>-2.0</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>-5.0</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GDP per capita in PPS (EU-27=100)</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>49.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Activity rate</strong>&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt; (15-64)</td>
<td>71.0</td>
<td>61.9b</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>48.1b</td>
<td>64.2</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>51.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Female activity rate</strong>&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>51.8a</td>
<td>39.7a</td>
<td>55.9</td>
<td>28.8b</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>30.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Employment rate</strong>&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>64.1</td>
<td>53.4a</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>26.1e</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>44.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unemployment rate</strong></td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>13.8b</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>45.4b</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agriculture in total employment (in %)</strong></td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>44.1b</td>
<td>21.2b</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agriculture: share of gross value added (in %)</strong>&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>18.8b</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>11.2b</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Absolute Poverty, $5 per day</strong>&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt; (in %)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>82.0</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>49.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: European Commission, 2011a;<sup>a</sup> Eurostat (tables: nama_gdp_c, nama_nace06_c, lfsi_act_a, cpc_pslm, lfsi_emp_a, une_rt_a, cpc_ecnabrk);<sup>b</sup> figures are from 2009;<sup>c</sup> World Bank, 2010b; 71 (latest year for which data are available)

In terms of poverty and social exclusion, at least in terms of general aggregates, there is a clear division between low levels of poverty in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, medium levels in Serbia, Montenegro and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and high levels in Albania and Kosovo*. At the same time, levels of social exclusion and the decline in what might be termed ‘bridging social capital’ (Woolcock, 1998) in Bosnia and Herzegovina are extremely high as a result of war events and the effective ethnicised division of the country. The impact of ‘network poverty’ (UNDP, 2009b) is felt most strongly by returnees, minorities, women and older people, and contributes to levels of social inclusion not revealed by standard measures. Whilst Croatia has levels of poverty and social exclusion which are close to those of the new EU Member States, the new EU-SILC data for 2010 show that 20.6% of the population is at risk of poverty (defined as 60% of median equivalised household income); 14.5% are at risk of severe material deprivation; and 15.4% live in low work intensity households. A total of 31.3% of the Croatian population is at risk in terms of at least one of the three indicators. Only four Member States (LV, LT, BG and RO) have a higher figure.

During the growth years, absolute or consumption basket poverty was reduced in all of the countries of the region. There is some evidence, from Serbia for example, that the impacts of the economic and financial crisis have eroded the gains made, however, with falls in non-urban poverty being eroded during the crisis (Matkovic, 2010). Modelling in Croatia suggests that the impacts of the crisis have been particularly felt by households with children (World Bank, 2010a). A number of studies (Deacon and Stubbs (eds), 2007; EC, 2009; Stambolieva and Dehnert (eds), 2011), point to the ways in which the ‘Yugoslav welfare model’, a mixture of Bismarckian social insurance and decentralised or deconcentrated state social work and employment services, has even been eroded by the combination of transition, conflict and structural reforms, including the growth of a significant grey economy and the informal marketisation of many essential services, particularly health. The politics of nationalism and the complexities of ethnicised and cross-border welfare claims have also eroded common
legacies of welfare and led, in some cases, to situations as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where “the services one receives still largely depend on where one lives” (Maglajlić et al., 2007: 163). The convergence of conflict, transition, and demographic changes, combined with the strong influence of diverse international organisations, has led to a variegated pattern of ‘hybrid’ welfare regimes across the region. Some authors have also pointed to the strong linkages between political elites, certain privileged groups, including war veterans and their families, and welfare arrangements, referring to ‘clientelistic’ (Stubbs and Zrinščak, 2011) or ‘captured’ (Cerami and Stubbs, 2011) welfare systems, leaving too few resources for those most in need.

As already indicated in Chapter 2, the significance of conflict-induced migration in much of the Western Balkan region, combined with the absence of free movement into the European Union, is more important than any linkage between poverty and migration in the period in question. It is possible to argue that Albania, still one of the poorest countries in Europe, may have experienced poverty-induced migration. Although, in the midst of the global crisis, Albania and Kosovo* have experienced high levels of growth, any return migration in the period is much more linked to difficult conditions for migrants in receiving countries.

### 3.3.2 Labour Market Developments under the Influence of Migration

As already denoted in Chapter 2, emigration flows from the Western Balkans also after the wars and armed conflicts have remained high and still involve significant population shares. Without doubt, this high post-war out-migration is to be placed in the process of the above mentioned economic transformation and certainly contributed to easing the pressure on the domestic labour markets, especially in Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, given the persisting high unemployment rates in some countries, emigration is not to be seen as a remedy to structural problems. Low rates of job creation and insufficient development of the private sector, a significant mismatch between skills produced by the education system and the labour market needs and insufficient access to (active) labour market policies still remain to be addressed in order to improve the performance of labour markets in these countries (ETF, 2007a).

Moreover, massive outflows of the active population have led to the change of the age structure, reducing the number of young productive adults and increasing the share of older age groups. In particular, in Albania the fall of the Communist regime and the collapse of the economy “unleashed a demographic shift at an unprecedented pace” (Gedeshi et al., 2008: 9). Already now, sustained emigration of the most active population might hamper the economic development of the countries. Combined with shrinking fertility rates, it raises concerns on the region’s future demographic development in the long term (Kupiszewski et al., 2009).

Under the condition of continuing economic growth, the countries of the region might face serious challenges in meeting the labour market demands. Already now, some countries of the region experience labour shortages in certain sectors and regions. They have appeared also in those professions where labour force is being requested by the receiving countries. This applies first of all to industrial and construction workers (BA, HR, MK) and service staff in the tourism sector (BA, HR). The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia also reports on labour shortages in professions that require a tertiary education, namely in electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, ICT and others. These skills, which are needed on the Macedonian labour market, at the same time correspond to the profiles of the tertiary educated persons who left the country (CR MK). As already previously mentioned, labour shortages are not necessarily caused by migration, but migration can contribute to it. In the Western Balkans, an underdeveloped system of labour market forecasting and skill needs analysis at regional level, combined with an education system that does not yet respond to the labour market needs, contributes to this situation.
The war in Yugoslavia and the political instability in Albania have caused a tremendous outflow of high-skilled people from the Western Balkans, except from Kosovo. It seems that the problem of "brain drain" is more relevant in the Western Balkans than within the EU, since, due to the lack of freedom of movement and the low economic performance in these countries, people tend to emigrate permanently or at least circulate less frequently than the EU-8+2 migrants within the EU.

According to the World Bank, the emigration rate of tertiary educated persons was highest in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 2000 (29%) and even increased during the previous 10 years, showing a strong decline in the numbers of researchers (Table 3.11). The country profile for the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia issued by IOM states that in the second half of the 1990s the total number of scientists and engineers working in research and development fell by over 70%. One of the reasons behind this might be found in a considerable decrease of expenditure on R&D in the country. This problem is further aggravated by the fact that no significant return is observed. Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina had similar high emigration rates of tertiary educated persons (24% and 20%) in 2000, showing however a decreasing trend since 1990. Gedeshi et al. (2008; 4) suggest that 50% of all lecturers and research staff have emigrated from Albania since 1990. Also in Serbia, emigration of tertiary educated persons rose in the first years of the 1990s, and it is estimated that 30,000 university graduates left Serbia and Montenegro during the last decade of the 20th century (WHO, 2011: 543). The Serbian country report indicates considerable losses of tertiary educated persons, in particular in the industry sector, where the number of researchers and engineers fell by 45% in the period between 1990 and 2003. Besides considerable wage differentials, the sharp decline in R&D and lacking opportunities for professional development push highly educated persons out of their country.

For these countries, the highly skilled labour emigration already has and will continue to have negative consequences. Besides the loss of return on investments in education, the implications will manifest themselves “in the decrease of the number of necessary education staff, especially of the young education staff in some faculties, on the one hand, and in the development of the scientific activities in particular areas and the development of the country on the other hand” (Janeska, 2003). As reported from Albania, wages of academics and scientific personnel in the public sector tripled from 1998 to 2004, which in turn slowed down emigration rates of tertiary educated persons after 2000. However, interviewed persons from research institutes in Albania consider migration as a main factor leading to a drop in quality and competitiveness and to the loss of the "research memory", i.e. transmission of experience from one generation to another (Gedeshi et al., 2008: 18).

Table 3.12: Emigration rate of tertiary educated (% of total tertiary educated population)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Albania</th>
<th>Bosnia and Herzegovina</th>
<th>Croatia</th>
<th>former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>27.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: World Bank (2011a)*

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44 According to the country report from Kosovo, 92% of all migrants have no higher than secondary education.
It is to be highlighted that typically brain drain also means youth drain. As already mentioned in Chapter 2, many young people of this region are searching for better education opportunities abroad, which is reflected in the high and increasing students' mobility in these countries.\textsuperscript{46} Student mobility rates are highest in Albania: according to the Albanian Ministry of Education, around 2,000 students leave Albania every year to study abroad (Agolli et al., 2010). Student mobility can be a first step on the way to emigration, since a large share of these individuals stays in the host country after graduation, as the prospect of getting a job back home in line with their qualification is rather low. Furthermore, the mechanisms for recognition of the diploma acquired abroad in the home countries are underdeveloped and the process is complicated and time-consuming (CR AL, MK).

As in the EU-8+2, health professional migration is also an issue in the candidate countries and potential candidates, although reliable data on emigration of health workforce is not available. Data sets of a research project funded by the World Bank for the period 1991-2004 suggest increasing emigration rates of physicians for all countries of the Western Balkans since 1991, reaching highest rates in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2004 (12\%) and lowest in Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2\%).\textsuperscript{47} The countries of ex-Yugoslavia hold a specific position, because already starting from the 1960s, health professionals have experienced a relatively open market in Western European countries, which was associated with the fact that medical diplomas were recognised in a number of these countries at that time. Serbia has been one of the few countries that “produced” an oversupply of medical doctors and dentists at that time, and the economic crisis in the 1970s pushed the people to work abroad. Still, the National Employment Service of Serbia registers an increase of unemployed health professionals since 2000, which goes along with an increasing number of graduated medical doctors, dentists and pharmacists. The oversupply of health workforce in Serbia might further enhance health professional migration in the context of the accession to the EU, as barriers to emigration decrease and, in consequence, might offer solutions to staff shortages in destination countries and expectations to career development and skills improvement (WHO, 2011).

Different sources show that a considerable share of the highly skilled migrants undergoes occupational downskilling, potentially leading to brain waste. This, for example, applies to 74\% of highly educated Albanians in Greece and 67\% in Italy, who work there mainly in the service sector, e.g. as housekeepers, cleaners or baby sitters (Gedeshi et al., 2008: 9f). But also the Macedonian and Serbian country reports state that the migrants are usually employed below their qualifications in the destination countries and are overrepresented in low-skilled jobs in the construction, manufacturing and services sector.

Some studies highlight that migrants have increased their human capital in terms of acquisition of new work practices, experiences, languages and behaviour. As reported from Bosnia and Albania, the low-skilled migrants passed from agriculture to other sectors such as manufacturing or services (CR BA, AL).

### 3.3.3 Remittances

Similar to the remittance inflow to Turkey in the 1960s and 1970s, remittances in the Western Balkan countries constitute a relevant share of GDP. While inflows to Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia remain at the level of the EU-8+2, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo* registered inflows of around 13-20\% before the crisis (Table 3.13). It is important to note that these figures only reflect the transfer of remittances through official

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\textsuperscript{46} OECD Database, Foreign/international students enrolled (tertiary education),

\textsuperscript{47} This data set is part of a research project on "Brain drain, return migration and South-South migration: impact on labor markets and human capital" financially supported by the Austrian, German, Korean, and Norwegian governments through the Multi-donor Trust Fund on Labor Markets, Job Creation, and Economic Growth administered by the World Bank's Social Protection and Labor unit (contract 7152391).

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channels. Various authors state that the transfer by informal channels is much higher and estimates for informal transfers to Serbia range between 50% up to 80% of the total inflow. The main reasons are the lack of bank accounts among remittance receivers, lack of trust in the banking sector and high costs for bank transfers (Mughal et al., 2008, SECO, 2007; Mansoor et al., 2007). In terms of volumes, Bosnia and Herzegovina is among the leading remittance receiving countries in the world. According to the World Bank, Bosnia and Herzegovina experienced the most significant growth of remittances in Europe and Central Asia from 1995-2004, compared to other remittance receiving countries. Measured as percentage of GDP, however, the Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina states a continuous decrease of the share of remittances from 1998 until today, which points to the more or less stable GDP growth in the country during the last decade (IASCI-IOM, 2010: 41).

As reported by the country teams, remittances significantly exceed foreign direct investments (FDI), being three to six times larger. In Bosnia and Herzegovina remittances are six times larger than FDI and three times larger than the development assistance provided to the country (CR BA and HR; Black et al., 2007). It is also Bosnia and Herzegovina which suffered most from a decrease of remittance inflows in the context of the global economic crisis: According to World Bank data, remittances received by Bosnia and Herzegovina declined by over 20% from 2008 to 2009.

Table 3.13: Workers’ remittances and compensation of employees, received (% of GDP)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo*</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>former Yugoslav Republic</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of Macedonia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Remittances are mostly used for consumer items such as food and clothing, the payment of utility bills or for non-productive investments such as housing renovation or construction. Several studies point to a minor share invested in business, ranging from 6% in Bosnia and Herzegovina to 10% in Albania (CR AL, BA). The reasons behind this reluctant investment behaviour are lacking information on business opportunities, unfavourable business environments such as fiscal policies or corruption. There are only few examples where the Diaspora supported small-scale development such as community infrastructure (schools, roads) in Croatia (islands Unije, Susak) or Serbia (village of Ranovac). It seems that formalised mechanisms for communication and collaboration between local municipalities in migrant-sending regions and Diaspora organisations are widely lacking (IOM, 2007).

Also, in the agricultural sector, only a small fraction of the remittances is invested in productivity-enhancing technologies in crop production such as chemical fertilisers and farm equipment. On the contrary, most households use migration rather as a strategy to move out of agriculture (Miluka et al., 2007). A recent study (McCarthy et al., 2006) found that
households where one member is involved in long-term migration tend to reduce crop production and allocate more land towards less labour-intensive production systems such as livestock production, leading to higher agricultural and total income. They can do this, since remittances sent home increase liquidity and enable the households to choose more risky but more profitable and less labour-intensive activities. There is some evidence from Albania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Kosovo* that women or other family members left behind who receive remittances tend more to withdraw from the labour market than non-remittance receiving family members. A survey of 4,000 Kosovar households conducted by UNDP in 2010 found out that labour force participation in households with migrants is 14 percentage points lower than that of non-migrant households (CR XK: 15). It is assumed that the lower labour market participation is mainly caused by a higher burden of those left behind as regards domestic duties (care duties for the children and the elderly, work on their own plots of land, etc.), combined with insufficient or unattractive employment opportunities.

There is also some evidence – at least from Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia - that returnees are more likely to open their own business than non-migrants (World Bank, 2007a; IPPR/GDN, 2009). It remains, however, an open question whether the higher propensity to open their own business among returning migrants is rather a coping strategy, due to lacking employment opportunities in their home country. The results from a household survey conducted in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 2008 suggest that returnees, after having spent some years abroad, have more difficulties integrating themselves into the domestic labour market than non-migrants (IPPR/GDN, 2009). A report from the World Bank on the relation between migration and poverty in Albania tends to confirm that there is a strong positive relationship between return migration and business ownership, but in most cases these businesses are small and of low productivity (World Bank, 2007a: 52). Some country reports claim that returnees have poor entrepreneurial skills and do not have access to any active labour market measures which would support them to open their own business.

The high volumes of remittances in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo*, together with their volatility, in part, at least, related to the impacts of the economic and financial crisis, mean that they are extremely important as factors in relation to well-being and poverty. In Kosovo*, significantly more households receive remittances from abroad than benefits under the social assistance scheme (CR XK), with remittances overall reducing absolute poverty rates by some 2.2%. The strong linkage between migration, remittances, inequality and the welfare of those left behind, in Kosovo*, is indicated by research which shows that the poverty rate of households with migrants abroad is 7 base points lower than that of the general population (World Bank, 2007c), and that households whose main source of income is remittances from abroad have a lower child poverty rate than those whose main income derives from private sector wages in Kosovo* (Chzen, 2008). In Albania, whilst earlier studies based on the 2002 LSMS suggested that non-poor households are more likely to receive remittances from abroad (23.5%) than poor households (16.8%) or extremely poor households (10.1%) (CR AL), the poverty impact of remittances has been highly significant, being cited as the second most important factor, after economic growth, in reducing poverty between 2002 and 2005 (World Bank, 2007a). Declining remittances in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a result of the economic crisis, may also increase poverty significantly, even though more non-poor households tend to receive (larger amounts of) remittances than poor households (Oruc, 2011). The impacts of a decline in remittances in Albania and Kosovo* may depend on whether the declines are temporary or more long-lasting. There are suggestions that, in Albania, the decline may be a result of a combination of the crisis impacts and a shift in the remitting behaviours of migrants (CR AL).

48 The survey covered 1,211 households distributed in the whole territory of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and took place between July and September 2008.
Whilst the volume of remittances is somewhat lower in the rest of the region, it is still important in terms of poverty reduction. In Croatia, a rather old study suggests that remittances have contributed to inequality, but that the disparity in terms of receipt of remittances between the top and the bottom decile of the population has declined over time (Poprženović, 2007). The author argues that, because of their size and distribution, remittances have only a marginal effect on poverty reduction. A study from Serbia by IOM (IOM, 2007) shows the significance of remittances at the micro or community level, in the context of the Western Balkans having long-standing guest worker populations in Germany, Switzerland, Austria and other Western European countries. A study of 343 migrant-sending households from two rural regions in Central and Eastern Serbia shows that nearly all receive some remittances and that 40% have been receiving these for 20 years or more. The household members left behind are mainly retired or unemployed, with just under half of them working, mainly in agriculture. The migrants left agricultural jobs for positions as unskilled or semi-skilled workers in urban centres in Switzerland. On average, the household left behind had a monthly income of CHF 990 (at the time about EUR 615), of which on average 40% came from remittances. In fact, the average in this case hid a wide spread, with some households receiving up to ten times as much per month.

A review of remittances in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Dietz, 2010) notes the impact of an increase in remittances over time. Between 2002 and 2005, remittances were higher than FDI. The Macedonian country team reports that the 1994 census showed that 6.0% of the total number of dependents had been supported by persons employed abroad, suggesting that the figure will now be much higher. The country report also quotes the OECD Investment Reform Index 2010, suggesting that households in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia receive an average of EUR 240 per month in remittances (OECD, 2010b), i.e. more than 70% of the average net salary. In Montenegro, the 2004 Human Development Report showed that almost 20% of household income was, on average, made up of remittances. Households with a member born outside of Montenegro had a higher material standard than others, and the crisis appears to have had an impact, in terms of 6% of respondents in a recent World Bank survey reporting that their income has declined as a result of decreased remittances (CRME).

### 3.3.4 Disadvantaged Regions

In the Western Balkans, the nature and extent of exclusion in different regions relates to long-standing problems of rural decline, inaccessibility and unfavourable geography and the 'arc of exclusion', including the eastern part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the east of Serbia, and much of Kosovo* and Albania, which has been noted in earlier studies (DFID, 2004; Stubbs, 2008). The high migration loss regions identified by the country teams are traditionally prone to migration and depopulation, which already began in the 1970s, because of high out-migration to the cities or abroad. The fall in rural population since the 1970s in the region has been considerable and is demonstrated by Table 2.9 in Chapter 2. Later, the break-up of Yugoslavia led to a situation where towns which were formerly central to regional economies are now new border towns with limited cross-border cooperation, experiencing new forms of deprivation. The Bosnia and Herzegovina report shows this most clearly in terms of the loss of markets in the more disadvantaged regions. Furthermore, out-migration from rural war-affected areas – in particular in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia – has been followed, in large part, by only little return, resulting in an ageing population. Crucially, „huge rural areas of the Western Balkans remain depopulated and their resources unutilised, while urban centres record a disproportionate concentration of population and economic activity”. (EESC, 2011: 1).

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49 The total area of the Western Balkan countries is 264,462 km² (equivalent to 6% of the EU). The population is 26.3 million, of which 50% live in rural areas. The average population density of 89.2 persons per km² is much lower than that of the EU (114.4) (EESC, 2011).
The economies of the high migration loss regions are characterised by a decline in industrial production (RS, HR) and high employment shares in agriculture, with prevalence of (semi-) subsistence agriculture (AL, BA, XK, MK). The latter is also observed in high migration loss regions in Turkey, mainly in the Eastern Black Sea region. In many of the regions identified, rural population is prevailing and agriculture is the main source of employment, but this includes high shares of self-employment, non-paid family members and a high female workforce. Furthermore, labour migration is low, in particular in Bosnia and Herzegovina (CR BA). As already mentioned above, the high share of labour workforce in agriculture is not reflected in the contribution agriculture makes to GDP. High land fragmentation, limited use of modern inputs, poor infrastructure and low market access are remaining constraints to increasing productivity and keep income levels considerably low. Alternative employment opportunities are lacking, so that especially the young working-age population tends to leave the villages in search of education or better paid jobs in the cities or abroad (EESC, 2011).

Some country teams report on a high and increasing share of female out-migration from rural areas (CR HR, MK). In the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, this share is considerably high, reaching 70% of overall internal migrants, which is attributed to education, marriage and family reunification. Thus, the profile of the population left behind in the high migration loss regions is characterised by higher-than-average shares of elderly people, by low birth rates and a much lower number of women than men. All migration loss regions display activity and employment rates that are lower than the national average. In particular, female inactivity in these regions is high, possibly indicating high shares of unpaid female workforce.

Further to this, the population in high migration loss areas usually has lower-than-average educational attainments and has the highest share of population without any schooling (CR AL, HR, ME, TR). Pre-school enrolment rates (age 3-6) are remarkably low, ranging from 12.5% in Bosnia and Herzegovina to 53.6% in Serbia in the school year 2009/2010 (Transmonee, 2011), and, due to the rural/urban divide, rates in rural areas are generally even lower. The absence of vocational schools and universities in the regions further encourage out-migration of the youngest. Last but not least, on-going rural-urban migration has led to a decrease of pupils, school closures and combination of different grades of classes, which, in turn, has led to a worsening in access to education and a decrease of quality (EC, 2009; CR HR).

**Disadvantaged migration gain regions in Albania and Turkey**

As already stated above, the urban share of population has considerably increased in the last decades and, in particular, large cities have grown substantially, leading to uncontrolled and informal building of dwellings, high unemployment rates and a worsening access to services. Several country reports indicate the emergence of disadvantaged areas with above-average in-migration, in particular in Albania (Tirana, Durrës) and Turkey (large cities). As reported from the Albanian country team, the population of Tirana grew by over 40% starting in 1991 and the capital continues to attract the major share of internal migrants in the country. The high rural-urban migration led to the emergence of new peri-urban zones in the greater Tirana area (Bathore) and Tirana-Durrës corridor (Keneta), accommodating tens of thousands of migrants. In former times, these areas were agricultural land, and with the uncontrolled inflows of population they were transformed into informal settlements with high shares of informal employment and severely limited access to infrastructure and social services (CR AL).

Also, in Turkey, in the course of migration flows from the countryside, starting already in the 1950s and still continuing, so-called gecekondu (shanty) houses have been built on the outskirts of large cities such as Istanbul, Izmir and others. These gecekondu communities generally house the working poor who are, in fact, working, but mostly in irregular and non-permanent jobs. Consequently, the majority of the population living in these communities live at or below the poverty line. Housing is of low quality and sewerage systems are widely lacking. Furthermore, the access to education and health facilities are considerably lower when compared to the city average (Adaman et al., 2006).
In Albania, two in three internal migrants and about 55% of international migrants originate from rural areas. This concerns, in particular, the mountain areas in Albania, which have suffered and still suffer above-average depopulation due to migration: 30% of all migrants come from this area, even though it represents only 11% of the total population (World Bank, 2007a: 18). The patterns of migration have created what has been termed a ‘migration-poverty trap’, whereby poorer people from rural areas move internally or to Greece, remitting less than urban or better educated Albanians able to access better remunerated jobs in Italy or elsewhere (Black et al., 2005: 7). Although those in mountainous areas still receive remittances, these are sometimes diverted into property on the coast or in the capital Tirana. The vulnerable population in remote rural areas face enormous problems in terms of access to health, education and social services, as well as transport, compounding exclusion and inequality. At the same time, as noted above, there is a particular pattern of exclusion faced by some of those who relocate to the edge of Tirana in search of better life chances, not least because of the failure to secure legal tenancy rights and access to essential services (World Bank, 2007a).

In Serbia, high migration loss regions are those districts in the Eastern part of the country bordering Romania and Bulgaria which suffered a considerable decrease in mining and processing industries. Poverty and social exclusion is highly concentrated in the South and the East of Serbia, although the degree of inequality in access to services is, to an extent, limited by national policies favouring disadvantaged areas. At the same time, receipt of social assistance is higher in those areas which have better organised local social plans, such as Vojvodina, even though poverty risk is less. In Montenegro, there is higher poverty and social exclusion in the relatively under-populated Northern areas. In general, the net migration loss regions have lower levels of human development (UNDP, 2009b; CR ME). The Northern region has poor access to services, including transportation and has suffered long-term decline.

In Kosovo*, the relationship between migration, regional inequality, and poverty and exclusion is complicated by the existence of disputed border territory as well as ethnicised ‘enclaves’. Hence, whilst some net migration loss regions have high poverty, this also applies to migration gain regions (CR XK). A somewhat old Kosovo* Human Development Report (UNDP, 2004) found significant regional differences in human development within rural areas and areas where the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities were concentrated, having significantly lower levels of human development, mainly as a result of poorer educational levels.

In the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, problems of poverty and exclusion are faced by areas which have experienced large scale out-migration, such as the Pelagonia region, as well as mass immigration, as in the areas around Skopje. Nevertheless, the impact of demographic ageing, poor access to education, and general remoteness, suggests that the Pelagonia region is facing a longer-term negative spiral. A recent report using Quality of Life data (Bartlett et al., 2010) shows significant differences between income- and expenditure-based poverty in different regions in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, highly suggestive of the importance of the informal economy, although the Northeast region has the highest levels of poverty on both measures. A different picture emerges when material deprivation is considered, however, with the highest levels of material deprivation being found in the Vardar region. This suggests the complexities of regional inequalities in the region.

The general pattern facing the net migration loss regions in the Western Balkans is well described in relation to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia by Bartlett and his colleagues (2010). They point to the cumulative impacts of deindustrialisation, the outward migration of skilled young people, the deterioration of public services and environmental degradation. In the war-affected parts of the region, there are severe problems of damage to housing and other essential infrastructure, the continued problems of landmines, and the selective return of a disproportionate number of older and lower-skilled persons. In some regions, all of these are compounded by continued discrimination limiting access to labour
markets. In addition, agricultural land appears to be divided between that which is large-scale and productive and that which is small scale, allowing for little more than subsistence, and highly inefficient. Some of the more remote, mountainous and depopulated areas, such as the smaller and less accessible Croatian islands, also face the accumulation of problems leading to significant negative spirals of disadvantage and exclusion.

A recent regional Human Development Report (UNDP, 2011), including the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Serbia among its selected countries, shows levels of social exclusion up to four times as high in rural compared to urban areas. Those in rural areas face less access to networks, to employment opportunities, to goods, and to services, including transport services. Migration to urban areas is often the only option left to young people. The report also looks at the existence of inequalities between rural and urban areas in terms of access to pre-school education, water and sewage systems, and energy, suggesting that the multiplier effect of all these exclusions is significant.

The Country Reports, as well as UNDP Human Development Reports and Quality of Life surveys show a significant problem in terms of access to employment, education, health and social services, as well as housing and transportation, in the rural, disadvantaged, migration-loss, war-affected and remote areas of the Western Balkans and Turkey. In Montenegro, which is the smallest country in the region, disparities in terms of unemployment, poverty, and social exclusion are significant. The impoverished Northern region lags behind in terms of human development, largely as a result of lower regional GDP (UNDP, 2009b: 81): The report also creates an Index of Multiple Deprivation, including all who are unemployed, have less than 8 years of schooling, and have limited access to health services. The overall percentage in Montenegro of these highly excluded individuals is only 1.3%, but it is 3.3% in the mountainous Northern region, and negligible in the other two regions studies (ibid.: 82).

Taking Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey together (as three candidate countries) the European Quality of Life survey tends to suggest that rural disadvantage is greater than in the EU-27 but less than in the new MS, particularly in Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, and the Baltic States. As an example 14% of rural households in the three CCs lacked an indoor flushing toilet, compared to 24% in the 12 new EU Member States. At the same time, however, 8% of urban households lacked this, compared to only 5% in the EU-12 (European Foundation, 2009: 43). The main difference revealed in the survey, most probably due to the inclusion of Turkey, related to the availability of facilities in the immediate neighbourhood (Table 3.14 below). But as can be seen, in every dimension, both rural and urban areas in the three CCs fared worse than the EU-12, with extremely high rural-urban disparities. The UNICEF Monee report looks at disparities in the percentage of households not connected to the public water system. There are striking differences between rural and urban households in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (16% and 4%); Montenegro (36% and 5%); Serbia (40% and 9%); although disparity was less in Albania (27% and 20%) (UNICEF, 2009: 29).

As in many of the EU-8+2, generally low enrolment of children in pre-school education throughout the region is also associated with highly significant differences in access between rural and urban areas (UNICEF, 2009: 25).
Table 3.14: Availability of facilities in immediate neighbourhood (within walking distance), in %.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Food store</th>
<th>Banking</th>
<th>Cinema, theatre or cultural centre</th>
<th>Public transport</th>
<th>Post office</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 CCs (HR,MK, TR)</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU12</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-27</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: European Foundation, 2009: 44.
3.4 Eastern Partnership Countries

3.4.1 Economic, Labour Market and Social Developments in the Context of Transition

The break-up of the Soviet Union and the following disruption of economic ties created enormous pressures on the economies of the six EaP countries at the beginning of the transition period, which, in turn, led to massive out-migration. In the first years after their independency, EaP countries experienced a steep fall in economic output, with the industrial sector suffering disproportionally from the dismantling of the Soviet system. Privatisation and restructuring accompanied by abolishment of subsidies, mass redundancies, an exceptional drop in real wages and price liberalisation deeply affected the labour market structure, employment conditions and living standards in these countries. Following the land privatisation, many people were allocated small plots of land and many industrial workers who lost their jobs moved over to subsistence agriculture as self-employed farmers (ETF, 2011).

Further, enormous resources which could have been used for economic and social development were absorbed by regional conflicts and civil wars in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova. The unsolved conflicts in the Southern Caucasus still involve more than 1 million displaced persons and have considerably contributed to deficits in solid economic development, to high emigration and widespread poverty (EC, 2011c).

Economic recovery started in the mid 1990s, with annual real GDP growth rates well above 5% and reaching rates around 10% in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus and Ukraine by the mid 2000s. The impact of the financial and economic crisis has been relatively strong in Armenia and Ukraine, and only Azerbaijan and Belarus had positive growth rates in 2009 (ETF, 2011).

The labour market in the EaP countries has been severely affected by the economic transition, involving shrinking activity and employment rates, increasing unemployment rates and a significant decline in real wages. Twenty years after independency, the labour markets in these countries are still characterised by low employment rates, in particular in Armenia and Moldova, and high informality. Unemployment and under-employment are common features, with particularly high rates among the youth, indicating the difficulties young people experience when entering the labour market. The low proportion of wage employment and disproportionately high shares of agricultural employment indicate the high vulnerability of employment in these countries. A significant share of the population now lives from subsistence agriculture and most farmers cultivate small plots of lands using rudimentary techniques and are deprived of a decent income. The fact that this population is automatically classified as self-employed greatly embellishes employment figures for rural areas (EC, 2011c; ETF, 2011).
Table 3.15: Economic and labour market data, 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EU-27</th>
<th>AM</th>
<th>AZ</th>
<th>BY</th>
<th>GE</th>
<th>MD</th>
<th>UA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Real GDP growth rate</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth change 2008-2010</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
<td>-5.2</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>-8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (in EUR)</td>
<td>23,000</td>
<td>2,184</td>
<td>4,344</td>
<td>4,388</td>
<td>1,998</td>
<td>1,234</td>
<td>2,266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absolute poverty USD5/day&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt; (in %)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td>71.0</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>76.0</td>
<td>77.0</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Development Index (rank)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0.716</td>
<td>0.731</td>
<td>0.756</td>
<td>0.733</td>
<td>0.649</td>
<td>0.729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity rate (15-64)</td>
<td>71.0</td>
<td>64.1</td>
<td>69.5</td>
<td>80.8</td>
<td>70.3</td>
<td>47.6&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>67.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female activity rate (15-64)</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>87.1</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>45.3&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>62.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>6.4&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture in total employment (in %)</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>53.4&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>28.1&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture: share of gross value added (in %)</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>18.6&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Real GDP growth and GDP per capita (EC, 2011b; Eurostat); Activity rates and unemployment rates (Eurostat, table enpr_pslm); Agricultural employment and agricultural share of gross value added (Eurostat tables: nama_nace06_c, enpr_ecnabrk, own calculation);<sup>a</sup> World Bank, 2010b: 71 (latest year for which data are available),<sup>b</sup> figures are from 2009,<sup>c</sup> figures are from 2007, UNDP 2011 Human Development Report

The steep recession at the outset of the transition made it also necessary for the EaP countries to reform their social security systems, which in Soviet times included pay-as-you-go pension systems, social assistance programmes for special categories of population such as the disabled, orphans and war veterans and numerous non-means-tested subsidised services. Reforms have been undertaken in all countries, albeit with different focus, but implementation remains weak. A significant part of the population is not adequately covered by social protection and social assistance systems, due to a large informal sector and because of insufficient coverage of vulnerable groups. Although pensions have been considerably increased during the last years, they remain low in particular in the Southern Caucasus, and poverty among the elderly is a matter of concern in the region. Only in Azerbaijan, pensions are above the official poverty level. The development of the health care systems followed different dynamics and tendencies in the EaP countries. While Georgia opted out of the social security system, all other countries maintained the solidarity approach by reforming the sector. Access to health care is hampered in a number of ways, in particular because of widespread informal out-of-pocket payments (EC, 2010b and 2011c).
Using a regional standardised poverty line, there are extremely high levels of poverty in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova, with lower levels in Belarus and Ukraine. The recent UNDP Regional Human Development Report tends to confirm this picture, showing levels of social exclusion in Moldova at 40%, twice those of the Ukraine, at 20%, based on composites of economic exclusion, exclusion from social services and exclusion from participation (UNDP, 2011: 38). The synthesis reports from recent studies on Social Protection and Social Inclusion (EC, 2010b and 2011c) fill in the picture in greater detail. Belarus is the least reformed country in the region, maintaining some inherited elements of the old system. Rates of poverty are low in Belarus and Ukraine, but this masks the high levels of disadvantage faced by specific groups, including the long-term unemployed, the homeless, those with long-term health conditions (particularly in the Ukraine), and so on. Belarus has close links to the Russian Federation and maintains a degree of wealth and low levels of inequality, in part through its role as an oil and gas re-selling country. Azerbaijan is an oil producing country, whose growth is strongly related to the amount and price of oil exports. The other countries in the region are all dependent on oil and gas, so that energy costs are a key contributor to poverty and social exclusion. Moldova is the country most affected by the social impacts of migration, and child poverty rates are extremely high. It is also the most unequal country in the region, as measured by the Gini coefficient. On the whole, with the partial exception of Moldova and Belarus, these countries are low social spenders. Spending on education as a percentage of GDP in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, for example, is reported to be less than 3% of GDP (EC, 2010b: 33).

The general picture is of social protection systems that have faced high levels of demand, where reforms, which have sometimes, as in the case of Georgia, been quite radical, have had limited effects. At the same time, there is a high degree of ‘capture’ of resources by particular groups which have political weight or influence, so that there are fewer resources available to be targeted to those in need. The poorer countries are quite reliant on remittances and donor assistance (Gerami and Stubbs, 2011). Much of the population is more reliant on ‘informal’ than ‘formal’ welfare (Cook, 2007) with public services underfunded, in short supply, and often subject to formal or informal marketisation, including out-of-pocket payments. Overall, it could be argued that the linkage between poverty and migration is strongest in Moldova and Georgia.

3.4.2 Labour Market Developments in the Context of Migration

The above described economic situation accompanied by an increased freedom of movement led to large-scale migration in the early 1990s, motivated on economic, political and ethnic grounds. Since the late 1990s, ethnic and political factors have mostly disappeared and migration flows have been largely driven by the search for (temporary) employment. Mansoor and Quillin (2007: 75) conclude that “…The most recent labour flows [in the] region seem largely to be a response to poorly functioning labour markets, insufficient productive capital, the low quality of life in […] sending countries, and a rising demand for unskilled labour for the non-traded services sector in the labour-importing economies in the EU and the CIS”.

Although to a varying degree, all countries of the region are facing decreasing fertility rates and higher-than-average mortality rates. Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine experience particularly low fertility rates and showed negative natural population increase rates during the last decade (Transmonee 2011 database). Combined with large outflows of individuals of reproductive age, these countries might experience a worsening of the demographic profile in the long term. In a short- to mid-term perspective, the decrease of the labour force can lower the unemployment rate. Such an impact has been confirmed by the country reports for Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. In Moldova, one out of two migrants was unemployed prior to emigration in 2009 (CR MD). Calculations of experts in Ukraine come to the conclusion that the unemployment level in Ukraine in 2008 would have been 1.6 times higher without labour migration (CR UA).
Most migrants abroad work in low-skilled and low-paid jobs in construction, agriculture, hotel and catering, as well as domestic services. As it is evident from surveys conducted in Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine, men are predominantly working in the construction sector in Russia, while women prevail in service jobs in private households in the EU. In these countries, but also in Armenia and Azerbaijan, some 40-50% of all labour migrants work in the construction sector. The country reports of Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine also confirm a lack of skilled labour, namely in the agriculture, construction and industry sectors (CR BY, MD, UA), although it is not clear whether this is a direct result of migration. Also, in Armenia, labour demand has been identified in the field of skilled labour, mostly in the construction and IT sectors (CR AM). The lack of construction workers in Belarus led to a considerable increase in wages in this sector, exceeding average wages by 33% in 2010 (CR BY).

In the 1990s, along with the economic recession and structural reforms, many countries in the former Soviet Union cut down their R&D expenditure which entailed increasing emigration rates of scientists, researchers and engineers working in research institutes or R&D departments of industrial enterprises. Ukraine lost 15-20% of its specialists with higher education in the 1990s, while in Armenia, one third of the tertiary educated specialists in humanities, national and technical sciences left the country in those years (CR UA; UNDP, 2009a). Although the emigration rate of tertiary educated in Armenia has somewhat decreased since 1990, with 8.9% in 2000 it is still the highest among the EaP countries. In all other EaP countries, emigration rates of tertiary educated increased during 1990-2000 (World Bank, WDI database). Recent studies estimate that over half of the emigrants from Georgia have university degree (CR GE).

Beside the R&D sector, the education and health care sector are also particularly affected by massive outflows of the highly educated staff. Teaching staff of universities and schools left their jobs in order to search employment abroad and acquire higher wages and social status (Abazov, 2009). The emigration of the highly skilled has negatively affected the development and reproduction of the educational qualities, which is particularly tangible in the worsening quality of schooling in rural areas (see chapter 3.4.4). As reported from Moldova, severe cuts in budgets of the education and health systems in the 1990s led to massive outflows of teachers and health professionals out of the systems, partly through emigration. It is estimated that 40% of the trained health professionals left the medical sector in Moldova during the past two decades, which has dramatic consequences for the provision of health services, especially in rural areas (IASCI-CIVIS, 2010: 18; CR MD).

The consequences of brain drain vary, depending on the population size and education enrolment rates in tertiary education. All EaP countries have high education enrolment and a high proportion of highly educated professionals. It seems that in some countries, the domestic labour markets cannot absorb the university graduates, due to unfavourable economic environment and education systems being insufficiently responsive to the changing labour market needs. According to an ETF study, there are only a limited number of jobs available for researchers in Moldova (ETF, 2010), while in Georgia unemployment rates among tertiary educated persons are considerably high (EC, 2011c).

Due to the non-recognition of qualification and the high share of irregularity among migrants, most of the migrants from these countries work in unskilled or low-skilled jobs as construction workers or plant operators, in the case of men, and as nurses, home care workers or other service staff, in the case of women. Also, as confirmed by all EaP country reports, the highly skilled migrants usually work far below their qualification and, thus, their potential is effectively unused or lost.

A particular feature which deserves attention in this context is the increasing involvement of Ukrainian female migrants in domestic and caretaking services in Western Europe. They predominantly originate from rural areas in the underdeveloped Western Ukraine bordering Poland and Hungary. From a case study on circular migration between Ukraine and Poland within the framework of the Metoikos project (Iglicka and Gmaj, 2010), it becomes clear that most of these women have secondary or tertiary education and some have a professional nursery qualification but did not validate their certificates in Poland. They are often illegally
employed, which makes them more prone to abuse and social isolation. Due to the predominance of Ukrainian females in domestic services, “the label ‘Ukrainian lady’ has become nearly a synonym for a foreign housekeeper in Poland” (Iglicka and Gmaj, 2010: 16).

In different surveys carried out in EaP countries (OSCE, 2008a; ETF, 2007b), returned migrants assess their migration experience as useful in terms of acquiring knowledge and skills. It seems that most of them benefited from the migratory period by enhancing their social skills, language skills or their job-related know-how in modern technologies. However, when comparing the employment status before and after the migratory period, the picture is rather mixed and does not allow drawing an unambiguous conclusion. The findings from the Returnee Survey conducted in Armenia in 2008 indicate an increase of employability of migrants upon their return, since the share of employed among them increased from 46% to 53% (ILO, 2009: 21). The picture is different in Georgia, where unemployment among returnees was at a similar level than prior to their departure (CR GE). Further, only 50% of those who held skilled positions before departure gained a similar occupational status after return. This trend is also confirmed by the ETF study in Moldova (ETF, 2007b), and it is a clear indication that the migration experience did not contribute to enhancing the human development in the country. However, due to the absence of data it is not possible to conclude whether it is because the labour market cannot make use of the acquired skills and knowledge of the migrants or whether the migrants are not willing to accept jobs due to their expectations related to higher wages and better working conditions.

### 3.4.3 Remittances

Similar to the Western Balkan countries, remittances in the EaP countries constitute a significant source of external financing and foreign exchange and play an essential role in increasing living standards. In Moldova and Armenia, they are even the largest source of external financing. The World Bank data show that remittances considerably increased from 2000 to 2005 in nearly all EaP countries (see Table 3.16), which, on the one hand, can be attributed to increasing migrant flows, and, on the other hand, is a clear indication of improved capacities in the countries to monitor these flows. However, it is estimated that remittance flows are still largely underreported. According to a World Bank survey, 41% of migrant workers in European and Central Asian countries are sending their transfers through unofficial channels such as courier services, bus drivers, friends, etc. (Mansoor et al., 2007). It remains a challenge for the financial sectors of these countries to attract remittance recipients as clients and to utilise the potential of remittances for capital formation and development.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>94.7</td>
<td>400.3</td>
<td>617.2</td>
<td>722.1</td>
<td>551.7</td>
<td>751.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td>557.4</td>
<td>939.3</td>
<td>1,056.8</td>
<td>913.2</td>
<td>1,080.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>150.7</td>
<td>204.6</td>
<td>258.4</td>
<td>301.1</td>
<td>256.5</td>
<td>283.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>296.1</td>
<td>278.2</td>
<td>507.5</td>
<td>497.7</td>
<td>512.1</td>
<td>608.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>193.4</td>
<td>739.7</td>
<td>1,093.2</td>
<td>1,289.9</td>
<td>868.1</td>
<td>1,033.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>478.3</td>
<td>3,285.7</td>
<td>3,922.4</td>
<td>3,637.1</td>
<td>4,229.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The global financial and economic crisis deeply affected the remittance inflows, as can be seen from Table 3.16. Growth in the Russian construction sector, which is an important
source of employment for EaP migrants, decelerated sharply, and consequently, remittance outflows from Russia to CIS countries contracted by 31% from 2008 to 2009 (World Bank, 2010b). At the same time, remittance inflows to Armenia and Moldova fell by 23% and 33% respectively (Table 3.17 below). This is an indicator of the high shares of migrants from these countries in Russia and, consequently, of the high dependency on the Russian economy.

Decreases in remittance inflows were more modest in Azerbaijan, Belarus and Ukraine. During the crisis, depreciation of GDP in Ukraine was much stronger than the decrease of remittances, which caused an increase of the remittances’ share in GDP from 2008 to 2009. Furthermore, FDI more than halved from 2008-2009 to EUR 3.5 billion, which rendered the importance of remittances for the country even more important (CR UA).

According to the World Bank, Moldova was on fourth place among the top remittance-receiving countries in terms of GDP percentage. Remittances undoubtedly had a positive impact on the macro-economic stability of the country and considerably helped to finance the increasing trade deficit and supported the value of the currency. They were six times higher than official development aid (ODA) and more than two times higher than FDI (IASCI-CIVIS, 2010). On the other hand, the income provided by remittances may retain governments from their responsibility to adopting long-term economic and social policies to combat poverty and inequality. In Moldova, remittances are more than double the amount spent on social assistance and pensions by the government (Vogiazides, 2009).

According to a survey conducted by the Asian Development Bank in 2006 in Armenia, 77% of remittances were sent from migrants in Russia (ADB, 2008).

Table 3.17: Workers’ remittances and compensation of employees, received (in% of GDP)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>23.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As already mentioned above, remittances constitute a stable income for many households in most EaP countries. In Armenia, 26% of households receive remittances, while the share is 21% in Moldova. Most of the remittances are sent regularly – and in most cases more often than once in a quarter (ADB, 2008; EBRD, 2007). As in the Western Balkan countries, remittances are primarily used for daily expenditure such as food, clothes and utilities. Its share in total remittances received amounts to 92% in Armenia, 85% in Georgia, 81% in Moldova and 72% in Ukraine. By contrast, only a negligible amount is invested in business ranging from 1% in Armenia to 9% in Moldova (CR AM, UA; EBRD, 2007). Data from a Market Analysis conducted in 2010 in Moldova suggest that 26% of households with a migrant family member provided financial support in terms of investing or lending to an enterprise in Moldova. These investments are mainly directed towards

According to a survey conducted by the Asian Development Bank in 2006 in Armenia, 77% of remittances were sent from migrants in Russia (ADB, 2008).


A direct comparison of remittance flows and impacts in the EaP countries is not possible due to different methodologies and samples.
agriculture, retail trade, construction and the services sector. It is to be noted, however, that these investments are predominantly small-scale and in the informal sector (IASCI-CIVIS, 2010). The share of households investing in farm modernisation is even higher in the northern region (36%), which experienced high outflows. However, investments in other (non-farming) business are very rare also in this region (Hristev et al., 2009).

As in the Western Balkans, low investment rates are considered to be the consequence of insufficient savings, limited access to credits and an unfavourable economic environment. Insufficient knowledge on business opportunities and lacking entrepreneurship skills further contribute to the low entrepreneurial potential among this group (CR MD, UA).

Another important share of remittances is spent on investments in education and health care services. In Ukraine, 12% of remittances are spent on tuition fees and 6% on medical treatments, while in Armenia, remittance-receiving households spend 8% of their expenditure on health and education services (CR UA; ADB, 2008). Several surveys found out that expenditure on education is higher in remittance-receiving households than in non-remittance-receiving households. Therefore, one might conclude that remittances increase the level of expenditure on education and in the long term also increase the educational attainment of remittance-receiving household members (ADB, 2008; Hristev, 2009).

Comparing the investment behaviour of remittance-receiving and non-remittance-receiving households, some surveys suggest that remittances even lower the motivation for getting employed and the propensity to invest in business. As reported from the Armenian and Ukrainian country teams, members of migrants’ households left behind are less motivated to search for employment, since the funds received from abroad are often higher than they can earn in their country (CR UA, AM). The ADB survey on remittances conducted in 2006 in Armenia and Azerbaijan found out that remittances seemingly lower the propensity to invest in business. In Armenia, the share of remittance-receiving households who are engaged in entrepreneurial activities in their town/village is 4.2%, while it is 6.0% in the case of non-remittance-receiving households. A similar trend is observed in Azerbaijan (ADB, 2008: 60).

A survey carried out in 2007 (ADB, 2008) suggested that 26% of Armenian households received remittances, with remittances determining welfare, in terms of which quintile households belonged to, rather than the other way round. Extreme poverty would be three times higher were it not for remittances. Interestingly, remittances contribute to both poverty reduction and a reduction in inequality, especially in the capital and other urban areas.

Remittances, together with wages and social benefits, has been one of the three elements contributing to a steady decline in Moldova’s poverty rate for much of the last decade (CR MD), contributing to an overall reduction in poverty by almost 12 base points. The decline in remittances from the fourth quarter of 2008, linked to the economic and financial crisis, impacted directly with an increase in poverty, followed by a swift decline in poverty when remittances began to rise again. The heavy dependence on remittances in Moldova is also illustrated by the fact that, in addition to consumption, many receivers of remittances have invested in building, leading to increased costs in the construction sector (CR MD).

According to an IOM study quoted in the Moldovan report, about 30% of households benefit from remittances, amounting to some 1.5 million people (IOM/CBS Axa, 2008; IOM 2009a), with 21.8% of households dependent on remittances and with over 80% of their income coming from abroad. Remittances to the Ukraine are twice as high in the top quintile group compared to the bottom quintile (CR UA), suggesting that remittances increase inequality as well as reduce poverty. Survey data in Georgia suggest that remittances improve recipient households’ welfare, particularly in urban areas (CR GE); with remittances excluded, the headcount poverty rate would, consistently, be some 2-3 basis points higher. In 2009, without remittances, relative poverty in Georgia would have been 23.3%, rather than the actual figure of 21.0% (CR GE).

Using a sophisticated macro-economic model, based on data for 2004 and 2006, Atanamov et al. (2009) suggest that Moldova’s GDP would be almost 11% lower without remittances, whilst pointing out that official remittances include only those who are still part of a household.
in Moldova. Given the pattern of Moldovan migration, therefore, this is probably a considerable underestimate. Total consumption would be over 30% lower and, for small farmers, would be cut in half without remittances (Atanamov et al., 2009: 25). The corresponding figures for the Ukraine are 7% and 14%. Interestingly, richer households gain more from remittances than households reliant on social transfers (ibid.: 30). In Georgia, the study specifically addresses impacts on different income groups, and in terms of the differences between urban and rural households. It shows that, in fact, the rural poor gain only about 1% in consumption from remittances compared to 7% for the urban poor. Remittances tend to benefit higher-income urban households most – without remittances their household consumption is predicted to decline by about 16% (ibid.: 40). The study reveals the complexity of the linkage between remittances, poverty and labour markets, suggesting that the issue of transaction costs is crucial. For example, if remittances allow subsistence farmers to switch to market farming, then this will have a greater impact than if the remittances are simply channelled into consumption without a shift in terms of labour market status.

3.4.4 Disadvantaged Regions

Similar to the Western Balkan region, high net migration loss regions are predominantly rural areas of the Eastern Partnership countries. They are mostly located in border regions, either in mountainous regions with harsh climate conditions (GE, AM, AZ), in regions suffering dramatic declines in industries (GE, BY, UA) and in predominantly agricultural areas (AZ, BY, UA, MD). As can be seen in Table 2.13 in Chapter 2, the share of rural population decreased in all EaP countries, with highest losses in Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. The Moldovan and Ukrainian country teams assume that depopulation in rural areas is even more intensive than official figures might suggest, due to the fact that most migrants keep their original place of residence while working on a temporary or even permanent basis in the capital or abroad. The Moldovan report states that 70% of the rural population is either working abroad or is planning to do so (CR MD, UA).

Migration from rural areas was mainly triggered by the collapse of big agricultural enterprises or other industries in rural areas. As already previously mentioned, land restitution at the beginning of the 1990s was accompanied by strong fragmentation of land, shifting ownership from large-scale former collective farms to households who engaged themselves in (semi-) subsistence agriculture as a coping strategy against poverty (Macours et al., 2008).

The high migration loss areas are mostly characterised by lower-than-average activity and employment rates and higher unemployment rates. However, this is not the case in all high migration loss regions, due to hidden unemployment through high shares of subsistence agriculture. The Moldovan country team reports on a decline in both activity and employment rates of about 22 percentage points in rural areas during 2000-2009. The Southern region of the country, where most migrants originate from, show a female activity rate of 34.9% in 2010 (compared to a national average of 38.6%; CR MD). The high female inactivity in migration loss regions may, on the one hand, be an indicator for the high involvement of women in migration. On the other hand, as already mentioned under Chapter 3.3.2, it seems to confirm the assumption expressed by some experts that women left behind tend to withdraw from the labour market due to the remittances they receive (Hristev, 2009).
Tkibuli in Georgia – the “skeleton of abundance”

At the time of the Soviet Union, Tkibuli, a city in central Georgia, became an industrial rural zone exploiting four coal mines and extracting granite and sand. Further, it became a centre for the tea-cultivating collective farms in the surrounding areas. With the fall of the Soviet Union, all the state activities collapsed in Georgia. The dramatic consequences were felt more sharply in Tkibuli, since Georgia on the whole had not been industrialised at large scale. According to statistics, a third of the population has left the district and local experts estimate even more. As Landru (2006) describes, “today, however, arrival in Tkibuli offers a dismal picture. Mines and buildings left abandoned, striped plaster factories, cows and pigs grazing in industrial wastelands: built along the sinuous road, the partly-deserted city is nothing more than a succession of concrete blocks….The completely empty houses are evidence of the departure of whole families, particularly for the suburbs of Tbilisi, if the heads of the households found employment there in construction or as salesmen. But if their education allows them - that is, if their language abilities allow them - they leave their families in the countryside to find resources abroad, generally in Russia.”

As already stated for the Western Balkan region, migration of the younger, more skilled population has perpetuated the human capital disadvantage in rural areas. Lower-than-average educational levels of the rural population are confirmed by most of the country reports. Furthermore, the Ukrainian and Belarusian country reports state severe shortages of teaching staff in rural areas and a consequent growing gap in education quality between cities and rural areas. Even if the pupil/teacher ratio shows lower rates in rural areas, teachers often have to combine different subjects.

Furthermore, outflow of skilled individuals is a common feature, due to better employment and remuneration opportunities in urban centres or the capital. A lack of engineers and mechanics is reported, in particular from Belarus, and negatively affects also the agricultural sector. Macours et al. (2008) confirms a trend in the EaP countries similar to that in the Western Balkans, where, beyond a certain level of education (and income), people tend to leave agriculture to look for more qualified employment in the non-agricultural sector.

There is considerable evidence that urban-rural differences in terms of social exclusion are higher than those in the other regions in the study. In terms of access to a public water network, only some 3% of urban households in Armenia lack access, whereas in rural households the figure is 25%. In Moldova, the corresponding figures are 27% and 80%; in Georgia 10% and 51%, and in Azerbaijan 22% and 81% (UNICEF, 2009: 29). The Regional Human Development Report shows that, on the multi-dimensional social exclusion index, some 52% of households in Moldova are excluded, the rate in both small towns and regional centres is under 20% and the rate in the capital city is some 3% (UNDP, 2011: 44). The report also points towards living in single industry regions and living in regions marked by environmental problems as being drivers of social exclusion, both of which merit further research.

In Armenia, the highest rates of poverty are, in fact, in urban areas outside the capital. Subsistence agriculture contributes to lower levels of extreme poverty in some rural areas, especially those with access to irrigated land. At the same time, levels of access to key amenities are much lower in rural areas (EC, 2011c). In Azerbaijan, rural poverty is higher than urban poverty, in part because economic growth has had a greater impact on urban areas (ibid.). It is clear that access to agriculture, whilst minimising extreme poverty risk, has little long-term value as a route out of poverty. Azerbaijan is a country with high general levels of material deprivation, even more so in rural areas. Poverty rates in Georgia are higher in rural areas, particularly in the Northern mountainous areas (ibid.: 46). Anti-poverty programmes, whilst well targeted, reach only a small proportion of the rural poor. The pattern of higher levels of rural compared to urban poverty is repeated in Belarus, to an extent, in Ukraine and, particularly, in Moldova (EC, 2010b). Moldova also faces high poverty levels in smaller towns.

There is a strong link between migration flows and socio-economic conditions in Armenia (UNDP, 2009a), with a consequent de-skilling of rural and net migration loss areas.
Unusually, the Azerbaijan report suggests a convergence in terms of both income and poverty rates between the regions, in part through the stimulus of social and employment policies and the generating of income through tourism in some of the net migration loss regions (CR AZ). Although Belarus has rather low and declining poverty rates, rural poverty is higher than urban poverty. Out of the four main net migration loss regions, two have higher poverty rates. In general, whilst access to services tends to be regulated, there is a significant gap in terms of pre-school enrolment between rural and urban areas (CR BY).

Georgia is marked by diverse kinds of migration, including the long-term depopulation of mountainous areas, the one-off depopulation of former single industry towns, often employing significant numbers of ethnic Russians, and the decline of agricultural areas and the drift to large urban areas (CR GE). The picture is further complicated by the impact of conflict in certain regions and, conversely, by new economic growth through the location of oil and gas pipelines. At the same time, material deprivation is higher in rural migration loss areas, and access to social services is lower (CR GE).

Poverty rates in rural areas of Moldova and, particularly, in the net migration loss Southern region are higher than in urban areas. The differences in terms of material deprivation and access to services are even more pronounced (CR MD). The country report suggests that block grant systems lead to the closure of unsustainable schools in some depopulated areas, leading to even more out-migration. It is the population in the North of the country, as a result of geo-political reasons, which has less access to water and energy, however.

In Ukraine, there is a clear correlation between poverty rates in net migration loss regions compared to net migration gain regions, with the rates diverging over time, even though remittances tend to have greater poverty alleviation impacts in rural as opposed to urban areas. The Ukrainian Human Development Report (UNDP Ukraine, 2011) shows clear differences in perception of returns to education in rural as opposed to urban areas, and risks of exclusion are much higher in villages. The report provides a very detailed breakdown of the relationship between rurality, exclusion and household type, suggesting that, when needs are held constant, those in rural areas have lower levels of entitlement to social assistance, but that, on the whole, access to health services is more equal between urban and rural dwellers.
4 Social Security of Migrants and Their Families Left Behind

4.1 Introduction

Social security of migrants as well as their families is an important aspect of (labour) migration and mobility to the extent that the level of social protection offered by social security systems of both sending and destination countries and the possibilities opened to migrants (and their family members) for transferring social security rights from one country to another is often a determinant factor in migrants’ decisions to move abroad or return to their country of origin or even to migrate temporarily or permanently to a foreign country. This might be particularly true for migrants within the EU, where a regime of (nearly completely) free movement and labour mobility can only be sustainable if backed by a comprehensive framework of social security provisions with ensured protection of social rights across borders. The present chapter will turn the attention to the social security situation, not only of the migrants themselves, but also to those of the families (spouse and children) of the migrants in the case these remain in their country of origin. In most cases the migration of one family member influences the social security rights of family members left behind in the sense that they might benefit from provisions of the destination country available to the migrant, or the migration situation might have an impact on their status as regards social security in their home country. The analysis will focus on existing mechanisms (national legislation and bilateral or multilateral agreements) which promote and improve the situation of migrants and their families in terms of social security coverage; it will also point to difficulties in the implementation of these mechanisms and show where gaps still exist and, thus, increase the vulnerability of migrants and their families. Concerning the migrants themselves, we will essentially look at their situation in terms of pension entitlements, access to health care and to unemployment protection when they return to their countries of origin. As regards families left behind, especially access to health care and family benefits will be particularly important.

4.2 EU Member States (EU-8+2)

The situation of migrants and their families from the EU-8+2 can be summarised as follows:

- Social security coverage of migrants from the EU-8+2 involved in intra-EU migration and their family members left behind has improved with EU accession and application of the EU regulations on the coordination of social security of migrant workers.

With EU accession in 2004 and 2007, the EU regulations on the coordination of social security schemes, which “constitute the most far-reaching multilateral agreement in existence (...) both in terms of the number of persons covered and the comprehensiveness of the coordination” (Hirose et al., 2011), became immediately applicable, thus enabling migrants to profit from the most advanced rules and highest standards of benefit (ex)portability worldwide. Contribution periods accomplished before the accession date by migrants within the social security system of an EU country or their own acceding country were also brought into the scope of application of the regulations. The EU regulations have for the most part replaced a set of (bilateral and multilateral) agreements which were in

53 The key legal instrument for social security coordination is Regulation 883/2004 (and implementing Reg. 987/2009), which entered into force on 1 May 2010 and replaced Reg. 1408/71 (and Reg. 574/72). As a result of Reg. 1231/10 (applicable as of 01.01.2011), the personal scope of Reg. 883/2004 was extended to non-EU nationals who legally reside and move within the EU (“third-country nationals”). It does not apply to DK and the UK but third-country nationals in DK or the UK are still covered by Reg. 1408/71 in conjunction with Reg. 859/2003.

54 Bilateral agreements have not ceased to be completely applicable; specific provisions of single agreements might still apply alongside the EU regulation, especially where they regulate specific cases or situations or provide for more favourable conditions than the EU regulations.
place in many, but not all, EU Member States\textsuperscript{55}. As noted in a recent publication, the EU regulations have helped filling the gaps which existed for migrants from countries which had not benefited from agreements so far, they have substituted existing rules of bilateral or multilateral agreements by more advantageous ones and, finally, have created a more consistent set of provisions applicable independently of varying factors, the most prevalent one being the migrant’s nationality (Hirose et al., 2011: 53).

At the same time, it can be argued that the entry into force of the EU coordination regulations as from the time of EU accession has contributed to improving the awareness of the public on the existence of a common framework for social security rights in general and the information of concerned citizens about their particular entitlements to social security when moving within the EU, leading to more clarity, not only about social security rights, but also about obligations, as compared to the situation before accession of the EU-8+2. The Slovak country report, for example, mentions that there was a lot of confusion among insured persons about health care entitlements abroad before EU accession of the Slovak Republic, which often led to situations of double insurance or insurance in the “wrong” country\textsuperscript{56}. The path to EU accession has also led the majority of the EU-8+2 to reform their social security systems in the years preceding accession, with a view to comply to and be able to absorb the EU standards in the field of social security and coordination. In many cases the reforms carried out have been beneficial for migrants to the extent that they have facilitated the transfer of social benefits across borders already before EU accession, as was the case for example in Romania, when the law on public pensions and other social benefits was changed in 2000 to enable their exportability abroad (CR RO).

- There is very little evidence of serious (legal) gaps in social security coverage for migrants originating from EU-8+2 involved in intra-EU migration. Various problems and shortcomings are reported, however, when it comes to the practical implementation of the EU coordination regulations\textsuperscript{57}.

As noted in a recent report, “problems noticed are often those related to non-compliance with the EU Regulations while others are basically the results and functions of the constraints, both political and practical, of a system of coordination” (Jorens et al., 2011: 5). These difficulties are caused mainly by slow data exchange and time-consuming translation procedures, which delay acknowledgement and payment of benefits to the disadvantage of the migrants. For example, it is reported from Poland that the waiting periods for the issuing of the E303 forms for authorisation of the export of unemployment benefits often exceed six months, leading to a situation where the insured cannot get the benefit anymore in case of take-up of employment during this period (Jorens and Hajdú, 2009). Problems are also generated by the wrong use of E-forms (now “portable documents”), or the non-submission of E-forms by claimants as well as by differences in interpretation of EU rules (i.e. about insurance and employment periods) between countries\textsuperscript{58}. Further, a general difficulty faced by migrants moving within the EU is inherent to the variety of the social security systems; it lies in the fact that diverging qualifying conditions for benefit entitlement co-exist in the different EU Member States. For example, qualifying conditions for a pension might vary from 27 years of insurance in the Czech Republic\textsuperscript{59} or 15 years in Estonia, Hungary,

\textsuperscript{55} For example, no agreement at all applied to the relations between IT and RO or between LT and IE. In cases where agreements were concluded these were not necessarily in force already at the beginning of the 1990s; in many cases agreements came into force only in the course of the 2000s. For example, Bulgaria did not have a bilateral social security agreement (SSA) with Spain before 2003 and Romania not before 2006.

\textsuperscript{56} Especially for migrants moving to the UK (CR SK).

\textsuperscript{57} Information provided by the country reports and the reports elaborated by the European Commission network of experts in the field of European social security law (trESS). trESS organises seminars, establishes networks of persons involved in social security coordination at national level, reports to the European Commission on implementation problems in the EU MS and undertakes legal analysis on the EU coordination regulations.

\textsuperscript{58} For a detailed account of problems encountered in the implementation of the EU coordination regulations, reference is made to the reports of the aforementioned trESS network.

\textsuperscript{59} Information provided by MISSOC, July 2011. Other sources might indicate a slightly different period depending on the date of the information provided. For example information provided on the conditions for entitlements to pension benefits, published on the website of the Czech Social Security Administration (http://www.cssz.cz/NR/)
Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia to 5 years in Germany. Similarly, qualifying periods for unemployment benefits vary from a few weeks to up to 2 years (e.g. in SK) (MISSOC, 2011).

- Further assistance and support might be needed by competent national institutions and legal professions in the EU-8+2 as regards the correct application of the new regulation 883/2004 towards a more efficient and timely management of claims. At the same time, information for migrating citizens about social security rights should require an even more individualised and more specific approach, also integrating situations of return.

In general, it seems that on the part of the implementing social security institutions a need for further information and guidance for better and more efficient management of the lengthy procedures can still be identified among the EU-8+2 countries (Jorens and Hajdú, 2009). This seems to be even more crucial as the administrations of the “new” EU-8+2 countries have been confronted with an increasing number of claims and cases in respect of the application of the EU regulations after accession (see CR EE as regards e.g. pension claims in relation to DE) and in the aftermath of the global economic and financial crisis (soaring claims relating to unemployment benefits e.g. in EE, PL, RO), while at the same time they have already been faced with the preparation for the implementation of the new regulation 883/2004 shortly after EU accession and application of EU coordination. Some country reports point out the still persisting existence of lacking capacities and knowledge among (some of) their social security institutions; for example, this seems to be the case in Hungary as regards the administration of EU coordination for family benefits (CR HU) 61. In others, in particular the most recent accession countries like Bulgaria, there seems to remain a need for further information and capacity-building within the national courts and the judiciary professions (ibid.) to ensure a correct application of the EU regulations.

As regards the situation of (returning) migrants, one challenge mentioned by the latest trESS report is the question of how to better reach migrant workers - who by definition are located abroad - in order to improve the provision of information on their social security rights and of more individualised support to them (Jorens and Lhernould, 2011), as situations still arise where migrant workers are not aware of the rights open to them. For example, it seems that the knowledge about the possibility to export unemployment benefits is very limited in several EU Member States (Jorens and Hajdú, 2009); in cases where the benefits paid by the destination country are higher and paid for a longer time than in the source country (i.e. LT), the lack of knowledge even discourages return despite the fact that the benefit could be exported. There are examples of activities undertaken in the different EU Member States (with entry into force of the new regulation 883/2004) aiming at improving the information of migrants (see Chapter 5) but it might be worth focusing this information even more on the specific situation of returning migrants.

- Adequate protection of migrant workers and coordination of benefits through EU legislation is currently challenged by a rising complexity and variety of pension systems, including the emergence of fully-funded private and supplementary pension schemes as well as more flexible patterns of increasingly (short-term) mobility.

As concerns pension benefits of migrants, there is some indication that the payment of benefits abroad via bank transfers still generates important costs borne by the migrants in some countries (CZ, RO, HU) 62, as the fees charged by banks for transfers abroad are high (Jorens and Hajdú, 2009) and the application of exchange rates lead to losses. In this

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60 This can be considered as normal process within the first years of EU accession. The Estonian country report indicates rising numbers of pension claims in relation to Germany; the Polish report mentions soaring numbers of claims for payment of child benefits.

61 The country report for HU mentions that the administration responsible for coordination of family benefits since 2007 does not have adequate resources to deal with this task, often leading to important delays in the granting of benefits. This is a problem as family benefits are back-paid only 2 months from the date of acceptance of the request.

62 Whereby, this rather concerns payments from the sending towards the migration destination country.
respect, interesting practice can be cited from Romania, where payment of pensions is effected either in Euros, GB pounds or US dollars depending on the decision of the beneficiary (Jorens and Lhernould, 2011). Whereas EU coordination seems to have been functioning quite well in the field of pensions covered by EU regulation 883/2004 in general, there has been a growing concern in the last years, however, that the increasing emergence of statutory, fully-funded private pension schemes, especially in the Eastern Member States, complicates the application of the EU regulation, which is viewed as being not adapted to funded schemes (Jorens and Hajdú, 2009; Ghailani et al., 2011). The recent crisis has partly reversed this trend and might mitigate the worries about the applicability of the EU coordination framework, but the development of multi-pillar pension systems within the EU (in particular in EU-8+2 countries) and the growing coverage by supplementary (non-statutory) pension schemes not covered by EU regulation 883/2004 has attracted increased attention of experts. In particular, it is feared that the missing portability of these pension benefits up to now will create an increasing lack of protection for migrant workers and, therefore, new impediments to mobility within the EU. Besides this, the changing mobility patterns within the EU, with rising numbers of migrants opting for temporary short-term migration periods and more frequent changes of jobs rather than long-term migration with the perspective of integration in the receiving country, questions the appropriateness of the existing coordination provisions, which were meant for situations of long-term migration.

- The irregularity of migration, still persistent for migrants from Bulgaria and Romania in particular, who do not yet enjoy full free movement, excludes them from the benefit of the EU coordination regulations.

A still problematic issue from the point of view of the migrants mentioned in some country reports is the social protection coverage in a situation of irregular migration, which still affects important numbers of Bulgarian and Romanian migrants in the EU in particular. In many cases, these migrants already moved to and worked in other EU countries before EU accession of their home country, but the irregular character of their work has not enabled them to access social security rights across borders in spite of the application of the EU regulations as from the accession date (CR BG and RO).

- Implementation of coordination rules for family benefits still cause uncertainty among competent institutions and confusion among beneficiaries leading to lengthy procedures to the disadvantage of migrants and the families but also to the overlapping of benefits.

In respect of access to and coordination of family benefits, which are of specific interest for the family members left behind in their home country, the latest trESS report mentions that coordination in this area remains an important challenge and a “burning issue” (Jorens and Lhernould, 2011: 6), because of the “wide variety of different types of family benefits and measures taken to support family” within the EU. The uncertainty about a clear distinction between paternity, parental and family benefits and about priority rules in the EU regulation lead to confusion among the institutions, which causes delays in the processing of claims which are detrimental to the migrants and their families. Likewise, the exchange of information between the institutions of the Member States on the situation of family members and on the granting of benefits does not seem to function properly (Jorens and Hajdú, 2009). It is even worsened in some cases, in particular where entitlement to the benefits is based on residence (e.g. for child benefits), by the fact that insured persons often do not inform the authorities about a change of residence (one of the reasons being a lack of knowledge) and by weak control mechanisms of residence. This often causes situations of overlapping of family benefits received (as reported e.g. in EE and LT). Improved mechanisms for better

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63 This issue has been dealt with in the trESS reports of the last years. It was also the focus of a specific, more recent research report published in the second half of 2011 and elaborated by the European Social Observatory (OSE) on behalf of the European Commission (See: Ghailani et al., 2011).

64 Attempts have been made at safeguarding supplementary pension rights of migrants via Directive 98/49/EC and in 2005 with the draft proposal of the European Commission on the portability of supplementary pension rights (COM(2005)507), which was, however, amended in 2007 to omit the transferability element. The draft directive has not yet found agreement in the Council.
exchange of information, e.g. between administrations in charge of population registers, might need to be put in place.

- The social security coverage of migrants of the EU-8+2 moving outside the EU is less favourable and usually restricted to pension insurance.

For some EU countries (CZ, HU, LV, SK, PL), the USA have become an increasingly important migration destination country. In some cases (CZ, PL) migrants benefit from bilateral SSA of their home country with the USA concluded in recent years\(^\text{65}\); these are, however, restricted to the field of pension insurance\(^\text{66}\) only; they provide for the aggregation of insurance periods and exportability of pensions. The US legislation does not allow the export of health benefits, hence there is no reimbursement of health costs incurred outside the USA; this affects, for example, returning migrant pensioners who are covered by the national health system in the USA\(^\text{67}\) and who, thus, need to return to the USA to receive health care treatment (Holzmann et al., 2005; Avato et al., 2009). In case there are no bilateral agreements with the USA (HU, LV, SK)\(^\text{68}\), there is no aggregation of pension periods accomplished abroad, but the US legislation allows for (more or less full) exportability of pensions\(^\text{69}\) (Holzmann et al., 2005).

Migration to Russia in the past 20 years is a specific feature of the three Baltic countries of the EU (EE, LT, LV), whereby these flows mainly concerned Russian nationals who returned to their country of origin after the independence of the Baltic States. Presumably for this reason, the agreement signed by Estonia only covered social rights of Russian citizens and their families\(^\text{70}\), but did not seem to encompass Estonians migrating to Russia. However, since October 2011 persons who have paid pension contributions in either Russia or Estonia now have a right to apply for a pension or recalculation of pension (CR EE). Also in Latvia, a newly signed bilateral agreement with Russia, applicable since January 2011, seems to provide for payment of pensions across borders in application of the proportionality principle\(^\text{71}\). Lithuania for its part has a bilateral agreement with Russia applicable since May 2001; it relates to pension insurance only and is also based on the territoriality principle\(^\text{72}\).

\(^{65}\) The USA has signed bilateral agreements only with the Czech Republic (effective as from January 2009) and Poland (as from March 2009). See: website of the US Social Security Administration (http://www.ssa.gov/international/agreements_overview.html), last accessed 20.02.2012.

\(^{66}\) This is also the case with agreements concluded with other overseas countries like Australia and Canada.

\(^{67}\) Pensioners who receive a US pension and with 10 years of insurance record in the US are entitled to Medicare, the health insurance for people aged 65 and older in which they get free hospital treatment (Part A of Medicare).

\(^{68}\) The bilateral SSA between Latvia and the USA of 1993 about mutual pension payments provides that the Latvian side pays pensions to citizens of the USA even if these persons do not reside in the territory of Latvia.

\(^{69}\) Except to some countries, among others some former USSR countries.

\(^{70}\) The bilateral agreement signed with Russia regulates pension insurance to Russian citizens and their families. Another special agreement provides health coverage of military pensioners living in Estonia.

\(^{71}\) The agreement between Latvia and Russia (signed in December 2007) is not restricted to pension insurance only but also covers other social security benefits, amongst others family and unemployment benefits. See website of the Latvian Ministry of Welfare (http://www.lm.gov.lv/text/595, accessed 07.05.2012).

\(^{72}\) Lithuania pays pensions abroad outside any agreement but payment is ceased when the migrant gives up Lithuanian citizenship. A returning migrant pensioner without pension from LT will not get health coverage except for emergency cases and has access to further health services only against payment (See: CR LT).
### Excursus: Social security of Greek migrants – Example of specific provisions

Greece signed bilateral social security agreements with most of its main migrant receiving countries as far back as the late 1950s. These usually included health and maternity coverage, compensation for work accidents and occupational diseases, pensions, family benefits and in some cases unemployment benefits (e.g. Greek-German agreement). Some provisions, like the possibility to redeem social security (pension) contributions paid in case of return to Greece, as foreseen by the Greek-German agreement, were considered as rather harmful for Greek returnees, as they have pushed returnees to give up their social security rights (CR EL). With accession to the EU in 1981, the EU coordination law applied to Greece, leading to an overall improvement of social security coverage of Greek migrants. Nevertheless, some provisions of bilateral agreements remained applicable alongside the EEC regulations, as they provided a more favourable treatment of Greek returnees than the community law. Further, in order to improve coverage of migrants who did not benefit from the EU coordination regulations or bilateral agreements, options for voluntary insurance were introduced in Greece. Here are some examples of specific provisions in favour of Greek (returning) migrants:

**Unemployment benefits:** according to the Greek-German agreement, Greek migrants in a situation of unemployment upon return were entitled to an unemployment compensation for a duration of 6 months (for work of a minimum of 3 years in DE) or 3 months (for work between 26 weeks and 3 years). The state of Germany had contributed 85% to the financing of this benefit until accession of Greece to the EU. After EU accession, this provision was maintained by the Greek state alongside the application of the EU regulations, thus offering Greek returnees the possibility to opt for the more advantageous unemployment compensation of the former agreement (the EU provisions of Reg. 1408/71 were less favourable as they provided for the export for up to 3 months only). This provision applied until May 2010.

**Voluntary insurance for Greeks abroad:** Greek citizens or citizens of Greek origin established in other countries (as of 01.01.1985) are entitled to voluntary insurance coverage in Greece. The insured must pay both the employer’s and employee’s contributions to the pension branch according to categories designated by law. During permanent or temporary residence in Greece, Greek migrants can also be insured for medical care that covers pharmaceutical and hospital expenses.

**Health insurance for returning pensioners:** Greek pensioners who had worked abroad and had not acquired any Greek social security rights before emigration were offered voluntary medical insurance against the payment of 8% of their monthly pension amount.

4.3 Candidate Countries and Potential Candidates

The main features of social protection coverage for migrants of the candidate countries and potential candidates might be summarised as follows:

- Migrants and their family members left behind, originating from the successor states of former Yugoslavia (except Kosovo) and Turkey, benefit from a rather comprehensive and good coverage based on the long-standing existence of bilateral social security agreements (SSA) with the main migration destination countries of Western Europe. Turkish migrants moving within the EU additionally profit from the legal framework created by the Association Agreement of 1963, which has integrated them into the social protection systems of the EU countries and granted them transfer of social security rights according to the principles of the EU coordination law.

Bilateral agreements signed by the Yugoslav state were usually taken over by the new independent states of the ex-SFRY and the migration destination countries and continue to apply today, unless new agreements have been concluded bilaterally. Similarly, Turkey has also concluded bilateral agreements with most of its main migration countries. All these agreements are not restricted to the pension insurance field but cover a wider range of social risks. As noted in a World Bank report (Avato et al., 2009: 16), while bilateral SSA including the portability of health care benefits have hardly existed, those concluded by Germany and Austria with countries of former Yugoslavia and Turkey are an exception to this. According to them, the principle is that migrants moving between the receiving and the home country are continuously covered for health care (Holzmann et al., 2005). Other contingencies covered are usually maternity, work accidents and occupational diseases, whereas unemployment and family benefits are not necessarily part of these agreements. For example, the agreement between Germany and Turkey does not cover unemployment insurance (CR TR; Aşkin, 2009), whereas it is included in the agreements concluded by Austria with the countries of the ex-SFRY; in this respect these SSA usually provide for aggregation of insurance periods for determination of entitlement, but do not foresee the export of unemployment benefits.

Migrants from Turkey moving within the EU benefit from a particular relation between their country and the EU Members States, rooted in the Association Agreement of 1963 (Ankara Agreement) completed by the Additional Protocol of 1970, which forms the basis for the Decision 3/80 of the Association Council on the coordination of social security for Turkish workers moving within and their families residing in the EU (EEC). These provisions created a new legal basis and framework for the social protection of Turkish migrants within the EU, which was concretised in the following decades by several rulings of the European Court of Justice. They set the rules for the inclusion of Turkish nationals into the social security systems of all EU Member States and, by doing so aligned them to the principles set in the EU regulations on social security coordination. This has resulted in a mutual influence and interaction between bilateral agreements and the coordination law of the association council. In practice this means that the provisions of bilateral SSA between EU Members States and Turkey have to comply with the association law; consequently, they have been assigned the task of putting its principles into practice. The interplay of bilateral agreements and the legal framework created by Decision 3/80 have placed Turkish migrants and their families in a

73 Agreements were signed starting in the 1960s, amongst others with Germany, Austria and Italy. The agreement with DE, in force since September 1969, still applies to migrants from BA, ME, RS and XK (with some restrictions as regards Kosovo dealt with below as separate case), while new agreements have been signed with HR (in force on 1 December 1998) and with MK (1 January 2005). Newly signed bilateral SSA have also applied in the relation between AT and the former countries of ex-SFRY since the end of the nineties.
74 First agreement with the UK in 1959. The agreement with Germany, in force since 1964, still applies today.
75 As regards Germany and the ex-SFRY countries: unemployment insurance is covered partly in the frame of separate agreements (e.g. between DE and HR).
76 The Agreement establishing an Association between the European Economic Community (EEC) and Turkey entered into force on 29.12.1964. It provided for the (progressive) establishment of free movement of workers between TR and the EEC countries.
special position, as they profit from the most established rights of third-country nationals within EU law.

- While returning migrants from these countries profit both from the full exportability of their pensions and the aggregation of insurance years accomplished abroad, family members left behind partly have derived rights to health coverage at the expense of the receiving country and can in some cases receive child benefits. However, there is a noticeable tendency to exclude child benefits from (renewed) bilateral agreements.

All bilateral SSA concluded by the countries of ex-SFRY as well as Turkey with their main migration destination countries entail the principle of totalisation or aggregation of insurance periods, thus ensuring that rights acquired by migrants in both the home and destination countries are transferred and taken into account for determining entitlements to benefits in the other country. Further, as concerns the countries of the former SFRY, the agreements usually ensure that contribution periods accomplished in all territories of ex-Yugoslavia which later became independent states are taken into account for the acquisition of rights. The bilateral agreements, moreover, provide for full export of benefits, which means that returning migrants receive their benefits and pensions from the destination country without any reduction. Different situations might apply, however, in case minimum qualifying periods for a foreign pension are not fulfilled when reaching pensionable age: Germany foresees the possibility to obtain a lump-sum reimbursement of contributions paid\(^{77}\), whereas migrant workers in Italy can receive a pro-rata payment even in case the minimum contribution years have not been reached (Colleo and Perelli Branca, 2008; Avato, 2008).

Coverage for health care after return to the home country differs according to the situation of the migrant. A migrant returning to his home country to take up (regular) employment will have access to health care, either on the basis of his status as insured employee or as resident. For returning pensioners two situations might arise in application of the agreements: in case they receive or applied for a pension from both the country of migration and the country of origin, they will have health insurance in the residence (home) country. Returnees who are only in receipt of a pension from the migration country will also have access to health care treatment in the home country, at the expense of the health insurance of the pension paying country, where they remain compulsorily insured (DRV 2010a, 2010c and 2010d; DRV 2011a to d). In such situations health services provided go beyond mere emergency care but are limited to treatment which cannot be postponed until a return to the host country (Holzmann et al., 2005)\(^{78}\).

During the period of migration, health coverage of family members left behind depends on the type of health system in place in the receiving country. Many of the destination countries of Western Europe which have a sickness insurance system based on employment provide derived rights to sickness insurance to dependant family members of the insured workers, even if these reside in the country of origin. This is the case for Germany, whereby the circle of family members covered by the health insurance of the migrant worker not only includes spouses and children, but also encompasses dependant parents of the migrant\(^{79}\).

Access to child benefits for children left behind in the country of origin, paid by the receiving state, differs among the countries of the region, being dependant to a large extent on the provisions of each single bilateral agreement. Migrant workers who are citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia (as well as Kosovo*) and Turkey are entitled to

\(^{77}\) However, the refund of contribution only covers contribution paid by the employee, not by the employer.

\(^{78}\) Dependant family members who return home with the pensioner also keep their health insurance in Germany if they return to HR or to MK. In case of return to BA, XK, ME and RS, health insurance for family members is determined by the law of the residence country. See: DVKA, 2011.

\(^{79}\) The circle of dependant family members who are covered by German health insurance is determined by the legislation of their residence country. In the case of the countries of ex-SFRY and TR, whose concept of family is usually wider than in Western European countries, this also includes parents of the migrant supported by him/her. Medical treatment has to be provided by the health institutions of the home country at the expense of the German insurance, which reimburses the home country institution on the basis of a lump-sum for families.
German child benefits⁸⁰, whereby the amounts of the German child benefit paid for children residing in the home country differ from the amounts paid for children residing in Germany⁸¹. Family members left behind in Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, however, are in a less advantageous situation than their counterparts from the other former Yugoslav republics, as they cannot benefit anymore from child benefits, which have been excluded from the separate renewed agreements with these countries. The same situation applies to migrant workers and their family members originating from all ex-Yugoslav republics as well as Turkey in relation to Austria⁸². These developments seem to indicate a tendency among (some) main receiving countries to question running bilateral agreements and to engage in (re)negotiation of agreements with the aim of limiting their scope of application.

- Within and between the countries of former Yugoslavia, difficulties still remain as regards the recovery of pension entitlements of the refugee and IDP population.

( Older) migrants who have moved within and between the Western Balkan countries in the context of the wars are in a much more vulnerable situation than migrants to the EU. The legacies of the armed territorial conflicts and the “years of vacuum in establishing relations in the field of social security” (ESCoM, 2011: 24) caused by these conflicts have been hindering effective realisation of (acquired) pension rights for important parts of the migrant refugee population. As mentioned both in the country reports for Croatia and Serbia, this affects refugees originating from Croatia (Croatian Serbs) who have accumulated insurance records in the territory of the so-called Republic of Serbian Krajina between 1991 and 1995⁸³, who later settled in Serbia or Bosnia and Herzegovina and who encounter difficulties in either obtaining due pensions or in establishing and validating service periods for entitlement to a Croatian pension. This situation has generated existential fears for large parts of the older refugee population for whom pensions are often the only source of income.

According to a recent report on the challenges of forced migration in Serbia (ESCoM, 2011), the most serious problems regarding the verification and validation of contribution years seem to be the lack of years of service records at the Croatian Institute for Pension Insurance for the concerned period, as well as legal (high burden of proof imposed on the claimants) and practical obstacles in proving written evidence of contribution years (ibid.: 36 and CR RS), due to the destruction or loss of documentation, which has led to lengthy and difficult procedures with uncertain outcome. This situation seems to have been exacerbated by the fact that migrant refugees were given a restrictive deadline to validate their contribution records under a much controversial Croatian Convalidation Law of 1997 (CR HR, UNHCR, 2002)⁸⁴. Besides this, the cases of several thousands of Croatian pension

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⁸⁰ The migrant must be legally employed and employment subject to payment of contributions to unemployment insurance. Entitlement is also granted to recipients of other benefits (unemployment benefits, sickness benefit, etc.). The child benefit, however, is not paid when benefits are already paid in the home country according to its legislation or in case entitlement to it would effectively be given if claimed for. Entitlement to child benefits is also open for persons mandatorily insured in the German social insurance for other reasons than employment (recipients of a German pension or social assistance). In the latter case, entitlement for Turkish migrants is either based on Decision 3/80 of the Association Council or the European Convention on Social Security (BA, 2010 b). Migrants from ex-Yugoslavia with a status as asylum seeker or political refugee cannot get child benefits in the home country (BA, 2010a).

⁸¹ These are EUR 5.11 for the 1st child, EUR 12.78 for the 2nd child, EUR 30.68 for the 3rd and 4th child and EUR 35.79 for every further child (situation in March 2011 – See: BA, 2010a and 2010b).

⁸² The new bilateral agreements concluded by Austria with former Yugoslav republics do not cover child benefits anymore (See: BMASK, 2010). Further, Austrian legislation makes payment of child benefit (Familienbeihilfe) conditional upon residence of the child in AT and no payment is foreseen for children living permanently abroad (See: MISSOC, July 2011). As regards TR: the SSA concluded with Austria was terminated by AT; a new SSA which excludes the provision of Austrian child benefit from its scope of application has applied as from 2000 (See: CR Turkey, 2012).

⁸³ This part of Croatia was not under Croatian control during this period but a territory under Serb control, managed by the UN.

⁸⁴ This law enabled the validation of documents issued in the areas outside the control of Croatian proving employment and insurance rights.
beneficiaries\textsuperscript{85} who lived in the Serb-controlled territories between 1991 and 1995 remain unresolved to date. Payment of their pensions was interrupted unilaterally by the Croatian Pension Institute because of war circumstances; claims of pension beneficiaries for payment of the due pensions have been mostly rejected by the Croatian side, partly on the grounds that refugees have received a pension from the “para-state” pension fund set up by Serbian authorities in these areas during this period (ESCoM, 2011). Similarly, difficulties in payment of pensions are faced by refugees who left Bosnia and Herzegovina towards Serbia; this concerns pensions acquired in Bosnia and Herzegovina before the war and the year 2004\textsuperscript{86}. During the period of refuge in Serbia, pensions were paid by the Serbian Pension Fund, not by the fund in which contributions had been paid. Persons who fled from Bosnia and Herzegovina and acquired years of insurance there also face difficulties in realising pension rights, due to bureaucratic requirements for the production of documents, arduous procedures in cross-border settlements of rights, despite existing agreements, and frequently exceeded deadlines. The situation of Bosnian migrants is further complicated by the co-existence of different social protection systems within the two constituent entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which hinders internal migration and effective coordination of acquired rights.

As regards IDPs (from Kosovo*) in Serbia, reports from the UNHCR suggest that they often cannot access their earned pension benefits, whereby this seems to only affect IDPs which started to receive pensions after 1999\textsuperscript{87}. This occurs for different reasons, one of them being missing work-related documents; another reason, however, seems to be the refusal by the Serbian competent institutions to recognise administrative forms used for evidence of employers’ contributions issued by the UNMIK administration on the basis of the documentation of Kosovo’s Pension Fund (ESCoM, 2011). A question arises about the pension status of persons who contributed to the Kosovar pension scheme after 1999 and who left Kosovo towards Serbia after self-proclamation of independence in 2008. It is probable that the Serbian territory is considered as being a foreign country by the Kosovar pension authorities, in which case pension rights acquired by Kosovars would be lost since the Kosovar pension system does not foresee (ex)portability of entitlements and benefits.

- Migrants from Kosovo* are in a more vulnerable position than their counterparts from other ex-Yugoslav countries: Despite the fact that they have been theoretically benefiting from the bilateral agreements signed by the ex-SFRY, these have not been applied to their full extent in practice, due to peculiarities of the (autonomous) Kosovar pension system and practical problems induced by the recent independence of Kosovo*. Furthermore, implementation of the bilateral SSA in place with Switzerland, a main receiving country of Kosovar migrants\textsuperscript{88}, has been unilaterally stopped.

The fact that Germany has continued to apply the old SFRY agreement unilaterally to Kosovo\textsuperscript{89} entails an unstable situation for (returning) migrants insofar as such unilateral implementation can be ceased very rapidly. Moreover, in the aftermath of the armed conflict in Kosovo in 1999, which had resulted in the destruction of the former Yugoslav pension system and the loss of pension contribution records (ILO, 2010)\textsuperscript{90}, a fundamental reform of

\textsuperscript{85} Approximately 50,000 persons are concerned. See: ESCoM, 2011.
\textsuperscript{86} In 2004, the bilateral SSA between RS and BA entered into force; there are about 4,000 pensioners from BA in RS according to the ESCoM report (ESCoM, 2011).
\textsuperscript{87} I.e. when the new residence-based and privately funded pension scheme was put in place in Kosovo. Persons who contributed to the old scheme in place until 1999 did not encounter serious problems in receiving pensions from XK to RS if they informed the Serbian Pension Fund of their change of address (See: UNHCR / PRAXIS, 2007).
\textsuperscript{88} Switzerland, an important migration destination for migrants from Kosovo in particular and, to a lesser extent, for migrants from other parts of ex-Yugoslavia, concluded a bilateral SSA with the ex-SFRY at an early stage; migrants from XK have so far benefited from it also after declaration of independence in 2008.
\textsuperscript{89} German institutions of social insurance have decided unilaterally to continue to apply the German-SFRY agreement to XK, despite the fact that this SSA was not taken over by means of a formal declaration and that Kosovar institutions for their part have ceased to implement it for several years already (DRV, 2009c and 2010a).
\textsuperscript{90} Until 1989, the pension scheme in Kosovo was part of the broad Yugoslav pension system, with XK having its own Pension Fund Administration. As from 1989, when XK lost its status as autonomous province, the Kosovar
the pension system was introduced, shifting from a contribution-based PAYG system to a three-tier system with a mandatory fully-funded pension scheme. Because of the specific constraints which would be imposed on reciprocal agreements for coordination of the private-funded scheme in Kosovo since introduction of the new pension system cannot be taken into account anymore for aggregation of pension periods in Germany. As a result, pension periods built up by migrants in Kosovo after 1999 are not taken into account for determining eligibility to a German pension. This, however, is not the case for contributions paid to the Yugoslav pension system until April 1999, which can still be aggregated upon evidence of contributions paid (DRV, 2010a). The lack of coordination generated by the reform of the Kosovar pension system has, thus, been affecting younger migrants to a larger extent than older migrants. Reciprocally, the absence of coordination means that contributions made to the German system by migrants who return home before retirement age are irrelevant for building-up pension entitlements in Kosovo. Further, pensions from the Kosovar system are not exportable abroad and, thus, can only be paid to pensioners residing in Kosovo. Other difficulties faced by returning migrants from Germany and other countries seem to be partly induced by the recent independence from Serbia in 2008, as migrants from Kosovo now encounter difficulties to receive pensions from receiving countries (CR XK); although not explicitly reported, it is assumed that this might be caused by difficulties for pension claimants in providing evidence of insurance periods accomplished in the Serbian territory.

In relation to Switzerland, the social security coverage of Kosovar migrants and their families is currently questioned by an on-going debate taking place in Switzerland about the validity of the unilateral decision taken by the Swiss Government in December 2009 to terminate the application of the old Swiss-Yugoslav agreement for Kosovo as from April 2010. This decision has the effect of terminating the exportability of pensions and benefits provided by the Swiss social system to Kosovars. Practically, this means that Kosovar migrants who have contributed to the Swiss scheme will lose any rights to receive a Swiss pension in case they return to Kosovo. While the governmental decision does not challenges the on-going application of the old Swiss-Yugoslav agreement for Kosovo as from April 2010, it affects any new pension decisions taken as from April 2010, which seems to severely affect a large population of Kosovar migrants in Switzerland (CR XK). The governmental decision has been fiercely contested by the Kosovar community and authorities and has given rise to a legal dispute which has not been settled to date. It can be assumed that this unsatisfactory situation, which leaves Kosovar migrants in total uncertainty as regards their social protection coverage in case they decide to return to their home country, will drive the authorities of both states to the bargaining table in order to

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Pension Fund was absorbed into the Serbian pension system. During the armed conflict that ensued a building of the pension fund in Pristina housing records of the fund was destroyed, leading to important damages and loss of data and information about pension contributions mainly (See: ILO, 2010).

91 New system: a basic, residence-based scheme with universal flat-rate pension (1st tier), a mandatory fully-funded scheme (2nd tier) based on individual capital savings and a voluntary supplementary scheme (3rd tier).

92 Various media reported that the reasons which motivated the decision of the Swiss Government lie in the failure of investigations undertaken by the Swiss social insurance institutions to verify the health status of Kosovar recipients of invalidity pensions. In the concrete cases the investigations conducted had been severely hindered and the investigators had been threatened to life and physical condition. It is also reported that one other main reason put forward is the ongoing absence of a proper social security system in Kosovo. See for example: article of NZZ Online of 18.03.2011 “IV-Noventreten weiter nach Kosovo” (http://www.nzz.ch/nachrichten/politik/schweiz/iv-neurenten_weiter_in_den_kosovo_1.9942029.html, accessed: 25.01.2012) or online article of Blick “Die Schweiz hat mit Serbien und Montenegro neue Sozialversicherungsabkommen abgeschlossen” of 11.10.2010 (http://www.blick.ch/news/schweiz/iv-soll-auch-in-serbien-ausbezahlte-werden-99210, accessed: 25.01.2012).

93 In particular old-age/survivors pensions (AHV - Alters- und Hinterlassenenversicherung) and invalidity pensions (IV - Invalidenversicherung) of the basic scheme.

94 The dispute has been brought up to the Swiss Federal Court. Despite the fact that administrative courts have invalidated the decisions of the social insurance institution not to pay out the pensions to Kosovo, the parties have continued to argue about the interpretation of the court decisions and the question whether the termination of the application of the Swiss-Yugoslav agreement might be valid or not has not been answered.
find temporary solutions and negotiate a new agreement\textsuperscript{95}. The current non-application of the SSA does not only impact on pension rights but also has effects on the situation of family members left behind in Kosovo\textsuperscript{96}. Indeed, since the agreement allowed for the export of child benefits (\textit{Familienzulagen}) paid to employed Kosovar migrants for children residing in Kosovo\textsuperscript{96}, the interruption of the agreement also puts an end to the entitlement to child benefits in case the children are left behind in the home country.

- Albanian migrants remain largely unprotected due to the absence of any bilateral social security agreements with the main migration destination countries up to now and a high proportion of irregular migration. Some features in the social insurance system of the receiving countries (Italy), however, have facilitated the maintenance of pension entitlements in some specific cases. Moreover, Albania has set up a scheme of voluntary insurance enabling migrants to acquire pension rights while working abroad.

Albania is the only country of the Western Balkans which has no formal bilateral SSA with its main migration destination countries (Greece and Italy)\textsuperscript{96}; although negotiations have been started with these countries, they have not been brought to a close yet\textsuperscript{97}. As has been reported (CR AL), the negotiations have been stopped due to the difficulties which both these EU countries are currently facing because of the financial and economic crisis. The Albanian migrant population in Greece and Italy, thus, has to rely on the possibilities provided by the law of the host countries for social protection coverage in case of return. Like many other countries, Italy and Greece foresee the export of contributory benefits (old-age, disability and survivors’ pensions) abroad also in the absence of any social security agreement. Further, Italy allows migrants who have contributed to the new Italian pension scheme in place since January 1996 to receive a minimum pension, even in the case they have not completed the required minimum qualifying period of 5 years\textsuperscript{98}; in the latter case they will receive a pension amount proportional to their contribution payments. However, the rather generous cash-out option (refund of contributions paid in case of definitive return to the home country) opened by the Italian law in 1995\textsuperscript{99} was abrogated by the 2002 immigration legislation (Colleo and Perelli Branca, 2008; Chaloff, 2008). The situation of Albanians in Greece, however, is more difficult as the Greek legislation does not foresee the portability of accrued pension rights if the minimum eligibility conditions of 4,500 days (15 years) of insurance in Greece are not accomplished; migrants who return home definitively before having 15 years of service, thus, lose their pension rights (Cupcea and Pavleas, 2008).

The situation of Albanian emigrants is aggravated by the fact that an important part of emigration remains irregular; therefore, important numbers of Albanian migrants are not covered by any formal social protection system in the destination countries. The Albanian state has reacted to the challenges arising from the low inclusion of its (migrant) population in social insurance and has introduced a voluntary scheme of (minimum) social insurance in 1993 which is not restricted to migrants, but whose goal is the improvement of the insurance coverage of migrating Albanian citizens within the statutory public insurance scheme (ISSA, \textit{Bund überweist keine Renten nach Kosovo*}. Indeed, since the agreement allowed for the export of child benefits (\textit{Familienzulagen}) paid to employed Kosovar migrants for children residing in Kosovo\textsuperscript{96}, the interruption of the agreement also puts an end to the entitlement to child benefits in case the children are left behind in the home country.

\textsuperscript{95} It has been argued in the media that this difficult situation might be used to renegotiate a more stringent bilateral agreement, as this has been the case for the newly concluded SSA between CH and HR in which child benefits, for example, have been taken out of the list of Swiss benefits for which exportability is allowed. See: article “\textit{Bund überweist keine Renten nach Kosovo}” of 06.01.2012 published on the online portal of the Swiss broadcasting companies (http://www.drs.ch/www/de/drs/nachrichten/schweiz/315570.bund-ueberweist-keine-renten-nach-kosovo.html), last accessed: 25.01.2012.

\textsuperscript{96} During the former Communist regime, Albania concluded bilateral agreements only with Bulgaria and Romania (these are being renewed). Further, it recently concluded an agreement with Turkey (entry into force in 2005).

\textsuperscript{97} The conclusion of bilateral SSA with Greece and Italy has been formulated as one priority objective of Albanian migration policy in the National Action Plan for Migration 2005-2010 (See: Colleo and Perelli Branca, 2008).

\textsuperscript{98} This possibility was instaured with the law N°286 of 1998. See: Colleo and Perelli Branca, 2008. For workers who contributed to the old pension system before 1996, a minimum qualifying period of 20 years is still required.

\textsuperscript{99} With the law N°335/1995 migrant workers could claim for a refund of all pension contributions paid by the worker and the employer in case of definitive return before having completed the minimum qualifying period. Moreover, the migrant worker was entitled to a supplement of 5% of each year of contribution paid. It seems that this was also possible for seasonal workers working for up to 9 months in the year. See: Colleo and Perelli Branca, 2008; Chaloff, 2008.
Voluntary contributions can also be paid to cover other contingencies such as temporary incapacity for work in case of sickness\textsuperscript{100}. Further, administrative measures and structures have been put in place which shall facilitate contracting of voluntary insurance and payment of contributions by migrants without the need to return to Albania for this purpose (see box below). Although take-up of voluntary insurance remains very modest in comparison to the numbers of Albanian migrants abroad, the number of insured (persons and) migrants has been steadily increasing in the period between 2005 and 2009\textsuperscript{101}. Thus, despite the low take-up, the Albanian voluntary scheme can be regarded as a valuable and interesting attempt to improve social insurance coverage of migrants for countries in transition who face high (irregular) migration in the absence of bilateral SSA. As such the voluntary insurance scheme has been identified by the ISSA as an example of good practice in social security.

\begin{center}
\textbf{Voluntary Social Insurance Scheme in Albania}
\end{center}

\begin{tabular}{|p{15cm}|}
\hline
\textbf{Legal basis}: Amended Law N°7703 of 11.05.1993 on “Social Insurance in the Republic of Albania”. Law of 2004 calling for the establishment of agencies abroad in order to facilitate take-up and contribution to the scheme of migrants abroad. \\

\textbf{Organisation}: voluntary insurance scheme within the public social insurance scheme managed by the Social Insurance Institute (SII) of Albania. \\

\textbf{Contingencies covered}: pensions (old-age, disability) and other branches (benefits for temporary incapacity to work in case of sickness) \\

\textbf{Persons covered}: Albanian emigrants; persons within Albania who are no longer compulsorily insured and want to avoid or fill gaps in their insurance record. Compulsorily insured persons who want to pay additional contributions and increase their entitlements. Foreign nationals and ex-citizens of Albania for periods from 01.01.1994 until change of nationality.

\textbf{Administrative measures}: set-up of information structures in the regional directorates and local agencies of the SII enabling provision of information, pension calculations and signing of insurance contract on the basis of a birth certificate and work history booklet.

\textbf{Structures in foreign countries}:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textit{Cooperation with Greece}: in 2005, the SII concluded an agreement with the American Bank of Albania in Greece. On behalf of the SII, the bank:
    \begin{itemize}
      \item Provides information and consultation on the voluntary insurance scheme to Albanian migrants in Greece 
      \item Witnesses presence of clients and concludes voluntary insurance contracts on behalf of the SII 
      \item Collects contributions paid by migrants
    \end{itemize}

  \item \textit{Cooperation with Italy}: in February 2011, an agreement was concluded between the SII and the Intesa San Paolo IMI banking group to facilitate payment of contributions by migrants from Italy. A Technical Cooperation Protocol was signed between the SII and the Italian National Social Security Institute INPS in 2005. Since 2007, conclusion of several technical cooperation protocols between the SII and Italian trade unions and associations\textsuperscript{102} which provide information and assistance (free of charge) to Albanian migrants in Italy on issues of social insurance and conditions of payment of contributions to the voluntary insurance scheme.
\end{itemize}


\textsuperscript{101} In 2005, 9,623 insured migrants were recorded, this increased to 12,556 in the year 2009 (See: ISSA; 2010). It seems that data about the number of insured persons in the years before 2005 is not available, but estimates made by the Albanian government in 2004 indicate that 70% of persons enrolled in the scheme were migrants (CR AL).

\textsuperscript{102} Italian National Institute of Social Assistance (INAS) of the Italian trade union CISL, Italian National Entity of Social Assistance (ENAS UGL) and Social Security Institute A.C.A.I. (Christian Association of Handicraftsmen), Italian ACLI Patronage.
In the absence of bilateral SSA, family members left behind in Albania by migrants in Greece and Italy have access to health care in their home country only\(^\text{103}\). In Albania, where health care basically covers all residents, family members are automatically covered – at least theoretically – whereby their contributions to the system are paid by the state in case they are inactive (children, pensioners, unemployed, social assistance beneficiaries, etc.). In practice, however, an important part of the population does not have health insurance, despite the formally universal nature of the scheme (EC, 2009).

- Competent social security institutions in some countries of the region are facing difficulties in the coordination of social security of migrant workers and the proper application of bilateral agreements because of insufficient institutional capacities, a lack of human resources, adequate knowledge and material resources.

In some countries it is reported that migrants encounter practical barriers in the process of claiming their pension rights: migrants are often confronted with lengthy procedures caused by mistakes and slow exchange of information between competent institutions of the involved countries, leading to delays in pension payment (ME, MK). A lack of information of migrants about who is responsible for the treatment of claims for foreign pensions in Kosovo\(^*\) leads to an inefficient use of available resources; uninformed migrants invest money into hiring the services of lawyers in order to work out their pension entitlements abroad, not knowing that the Kosovar Pension Administration is competent for treating their claims. Besides being a waste of time and resources, this also entails a supplementary burden of work for foreign pension institutions, which have to deal with the claims before sending them back to the competent Kosovar institution. Another point mentioned in the country reports refers to the lack of proper human capacities and adequate equipment in the social insurance administrations to handle the increasing number of claims in an adequate and timely manner.

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\(^{103}\) Family members of migrants working in Italy benefit from coverage of health costs by the Italian health system only in case they live together with the migrant, as IT has a health system based on residence (MISSOC, 2011).
4.4 Eastern Partnership Countries

Migrant returnees originating from the EaP countries and their family members left behind are confronted with the following difficulties as regards access to social security:

- Migrants moving towards Russia - a main migration country for all EaP countries - have a very fragmentary and rather low social protection coverage, resulting either from the non-application or improper implementation of existing multi-/bilateral agreements.

Whereas multilateral conventions concluded by the CIS countries have created, at least on paper, a framework of social protection rights of migrant workers within the receiving countries of the CIS area, coordination of pension entitlements across borders was regulated by another multilateral agreement signed by the CIS countries in March 1992 (Agreement on Guarantees of Rights of Citizens of Participants States of the CIS in the sphere of Pension Provisions), to which Russia and five of the EaP countries (except Georgia) have been signatory parties. Implementation of a separate bilateral SSA concluded between Georgia and Russia, which came into force in 2002, has been stopped by Georgia because of the conflict that emerged between the two countries in 2008 (CR GE). This multilateral CIS agreement has established that pensions of migrants are paid only by the migrant’s country of residence according to its own legislation, whereby contribution periods accomplished in other countries which are signatory parties to the agreement are taken into account (principle of territoriality). All expenses incurred are paid by the country granting the pension, without any mutual compensation between the countries. The agreement also ensures that insurance periods completed by migrants in territories of the former Soviet Union until 1991 are considered for calculation of the pension by the competent country. The export of pensions is only foreseen in the exceptional case where a pension of the same kind is not provided for by the receiving country.

However, as reported in some countries (CR AZ and UA), the effective implementation and proper functioning of the multilateral agreement of 1992 has been largely hampered by various developments. Firstly, difficulties in implementation seem to have emerged because of the (too) general nature of the agreement. The lack of precise implementing provisions and conventions about procedures and documents to be provided has increased the potential for discretionary decisions taken within the competent institutions (CR AZ), thus creating an unstable basis for decision-making on individual cases. Because of such problems, the CIS agreement has not been applied properly in practice; as exemplified in the case of Azerbaijan, the consequence has been that periods of insurance accomplished by Azeri migrants in Azerbaijan are currently not taken into account for determining entitlement to a Russian pension by the Russian Pension Fund.

Secondly, whereas the agreement stipulated that the participating countries should adopt policies towards a harmonisation of pension provisions, this has not happened in practice. On the contrary, numerous modifications and reforms of the pension legislations of the EaP countries after the break-up of the Soviet Union have contributed to transforming rather

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104 A multilateral Agreement on collaboration in the sphere of Labour Migration and the Social Protection of Migrants including Russia was signed by all CIS countries in 1994. It mainly regulated employment and social protection rights of migrant workers employed and their families residing permanently in the territory of one of the signatory countries (mutual recognition of diplomas, qualifications and work certificates; equal treatment with nationals; elimination of double taxation, etc.). It stated that migrant workers are entitled to social insurance and social protection, excluding pensions, as well as to medical treatment at the expense of the employer on an equal level as nationals of the state of residence (Kosygina, 2011). This agreement, which was applied only partially, was substituted by the Convention on the Legal Status of Labour Migrants and their Family members within the CIS, which has not yet come into force and was signed by four of the EaP countries, except MD and GE.

105 Georgia was not member of the CIS at the time of signature of the agreement. It joined in December 1993.

106 The CIS Agreement of 1992 on Guarantees of Rights of Citizens of Participant States of the CIS in the Sphere of Pension Provisions contains only 13 short articles which lay down the main principles, but does not contain any provisions regulating cooperation and information mechanisms. In many cases this multilateral agreement has not been specified by implementing regulations or conventions.
identical pension systems inherited from Soviet times at the beginning of the nineties into very diverging systems with very different levels of benefit provision. This situation has not facilitated the exchange of information and the accumulation of a continuous and common experience in application of the agreement between competent pension bodies of the countries concerned. This, however, is all the more important as the principle of territoriality underlying the agreement requires that the pension institution of the paying country relies on information and documents provided by the foreign pension administration.

- The principle of territoriality in place in the multilateral agreement between the EaP countries is outdated and does not permit returning migrants to build up adequate pensions, due to the low level of pensions in the countries of the region; to some extent, it can even be considered as an impediment to returning to the home country.

The principle of territoriality means, in consequence, that the complete pension of migrants is determined and calculated according to the legislation of one country, which is the country of residence of the migrant. For the migrant the decision to return or not to the home country might, thus, be largely influenced by the given retirement conditions and the levels of pensions of the source and receiving country. In case the country of migration offers more favourable conditions than the home country, especially as regards the replacement rate, this situation might play a considerable role in the decision of migrants with an already long record of employment abroad or close to retirement not to return to the home country. In case of effective return home, the application of the principle of territoriality leaves a large part of migrant workers in receipt of pensions which in general are considered to be of low level, in the Southern Caucasus countries even more than in Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine; this low pension level is a matter of concern for the whole region (EC, 2011c). Moreover, when migrants decide to return home after a long time spent abroad or upon retirement, the principle of territoriality imposes an additional burden on the pension systems of the source countries, which do not get any compensation for pensions paid to returning migrants, while they cannot profit from contributions paid into the foreign pension system during the migration period.

For these reasons, and because the diverging developments in the pension systems of the region have significantly complicated the coordination of pension rights, the principle of territoriality is considered as being outdated and inefficient (Tkachenko, 2009). In the mid and long term it could even turn out to be a main obstacle to targeted return policies. This is why several EaP countries have been seeking to renew or conclude new agreements with each other based on the principle of proportionality. In relation to Russia, Ukraine and Belarus have already taken this step and have recently concluded bilateral SSA based on this principle. The agreement concluded by Moldova, however, is still based on the territoriality principle; this is also true for the (frozen) agreement with Georgia mentioned above. A bilateral agreement on pensions has been negotiated between Azerbaijan and Russia, but has not been ratified yet (CR AZ), thus the CIS agreement of 1992 still applies (in theory) in the relations between these countries.

- Existing agreements mostly cover the field of pension insurance only; thus, there are no systems of coordination and transfer of social benefits and accrued rights in the other branches of insurance for returning migrants.

All agreements signed by the EaP countries with Russia are restricted to the field of pension insurance, the only exception being Belarus, whose bilateral agreement with Russia signed in 2006 seems to cover all branches of social insurance. Thus, in most cases, returning migrants have to rely on the provisions of their home country for social protection coverage. Access to health care in the EaP countries is usually given without qualifying conditions.

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107 See developments in the MD country report and information provided on the website of the Russian Pension Fund about pensions for people residing abroad ([http://www.pfrf.ru/ot_en/zabugor/](http://www.pfrf.ru/ot_en/zabugor/), last accessed on 09.02.2012). As regards AM, neither the country report, nor other information sources (NATLEX database or Russian Pension Fund) could provide reliable information about the existence of a bilateral agreement regulating social security rights of migrants moving between Armenia and Russia.
(MISSCEO, 2010 and ISSA database) as regards previous insurance periods. Most EaP countries have a system of health care provision inherited from former Soviet times which provides universal access to medical care on the basis of residence (AM, AZ, BY, UE), whereby the provision of health care free of charge might be limited to specific services defined within the framework of basic benefit packages (AM) or granted free of charge only to specific vulnerable groups of the population (AZ)\textsuperscript{108}, these usually include (returning) pensioners (with a pension from the home country) (EC, 2010b and 2011c; Ibrahimov et al. 2010). In Moldova, where a contribution-based health insurance system has been introduced in 2004, returning migrants are insured either in their capacity as employed person against the payment of contributions or as part of the non-active population in case they are pensioners or (registered) unemployed (in this latter case their contributions are paid by the state). To some extent, Georgia is to be seen as an exception among the EaP countries: A new health care system introduced in 2007 involved a shift from a public system of universal and free medical services for the entire population to a health insurance system dominated by private health insurance, where free medical services are open only to the most vulnerable parts of the population, amongst others, to pensioners, households under the poverty line and specific groups of state employees (EC, 2011f) within state-funded programmes. As a consequence, a major part of the Georgian population, including returning migrants who do not belong to the specified vulnerable groups, is not covered by the national state health care system and is responsible for purchasing medical services either through private insurance or out-of-pocket payments on its own (ibid.).

In the absence of agreements covering unemployment insurance, as is the case for the EaP countries\textsuperscript{109}, unemployed returning migrants do not get unemployment compensation from the migration destination country. Further, access to unemployment support in their home country is usually conditioned by minimum insurance records\textsuperscript{110}. It must be noted that, due to the extremely low level of unemployment benefits provided for in the region (ibid.: 25), a large number of unemployed do not even register and the number of beneficiaries remains marginal. In the case of Georgia, there is no compensation provided for at all, since a system of unemployment insurance does not exist.

- There are no bilateral agreements in place with the main migration countries of Western Europe (Poland, Italy, Greece, Germany).

Presently, there are no bilateral social security agreements in place between the origin countries (AZ, BY, GE, MD, UA) and the main respective destination countries of the EU (DE, PL, EL, IT)\textsuperscript{111}. While some negotiations have been engaged between Ukraine and Poland as from April 2008, and even seem quite advanced as regards Moldova and Italy (CR MD), the negotiations have not been finalised yet. As regards Belarus and Georgia, there is no indication in the country reports (or other sources) that negotiations about the conclusion of bilateral agreements have been started between these countries and the receiving

\textsuperscript{108} In AZ the introduction of a general Basis Benefits Package covering the entire population is planned for the end of 2012; for the moment, existing basic benefit packages are free of charge only for specific vulnerable groups of the population (children, pensioners and others). See: EC, 2011c and Ibrahimov et al., 2010.

\textsuperscript{109} The bilateral agreement between Belarus and Russia covers unemployment benefits according to information provided by the NATLEX database of the ILO. However, it is not known if the agreement provides for the export of Russian and Belarussian unemployment compensation or aggregation of insurance periods or not.

\textsuperscript{110} Qualifying periods of covered employment (in the country) in the last months before unemployment are required in AZ, MD, UA; in AM fulfilment of a general minimum insurance record is necessary (MISSCEO, 2010; ISSA database, CR Ukraine, 2012).

\textsuperscript{111} Between Ukraine and Poland, however, it seems that a governmental agreement signed in 1993 applies, which regulates the mutual transfer of pensions (export) for cases where a pension has already been granted. See: Reply of the Minister of Labour and Social Policy Jolanta Fedak, with the authorisation of the President of the Council of Ministers, to interpelation no. 1381 related to a conclusion of a Polish-Ukrainian Agreement in the field of social insurance, enabling the transfer of pension claims of people living in the territory of the other country, Warsaw, 19th March 2008 (Odpowiedź ministra pracy i polityki społecznej Jolanta Fedak - z upoważnienia prezesa Rady Ministrów - na interpelację nr 1381 w sprawie zawarcia umowy z zakresu stosunków polsko-ukraińskich o ubezpieczeniu społecznym, umożliwiającej transfer świadczeń emerytalno-rentowych osobom zamieszkałym na terytorium drugiego państwa, Warszawa, dnia 19 marca 2008 r.), retrieved from: http://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/I26.nsf/main/69CD1246
countries (PL, EL) yet. This might have political reasons as regards Belarus. Concerning Georgia, the main obstacles for the conclusion of SSA lie in the specific features of the Georgian social protection system: while the public state pension system is based on a basic pension scheme with a flat-rate benefit paid to residents, which in fact has the character of a social assistance benefit (EC, 2011f), any other further pension schemes have been completely privatised; further, Georgia neither has an unemployment insurance nor a public health scheme covering the entire population.

Consequently, migrants in Germany, Poland, Italy and Greece have to rely on the legislation of the receiving country as regards the possibilities to transfer social benefits and social security entitlements to their countries of origin in case of return, whereas all countries provide for exportability of pension benefits abroad. Access to a pension from the receiving country will be conditioned by the accomplishment of minimum qualifying periods of insurance membership, which widely differ between the countries (from 5 years in Germany up to 20 years in Poland). For Moldovan migrants returning from Italy and Georgian migrants returning from Greece, the provisions of the Italian and Greek legislation described above (see Section 4.3 above) remain valid, as they apply to any foreign migrants not covered by bilateral social security agreements.

- A very high share of irregular migration from the EaP countries excludes migrants from the application of bilateral agreements and social security legislation of the receiving countries.

As unanimously pointed out in the country reports, the most problematic aspect as regards social protection of migrants from the EaP countries within the region, however, is the fact that these countries record a considerable level of irregular migration and that, in spite of bilateral agreements, these do not capture the masses of migrants, who remain outside of the legal space of protection created by the agreements. In order to elude the disadvantages caused by irregular employment as regards social protection coverage, migrants often cumulate regular employment in the home country and take up additional irregular and unsecured jobs in a neighbouring country. Or they accept the loss of insurance years as marginal opportunity costs in comparison to other advantages of migration.

With the aim of improving the pension coverage of irregular migrants and/or those not covered by existing agreements, there have been some attempts among the EaP countries to set up possibilities of individual voluntary pension insurance for persons working or living abroad. Ukraine and Moldova have introduced voluntary insurance within their public state pension scheme in 2004 and 2006 respectively

113, in the case of Moldova, this option was also established in the health insurance (CR MD and UA; MISSCEO, 2010). However, for both countries it is reported that the rate of take-up among migrants is very low, which can be partly explained by a widespread distrust in state institutions and structures (CR UA). The very modest coverage in voluntary health insurance in Moldova is obviously due to the high price for such voluntary insurance. Further, the high degree of corruption in the health care system of Moldova requires frequent informal payments by patients to health providers. Under these circumstances take-up of voluntary insurance is perceived as highly inefficient and a waste of financial resources (CR MD).

- Family members left behind in the home country do not profit from existing bilateral agreements and have to rely on provisions of their national legislation as regards their social protection coverage. While formal coverage is usually provided to them by legislation, effective access to social protection is at a low level because available

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112 See also: Tkachenko, 2009.

113 In Ukraine, an application for affiliation to voluntary insurance can be made by phone or via Internet with the obligation to make contributions of a minimum amount of EUR 20 per month, which corresponds to the rate of a minimum contribution payment to pension insurance according to the legislation of Ukraine.

114 The Ukraine country report, based on data of the Ukrainian Pension Fund for January 2011, indicates a number of 4,567 migrants who have concluded voluntary pension insurance.

115 The Moldovan country report mentions that only 1.4% of the total number of insured persons was voluntarily insured in the year 2008. Amongst these voluntarily insured, only a part of them is made up of migrants.
schemes remain underdeveloped, even non-existent for some specific social risks and, in the case of health care, demand a high degree of formal and informal payments.

Children under the age of 18 years usually have their own right to health coverage and free access to medical services in the EaP countries, whereby free medical services are provided to them in their specific capacity as vulnerable group in some countries (AM, AZ, GE) or as part of the non-active population insured by the state in others (MD) (MISSCEO, 2010). In the case of Armenia, not all children have general access to medical services (ibid.), since the Armenian law defines several categories of children who can benefit from defined medical services dependent on age and the specific situation (i.e. disability) (MISSCEO, 2010). However, it can be noted that Armenia provides free health care for children left without parental care (ibid.). Elderly (left behind), like children, are usually to be found among the groups of specifically vulnerable persons with access to medical services free of charge in the EaP countries, whereas the situation of spouses differs according to their status as either employed persons, unemployed, pensioner or recipient of assistance benefits.

While returning migrants and their families left behind, thus, have access to health care on the basis of residence in their home country (except in MD) at least formally, effective access to health care in the EaP countries is hampered in many ways, as noted in research reports on behalf of the EU Commission, most importantly because of the wide incidence of both formal\textsuperscript{116} and informal out-of-pocket payments (EC, 2010\textsuperscript{b} and 2011\textsuperscript{c}). In the Moldovan country report it is pointed out that, if migration and remittances received by migrant families have helped these to access medical services in their country by enabling them to make informal payments to health providers, these developments have to some extent contributed to exacerbating inequalities in access to health care among the Moldovan population and have worsened the situation in a system already prone to corruption.

\textsuperscript{116} The scope of formal out-of-pocket payments required by patients for medical services not included in the catalogue or packages of free medical services provided has been increasing considerably since the beginning of transition and makes up an important part of the financing sources of the health systems in the EaP countries.
5 Impacts on Vulnerable Groups in the Sending Countries

5.1 Introduction

This chapter addresses the impact of migration on different vulnerable groups. In some cases, it is hard to isolate the vulnerability which is a product of migration from other general vulnerabilities. Most of the groups discussed here face vulnerabilities in relation to changing demographics, to changing family forms, and may be, in general, more at risk of poverty and social exclusion. In addition, the ways in which, and to what extent, social protection systems, including pensions and health care, respond to vulnerabilities makes a difference. In this section, then, for each of the three main groupings of countries, we address the key challenges in demographics, family forms and social protection responses before dealing with the main migration-related vulnerable groups.

These issues all emerged in studies on social protection and social inclusion in the new Member States, candidate countries and potential candidates, and in the European Partnership countries and are, therefore, not repeated here in general terms. On the whole, the new Member States have stronger, more integrated and more coherent social protection systems than the other countries in the study.

In addition, there is no overwhelming evidence from the country reports that women, per se, are a vulnerable group in relation to migration. At the same time, there has been a growing attention paid to the gender dimensions of migration in recent years. This has led to an important discussion on the many and varied gender vulnerabilities to migration. Here, we address the different gendered impacts of migration and return, as well as on those left behind, in different contexts, against the backdrop of changing gender relations and changing expectations upon men and women.

5.1.1 Gender and Migration

EU-8+2

A number of reports note the increased burden on women left behind, in terms of care-giving responsibilities. Even more importantly, much of the ‘new’ female migration from the new Member States to parts of the EU-15 concerns women who migrate as care workers or domestic workers. Whilst some of this is in the formal care sector, and involves professional or semi-professional pay and conditions, much of it is informal and akin to a form of domestic service. Whilst this may provide valuable experience, a small income, and a new horizon, for younger women, including those seeing this as a period prior to entry to higher education or the formal labour market back home, the implications for older women, who may migrate out of financial reasons, can be more problematic, in terms of precariousness and exploitation which may take place. In addition, those women who migrate who have a qualification as a nurse, for example, may find their qualification and experience are not valued or validated, so that they essentially become unskilled workers. The Polish report suggests that a significant number of younger women also work abroad as seasonal workers or as contract cleaners, often in the informal economy. These women, on return, face difficulties in finding employment and are disadvantaged in terms of realising social security rights. There is some limited evidence from the reports of strains in family relationships as a result of migration. There are also suggestions that, in some isolated rural areas, significant female migration contributes to further decline and low birth-rates.
**Gender and Migration: the Greek Experience**

The Greek country report shows the importance of gender and migration in the context of female labour migration to more developed parts of the EU, where women who had been, mainly, home workers experienced the formal labour market for the first time. Whilst, upon return, women from agricultural areas tended to become part of small family businesses as well as helping to invest in agricultural machinery, women returning to urban areas found it hard to reintegrate into what was still a very male dominated formal employment scene. Women tended either to 'cash in' their social security rights upon return or face real problems in transferring their social security rights and securing sufficient paid years back home to be entitled to a pension. The Greek experience may be relevant for other countries with a sizeable agricultural sector based on smallholdings and significant levels of subsistence or near-subsistence agricultural production.

**Candidate Countries and Potential Candidates**

All of the country reports speak of the increased pressure on women within families, either when men migrate or in situations where women return after paid work abroad. Whilst traditional gender roles can sometimes be challenged by female migration and return, as the Kosovo* and Macedonian reports point out, often women are left to manage multi-generational households. Indeed, in Kosovo*, remittances tend to be from men abroad to women who assume the role of head of the extended family at home. The impact of conflict-induced displacement is also emphasised in a number of reports, with women in collective centres reported to have fewer opportunities for employment or education. At the same time, the role of women as single parents in the context of conflict has led to higher poverty rates in many countries. The Macedonian report suggests that women left behind have so many household responsibilities that they are often forced to disengage from the formal labour market. The situation is even more problematic for ethnic minority women and for rural women. The latter, in both the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Albania, are reported to face dual burdens of household caring, often for two or three generations, and engagement in subsistence agriculture. The Turkish report suggests, on the contrary, that women may have even been empowered by migration, and even in Kosovo* there is a cohort of women who, on return, tend to distinguish themselves from the rest of the Albanian society.

**European Partnership Countries**

Whilst date sources vary, there is clear evidence that a number of women and girls from Belarus, Moldova, Azerbaijan and Georgia are at risk of being trafficked, mainly for sexual exploitation. These countries may also be origin and transit countries for trafficking to different parts of the world. In addition, many of the same concerns regarding gender relations in the other two sub-regions are reflected in the reports from the European Partnership Programme countries.

**5.2 EU Member States (EU-8+2)**

**5.2.1 Children**

Whilst there is a great deal of empirical research evidence on the adaptation of migrant children in receiving countries, the issue of children of migrants 'left behind' in sending countries is only now beginning to attract attention in the enlarged EU. Whilst the main concern is in relation to children 'left behind' when one or both parents migrate, there are also concerns regarding children who spent part of their childhood in different countries and who may not complete their education. In a small number of countries, the scale of the problem is such that it has attracted both public and policy attention. In other countries, the issue is not yet of significance. In many countries, however, the size of the problem is probably understated, so that policy choices made are far from optimal in addressing the needs of diverse groups of children affected by migration.
Children left behind and returnee children: Lessons learnt from Greece

There are lessons to be learnt, however, from the Greek experience in the 1970s and 1980s, particularly relating to Greek migrants to Germany, with estimates that, in 1980, a third of Greek children were left behind, mainly with grandparents, and often for very long periods. The Greek CR also notes the problems of the reintegration of returnee children into the Greek education system and the lack of support services, particularly for those in rural areas. Around half of the returning young people failed training programmes because of language difficulties or lack of interest, with research pointing to the dangers of returnee children becoming “an ‘underclass’ living in the same underprivileged conditions as their parents did before migration” (CR EL). There is some evidence of the practical and psychological problems faced by children left behind, only partly compensated for by remittances which were channelled into the children’s education.

The numbers of children left behind are largely uncertain. Estimates from a coalition of NGOs ‘Children Left Behind’ are that there are some 500,000 children of migrants left behind in today’s EU. Their suggestion that the overwhelming majority of these are in Romania and Poland, with smaller numbers in Lithuania and Latvia, is largely borne out by the country reports, although there may also be children left behind in Bulgaria and Estonia. Of the remaining EU MS in the study, it is possible that the issue is no longer relevant in Slovenia and is of little significance in Hungary. The Slovak Republic is, perhaps, a case where there has been almost no policy attention to the issue but where, given the scale and nature of migration, there may be a significant number of children affected.

Evidence from research and surveys, and policy responses, are most advanced in Romania, in the context of a wider awareness of the importance of child protection issues. As early as June 2006, a statutory order placed responsibility on local authorities to identify, monitor and, if necessary, supervise children whose parents are working abroad. Official statistics from March 2011 suggest that some 85,000 children have one or both parents working abroad, 42% of whom have no parent with them. Some 3,350 are under special protection measures. A UNICEF study in August 2007 suggested that the true figure was closer to 350,000 children, representing about 7% of the total population aged 0-18, with more than one third (126,000) having both parents abroad, half of them under 10 years of age. Significantly more children lived without their father than without their mother. The majority of these children were from rural areas and from the part of Romania bordering Moldova, which has also been identified as one of the high migration loss regions under Chapter 3 (CR RO). The scale of the problem is highlighted by the fact that another 400,000 children have experienced separation from one or both migrant parents in the past (quoted by ‘Children Left Behind’). Between 2006 and 2008, some 30,000 children requested papers to continue their education in a foreign country, and some 14,000 returnees enrolled in the Romanian system, some of whom were reported to face problems of language and of being too old for their class or too young for ‘Second Chance’ programmes in adult education (CR RO).

Research evidence on the impacts on children left behind is rather sparse and mixed. There are suggestions that such children experience the emotional impacts of the lack of parental affection and, interestingly, that remittances tend to be used not so much for educational investments as for consumer goods for children. Those with both parents abroad appear to have poorer school achievement, on a par with that of non-migrant children whose parents have divorced or are from a lower socio-economic background (CR RO).

In Poland, the issue has also become a subject of public and policy concern. Whilst ‘Children Left Behind’ cite figures of some 100,000 children affected, the Poland country report cites a national survey suggesting that between 1.1 and 1.6 million children aged 9-18 experienced some separation, however short term, from at least one parent within a three year period. Given that in 40% of cases the separation lasted less than 2 months, the true figure is much lower but may still represent some 15% of all children in that age group. The majority of children have fathers working abroad, and there is some evidence of lower grades, more

absences, and increased behavioural difficulties in the context of a lack of awareness of the problem within schools (CR PL). A particular cause for concern are older children, aged 14-18, with both parents abroad, who appear to be at higher risk of school drop-out and of problems with the criminal justice system.

‘Children Left Behind’ estimates that some 9,500 are left behind in Lithuania. A survey of 651 educational institutions in 2007 found 4,039 children left without any parental care, living with grandparents, relatives, older brothers and sisters, friends, or, in a small number of cases, even living alone. In the context of Lithuania’s general poor outcomes in terms of child well-being (Bradshaw and Richardson, 2009), children can suffer emotional, intellectual and behavioural problems which are often not reacted to by parents or caregivers and, thus, reproduce educational inequality. A survey in 2008 by the Children’s Rights Ombudsperson found 608 returnee children in the school year 2007/8, many of whom needed extra attention and support because of differences in learning programmes, language problems and poor social conditions (CR LT).

The Latvian country report notes increasing concern regarding children left behind but no precise numbers, suggesting, however, that the number runs to thousands. There are suggestions that many of those children who do not attend school have one or both parents abroad. In Estonia, there is a phenomenon of children left behind where one or both parents work in Finland and, thus, return home most weekends, with consequent effects on children’s behaviour at different times of the week (CR LV). Whilst Bulgaria has no numerical estimates, some locations in the mountains and in the North of the country face situations where the majority of children live with relatives because their parents work abroad or elsewhere in Bulgaria (CR BG). The Bulgarian report notes a phenomenon which was remarked upon in earlier migrations, namely the impacts on children of living with migrant parents some of the time and returning home at other times. When this is planned carefully, in line with educational milestones, the impacts may be less than in cases where the children frequently miss some or all of a school year as is, apparently, the case in some Roma families.

In summary, the issue of the impacts of migration on children needs more attention. The importance of knowing the nature of the phenomenon is most relevant here. The importance of registration of child migrants, in ways which do not label them as automatically a problem group, is crucial. Research shows that, whilst migration may be a stress factor in relation to psycho-social well-being, school performance, and the like, it cannot be treated in isolation from socio-economic status and, above all, the quality of the child’s care network, regardless of its nature and transnational form. Support services, ranging from information provision to intensive psycho-social support, need to be offered in a flexible and supportive way.

5.2.2 Older People

In the context of general population ageing throughout Europe, and an erosion of the extended family form in post-communist countries, the specific linkages between migration and older people are rarely a focus of research and policy interest. The migration of older people to join their children abroad, which is said to happen rarely, and the return of migrants to their home country upon retirement, which may happen increasingly in the future, are issues of potential concern. Nevertheless, the main issue raised in the country reports relates to older people left behind as a result of migration, both internal migration and, even more so, emigration abroad. There may also be an issue relating to the added pressure on older people looking after children whose parents are abroad (see above).

119 Old age dependency ratios are meant to increase considerably in all the new MS by 2030, reaching between 30.2% (RO) and 38.8% (BG). In the New Member States, currently between 2.7% and 4.6% of the population is 80+, below the EU-27 rate of 4.7%. The proportion of single-adult-over-65 households is between 11.4% (CZ) and 15.4% (EE) (EU-SILC).
Whilst old people alone tend to be a relatively poor and excluded group in many EU MS, it is difficult to state that those ‘left behind’ by migration are in any worse position. Only in Bulgaria and Slovenia are at-risk-of-poverty rates significantly higher amongst older people than the working-age population. In part, this is because the aggregate replacement rates of pensions are still relatively high, between 43% (BG) and 65% (RO), but likely to fall in the context of a crisis of contributions and wider demographic changes. In many ways, the fate of older people alone is dependent on the quality of support received, be it informal support, from relatives, friends and neighbours, and/or formal support in the form of community-based or residential social services. At the same time, the existence of links with those who migrated, and their nature, intensity and form, may also be crucial in terms of emotional and material well-being for those left behind. Another issue which has not been a focus of research concerns the growth of private sector care providers, with older people whose children can afford to pay for care because they work abroad being an important target group. Here, the purchasing of care ‘long-distance’ as it were may not be matched by the quality of care nor adequate supervision. Older people are, in addition, often users of ‘bought-in’ and, indeed, ‘live-in’ care services provided by migrants, usually female, from other countries, again a sector which may lack sufficient regulatory controls. (Hrženjak, 2012; Williams, 204).

The Hungarian country report also raises the issue of ‘ageing regions’, which may have a wider applicability. In the context of both internal migration and emigration, some regions have a significant increase in the proportion of older people and, consequently, a decrease in the availability of both informal caring networks and formal care services. Older people with health issues who, with support, may have been able to remain at home tend, therefore, to be admitted to long-term care some distance away. The lack of access to essential services and infrastructure, important for all in these regions, poses acute problems for older people who may have issues with mobility. In Poland, where there has been significant migration of people of working age, only around 2% of emigrants annually are over 65 years of age. According to the report, there is a disproportionate number of older women living at home alone, replicated in most other countries, a product more of the higher life expectancy of women than any dynamics of migration, we would suggest. Limited survey data on Polish migrants in Iceland shows that 66% provide some form of care for their parents left behind, 56% sending money, on average around EUR 200 per month, although other research suggests older people are net givers of transfers rather than receivers (CR PL). In both Romania and Bulgaria, spending on formal care for older people is extremely low, and Romania has a significant waiting list of older people for admission into residential care, as does the Slovak Republic, where older people can wait up to five years for a place (CR SK). Home care services are not well developed, which is a significant gap in the ‘continuum of care’ for vulnerable older people.

The Slovak report, whilst noting that as migrants tend to be young, their parents are still young too, picks up on the issue of transnational care chains, which may be relevant elsewhere. A recent study of female carers from the Slovak Republic in Austria shows that 5% of them have parents with care needs back home. On the whole, these needs are being met by other family members rather than through formal social services (CR SK). The introduction of a Carer’s Benefit for anyone looking after a severely disabled family member, whilst subject to considerable variation in different regions, and having declined in recent years overall, is an important benefit which can act as an incentive for carers to stay at home rather than work abroad.

5.2.3 Roma and Other Vulnerable Religious and Ethnic Communities

Statistics on Roma migration, even within the EU Member States, are notoriously difficult to obtain and unreliable. Indeed, given the mistrust which many Roma have in the official use of

statistics, the true number of Roma in EU MS, as in the other countries in this study, often is considerably higher than those who declare themselves as Roma at a census. As Table 5.8 shows, Council of Europe estimates suggest that between 8% and 10% of the population of Bulgaria, the Slovak Republic and Romania are Roma and slightly less in Hungary. Greece and the Czech Republic each has about 2-2.5% of the population who are Roma. Whilst there are significant numbers of Roma in Latvia, Poland and Slovenia, between 3,000 and 12,000, their proportions are low. The two other Baltic States, Lithuania and Estonia, have negligible numbers of Roma, constituting less than 0.1% of their respective populations.

Table 5.1: Official and estimated number of Roma in selected EU MS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Official numbers</th>
<th>Average estimate</th>
<th>Estimate as % of total population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>370,908</td>
<td>750,000</td>
<td>10.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak Republic</td>
<td>89,920</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>9.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>535,140</td>
<td>1,850,000</td>
<td>8.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>190,046</td>
<td>700,000</td>
<td>7.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>11,718</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>1.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>8,205</td>
<td>14,500</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>3,246</td>
<td>8,500</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>12,731</td>
<td>37,500</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>2,571</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>584</td>
<td>1,250</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>265,000</td>
<td>2.47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OSCE, 2010: 87-88. These are the same as the latest CoE statistics downloadable from http://www.coe.int/t/dg3/romatravellers/default_en.asp (accessed 7 May 2012)

Much of the concern over the last two decades has focused on discrimination against, and the lack of integration of, Roma in receiving countries in the EU, as well as uneven and arbitrary treatment of refugee and asylum claims. In recent years, practices of the repatriation or deportation of Roma from France, Italy, and other EU Member States in Western Europe, coming on top of rather arbitrary ethnic profiling by police and social workers, as well as forced evictions and destruction of property in informal Roma settlements have raised the issue of the impacts of migration on Roma even more starkly. In addition, EU enlargements in 2004 and 2007, and limitations on the free movement of some EU citizens, have created an even more complex situation. Significant numbers of Roma have, in the past, left countries which later became EU Member States, blurring the line somewhat between economic migrants and asylum seekers. A number of new Member States have seen both immigration and emigration of Roma. The creation of new nation states has left significant numbers of Roma without citizenship or without their preferred citizenship. The fact that “superficially unitary Romani communities may include persons with differing status and potentially differing legal entitlements” (OSCE, 2010: 18) presents enormous challenges for Roma inclusion and social cohesion. The implications of these processes for Roma left behind, for Roma extended families which are split up through migration, and in terms of the negative cycle of (possibly repeated) forced repatriation of Roma migrants are now being considered as equally serious as issues of Roma integration and non-discrimination in receiving countries.

As the Bulgaria country report reminds us, there may also be negative social impacts for Roma as a result of internal migration, often contributing to a precarious situation in which it is even harder to access social rights and to secure access to education, health and social
services. External labour migration is, often, without children, who lose contact with their parents and where older children take on the role of care giver at an early age. There may be around 10% of the Bulgarian population lacking insurance-based health care rights, the vast majority of whom are thought to be Roma (CR BG). Significant numbers of Bulgarian Roma work in neighbouring Greece as temporary migrants, seasonal workers in agriculture, and in scrap metal recycling (OSCE, 2010: 38). This kind of ‘circular migration’, of course, carries with it no rights to transferable social security benefits. The fact that Bulgaria is not part of the Schengen agreement, coupled with the limitation on free movement of Bulgarian citizens within the EU, both work to limit the possibility of Roma finding work in the more prosperous EU Member States. Recent actions by France, involving the repatriation of large numbers of Bulgarian Roma, also suggests that the gains from Roma migration are limited by continued discrimination, lack of access to contract-based employment, and continued poverty. What is particularly relevant, especially where local authorities have discretion, is that Roma may have great difficulty in registering for services within a local authority, even when they have a right to stay in a country.

The nature of Roma emigration has been studied, to some extent, in Romania, where a picture emerges that migration tends to occur more in less impoverished Roma communities. In addition, once emigration of a significant number has been achieved, there is a tendency to even greater migration (CR RO). Large-scale Roma migration occurs from the South West (Oltenia) and Central regions. Whilst general surveys show almost twice as many Roma intending to migrate than non-Roma, in reality the numbers who do migrate are probably rather similar, although the impacts on the social conditions of those back home is very different. It has been suggested that some 30% of Roma in Romania lack health insurance, and only 21% of Roma are formally employed (CR RO). The majority of Roma migration has traditionally been to Latinate speaking countries such as Spain, Italy and France. Certainly, the combination of deportation and substantial payments to those who presented a viable business plan was applied in France to Romanian Roma, albeit with, apparently, no significant impact on Roma well-being back in Romania (OSCE, 2010: 53). It is not clear what the demographic profiles of deported Roma were, whether it was mainly individuals, or groups of adults or whether it included extended family members. A little remarked on possibility is that the deportation of Romanian Roma from France and Italy has led to increased hostility to Roma in Romania, seen as having ‘harmed Romania’s reputation abroad’ (OSCE, 2010: 39).

There are issues regarding Roma migration within the Slovak Republic, with a marked movement in the 1990s of Roma out of the hostile environments in towns, where they had often been displaced to sub-standard accommodation following non-payment of rents, in search of a better standard of life in the relatively cheaper countryside. Some Roma sold their urban flats in the first wave of housing privatisation. A form of forced internal migration has emerged after the passing of a law in 2001 which allows for eviction after non-payment of three months’ rent and gives municipalities a duty to provide alternative shelter only in situations where the non-payer has permanent residence. There are suggestions that, in terms of international emigration, urban Roma who have more access to resources, information and networks, tend to migrate more than their rural counterparts. There are a number of voluntary repatriation programmes involving former Roma asylum seekers in Belgium. Again, where the returnee has housing debts back in the Slovak Republic there are no obligations on municipalities to provide housing. Small studies suggest positive benefits of Roma emigration to more multi-cultural societies such as the UK, particularly on children (CR SK).

Whilst significant numbers of Roma residing in the Czech Republic were forced into the Slovak Republic after the break-up of Czechoslovakia, the Roma community in the Czech Republic remains significant in size, concentrated in industrial areas, whereas Slovak Roma are overwhelmingly concentrated in the East of the Slovak Republic and in the Prešov region. Czech Roma have, in the past, been pushed by a combination of poverty and discrimination into seeking possibilities for work, or asylum, in other countries. At one time or another, asylum applications from Czech Roma were high in the United Kingdom and in
Canada, for example. Again, migration tends to involve a larger extended family, although officials suggest that often working age adults migrate first with children following if the adults manage to secure a foothold in the receiving country. Qualitative research suggests that there are strong bonds between transnational Roma families and significant levels of migrant remittances. Returning Roma children are said to face greater problems in accessing and completing education than their non-migrating Roma peers. In terms which are relevant to all the countries in this study, there are some suggestions that returning Roma are often worse off than they were when they left, having sold whatever property they may have had, sometimes having accumulated debts, and finding it even harder to access basic services. A minority of Roma, however, are said to be able to save while abroad and invest in improved housing on return (CR CZ).

In Hungary, as in many parts of Central Europe, Roma were among the greatest losers of transition, although some of the legacy of high levels of employment and completion of higher education for a tiny group still remain, particularly in Budapest. Roma migration tends to be in larger extended family groups. Roma circular migration is, it seems, strongly linked to transnational forms of intermediary training. Like Czech Roma, Hungarian Roma went to Canada in significant numbers in the late 1990s as asylum seekers, although far fewer saw their claims accepted.

In Bulgaria, there is evidence of discrimination and social exclusion against Bulgarian Turks, 9.4% of the population according to the 2001 census, and Bulgarian-speaking Muslims, around 3% of the population according to the census. Bulgarian citizens of Turkish origin had been subjected to ‘forced assimilation’ in the last years of the Communist regime in the 1980s, when it was forbidden to use the Turkish language and people were forced to adopt Bulgarian names. Around 350,000 Bulgarian Turks were expelled to Turkey in 1989 after protests against these policies, with some 120,000 subsequently returning (Council of Europe, 2010). The existence, then, of a strong linkage amongst some families and communities with Turkey has implications in terms of options for the future, given that this group continues to be most disadvantaged on the labour market in Bulgaria. The Bulgarian-speaking Muslims face even greater discrimination, being denied access to certain minority rights protection instruments in Bulgaria, in the context of a marked rise in intolerance against this group by the general population. Bulgarian Muslims are involved in seasonal labour migration but, thus far, there is no evidence of significant depopulation of their villages (BG CR).
5.3 Candidate Countries and Potential Candidates

5.3.1 Children

Although precise figures are not available, many of the issues regarding children and migration are similar to those discussed above concerning the EU Member States. In addition, however, most of the post-Yugoslav countries have faced issues regarding children in the context of conflict-driven forced migration and uneven return and repatriation post-conflict. One issue concerns unaccompanied children in exile, with UNHCR registering over 6,300 children fleeing their homes as a result of the war (UNHCR, 1995). In 1994, over 4,000 unaccompanied minors from Bosnia and Herzegovina were registered in Croatia, with projects seeking to find accommodation for such children as well as attempting to reunite them with relatives (Bucevic and Ljiljak, 2000). Unlike internally displaced children, refugee children were not eligible for care placements through the Croatian statutory system, so that special arrangements needed to be made.

Whilst some 19,000 minors are noted amongst internally displaced persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina (CR BA), it is not known how many are separated from one or both parents. Just as exile can involve separation from one or both parents, and indeed many children suffered the death of one or both parents in the war, so return can also involve the splitting of families. Children returning to pre-war settlements face problems in terms of receiving the appropriate schooling and the lack of genuine multi-ethnic schooling, in the context of the policy of ‘two schools under one roof’ in Bosnia and Herzegovina. All returning children in this region face problems of the lack of, slow, or only partial recognition of diplomas gained abroad.

Generally, the picture presented is that, at the height of the guest-worker phenomenon in the 1970s and 1980s, children were often left at home with one parent, at that time nearly always the mother, or in the care of grandparents. Sometimes, this was a result of restrictions on family members joining the migrant worker, in other cases, parents decided to explore conditions before sending for children. The existence of transnational families should not, necessarily, be viewed as problematic, even in situations where children attended schools in different countries, evidence of poorer school performance and of emotional problems is far from scientifically proven. On the other hand, it should not be assumed that remittances automatically support children’s education – as the Kosovo* report notes, remittances tend to be consumption-oriented. As is noted in the Macedonian report, the receipt of remittances may even discourage families to send children to school (CR MK), particularly in rural areas. Schemes to encourage school attendance, which make certain child and social benefits conditional on attendance, can, therefore, be undermined by remittances. However, a recent paper on remittances in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia shows the general growth of remittances, as well as their cyclical nature (Cipusheva and Abazi-Alili, 2011). Whilst the study does not address the poverty impacts of remittances, it does counter any idea that, in the context of making child benefits conditional on school attendance, there is any negative impact of remittances on school attendance.

A concern which is raised in the Kosovo* country report, regarding the return of young people, may well be of wider relevance. Many young people earlier forced into exile, often at a very young age, in the conflict, now face return to a country, culture, language, and education system which they have little or no understanding of. This can lead to inter-generational culture clashes. In addition, given the absence of any clear support programmes, their educational performance and future employment prospects can suffer. Many find integration difficult and dream of returning to the country they know, something which is currently largely impossible other than through illegal emigration. A particular concern is Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian young returnees, many of whom do not possess the relevant documents enabling them to access health and educational services.
In the poorer countries of the region, rural children left behind are the most vulnerable, with the absence of pre-school, secondary school and higher education provision in rural areas most striking. Indeed, in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, where high levels of youth unemployment is being countered, in part, by a significant increase in tertiary enrolment, young people themselves are effectively migrating to take advantage of opportunities which may not, in the end, lead to increased employability. Surveys in Albania suggest that over 10% of both internal and international migrants leave children behind, with the phenomenon more common for international migrants from rural areas. A UNICEF study suggests over 4,200 children left behind (UNICEF-IUR, 2009). The vast majority of these families have only the father working abroad and the mother remaining behind in Albania. The problem for children is compounded when the migration is undocumented or illegal, or where the migration is of the low-skilled who, even abroad, receive relatively low incomes. Children left behind, especially Roma and Egyptian children, thus, live in poverty and with grandparents who often cannot meet their health, educational and social needs (CR AL).

The Turkish country report considers those children as most vulnerable who were sent back to Turkey by their parents for schooling in the 1980s and 1990s. Statistical data about how many children were sent back to Turkey unaccompanied are not available. However, it is commonly known that many children were sent back to Turkey for schooling at the secondary level after five schools were opened in Turkey through the cooperation of German and Turkish states for the purpose of reintegrating returnee children. Some of these children stayed with their grandparents, but some of them even stayed alone away from parental control (CR TR).

5.3.2 Older People

Whilst concrete survey evidence is lacking, the general concerns regarding the impacts of migration on older people, particularly in terms of older people 'left behind' are relevant to the candidate countries and potential candidates. With the partial exception of Albania, Turkey and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the countries in this sub-region have high, and rising, old age dependency ratios. Croatia’s rate, at 28%, is already higher than the EU-27 average of 25.9%\(^\text{121}\). Contributor-to-pensioner ratios are as low as 1.2:1 in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, although higher, between 1.4:1 for Serbia and 1.7:1 for Montenegro elsewhere. Replacement rates have been kept artificially high through state subsidies in Serbia and Montenegro but are falling elsewhere (LO Norway, 2011).

There are a significant number of older people throughout the region who do not receive a pension or whose pensions are very low.\(^\text{122}\) Many of these are those who have remained in rural areas and are involved in subsistence or near-subsistence agriculture. The risk is increased when health issues make continued involvement in subsistence agriculture difficult. In remote areas, or areas where there has been large-scale out-migration of the working age population, the lack of informal support from neighbours is a major issue. At the same time, lack of support and lack of transport may make it more difficult to access formal health and social services.

In addition, there are specific concerns relating to conflict-induced migration and post-conflict return, as well as, potentially at least, issues regarding the return of older guest workers. Underpinning all of these are rather rapid changes to family structure and culture in the context of diverse processes of modernisation and the erosion, in parts of the region, of what might be seen as a traditional extended family model, with formal social services being under resource constraints and/or extremely slow to react to this trend. At the same time, there is a growing trend for older people to be the primary carers of grandchildren, either in migrant


\(^{122}\) In Croatia, 12.4% of the population above 64 or 2% of the total population are without pensions or other income (ASISP, Annual Report HR, 2012, unpublished). In the FYR of Macedonia, 31.9% of the population above 64 does not receive a pension (Bornarova, Gerovska, 2009, in CR MK).
worker households or when ‘left behind’, which also places strain on an impoverished section of the community. Notwithstanding the alleviating impact of (albeit declining) remittances, it is often the case that older people are negatively affected by both international emigration and rural-urban migration.

In relation to the wars and post-conflict return, the impact of forced migration is often greatest on older people. At the same time, there is evidence from the region that older people are more likely to return than the working-age population. Both displacement and return can contribute, then, to vulnerability, especially when return is to war-affected areas, and where there may be difficulties in securing entitlements to pensions, as a result of interrupted pension and social insurance contributions. The fact that older returnees may be from a different ethnic group compared to the general population can compound deprivation.

The reports from Kosovo* and Albania suggest that the extended family model remains important even in the context of migration, with older people left behind still living with one or more providers or, in other cases, receiving remittances from abroad. At the same time, other reports suggest that, particularly in the context of forced migration and uneven return, parents may begin to forget their ageing relatives ‘back home’ after a number of years. The point made in the Croatia report that a combination of low income, isolation, high transport costs and gaps in the provision of community-based social services adds to the exclusion of older people left behind, especially in rural, net-migration-loss, and war-affected regions, has a general applicability to much of the region (CR HR).

All of the country reports suggest that the vulnerability of older people is quite high, with a higher-than-average risk of poverty and, particularly in rural areas, of social exclusion. Hence, migration compounds these vulnerabilities and, although remittances may help, the absence of quality community-based social services is the major problem facing all older people living alone, who face problems in accessing basic services. In Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, older people tended to return more than their children after the conflicts ended. In some cases, this may be to areas where they are a minority, suffering from post-conflict-related deprivations and even discrimination. The Bosnian country report notes the possibility of older people living alone in situations where there is limited support from friends and neighbours. In Croatia, increasing numbers of old people live alone, some of these as a result of migration. The extent of family care varies in different parts of Croatia, with the larger extended family still important in the East and South of the country (CR HR). The Macedonian report points out that, whilst older people may have support from distant relatives and neighbours, this is less the case in urban areas. Access to social protection services, both in terms of travelling to where the services are and finding all the necessary documents, is reported to be much harder for older people living alone (CR MK). The issue of isolated older people living in deteriorating housing, on land they are unable to cultivate, but whose remittance income makes it hard for them to qualify for social services support is a wider problem. The absence of private care services in the region, therefore, impacts most on this group of older people. The under-cultivation of land in rural areas is associated with older people living alone (CR MK). The issue of lack of access to banking facilities is also raised in the Macedonian report, meaning that many older people left behind receive remittance incomes only periodically. The Croatia and Montenegro reports both suggest that the problem of older people living alone is exacerbated in isolated rural areas, such as the mountainous areas or the less accessible islands. In Serbia, general problems faced by older people, particularly in rural areas, are said to be compounded by the impact of migration. Whilst, legally, older people with children abroad can be entitled to social support in the same way as those with no children, in practice realising these rights is difficult (CR RS). The issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia are compounded by older people who may have lost pension entitlements during the conflicts (see Chapter 4).

### 5.3.3 Roma and Other Vulnerable Religious and Ethnic Communities

The issues regarding Roma and migration in the Western Balkans and Turkey are similar to those regarding the EU MS, with two important caveats. The first is that Roma have
experienced forced migration and, often forced return, consequent upon the wars of the Yugoslav succession. In the case of the conflict in Kosovo*, Roma have been explicitly targeted – elsewhere, whilst they may not have been targeted directly, impacts on their well-being have been profound. Secondly, even in the context of new visa regimes between the Western Balkans and EU MS, Roma from the region are largely unable to take advantage of opportunities for legal economic migration, much less circular migration, to the EU, lacking many of the formal qualifications required and, in significant number of cases, lacking travel documents. Instead, Roma are forced to rely on illegal migration or, at best, to claim temporary asylum or to seek refugee status which, since the end of the conflicts, is now virtually impossible.

As Table 5.9 shows, Roma in the region are even less likely to declare themselves as such in a population census than Roma in EU Member States. Whilst some of the average estimates are higher than those given in country reports, it is clear that Roma, together with Ashkali and Egyptians (in Kosovo*), and Egyptians (in Albania)\(^{123}\) constitute a sizeable minority in many of the countries of the region. Even in Croatia, where they make up less than 1% of the total population, they would have been the second largest ethnic or national minority, after Serbs, at the 2001 census, or third largest if those who described themselves as ‘Bosniaks’ and those who described themselves as ‘Muslims’ were added together.

Table 5.2: Official and estimated number of Roma in the candidate countries and potential candidates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Official numbers</th>
<th>Average estimate</th>
<th>Estimate as % of total population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
<td>53,879</td>
<td>197,750</td>
<td>9.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>108,193</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>8.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>1,261</td>
<td>115,000</td>
<td>3.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>2,826</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>2.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo*</td>
<td>45,745</td>
<td>37,500</td>
<td>1.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>8,864</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>1.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>9,463</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>4,656</td>
<td>2,750,000</td>
<td>3.83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


What is also clear, both from the country reports and from national and comparative studies (cf. UNDP, 2005), is that Roma are the group at greatest risk of poverty and social exclusion in the region. In addition to discrimination, human rights violations and, often, access to citizenship, Roma face disproportionately high levels of poverty, material deprivation, and live in housing which, despite infrastructure investments in recent years, is still overcrowded, ill-health producing, and with little access to utilities. As UNDP research shows, Roma deprivation is high even when compared to non-Roma living in the vicinity (UNDP, 2006) and when other characteristics are controlled for (Milcher, 2009). In addition, despite official policies and endless pilot programmes, access to pre-school, school and higher education is extremely limited. This situation, taken as a whole, can be a driver for migration.

There are few comprehensive studies, however, of Roma and migration in the region. A survey in Kosovo* found that around 20% of Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian households had

\(^{123}\) Ashkali and Egyptians are self-identifying communities who are Albanian speaking (Arifi, 2009).
family members living abroad, with over half receiving support from them, 52% of these stating that they are totally or highly dependent on such assistance. The extent of Roma poverty is shown by the fact that only 3.76% of respondents have a monthly household income over EUR 300 (CR XK). Roma in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are said to undertake seasonal internal migration or to attempt to migrate to Western Europe to break the poverty trap. Whilst Roma fleeing the conflicts were given temporary right to stay in EU Member States, they faced compulsory return when it was deemed safe. Throughout the region, however, this forced return has compounded the problems. Even if the return was to the place of origin, which it often was not, the possibilities for reintegration are often hindered by arbitrary rules and administrative discretion, in some cases rendering Roma without necessary documents to access key services or even, as in some cases, stateless. In January 2009 there were 29,781 stateless persons in the Western Balkans, mostly Roma lacking documentation (CSIS-EKEM, 2010). There have been programmes which have linked forced return of Roma to development aid but there has been little review of the effectiveness of this support in the longer term.

As with non-Roma migrants, the Albania CR suggests that only those with sufficient income and good networks are able to migrate. Interestingly, Roma and Egyptians migrate overwhelmingly to Greece. In the late 1990s, two forms of illegal migration were common: migration in large groups of up to 300 people, often using the services of an intermediary, and illegal migration in small family groups. In addition, and still today, legal migration to Greece can occur through family connections and in relation to seasonal agricultural work at harvest time. Other sources of income in Greece, as at home, are begging and collecting, often tasks performed by women and children. In the survey, about 80% send remittances home, 97% through informal channels (CR AL). The issue of Roma child labour is also raised in the Macedonian report, in terms of seasonal agricultural work or begging in tourist sites. This combination of work and internal migration serves to further limit Roma children’s possibility to enrol and continue in formal education.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Roma living in informal settlements or who lived in social housing before the war are frequently excluded from the benefits of new property laws and tend not to benefit from reconstruction assistance. The country report from Bosnia and Herzegovina suggests that a very large number of adult Roma do not possess any documents, and a significant number are stateless. The authorities have been unresponsive to Roma requests for return of possessions or rehabilitation of damaged housing. Some reports have also indicated that Roma women and girls may be especially vulnerable to trafficking.

The situation of Kosovo* Roma is particularly sensitive because of the continued unresolved nature of Kosovo*-Serbia relations, the existence of border enclaves, and the targeting of Kosovo* Roma for alleged ‘collaboration’ during the conflict. The case of the Roma from Kosovo* Mitrovica, some 8,000 of whom lived in a mahalla or Roma settlement before the war, has received the most attention but is, in many ways, symptomatic of wider concerns. During the height of the conflict, Roma fled mainly to Serbian-held Northern Kosovo* and, at the end of the conflict, their mahalla was destroyed. Most remain in displaced persons camps in northern Mitrovica, amidst continued concerns about health in the context of high levels of lead from a disused lead mine complex nearby. In 2007, some 450 displaced persons returned but fewer now remain in the context of no prospects of a sustainable livelihood (Human Rights Watch, 2009).

In the context of the recent wars and longer-term historical changes, not least in terms of state-building and the end of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires, the situation of other ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities in the region is complex, with family and community ties often being ‘transnational’ in the context of the ‘new’ nation states. It is often said that the region remains the meeting place of Orthodox Christianity, Catholicism and Islam. At the same time, the idea of a homogeneous Islamic community is in danger of neglecting critical historical, cultural, religious, linguistic and political differences. Little is known regarding a number of smaller Islamic communities, such as the Gorani, who speak a
South Slavic dialect, probably number less than 100,000 and who are concentrated in the Gora region, a triangle of land including parts of Albania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Kosovo*. In terms of other Muslim groups, whilst the Ashkali are most often discussed as Roma, they also have distinct religious, cultural and linguistic traditions. There are also Bosniaks throughout the region, Muslims who trace their roots to Bosnia-Herzegovina, and those who identify as Turkish. In the context of this transnational status, many of these groups are underestimated in national population accounts and face various kinds of discrimination. They are also more prone to migrate, at least seasonally, than their non-Muslim neighbours.

The broad picture is that minorities tend to migrate to their perceived homeland, this being the case for Albanians in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Macedonians and Greeks in Albania (AL CR, MK CR). In Serbia, the Hungarian minority, concentrated in the more prosperous Northern area of Vojvodina, which had a status, like Kosovo*, as an autonomous province in socialist Yugoslavia, has declined in absolute and relative numbers over the last fifty years, with some migration to Hungary increasing in the 1990s. The Sandžak region, named after a former Ottoman region, covers part of Serbia and Montenegro and tends to have higher out-migration, which also increased during the wars in the 1990s, so that those who remain are often older and more vulnerable (RS CR). The vulnerability of these migrants lies, in part at least, in the continued uncertainty regarding the political situation between the nation states across whose territories they move and a consequent lack of portability of rights.

5.3.4 Post-conflict IDPs and Returning Refugees

As a result of the wars of the Yugoslav succession, the forced migration of refugees and internally displaced persons was a defining characteristic of much of the region in the 1990s and early part of the new millennium. Since then, rather halting efforts at securing conditions for the sustainable return of these forced migrants, or at least for other viable long-term solutions, have taken centre stage. It is true to say that refugees and displaced persons still lacking sustainable solutions represent the most vulnerable group in the region in the context of social exclusion. Refugees and displaced persons frequently lack rights in their host country, are excluded from access to sustainable livelihoods and essential services, and are often used as political pawns in wider geo-political conflicts. The uneven demographic character of return has also meant that returnees are often isolated and disadvantaged within already disadvantaged regions.

In January 2009, UNHCR suggested that there were still 132,071 refugees and 352,905 internally displaced persons in the Western Balkans (CSIS-EKEM, 2010). Table 5.3, summarising the situation at the end of 2010, whilst providing only a snapshot, does show the enormous gap between the total population of concern in the region and the number of returnees to their places of origin in the calendar year. The main outstanding populations of concern are those displaced in Bosnia and Herzegovina, presumably those unable to return to the entity from which they were originally displaced, refugees from Croatia in, primarily, Serbia, and those displaced between Serbia and Kosovo*. The first two groups have experienced up to twenty years of displacement and the last group over ten years, and many may have experienced multiple displacements. In addition, of course, former refugees may now have formal citizenship in the country where they are settled but this does not necessarily guarantee equal rights, or access to sustainable livelihoods, goods and services.
Table 5.3: Refugees, asylum-seekers, internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees (refugees and IDPs), stateless persons, and others of concern to UNHCR by country/territory of asylum, end-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County/territory of asylum</th>
<th>Refugees</th>
<th>People in refugee-like situations</th>
<th>Total refugees and people in refugee-like situations</th>
<th>Of whom assisted by UNHCR</th>
<th>Asylum-seekers (pending cases)</th>
<th>Return ed refugees</th>
<th>Returns IDPs</th>
<th>Stateless persons</th>
<th>Various</th>
<th>Total populati on of concern</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>7,016</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7,016</td>
<td>1,370</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>909</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>113,365</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>52,713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>863</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>936</td>
<td>936</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>2,125</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>18,042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>16,364</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,364</td>
<td>16,364</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia (and Kosovo*)</td>
<td>73,608</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>73,608</td>
<td>73,608</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>228,442</td>
<td>1,803</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>312,961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
<td>959</td>
<td>439</td>
<td>1,398</td>
<td>1,398</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,573</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3,132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>10,032</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10,032</td>
<td>10,032</td>
<td>6,715</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>18,088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>108,918</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>109,430</td>
<td>103,784</td>
<td>7,347</td>
<td>2,032</td>
<td>343,932</td>
<td>2,240</td>
<td>18,902</td>
<td>557,658</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* The category of 'various' refers to individuals who do not necessarily fall directly into any of the other groups but to whom UNHCR may extend its protection and/or assistance services. These activities might be based on humanitarian or other special grounds.

Survey data on some 744 IDPs and 458 refugees in BA, HR, RS and ME, although dated, provides a clear picture of the high risks of poverty and social exclusion amongst this group (UNDP, 2006). It also explores the complexities of the distinction between refugees and internally displaced in the context of the break-up of Yugoslavia and in the context of multiple displacements, pointing to the case of refugees to Serbia in the early 1990s from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia who were then settled in Kosovo*, only to flee again to Serbia after the end of the NATO intervention in 1999. Many of these people lost their original documents and have become reclassified as IDPs rather than refugees. Whilst the report makes clear that the distinction is not particularly relevant in terms of day-to-day vulnerability, its legal relevance is in terms of who has the duty to protect and what then constitutes a durable solution. The worst conditions are faced by those still living in collective centres, although most are now closed. According to the Serbian government, only 26 collective centres remain in Serbia124, accommodating 2,636 persons. In Kosovo*, however, UNHCR reports on still 41 collective centres (UNHCR, 2012).

Using a PPP poverty line of USD 4.30 per day, IDPs had poverty rates of 20% and refugees 17%, compared to 4% for the general population. RDPs had substantial levels of extreme poverty (at USD 2.15 per day), particularly in Serbia. Displaced Roma in the sample were

doubly disadvantaged, facing a poverty rate of 49%. In an inversion of the picture for majority households, displaced persons face higher poverty risk in capital cities, reflecting greater costs, the location of collective centres, and the fact that those in rural areas can resort to subsistence agriculture and those in urban areas on support from friends and neighbours. The poverty risk for displaced households with two or more children rose dramatically, being 32% compared to 2% for the general population (UNDP, 2006: 73-76). Whilst the report finds a link between poverty, educational level and employment, it is important to note that a significant number of the vulnerable displaced were relatively well-off before displacement, suggesting that the psychological shock of vulnerability may be even greater for this group. Displaced persons are more likely to face inadequate housing and to suffer from poor access to health services, and a lack of diagnosis of recurrent health issues, including conflict- and resettlement-related trauma. Access to health care is related to status but also to wider vulnerabilities. These issues are compounded for those displaced persons who are still in collective centres.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the main issues concern the lack of sustainable solutions, particularly for those who have been multiply displaced and who have, merely, traded refugee status for IDP status. A study quoted suggests that only 17% of heads of IDP households in Bosnia and Herzegovina were employed and over 20% have no source of income (CR BA). Those IDPs still in collective centres are amongst the most vulnerable including “persons who are physically and mentally challenged, ... with chronic illnesses, the elderly without income or family support, and some who cannot return to their places of origin due to serious protection concerns” (UNHCR, 2011, cited in CR BA). The report outlines three different return situations: to areas where the returnee is part of an ethnic majority, where they are part of an ethnic minority, and where they settle somewhere other than their place of origin. Whilst some legal barriers have been removed, minority returnees face systematic discrimination, institutional and administrative obstruction, and difficulty in terms of finding employment. For this reason, many returnees of working age have moved since return, leaving a disproportionate number of older returnees. Whilst return from third countries has sometimes been accompanied by development assistance, this has rarely had a long-term impact on sustainable livelihoods. The report also notes split families where one parent returns and the other parent remains with children to allow them to continue their education. Conversely, when children return they face problems of integration into new schools, compounded by separate curricula on ‘ethnicised’ lines. Older people returning alone face all the normal problems of reintegration combined with problems securing pension rights.

There is now widespread agreement that the possibility of future return of Serbian refugees to Croatia is highly limited, following significant returns in the first decade of the new millennium. There are suggestions that half of all Serb returns to Croatia are unsustainable, with many people returning only in order to sell their property and then migrate again. In addition, return has tended to be more of older people. Securing of guarantees regarding pension and social security rights (see Chapter 4), property repossession, reconstruction, and access to services has been slow and a gap still remains between legal provisions and their implementation on the ground. A UNHCR survey study showed that 37% of all Serb returnees were over 65, many returning to areas which remain the most disadvantaged and with added problems of mines, discrimination and threats, as well as problems linked to returning without the rest of the family. Often tensions are high between Croats who remained, ethnic Croats who returned, ethnic Serbs who returned, and ethnic Croats from Bosnia and Herzegovina who have secured Croatian citizenship but are often also in a vulnerable position. Croatia has a phenomenon of ‘weekend’ refugees particularly in areas bordering Serbia, where refugees come at weekends to work on their property prior to selling it.

51% of Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian IDPs in Kosovo* are said to lack some documentation. These IDPs are reliant on social assistance, whilst Serbian IDPs receive some benefits paid by the government of Serbia (ibid.). There are suggestions that up to 80% of Serbian IDPs in Kosovo* plan to migrate (CR XK). The lack of agreement on status between Kosovo* and
Serbia, of course, continues to impact on IDPs on both sides whose status is, to all intents and purposes, also frozen.

Whilst there are now very few refugees in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and, officially, according to UNHCR, no IDPs, after the conflict which flared up in 2001, in the wake of the spill-over of the conflict over Kosovo*, the Macedonian country report suggests there were still 644 IDPs in March 2011, almost half of them ethnic Macedonians, mostly from one particular village where fighting was most intense. Those who live in collective centres are particularly badly affected. Those who have returned have faced threats to their safety and have seen heightened tensions with neighbours.

Montenegro still has a significant number of refugees from Kosovo*, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, with a UNDP Human Development Report suggesting their rate of poverty risk was much higher than the general population. Whilst formally entitled to access to essential social services, refugees lack access to social assistance (CR ME).

Serbia’s refugee population has decreased significantly but still remains, by far, the highest in the region, with refugees mainly from Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Whilst significant numbers of the original refugees have returned, over 200,000 have taken Serbian citizenship and some 50,000 have emigrated, primarily to Canada, the USA, and Australia (CR RS). Serbia issued a decree in 2002, which regulates the rights of those displaced from Kosovo*, in terms of health and pension protection. The pressure on social care services of large numbers of displaced persons has had a significant impact on overall social welfare in Serbia.

The main issue in Turkey, not revealed in the UNHCR figures largely because the definition of IDPs expanded in the context of the wars of the Yugoslav succession\(^\text{125}\), are the large numbers of persons as a result of the conflict between the Turkish security forces and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the south east of the country, or the area claimed by the PKK as Kurdistan. Whilst some 150,000 displaced persons have returned, the vast majority continue to live outside their place of origin (IDMC, 2010). A raft of legal and administrative rules means that, although most displaced persons can gain access to benefits, those who are deemed to hold property, even though they cannot live in it, do not (CR TR). There are also questions concerning Kurdish education, since the Turkish Government does not recognise Kurds as a minority group.

\(^{125}\) It is to be highlighted, that the majority of Turkish IDPs are not deemed to be of concern by UNHCR. There are different statistics regarding the IDP population in Turkey. According to the authors of the Turkish country report, the most reliable one is the numbers given by the Hacettepe University’s Institute of Population Studies (HÜNEE). They estimated the number of the IDPs between 953,680 and 1,201,000 in the year 2006.
5.4 Eastern Partnership Countries

5.4.1 Children

In all six countries in the region, child poverty is a serious concern and households with three children or more face a higher incidence of poverty. In Moldova, also households with children headed by persons other than their parents face a higher incidence of poverty, which suggests that migration also generates substantial social costs (EC, 2011c; EC, 2010b).

The issue of children left behind is a major social issue in Moldova, with estimates that every fifth family with children has at least one parent working abroad or, rephrased somewhat, 17% of all children in Moldova live in households with at least one parent abroad (Sandu, 2011). Official statistics suggest that 90,710 children were left behind at the end of 2010, of whom 29,681 were without the care of both parents. The share of such households is roughly twice as high in rural compared to urban areas (CR MD). A range of surveys suggest that these figures may be an underestimate. 91% of children where both parents are abroad are looked after by grandparents and in 36% of cases where one parent is abroad. About a third of these grandparents actually have guardianship or formal custody of the children (UNICEF Moldova 2010, cited in CR MD). Overall, there is a sharp decrease in risk of consumption-based absolute poverty for those children with parents abroad. The risk falls from 27% in households with both parents at home, to 14.7% where the father is abroad, 9.4% where the mother is abroad, and 3.6% where both parents are abroad (Sandu, 2011).

There is compelling evidence that many of these children, particularly those lacking either both parents or the mother, tend to suffer from emotional problems, with lower school achievements and greater risk of poor nutrition and ill health. Surveys show that a proportion of such children has no primary care giver or are looked after by other children in the extended family. Teenagers are at risk in terms of behavioural problems and, also, using remittances as a substitute for continuing their education. Remittances mean, however, that the children of migrants are at less risk than their peers of poverty, in the short term at least. All the negative effects are correlated with the length of time parents have been separated from children, with survey evidence that the amount and quality of contact diminishes over time.

In Belarus, whilst children were reported to be largely satisfied with parents working abroad, there actually appears to be a greater risk of poverty (measured by consumption basket) for children of migrants than their peers. Official estimates in Ukraine suggest that some 200,000 children, or 2% of the age group, have one or both parents working abroad. Survey data suggest levels may be much higher, with around half of labour migrants leaving children aged 14 or over at home. The scale of the problem is illustrated by the fact that 12% of all families with problems which come to the attention of social services, or around 22,000 families, have at least one member working abroad (CR UA).

In some parts of the Ukraine, the level of migration is such that, either children left behind with migrant parents are a significant group or, in other areas, so many children are abroad with their parents that school enrolment is at very low levels. There are concerns that children abroad sometimes do not have permission to stay, or have entered on tourist visas, so that the impacts on the children’s access to schooling and other services can be dramatic. It is not particularly clear from the reports whether the rights of migrant children, or their de facto position, are different when parents work in Russia compared to working in the European Union. The Armenian country report notes that some parents leave children in Armenia because they do not consider Russia an appropriate environment.
Care chain Ukraine – Poland – Germany

As is visible from the country reports and other sources, migrant flows of women who are employed in domestic and care services in the receiving countries have considerably increased in the last decade. The concept of a new international division of reproductive labour (Yeates, 2009) is relevant here, with evidence that there is significant ‘care drain’ from countries such as the Ukraine, as women travel as carers to fill the ‘care gap’ in countries such as Austria (Haidinger, 2008), Poland (Kindler, 2008) and Italy (Mudrak, 2011). To describe this situation, Hochschild (2000) coined the term “care chain” and points to the fact that the social and emotional costs have to be largely paid by the family members left behind, which may themselves be in need of care alike. Whilst the issue of children left behind has been neglected for a long time, the media in the countries of origin increasingly report on this issue with a tendency to scandalise the problem and to stigmatise the mothers, using terms such as ‘euro-orphans’ (Poland) and ‘social orphans’ (Ukraine) ignoring the fact that the children are not orphans but are left behind either together with one parent with other relatives such as grandparents or alike. Although the care arrangements which are made by the transnational mothers for their children or parents left behind at home involve a series of problems already described in this report, a case study of transnational care arrangements of Polish and Ukrainian female migrants (Lutz et al., 2012) found out that the mothers usually stay in close contact with their family members and try to return to their families every two-three months. While being abroad, they communicate with their families via telephone or internet (Skype), sometimes even on a daily basis. Some transnational care arrangements are rather well functioning by perfectly organising the child’s everyday life, ensuring regular contacts and by teaching self-reliance to the children (ibid.). However, it is clear that these arrangements cannot substitute the physical presence of the mother. Apart from this, substantial support from the state in terms of childcare or long-term care facilities to reconcile transnational work and family life is widely non-existent in the countries at the very end of the care chain.

5.4.2 Older People

The issues for older people left behind in the Eastern Partnership countries are exacerbated as a result of low pensions and the lack of community-based social and health care services, particularly in declining, net migration loss, and rural areas. Whilst, on the whole, this region has lower median ages and old-age dependency ratios than the other sub-regions in the study, pension replacement rates are extremely low, particularly in Armenia, Georgia and Moldova. In all EaP countries, many pensioners continue working after reaching the retirement age. Particularly in the Southern Caucasus countries, pensions were not able to protect pensioners from poverty during the transition phase and today, only in Azerbaijan average pensions are above the official poverty level (EC, 2011c; EC, 2010b). A typical situation involves older people left to look after children or, after the migration of their children and grandchildren, left in accommodation which incurs significant costs for housing and utilities. In Moldova, over 50% of remittance-receiving and 58% of non-remittance receiving elder households faced medical expenses they could not meet in the last twelve months (CR MD). Both Belarus and Ukraine suggest that the situation for older people left behind in rural areas is difficult in the absence of flexible care services. Whilst Belarus has introduced ‘social beds’ in hospitals, in part to make use of the excess of hospital places in rural areas, this de facto amounts to the institutionalisation of older people. There are suggestions, in fact, that those who moved to the urban areas remit less than those who found work abroad.

In the Ukraine, it is reported that those between 55 and 65 years of age, having lost gainful employment in the Ukraine, particularly women, seek employment abroad as seasonal agricultural workers or in the domestic care sector. This migration is often, at best, only ‘semi-legal’, such that the migrant is vulnerable to return and, in any case, finds it difficult to access health services or to receive any kind of social protection. The lack of social services or their high cost also limits the support for those older people left behind. The issue of migration in Armenia, a country where the extended family still has an important role to play, has given rise to the phenomenon of ‘elderly orphans’, those left behind, and ‘migrating grannies’, those who follow their children abroad in order to resume their traditional family

126 Replacement rates in Armenia in 2009 amounted to 23% and in Georgia to 14% of the average wage (EC, 2011c: 61).
role. Another issue is that those older people who perform caring roles so that their own children can migrate temporarily to improve household opportunities and income are often in the position of neglecting their own health, and postponing medical treatment, because they are needed in a care-giving role. In addition, older people are often left with land in rural areas which they are too frail to cultivate, and which, therefore, tends to be a wasted or unrealisable asset. An EBRD survey (2007, cited in CR AZ) suggests only 8% of older people regularly receive remittances, covering essential items including food, utilities, clothing and medicine.

5.4.3 Roma and Other Vulnerable Ethnic and Religious Communities

There are small, but important, Roma communities in Belarus, Moldova and the Ukraine. These Roma face similar problems regarding citizenship rights, education, health care, and discrimination as do their counterparts in other parts of Eastern Europe. There is not, as yet, any evidence of widespread migration from Belarus or the Ukraine, nor claiming of asylum in EU Member States (Tanner, 2004). There is migration of Roma from Moldova, particularly to Russia, the Ukraine and, for a smaller group, Italy. These groups of Roma tend to be younger and to be in search of employment opportunities. There is some evidence that traditional migration routes to Russia are beginning to be replaced by migration to the EU MS, with Roma leaving for longer periods of time (CR MD). Whilst whole families tend to migrate, there are reported problems regarding sending children to school.

In terms of other vulnerable ethnicised or religious communities, there is a significant concern expressed regarding Crimean Tatars in the Ukraine. Having been deported en masse from the Crimea after World War II, there was some return allowed in the 1980s but most, some 260,000, returned after Ukrainian independence. They now make up about 13% of the Crimean population (CR UA). Smaller numbers of ethnic Greeks, Bulgarians and Armenians also returned to the same area. These returnees face acute problems of housing, with some 1,000,000 living in dormitories, rented apartments or unfinished buildings (CR UA). Access to amenities, infrastructure and livelihood opportunities are severely limited. The option of labour migration is one of the view possibilities of survival. This mainly involves seasonal migration, with Crimean Tartars moving from their place of settlement to tourist facilities. The problem of illegal settlement and negative reactions from the majority ethnic group compound the problems.

Of the estimated 43,000 Meshketian Turks currently living in Azerbaijan, some 13,000 are reported to be seeking to migrate to Georgia, which is their ancestral homeland prior to expulsion in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The issue of what status the returnees will have and what rights will be associated with this status remains an open question (CR AZ).

Table 5.4: Official and estimated number of Roma in Eastern Partnership countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Official numbers</th>
<th>Average estimate</th>
<th>Estimate as % of total population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>12,280</td>
<td>107,500</td>
<td>2.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>47,917</td>
<td>260,000</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>7,079</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>1,744</td>
<td>2,250</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OSCE, 2010: 87-88 and CR BY. The figures are identical to the latest estimates provided by the Council of Europe.
5.4.4 Post-conflict IDPs and Returning Refugees

As Table 5.5 below shows, there are continuing issues regarding IDPs in Azerbaijan and Georgia. Refugees and IDPs, many sheltered on a long-term basis in educational facilities, have been identified in official documents as one of the groups most at risk of poverty and social exclusion, lacking access to essential services and often at risk of chronic health problems. Those most at risk are in cramped and unhygienic collective centres in the larger cities, including the capital Baku. Although not reflected in the UNHCR figures, the Azeri country report suggests there were some 248,000 refugees from Armenia in January 2010. In addition, the figures do not include residents in a number of villages bordering Armenia who fled their homes but resettled within the same area. Any IDPs and returnees who were not public servants before they were displaced find it extremely hard to find employment. The cycle of deprivation often means that IDPs move on a number of occasions, leading to the concentration in the capital where, it is thought, opportunities for living may be better.

Table 5.5 Refugees, asylum-seekers, internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees (refugees and IDPs), stateless persons, and others of concern to UNHCR by country/territory of asylum, end-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/territory of asylum</th>
<th>Refugees</th>
<th>People in refugee-like situation s</th>
<th>Total refugees and people in refugee-like situations</th>
<th>Of whom assisted by UNHCR</th>
<th>Asylum-seekers (pending cases)</th>
<th>Returned refugees</th>
<th>IDPs protected / assisted by UNHCR, incl. people in IDP-like situations</th>
<th>Returnee IDPs</th>
<th>Stateless persons</th>
<th>Various</th>
<th>Total pop of concern</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>3.296</td>
<td>3.296</td>
<td>3.275</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>82.519</td>
<td>85.844</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>1.891</td>
<td>1.891</td>
<td>1.891</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>592.860</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.078</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>596.846</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>589</td>
<td>589</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7.371</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8.386</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>639</td>
<td>639</td>
<td>639</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>359.716</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.826</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>362.228</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.031</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.260</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>2.522</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>3.022</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>2.981</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>40.353</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>46.356</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Georgia has had a somewhat intractable situation regarding IDPs for over fifteen years, affecting about 5% of the whole population. A large number of IDPs have lived, long-term, in poor material conditions, lacking access to many essential services, with their situation often threatened again in the context of the conflict in 2008. Half of IDPs live in private accommodation and half in publically-provided collective centres, often former military barracks, schools and tourist facilities, as well as municipal buildings, often overcrowded and in poor state of repair. After the 2008 conflict, Georgia received international aid to build new settlements for refugees and IDPs, but many of these are in remote areas with poor employment prospects. Nevertheless, resettlement has gone ahead and a number of forced migrants have been evicted from accommodation in the capital Tbilisi. IDPs are extremely poor and reliant on pensions and social assistance. Only about half, more in the rural areas, and fewer in the larger cities, have health insurance, and many are forced to take out loans to cover health costs. Forced migration and labour migration are inter-linked with significant subsequent migration of members of IDP households abroad, with about two thirds working in Russia. Whilst remittances from these adult males help, the overall vulnerability of ageing members of the household may be increased.
There are a significant number of forced migrants also in Armenia, living in poor accommodation and at risk of poverty and exclusion. Those who have returned after the situation in the conflict zone stabilised, often cannot access basic services and reconstruction of housing has been limited. International donors have renovated dormitory accommodation but this is not a permanent solution. In Ukraine, the issue of statelessness relates, primarily to the Crimean Tartar population, discussed below. In Moldova, the crisis of IDPs from the Transnistrian region has been intractable, although most of those displaced have either returned or permanently resettled in another part of Moldova.
6 Existing Policy Responses to the Social Impacts of Migration

6.1 Introduction

This chapter aims to give an insight into existing policy measures of different political actors (governmental, non-governmental, social partners, etc.) the authors consider relevant for the future policy debate on the social impact of migration. The approach differs according to the main challenges in the EU-8+2, in candidate countries and potential candidates and in Eastern Partnership countries identified in the report, respecting different political contexts: The first country group is shaped by the free movement of persons, while migration in candidate countries and potential candidates is dependent on restricted bilateral labour agreements, which offer the possibility to migrate and work in a legal framework only to a certain number of people. The challenges deriving from forced migration and internal displacement are also to be tackled by these countries. In the Eastern Partnership countries, illegal migration is dominant, while internal displacement needs to be addressed, too. Depending on the socio-economic and political context of the specific country group and migration patterns, various challenges result from migration, so that the different sub-chapters are structured according to country-specific challenges and groups affected.

The critical assessment of introduced policies and programmes, and the identification of good practices is a challenging task, since most policies have either not been evaluated or evaluations are not available for the public. Furthermore, the country experts showed that most countries focus on strategic programmes rather than concrete measures. Major strategies are rarely implemented, either due to a lack of political will or due to financial constraints, partly caused by the crisis that severely hit all countries under review. In spite of unavailable evaluation reports, it still becomes very clear that even in those cases where concrete political measures have been introduced they seldom address a large group of people, but are rather negligible in terms of size and impact.

6.2 EU Member States (EU-8+2)

Labour mobility in the EU Member States is shaped by the free movement of people. Except for transitional arrangements with a maximum of five years for some countries, every European citizen has the right to live and work under the same conditions as national citizens. As reflected in the Europe 2020 Strategy, a common European labour market may contribute to balancing demographic change and to mitigate labour shortages in Europe (EC, 2010d: 11). But labour migration is not a new phenomenon in the EU-8+2. Since 1990, there have been several bilateral labour agreements that enabled citizens to migrate for work. In this chapter, the impact of labour mobility (6.2.2), policies to balance the impact of migration on regions (6.2.3) and vulnerable groups (6.2.4) will be discussed. In some cases, we will refer to policies implemented before introduction of the free movement of workers.

6.2.1 Making Labour Mobility Work

Mobility supporting services and measures

As Chapter 3 revealed, most EU-8+2 countries have been facing high unemployment along with increasing vacancy rates during the last decade. A mismatch between the skills provided by the education systems and the changing labour market needs, insufficiently targeted active labour market measures and other policies (e.g. housing, regional development) to increase the employability of the workforce and to combat regional imbalances have contributed to this situation. While commuting, internal and international migration have a role in equilibrating labour market imbalances within a single country and within the EU, policies to support internal and international mobility are still widely lacking.

While the EURES network is the most important instrument in the EU to support international mobility by providing comprehensive information on employment opportunities, skills
requirements, etc., in receiving countries as well as other relevant information (e.g. social security rights of migrants), there is still a lack of full integration of EURES in some countries and regions. In particular employers and higher educated people prefer not to use these services (Bonin et al., 2008, 106).

Active labour market measures (ALMMs) to foster geographical labour mobility within the EU-8+2 and across borders are still rare and mostly focus on the exchange of information. The latter also applies to the project EURES-T Beskydy which was launched in 2008 and is financed within the framework of the Interreg programme. It aims to foster cooperation between the Slovak Republic and Poland and between the Slovak and the Czech Republic. Exchange of information and counselling on employment opportunities and living conditions aims to provide the basis for higher cross-border mobility. The partnership is based on a four-year preparation period in which tripartite projects in collaboration with labour market institutions of the Czech and Slovak Republic and Poland are conducted. The major instrument is a website (www.eures-tbeskydy.eu) that provides information for employers, employees, job-seekers and students, and gives relevant information on the regional labour market and employment opportunities. It remains to be seen if the project will be successful, but in case the so far rather limited content of the website is supplemented, this seems to be a promising approach for the preparation of migrants and the encouragement of mobility (CR PL).

Further measures to enhance geographical mobility within the countries and across borders have been implemented in Hungary, Slovakia and Poland. In order to prevent further out-migration and increase employment opportunities for the population of disadvantaged areas, these countries introduced transport subsidies, cross-border exchange of information on employment opportunities or exemption of social insurance contribution for employers hiring people from disadvantaged migration loss regions (CR HU, SK, PL).

**Recognition of qualifications**

As explained in Chapter 3, a significant number of migrants work in occupations below their qualifications and lack information about skills recognition or employment opportunities. Easy and fast recognition of qualifications is essential for the mitigation of downskilling. The Bologna process, the Copenhagen process, the European Qualification Framework (EQF), and ESCO (The European standard terminology on occupations, skills, competences and qualifications) are European initiatives that reduce the barriers for the recognition of qualifications and set the basis for beneficial labour mobility.

Recognition of professional qualifications in the EU has been regulated by the EU Directive 2005/36/EC, which came into force in 2007. The directive applies to professionals qualified in one Member State and willing to access a regulated profession in another Member State. It differs between the general system for the recognition of qualifications, the system of automatic recognition of qualifications attested by professional experience in certain industrial, craft and commercial activities and the system of automatic recognition of qualifications based on harmonised minimum training requirements for seven professions. Professionals with qualifications that are not subject to automatic recognition may face difficulties and administrative burden when applying for a job in another Member State, which severely hampers job mobility (Bonin et al., 2008: 112). In order to simplify recognition procedures and foster labour mobility, the Commission adopted in December 2011 a proposal for modernising Directive 2005/36/EC. This legislative proposal is under discussions in Council and European Parliament.

In addition to problems regarding the recognition of formal qualifications, it remains difficult to validate informal skills acquired by on-the-job training. The EQF as well as ESCO contribute to facilitating comparability of (informal) skills, qualifications, and competences and to focus on learning outcomes. Successful implementation of both in all Member States would offer

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127 Doctors, dentists, pharmacists, nurses, midwives, vets and architects.
the opportunity for skills-matching on an international level, but asks for strong commitment of labour market stakeholders.

Social security of migrants and their families left behind

After joining the EU, bilateral agreements were mostly replaced by the EU coordination legislation (for details see Chapter 4). The social security authorities and institutions of the EU-8+2 continued to benefit from EU financial assistance and support during a transitional period after accession in order to ensure a smooth and effective application of the EU coordination law. Further support and training of staff as well as of legal professions has been provided since then within the trESS network on European social security. Within the framework of the preparation for implementation of the new Reg. 883/2004 as of May 2011, policies pursued at EU level and within the Member States have focused on promoting the dissemination of information on new developments in EU social security coordination towards the public and within the staff of national institutions. Public information campaigns, the set-up and dissemination of information tools like leaflets, web-based information portals and public counselling and enquiry services have been implemented EU wide, including the EU-8+2. For example, a pilot project was initiated by Polish authorities offering specific advisory services to their citizens based in Belgium via the Polish embassy, which is planned to be extended to other migration destination countries; moreover, the Polish health insurance fund has installed an internet portal providing specific information on social security rights to Polish citizens wishing to return to Poland (Jorens, 2010). In Romania, the number of working hours of the staff of social security institutions allocated for direct contacts with the public has been increased and a public information campaign was initiated to inform the public about the coordination of family benefits. In Slovenia, specific contact persons have been nominated, with their contact details made public, to deal with public queries and in several other EU-8+2 the websites of the responsible institutions have been updated to provide more and better accessible information to the public (Jorens, 2010).

Return migration

The analysis of limited data on return migration shows that in many cases the employment status hardly changes after the time abroad (Chapter 3). Prepared migration and employment according to the qualification level of the migrant on the one hand and active labour market measures supporting the re-integration in the labour market after return on the other hand could contribute to at least equal or even better employment opportunities for returnees.

The EU-8+2 countries have an increasing interest in the return of skilled workforce due to increasing labour shortages and demographic change. They express their interest in national strategies (BG, PL, LT, LV), but most programmes are rather general and do not encompass concrete measures, such as for example active labour market measures for returnees, return incentives or other re-integration measures. Only some countries plan to introduce financial incentives for migrants by providing returnees the financial means for starting their own businesses (BG). In addition, implementation of political programmes for return migration lack - especially in times of the financial crisis - financial resources (OECD, 2011a: 124) and countries have skipped or postponed planned activities due to financial constraints (BG, LT, LV) (OECD, 2011b).

Small scale projects mostly focus on a rather small and special target group as in Estonia ‘Bring Talents Back Home’ and in Bulgaria ‘Return Home’ both financed by the European Social Fund. They exclusively focus on highly skilled workers even though it can be expected that workers for the medium or low-skilled sectors will be needed, too (Markova, 2010: 226). Tailor-made ALMP measures or special guidance for the total group of returnees are not in the focus of governmental policies.
Two decades of programmes fostering labour migration in Poland

Poland has a long tradition of temporary migration beginning already in the 1980s during pre-transitional times. In the 1990s, Poland closed bilateral agreements with Western European Countries, and Germany became one of the most favoured countries for Polish migrants. These labour agreements exclusively targeted at low-skilled labourers as e.g. seasonal workers for the harvest. The agreements introduced ‘soft’ regulatory mechanisms, significantly decreased irregular migration and reduced unemployment in Poland at least to some extent.

Nevertheless, managed migration was mostly impossible. Labour migration was mainly based on informal networks and personal job offers. Polish employment agencies had very little room for strategic coordination of migratory movements and did not succeed in targeting regions with high unemployment rates for foreign recruitment.

The outcome for a migrant moving back and forth was rather mixed. Between the periods of employment abroad migrants were most of the times unemployed. Since most workers did not work in their occupation, but rather below their educational level, transfer of skills, improving personal career prospects or having a positive impact on the local community was not given and re-integration was quite challenging.

This made the government generally reluctant to further actively promote mobility after 2004. Instead, policies fostering return migration with a major focus on skilled workers became increasingly important in order to cope with large emigration rates and the pressure of demographic change. All major governmental strategies, as Poland 2030 – National Development Strategy 2009, the National Strategy Report on Social Protection and Social Inclusion 2008-2010 and the ESF-related Human Capital Operational Programme 2007-2013, deal with the issue of return migration.

Apart from general strategies, one governmental information campaign gained public attention: Do you Plan to return? (Masz Plan na powrót?), established in 2008 and financed by the ESF with EUR 0.62 million, is targeted at emigrants and returnees and offers comprehensive information for Polish emigrants who plan to return. Unfortunately, the project has not been evaluated as a success, because the actual number of returnees is still rather small (Iglicka and Ziolek-Skrzypczak, 2010).

As mentioned above, active labour market measures targeting specifically at returning migrants on the national level are missing, but on a local level the project ‘Opolskie – I will stay here’ provides ALMP for returnees and their successful integration into the labour market. Further, the introduction of consultative desks by District Labour Offices and other institutions for returnees has been evaluated as a successful measure to offer information (CR PL).

In addition to information campaigns and regional active labour market policies, Poland has passed the Tax Abolition Action in 2008, which relieves migrants from double taxation and gives them the possibility to be refunded for taxes paid between 2002 and 2007 for income gained abroad (Iglicka and Ziolek-Skrzypczak, 2010).

Health Professional Mobility

As mentioned in Chapters 2 and 3, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Romania have especially faced high outflows of health care professionals, but none of these countries developed a comprehensive strategy to address the challenge of labour shortages in the care sector. Still, the topic only starts to enter the political discourse. In fact, the Estonian parliament expressed its concerns about large numbers of emigrated health care professionals and asked the government to give more information on long-term costs resulting from a lack of qualified personnel. Furthermore, it is currently discussed to charge health care emigrants tuition fees for their education (CR EE). In contrast to Estonia’s approach, Poland is not searching for possibilities to make emigration less attractive, but encourages immigration and closed a bilateral labour agreement with the Ukraine. Furthermore, some countries such as Estonia, the Slovak Republic, and Poland succeeded in decreasing emigration rates of health care professionals by increasing wages. However, integrated workforce policies and concepts to address the increasing demand of health care professionals in the countries are lacking.
Having recognised the European dimension of the challenges at hand, the European Commission has included an Action Plan on EU Healthcare Workforce in its Communication “Towards a Job-rich Recovery” from April 2012 (EC, 2012a). This action plan aims to assist Member States to address shortages of health care professionals by improving health workforce planning and forecasting, better anticipating skill needs in the healthcare sector, by stimulating exchange on recruitment and retention of health workers and by supporting ethical recruitment.

**Diaspora involvement**

In most countries, there is an increasing interest in the role of the Diaspora for economic development (EE, PL) by using the Diaspora’s economic resources or intellectual potential, but there is no comprehensive strategy to boost the domestic economy with help of the Diaspora. Diaspora programmes are still very much focused on conserving the cultural heritage (CZ, LT, LV, HU, SK). The effective use of transfer of skills and financial investment is still underdeveloped. The most important economic influence of the Diaspora might be fostered through the efficient channelling of remittances. As stated in Chapter 3.2.3, there are only two countries in the EU-8+2 whose remittances are of greater economic importance, namely Bulgaria and Romania. Although both countries show increasing interest in the potential of their Diaspora, the measures undertaken for Diaspora engagement are still sporadic and not embedded in a more comprehensive approach (e.g. information campaigns by the Agency for the Bulgarians Abroad about investment possibilities (World Bank, 2011c); SME project in Romania – see next chapter).

The outcome still unknown, the project ‘Bring Talents Back Home’ (EE), which not only focuses on returning Estonians, but also aims to strengthen business cooperation with the Estonian Diaspora, might be a good example for the use of online platforms as an innovative way to encourage investment. The managing director of the Estonian Chamber of Commerce and Industry evaluates the projects as successful and states that the database in 2011 consisted of 450 Estonians who wanted to cooperate with Estonian companies after their return or during their absence (Baltic Business News, 2011). Similar platforms could further be used for the strategic development of an investment network.

### 6.2.2 Support to the Development of Regions Severely Affected by Migration

Rural Development programmes address job creation and the development of human resources in disadvantaged rural areas, mainly through the Axis III (Quality of Life) and the Axis IV (LEADER). While it is not possible to evaluate the impact of these programmes on migration loss regions within the framework of this study, it is worth to highlight the bottom-up Leader approach that aims at building up local capacities for employment and diversification of the rural economy, which is considered to be a useful approach for disadvantaged communities. The Leader axis encourages the establishment of Local Action Groups (LAGs) made up of public and private partners from the rural territory, which represent an important tool for empowering local communities and activate the cooperation and development of human resources in rural settlements. However, some country reports and other studies also suggest that not all regions have the same ability to use the financial resources and implement the programmes (Zaman and Georgescu, 2009: 142). Dynamic regions with appropriate human resources may disproportionately benefit from the funds, thus widening the gap between territories. It is, therefore, recommended to invest in capacity-building of local stakeholders in disadvantaged rural communities in order to promote their use of the Leader approach (EC, 2008c: 145).

The Diaspora can also play an important role on a regional level. Some countries provide state support for strategic investments or tax incentives for entrepreneurs in disadvantaged areas. However, as mentioned by the Slovak country experts, past investments in disadvantaged areas have often required highly educated human resources that are not
usually available in the disadvantaged areas and, therefore, these investments have not benefited the population of origin and will need to be accompanied by a building-up of human capital in the future (CR SK).

It is worth highlighting one specific project called “Supporting Migrants’ Entrepreneurship”, co-funded by the International Fund for Agricultural Development. The SME project has established a transnational and multi-stakeholder partnership among Italy, Romania and Moldova and focuses on connecting remittances and migrants’ savings to entrepreneurial rural-area investments that would lead to more sustainable development and long-term eradication of poverty, especially in rural areas where migration flows originate. The project includes the establishment of an information desk for migrants in the Veneto (Italy) region, the migrants’ acquisition of tools and knowledge in entrepreneurship skills and the financial and technical assistance of business start-ups in the countries of origin. The country experts consider this project as best practice due to its comprehensive approach, involving the promotion of small and medium-sized enterprises, access to credit, labour market, social and welfare policies and human capital (CR RO).

Policy responses to migration loss regions in Greece

The migration waves from Greece in the period 1950-1970 were characterised by a large share of emigrants originating from rural areas, in particular from the predominantly rural Northern regions of Greece. This rural exodus led to a considerable depletion of economically active population and severe seasonal shortages in agricultural labour. In order to counteract these developments and to attract returnees to rural areas, the Greek government undertook various measures aimed at development of the regions particularly affected by out-migration. Following 1970, it introduced various incentives for industrial decentralisation and tourism development in rural areas, which mainly consisted in fiscal instruments such as profit and income tax allowances, exclusion of firms from taxes on wages and reductions on value added tax imposed on firms. These measures promoted the engagement of farmers in non-agricultural activities in the trade, tourism and industry sectors and today, nearly 40% of the farm households’ income is from off-farm activities. Other measures were aimed at attracting returnees and their savings to the countryside and included a lump sum for the residence of returnees in the countryside, the promotion of migrants’ investments in agriculture through technical, economic and financial assistance by the Agricultural Bank of Greece, and the support for the establishment of co-operatives. However, these measures did not achieve their goal, which can be easily shown by the rates of returnees to the countryside, which were decreasing from 1980s onwards, while returnee rates to Athens increased.

Since the accession of the EU, Greece has implemented several rural development programmes funded by the Structural Funds. According to the evaluations of the first two operational programmes they do not seem to have considerably improved the structural weaknesses of the rural areas. The programmes mainly benefited large agricultural holdings and it was only in the third programming period from 2000-2006 that the operational programme included a more comprehensive approach for the development of rural regions, including measures such as the diversification of agricultural activities, development of tourism in rural areas, the provision of social services, employment and training of the rural population. Similar measures pointing to a more integrated approach in rural development can be found also in the pillar 2 (Axis 3 and 4) of the last Operational Programme 2007-2013, in particular related to the rural development plans elaborated by the Local Action Groups. Rural development policy in Greece has been subject to criticism, due to the concentration on agricultural development rather than on rural development, to the highly centralised planning, to the lack of coordination and complementarities of different policies and to the relatively low funding of the pillar 2. Despite the numerous interventions, the primary sector of the Greek economy is still suffering high land fragmentation, predominance of self-employment, low skill levels and ageing of the population.

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128 The following text is based on the Greek country report and on a handout on rural/regional development policies in Greece produced by the Greek expert Charalambos Kasimis for the project workshop in Istanbul in June 2011.
6.2.3 Policies in Support to Vulnerable Groups Affected by Migration

As defined in chapter 5, children left behind and children returning after the migratory period, elderly left behind, and Roma can be considered as being especially vulnerable due to migration.

**Children left behind**

Children left behind by one or both parents might experience emotional and psychological stress due to the lack of parental affection and appear to have poorer school achievement depending on the carer and the family situation at home.

On the European level, the EU Agenda for the Rights of the Child aims to provide children with education, access to services and resources. It proposes actions to protect children from poverty and social exclusion, as for example the exchange of information on how to improve the performance of relevant actors for unaccompanied children (EC, 2011g: 11). As regards financial support for child-raising, all EU-8+2 countries provide for the possibility to transfer child care benefits to another person in case of absent parents; however, the administrative burden and legal requirements are different from one country to another (MISSOC comparative tables).

In their 2006-2008 and 2008-2010 National Reports on Strategies for Social Protection and Social Inclusion, EU Member States formulate measures for the prevention of poverty of children. Even though there are almost no strategies that exclusively deal with children left behind, general strategies and action plans may contribute to children’s well-being in case they impact on general poverty levels.

As regards targeted programmes for children left behind, in Latvia, there has been drafted a plan for the improvement of the situation of those children whose parents have gone abroad. It pleads for better cooperation between institutions, provision of education and improved employment possibilities for parents in Latvia and aims at additional support for families in severe situations. Unfortunately, the outcome of the project has to be judged as irrelevant. Most of the planned activities have not been implemented and, due to the lack of financial resources, there were no attempts to proceed with similar activities (CR LV).

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**Children policies in Romania**

After the fall of communism, reports about Romanian orphans being placed in large orphanages and subject to abuse, neglect, and malnutrition gained public attention and provoked rapid reaction by NGOs and governments. During the 1990s, various Romanian NGOs for the protection of children emerged and are still important players in the field of child welfare. International donors encouraged institutional cooperation for child protection in Romania and paved the way for increasing international adoptions. The latter was the major instrument for reducing the number of children in child care institutions or living on the street and was later several times reformed to reduce the number of illegal adoptions and strengthen foster care and adoptions within Romania. As regards atypical family patterns, Romania can be considered to be a specific case, since “nowhere in Europe have alternative services, mainly foster care and guardianship, increased as quickly as in Romania since the late 1990s” (Jacoby et al., 2009: 128).

Children of migrants are not necessarily left alone, but rather guarded by close relatives. Nevertheless, the protection of children generally remains in the public focus due to the recent history. In 2005, the National Children’s Rights Protection Authority and the Ministry of Labour closed an agreement that obliges parents to point out one legal guardian for children whose parents emigrated to protect them from being left on their own. However, the legal situation differs sharply from reality. While since 2006, the identification and monitoring of children left at home is monitored by the National Children’s Rights Protection Authority, a lack of coordination between responsible institutions makes the implementation difficult. The national Strategy for Children’s Rights Protection 2008-2013 summarises the main challenges, as e.g. the lack of financial and human resources, and identifies children left at home as a vulnerable group, which makes clear that this issue is becoming more and more politically relevant (SOROS Foundation, 2011: 129 ff.).
Concrete actions, however, are mostly taken by NGOs. Alternative Sociale Association is one of the main players in the field and has conducted several projects for the improvement of living conditions for children of migrating parents, by introducing psychological assistance and support programmes. One example is the project on family members left behind in Iasi, a county in the North-East of Romania. Information campaigns and direct services to 647 children and 583 elderly people with a budget of EUR 465,000 were provided for this specific vulnerable group (CR RO).

Returning children

Children returning to their home country after a migratory period might encounter problems when being reintegrated in the education system. This is most often due to language difficulties or differences in learning programmes. Educational support measures for children who plan to migrate, plan to return or are in the process of returning to their home country are largely missing, which might prevent parents from taking their children with them during migration or prolongate migration periods.

In Lithuania, one small project has been evaluated as being innovative and could serve as a good example for countries exposed to high emigration rates. One school in Vilnius offered long-distance learning programmes for children who accompanied their parents. Children could complete secondary education accredited by the state while parents were still able to care for them while working abroad (CR LT). Similar activities have been taking place in Poland, where the establishment of Polish schools and an online platform for learning activities aims to enable an easy return to Poland (CR PL).

When Greece was experiencing high return migration rates in the 1980s, specific school classes for returning children were introduced in the receiving countries. Even though most of Greece’s efforts in re-integration policies have been "evaluated as being largely inconsistent, ineffective and devoid of a long-term strategy" (CR EL), governments should invest in similar, but more effective measures to support cross-country education.

Older people

The situation of elderly people left behind in countries with high emigration rates may differ according to the general provision of long-term care arrangements. The family network is increasingly dissolving, which especially in countries with high emigration rates may jeopardise the provision of care arrangements. It is true that those countries with the highest emigration rates in the EU have also rather underdeveloped long-term care systems. In Bulgaria and Romania, the provision of institutionalised and home-based care is rather limited, the whole system is underfinanced and suffers from decentralised and mostly unclear responsibilities. Care is mainly provided by family members or personal assistants, in Bulgaria the latter are financially supported by the municipalities. In both countries, long-term care provision is far from meeting population needs (see forthcoming asisp Annual Reports 2012).

In the Baltic States, the provision of long-term care is also the responsibility of municipalities, which are often supported by NGOs, but care needs are not sufficiently addressed. Furthermore, the quality of services is strongly dependent on the financial situation of the accordant municipality. In all countries, the role of the family is very important, which is actually mentioned in the Estonian constitution. In Lithuania, the consolidation of public finances makes it impossible to increase institutionalised or home-based care, which would be needed for satisfactory provision (ibid.).

The abbreviation ‘asisp’ stands for Analytical Support on the Socio-Economic Impact of Social Protection Reforms and is an independent expert network which, on behalf of the European Commission, DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, provides up-to-date information on social protection developments, the national debates and present-day research in the fields of pensions, health and long-term care. For further information see www.socialprotection.eu
In Poland, the role of the family to meet care needs is very important, too. Institutional care is unsatisfactorily provided and private care is very expensive and can only be used by wealthy persons (ibid).

The strong role of the family, the lack of institutionalised care and the limited resources for financing community-based services expose elderly people to a severe situation when they are left behind.

**Roma**

As discussed in Chapter 5.2.2., Roma are very often exposed to discrimination and poor living conditions with minor access to basic health care, education and employment and can be considered as one of the most vulnerable groups in Europe. Roma people very often face the situation of statelessness and lack documents, due to state-building processes in the former Soviet Union and wars in the Western Balkans. In 2011, the EU released the first coherent strategy for Roma: In its European Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies up to 2020 the EU has defined concrete goals in the fields of access to education, employment, health care and housing. Member States are asked to formulate their Roma Strategies along these objectives and to concretely explain how to reach these goals. This was the European answer to a multitude of Member States’ Roma strategies with hardly any impact (EC, 2011h).

An earlier attempt to improve the situation of Roma was the ‘Decade of Roma Inclusion 2005-2015’, founded, organised and implemented by a consortium of international organisations initiated by the SOROS foundation. The participating countries drafted Action Plans for the Roma Decade 2005-2015 (BG, CZ, HU, RO, SK) initiative, but unfortunately, none of the activities can be deemed as a success. A high administrative burden and the lack of target orientation prevented an effective outcome of social programmes in most of the countries. However, the Action Plans may serve for and will be used as a basis for the national integration strategies under the EU framework.

Generally, national attempts to advantage the situation of Roma largely remains in the state of drafting strategies that are seldom translated into effective and efficient policy implementation that result in real improvement.

As regards Roma children, Member States have introduced preparatory classes for Roma pupils to increase school attendance, but none of them focusing on Roma children abroad, as e.g. the long-distance learning programmes for Roma introduced in France (EP, 2011: 74ff). Conducting a similar project in the EU-8+2 as in France would be an advantage, especially for returning Roma children, who would be able to follow the curriculum in their home country while being abroad.

This chapter aims to give a comprehensive overview of policy measures implemented in the EU-8+2, in candidate countries and potential candidates and in Eastern Partnership countries respecting different political contexts: The first country group is shaped by the free movement of persons, while migration in candidate countries and potential candidates is dependent on restricted bilateral labour agreements which offer the possibility to migrate only to a certain amount of people, and where illegal migration is still prevalent. Internal displacement and people with a refugee status abroad need to be tackled by these countries. In the Eastern Partnership countries, illegal migration is the major way of cross-border movement, which requires different policy measures for returning illegal migrants, while internal displacement needs to be addressed, too. Depending on the socio-economic and political context of the specific country group and migration patterns, various challenges result from migration, so that the different sub-chapters are structured according to country-specific challenges and groups affected.

EU political and financial instruments play a major role in the EU-8+2, the candidate countries and potential candidates and to some extent in the Eastern Partnership countries and will be explained in the beginning of each chapter. Further, national programmes that
aim to balance the consequences of migration will be described. Concrete projects and their
impact will be analysed in the last part of each sub-chapter.

The critical assessment of introduced policies and programmes, and the identification of
good practices is a difficult task, since most policies have either not been evaluated or
evaluations are not available for the public. This is why most country experts could not
definitely assert if they would judge the country’s approach towards migration to be adequate
or not. They were, however, able to show that most countries focus on programmes rather
than concrete projects and major strategies are rarely implemented, either due to a lack of
political will or due to external constraints, as the financial crisis, which severely hit all
countries under review, has led to expenditure cuts for accordant projects. In spite of
unavailable evaluation reports, it still becomes very clear that, even in those cases where
concrete political measures have been introduced, they seldom address a large group of
people, but are rather negligible in terms of size and impact.

6.3 Candidate Countries and Potential Candidates

As outlined in Chapter 2, migration in candidate countries and potential candidates
encompasses, on the one hand, large-scale forced internal and international migration, due
to the wars of the Yugoslav succession, and, on the other hand, predominantly international
labour migration, which already had a tradition in the time of the Yugoslav Federation. The
challenges arising from labour migration of mainly young and qualified people are to be seen
in the context of a legal framework for (labour) migration different to that of the EU-8+2 and a
lower socio-economic development level, including high unemployment and significant
regional disparities. The consequences of the war-related forced migration, involving large
refugee streams and IDPs, poses the challenge of finding sustainable solutions for the
returnees from abroad and within the country. Programmes and policies and their impact for
the reintegration of IDPs and refugees, including forced returnees, will be dealt with in the
second section of this chapter (6.3.2). Support to the development of regions severely
affected by migration is most important in these countries, due to their high degree of rurality
and due to regional disparities and will be explained in Chapter 6.3.3. Policies in support of
vulnerable groups affected by migration will be discussed in the last part of this chapter
(6.3.4).

6.3.1 Making Labour Migration Work for Sending Countries and
Migrants

First and foremost, migration policies after the war were, to a great extent, influenced by the
prospect of visa liberalisation and EU accession.130 The candidate countries and potential
candidates aimed to reduce the pressure on national labour markets by closing bilateral
labour agreements with EU-15 immediately after the end of war and also labour agreements
in the region became more and more important. Whereas the governments of Croatia,
Albania and Serbia have put a major focus on labour migration towards countries outside the
region, Bosnia and Herzegovina has been much more engaged in closing bilateral
agreements within the region, e.g. with Slovenia, Croatia and Montenegro (Kincinger 2009:
78ff.). Against the background of increasing labour demand for skilled labour, some EU-15

130 The Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAA), which were launched at the Zagreb summit in 2000, set
the basis for the Western Balkan countries to become Candidate or Potential Candidate Countries, which was
supplemented by additional instruments agreed upon at the Thessaloniki summit. It offered a membership
perspective and provided the tools for implementation of EU regulation and the introduction of a stepwise free-
trade area and offered financial assistance with the CARDS (Community Assistance for Reconstruction,
Development and Stabilisation) programme. In 2007, Phare, ISPA, and CARDS were merged and the Instrument
for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) is now the financial instrument for pre-accession countries. IPA consists of
cfive components: Transition Assistance and Institution Building, Cross-Border Cooperation, Regional
Development, Human Resource Development and Rural Development. Component III-V (Regional, Human
Resource, and Rural Development) is open to candidate countries only.
countries have set up managed labour migration schemes for specific groups of professions, such as Germany with Croatia in the field of care personnel. Circular labour migration schemes that link temporary employment abroad to development measures for the source country (e.g. through investment in training) or to measures promoting the skills of the migrant her/himself seem to be still rare or are tested within the framework of pilot projects. The German Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH and the German Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit), in co-operation with the Bosnian and Albanian governments, are currently implementing the pilot project “Triple Win” that seeks ways to link the temporary (18 months) recruitment of Bosnian and Albanian care workers for Germany into a set of measures aiming at enhancing the development impact for Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania. Beyond the preparation of the migrants in terms of language and professional skills, the project will explore means to support the migrants upon return in re-integrating into the labour market and to set up co-operation schemes in the field of vocational education of the care personnel between both countries and Germany.¹³¹

**Counselling services to potential migrants and returnees**

Despite the above mentioned legal migration opportunities, labour migration from the Western Balkans still involves high shares of irregular migrants. The need to inform the migrants on legal opportunities, to adequately prepare them for migration and to support their reintegration into the labour market upon return has been recognised by the EU, which launched a series of initiatives, amongst others the European Agenda for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals and the European Fund for the Integration of non-EU immigrants – EIF (EC, 2011). These instruments are primarily targeted at actions to be implemented in the receiving EU Member States, but they also include pre-departure measures targeted at potential migrants in the countries of origin, such as information and counselling services or language courses. Furthermore, the EU funded the ANEAS programme, a programme for financial and technical assistance to third countries in the area of migration and asylum. Within the framework of this programme, amongst others, the IOM opened Migrant Service Centres (MSCs) in all Western Balkan countries, in some countries in several towns, in the context of the project “Capacity Building, Information and Awareness Raising towards Promoting Orderly Migration in the Western Balkans”, which ran during 2008-2010. Besides the provision of advice to migrants and potential migrants (9,000 visitors in total), officials from the public employment services were trained in providing assistance to the migrants. At the end of the project, the MSCs were handed over to the public employment services, which have been responsible for them since then. The follow-up project ‘Migration for Development in the Western Balkans (MIDWEB)’ is managed by the IOM, started in January 2010 and will run until November 2012.¹³² Further efforts into communication tools are meant to be put into practice during the follow-up.

Other programmes offering vocational training or counselling or other active labour market measures, such as entrepreneurship training or subsidies for business start-ups for returning migrants, are small scale or do not exist at all. Furthermore, most returnees do not register as officially unemployed, due to low benefits, and the projects are only of limited success (HR, AL).

**Recognition of qualifications**

The recognition of qualifications and skills is an important precondition for successful labour migration. As we have seen under the Chapter 3, migrants from the Western Balkans usually work below their qualifications in the EU-15, and, upon their return, have difficulties making use of their skills acquired abroad. The mismatch between the migrants’ skills and the work they perform in the receiving country, on the one hand, is caused by weak performance of educational systems which do not respond to the labour market needs in the countries.

¹³¹ Information on the project has been provided by Mr Björn Gruber, the project leader of the pilot project ‘Triple Win’ from GIZ during a phone conversation on 11 May 2012.
Furthermore, systems for skill needs analysis and/or mid- to long-term labour market forecasting are underdeveloped and often remain at the level of pilot actions. It is, therefore, necessary that the IPA programmes aimed at human resource development continue to prioritise the reform of educational and labour market systems, in order to strengthen VET and adult education, develop labour market forecasting systems, etc. On the other hand, downskilling is also the result of lacking mechanisms for the recognition of professional qualifications between sending and receiving countries. It is up to the employer to decide whether the qualification is comparable to the host country’s system, and very often, employers are not able or not willing to assess the validation of foreign qualifications. Croatia is the only country in the region which implemented the Croatian Qualifications Framework. In addition, the Croatian government passed the Act on Adult Education that allows for the consideration of prior informal learning when applying for higher education (CR HR).

As regards the recognition of academic skills, all Western Balkan countries participate in the Bologna process, which adjusts different academic pathways and aims to make academic degrees transferable. It is to be expected that recognition of academic degrees will be facilitated in the future (Alquézar Sabadie et al., 2010: 50ff). For the moment, recognition procedures are still problematic and the de facto situation largely differs from the de jure situation. The country report Croatia evaluates the validation of degrees as a time-consuming process (CR HR). In the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, a survey on the validation process of foreign academic diploma reveals that it is a long and complicated process to receive the recognition of an academic degree, even though some of them have been acquired at the world’s top universities (Vangeli, 2011: 7). This leads to the absurd situation that most times holders of academic degrees do not even try to receive recognition.

**Social security co-ordination of migrants**

After the Yugoslav secession wars, policies for social security co-ordination in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia consisted in the take-up of the previously existing agreements with the ex-SFRY or the renewal of it through the conclusion of new bilateral agreements with the main destination countries.

In order to build capacity for social security coordination in all candidate countries and potential candidates, the “IPA Regional Programmes on Social Security Coordination and Social Security Reforms in South-East Europe”, as from 2004 until 2011, implemented jointly by the European Commission and the Council of Europe, enabled the set-up of a network of civil servants among the countries. The first and the second joint programme of the EU and the CoE enhanced the social security coordination and reforms according to EU standards as well as regional cooperation on these topics. This included a series of different activities (training sessions, speaking days, study visits, ministerial conferences, summer schools, etc.) with the aim of improving knowledge and capacities of the civil servants of the social security institutions and administrations involved of the countries.

Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey have been benefiting from EU financial support within the framework of IPA, in order to prepare their social security administrations to the challenges of free movement and the implementation of the EU coordination rules as from EU accession within the framework of institutional building projects. On the basis of the Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAA) concluded with Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia133, which contain a number of principles governing the coordination of social security, the EU is currently working on a decision by the Association Council(s) set-up by these agreements, which aims to ensure equal treatment with nationals of the destination country and the exportability of certain benefits, such as pensions, on the basis of reciprocity towards EU nationals. It can be expected that a similar approach will be taken towards other countries of the region with

133 As well as with Algeria, Marocco and Tunisia.
whom Stabilisation and Association Agreements have been signed (AL, BA, ME, RS,\textsuperscript{134}) in the course of their path to EU accession\textsuperscript{135}. In Albania, alongside the set-up of a voluntary insurance scheme aiming at improving the social security coverage of Albanian migrants abroad during the 1990s (see Chapter 4), efforts have been made towards engaging a process of negotiation and conclusion of social security agreements with the main migration destination countries (Greece and Italy), which has been made a priority of national migration policy. This process has, however, been somehow hampered by the financial and economic crisis affecting the two main migrant receiving countries.

**Promoting the return of highly skilled**

Against the background of high emigration rates of highly skilled persons in the Western Balkans, the countries began to address the phenomenon of brain drain by setting up programmes to attract the return of these migrants or to involve the Diaspora in the development of the country. The implementation of several brain gain programmes (AL: 2006, HR: 2005, ME: 2011, RS: 2009) shows that especially those countries with increasing economic growth and labour demand aim to attract skilled workers who could contribute to the country’s development. Since Croatia officially gained the status of an accession country in the beginning of 2012, the free movement of labour will soon become reality for this country and the attraction of highly skilled persons is high on the political agenda of Croatia. Albania has launched a Brain Gain Programme in 2006, with support from the UNDP, which provided incentive packages to 137 highly qualified individuals to return from abroad and work in higher positions in public administrations. However, those policies are expected to be more successful under the condition of economic and political stability and of higher investments in education and research activities.

Some countries put a strong focus on strengthening collaboration with the scientists abroad (HR, RS, ME). In Croatia, the ‘Unity Through Knowledge Fund (UTKF)’ organises common projects between scientists in Croatia and the Diaspora. The programme can be considered as being successful: The UTKF received 299 project proposals and 80 have been launched with financial resources of EUR 30 million (CR HR). In Serbia, besides some other projects with Serbian academics abroad, a database of Serbian researchers living and working abroad was created in 2009, in order to strengthen their ties to domestic researchers. 700 scientists have registered and provide their contact details and research field. The project is followed up by the Ministry of Sciences and Technological Development in the project cycle 2011-2014 (CR RS).

**Diaspora engagement for the country’s economic development**

As already described in Chapter 3, remittance inflow to the Western Balkans constitute a significant share of GDP and considerably contribute to raising the living standard of the migrants’ families left behind. However, the potential of remittances for the sustainable economic development of the country remains largely unused, due to high transaction costs, the lack of trust in banks, and the lack of incentives for investments. Like in the EU-8+2, Diaspora engagement is mainly shaped by the sole transfer of remittances. Policies encouraging Diaspora engagement in the Western Balkans have a rather cultural approach and still rarely aim at attracting foreign investment. The latter started to change recently and

\textsuperscript{134} The entry into force of the SAA with Bosnia and Herzegovina, ratified by all EU Member States has been delayed; the SAA with Serbia is currently in the process of being ratified by the EU Member States.

\textsuperscript{135} The latest Communication of March 2012 of the European Commission on the external dimension of EU social security coordination states clearly that the EU Commission will be proposing a second package of Council decisions on the position to be taken by the EU within the Association Councils on issues of social security coordination, in order to enable implementation of the agreements’ provisions on these issues (See: EC, 2012b: 8). In relation to other third countries with whom new SAA will be concluded, the EU Commission seeks to integrate a standard clause on social security coordination based on the principles of equal treatment, export of pensions and administrative cooperation.
parts of the Western Balkan countries expressed their preferences in national strategies and action plans and migration policies (MK, AL, BA). In the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the National Resolution on Migration Policy 2009-2014 concretely states that there should be an increased use of the Diaspora for the overall development of the country (CR MK). A Diaspora mapping – a database for Macedonians working abroad – aims to provide more information about different Diaspora groups and their potential value for development (Kincinger, 2009: 86ff.).

Despite the fact that Western Balkan countries only began to strategically think about economic Diaspora engagement, some countries have already reduced their banking regulations to attract Diaspora savings (AL, TR), which increases the capital for potential investment in the country of origin (Terrazas, 2010: 13) and facilitates an indirect way of the Diaspora’s resources use. Policies that foster the direct investment of remittances are largely missing. The ‘One-Euro-Initiative’ in Albania was one small example of attempts to directly use financial resources. The aim was to attract investment by selling public land, buildings or storehouses to potential investors against a symbolic payment of one Euro, but even though the project gained a lot of public attention at first, the outcome was not satisfying at all (CR AL).

**Diaspora engagement in Turkey**

Turkey was one of the first countries during the economic boom in Western Europe that strategically used migration for the domestic economy. The issue of ‘export of surplus labour power’ was part of the five-year development plan and was translated into concrete political action by closing bilateral agreements with Western European countries, Germany as one of the most important ones, in the 1960s (CR TR).

It can be stated that some regions, indeed, took advantage from high emigration rates and seem to be better off than before the migration period. Immediately after the export of labour force, different methods with mixed success for the use of Diaspora engagement were introduced: Worker’s joint stock companies, Village Development Cooperatives, and the State Industry and Workers’ Investment Bank. The latter was introduced in 1975 and aimed to attract savings of remittances and to fund enterprises by mixed capital provided by private and state funds, but cannot be evaluated as being successful. The Village Development Cooperatives should transfer remittances and savings of returnees into the development of rural areas by increasing the number of advanced agricultural technical devices, which worked, at least to some extent. The establishment of Workers’ Joint Stock Companies in disadvantaged areas financed by remittances was brought forward by the state, but could not be successfully managed when left in private hands (İçduygu, 2009: 20ff.).

In the last couple of years, Turkey’s interest in economic engagement of the Diaspora has substantially decreased. The on-going economic boom has changed the government’s policy and nowadays merely focuses on political engagement (Bilgili and Siegel 2010). Turks living abroad will be enabled to keep their citizen’s rights, as e.g. their ID number in addition to their quasi-passport (mavi kart).

As regards the exchange of knowledge between researchers in Turkey and Turkish scientists abroad, the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TÜBİTAK) plays an important role in the provision of financial and administrative resources. There is a strong effort of encouraging return of skilled researchers. Several information programmes and conferences in Europe and the USA aimed at attracting Turkish researchers living abroad. The programme ‘Destination Turkey: European and National Funding Opportunities for Brain Circulation, R&D Cooperation and Research Career’ and the recently established ‘Young Turkish Academy’ have been introduced for that purpose.

The role of the Diaspora has profoundly changed in Turkey. The aim of the government to attract economic engagement of less skilled workers in the 1960s and 1970s has turned into the objective to make a return attractive for highly qualified people, sometimes belonging to the second generation of Turkish emigrants.

6.3.2 Reintegration of IDPs and Refugees (Including Forced Returnees)

In Chapter 5, it has already been mentioned that the differentiation between refugees and IDPs is crucial, since those groups have unequal access to social services and the labour market. In most countries returning refugees are better off than IDPs as regards social integration\(^\text{137}\). Besides, there is still a considerable amount of people who still have an unclear state of citizenship. The law of citizenship in post Yugoslav times was used to build the republics on ethnicity. This means that refugees from other Yugoslav republics who could prove that they have the same ethnic background of the state they fled to were considered to be important for state-building. IDPs, on the other hand, might have been born in a republic different from their ethnic background, which made them most vulnerable during and also after the war. A considerable group of people lost their documents and changed their status from a refugee to an IDP or still have an undefined status and, accordingly, major difficulties in having access to social services and working permits. Sometimes, people have double citizenships (e.g. Bosnians living in Croatia). According to Šticks, during or after the wars, people found themselves in the following different situations: former citizens of a particular republic with republican citizenship (e.g. Croatians in Croatia), people living outside their republic with an ethnic background of the republic who can obtain citizenship in the country of their ethnic background (e.g. Croatian Bosnians in Croatia), citizens living outside their republic with a different ethnic background than the major group of the place where they lived (e.g. ethnic Albanians with a Serbian citizenship in Kosovo)* (Šticks, 2010: 12ff.). Depending on their situation immediately after the war, they were classified either as refugees or IDPs.

Reintegration of refugees and forced returnees

As part of the Thessaloniki Agenda, which defined the next steps for the Western Balkans in preparation of the future European Integration, all Western Balkan countries, except for Kosovo*, signed readmission agreements in 2005 (AL) and 2007 (MK, ME, RS, BA), which regulate all readmission procedures. According to the agreements, any Western Balkan country has to readmit citizens who have either legally left their country of origin and have lost their residence permit or illegally entered a EU MS and the receiving country can prove that the residence conditions are not or no longer being met\(^\text{138}\).

In the context of the readmission programmes, all countries introduced national strategies/programmes for the reintegration of refugees (e.g. National Strategy for Resolving the Issues of Refugee and IDP Populations in 2011 in Serbia) and implemented projects funded by international donors aimed to improve the situation and integration of refugees and forced returnees under readmission agreements, mostly in terms of housing and infrastructure. The EU also extensively supported this process within the framework of the IPA programme and the SOLID (Solidarity and the Management of Migration Flows) Programme.\(^\text{139}\)

However, it seems that the countries are not well prepared to readmit the returnees and returning refugees still struggle with issues such as citizenship and housing including unresolved property rights, and also face enormous difficulties as regards access to pensions and as regards their labour market and social (re-)integration. Projects aimed at balancing negative consequences of forced return are small scale and only address a small

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\(^\text{137}\) According to the Guiding Principles on International Displacement by the United Nations, Internal Displacement is defined as follows: “Internally displaced persons are persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed internationally recognized State borders” (UN 1998).


\(^\text{139}\) The SOLID (Solidarity and the Management of Migration Flows) Programme provides three funds that are especially relevant for countries under readmission agreements: the European Return Fund (RF), the European Refugee Fund (ERF), and the European Integration Fund (EIF). These funds are deemed to finance voluntary and forced return programmes, integration of refugees and capacity building for institutions dealing with refugees, and integration measures including pre-departure measures. See also [http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/funding/solid/funding_intro_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/funding/solid/funding_intro_en.htm)
number of people. Furthermore, in Serbia, Kosovo* and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, still a considerable amount of people is accommodated in collective centres (Cvejić et al., 2010; CR MK, XK). Also in Croatia, effective housing policies are missing and a strategy for the local integration of returnees is urgently needed (IDMC, 2010: 10). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, there are still considerable problems after return. People have a hard time finding employment and bureaucratic and complicated procedures hamper a smooth start in their country of origin. There are reports on children who cannot attend school because their documents are not accepted without translation, but parents are not able to pay for it. In addition, complicated procedures prevent some returnees from access to social services and a general lack of information about NGOs that could provide financial assistance for starting up a business or buying some property and counselling leave some returnees in an unfavourable situation. Especially the lack of psychological treatment is severe for returnees who suffer from a posttraumatic stress symptom (de Koning, 2008: 17ff.). In Kosovo*, besides major still existent difficulties in reintegration of returnees, there are some indications for minor improvements in 2011: institutional capacity for processing the reintegration fund and training of relevant staff has been built; nevertheless, there is still a lot of room for improvement as regards communication about available funding and integration of returnees into the labour market is still a difficult task, the establishment of a working group for the implementation of Kosovo*’s reintegration strategy aims specifically to improve integration in education (CR XK).

Reintegration of IDPs

Although most countries of the Western Balkans have strategies for the return and reintegration of IDPs, there are still substantial shortcomings of housing provision, infrastructure, and labour market and social integration of IDPs in all Western Balkan countries. Furthermore, also those IDPs who are not able to or do not want to return to their former place of living and stay in the place they have been displaced to need to be offered support to sustainable integration (IDMC, 2008: 274). The insufficient housing situation has been addressed by several countries, but still, IDPs are considerably exposed to unemployment, poverty and social exclusion. For example, in Bosnia and Herzegovina housing provision reached 93% in comparison to pre-war times by 2007, but reintegration of IDPs is more than insufficient (de Koning 2008: 5). Considering the fact that in the country the amount of IDPs is the highest in the Western Balkans, the ineffectiveness of IDP strategies in Bosnia and Herzegovina causes a severe situation.

Some countries implemented so called ‘go and see’ projects (ME, XK). To foster voluntary return, the UNCHR has implemented the ‘go and see’ project, where potential returnees and IDPs can return to Kosovo* for a certain time period to have a look at their former property. Nevertheless, results of managing return are still unsatisfying. Since 2000, the EU has intensively assisted the voluntary return and reintegration of displaced persons of Kosovo*. However, 18,296 persons are still displaced in Kosovo* or still reside in collective centres and would like to have a durable solution. Furthermore, some further thousands of displaced persons continue to reside in the neighbouring countries, in host families in Serbia, Montenegro and other countries or in collective centres in the region (EC; 2011i: 3).

Also in Turkey, sustainable return of mostly Kurdish IDPs remains a difficult task, due to ongoing conflicts and landmines in the south-eastern area. The ‘Return to Villages and Rehabilitation Project (RVRP)’, conducted by the UNHCR, the Council of Europe and the European Commission aimed to pave the way for successful return by providing financial support and infrastructure. The Law on Compensation introduced in 2004 and the Van Action Plan in 2006 aimed to address the issue of return of IDPs. However, all initiatives still lack a clear commitment of the government and still suffer from an unresolved situation between the Turkish government and the Kurdish community and the resistance of Turkey to acknowledge the Kurdish identity (CR TR).
6.3.3 Support to the Development of Regions Severely Affected by Migration

In Chapter 3.3.4 it has been analysed that disadvantaged regions suffering from high out-migration rates have been facing long-standing problems of rural decline, combined with inaccessibility and unfavourable geography. The prevalence of subsistence and semi-subistence agriculture, high unemployment and a poor labour force mobility characterise the economies of these predominantly rural areas.

On their way to EU accession, the candidate countries – in contrast to the potential candidates - have all access to the IPA components III and IV, supporting regional and rural development programmes. Again, the impact of development strategies is hardly measurable. It, is however, clear that the rural and regional development programmes widely lack an integrated approach and suffer from poor inter-ministerial co-operation. They are rarely combined with other sectoral programmes (e.g. for HRD), so that the issues of employment and social inclusion of those left behind are not adequately addressed. In particular, active labour market measures to increase the employability and the mobility of the rural workforce should go hand in hand with rural diversification programmes (EESC, 2011).

Up to now, there are only few projects that are targeting the issues of migration specifically. From 2006-2011, the government of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia established 46 university faculties throughout the country in order to divert the students’ flows from the traditional university centres of Bitola and Skopje. However, student enrolment rates in these newly established faculties have been far lower than expected, which is associated with lower quality of education and employment opportunities in these areas (CR MK).

In Serbia, the Ministry for Diaspora established 16 Centres for the Diaspora within the Regional Chambers of Commerce, which are aimed at attracting investments from the Diaspora for local development projects. In 2010, the Ministry issued the first edition of a catalogue on ‘investment opportunities in the municipalities in Serbia’. Unfortunately, information on the impact of this initiative in terms of successful development projects set up by the Diaspora is not available (CR RS). However, it is clear from the Serbian and other country reports that complicated bureaucratic procedures, corruption and poor administrative capacities, in particular at local level, hamper the success of those initiatives.

6.3.4 Policies in Support to Vulnerable Groups Affected by Migration

Vulnerable groups in candidate and potential candidate countries are doubly affected by migration: Either, they belong to the group of IDPs, refugees or forced returnees and/or they are left behind by their family members, either due to labour migration or due to migration caused by the war. During the war, Roma lost their at least officially pronounced protection by the Yugoslav Republic and faced military aggression by all war parties, since they did not belong to one particular republic. Children of IDPs, forced returnees or refugees or Roma children are especially exposed to social exclusion. In this context, it is to be highlighted that in the social service systems in most countries, institutionalisation still prevails and home-based social services or day care services are still underdeveloped (Stambolieva et al., 2011). In some countries in the region social services provision, along with the educational system of social workers, did not undergo any substantial reform (e.g. in Bosnia and Herzegovina), so that the staff in the Centres of Social Welfare (CSWs) predominantly “still focus on the provision of paltry and poorly targeted material assistance, rather than offering professional services” (Maglajlić et al., 2011: 35). Even though the involvement of non-governmental organisations in care services becomes more and more important in view of the ageing society, the system is still underdeveloped, and in most countries, the CSWs are

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140 Centres for Social Welfare/Work (CSWs) were established in the 1960s in the Yugoslav Republic and are public institutions responsible for the provision of social services and the administration of the payments of the social assistance benefits.
still the main service providers. Last but not least, in the course of decentralisation of social service systems, which is ongoing in some countries (e.g. Croatia, former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), local authorities are getting more responsibilities in care provision, with the consequence that quality and accessibility might highly vary between regions dependent on the budgetary possibilities. Thus, underdeveloped or non-existent care systems make elderly people left behind in remote areas most vulnerable and leave them in extreme poverty and isolation.

Children

There are two ways children may be exposed to vulnerability: as returning children of IDPs, refugees or forced returnees or as left behind by their relatives. As mentioned in Chapter 5, returning children of IDPs or (forced) returnees face difficulties in getting access to education, mainly due to problems in recognition of school certificates. In the case of lost citizenship, they are deprived of social and health services. In addition, some of them suffer from post-traumatic stress symptoms after war experiences, but psychological programmes are largely missing.

All Western Balkan countries, except Albania and Kosovo*, have at least means-tested child allowances or equivalent assistance, but still, the general level of child poverty remains high (UNICEF, 2009: 81). Comprehensive programmes targeted at returning children of returnees or IDPs have not been implemented yet. As most severe can be considered the situation in Kosovo*, where returning children face major difficulties due to the absence of a functioning welfare scheme. According to UNICEF (2010), there are some projects dealing with the issue of child poverty and exclusion funded by the World Bank, the EU and similar donors, but still, their impact is hardly measurable.

There are some positive reports on children’s policies in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, where schools are obliged by law to provide appropriate learning facilities for returning children, but even here, the de facto situation shows that concrete activities remain to be implemented. An additional Programme for Conditional Cash Transfers for secondary education in 2010/2011 aims to mitigate the impact of poverty on education levels as a consequence of increasing enrolment rates, but there is no assessment that reveals the success of the programme (CR MK).

Projects for children left behind have more a pilot character and their impact is largely unknown.

Older people

As explained in Chapter 5.3.2., the impact of migration on elderly people is only entering the discussion, but it is clear that elderly left behind are particularly vulnerable in general, but also due to migration. Many older people in the Western Balkans suffer from very low pensions or are not entitled to pensions at all. Furthermore, in the context of the erosion of family networks, which is partly due to migration, the mostly underdeveloped long-term care system increases their vulnerability, in particular in remote areas. In most countries of the region, long-term care services are highly institutionalised, but the need for services greatly exceeds the capacities. Moreover, home-based social services for the elderly are either non-existent or only slowly developing.

In Croatia, the Social Welfare System Development Strategy 2011-2016 defines social inclusion as a key priority and proposes several long-term care schemes aimed at the improvement of living conditions for the elderly, and programmes for the development of non-institutionalised services for elderly people in remote areas try to reduce the burden for the elderly living in the countryside (asisp HR). Also, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia elaborated a National Strategy for the Protection of the Elderly (2010-2020), which foresees the set-up of local services at community level in collaboration with the municipalities and the
civil society. However, the operationalisation and implementation of the strategy has not started yet (forthcoming asisp Annual Report MK, 2012:39\textsuperscript{141}).

Also in the remaining countries of the region, long-term care provision is insufficient and elderly people are still highly dependent on the support of family members or the neighbours.

**Roma**

Roma were exposed to discrimination, deprivation, and social exclusion before and even more so after the Yugoslav secession wars. In most cases, they were not able to obtain citizenship from the republic where they used to reside before secession and are now in a situation of statelessness, which prevents them from benefiting from the visa liberalisation process. They are very often subject to forced return from EU MS, and the high numbers of Roma in specific camps or IDP camps with extremely bad living conditions and the general lack of health care for Roma call for effective policy measures. Still a major problem is the missing monitoring and evaluation of Roma activities or the Roma situation. Reliable data is not available and, therefore, projects for Roma inclusion cannot be evaluated as being effective or not (Karacsony, 2012).

The EU puts a lot of effort into the improvement of social and economic inclusion of Roma in the Western Balkans under the instrument of IPA and closely monitors the progress by each country in social inclusion of Roma in the enlargement progress reports. Ensuring access to education of Roma children and the improvement of human rights and anti-discrimination policies are priorities in social inclusion projects financed by EU Funds. With the help of EU financial instruments, the conduction of programmes on the return of Roma to pre-war settlements was possible and enabled the reconstruction of housing for Roma. Again, projects are mostly implemented independently from each other and are rarely coordinated. There is no comprehensive Roma inclusion programme in the Western Balkan countries, but rather a focus on single projects with a small target group (Müller and Jovanovic, 2010: 48-55). The European Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies dedicates one special paragraph on the particular situation of Roma people in the enlargement countries and asks for revising or drafting (TR) Roma strategies\textsuperscript{142} in line with the framework objectives: better use of IPA funds (more than EUR 50 million exclusively for Roma projects), involvement of Roma organisations, and monitoring of the progress achieved within the frame of Roma inclusion (EC, 2011h).

The Western Balkan Countries, except for Kosovo*, joined the ‘Decade of Roma Inclusion 2005-2015’, founded, organised and implemented by a consortium of international organisations and have drafted National Decade Action Plans in a consultative process with Roma organisations to elaborate concrete measures for the inclusion of Roma. All countries have additionally drafted national strategies for Roma inclusion, independently from the Roma Decade. But as in most EU MS, none of the Action Plans could be implemented in a way that would substantially improve the situation of Roma. Especially the unresolved relation between Serbia and Kosovo* leaves displaced Roma in a difficult state (OSCE-ODIHR, 2010: 5). Serbian speaking Roma returned to Kosovo* – Kosovo* has signed agreements for the forced return of Roma – face severe discrimination and sometimes violent attacks by the Kosovo-Albanian majority group (Human Rights Watch, 2010: 7). Roma from Kosovo* displaced to Serbia are not necessarily in a better situation. They are placed in IDP camps or Roma settlements with unacceptable living conditions (Müller and Jovanovic, 2010: 23). Effective projects targeting better employment opportunities explicitly for Roma in the Western Balkans are mostly missing. Employment strategies as the Joint Assessment Paper on Employment (JAP) in Croatia or the Employment Strategy 2010-2012/Action Plan 2011-2013 in Kosovo* did not include returning Roma as a vulnerable group.

\textsuperscript{141} www.socialprotection.eu

\textsuperscript{142} According to the EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies, all Candidate and Potential Candidate Countries are requested to align their Roma integration Strategies (which in most cases have been elaborated within the framework of the 2005-2015 Decade for Roma Inclusion) to the EU goals.
In the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the missing linkage between the state and municipal level seems to prevent a successful implementation of Roma inclusion policies (Redzepi, 2011), whereas in Kosovo*, absent inter-ministerial coordination makes efficient and effective implementation of policy measures for Roma inclusion impossible (OSCE, 2011). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, none of the measures discussed in the action plan have been implemented yet (CR BA). This is also the case with the Poverty Alleviation and Social Inclusion Strategy 2007-2011 in Montenegro, where the European Commission sees the situation of Roma still highly problematic and assesses the impact of Roma integration strategies as quasi non-existent (EC, 2011j: 20). In Croatia, at least, the amount of funding for inclusion programmes increased during the Decade of Roma Inclusion from EUR 2.4 million in 2008 to EUR 5.3 million in 2009.

For the inclusion of (returned) Roma children, there have been education programmes financed by the EU, but they are still limited in number and impact. Some countries established special learning centres for Roma children that aim to increase their school attendance rates (HR, MK, XK) and simplified school registration processes (CR XK) or Conditional Cash Transfers for secondary education in 2010 and 2011. The latter is not only targeted at Roma children, but at socially deprived children in general and aims to especially increase the school attendance rate among Roma children (CR MK). Special training programmes for teachers with the objective of inclusive education have been introduced in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and could be one way to tackle this issue (UNICEF, 2007: 52). Another initiative from Germany as a receiving country is of particular interest for the repatriation of the children: in 2010, the Ministry of the Interior of North Rhine-Westphalia in Germany issued a special decree regarding the repatriation of Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians from Kosovo* that currently reside in Germany and who are obliged to leave the country. The document requires that the best interest of the child should be primarily considered during the review process regarding his or her status. The child’s level of integration in German society must be considered on its own merit, in particular with respect to his/her education, professional training and other key considerations (CR XK).

Even though all Western Balkan Countries - the last one was Montenegro in 2010 - implemented comprehensive anti-discrimination laws, discrimination on a regular basis stays an issue in the region. In BA, the European Court of Human Rights wants the government to implement democratic rights of minority groups. A Roma man and Jew man were not allowed to vote for the state institutions because this is restricted to Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croatians (Amnesty International, 2011a). The segregation of Roma school children from other children in Croatia caused some criticism and demands for its abolition were made (Amnesty International, 2011b). Access to housing, health care, employment, social protection and education is often denied due to discrimination. In the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, returning children do not obtain legal documents and there is de facto segregation of school children, many Roma children are in schools for children with mental disabilities (Amnesty International, 2011c). One step towards the right direction was the election of a Commissioner for Equality in Serbia in 2011 (Amnesty International, 2011d).

It can be concluded that Roma policies still address basic, but severe challenges as housing and infrastructure, and sometimes education. The latter, one of the most effective social inclusion policies should be urgently strengthened (Müller and Jovanovic, 2010: 60-69).

6.4 Eastern Partnership Countries

As outlined in Chapter 2, the main characteristic of migration in the Eastern Partnership countries is irregularity. Irregularity has a considerable impact on the quality of work carried out in the receiving countries and the social protection coverage of the migrants. Another important characteristic of migration in the EaP region is the high share of remittances, which play a crucial role with regard to the social situation of family members left behind. However, family members left behind, in particular children and elderly, are particularly vulnerable to poverty and social exclusion in general, but also, and in parts even more, under the condition of migration. In this sub-section, we will initially summarise existing policy responses in the
Eastern Partnership countries with regard to the regularisation of labour migration and social protection of migrants, and secondly, we will review which policies are successful with regard to an efficient and sustainable use of remittances and how the Diaspora is actively involved in the social development of sending countries. Moreover, a number of Eastern Partnership countries are challenged by a large share of internally displaced people and refugees. Thus, Section 6.4.3 summarises existing strategies for better social inclusion of refugees and IDPs and Section 6.4.4 will look at policies to improve the living conditions of children and elderly people left behind.

6.4.1 Making Migration Work for Sending Countries and Migrants

Eastern Partnership countries have largely realised that a state policy for migration management is necessary in order to cope with large-scale (irregular) migration flows. However, the implementation of migration management policies still seems to be rather fragmented in practice.

The main overall observation is that coherent policy frameworks to manage migration are still missing or only in initial stages. Belarus has approved a State Migration Programme targeted at the regulation of labour migration, which was followed by a national programme for demographic security. However, these national programmes are considered to have only a very limited practical relevance. In Moldova, the need for a coherent national migration policy approach was neglected for a long time and has gained momentum only under the pressure of negative demographic and social consequences. Likewise, the Ukrainian report states that comprehensive migration policies have not yet been formulated and existing policy responses are fragmented. In Armenia, a coherent policy approach to mitigate negative consequences of migration is also still missing. Despite the existence of a concept paper on state regulation of migration, which was approved at the end of 2010, and the existence of a national “State Migration Service”, the need for a better and more effective migration regulation is acknowledged. In Azerbaijan, likewise, a State Migration Management Policy Concept (2004) was approved and a State Migration Service within the Ministry of Internal Affairs was established in 2007, but it lacks clear policies with regard to circular migration of skilled workers. The Georgian country report states a lack of migration policies and regulation of migration flows, despite the acknowledgement that migration substantially impacts on the social and economic situation in the country. A State Migration Commission was established at the end of 2010 as an advisory body to the government.

One of the reasons of the high prevalence of irregular migration is the existence of complex and prohibitive visa procedures. The Eastern Partnership countries seek to foster visa liberalisation or visa-facilitation; at the same time, the EU continues its efforts to ease visa procedures, which was also reconfirmed in a Joint Declaration of the Warsaw Eastern Partnership Summit in autumn 2011.

Further important policy responses with regard to the overall migration management are bilateral labour agreements which aim to offer legal opportunities and to ensure the protection of workers’ rights in general. Whilst most countries have concluded bilateral labour agreements with Russia and other CIS countries, implementation is mostly lacking or inefficient.

There are some attempts to set up circular migration agreements but these are mostly small-scale, and little is known on their impact. Currently, an agreement between France and Georgia is under negotiation, targeted at employment of 500-600 qualified Georgians in France on a short-term basis. However, the agreement has not yet been signed. The intention to stimulate return migration has also been announced in a draft labour agreement between Ukraine and Italy. Further to that, country studies rather state that current migration is de-facto circular migration, as migrants often return back home and emigrate again (as in e.g. the case of Armenians to Russia). However, understanding and implementation of the concept of circular migration with respective mechanisms towards achieving “win-win-win”

(for migrants, sending and receiving countries) situation for the region is still to come, and the instrument of the Mobility Partnerships, initiated by the EU, can provide the framework for such programmes (see box below).

Receiving countries increasingly invest in measures targeted at preparation of potential migrants and, by this, contribute to facilitating regular migration. Pre-departure measures are partly included in Mobility Partnerships or other managed labour migration schemes. As already mentioned under Chapter 6.3.1., the European Fund for Integration of Third-Country Nationals supports EU Member States in facilitating the integration of third-country nationals and may also finance pre-departure measures for potential migrants. One example is the pre-departure education and information programme in Moldova implemented by Greece in cooperation with IOM. For four months, the programme offered formal and informal information on the language, institutions and values of Greek society, practical information on migrants’ rights and obligations and the necessary procedures to legally enter and stay in Greece, and vocational guidance in order to obtain a better match between the third-country nationals’ skills and the actual demand on the Greek labour market (EC, 2011m).

**Mobility Partnerships**

In 2006, the European Commission introduced Mobility Partnerships between the EU and third countries. These partnerships aim at better migration management and are considered as partnership negotiations based on reciprocity. While the EU commits itself to facilitating visa procedures and legal access to the EU, third-country partners are expected to improve border control and security of travel documents, combat human trafficking and readmission of nationals of other states residing illegally in the EU.

Moldova was the first country concluding a Mobility Partnership with the EU in 2008, which covered a wide area of migration related policies. Georgia signed a Mobility Partnership with the EU in 2009 and recently, a third partnership among the EaP countries was concluded with Armenia. Given the limited number of Mobility Partnerships concluded up to now, experiences with the partnerships in general and individual programmes and measures are rather limited. In 2009, the Commission made a preliminary assessment of the Mobility Partnerships and concluded that they are a valuable framework for cooperation but need to be further developed, beyond addressing border management and illegal migration issues, and require the strong commitment of the EU and the third-country partner.

In autumn 2011, the EU has reconfirmed its will to strengthen the dialogue and operational cooperation with non-EU partner countries in the area of migration and emphasised the role of Mobility Partnerships. Policies should be focused “on facilitating and organising legal migration, effective and human measures to address irregular migration, and concrete steps towards reinforcing the development outcomes of migration. Concluding visa facilitation and readmission agreements are to be part of these partnerships” (EC, 2011k). In response to the weaknesses identified in previous Mobility Partnerships, the recently concluded Mobility Partnership with Armenia has been translated into a detailed action plan and covers a number of various instruments and programmes to achieve its objectives, including information campaigns, support to the enhanced monitoring of migration, pre-departure training of migrants, job-counselling and others. They also aim at the prevention, reduction and counteraction of brain drain and brain waste through return policies and the active involvement of the Diaspora.

**Support to return migration**

A number of further policy initiatives in the EaP countries are focused on the support for return migration. They are often initiated jointly with receiving countries in the context of

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145 A too strong focus of the first Mobility Partnership with Moldova on border control and combating illegal migration has been also constated by Parkes (2009). [http://www.carim-east.eu/media/sociopol_module/The%20action%20Plan%20for%20the%20Implementation%20of%20the%20Policy%20Concept%20for%20the%20State%20Regulation%20of%20Migration_2012-1016.pdf](http://www.carim-east.eu/media/sociopol_module/The%20action%20Plan%20for%20the%20Implementation%20of%20the%20Policy%20Concept%20for%20the%20State%20Regulation%20of%20Migration_2012-1016.pdf)
readmission agreements and are operated on a project basis only.\footnote{There has been ‘The Return Assistance Programme for the RA Nationals from Switzerland’ since 2004, further return assistance programmes are implemented by the French-Armenian Development Foundation and the National Agency for the Reception of Foreigners and Migration of the Government of France, and Armenian Association of Social Aid in France since 2005 and have provided support for approx. 400 returnees. About 30 returnees annually benefit from Caritas, funded by Belgium. Armenia has also provided labour market training for about 100 returnees for the new start-up of businesses.} Encouraging return migration is also contained in the recently signed Mobility Partnerships between the EU and Armenia and Georgia. Also, the Mobility Partnership with Moldova aims at the facilitation of reintegration of migrants. Other measures are implemented mostly by non-governmental organisations such as IOM or AWO in Azerbaijan and Georgia, who support returnees by covering travel expenses, providing administrative support, job counselling and financial assistance. Belarus has introduced compensation and resettlement benefits for returnees or immigrants which are particularly targeted at high qualified below the age of 40. However, the impact of these measures appears to be limited so far and in particular re-integration into the labour market in most cases turned out to be not successful.

In addition to concrete support measures for those who returned, some of the countries have started to provide public information for potential returnees. Armenia e.g. has established a special website (www.backtoarmenia.com) to inform about legal and administrative issues for those who intend to return. A similar initiative has been started in Georgia, where recently a Mobility Centre has been established, which among others will foster dissemination of information for returnees. There is a special website where migrants can make an online application as well (www.informedmigration.ge).

**Social security of migrants and their families left behind**

Efforts undertaken by countries of the region to improve the social protection coverage of their migrant population via the conclusion of bilateral agreements with main destination countries have been hampered in some cases by the difficult political situations prevailing in bilateral relations. While Belarus has been able to extend social protection coverage of migrants in Russia beyond the pension insurance field, it seems that this has not been possible to date for other countries, partly because of the reservation of the Russian side towards a widening of the scope of bilateral agreements.

Countries of the region who face large migration flows towards EU Member States, like Ukraine and Moldova, have engaged in a process of consultations and negotiations, amongst others with Poland and Italy respectively, which is still ongoing. The process of negotiation and conclusion of bilateral (labour) and social security agreements in general has been put high on the agenda and is being promoted with EU support within the implementation of the Mobility Partnership. More concretely, within the 3-years project “Supporting the implementation of the migration and development component of the EU-Moldova Mobility Partnership”, implemented by IOM Moldova, capacities of Moldovan government officials in techniques and negotiation of bilateral (labour) and social security agreements shall be enhanced via training sessions and the support to negotiation meetings abroad. Despite the absence of a bilateral agreement between Moldova and Italy to date, some kind of cooperation between Italian and Moldovan institutions have started quite recently, in order to provide Moldovan migrants who have worked in Italy with support in clarifying their social security situation. Similarly to the model of cooperation instituted for Albanian migrants in Italy (see Chapter 4), a co-operation has been established with the Italian association ACLI Patronage, which opened its first office in Chisinau in 2010. The association offers advice to Moldovan migrants and returnees about their social security rights in relation to Italy (CR MD).

Likewise, negotiations have also been engaged between Ukraine and Poland as from April 2008. These were started on the initiative of the Polish authorities and, after first bilateral consultations, the Polish Government assigned the responsible ministry to officially negotiate an agreement in March 2009; subsequently, a first draft agreement was sent to the Ukrainian
side. Both sides have committed themselves to conclude an agreement oriented towards the principles of the EU coordination law. According to a parliamentary source, among the main difficulties which have to be solved during this process is the absence of reliable data which would enable the Polish side to assess the costs of such an agreement with the Ukraine. Further, the situation of the so-called “repatriates” calls for a solution: this concerns persons of Polish origin who have worked regularly in the Ukraine and who have later resettled in Poland. According to Polish law, the pension contribution years of these persons to the Ukrainian pension system are taken into account for the payment of a Polish pension. The level of these pensions is significantly higher than the pension to which these persons would be entitled to according to a bilateral agreement.

In the absence of adequate bilateral agreements, two countries of the region (MD and UA) have sought to remedy the lack of social protection coverage of their migrant population by introducing mechanisms of voluntary insurance into their public insurance schemes. As described in Chapter 4, however, the success of these measures seems to have been quite limited and a review might be called for in order to improve take-up, effective coverage and efficiency.

Aside from efforts undertaken at national or bilateral level to improve the social protection of migrants and their families, developments at EU level have also contributed to influencing and improving social protection of migrants originating from EaP countries who move to the EU. In this respect, reference will primarily be made to the fact that the principles of EU social security coordination have been extended to cover all third-country nationals legally resident in the EU and featuring some kind of cross-border element as from 2003. But also other legal, migration-related instruments of the EU, like the “Blue Card” directive and the directive dealing with third-country researchers have reinforced the position of workers from third-countries (like the EaP countries) in specific situations as they guarantee equal treatment with EU nationals as regards the transfer of acquired pensions to a third-country outside the existence of any bilateral social security agreement. Finally, the latest Communication of the European Commission on the external dimension of social security coordination of March 2012 (EC, 2012b) is very likely to have a significant influence on the social protection coverage, especially of EaP migrants, in the future. With this communication the Commission clearly confirms its intention to develop a common EU approach towards social security coordination for third-country nationals which has the potential of providing a much better and comprehensive framework for social protection of migrants from the EaP region in the long run.

**Remittances and Diaspora**

Large scale emigration from the EaP has resulted in an important share of remittance inflows, which considerably contribute to raising the living standards of the family members left behind. However, the share of remittances invested into the home country’s development in most countries is marginal. Contacts to the Diaspora groups are mainly limited to cultural issues, although the Diaspora could be an important driving factor for economic and social development of their home country by long-term economic investment and support.

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148 Reply of Marek Bucior, Undersecretary of State in the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, with the authorisation of the Minister, to question Nr. 5055 from the Polish Parliament related to the progress in regulation of Polish-Ukrainian relations in the area of social insurance, Warsaw, 2 November 2009 (Odpowiedź podsekretarza stanu w Ministerstwie Pracy i Polityki Społecznej Marek Bucior - z upoważnienia ministra - na zapytanie nr 5055 w sprawie postępu w regulowaniu wzajemnych relacji między Polską a Ukrainą w dziedzinie ubezpieczeń społecznych Podsekretarz stanu , Warszawa, dnia 2 listopada 2009 r.), retrieved from: http://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/IZ6.nsf/main/075F8BF28


150 The communication deals with social security coordination in relation to all third-country nationals, which means that it is (still) relevant for candidate countries and potential candidates and EaP (or other) countries. As the EaP countries, however, do not have an EU accession perspective, migrants from these countries will not profit from the comprehensive framework of EU social security coordination like migrants from candidate countries and potential candidates. This is why the approach followed by the communication is likely to affect them to a larger extent.
In Moldova, which is one of the countries with a very high share of remittances, efforts have been made to steer remittances into sustainable investments. The project Pare 1+1 provided for a 100% state top-up of remittances used to set up small or medium-sized businesses. Take-up rates, however, have been disappointingly low so far, since 2010 only 28 applications for funding were approved. This has been caused by a number of reasons, among them difficult administrative procedures, tight eligibility criteria and a lack of knowledge in drawing up business plans among the applicants.

A particular case in the context of Diaspora involvement is Armenia, where the Diaspora plays an important role, as many of those who left abroad in the 1990s have started to invest asset in the development of their homeland. Initially, they helped their relatives who stayed at home by sending them money for living. At a later stage, migrants began to invest into economic and social development, such as building kindergartens, schools, and health clinics, but also pipelines for drinking water in villages. In these cases, the Armenian government strongly promotes and facilitates mobilising of migrants’ assets to the development of the economy of the country. In 2006, the government worked out a project for creating a special All-Armenian bank in Armenia, which aims to allow for a more efficient use of the capital of the Diaspora in the development of the Armenian economy. The establishment of an All-Armenian bank has already started in one of the small towns of the republic - in Dilijan, which is planned to be turned into a major financial centre in Armenia. Apart from the work of the Pan-Armenian Fund "Hayastan"151, all the embassies and diplomatic missions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia, as well as the Ministry of Diaspora carry out constant and active economic relations with compatriots abroad. However, reliable figures on the extent of financial investments from migrants are not available (CR AM).

In Moldova, initiatives to involve the Diaspora have also been taken. They aim at a better coordination of Moldovan Diaspora organisations abroad but, despite the expectation that the Diaspora would support economic growth and community development, Diaspora relations in Moldova largely focus on cultural issues. In other countries, such as Belarus for example, no visible impact of the Diaspora on the economy is observed either.

6.4.2 Reintegration of IDPs and Refugees (Including Forced Returnees)

The reintegration of IDPs is a crucial challenge, in particular in Georgia and in Azerbaijan. Reintegration measures largely focus on income assistance and housing, while active inclusion policies to provide sustainable livelihood to IDPs are often missing or implemented through small-scale projects by non-governmental institutions.

Azerbaijan has substantially invested in settlement-building and the establishment of community services. Moreover, IDPs are eligible for medical services, food allowances and other cash benefits. However, the country report states a lack of support with regard to improved employment opportunities. Policies still predominantly target at the mitigation of poverty and material deprivation, but the long-term oriented objective of social inclusion is neglected due to political reasons.

In Georgia, the government has publicly formulated its intention to foster the reintegration of IDPs. In 2009, an action plan has been adopted which includes the provision of housing but also contains the objective of socio-economic integration. Whilst new collective centres have been built and IDPs have been offered ownership in these collective centres, they are often located in areas with no or insufficient access to employment opportunities. Apart from the housing programme, UNHCR supported the establishment of so-called Community Technology Access Centres in IDP communities, in order to improve access of IDPs to education and livelihood through computer literacy, distance-learning and vocational training (CR GE).

151 The Pan-Armenian Fund „Hayastan“ regularly organises charity events where large funds are collected from the Diaspora, which are then donated to special social programmes in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh.
In Armenia, the government prioritises the return of IDP families to their original place of residence. Special regulations for the protection of IDPs are lacking, so that IDPs are not entitled to special benefits or support measures. IDPs have been placed in collective centres or received temporary shelters in border areas. Furthermore, USAID successfully piloted a housing purchase certificate model, which turned into a large programme that provided permanent housing for more than 6,000 earthquake-displaced IDPs and refugees. The families who were housed in trailers and temporary shelters were qualified for shelter assistance, and the certificates were used to both provide permanent housing and clear the site for future development (CR AM).

6.4.3 Policies in Support of Vulnerable Groups Affected by Migration

As we have seen under Chapter 5, elderly people and children are particularly vulnerable to poverty and social exclusion in the EaP countries in general, and even more under the condition of migration of the children/parents abroad. Furthermore, human trafficking is an issue of concern which affects nearly all countries of the region.

In nearly all countries of the region, means-tested benefits for families with children have been introduced. However, take-up rates are low and also the financial dimension of these benefits is much less important than the contributory benefits. Still, families with 3 children and more are have a higher risk of poverty. (EC, 2010b and 2011c).

Moldova seems to be the only country in the region which undertook first steps to address the issue of children left behind without parental care. The Labour Migration Law adopted in 2008 foresees the obligation of migrant parents to register their minor children with the local public administrations competent for child protection. Furthermore, a National Action Plan on the Protection of Children has been developed in 2010/2011. However, neither the law nor the action plan have been implemented. First of all, parents try to minimise the involvement of local authorities and usually do not inform them. Also, effective mechanisms of interventions have not been identified so far and local administrations usually only interfere in most serious cases (CR MD).

Besides child poverty, the elderly are another group which is above average vulnerable to poverty and social exclusion. This is in particular due to low replacement rates in all countries of the region. In Armenia and Georgia, pensions were increased in the last years in order to close the gap between the average pension and the poverty line, but this was stopped under the financial crisis and average pensions in these countries are still under the subsistence minimum (EC, 2011c). In all countries of the region social services are underdeveloped; this refers above all to the Southern Caucasus, where a weak tradition of social work and community-based services has been stated. But also in other countries, the access to social services, in particular in remote areas, is low and home care services for the elderly and other community-based services are underdeveloped. Thus, elderly people depend on the care of their children, other relatives or neighbours. However, as stated by the country reports, the issue of elderly people left behind by their migrant children is largely disregarded.

As regards human trafficking, all countries in the region run policies aimed at crime prevention such as detection of human traffickers, awareness-raising, educational programmes, assistance to returning victims and facilitation of their employment and professional education, improvement of rehabilitation centres’ operation, etc. Beside state-run programmes, NGOs are important actors in this field. For example, a rather successful programme called “La Strada”, aimed at awareness-raising on risks of human trafficking among multipliers such as teachers, representatives of employment and migration services, is run in Belarus.
7 Conclusions: Policy Challenges and Directions

The findings from the study allow for the opening of the discussions for the development of various policy directions aimed at mitigating the adverse effects of migration on the migrants and the social development in the sending countries and at strengthening the positive effects. Cautious policies should be balanced between internal reforms in the country – improving living conditions for all people and, thus, discouraging emigration – and policies with the explicit aim to make migration as beneficial as possible. In this context, it is important to strengthen the transnational policy nexus between sending and receiving countries.

As in the whole report, we group the policy recommendations into three regions, taking into account the EU policy approach towards these countries and the different financial instruments of the EU. It is clear that some of the policy responses for one region might be also applicable in another region.

In order to develop targeted policy measures addressing the social impact of migration, apparent gaps in data availability and programme evaluation should be addressed in all countries:

- All countries involved in this study should make an effort and improve data gathering and analysis of migration trends and their impact (possibly with further support of the EU). For those countries with high out-migration rates it is recommended to include the migration dimension into the Labour Force Survey, so as to update quantitative and qualitative data on the related issues in a regular and timely manner.
- The country reports reveal that many policy measures and targeted projects have not been externally evaluated, or evaluation results have not been made available beyond the immediately concerned parties, which hampers learning from experience. The implementation of every programme or project should be monitored and evaluated during and after its finalisation.

7.1 EU Member States (EU-8+2)

As we have seen in the previous chapters, the regime of free movement of workers within the EU has contributed to a considerable increase of labour mobility in most of the EU countries, leading to significant outflows of the population, high in absolute numbers in Poland and Romania and high as proportion of the population in the Baltic countries and Bulgaria. The outflow of the predominantly young working-age population is, amongst others, the consequence of high disparities in employment opportunities, wage levels and living standards between receiving and sending Member States. While labour mobility within the EU may contribute to equilibrating labour market imbalances across the EU, it also involves specific challenges for the sending countries and the migrants themselves. The study has shown that the predominantly circular migration in a free mobility regime has not only positive effects, but also negative social impacts for the migrants and the sending countries. Policy measures to address these effects are largely missing or not adequately targeted.

The following policy suggestions derive from the main challenges identified in the previous chapters:

**Develop mobility-supporting labour market policies**

Within the context of free movement, repeated temporary migration from the EU-8+2 to the remaining EU countries has considerably increased. Nevertheless, skill shortages coexist with high rates of unemployment within a single country and across Europe. Skill mismatches in the countries themselves, but also between the migrants’ qualification and the jobs they take abroad, and low transferability of skills upon return are important barriers to intra-EU mobility beneficial for both destination and sending countries.
The EU-8+2 countries are recommended to develop further their mobility-supporting active labour market policies in order to combat regional imbalances and to increase employability of the unemployed and those threatened by unemployment. These measures, which should be co-financed by ESF, may include mobility allowances for internal and international mobility or incentives for language courses for future migrants (i.e. in border regions). Furthermore, the role of the provision of accessible and affordable housing and childcare facilities to improve labour mobility should be assessed.

In order to promote skills matching and the comprehensive preparation of prospective migrants, there is a need to strengthen the provision of information on international employment opportunities, on living and working conditions and cultural environment in the receiving countries. The EURES network already offers these services for registered employers and job seekers. However, from the number of registrations at the EURES network it is obvious that only a few employers make use of the EURES services. It is, therefore, recommended to further develop the EURES activities and render services more efficient in view of recruitment, information and guidance to support the transnational geographical mobility of workers. Also, it is recommended to further strengthen the network of EURES advisors, in particular in areas with high out-migration. The instalment or increase of additional mobility advisors (e.g. in other institutions such as trade unions, local authorities, etc.) should be considered. These activities could be supported by the ESF.

In order to support the employment of migrants according to their qualifications, further efforts in international recognition of formal and informal skills should be undertaken. This can be done by either reconsidering formal qualification requirements for certain occupations or by extending the list of professions which are subject to immediate recognition of qualifications and diplomas. Social partners should take an active role in preventing downskilling and in promoting cross-border skill matching. This might also include providing for greater awareness on recognition procedures among employers in receiving countries. In addition, employers should support the preparation of migrants to be recruited by investing in language courses and in upgrading the migrants’ professional skills in line with national standards.

It is further recommended to create a group of supporting measures for the successful re-integration of the migrant upon his/her return. This, first of all, should target re-integration into the national labour market. Special guidance and counselling at the public employment services should be introduced or strengthened where it already exists, in order to inform the migrant on the relevant vacancies, to provide guidance on recognition procedures and to support entrepreneurship among returnees. These measures should be increasingly supported by the ESF. It cannot be assumed that migrants are aware of all legal requirements and available options in their countries of origin, particularly after long-term stays during which sending countries have undergone profound transformations, changed institutional structures and implemented reforms. Consulting services in the countries of origin should be available at low cost in the receiving countries (e.g. via Skype or chat facilities).

In order to support labour mobility, attention is to be paid to the social security of mobile workers. The question arises whether the current EU regulations, originally shaped for migration periods of more than one year, do still respond to changing patterns of mobility involving increasingly temporary and short-term (and partly successive) migration periods and growing cross-border mobility outside the scope of the concept of “frontier workers”. Therefore, it is recommended that the EU investigates whether the current regulations and administrative practices of the Member States might need to be adapted in order to take into account changing mobility patterns.

The increasing development of pension systems towards multi-pillar pension schemes among the EU and the growing coverage by supplementary (non-statutory) pension schemes, which currently do not fall under the scope of the EU coordination regulations, bear the risk of generating new gaps in social protection coverage of migrants and of
creating new barriers to mobility. It is, thus, important that the EU pursues its work towards improving the co-ordination of supplementary pension entitlements.

- There is a lot of information material available at EU level and in the Member States as regards issues of social protection coordination and social security rights addressed at the wider public and persons who (wish to) move to foreign EU countries. The information available, however, seems to rather focus on situations of migrants settling in the destination country and less on situations of return to the home country. It might be worth for the EU to promote information targeting more specifically (potential) returnees.

**Address health professional shortages**

Health professional mobility involving medical doctors, nurses and dentists from the EU-8+2 to the remaining EU Member States considerably increased shortly after enlargement, but seemingly dropped again afterwards and did not lead to a massive brain drain, at least in the EU-8. Nevertheless, intention-to-leave data based on the numbers of issued certificates on diploma recognition remain high, particularly in Romania, and it is most probable that the outflow of nurses in some countries is highly underestimated due to the lack of data. It is clear that the impact of health professional mobility in the countries of origin depends considerably on workforce policies in general, including territorial distribution, attrition/fluctuation of staff and graduate numbers. Improved data on the real outflows of health professionals, on the one hand, and on health performance, on the other hand, would be needed to analyse properly the causes and effects of health professional mobility. Nevertheless, findings from the country reports suggest that health professional mobility has an impact on domestic health system performance which is mainly concentrated on specific health professions and regional shortages.

- With a view to health professional mobility within the EU, there is a clear need to improve health workforce policies in both sending and receiving countries. Sending countries should make further efforts to improve the working conditions and environment for their health professionals in order to prevent out-migration. Measures to be considered encompass wage increases, the improvement of the infrastructure and investments into new technologies. But also those countries which are predominantly receiving countries are recommended to improve workforce planning and forecasting, to assess the working conditions of their health workforce and introduce measures to make specific professions (i.e. nurses, carers) more attractive for the national workforce and encourage the acceptance of such jobs among the unemployed youth, including the offspring of migrants from earlier migration waves. Further, in those (receiving and sending) countries facing severe shortages of health workforce, it is recommended to increase the domestic supply by investing in the capacities of faculties and vocational training schools, thereby focussing on those specialisations and regions mostly affected.

- Besides workforce policies at national levels, destination and source countries might seek to develop bilateral agreements aiming at a balanced recruitment of specific health professionals, incorporating either compensatory measures for the sending country or supporting the development potential of the sending country. These may include staff exchange programmes between health care providers and teaching hospitals, investments in education or the take-over of costs for training additional staff or staff recruitment for a fixed period combined with staff training and development prior to the return to the source country. The EU should consider setting up an EU-wide framework for cross-border collaboration between receiving and sending countries.

- Destination countries should effectively apply international and flexible rules of ethical recruitment of health professionals (such as the WHO Code of Practice on the international recruitment of health personnel) in order to cushion adverse effects of the drain of health professionals from source countries. Responsible recruitment policies should include a discussion of active recruitment strategies with national health
authorities. Hospitals recruiting a higher number of staff from specific regions should be encouraged to build up bilateral cooperation with hospitals in the sending regions.

**Address the development of disadvantaged (rural) areas**

As presented under Chapter 3.1, areas which are suffering above-average out-migration are either remote and/or rural areas or deindustrialised regions which were formerly strongly subsidised by the government. They all lack an attractive growth pole and consequently suffer structural underdevelopment and lack of employment opportunities. Due to the out-migration of predominantly young people of working age, the ageing process in these regions is being accelerated. Usually, the educational attainments of the resident population are below the average level in the country and unemployment and poverty rates are higher. In order to break through the vicious circle of remoteness and structural underdevelopment, low educational levels, poor employment opportunities and ageing, the following policy recommendations are provided:

- What is, above all, necessary is long-term integrated strategic planning which aims at achieving a sustainable population and economic development level of the region. While the identification of growth potentials should be prioritised, some regions may need support in times of downsizing, whereby the need for targeted social policies might increase, in spite of declining populations, particularly for elderly persons.

- Bottlenecks in the education system may lead to educationally motivated migration. The dispersed delivery of education at all levels, starting from the pre-primary level up to lifelong learning facilities, is crucial to avoid migration and realise the development potential in rural areas. Consideration should be given to use Structural Funds for investments in the creation of higher education facilities and vocational training schools in those areas which are structurally underdeveloped, in order to prevent the young population to move to the capitals (where they tend to stay also after finalising their studies). Another way to attract highly skilled people to disadvantaged regions might be stronger investments in R&D linked with the establishment of future viable 'industries' such as technology parks etc.

- In order to provide the local labour market with the skills needed, it is important to design active labour market measures in accordance with the local economy. The provision of tailor-made vocational (re-)training measures for the local workforce (including agricultural training), the provision of local employment initiatives and social enterprises are considered important policy interventions in disadvantaged areas. In order to target the interventions in accordance to regional/local needs, local or regional partnerships for employment involving public and private stakeholders, the training sector and social partners proved to be a successful approach if funds are made available. All these measures should be increasingly prioritised by the ESF-funded programmes.

- Due to the fact that remote/rural areas often suffer from limited accessibility, the improvement of transportation infrastructure to ensure access to regional economic centres (employment), to schools and other educational facilities (education) and to social and health services (social inclusion) should be supported by national and regional governments.

- It is necessary to strengthen the social dimension in rural and regional development programmes. At the very least, this should involve the integration of social planning and social needs assessment, including health, education, and social services, into regional development planning processes. A thorough analysis, and clear targeting, of those at risk of social exclusion in disadvantaged areas should be made an obligatory part of the planning process. The networks of social services may need to be complemented through social enterprises, non-governmental organisations, the private sector and, above all, by programmes of volunteering.

- The bottom-up approach, as exemplified by the Leader initiative (Axis 4 of the Rural Development Programme), has proved to be a useful approach to mobilise disadvantaged
areas, to enhance links between various sectors and stakeholders, to create jobs and to improve the quality of life. In particular the Local Action Groups is considered a successful instrument to promote the creation of partnerships and networks at local level and to activate the co-operation and development of human resources in rural areas. It is, therefore, recommended to strengthen integrated and multi-sectoral community-led initiatives and to increase the funds allocated to this axis. At the same time, there is a need to facilitate the access to funding of local development strategies and to invest in capacity building of local stakeholders in disadvantaged communities, in order to promote their use of the Leader approach.

- Those communities which are particularly affected by high out-migration are recommended to establish and maintain strong links to the Diaspora. These contacts may become beneficial in the future when the migrant returns and invests his/her savings into the set-up of a business or local development projects. Stronger links with the Diaspora might also promote a more targeted use of remittances sent by migrants, also for projects of general interest to local communities or other productive investments. This is of specific relevance for countries with a high volume and share of remittances in GDP like Bulgaria and Romania.

- In this context, bi- and multilateral partnerships between sending and destination regions, such as the SME programme between Romania, Moldova and Italy supporting the investments of remittances into business creation and social programmes in the sending regions, should be considered.

**Support family members affected by migration**

Increasingly, women migrate to work in other countries or regions, leaving children in the care of their fathers, grandmothers and other family members. While the emergence of new transnational family structures does not as such endanger the development of children, the emergence of family structures with repeatedly absent mothers poses challenges for the family members looking after the children. As women have traditionally shouldered the main burden of care for children and older family members, new forms of burden-sharing induced by migration have to be seen in the context of more general developments in family practices, including the educational and care-giving challenges arising from marriage breakdown and internal migration. Consequently, the specific problems of lacking family support have to be seen in the wider context and call for a comprehensive policy approach for dispersed families at community level:

- In order to raise awareness and target support measures properly, local authorities should develop their information base and identify single parents, elderly living alone and those children living without one or both parents.

- The issue of children ‘left behind’ has become a subject of public concern in particular in those countries most affected by out-migration, i.e. in Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Romania. While it is important to raise awareness of the needs of children with migrating parents, support policies should avoid stigmatising absent mothers and strengthen the capacities of transnational and blended families. One instrument might be to lower the legal and administrative barriers for the payment of child benefits and child-raising allowances to those persons who de-facto care for the children in case both parents are absent.

- As already mentioned before, the erosion of extended family forms and decreasing public educational and care capacities in the post-communist countries so far has not been compensated by alternative (formal and informal) support structures. Elderly people living without their children often lack adequate support, which leads to their isolation and social exclusion, in particular in remote regions. It is, therefore, recommended to further invest in long-term care services in view of ensuring adequate access to services and overcoming regional disparities in the provision of these services. This also includes the strengthening of community-based social services like home-based care or day care centres in all EU-
8+2 countries and to encourage volunteering at community level. This development should be support by the ESF. Besides, incentives to encourage informal support mechanisms provided by relatives, friends or neighbours should be taken into consideration. In some cases, existing residential care institutions may be able to also offer these services. It is important, however, that older people do not end up in long-term care in hospitals purely as a result of their social needs. The establishment of more mobile social work services, as well as social work services in hospitals to plan for re-integration into the community of vulnerable older people may also be needed.

- In order to meet the children’s need for informational and emotional support, teachers in those areas with above-average number of children left behind should receive specific training. Besides, it is recommended to establish psychological and counselling services at schools that take care of children with temporarily absent mothers or fathers and their caregivers. Communities should also provide opportunities for involvement of children left behind in out-of-school activities and leisure activities in accordance to their needs and interests. These activities should be accompanied and led by competent staff responsible for the work with children and youth. In areas where internet penetration is low the use of school and other community facilities for free internet facilities should be made available to promote transnational communication.

- When it comes to the support of children migrating with their parents, education programmes (e.g. language courses, cultural education) are important to prepare the children for migration and also for return. This may include the development of internet-based long-distance e-learning programmes, as already implemented in some countries, or targeted return school curricula. Sending and receiving countries may seek co-operation in this field, for example by supporting partnerships between schools.

**Promote the inclusion of Roma and other vulnerable religious and ethnic communities**

Contemporary migration patterns of the Roma and other vulnerable religious and ethnic communities are closely related to their social and economic position in the EU-8+2. Roma migration stems from deep social problems including discrimination and marginalisation, unemployment, limited access to social services and poverty. Their situation is even worse when their migration is unsuccessful and leads to return to their original locality, where they deal with multiple problems including housing, employment and re-integration of children into the educational system.

- All of the general recommendations to promote Roma inclusion deriving from National Roma Integration Strategies, relating to citizenship, anti-discrimination, income maintenance, employment, education, health, housing, and personal social services are also relevant and important for Roma migrants and returnees. Additionally, there is a clear need for National Roma Integration Strategies to address, more specifically, the needs of Roma migrants and Roma returnees. In order to achieve this, there is a need for improved quantitative and qualitative data on Roma and migration.

- The importance of provision of information regarding the opportunities for migration, rights and responsibilities in the receiving country and accurate information about return options, which are all of general importance, are even more important with regard to Roma, who may be increasingly vulnerable to social exclusion within the migration process.

- There is a need for speedy, non-stigmatising, community work services to be supported by the ESF to ensure that Roma are registered and made aware of available resources. Onsite support, for example in language classes, should be provided. Wherever possible, measures to integrate Roma children into education will be needed. This should be in integrated classes with special assistance provided, for example in language, where needed. The provision of Roma assistants in classrooms should be available in schools with significant Roma populations.
• Attention needs to be paid to the needs of Roma women and girls, perhaps through the provision of community support services, to encourage education, to raise awareness of health services, and to promote employment opportunities for women.

• Given the tendency for Roma migration to be ‘chain migration’ i.e. significant numbers of Roma may migrate to one location over a relatively short period of time, often setting up home in informal settlements or on public or disputed land, there is a need for a degree of ‘cost sharing’ between municipalities where Roma settle and the respective national authorities.

• There may be a need for mediation and dispute resolution services to be made available in cases where conflicts arise between newly migrating Roma and local populations. Also, access to free, accessible and quality legal aid services should be made available to Roma communities whenever needed.

• The practice of ‘humanitarian repatriation’ of Roma and the provision of financial inducements to return should be avoided.
In brief:

Recommendations for the use of EU Structural Funds in the upcoming Programming Period 2014-2020

The Structural Funds represent important financing instruments for EU Member States to boost employment and social inclusion and to contribute to social and territorial cohesion. The findings of the present study provide relevant directions for the use of EU Structural Funds in the upcoming programming period contributing to the achievement of the goals of Europe 2020. In general, EU Structural Funds shall increasingly support transnational labour mobility and benefit labour migrants and their families including those left behind. In detail, the following directions should be pursued:

- The ESF should be increasingly used to support geographical national and transnational labour mobility. Measures to be supported by ESF may include mobility allowances, pre-departure information and guidance of migrants, language courses, but also specific measures to support the labour market re-integration of the migrants upon return. In this context, it is recommended to use the ESF to strengthen the role of EURES and expand its services in view of recruitment, information and guidance to potential migrants and employers. In view of health workforce mobility, the use of ESF to promote balanced recruitment through bilateral agreements or staff exchange programmes between health care service providers and faculties or teaching hospitals may be considered.

- Structural Funds should increasingly invest in education and training facilities in disadvantaged areas in order to ensure a territorially dispersed availability of education for all age groups including pre-school education and lifelong learning.

- In view of social cohesion, an integrated approach to regional development should be strengthened. It is recommended to include social needs assessment including health, long-term care and social services in regional planning processes. Structural Funds should increasingly support the establishment and accessibility of community-based services, in particular in disadvantaged areas, in order to support those left behind.

- Given that the Leader approach of the Rural Development Programme proved successful in mobilising disadvantaged areas, establishing links between various stakeholders and diversifying employment opportunities, we recommend to strengthen integrated and multi-sectoral community-led initiatives and to increase the funds allocated to this axis.

- We furthermore strongly recommend strengthening the services and investments aimed at social inclusion of those groups particularly vulnerable due to migration. These are children and elderly left behind, Roma and other vulnerable ethnic and religious communities. Besides strengthening health, social and long-term care services, the ESF should increasingly support services aimed at combating discrimination against Roma, encouraging education and promoting labour market integration.
7.2 Candidate Countries and Potential Candidates

As we have seen in the previous chapters, the challenges which result from external and internal migration in the candidate countries and potential candidates in parts differ from those in the EU-8+2, due to different trends and patterns resulting from the armed conflicts in the region, a different legal framework for (labour) migration and a lower socio-economic development level.

Several waves of mass forced migration involving both large refugee streams and internally displaced persons were followed by large-scale forced return. However, return to the place of origin was often not possible, which created a new vulnerable group of internally displaced persons, in particular in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo*. In the context of the creation of new states, many persons, mainly Roma, remained stateless and continue struggling to exercise even their basic rights. Along with forced migration, labour migration, which already had a tradition in the Yugoslav Federation, led to a substantial loss of population of mainly young and qualified people seeking better employment opportunities and living standards in Western Europe.

Further develop human capital and foster regular labour mobility

The previous chapters show that poor employment and job growth, high unemployment rates, in particular among the youth, and significant regional disparities are the main drivers for international and internal migration in the Western Balkans. Against this background, it is clear that policy interventions targeted at the reform of the national education systems and labour markets remain priorities and should continue to be a main focus of the IPA programmes funded by the EU. The improvement of labour market information systems, including skill needs analysis, along with a better adjustment of labour market policies to regional and local needs, the promotion of the employability of the labour force and an increase and better targeting of active labour market policies to the most vulnerable groups (youth, IDPs, etc.) are only some of the key areas. At the same time, the EU and national policy makers should integrate the migration dimension into their programmes for human resource development. In particular, the following policy interventions are recommended:

- The migration information centres set up by IOM and handed over to the public employment services are a useful approach to support potential migrants and returnees by providing information on the labour market and skill needs in the receiving countries and on reintegration measures in the countries of origin. It is recommended to scale them up both in the sense of geographical distribution, size and responsibilities including investment in staff capacities. For example, they should play a stronger role in evaluating the skills and qualifications of the migrant and in providing advice on how to document informal learning in order to be recognised later upon return in the national qualification system. Further, there is a clear need to increase awareness about their existence and tasks among the public.

- In order to promote the recognition of skills and qualifications in the preparatory phase of migration and upon return, it is recommended to support social partners in the sending countries in defining national sector skill standards taking into consideration international standards. Also sending countries should align their qualification frameworks with EU countries so that migrants who acquire licences, qualifications and vocational training abroad can formally utilise their skills in the countries of origin. Furthermore, bilateral pilot actions to upgrade skills in those sectors where migrants dominate (i.e. nurses, construction) should be promoted.

- Returning migrants should become a specific target group in active labour market policies in order to provide targeted support for their re-integration into the labour market. In general, it is recommended to increase active labour market measures including business start-ups, training in entrepreneurship skills or re-training measures.
The Western Balkan region should be supported in establishing a regional labour market mediating the demand and supply sides across the national borders. This would require the transparency of labour market needs in the region as well as a skills assessment of potential migrants in this process.

In support of regional labour migration between the Western Balkan countries, the potential role of a platform similar to the EURES platform could be explored. In particular, agreements on seasonal migration should be signed by the countries in relation to tourism, agriculture, and other seasonally variable jobs. Furthermore, cooperation with and between the countries in the field of social security reforms and social security coordination should be further pursued and supported by the EU. This will also impact the improvement of the regional dialogue on social security issues and difficulties specific to the region and enhance coordination of the national social security systems in the region in general.

**Turning brain drain into brain gain**

All countries of the region experienced a considerable loss of persons with tertiary education and, in addition, face increasing numbers of students choosing to study abroad. No significant return of both the qualified professionals and the students (after their graduation) has been observed. While emigration of brains may avoid unemployment in case no gainful employment according to qualification was achievable in the countries of origin, it involves a significant loss of human capital across sectors, depriving the sending countries of their development potential. Efforts to encourage return and link emigrated professionals to national (university or scientific) institutions may turn brain drain into brain gain.

As it became clear in the country reports, along with low income, large wage differences, decreasing expenditure on R&D and worsening working conditions have been determinant factors for the emigration of lecturers and research staff at universities and research institutions. Against this background it is highly recommended to stronger link EU support to investments in R&D, i.e. by supporting regional development hubs or exchange programmes. The Croatian example of knowledge exchange (Unity Through Knowledge Fund) might be worth considering.

The further development of networks of scientific communities has the potential to transform brain drain into brain gain by transferring knowledge back to the country of origin. Even if this form of co-operation between scientific communities does not necessarily lead to temporary or permanent return of the brains to their country of origin, personal and institutional links involving a number of continuous co-operations in terms of guest lectures and joint projects ensure brain circulation and support the scientific communities in the source countries to keep up with recent developments. Examples to draw on lessons learnt exist already in Turkey and several Western Balkan countries.

Experiences in the EU-8+2 alert to the danger that EU accession may lead to rapidly increasing health professional mobility. Qualifications are relatively easily transferable in the EU countries, and demand in the richer EU regions is bound to increase, due to ageing societies and sudden changes in emigration options as being offered in the process of EU accession, may lead to outflows which health schemes find hard to cope with. Temporary programmes in the process of EU accession may be considered in order to buy time for adjustment. It should be considered to develop 'stay-to-go'-programmes. Doctors and nurses committing themselves to work for at least three years in their countries of origin after accession could be offered support, such as language and training courses and granting of leave for a temporary employment abroad, so that they consider postponing migration decisions and plan them as temporary leaves.

**Making remittances beneficial for the development of the sending country**

In the last years, the Western Balkan countries have experienced large-scale remittance inflows, which considerably fuelled households’ consumption levels and boosted certain
sectors of economy such as construction. They considerably contributed to raise the living standards of migrants’ households and to reduce poverty. However, despite the fact that there is a high propensity to make savings among migrants, investments are low in numbers and remain non-productive and small-scale. Consequently, sustainable development effects are lacking so far.

- While it is commonly acknowledged that remittances are first of all private transfers, policies and measures should directly address the concerns of migrants and convince them that they would benefit by transferring or investing a part of their financial resources into saving products or productive investments. At the same time, savings and investments need to be placed in an appropriate macro-economic framework that includes a business-friendly environment.

- National governments of both sending and destination countries are recommended to join and strengthen their efforts in establishing close links with the Diaspora communities. Particularly in the process of EU accession, emigrants may underestimate the progress in their countries of origin and advantages of diversification of risks if they split their savings and investments between origin and receiving countries. Progress should be closely monitored and communicated in Diaspora media, where particularly concerns of migrants can be credibly allayed. Programmes to provide the Diaspora with financial literacy training and information on saving and investment opportunities in the countries of origin should be jointly developed.

- National governments should further strengthen their catalytic and regulatory role for making investments of the Diaspora more attractive. Measures to encourage the Diaspora to invest in the development of their home country might include the provision of tax incentives and loan subsidies for investments into business and development projects.

- Further, regional authorities should develop stronger linkages between the Diaspora and the regional development agencies in order to explore ways of channelling remittances and savings of migrants for development. Community-based development funds managed by banks or non-commercial companies and guaranteed by the government are one possible instrument. These funds should be earmarked for projects supporting the local infrastructure, the creation of jobs and the provision of social services, among others. The role of intermediaries, such as the churches, trades unions, professional associations, NGOs and cultural associations may also be crucial in channelling remittances for development purposes.

- Financial institutions play an important role in supporting economic development. As mentioned under Chapter 3, migrants from Western Balkan countries still send a considerable part of remittances via informal channels due to a lack of trust and high transaction costs. It is, therefore, a first step to take a closer look at banking regulations to find out whether they hinder easy money transfer and savings options. To increase the share of remittances sent through formal channels, new and efficient financial products and cross-border services should be introduced by banks and other financial institutions. Furthermore, governments are recommended to create necessary conditions to guarantee savings in the countries of origin. Many of the banks dominant in the Western Balkan market are subsidiaries of German, Greek, Austrian and Italian banks, all of whom are countries where there is a significant stock of migrant workers from the region. Hence, encouraging remittances through these banks, combined with supports for social investments in the region provided by these banks, could add considerable value as well as lowering transaction costs.

**Foster sustainable integration of IDPs and (forced) returnees**

It is now over fifteen years since the resolution of conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia and over ten years since the effective ending of hostilities in Serbia and Kosovo*. There are, however, still significant numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons lacking sustainable solutions. Given that most of these are now unlikely to return in the
medium term, it is important to both regulate their status and facilitate opportunities for employment and access to services, in ways which do not in any way pre-judge political resolution of their status or of borders. To this end, a number of policy initiatives could help, including:

- Sustainable return of RDPs in the region can only be achieved through a continuous dialogue and close cooperation between the countries. In this context, the conclusion of bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements which eliminate any remaining obstacles to sustainable return should be promoted.

- As described in the previous chapters, RDPs are often deprived of social and health services due to an undefined status or lacking documents. It is, therefore, crucial to ensure that entitlements to social, educational and health services, and the right to social assistance are provided to all RDPs based on residence not citizenship criteria.

- In view of a sustainable solution for RDPs, it is recommended to use international donor funds to close remaining collective centres in the region and to find sustainable housing solutions for those who currently live in them.

- In view of high unemployment and poverty rates among RDPs, there is a need to offer targeted support for re-integration in the labour market, including reskilling and business start-ups for this population group. Within this, women, particularly those women with limited labour market experience, should be specifically targeted. Flexible schemes in terms of education and employment opportunities should be offered to enable RDPs to access livelihood opportunities in ways which do not alienate other members of the community.

- The support for return and (re-)integration of minority RDPs should be increased by providing conflict resolution, mediation, and reconciliation support in divided communities.

Roma

The challenges faced by Roma in the candidate countries and potential candidates are largely similar to those faced by Roma within the European Union, combined with the increased risk of deportation or even imprisonment in the context of irregular migration. In addition, the issue of statelessness in the aftermath of the break-up of Yugoslavia is a real issue for a significant number of Roma in the region. Over and above the recommendations regarding Roma from the EU-8+2, we would suggest the following:

- Repatriation should, whenever possible, involve support for livelihood opportunities upon return, through enrolment in training programmes, cash grants for small businesses, and so on. Programmes targeting Roma women should be developed. In this context, the use of IPA and other support programmes for targeted support to Roma returnees should be considered.

- There is a need to establish a close co-operation between sending and receiving countries regarding the educational needs of Roma children, particularly in cases of multiple moves.

- Governments should ensure that National Roma Action Plans are fully in line with EU strategies and include elements on Roma migration. In this context, continued consultations with Roma organisations on the issues concerning migration-linked vulnerability should be sought.

Combat rural poverty

Some regions in the Western Balkans are characterised by long-standing problems of rural decline, inaccessibility and unfavourable geography, which led to a considerable population loss in rural areas already in the 1970s and has been further intensified during the armed conflicts in the region. A considerable share of the rural population is living on (semi-) subsistence agriculture due to high land fragmentation, limited use of modern technologies,
poor infrastructure and low market access, which are all constraints to increase productivity and income levels. Furthermore, the rural areas face accelerated ageing (including ageing of the agricultural workforce), high rates of (hidden) unemployment and disappearing (educational and social) services. The following suggestions are provided:

- EU-funded rural and regional development programmes (IPA components III and V) need to integrate the social dimension and to target those areas which are particularly disadvantaged. There is a need to increase investments in rural areas and to target those most at risk of leaving. The improvement of the educational structure of the rural labour force is a precondition to diversify rural economy and to develop employment opportunities outside the agricultural sector. Programmes promoting entrepreneurship and managerial skills, vocational (re-)training and lifelong learning are particularly important.

- There is a need for a clear focus on those people left behind in regions particularly affected by out-migration who might be at a greater risk of social exclusion (single parents, the elderly, children, minorities). Investments in rural infrastructure targeting increasing mobility and access to social, health and educational services should be strengthened. Furthermore, a closer co-ordination of employment, social services and educational services at community level is needed to develop appropriate measures for above mentioned vulnerable groups.

- In the context of improvement of educational attainments of the rural population, it is necessary to ensure that there are schools at every level within reach of disadvantaged areas or, at least, that pupils are enabled to maintain links with their area of birth.

- It might be necessary to establish mobile teams and more flexible services in disadvantaged, war-affected and remote areas (including islands and mountainous areas). In particular, there may be a need to provide free or cheap, and accessible transportation services for older people with limited mobility in order to access health and social services.

- Schemes which offer incentives (including subsidised housing, tax breaks, enhanced salaries, etc.) for skilled and trained professionals (including doctors, nurses and social workers) to settle in disadvantaged areas should be evaluated in terms of their effectiveness. The most effective schemes should be scaled up and learnt from elsewhere in the region.

- Agricultural reform programmes need to have a much greater social component in order to minimise the divide between more productive and unproductive agriculture. In particular, support needs to be offered, through low interest loans, credit unions and so on, to enhance market opportunities for small-scale producers, including those working primarily in subsistence agriculture. Retraining programmes, including new service skills, rural tourism, and small craftworks, should be supported as much as possible in disadvantaged areas.
In brief:
Recommendations for the use of IPA funds in the upcoming Programming Period 2014-2020

Technical and financial assistance to support candidate countries and potential candidates in their preparations for EU membership and their progressive alignment of their economies to the European Union is currently provided through the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA). This instrument will expire at the end of 2013. A proposal for IPA covering the next programming period has been elaborated by the EU Commission in December 2011 (EC, 2011a). The findings of the present study provide important directions for the use of IPA in the next programming period to support the economic and social development of the countries and to promote minority rights, non-discrimination and reconciliation. In this context, it is recommended to review the old component structure of IPA and to allow an undifferentiated access to all policy components for both candidate countries and potential candidates. In particular, following directions should be pursued:

- IPA should be increasingly used to reform national education systems and labour markets in order to align skills and qualifications to the labour market needs and to promote the employability of the labour force. This will also include the further development and better targeting of active labour market policies in order to support the labour market (re-)integration of the most vulnerable groups such as youth, women, disabled persons and IDPs. Investments in R&D should be supported in order to prevent brain drain.

- In view of supporting transnational labour mobility and to prevent irregular migration, IPA funds should be invested in counselling and guidance of potential migrants prior to their departure and in labour market re-integration upon return. It is to be considered to use IPA funds to scale the migration information centres of the public employment services up both in the sense of geographical distribution, size and responsibilities, including investments in staff capacities. In this context, in view of facilitating skill matching, it is recommended to use IPA funds also to support the sending countries in aligning their qualification frameworks to the EU.

- IPA funds should be increasingly used to support the social inclusion of the most vulnerable groups including youth, women, the elderly, RDPs, Roma and other vulnerable religious and ethnic communities. As regards RDPs, IPA should invest in promoting sustainable solutions for these population groups, including sustainable housing, labour market integration and access to education.

- IPA funds should target rural areas and thereby follow an integrated multisectoral approach including the promotion of education and (re-)training of the rural workforce along with a diversification of the labour market in these areas, investments in rural infrastructure and in the provision of accessible health, long-term care, social and educational services.
7.3 Eastern Partnership Countries

Similar to Western Balkan countries, state-building after the dissolution of the Soviet Union increased the salience of ethnic divisions in most of the EaP countries, in particular in the context of armed conflicts over contested areas. Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia in particular are still struggling with high rates of IDPs facing housing problems as well as high poverty and unemployment. Challenges related to external migration arise due to high shares of irregular migration combined with the lack of or inefficient implementation of bilateral and multilateral labour agreements and social security agreements. Russia as main destination country for all six EaP countries is a key player here. Beyond these commonalities, EaP policies have to acknowledge that the countries have highly divergent conditions in terms of demography (ageing Belarus versus still relatively high fertility in Azerbaijan), political stability, and relations with immediate neighbouring countries.

**Foster regular labour migration (schemes)**

Migrants from the EaP countries are especially vulnerable, due to the fact that many of them are irregular and not protected by any bilateral and multilateral labour and social security agreements. The lack or inefficient implementation of bilateral agreements and the lack of mechanisms for mutual recognition of qualifications further entails a considerable mismatch between the skill level of the migrants and the jobs they end up doing abroad and hinders the transfer of knowledge and skills upon return. This is in particular acute in the case of migration to the EU.

- There is a need to expand temporary work programmes for low-to-medium skilled workers in order to increase the legality of migration. These can typically be based on bilateral agreements or on mobility partnerships with the EU. It is recommended to focus here on labour market sectors which already now involve high shares of (irregular) migrants such as the care or the construction sectors.

- It is recommended to expand mobility partnerships, both in terms of scope and coverage. The EU should put a stronger focus on the integration of social security provisions, temporary labour mobility agreements and reintegration mechanisms for returnees. Skill matching is an important prerequisite for successful labour mobility programmes. Temporary labour mobility arrangements should, therefore, include a clear assessment of the migrants’ skills and comprehensive information on the labour market needs in the receiving country. These agreements should entail provisions for protection from exploitation and mechanisms for the effective enforcement of migrants’ (labour) rights.

- The EU should further enhance its cooperation with and support to the EaP countries towards the set-up and implementation of a better framework for coordination of social security between EU Members States and the EaP countries. In this respect, it is important that the EU pursues the development of a common EU approach and framework for all countries of the region. In parallel, it should continue to support the countries in enhancing their institutional capacities for the negotiation, conclusion and implementation of social security agreements. As has been the case for Moldova, such support might be embedded into the implementation of Mobility Partnerships. At the same time, however, it is even more crucial to invest in the further advancement of the social protection systems of the EaP countries, which are still characterised by underdevelopment, low welfare levels, and weak governance. Developed and functioning social protection systems in the sending countries will be a driver for more legal labour mobility and are a pre-requisite for coordination of social security with the EU countries.

- The establishment or further development of voluntary insurance schemes to cover those lacking any social insurance because of informal employment and/or migration should be investigated, based on the experiences already made with such schemes in some
countries (MD, UA) of the region. For this purpose it is necessary to review and assess the existing schemes.

**Invest in human capital**

Similar to the Western Balkan countries, the transition in the EaP countries has not yet led to the creation of sufficient decent jobs in their economies. Unemployment and underemployment are persistent problems in all countries (with the possible exception of Belarus) and the employed population is highly vulnerable due to high shares of agricultural (self-)employment and small-scale informal activities. Further, there exists a considerable mismatch between the skills provided by the education systems and those needed on the labour market and this gap will become even more apparent with advancing restructuring. It is, therefore, crucial that the EU further supports the governments in reforming the educational systems and labour market policies, in particular:

- There is a need to further strengthen the institutional capacities of the labour ministries and public employment services in terms of employment policy development and implementation. This involves, in particular, an increase of capacities in labour market and skill needs analysis, the design and better targeting of active employment policies and in monitoring and evaluation of employment policies. The number of staff related to labour market issues and the share of funding for active employment policies is to be raised.
- There is a need to continue the reform of education systems and to strengthen the secondary education, including vocational education and also adult education. In particular, the adjustment of skills and competences to the needs on the labour market remains a high priority.
- Job creation and, in particular, the development of the SME sector should be enhanced by removing institutional and legal barriers, facilitating access to credits and providing entrepreneurship training. Returning migrants should be specifically targeted in the provision of information and advice on business opportunities and entrepreneurship education.
- Governments should establish mechanisms to recognise and validate formal and non-formal (on-the-job training) qualifications and skills that migrants acquired abroad.

**Making remittances beneficial for the development of the sending country**

Most of the EaP countries (with the possible exception of Belarus) have experienced in the last years large-scale remittance inflows which constitute a stable income for many households in the region and considerably boosted consumption levels. In Armenia and Moldova, in particular, remittances largely contributed to reducing (extreme) poverty. In Moldova, and to a lesser extent also in Armenia, the large inflows substantially exceed the expenditure on social welfare and might possibly absolve the governments from their responsibility to develop long-term economic and social policies to address poverty, which is the main cause for emigration. Similar to the Western Balkans, only a negligible amount is invested into business and predominantly in the informal sector. Policy suggestions provided in the case of Western Balkans, therefore, also apply to the EaP region.

- The governments in those countries which receive high volumes of remittances should seek to break through the cycle of remittance dependency by ensuring adequate welfare coverage and a secure investment climate.
- As in the Western Balkans, it is necessary to broaden and develop the channels and ways of money transfers and to lower transaction costs, so that remittances are increasingly transferred through formal channels. Campaigns to increase awareness and information on financial products and services of banks and non-bank financial institutions should be conducted in order to convert remittances into savings and divert them into development financing.
Communities which are severely affected by out-migration should be encouraged to establish close contacts to the Diaspora and to create community-based social development funds and economic development co-operative companies in order to attract remittances and savings from migrant households to invest in social and economic development projects.

**Combat poverty and support social inclusion**

Whilst reducing poverty and social exclusion is important in all of the sub-regions of this study, it takes on a particular importance in the poorest countries of the Eastern Partnership region, since, undoubtedly, risk of poverty and social exclusion is a major ‘push’ factor for migration. At the same time, very limited social protection systems and the absence of viable and meaningful social security agreements mean that there are gaps in safety nets whenever migrants may want to transfer entitlements or seek support as a result of risk of poverty and social exclusion. In this context, the most important policy suggestions are those which, whilst having a general value, will also benefit migrants. These include:

- There is a need to overall increase public spending on social protection and social assistance. Due to the fact that low benefits and low coverage of social assistance and social protection schemes could not eradicate extreme poverty, in particular in the Southern Caucasus countries, it should be considered to combine them with minimum income schemes. This might also encompass the inclusion of minimum provisions in pension schemes, since pensioners living alone in households are particularly affected by poverty.

- In all EaP countries, poverty alleviation programmes need to integrate a broader social inclusion perspective. This also implies the need to combine measures in different policy fields such as economy, employment, education, social protection and encompass income with non-income related measures.

- There is a need to strengthen community-based social and health services and hereby to increasingly involve non-governmental institutions as service providers. This, in particular, is needed in rural areas, where infrastructure is weak and accessibility to the bigger cities limited. In this context, it is also recommended to provide sustainable funding for NGOs working on providing advice and support to migrants.

- There is the need to increase the support for children and families of migrants 'left behind', including social work support and educational support.

**Foster sustainable integration of IDPs, (forced) returnees and ethnic and religious minorities**

In the Southern Caucasus region, and in particular in Azerbaijan and Georgia, IDPs constitute a considerable part of the population, as a consequence of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the conflicts around South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Despite the fact that the governments consider this population group as vulnerable and provide them with support, the latter is mainly limited to cash and in-kind benefits such as social assistance, free usage of health care or free provision of electricity, gas and water. One of the main reasons of high poverty rates and social exclusion of IDPs, however, seems to be their limited access to the labour market and the fact that they live in collective settlements.

- There is a need to find sustainable solutions for the IDPs who do not seem to have a perspective to return to their original place of living (this, above all, applies to the IDPs from Nagorno-Karabakh), but also for other ethnic and religious minorities such as the Crimean Tartars. This, above all, requires sustainable housing solutions for those still living in collective centres.

- In order to decrease high poverty rates, it is urgently needed to include IDPs and ethnic and religious minorities in employment and educational programmes and get them
involved in already partly existing measures, such as support for small business and professional retraining measures, education vouchers, etc.
Annex 1: Data interpretation issues

Population registers often serve as an indication of internal migration movements. However, the framework for residence registration changed in most countries under study, so that it cannot always be disentangled whether observed increases or decreases display changes in migration or only changes in registration practices. For example, former Soviet republics had inherited a strict residence registration system from Soviet times. Registration was obligatory and access to housing, regular jobs and welfare benefits depended on the registration status. When registration obligations were loosened, as, for example, in Ukraine in 1997, 2001 and 2004 (CR UA), the observed declines in internal migration may not correspond to declines in reality. For internal migration, it is particularly important that only permanent or long-term changes of address are meant to be registered. Young single people moving to cities for education or for jobs often keep their permanent address with their parents, even after years. Therefore, their migration often appears only with delays in official statistics. When interpreting rural-urban migration data, it has to be taken into account that areas close to big cities may still be classified as ‘rural’, while migration movements have made them increasingly urban or suburban.

The registration of emigration in countries of origin underestimates emigration substantially. Persons do not notify the authorities of their leave, for example, because they want to return soon, keep paying social security in their country of origin or simply because they do not bother. In the time frame of our analysis, incentives for registration of emigration declined substantially in most states with increasingly liberal emigration regulations. Only selected groups of persons – e.g. persons who marry a foreign national and need documents for this procedure from the authorities – officially register their emigration. Particularly in the 1990s, declines in registration cannot be disentangled from declines in registration rates, whereas the data for the 2000s can be considered as more reliable with regard to trends, but not levels.

Surveys of returnees and households with absent household members in countries of origin give important insights into recent emigration movements. Current residents inform interviewers about the basic demographic features of family or household members who live abroad, and returnees give an account of their experiences in other countries. This type of data underestimates the role of long-term emigration and the emigration of full families.

A census - an official survey of the entire population on a specified date - has the main purpose of estimating the size and structure of the population of a state or region. While a census is normally considered the most reliable instrument for this purpose, census data may be missing or problematic where the size and structure of a population is a highly politicised issue, particularly due to wars, conflicts over contested regions and power struggles between sub-state units. Two examples: In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the census was delayed by twelve years to 2013 due to debates about the concrete ways of assessing the population in the two legal entities. In Kosovo*, the census 2011 was boycotted by large parts of the ethnic Serbian population, whereas the 1991 census was boycotted by parts of the ethnic Albanian population.

For estimating the total extent of emigration, receiving country data is usually better than country of origin data, although not without flaws: Population registers in the receiving countries tend to overestimate the immigrant population, as returnees often do not register their leave. Census and survey data in receiving countries do not fully capture irregular migrants and migrants with limited language capacities.

Data sets on emigration by international organisations are mainly based on receiving country data. The main criterion is the question whether someone is born in another country. If someone is born in another country, the person must have migrated to this country at some stage in his or her life. There is one exception: When state borders change, a person may become foreign born without crossing a border. State borders changed in many of the cases...
under analysis in this study (countries belonging to the former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia or Czechoslovakia).

Therefore, it is important to take data with a more recent focus into account. At EU level, receiving country data on the population by citizenship gives useful indications, as most emigrants within the last two decades have retained their country of origin citizenship. Survey data from countries of origin, particularly in cases with a high degree of temporary and irregular migration, is a good complement.

**Annex 2:**

Population (in thousands) and population change (in %) in EU-8+2 countries based on preliminary CENSUS data

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<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>7,929</td>
<td>7,351</td>
<td>-7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech R.</td>
<td>10,230</td>
<td>10,562</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>1,370</td>
<td>1,294</td>
<td>-6%</td>
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<td>Hungary</td>
<td>10,198</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Latvia</td>
<td>2,377</td>
<td>2,070</td>
<td>-13%</td>
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<td>Lithuania</td>
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<td>3,054</td>
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<td>n/a</td>
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<td>5,379</td>
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<td>n/a</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>10,934</td>
<td>10,788</td>
<td>-1%</td>
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*Source: EUROSTAT for 2001 Census data, national statistical offices for 2011 Census data,
*Preliminary results of the Census 2011
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EP – European Parliament:


ETF – European Training Foundation:


European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions


European Integration Consortium:


Eurostat:


Human Rights Watch:


IDMC – Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (of the Norwegian Refugee Council)


ILO – International Labour Organisation


NATLEX database of national labour, social security and related human rights legislation of the ILO’s International Labour Standards Department. Available at: http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex_browse.home

IOM – International Organisation for Migration


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OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development:


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