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# INSECURITY AND THE FEELING OF INSECURITY ON LOCAL PUBLIC TRANSPORT

## SUMMARY REPORT

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summary of the hearing of 28/11/02)

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*"When a civilised people falls back into barbarity through the return of insecurity, the breaking of bridges, the deterioration of roads, letters and social ties, it becomes relatively silent." Gabriel Tarde, *L'opinion et la foule*.*

### 1) The project

The purpose of this study was to explore how the issue of insecurity and the feeling of insecurity on local public transport was being addressed by social dialogue within companies.

It was carried out by a European delegation made up of three representatives of the employers of the sector and three trade union representatives.

Representing the employers were:

Mr Jean Dekindt, responsible for social affairs within EuroTeam UITP;  
Mr Marcello Turini, General Manager of CPT (Naples);  
Mrs Mari Vasareinen, lawyer for the Finnish public transport association.

The trade union representatives were:

Mr Stefan Heimlich, VER.DI (Germany);  
Mr Jan Collbrandt, CCOB (Belgium);  
Mr Christophe Beauvalet, FO (France).

Due to unexpected circumstances, some of the members of this team could not go to one or other of the cities that were visited. They could sometimes be replaced, although at other times this was not possible. Nevertheless, this infrequent problem did not undermine the cohesion of the group which, from the very outset, was intellectually and morally sound.

The following cities were visited:

Valenciennes, France (June 2002);  
Stockholm (September 2002);  
Berlin (October 2002);  
Barcelona (November 2002)  
Antwerp, Belgium (December 2002)

These cities were selected on the basis of parity during the preparation phase of the study based on the ease with which we could have contacts there, the prior knowledge we had of problems of this nature in these cities and the desire to include in this panel a number of medium-sized cities (Valenciennes, Antwerp) among the larger cities.

Moreover, on 28 October 2002, at a meeting of the local public transport working group of the European road sectoral social dialogue committee, a representative from the employers and a trade union representative from the cities of Paris, Turin, London and Copenhagen were invited to present their policies on the problem under review. During this working day in Brussels, the Community project PRISMATICA was also presented.

To preempt the criticisms that might be levelled as regards the choice of the cities that were visited or audited, it will probably be said that cities in the south of Europe are not sufficiently represented. However, we do not believe that this shortcoming has any significant effect on the results of the study, firstly because in the sample that was put together we observed a certain homogeneity of the problems and the solutions adopted to combat these problems and, secondly, because against the backdrop of our objective of ascertaining how social dialogue functioned in the context of insecurity and the feeling of insecurity within public transport companies, we observed sufficiently contrasting situations to draw lessons that might be useful in the construction of a European system of recommendations.

Having said that, we must once again stress the following observations concerning the five cities that were visited:

- i) No company (management or trade unions) expressed the slightest reservation as regards our visit or for that matter on the 'rules of the game' (see box below) that we asked them to follow for the organisation of these visits. We should therefore like to express our deep gratitude for the trust that they spontaneously placed in us and for the time they devoted to us for the preparation of the visits and the visits themselves.
- ii) Finally, we would like to thank all those outside the companies who participated in the different meetings with our European delegation.

#### **The rules of the game**

- i) A common management/trade union introduction to present the company and the problem arising within the framework of the social dialogue in the company;
- ii) A joint management/trade union conclusion at the end of the visit;
- iii) Separate interviews with the management and the trade unions on the different aspects of the problem of insecurity (causes, extent of the problem, responsiveness of the company and of the management, etc.), always in connection with social dialogue within the company;
- iv) solutions to the problem (training, prevention, technologies, redress, help for employees, etc.), always in connection with social dialogue within the company;
- v) meetings with actors external to the company who are cooperating with it to find solutions (associations, organising authorities, police, the courts). These meetings call for the presence of a management representative and a trade union representative of the company in addition to the mixed European delegation.

## **2) Summary of the five reports (and of the hearing of 13/02/02)**

### **2.1) Valenciennes**

#### **Summary of the report**

The case of SEMURVAL (*Société d'Economie Mixte des transports URbains de la région de VALenciennes*) fully justifies the objective underpinning the company-based approach by the European social partners, which was to address the issues of insecurity and the feeling of insecurity on local public transport through social dialogue within companies.

However, this objective was not a foregone conclusion.

In particular because while the issue of insecurity and the feeling of insecurity has dogged public transport for several years to such an extent that, in many cases, it is considered as an obstacle to its development, the nature of the problem (attacks, antisocial behaviour<sup>1</sup>, etc.) is first and foremost regarded as a problem that is external to the profession, since it primarily concerns offences which are punishable by law<sup>2</sup>.

Our approach through social dialogue within companies presupposes that the problem is to some extent internalised within the company, that is, it has to some degree proliferated and with relative or total impunity (particularly as a consequence of the inertia of the police and judicial authorities), so much so that it has become (or is becoming) part and parcel of the professional remit of these

<sup>1</sup> Defined as "visible acts and behaviour in public places that are open to the public, perceived as a nuisance or unpleasant by the majority of the population but which in general are not prosecuted, although in most cases they do constitute infringements".

<sup>2</sup> At least in France as regards a whole series of minor misdemeanours such as insults, threats, drunkenness in public, minor damage, leaving potentially dangerous objects lying around, soiling of public premises, etc.

companies<sup>3</sup> (a trend which is in every way regrettable and should therefore be resisted).

In addition, it is equally undeniable that this problem is the source of much conflict between the workers and the management of the companies.

It is this somewhat negative overall picture - which was also to some extent our background - that was transformed within SEMURVAL and in Valenciennes, as can be seen from the draft agreement signed within SEMURVAL between the management and all the trade unions within the company on 27/06/2001<sup>4</sup>, which included and improved the provisions of the first social agreement signed in June 1996.

This was, first and foremost, because this draft agreement, to quote a company trade unionist, provided a basis for a 'convergence of interests' made possible by the provisions of the agreement in terms of procedures and measures relating to prevention, organisation, training, technology and follow-up.

Secondly, it was because another advantage of social dialogue and the SEMURVAL agreement - which we perceived clearly in our meetings outside the company with the representatives of the organising authority, the government, the judiciary, the police and the municipality - is that it lends formal credibility and underpins pragmatically the company's relations with the external institutional partners. This is reflected in a series of 6 agreements and contracts concerning 9 categories of actors (7 and 11 respectively if we include the SEMURVAL agreement and the company's social partners).

Therefore, at this stage we will consider social dialogue as necessary, for all the reasons we have stated (convergence, procedures and measures, credibility and pragmatism), but not, according to the hallowed expression, 'necessary and sufficient'.

The sufficiency condition dictates that it should be part of a system with all the arrangements which contribute towards the system (e.g. help for victims) or which, by their nature, escape the system (police and justice), an aspect which is supported by the 6 agreements or contracts we have mentioned.

However, in order for the system to operate, the institutions, and in particular the courts, had to be upgraded and 'denunciation'<sup>5</sup> (or complaint) procedures for breaches of security had to be set in place, procedures which concern the personnel and the managers of SEMURVAL.

The system had to be *upgraded*, because recently the Public Prosecutor in Valenciennes put an end to the inertia that had previously prevailed by breathing life back into the French legislation on the repression of antisocial behaviour and by deciding in this area that a 'system for dealing with problems in real time'<sup>6</sup> had to be set in place to respond to such acts with 'court action' by having the accused appear very quickly before the court (between 10 and 15 days) and by taking repressive action that was 'proportionate' to the nature of the offence.

Proportionate should be understood to mean that the repressive action is designed first and foremost

<sup>3</sup> In less caricatural terms, we feel that if the problem of insecurity and the feeling of insecurity is to become the subject of social dialogue within companies, it must become part and parcel of what has come to be known as the social responsibility of companies and/or corporate governance.

<sup>4</sup> It should be pointed out that, when the European delegation decided to ask permission to visit SEMURVAL, it was not informed of the existence of this agreement. It only learnt of its existence a few days before it went to Valenciennes.

<sup>5</sup> In the sense of social protestation.

<sup>6</sup> Which is not confined only to public transport but considers the case of public transport through an agreement between SEMURVAL and the Public Prosecutor.

to prevent repeat offences<sup>7</sup>, secondly to call to the mind of the perpetrators their social responsibility and, thirdly, to avoid leaving the victims with the feeling that the harm suffered is not redressed.

The 'denunciation' procedures call for the participation of the staff of SEMURVAL using the 'environment anomaly report', which they fill out systematically whenever an antisocial act is committed, particularly on board vehicles. This 'environment anomaly report' is then followed by an 'incident report' drawn up by the safety coordinator of SEMURVAL<sup>8</sup> and sent by fax to the Public Prosecutor for further action. As in the past, the most serious offences are treated by lodging complaints with the police.

This is the first aspect - essentially geared towards the perpetrators of offences - of the 'necessary and sufficient' system.

There is a second aspect, this time for the victims. This part of the project describes all the arrangements, measures and tools designed to ensure physical and psychological redress, compensation for damages and the follow-up and reintegration of victims, which are essentially contained in the draft social agreement of SEMURVAL, but also in the various contracts or agreements between SEMURVAL and its external partners.

## 2.2) Stockholm

### Summary of the report

All public transport in 1.7 million inhabitants' Stockholm is subject to competition. The Public Transport Authority SL, which is owned by the County Council of Stockholm, is responsible for organising public transport in Stockholm. SL itself is not a transport provider but it owns the public transport infrastructure, including stations, and the rolling stock for rail-based traffic. The commuter train contractors are currently Citypendeln and Connex Tunnelbanan, the underground has only one contractor, Connex Tunnelbanan, while bus contractors are Busslink, Swebuss and Linjebuss. The European delegation visited and met representatives from SL, Connex Tunnelbanan and Busslink.

Stockholm's public transport, especially underground transport, has been for years the focus of serious graffiti attacks. Stockholm has approximately 1,500 'professional' graffiti vandals. It is no longer enough to scrawl on the walls, etc. of stations and depots, instead the picture now includes the total destruction of property in what is known as 'bombing'. Graffiti perpetrators cause both a personal and physical lack of security to transport staff as well as to passengers.

Security problems in bus transport are greatest in the evening during the hours where the underground is closed and the buses are solely responsible for public transport. Situations involving insecurity for bus drivers are mainly linked to encounters with intoxicated passengers and the ticket purchasing stage when a person refuses to pay for his or her journey and threatens the driver.

During the last few years threats of insecurity and robberies suffered by underground staff have increased, while the number of cases of violence has remained the same for some time. The greatest risks and threats are seen at end stations and are caused by gangs of young people. When underground drivers have to get out of the cab, for example, in order to change train and wait unprotected on the platform for the next train, for that few minutes they are completely vulnerable to threats and attacks.

SL acts at a general level on safety issues seeking to influence the work of political decision makers etc. and checks that the contractors it uses promote customer safety in their operations. At all three companies which were the subject of the visit, security services were bought in from security

<sup>7</sup> With, it would appear, some success, since there were no repeat offences in 80% of the cases of repression thus defined.

<sup>8</sup> Who is sworn.

companies. Connex also had its own 'hosts' system and exemplary co-operation with youth organisations which had recruited young volunteers to patrol the underground. The 'hosts' employed by Connex patrol and help passengers at the stations and on the trains. They are not official security guards; instead their job is to create a feeling of security by being visible.

For bus transport all bus contractors in the Stockholm area have a common emergency centre from 20.00 until 06.00 for safety issues in night traffic. At other times of the day safety issues are dealt with by each bus companies' local traffic control centres (depots), of which there are a total of 18. Technical aids have been started to be used both on the underground and on the buses without however replacing human resources as the most important safety resource.

Both Connex and Busslink have general instructions for incidents involving insecurity which also contain general principles on corrective measures. At Connex statistics and the social dialogue are incorporated as a regular part of incident analysis. The social dialogue in general on working environment issues at Connex is based on an agreement which has the nature of a collective agreement, and contains among other things co-operation within Central Safety Committee and Local Safety Committees. Dialogue between the parties had an important, even self-evident, significance in the running of the company. Also the Swedish legislation contains provisions on employee representation and on co-operation between employer and employee on issues concerning the work environment and employment protection.

Altogether social dialogue works well within the companies but there is little contact with external players. One positive exception is the close co-operation with the underground police which is a special police group in Stockholm underground.

### **2.3) Berlin**

#### **Summary of the report**

##### **The company**

BVG has a workforce of 13,500 and provides local public transport in the form of buses, a light underground railway and trams. An eight-year contract has been concluded between the city and BVG but it does not contain any guidelines on the provision of security. Through the worker director, who is a member of the board with equal rights, the employees are directly represented on the Management Board of the undertaking. The employees also make up one-half of the Supervisory Board. The workers in the undertaking participate in determining both functions. The Staff Council represents the employees and is entitled to prompt and full information.

##### **The situation**

Attacks on employees have been steadily increasing in recent years. East Berlin in particular has become a centre for illegal cigarette trading and right-wing extremism. Most of the criminal offences relate to damage to property, pickpocketing, drug crimes, offences against the Aliens Act, bodily injury and illegal driving. These attacks are psychologically bad for the employees and are also bad for the company as they result in time-off for employees and/or damage, thus leading to an increase in costs. Resort to violence as a means of getting one's way is becoming increasingly common in our society and this is reflected in local public transport. Passengers want to feel safe and they want cleanliness and service. The company has to ensure this and its economic success depends on it.

##### **The security approach**

Since 1998 BVG and the police, fire service and municipality have had a common approach to security:

- A 'Pupils in the bus' prevention approach

- Inspections and patrolling on the route network jointly with the police
- Exchanges of information and joint training courses
- Redesigning of railway stations (500 lux illumination, no recesses, emergency call pillars)
- Video surveillance of railway stations and all vehicles
- A security control centre
- Training for staff
- Use of GPS to determine the location of all vehicles, and continuous contact with the control centre. Direct contact with the police and fire service.
- Assistance for employees who have been victims of an attack, beginning directly on the spot and with follow-up care for up to 7 days following resumption of work.
- Fast and differentiated punishment of the young persons involved

### **The result**

Since 1998, there has been a decline in the incidence of graffiti and damage to property. In the case of the urban railway, the number of criminal offences fell by 10% during the period 200-2001. It also made sense for the police and BVG to set up shared office facilities.

### **The problems**

Employees do not receive sufficient training in the management of serious conflict situations. Because of insufficient staff, there is pressure to maintain job performance and few of them are being released for training. As regards security, a distinction is drawn between BVG and other undertakings.

## **2.4) Barcelona**

### **Summary of the report**

From the point of view of our methodology focusing on social dialogue within companies, the case of the two companies (bus and underground) which are grouped under the name TMB (Metropolitan Transport of Barcelona) is somewhat peculiar.

There are in fact two contradictory sentiments which were expressed by our hosts (representatives of the management and of the trade unions): *impatience and doubt*.

Signs of impatience could be seen in the fact that the different meetings were always attended by large numbers of people with active participation, the preparations made for the talks given by the different speakers (often with manuscripts prepared in advance and to be read) and the clearly expressed desire that each person should express himself and be heard by the other person during the visit, etc.

Signs of doubt could be perceived in the fact that the problem of the lack of social dialogue within TMB concerning the issue of insecurity was overcome during this visit. After all, while all the speakers called - with more or less force and conviction - for the development of this kind of social dialogue, this call often followed talks which, in their rhetorical form, set up a certain monologue in which each speaker proclaimed his good faith but was unwilling to credit the other speakers with this attitude.

However, this impression must also be corrected.

In the different cities that we visited, including Barcelona, the problems encountered and the measures adopted in an effort to alleviate these problems are more or less the same, albeit with varying intensity.

The main problems in these cities are vandalism (tagging, scratching); muggings (physical); theft (pickpocketing, stealing from tills); antisocial behaviour (verbal abuse, drunkenness, rowdiness and

dirtying property); fraud and 'black spots' (no-go areas).

The main methods used to combat these problems include video surveillance, protection of cabs, discreet alarms, telephones, rapid intervention teams, security by police or specialised services, various forms of staff training, post-traumatic assistance, etc.

In terms of the offences committed and the methods adopted, Barcelona is no different (at least radically different) from the other cities that we visited or that were audited<sup>9</sup> (Turin, Copenhagen and Paris) in the course of a meeting in Brussels of the local public transport working group of the European road sectoral social dialogue committee on 28 October 2002.

While we would not want at this point to make a value judgement, in the view of the delegation the case of Barcelona is particularly instructive as it shows the need to tackle the problem of the growing insecurity and feeling of insecurity through social dialogue within local public transport companies.

Such dialogue, which depends on ensuring mutual good will between the management and the staff representatives, is necessary above all to eliminate a whole series of misunderstandings which develop needlessly and lead to a misreading of the problems themselves and of the solutions that should be implemented collectively and transparently.

The reason for this is that one of the features that we feel is essential to the development of insecurity and the feeling of insecurity in the professions connected with local public transport is the slow, insidious and relatively silent development of the factors underpinning the crisis. At least to some degree, this aspect has corroded relations within the company to such an extent that this translates into potential conflict.

But another factor that we identified during our different visits is that the moral corrosion (we prefer this term to 'psychological corrosion') within companies with regard to the development - objective and subjective - of the problems can reach such a degree that, in spite of the resources deployed, conflicts can thwart all endeavours to achieve a convergence of interests, even though there are undeniably common interests, since it is in the interest of the companies and of the personnel working in these companies that the public transport system can continue to operate safely.

From this point of view, we feel that social dialogue is one of the key elements that can help break the spiral of misunderstandings and restore the necessary trust among the different social partners so that they can together combat the growing reality of insecurity and the feeling of insecurity underpinned by perversion (moral corrosion).

The delegation observed that in Barcelona the social partners realised the danger of not breaking this spiral and that, for this reason, everyone had to assume their responsibility.

**The European delegation was therefore particularly pleased to see that in January 2003, that is, shortly after its visit to Barcelona, discussions were launched among the social partners and led to the establishing of shared principles: social alert, systematic meetings of the social partners in the event of incidents, communication and transparency in the adoption of measures to combat the growth of insecurity and the feeling of insecurity within the companies of the TMB group.**

<sup>9</sup> The observable differences between the different cities are based essentially on the resources allocated according to the nature of the offences. For example, in Stockholm the emphasis was on the problem of graffiti. It should be remembered that there are 350 graffiti gangs in this city. In Berlin, the scratching of vehicle windows appears to have become a major problem, and in the German capital one of the problems which could probably be considered as one of the main headaches facing the representatives of the company (BVG) was that the possibility of increasing security through technology ran up against certain limits and that the approach had to be reviewed. In Valenciennes, as indeed in Barcelona, the problem was stressed of the increase in road rage, in particular because not enough priority is given to bus traffic.



## **2.5) Antwerp**

### **Summary of the report**

On 10<sup>th</sup> and 11<sup>th</sup> December 2002, the delegation of the UITP and the ETF visited the city of Antwerp to overview the actions and projects of the Flemish Public Transport Company 'De Lijn' in order to deal with aggression in public transport.

The delegation had the opportunity to discuss with all actors, especially the management, the representatives of the employees, representatives of the city of Antwerp and the police.

### **The company strategy**

In spite of the fact that the data-registration has been implemented only at the end of 1999 and that the interpretation is rather difficult, we can conclude that generally speaking Public Transport is a safe and secure mode of transport.

When we take a look to the cause of acts of aggression, most acts of aggression are caused by ticket control, annoying behaviour, and traffic situations. When we look at the type of aggression violence without a weapon, kicking the vehicle, intimidation and verbal acts are the most important ones.

The major problem in Flemish cities as Antwerp or Ghent is the traffic problem related with the peak flow. These problems are for the driver and the other users of other modes of transport a stress factor and can be a cause of aggression and vandalism.

It is clear that a coherent security strategy was proposed on the highest negotiation level between 'De Lijn' and the trade unions within the company and has been implemented.

The social dialogue is organised on a central and local level.

The security strategy of the company is worked out over different subjects:

- Prevention on a organisational level;
- Technically adapted vehicles;
- Communication;
- Training;
- Aftercare.

### **Conclusion:**

As far as the social dialogue at company level is concerned, there are legal consultation bodies at central and local level at which the aggression issue can be raised.

The security strategy of the company is the result of this efficient and sufficient dialogue.

De Lijn has since the end of 1999 sufficient information and statistics about the security problem. Nevertheless, these statistics should be used with some caution, as a uniform registration form has not been used before 1999.

Positive or negative tendencies should therefore be deduced with sufficient caution. Yet, it is already obvious that some specific measures such as the use of cameras and the presence of Lijnspotters - have most favourable effects, for drivers (stronger feeling of safety) and in the matter of decrease in acts of aggression in the vehicles.

One of the big problems, causing a lot of frustration – and therefore maybe also aggression- is the circulation in the city. Circulation is very difficult for buses and trams in the big, busy agglomeration. It

is a constant struggle between the bus and tram drivers on the one hand and the other public road users on the other hand. These problems add to the pressure of work, the stress, causing a decline of the working conditions and the quality of work.

Moreover, this problem can also add to the stress among the customers and therefore increase the stress-related behaviour.

The dialogue with the external parties – e.g. the city hall – must therefore be intensified. This is absolutely necessary.

## **2.6) Meeting of the local public transport working group on 28/11/02**

The brief summary of the debates was drawn up by Mrs. Ellen Durst of the European Commission.

A hearing was held of representatives of employers and workers of a number of European companies (cf. list of speakers in the annex<sup>10</sup>), followed each time by a question-and-answer session. The general debate focused on the following points:

- the reasons for the attacks;
- the psychological follow-up of drivers who have been attacked and the need to keep them in their post;
- equipment (video surveillance, protective screens and alarm systems);
- checking of tickets by employees in uniform;
- the need to change the criteria for the selection of drivers (from simply the ability to drive to the ability to manage relations with passengers);
- the difference between 'insecurity' and the 'feeling of insecurity';
- the prosecution of the perpetrators;
- social dialogue as a means of preventing work stoppages.

### **1. Presentation of the European PRISMATICA project**

Mr ROSSO (RATP) presented this project. Its purpose is to improve real and perceived safety and security for passengers and staff by identifying and implementing innovative processes and tools (cf. <http://www.prismatica.com/>). It is financed by the fifth Framework Programme.

### **2. Conclusions**

It is difficult to draw general conclusions. Nonetheless, convergence was achieved on a number of approaches, and social dialogue appears to play an important role. There are good practices that should be disseminated, such as the RATP 'social alarm' procedure. One general problem facing employers and workers appears to be the fact that the judicial authorities are slow to intervene. One of the questions which has remained unanswered is the issue of the distinction between damage to materials (graffiti) and injury to persons (verbal abuse and physical assault). Before drawing any final conclusions, we have agreed to await the final report of the project.

#### **List of speakers**

<b>Company</b>	<b>Employers</b>	<b>Workers</b>
Copenhagen	Mr Peter JUNGE* Vice-Director of Connex Denmark	Mr Poul JOHANSEN* SID, local trade union officer of Copenhagen
Turin	G. BONFANTI*	Mr Francesco SEGHI

<sup>10</sup> The different talks can be obtained from the UITP, the IRU, the ETF and the Commission (DG EMPL).

	Representative of A.T.M., Turin	FIT/CISL
London		Mr Steve LINGER TGWU London
Paris	Mr Didier FABRE* Manager of Human Resources of the 'Network Security' Operational Unit, RATP Paris	Mr Pierre LE BIS Central trade union delegate of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of the RATP Group, Paris

### 3) Insecurity, the feeling of insecurity and social dialogue

Our initial task was therefore to identify good practices in the field of social dialogue within companies aimed at combating the development of insecurity and the feeling of insecurity. We therefore noted the following points in the summaries of each case:

- i) The development of social dialogue can vary from company to company. It is a relatively recent phenomenon, as the social agreements in this field - where any exist - date at most from a few years ago and were often prompted by dramatic events (e.g. people being injured by weapons) which aroused within companies a legitimate emotional reaction which raised awareness of the need to 'internalise' the problem at the level of social and work relations within companies, whereas in the past it had been considered as a societal problem and therefore to some degree outside the companies.
- ii) It is also important to note that, at a time when social dialogue was at an embryonic stage, a certain tension could be felt within the companies we visited. In contrast, this tension was much less in evidence in companies where there was effective social dialogue on this issue. From a certain point of view, this reveals that, irrespective of the objective seriousness of the problem of insecurity, it has an abrasive effect on any trust that exists among the social partners within companies.
- iii) We must also emphasise that the important role of the link between dialogue and trust is not confined to considerations of individual or social psychology. Indeed, as we have seen, while the extent of the efforts undertaken by companies to combat the development of insecurity has been variable in view of the fact that the problems encountered in the different cities vary in intensity, such efforts have always been relatively substantial in terms of the investments undertaken and the measures implemented. However, in companies where such efforts have been the subject of consultation, they are given due recognition, whereas otherwise they are thwarted due to this lack of trust.

However, the question of trust is not the only issue involved. We also found in the course of our visits that the fight against the growth of insecurity and the feeling of insecurity can be divided into three key aspects: prevention, repression and redress. We will discuss these aspects in more detail later.

Before we do that, we must emphasise that, particularly when it comes to repression, the social partners have no legitimacy. Therefore, if the authorities who have jurisdiction in this field (the police and the courts) fail in their duty, any restoration of trust within companies, which is the aim of social dialogue, will be quickly reduced to a mere formality.

Furthermore, it must be reiterated that insofar as the authorities who have jurisdiction to deal with repression must be involved, the growth of insecurity and of the feeling of insecurity basically undermines two essential freedoms which the authorities must seek to preserve according to modalities which we will outline in this report, all the more as, in terms of duty, they are the guardians of these freedoms more than the social partners could ever be. These freedoms are:

- i) the freedom to work under conditions of satisfactory physical and psychological security;
- ii) the freedom of mobility and accessibility of services in an urban environment.

However, at this point a third group - the citizens and/or, in a more restrictive way, the customers of the public transport companies - appears on the scene alongside those we have already identified: the social partners and the public institutions.

Although our study did not specifically discuss the problem of the users of public transport, this issue always appeared in the background through, for example, the following questions which fuelled some of our discussions with the representatives of the management or with the representatives of the trade unions within the companies concerned:

- i) How can we reconcile the physical protection systems for employees with the need to have a service relationship with customers?
- ii) How can we reconcile the presence of surveillance systems (especially video surveillance) on vehicles with the employees' right to exercise their profession with due respect for privacy?
- iii) In the event of any problem, how can we encourage a certain solidarity of users with the employees?
- iv) How can we raise awareness among the users of the tasks and working conditions of the personnel of public transport companies?
- v) Lastly, to avoid always going over the same ground, we may ask how we can ensure that within companies the fact that they serve certain districts which have a reputation for being problematic does not result in these districts being stigmatised.

These are merely a few examples of the issues raised, but they show the complexity of a problem that calls for constant interaction between the social partners, the legitimate public authorities and the users of public transport.

The issue of trust is therefore not simply an internal question between the management and the trade unions within companies. In fact, it encompasses the relations between companies (management and trade unions) and the legitimate public authorities, in particular in the area of public order, and between companies and citizens/customers who must be protected and at the same time involved in the fight against insecurity and the feeling of insecurity.

Although we must appreciate the complexity of the problem, this must not diminish the importance of social dialogue within companies.

Indeed, we should probably consider that social dialogue constitutes the first level of trust and that, without such dialogue, any links and any joint actions undertaken with the other actors will be undermined.

Social dialogue is in effect also a means of setting the rules of social responsibility for the company vis-a-vis these other actors, not only in terms of the modalities of action but also in terms of the specific involvement of the management and of the workforce according to the responsibilities of each party and, in return, information from the personnel on the results (including any difficulties that may sometimes be encountered) of the involvement of these actors in support of the company.

This is an aspect which must be emphasised, because our survey revealed that the lack of communication between the social partners within companies on the commitments of the company vis-a-vis these other categories of actors (and vice-versa) undermines trust due to the lack of transparency. This is therefore the other essential facet of social dialogue, which must be linked to trust like the front and back of a sheet of paper.

However, at this stage and before explaining in more detail the three aspects mentioned earlier (prevention, repression and redress), we feel it is useful to answer a question that is bound to be asked: Can the effects of social dialogue be measured in figures (in terms of the actual reduction in insecurity)?

First and foremost, we must admit that in reply to this question it is difficult to give figures of this kind.

Although in the course of our visits we had access to the different statistics kept by the companies on the scope and trend of the problem (cf. the different reports), for one thing, these data are on the whole insufficient (five cases are not enough to make proper statistical comparisons) and, secondly, they do not measure discrepancies between the results of measures of all kinds according to whether or not they are 'managed or supported' by social dialogue.

We therefore prefer to say in reply to the question that we do not know and that, within the framework of this project, we are not in a position to find out.

Nonetheless, we can somewhat qualify this rather discouraging answer as follows.

The catalogue of incidents that increase 'objective' or 'subjective' insecurity is vast indeed, as they range from the type of things we heard about during our visits (the worst cases), that is, people with gunshot wounds, to the less serious cases, for example school pupils messing about at the back of a bus.

Between these two ends of the spectrum, there is a plethora of reprehensible forms of behaviour ranging from vandalism to theft, with or without violence, serious or petty violence, threats, insults, drunken passengers, various forms of trafficking, etc.

All these forms of behaviour may be indulged in by individuals or by groups of people or gangs.

While the most serious acts will, because of their effects, automatically lead to complaints being lodged, we were often told that there is a whole series of acts of delinquency (insults, threats, etc.) which are seldom reported by the personnel targeted by such acts.

The reason for this low incidence of reporting is that, according to the representatives of the personnel, many victims of such acts decided not to lodge a complaint because they thought this type of complaint would not lead anywhere.

How much non-reporting is there? Even if we hazarded a paradoxical evaluation based on the increase in complaints when this gathering of data is provided for by social dialogue, as we will see later, there is nonetheless a risk that we would not end up with reliable data.

We therefore prefer to say that any measurement of the efficacy of social dialogue in terms of its absence or inadequacy is not achieved, at least within the framework of a reduced case study like ours, through statistical surveys.

At the same time, however, there is no reason why we cannot measure its efficacy by other more qualitative criteria, such as trust and transparency, which cannot be measured but provide a means of gauging the level of social responsibility assumed within companies, good corporate governance and the ability of the company to influence the attitude of the other social actors called upon to cooperate with it.

#### **4) The three key aspects: prevention, repression and redress**

##### **4.1) The system**

The three generic terms - prevention, repression and redress - describe different phases, actors and contents (which we will endeavour to outline in more detail a little later).

The first phase is before the incident takes place and the two other phases after the incident.

In terms of actors, the first and the third concern more particularly the social partners of companies; the second set of actors involves the public authorities.

However, these basic principles of order reflect only formal appearances, because the claim that this is a system presupposes that this is above all a unified whole in which the parts are interdependent and that they constitute a whole only insofar as each part thus designated plays its assigned role but in close correlation with the other parts.

One can therefore only say that a security policy exists if these three components act and interact in a recurring loop.

By way of illustration, let us examine first the judicial sluggishness that is often observed when it comes to repressing duly reported acts of delinquency.

The sentencing of the guilty is an integral part of the redress due to the victims.

However, if the process drags on and if little or no punishment is meted out and the perception is therefore that the delinquents have been given precedence over the victims, the work of redress is, if not impossible, at least hampered, which aggravates the sense of insecurity and, very often, exacerbates the feeling of insecurity, with the direct consequence that the trust which social dialogue is designed to restore is lost.

Conversely (and so that we have not just one single hypothesis to work on), the preventive measures may fail - due to their absence or malfunction - and the 'prey' becomes more vulnerable. As a result, turning towards the public authorities to encourage them to be more cooperative and efficient, i.e. repression, comes to lack credibility.

Finally, as a last example, should we not include within redress the need to strengthen preventive measures?

Thus, acting (or failing to act) in any of these three areas always presupposes that we must reflect on the possible or anticipated effects in the two other areas. Adjustments are therefore often required which are not without consequence as regards the nature of the actions and the content of the agreements, whether they be social or based on civic cooperation.

That said, we must also point out how this system applies, that is, to what categories of behaviour it is likely to apply.

There are four categories, which are also generic:

- i) vandalism, especially tagging, scratching and all other forms of destruction of public property, i.e. the premises and materials used in the context of public transport;
- ii) antisocial behaviour, that is, insults, threats, noise and rowdiness, alcohol and drug abuse, preventing the circulation of public transport by other road users (essentially cars), fraud, etc.;
- iii) theft (with or without violence), bearing in mind in this regard that fraud (see above) is theft and that many thefts are accompanied by physical attacks (see above);
- iv) muggings, bearing in mind that they can be classified as non-violent attacks (but with a very strong physical threat - with a gun for example); with slight injuries (e.g. a slap); with grievous bodily harm.

#### **4.2) Prevention, repression and redress: definitions, objectives, fields covered and the actors concerned**

##### **4.2.1) Prevention**

Prevention must be understood to mean all the measures intended to prevent incidents and/or, when they occur, to manage them in such a way that they can be controlled with a view to the rapid restoration of the normal situation. However, prevention must also help achieve two fundamental objectives of the profession: to complete the basic mission, which is to transport users in *safety* and

*security*, to guarantee the quality of the service relationship between the personnel of the companies and their customers. Prevention covers the following fields: training, technological protection and mediation. The main actor concerned is the company, with its human resource policy, but this does not rule out the possibility of participation by the transport authorities, especially when investments must be undertaken in the area of technological prevention, and this does not rule out either the participation of civic society when it comes to encouraging more civic behaviour.

#### **4.2.2) Repression**

Repression is a necessity insofar as the impunity enjoyed by those who commit acts of delinquency is increasingly criticised by real or potential victims who feel in a way let down by the responsible authorities (the police and the courts). It is also a necessity insofar as impunity encourages repeat offences and indeed an escalation of delinquency and delinquent behaviour. That said, repression must be proportionate. After all, if the primary objective of repression is to prevent a repetition of the offence, if it is disproportionate, it engenders in the delinquent the feeling that he has not so much been on the receiving end of social justice but rather of a form of vengeance. In turn, vengeance (or the grudge engendered by vengeance) is a denial of justice that creates the desire to get even. As a necessity, the purpose of repression must therefore be an act of justice that prevents a threefold escalation: of the feeling of abandonment, of the temptation to repeat the offence and of the spiral of vengeance. The danger of this threefold escalation raised its head explicitly or implicitly during our discussions, both the discussions we conducted with the social partners within the companies and those - less frequent - we had with the representatives of the public authorities in the different cities. It must therefore be seen as an indication of malfunctions affecting the procedures<sup>11</sup> and the credibility of justice (as the only credible social alternative to the stand-off between the victim and the assailant with no succour or support). This situation, which is similar to the "war of all against all" (Hobbes), automatically engenders this risk of threefold escalation.

Therefore, repression, as it emerged in the course of this study and in the terms which we have endeavoured to define it, appears to be an element which is essential to the restoration of security and of the feeling of security. And, insofar as the process of repression begins with a denunciation that concerns all the actors within the company (including its customers), it involves the legitimate institutional actors whose task it is to set the terms of redress through punishment.

#### **4.2.3) Redress**

Redress can be defined, in terms of the social responsibility of companies, as all the practices designed to restore the rights of victims and to render them their due. In other words, it is the process of reintegration, resocialisation and renormalisation. This process is essentially designed so that any person who has once been the victim (of an attack) during his professional career does not fall victim a second time because of lack of concern when he falls victim the first time. Redress therefore takes into account the following aspects: physical injury, psychological harm and financial loss.

Finally, redress is also geared towards delinquents, based on a process which is identical but which, with some exceptions (for example, certain cases of penalties involving community service within public transport companies), do not concern the social responsibility of the companies.

### **4.3) Prevention, repression and redress: arrangements and good practices**

#### **4.3.1) Prevention**

##### **4.3.1.1) Prevention of vandalism**

<sup>11</sup> With regard to the legislation and its effective application; the need for prompt justice; *modus operandi* and reliability of the chain of actors involved in a complaint and the mediators that this involves between: employee and victim; company reporting and support services; police and/or court authorities; representation of the victim in the event of a trial; actors responsible for imposing a penalty, whether it be a fine, community work or prison; lastly, at the end of the chain, those involved in the reintegration process.

- i) Tagging, reinforced protection for premises by security guards and police patrols; protection of premises by video surveillance; targeted public information (especially for schools) on respect for public property; information for public opinion on the cost of the damage and the risk of fines and criminal sentences;
- ii) Scratching: cf. tags;
- iii) Other forms of damage: idem.

Comments on the prevention of vandalism: Prevention is the cornerstone of technological and police or police-type surveillance. However, it can also in some cases involve the personnel (in particular, scratching, which is more discreet because it involves individuals more than gangs and most of the time is perpetrated while the delinquent is actually travelling on the vehicle). However, in this case it is important that the personnel be informed of the procedures to follow to avoid taking unnecessary risks with gangs who are sometimes quite determined.

For further information: See the reports on Stockholm (tagging), where the problem has taken on particular importance (with 350 highly organised gangs in the form of commandos); groups which are well equipped (with scanners and other listening devices) and sometimes armed; see also the report from Berlin (scratching).

Actors: Public authorities responsible for the city and transport; police; the courts; companies (technical services and cleaning services); schools; public opinion.

#### **4.3.1.2) Prevention of antisocial behaviour**

Training courses in:

- i) the management of risk situations;
- ii) controlling verbal confrontations and deescalating these situations;
- iii) rational behaviour, in particular to improve the quality of transport for passengers and to guarantee better control of vehicles in the event of antisocial road behaviour by other road users.

Technological resources:

- i) video surveillance of vehicles and public transport premises;
- ii) discreet alarms;
- iii) adaptation of drivers' cabs.

Mediation:

- i) actions geared towards target groups, especially young people, by delegating staff members from companies to make presentations, especially in schools;
- ii) event-type actions in which the company will raise its profile by organising or participating in the organisation, for example, of sports or music festivities;
- iii) recruitment of young persons who are able to understand and defuse potential conflict situations between the personnel of the transport companies and certain troublesome customers.

Comments on the prevention of antisocial behaviour:

Prevention:

Prevention presupposes that the personnel must be better prepared for situations marred by antisocial behaviour. However, at the same time it must also involve not only the company but also civic society to encourage the two parties to get to know each other and establish better relations



based on esteem and respect.

**Important note:** It is important to involve companies in the fight against racism and social discrimination, in particular, but not exclusively, when it comes to serving 'problem' districts.

The methods of technological surveillance include:

i) video surveillance:

- This should encourage: dissuasion; rapid intervention of help in the event of the triggering of a discreet alarm; proof in the event of a complaint.
- Furthermore, it should not be perceived as a means of checking that the staff are doing their job properly; if recordings are made to furnish proof, very strict rules of conduct (professional or legal) must be established to govern how these recordings are viewed.

ii) Adaptation of drivers' cabs:

- This must provide the personnel with more protection;
- Steps must be taken to prevent this from undermining the service relationship and communication between the drivers and the customers.

iii) General:

The different methods of technological surveillance (video and audio), positioning (GPS) and rapid intervention are seen as very important means of protection. However, two potential dangers must be avoided:

- the danger of random functioning, given that any malfunctions raise the spectre of their overall inefficiency;
- the danger of replacing human presence by technology.

Comments on mediation

Mediation entails the involvement of companies in terms of policies geared towards the city, training and employment.

**For further information:** See the reports on Stockholm and Berlin, which we feel are the cities which have best developed technological prevention systems and which also clearly understand where to draw the line between technological resources and human resources (especially Berlin). We also invite you to visit the website of the European PRISMATICA project: <http://www.prismatica.com/>

*Actors: companies, schools and authorities (in particular as regards technological investments).*

#### 4.3.1.3) Prevention of theft

**Fraud:**

Fraud straddles the line between antisocial behaviour and theft. It is antisocial behaviour when it is exceptional, but it becomes theft when it is systematic.

Good prevention practices include:

- i) informing the public of the consequences of fraud;
- ii) informing target groups (especially in schools);
- iii) ensuring staff visibility;
- iv) reinforced checks.

#### Till theft:

Attacks of this kind can be reduced by reducing the takings on board vehicles by changing the nature of the tickets sold on board or by developing alternatives to cash payments.

#### Pickpocketing:

This essentially involves the public. It is important to inform the public of the elementary precautions that can be taken: reinforced surveillance of sensitive areas (or which become sensitive at certain times) must be ensured through a visible human presence (uniformed agents) to act as a dissuasion, or a more discreet presence (plain-clothes police) if suspects must be approached.

Actors concerned: companies, police and schools.

#### 4.3.1.4) Muggings

Aggravated theft: This raises the issues already discussed with regard to the protection of cabs; discreet alarms; recordings (video and audio); rapid help. Training courses are also an important means of enabling the victim, as far as possible, to distance himself physically and psychologically from the event. Some companies have also opted to offer courses in self defence, especially for personnel responsible for checking or supervision.

The other categories of physical assaults linked to alcohol, drugs and antisocial behaviour (throwing stones or dangerous objects at vehicles to cause injury voluntarily or involuntarily) and criminal acts (armed assaults) are more difficult to prevent as they are more infrequent and much more unpredictable.

However, prevention can be achieved through:

- i) better knowledge of risk zones or risk times in cities and, based on this knowledge, the implementation of special measures on the use of vehicles with special protective features; reinforced escort and improved security and police presence;
- ii) the existence of alternative routes in the event of problems and until normality is restored;
- iii) the development of relations with the residents of risk zones by enlisting the support of district associations, other services concerned (shops and public services) and the municipal and police authorities.

Prevention can also be achieved through the efforts undertaken to maintain transport services in spite of the difficulties involved in travelling through certain areas of the city or at certain times of the day or week. In this regard, the general principle is a principle of public service that dictates that, if this service is not provided by all the actors who are responsible for or concerned by its existence, proper functioning and preservation, the result would be a worsening of the conditions in cities in these places or at these times by virtue of the fact that this would produce (intentionally or otherwise) a ghetto situation which, at the end of the day, would increase the risk of violence.

#### 4.3.1.5) Final considerations on prevention

All the good practices in the field of prevention which might be listed must nonetheless be 'filtered' through prior knowledge of the problems to be resolved and by deciding what should be done with this knowledge.

This is all the more important, as we observed in the course of our study and we compared the different countries, cities, districts and times, as, while the nature of the problems is more or less identical, the intensity of these problems can vary considerably and, consequently, may call to a greater or lesser degree for the adoption of a given preventive measure. The problems are therefore

relatively similar, but they are not necessarily of equal importance, which raises the question of the threshold at which it will be necessary to decide to apply *ad hoc* preventive measures.

*This notion of threshold, which we have introduced at this point, is to a great extent a subjective and vague notion, as it describes the indeterminate point where the balance tips from 'tolerable' to 'intolerable'.*

This notion cannot therefore be gauged using instruments devised to measure breaches of security, even though it might be thought that frequent complaints or denunciations are a sufficient indicator of intensity to trigger the adoption of preventive measures. However, the notion of threshold cannot be tied down by straightforward statistics but is amenable to an alarm procedure insofar as there is necessarily some point between 'tolerable' and 'intolerable' where the people involved in a situation perceive the gradual emergence of a danger or the feeling of danger.

It is therefore this danger or this feeling of danger (which can, moreover, be confirmed by the catalogue of events) that can trigger a 'social alarm' along the lines of the model described below, along with the mutual obligations that it imposes on the social partners.

#### **The model of the social alarm set in place by the RATP<sup>12</sup>**

In the event of serious problems creating insecurity or a feeling of insecurity on an underground or bus line, the social partners can trigger a 'social alarm' procedure to alert the management and seek together ways to remedy this situation.

Within 5 days following the triggering of the social alarm, a meeting is held to negotiate a solution. An agreement or declaration of disagreement on the measures adopted must be signed by the management and the trade union that triggered the social alarm.

The advantages of this procedure are as follows:

- i) It makes the management aware of a problem that may become a source of conflict;
- ii) It prevents wildcat strikes which greatly inconvenience passengers;
- iii) It improves social dialogue between the management and the social partners.

Consequently, when it comes to the production of data relating to incidents, it is clear that this procedure must be implemented by company employees and that they must have some means of reporting events of this kind which undermine security in the course of their work.

One of the proposed tools that we came across during our study is the 'green form' used in Valenciennes (see below), which is filled out by the driver and transmitted to the company's (sworn) security officer.

#### **The 'green form' used in Valenciennes**

The key instrument placed at the disposal of drivers working for SEMURVAL is the 'environment anomaly report', which is also referred to as the 'green form' because of its colour.

This form, which the driver must fill out, giving the date and place of the anomaly, draws a distinction between four types of anomaly according to different items (an example of these items is given each time):

- i) "mugging of an employee" (e.g. aggravated assault);
- ii) "material damage suffered by the employee" (e.g. torn clothing);
- iii) "material damage to the bus" (e.g. tagging or graffiti);

<sup>12</sup> Presented to the social partners at the meeting of the local public transport working group on 28/11/02.

- iv) "behaviour that inconveniences customers" (the adoption by passengers of obnoxious behaviour). In this case, the driver takes the name, address and telephone number of the plaintiff (e.g. rowdiness).

This model is not the only one that was shown to us during the study. For the reasons mentioned above (occurrence or intensity of problems), it is up to each network to develop its own model and to change it to suit the circumstances.

Nonetheless, this model offers two advantages which can be expressed in the form of two rules of thumb:

- i) It should be a simple model devised in consultation with the personnel;
- ii) It should be the direct expression of the problems encountered by the personnel (including the service relationship with the customers).

In other words, it is produced through social dialogue and informs the social partners of the nature, intensity and prevailing trend of the problems.

#### **4.3.2) Repression**

It is not the responsibility of the companies or of the social partners to set the conditions or the rules or laws underpinning repression (according to the definition outlined above).

However, it is their responsibility to complain of any violence observed against the personnel or the users.

It is also their responsibility to set in place procedures which facilitate the reporting of the violence observed in the proper legal forms, that is, procedures that can prompt repressive action by the legitimate authorities.

Finally, it is their responsibility to express their disapproval, including by criticism, when the legitimate authorities do not fulfil their role, the aim being to involve them more effectively in the fight against insecurity and the feeling of insecurity.

There are therefore two important aspects that emerge that can help define good practices when it comes to coping with vandalism, antisocial behaviour, theft or muggings: firstly, organisation and method and, secondly, communication.

##### **4.3.2.1) Principles of organisation and method**

By organisation and method, we mean all the procedures which, on the basis of the reporting tools (reports drawn up by the personnel, complaints lodged to the company, video recordings, etc.), provide a means of processing this information, first within the company and then for the legitimate authorities.

In terms of good practices, this means that there must be a person or a structure within the company whose task it is to gather the facts and examine them in depth. It is preferable that the person or persons appointed within the structure be sworn and required to keep confidential any information gathered through interviews with the plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs, if they are company employees, should also receive the assistance of a trade union delegate.

These persons (or this structure) must have a means of liaising with judicial police officers or magistrates when their intervention is required.

In terms of principles, it is desirable that clear rules and arrangements be established for cooperation between the companies and the legitimate authorities.

These rules should at least set the conditions in which cooperation takes place and determine the model according to which the information or the request should be transmitted. The question remains: to whom, within what timescale and for what result?

However, it is unlikely that these rules can work as they should without explicit commitments, possibly in the form of contracts or agreements on intervention signed by the companies and the legitimate authorities.

In this regard, we feel that Valenciennes offers the most advanced system. We therefore refer the reader to the report on Valenciennes for further details concerning the system, which would take too long to explain at this point.

Optimum functioning also depends at least on some sharing of a social culture by the institutional authorities and the companies so that both parties can have a better understanding of the other's obligations and *modus operandi*, the nature of the problems it faces and the possibilities for the development of cooperation.

It is therefore desirable that good practices be set in place through training sessions and/or the exchange of information, which brings us to the question of communication.

#### **4.3.1.2) Communication**

Of course, any complex system depends above all, in terms of its functioning and because of the underlying interdependencies, on the arrangements for communication and the exchange of information between the different parties, in other words the arrangements for dialogue.

This is all the more important as, when there are no arrangements for communication and the exchange of information, it is not possible to have an overview of the system. Consequently, this system will not work or will not work properly.

One of the main difficulties in this regard is the problem of adjusting the communication and the exchange of information between the parts of the system which, firstly, have a certain order of priority and, secondly, operate, whether by rule or by obligation, independently of each other.

However, at the same time the organic link that exists between prevention, repression and redress (which we have not yet discussed) is such that arrangements for dialogue must be found which allow such a system to operate in spite of the restrictions imposed by priorities or obligations.

This is confirmed by the fact that, in the course of our discussions in the different cities, we observed that from this point of view there were often very real shortcomings, including in the cities and in the companies where there appear to be good practices in terms of cooperation with the authorities responsible for ensuring order and the setting in place of 'proportionate' repression.

When one takes a closer look at what is happening in these cities and in these companies, one can see that these shortcomings are basically linked to two rhetorical forms, euphemisation and dramatisation, which, when the issue of insecurity and the feeling of insecurity is raised, effectively vitiates the circulation of information within the system.

##### **i) Euphemisation**

This phenomenon generally starts out from an observation that is intended as objective, i.e. the observation of relatively rare breaches of security. In this context, everything hinges on the existence, the nature and the value of the instruments designed to qualify and measure the objectivity of the facts. However, in addition to this aspect, this is not perhaps the most important factor, but rather the conclusion which is drawn and which, in this case, tends to put the problem down to an over-reacting

social sensitivity. However, this conclusion does not take properly into account the fact that social subjectivity is also an objective datum (for example, in reference to the social alert model).

## ii) Dramatisation

Dramatisation starts from the observation - with a largely ideological connotation - that insecurity has become part and parcel of society to such an extent that it is impossible to circumscribe it by any means other than by a radical reform of society itself. Consequently, although the phenomenon can be measured objectively and give rise to local measures aimed at combating the problem, such measures and provisions will always be inadequate and ill-suited to the task of controlling the global phenomenon.

However, euphemisation and dramatisation have one thing in common<sup>13</sup>. They both place the issue of insecurity and the feeling of insecurity outside the company on the pretext of insignificance or powerlessness. The upshot of this is that the process is short-circuited and the company is disarmed and unable to generate information, whether it be internally within the context of social dialogue or externally within the context of civil dialogue with the legitimate authorities.

### 4.3.3) Redress

The objective of redress must be to prevent a situation where the victim of a breach of security is once again penalised by the consequences of the attack.

The consequences of an attack are threefold: physical, material and psychological.

The first two consequences can generally be readily observed, because most of the time they leave tangible traces that are visible or can be recorded by surveillance equipment or corroborated by witnesses.

However, in addition to the fact that such consequences do not always meet this 'most of the time' condition, they can also be invisible, for example psychological consequences: verbal abuse (insults or threats) or indeed minor physical attacks (e.g. slaps).

These consequences can be particularly serious as they can lead to after-effects which are detected within a timescale that varies from one individual to another, resulting in disorders that may be temporary but also may sometimes be lasting and even work disabilities. In addition, this invisible aspect cannot be treated by straightforward care, as might a physical injury that no one would refuse to accept or deny anyone else. In order to treat a psychological trauma, the victim must give his consent to the treatment that must be offered to him, but which he is free to accept or refuse.

Furthermore, the effects of a psychological trauma can be more deep-rooted than those of the physical assault that has taken place in the context of the person's professional activity. In this case, the assault may reveal the already disturbed psychological condition of the victim, whether it be in the form of fragilities of his psychological makeup or fragilities due to conjunctural factors.

Of course, in the above scenario of a professional disability connected with a psychological trauma, a medical report will be drawn up, if only to justify absenteeism or, at the very least, any perceptible drop in efficiency.

<sup>13</sup> Which they share to some extent with other minor rhetorical forms, such as the contradiction between the 'denunciation' message and the 'valorisation' message. A good example of this is the question of tags. The 'denunciation' message is underpinned by a criticism based on the dirt that they cause and which increases the feeling of insecurity, while the 'valorisation' message is underpinned by considerations surrounding the artistic value of these tags or graffiti. Another minor rhetorical form is based on the obsolescence of certain social rules and on the fact that breaches of these rules are more or less tolerated. A good example of this is the fact that it has become old-fashioned to consider forms of verbal incivility as insults at a time when society has adopted certain insults as common modes of expression, especially from the media and certain art forms (cinema, popular music, etc.).

However, these situations are bound to create something of a dilemma.

For one thing, if the assault is the obvious cause of the trauma, that is, it corresponds to the point in time when the victim's work changed from being 'acceptable' to 'unacceptable', it is the social responsibility of the company to do everything in its power to re-qualify the victim for his job or, if that is found to be impossible, for another job. However, this re-qualification process is not always feasible, and it must also be said that it will always be difficult to say how far the social responsibility of companies extends in such situations. In this context, it is therefore impossible to suggest a more precise rule than that the company should 'do everything in its power'.

Another aspect of redress which can be considered at this point before we enumerate the good practices surrounding the possible consequences of an assault on the victim is the question of the arrangements for redress by the assailant.

Let us assume that the assailant is arrested and summoned to appear before a court.

However, a number of problems will already have emerged between the questioning of the suspect and the appearance before the court.

The first problem, which has been mentioned on several occasions, concerns the immediate release of the assailant. It is not up to us to assess the merits or otherwise of such decisions taken by the police or the courts, but we must point out one of the consequences of this situation which is extremely traumatising for the victim, that is, the fact that the assailant can return to the place where he committed the offence with the sole aim of meeting the victim to pester, insult or threaten him. If this risk is found to be real, the victim should, at least temporarily, be assigned to a service other than the service he was working in at the time of the attack.

The second problem concerns the question of the timescale between the questioning of the suspect and the court ruling. This problem has already been mentioned, but we would like to point out once again that the longer this process takes, the more the assailant will feel 'justified' in resorting to this kind of provocation. We have already mentioned the danger of disproportionate repression because it can engender a desire to get even, but this desire can also be prompted by the impression (real or assumed) of impunity created by the immediate release of the assailant or the delay *sine die* of his appearance before the court.

The third problem concerns the question of the representation of the victims who, when they are summoned to appear as witnesses, can once again (rightly or wrongly, it matters little) feel threatened by the idea that they can be seen by and recognised by the assailant. It is therefore desirable that the victim should have the possibility, if he so desires and if this is in keeping with the court proceedings, to be represented by a lawyer retained by the company.

In fact, all these problems are connected with the risk - real or assumed - that the idea of vengeance (or attitudes connected with vengeance) can supplant the victim's trust in the judicial process.

The concept of trust, of which the importance has already been mentioned in the context of social dialogue within companies, extends in this case to encompass the 'civic dialogue' between the companies and the public institutions responsible for repression.

However, it must also be stressed that trust cannot be merely a state of mind but must be measured by efficiency. Otherwise, there can be no redress.

Redress also concerns the type of penalty imposed on the assailant.

Depending on the seriousness of the offence, the penalty meted out can be a prison sentence (custodial or suspended), a fine or community work.

The cases in which the penalty is a prison sentence do not concern the companies.

However, cases in which a fine or community work is imposed might concern the company.

Cases in which a fine is imposed, when the money is to be awarded to an employee who is the victim of an attack, also run up against the problem that the perpetrator who is ordered to pay might be insolvent at that particular time. In such cases, the amount should be paid to the victim by the company, and the company should then use the legal means at its disposal to recover the money from the convicted person.

Cases in which the perpetrator is ordered to do community work can also concern the company insofar as some types of community work can be done within the company, a situation which, in the cases of this type which were described to us, can have the added advantage that the delinquent can find out more about the company and the people who work there.

## 5) Conclusion

A security officer working for a large French company recently said that the security of the public transport networks and the passengers' feeling of safety and security hinged above all on the feeling of security of the staff itself.

We believe that this is confirmed by our study insofar as, when social dialogue works properly within the companies we visited (and, better still, when there is also civic dialogue), the effects of tension, the lack of dialogue, the silence and the euphemisation and dramatisation of the problem of insecurity and the feeling of insecurity that we observed in places where social dialogue worked less effectively were eliminated and replaced by a more rational approach to the problem which was helped along by the awareness of genuine solidarity.

The fact that in the course of our study three social agreements were signed within different companies merely confirms our initial idea that social dialogue at every level is essential not only to reduce the impact of insecurity within companies but also to bolster the type of civic dialogue that they are called upon to develop with the legitimate public authorities, whether they be transport authorities, who are responsible for contributing towards investments, or police or legal authorities, who are responsible for supporting and bolstering actions in the field of prevention, repression and redress which must be taken to combat the different categories of offences (vandalism, antisocial behaviour, theft or muggings).

However, it should not be imagined that once trust is established or restored, it is *sic et simpliciter* permanent.

This would in fact be underestimating the three factors that constantly thwart such efforts to create trust.

The first factor is the testing of the facts which, in spite of our best endeavours, can be exacerbated by malfunctions or a mismatch between technological equipment and social relations or by routines which, for certain reasons outlined below, undermine the reporting procedures.

The second factor (even if the first series of factors does not come into play) is linked to the danger of threefold escalation which is due - whether it be the feeling of abandonment (victim), the temptation to reoffend (assailant) or the spiral of vengeance (assailant and victim) - to shortcomings in the institutional relays and the resulting feeling that *in fine* any real or potential situation of social violence is a stand-off between two individuals. Indeed, we must not underestimate the fact that to a great extent the feeling of insecurity is fuelled by a view of society that leads to the conclusion that, whatever happens, you are on your own when you are faced with a confrontation. This aberration of the forms of modern individualism towards solitude as a social datum does much to fuel the security



ideologies and the equally simplistic and antidemocratic solutions underpinning them: self-defence or the police state.

The third factor is connected with the fragility of a complex system that requires for proper functioning the creation of many different information relays and the guarantee that each informed relay will furnish the effective response that it must provide by duty and by right, and this in a timeframe that is compatible with expectations that are genuinely credible and not an excuse to shelve the problem.

All these factors reveal the fragility of the relationship based on trust which is the aim of social dialogue and civic dialogue.

However, this fragility must be considered not so much as structural but as formal.

Indeed, although in formal terms there are undeniable risks of fragility due to the complexity of an overall system in which all the actors must interact taking into account the capabilities of each of the actors, nonetheless, structurally, the entire system does not have to be fully constructed to begin to function and generate signs of trust.

Of course, the condition *sine qua non*, the first stage at the very least for the restoration of trust, remains that the social partners must be convinced of the usefulness of social dialogue.

However, if this conviction can be referred to as structurally strong, it is because in contrast, in appearance at least, to an emotive approach to the facts, it provides the basis for a rational approach, that is, basic social knowledge that specifies the terms, identifies fields of responsibility and validates frameworks for action.

However, this does not mean that there is no place for emotions. After all, insecurity and the feeling of insecurity (the name says it well) always spring from the emotions.

Nonetheless, if we were to confine ourselves to this expression alone, we would be running the risk of acknowledging the domination of the social registers linked to insecurity: the registers, spread by contagion and gradual amplification, of worry, fear and panic. In contrast, if we were to consider emotion as an alarm signal which should elicit a reaction, we would be assigning it a positive role as the first step in a rational approach, i.e. the approach we have already referred to as the internalisation (which is in every way regrettable and should therefore be resisted) of the phenomenon of insecurity in the professions connected with public transport.