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FOREWORD

The recovery of the EU economy from the worst shock since post-World War II has been been faster than expected thanks to the strong policy response at the EU and national level. Vaccination campaigns have contributed to reopening the economies and restoring confidence of European citizens. As all Member States introduced short time work schemes supported by the EUR 100bn SURE instrument, jobs and skills were preserved, incomes were maintained and companies could therefore rapidly benefit from the recovery. In the third quarter of 2021, the EU economy gained strength allowing employment to return to almost its pre-pandemic levels.

The rebound of EU employment occurred in parallel with the increase in the labour force activity rate. The labour market is now moving from recovery to expansion, though a high degree of uncertainty exists over the consequences of a new wave of infections.

The employment impact of the pandemic has been heterogeneous. This report shows that a strong decline of employment has been observed in manufacturing as well as in contact-intensive service sectors, and in occupations that cannot be done remotely and are vulnerable to automation. Young people have borne a disproportionately large share of the job losses, but they recovered more swiftly than older age groups. Temporary workers, the self-employed, the low- and medium-skilled have also been more exposed to job losses.

These changes in the composition of employment across the economy may reflect temporary factors, such as concerns over health risks or supply chain bottlenecks. However, the pandemic has also accelerated the transition towards digital technologies, boosting the demand for tasks that are not likely to be automated. There are risks of rising inequalities, especially if the negative impact of the pandemic on vulnerable groups were to persist, and the reallocation pressures were to affect the low-skilled and low-wage workers more negatively.

At the same time, labour shortages are being reported in several sectors. This is partly related to the increase in labour demand triggered by the swift recovery. However, labour shortages can also reflect an insufficient supply of labour due to structural factors such as ageing, poor working conditions in some sectors and occupations and skills mismatches. The twin transition will also imply a reallocation of labour between sectors, with the risk of increasing skills mismatches.

After the decline of wages in 2020 linked to the drop in hours worked, wage growth rebounded in almost all Member States in 2021, particularly in catching-up countries, which supports wage convergence in the EU. The emerging labour shortages may put pressure on employers to increase wages and offer better working conditions. Wage hikes, improvements in the quality of workplaces and investments in training can help firms attract or retain employees. Inflationary pressures and job polarization may accentuate concerns about the purchasing power of low wage earners and wage inequality.

Looking forward, three main challenges emerge for labour market policies. First, the reallocation in the labour market should be supported, to facilitate the adaptation of workers' skills to the needs of the twin transition. Second, the recovery and the twin transition should be inclusive. Improving employment and working conditions of groups most negatively affected by the pandemic would contribute to preventing the scarring effects of unemployment and inactivity and the rise of inequalities. Third, while the current increase in labour shortages may be partly temporary, the structural drivers of labour shortages should be tackled.

The full implementation of the reforms agreed in the context of the Recovery and Resilience Facility will be key to put the EU economy on a stable, inclusive and resilient growth path. Policies need to support workers to find jobs that require skills different from those of their previous occupations, as suggested by the Commission Recommendation on Effective Active Support to Employment (EASE). In particular, Member States are encouraged to develop coherent policy packages of active labour market policies, encompassing hiring and transition incentives, upskilling and reskilling measures, and enhanced support by employment services for job transitions. The Youth Employment Support package and its component,

the reinforced Youth Guarantee, encourage and support policies to prevent a scarring impact of the crisis for youth. Wage increases, better working conditions and supportive services should reduce the gap between the value provided to society and the remuneration received by essential workers. Legal migration will be necessary to complement these measures to address the impacts of ageing and skills shortages.

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In 2020 and 2021 economic growth was determined by the course of the pandemic and the vaccination campaigns

After the rebound that followed the deep contraction of GDP in the first half of 2020, the EU economy fell back into recession in the last quarter of the year. This time the GDP decline was milder because of the combined effect of selective restrictions and people's adaptation to sanitary measures. In 2021, rapid progress in vaccination campaigns resulted in a gradual relaxation of the containment measures, which allowed domestic demand to resume and labour market conditions to improve. After a mild decline in the first quarter of 2021, the EU economy returned to a strong economic growth in the second quarter (2% quarter-on-quarter), mainly driven by the recovery in market services. A high degree of economic uncertainty exists over the consequences of a new wave of infections, despite the recovery trend.

The EU labour market has been quite resilient during the Covid-19 recession

The impact of the sharp drop of GDP on unemployment has been mitigated by the policy response, notably the job retention schemes, but also by high temporary inflows into inactivity due to fear of contagion and lockdown measures that induced people to give up job-search. In 2020, almost three million of people were laid off, a drop of employment of 1.5%. However, only a fraction of these losses translated into higher unemployment, because many left the labour force. Higher increases of unemployment were recorded in some countries with looser firing restrictions (the Baltic countries), dual labour markets (Spain), or where short-time work schemes cover a relatively low share of the work force (Sweden). In the second quarter of 2020, the activity rate (15-74) dropped to 62.7%, the lowest rate since the second quarter of 2011. In Greece, France, Italy and Poland, the unemployment rate even fell, reflecting the drop in the activity rate.

Yet, the effect of the recession has not been evenly distributed

Young people have borne a disproportionate share of the job losses, but recovered more swiftly than prime age groups, while older workers were more resilient to the Covid-19 recession. Temporary workers, the self-employed, the low- and medium-skilled have been more exposed to job losses. Among women, young women and single mothers were more negatively affected.

Labour market conditions improved, with EU employment rebounding close to pre-pandemic levels in the third quarter of 2021

In response to the gradual easing of the containment measures, the activity rate rebounded to 64% in the third quarter of 2020 and remained at that level throughout the first half of 2021. Although the drop of the activity rate was temporary and mostly linked to the effect of social distancing on job search, in the second quarter of 2021 it was still 0.5 pps below the level of the fourth quarter of 2019. In spring 2021, the improvement in the economic situation was accompanied by a substantial reduction in the unemployment rate. In October, the unemployment rate dropped to 6.7%, one percentage point below the peak reached one year earlier but still 0.7 pps above the pre-pandemic level. In parallel, the share of long-term unemployed increased in almost all member states reflecting the low probability of finding a job, in particular for those unemployed for more than 12 months. Employment and hours worked increased markedly in the second quarter of 2021. The EU economy gained strength in the third quarter allowing employment to return close its pre-pandemic levels. This shows that the labour market is moving from recovery to expansion.

The situation differs across countries

In the second quarter of 2021, the unemployment rate was higher than the pre-pandemic level of the fourth quarter of 2019 in 14 Member States, notably Croatia, Estonia, Austria, Ireland and Sweden. Had the activity rate

remained unchanged at its low rate of the second quarter of 2020, this would have happened for only nine countries. Conversely, without the increase in the activity rate the unemployment rate would have been lower than the pre-crisis rate in 17 Member States, notably Luxembourg, Ireland, Hungary, Netherlands, France, Spain, Portugal and Italy. Despite, the improvements, the level of employment was below the pre-pandemic level in 20 Member States. The largest gaps with the pre-pandemic level were observed in Romania, Spain, Estonia and Greece.

The employment impact of the pandemic has been more severe and persistent for some sectors

The effect of the pandemic has been differentiated across sectors, with a strong negative impact in manufacturing and contact-intensive sectors – namely wholesale and retail trade, transport and hospitality. In the second quarter of 2021, EU employment in manufacturing was 2.7% lower than the level of the fourth quarter of 2019. In 22 Member States the reduction of employment persisted, in particular in Spain, Romania, Bulgaria, Poland Germany, and Czechia. By the second quarter of 2021, employment in less contact-intensive services returned to its pre-crisis level and was even above that level in construction, health, and public administration. Conversely, a strong decline of employment has been observed in occupations that cannot be done remotely and in occupations vulnerable to automation. In the second quarter of 2021 employment in occupations less at risk of automation returned to the pre-pandemic levels, while in those more exposed it was about 5% lower.

The shortfall in employment relative to pre-pandemic level reflects labour market slack in some sectors and ongoing structural changes associated with the twin transition

These changes in employment by sector may reflect both transitory and permanent factors. First, despite the improvements, economic activity in contact-intensive services has not fully recovered, partly due to concerns over health risks and remaining restrictions. Second, weak employment growth in manufacturing may be related partly to supply chains bottlenecks, linked to divergences on a global scale in the reopening of the economy and overwhelmed transportation networks. Shortages of specific inputs (e.g. semiconductors) with a booming demand linked to the acceleration of the transition towards digital technologies are also dampening the demand of labour in manufacturing. However, the spread of automation, AI, and digitalisation during the pandemic might also have an impact both on the number of workers demanded in manufacturing and their characteristics.

Labour shortages are emerging in some parts of the economy amidst labour market slack

Since the start of the recovery, labour shortages have re-emerged in manufacturing (especially in the manufacture of computer and electronic equipment) and services (especially in hospitality). Yet, for the EU as a whole labour shortages appear to have reached their pre-pandemic high levels only in a few branches of industry. Conversely, in services labour shortages remain below their pre-pandemic maximum level. In some sectors (e.g. real estate, security, repair of computer), substantial slack remains compared to 2013-2019. The increase in labour shortages may not necessarily imply hiring difficulties due to skills mismatches as vacancies usually react faster than unemployment to cyclical swings. Labour shortages are rising in most Member States, and in 2021, they were highest both in countries with relatively high labour market slack (e.g. France, Greece, Italy and Ireland), and in countries with low slack (e.g. Germany and many Eastern European countries). Finally, reported shortages in certain occupations in some EU countries/regions coexist with a surplus of qualified workers in others, highlighting the relevance of labour mobility. As the economic recovery

continues, bottlenecks and supply shortages, including of labour, will create challenges for businesses to meet demand for consumption and investment goods. Looking forward, this may be associated with worsening labour market matching.

The increase in labour shortages reflects both temporary and permanent features

Labour shortages are due to the rapid increase in labour demand triggered by the swift recovery, while labour supply dropped, due in part to health concerns of workers to come back to high-contact occupations, and lower labour mobility/migration flows linked to restrictions to individual mobility and health risks. As the recovery gains pace, it can be expected that non-employed people return to work. However, it is unclear whether labour mobility would recover to pre-pandemic levels, also in light of on-going wage convergence within the EU. On the other hand, labour shortages are also driven by structural trends (e.g. ageing) and other factors that predated the pandemic and have been reinforced since (e.g. poor working conditions in the health sector, or pre-existent skills mismatches), reducing further an already insufficient supply of labour. A comprehensive set of policies would be needed to tackle labour shortages, including skills, activation and labour mobility and migration policies.

Despite the stronger than expected economic recovery and increasing labour shortages wage pressure remained contained

Wages have followed a V-shaped adjustment that mirrors the adjustment in hours worked to the recession and the subsequent recovery. In the second quarter of 2021, compensation per employee expanded at 7%; this increase reflects the rebound from the deep recession of 2020 and the recovery of the hours worked linked to the phasing-out of short-time work schemes. During the recession, wages in services dropped less than in manufacturing or construction, where short-time work schemes are more prevalent. Consequently, they also increased less during the current recovery. So far, the link with labour shortages appears relatively weak. Wage growth rebounded in almost all Member States, and particularly in catching-up countries supporting wage convergence within the EU. The growth of negotiated wages has been picking up although the average increase in the years 2020-2021 is in line with the average of the period 2013-2019.

While so far the Covid-19 shock has not triggered a large reallocation between occupations, the twin transition will imply a reallocation of labour between sectors

The twin transition shall lead to some reallocation of employment between tasks and sectors. While this will create job opportunities, competitiveness gains and wage increases, the speed and effectiveness of such reallocation depends on whether the skills of workers are sector- or task-specific, or adaptable. A reallocation of workers across sectors will be more challenging in terms of skills needs than a reallocation between firms within sectors, and may entail longer unemployment spells. Firms may also face difficulties in assessing skills of job seekers with experiences in other sectors. A slow reallocation and skills mismatches may lead to major disruptions of the process linking vacant jobs to jobless people and higher structural unemployment. Policies need to support workers to find jobs, which require skills different from those of their previous occupations.

Looking forward, three main challenges emerge for the functioning of labour markets

First, the reallocation in the labour market should be supported, with a view to facilitating the twin transition. Second, the recovery and the twin transition should be inclusive. Improving employment and working conditions of groups most negatively affected by the pandemic would contribute to preventing the scarring effects of unemployment and inactivity and the rise of inequalities. Third, while the current increase in labour shortages may be

partly temporary, the structural drivers of labour shortages (i.e. the shrinking working age population, skills shortages and poor working conditions in some sectors and occupations) should be tackled. Policies should help address these challenges.

Short-time work schemes and similar measures have been used extensively throughout the Covid- 19 crisis

In response to the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, all EU Member States quickly adopted emergency measures to limit the economic and social consequences of the crisis. Short-time work schemes and similar job retention measures played a key role in supporting economic activities and sustaining employment, effectively preventing a severe surge in unemployment. During the first wave of the pandemic in April-May 2020, about one fifth of all employees across the EU were covered by short-time work schemes and similar measures (with this share reaching 40% in some Member States). Albeit at lower levels, the take-up of these schemes remained significant also in the second half of 2020 and first half of 2021, with a pattern following closely the evolution of the pandemic and the associated imposition of restrictions to economic activities to curb the spread of the virus.

In 2021, emergency job-retention schemes have been gradually phased out or re-focused

Following the successful rollout of vaccination campaigns, Member States have gradually started to scale back the crisis-related job retention measures. Emergency measures have become more targeted and less generous. The phasing-out of crisis-related support does not mean that short-time work schemes cease to operate. In countries with permanent schemes in place, the pre-crisis rules apply again, with stricter eligibility conditions and higher co-payments by employers. The Covid-19 pandemic has been a severe stress test for the national social protection scheme and an opportunity for structural reforms of the social safety net. Building on the experience of the crisis, a number of Member States is introducing new short-time work schemes on a permanent basis (Czechia, Slovakia and Slovenia) or re-designing their existing schemes (Spain, Italy).

Reallocation pressures can emerge both due to the Covid-19 pandemic and the twin transition

While the policy response to the Covid-19 crisis has been so far successful in preventing corporate insolvencies, a delayed surge cannot be excluded. Many companies – especially those in sectors most affected by the pandemic – will emerge from the crisis in fragile financial conditions, which could lead to an increase in insolvency proceedings. This will add further pressure to the reallocation forces triggered by the twin transition. Effective business restructuring procedures and strengthened active labour market measures can help address these challenges, including by supporting job creation and labour market matching across sectors and occupations.

Strengthened active labour market policies can help manage this reallocation challenge while also contributing to an inclusive recovery and to increasing labour force participation

During the recovery, Member States have been shifting from job-retention schemes to active labour market policies. This is in line with the approach put forward in the Commission Recommendation on effective active support to employment (EASE). Active labour market policies (in particular employment incentives subsidising private employment, training programmes and enhanced support by employment services) can be effective in supporting reallocation between different occupations. This underlies the importance of investing in such policies in the early stages of the recovery. To finance such programmes, Member States can rely on the funds made available at EU level under the EU budget and the NextGenerationEU programme, notably under the Recovery and Resilience Facility and REACT-EU.

Hiring incentives can support employment creation and labour force reallocation during the recovery

A large number of Member States has introduced hiring incentives, in the form of either employment subsidies, social security rebates or apprenticeship *premia*. Their main objective is to support job creation and improve the employability of vulnerable groups (such as the long-term unemployed, youth, people with disabilities or older workers). Concerns about the potential negative impacts of employment incentives appear to be less relevant in a context where economic uncertainty remains high and skills mismatches may be rising due to reallocation pressures triggered by the pandemic and the acceleration of the twin transition.

Investment in human capital is another crucial element in the recovery

All Member States have relied strongly on skills policies to tackle the economic consequences of the pandemic and support the up- and re-skilling of the workforce. Such policies have typically included subsidies and incentives to training across the public or private sector, in training centers. Many Member States focus their skills policies also on providing green and digital skills across the workforce, and orient their skills policies towards the youth, towards young persons not engaged in education, employment or training (NEETs) – contributing to the implementation of the Youth Guarantee – and towards the low-skilled and unemployed. Some Member States (Belgium, Croatia, France, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania and Luxembourg) foresee the provision of adult learning entitlements, in the form of individual learning accounts or vouchers, to reduce the fragmentation of the provision of training to adults, typically linked to improved quality assurance. These reforms can contribute to the achievement of adult learning targets.

Well-functioning employment services are crucial for the successful implementation of active labour market policies

Many Member States are also reforming their public employment services. The objective is to improve their operational capacity and better respond to the challenges posed by the pandemic as well as the green and digital transition. Well-functioning employment services are critical to deliver policies that foster job creation and facilitate job-to-job transitions. Measures include the increase of human resources and the provision of training to staff, notably on topics related to the twin transition and the circular economy, the digitalisation of service provision and administrative processes, and improvements to the quality and intensity of service provision, notably counselling. The involvement of private employment services has also been stepped up. In some countries, coordination across different levels of government has been enhanced. Specific provisions have been adopted to better address the needs of jobseekers with a migrant background, women, individuals not in employment education or training and most *vulnerable*

groups. In many Member States, these reforms are part of national recovery and resilience plans.

1. GENERAL LABOUR MARKET CONDITIONS IN THE EURO AREA AND THE EU

After the recession of the first half of 2020, the EU economy bounced back strongly over the second half. In response to the emergence of a second and third wave of infections in autumn and winter, governments reinstated containment measures and the EU GDP dropped in the fourth quarter of 2020. This time the impact of these measures was milder, partly due to the adjustment of the population to sanitary measures and more selective restrictions. In the fourth quarter of 2020, employment expanded by 0.5% quarter-on-quarter and dropped by 0.1% in the first quarter of 2021.

Throughout the pandemic, the labour market remained particularly resilient partly thanks to unprecedented policy support. Moreover, the fall in labour supply made the impact of the recession on unemployment less visible. Yet, the drop of the activity rate was temporary and mostly linked to the effect of social distancing on job search.

The expectation that the crisis would have overall impacted women's employment more than men's did not materialise. However, excluding married mothers, women suffered larger employment losses than men. While school closures do not correlate with lower female employment, they correlate with lower hours worked. This stresses the role of policies promoting female employment.

Hours worked dropped sharply at the onset of the crisis but recovered strongly once restrictions were relaxed and demand had accelerated. In spite of a V-shaped adjustment, in the second quarter of 2021 hours worked remained 2% below the pre-pandemic levels. While this can be a sign of remaining labour market slack, in particular in sectors such hospitality most affected by the pandemic, it might also reflect the introduction of labour-saving technologies during the recession.

The impact of the Covid-19 shock has been more severe and persistent for some sectors or groups. In the first quarter of 2021, employment gradually returned to pre-pandemic levels, except in sectors most hit by social distancing. Youth took the brunt of the crisis, including because they are over-represented in the most affected sectors and among the employed with fixed-term contracts. However, compared to other age groups youth employment recovered more swiftly.

Since the start of the recovery in the second quarter of 2021, EU employment expanded at 0.8% quarter-on-quarter (0.7% for the euro area). In the third quarter, the gap with pre-pandemic level almost closed as employment increased, both in the EU and the euro area, by 0.9% in response to the economic recovery gaining pace and GDP expanding at a 2.1% compared with the previous quarter.

With the rebound of the economic activity, labour shortages have been increasing, in particular in industries producing durable goods and in services such as hospitality and transports, albeit without a significant change in the unemployment rate.

In the short term, employment growth may be weak for a number of reasons, mainly related to the risk of labour shortages arising from a slow labour force reallocation and insufficient skills. The pandemic has accelerated the adoption of digital tools. In the second quarter of 2021, employment in occupations less at risk of automation had almost recovered the losses of the crisis; conversely, in those more exposed it was about 5% lower than its level in the last quarter of 2019. Without a rapid absorption of these losses, the rebound of employment might be delayed. The digital transition implies a reallocation of workers across sectors, which is more difficult than a reallocation of workers across firms of the same sector. A slow reallocation might increase skills mismatches and disrupt of the process linking vacant jobs to jobless people. Policies need to support workers to find jobs, which require skills different from those of their previous occupations.

As the recovery gained strength, the growth of negotiated wages picked up, in line with the 1.7% average of 2013-2019. In the second quarter of 2021, compensation per employee expanded by 7.7% compared to the same quarter of 2020. This increase reflects the rebound from the deep recession of 2020 and the recovery of hours worked linked to the phasing-out of short-time work schemes. On the whole, wage increases remain contained.

Table 1.1: **Unemployment, compensation per employee and GDP growth in the euro area and the EU**

					Quarter over same quarter of previous year, % and pps								Quarter over previous quarter, % and pps							
		2018	2019	2020	2019Q4	2020Q1	2020Q2	2020Q3	2020Q4	2021Q1	2021Q2	2021Q3	2019Q4	2020Q1	2020Q2	2020Q3	2020Q4	2021Q1	2021Q2	2021Q3
Unemployment rate	EA	8.2	7.6	7.9	-0.5	-0.4	-0.1	1.0	0.6	0.9	0.6	-1.0	-0.1	0.0	0.1	1.0	-0.5	0.3	-0.2	-0.6
	EU	7.3	6.7	7.1	-0.4	-0.4	0.1	1.0	0.7	1.0	0.5	-0.8	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.8	-0.3	0.3	-0.3	-0.5
Unemployment growth	EA	-9.3	-7.2	2.8	-5.4	-5.3	-3.2	13.3	7.0	11.8	9.6		0.1	-1.4	-0.5	15.3	-5.4	3.0	-2.5	
	EU	-10.4	-7.4	4.4	-5.7	-5.2	-0.5	14.4	8.9	14.4	9.2		0.1	-0.8	1.6	13.3	-4.7	4.2	-2.9	
Growth of nominal compensation per employee	EA	2.2	2.0	-0.6	1.8	0.4	-4.8	0.7	1.0	2.1	7.3		0.2	-0.9	-4.7	6.4	0.5	0.2	0.2	
	EU	2.5	2.3	-0.3	2.0	0.8	-4.2	0.9	1.1	2.2	7.3		0.3	-0.8	-4.5	6.1	0.6	0.3	0.3	
GDP growth	EA	1.9	1.4	-6.4	1.2	-3.0	-14.5	-4.0	-4.4	-1.2	14.2	3.7	0.0	-3.5	-11.7	12.6	-0.4	-0.3	2.1	2.2
	EU	2.1	1.6	-6.0	1.4	-2.5	-13.7	-3.9	-4.1	-1.2	13.7	3.9	0.0	-3.1	-11.3	11.8	-0.2	-0.1	2.0	2.1
Employment growth	EA	1.6	1.2	-1.6	1.1	0.5	-2.9	-2.0	-1.8	-1.8	1.9	1.9	0.2	-0.1	-3.0	1.0	0.4	-0.1	0.7	0.9
	EU	1.4	1.0	-1.5	1.0	0.5	-2.7	-1.9	-1.5	-1.6	2.0	2.0	0.2	-0.1	-2.8	0.9	0.5	-0.1	0.8	0.9

EU-27 from 2020Q1. Seasonally adjusted data. As for the unemployment rate, the table presents changes in percentage points, rather than percent.
Source: Eurostat.

1.1. INTRODUCTION

In 2020, economic developments were largely determined by the evolution of the pandemic. The objective of keeping infections under control was achieved by constraining people's mobility. After a temporary rebound in summer 2020, the economy plunged again as many governments reinstated strict containment measures. In the first half of 2021, the arrival of the vaccine allowed a gradual reopening of the economy.

In 2020, the increase of unemployment was relatively mild. While the policy response contributed to mitigating the impact of the recession, a significant drop in activity rates tempered the increase in unemployment. The aggregate figures conceal major heterogeneities. The chapter reviews the effect of the health shock on major socio-economic groups, occupations and sectors; it assesses the impact of school closures and childcare responsibilities on male and female employment, labour force participation, and hours worked.

The pandemic has accelerated the adoption of digital technologies on a large scale. The pandemic has accelerated the digital transformation that was underway for decades. During the lockdown, ICT has been a buffer supporting firms' operations; connectivity has allowed consumers to reduce infection risks. Firms have realised the benefit of investments in digital technologies, while consumers have shifted their preferences towards digitally delivered goods and services. Remote working may become more attractive for some workers. These changes facilitate job creation, boost productivity growth and wages and accelerate the twin transitions. In the short-term, a broad take-up of digital tools is akin to the introduction of labour saving technologies, in particular for routine intensive jobs. The chapter reviews the characteristics of the reallocation process triggered by the pandemic, focussing on how the interaction between automation and social distancing is changing the employment structure.

Against this background, this chapter analyses the labour market outcomes at different stages of the Covid-19 recession and as the economy recovers from the shock. It compares the EU labour market performance with that of other industrialised economies and assesses the role played by relevant variables including employment, participation, working hours and wages. Section 1.2 describes recent developments, discussing whether the recession has been particularly dire for women, and looks at the prospects of a strong and persistent rebound in labour force participation. Section 1.3 analyses the recent labour market developments in major world regions. Section 1.4 reviews trends in wages and labour costs. Finally, Section 1.5 focuses on aggregate movements in and out of unemployment and indicators of job matching.

1.2. SETTING THE SCENE: THE EU LABOUR MARKET IN AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

1.2.1. Recent EU-level developments

Economic developments have been largely determined by the evolution of the Covid-19 pandemic. The reduction of infections and the

loosening of the strict containment measures triggered a marked V-shaped rebound in summer 2020, which was, however, short-lived due to new pandemic spells at the end of the year and during early 2021 (Graph 1.1 and Table 1.1). However, in the fourth quarter of 2020, the fall of GDP was less pronounced than that of the second quarter of 2020; this is thanks to more selective restrictions, people's adaptation to the pandemic environment, and supportive economic policies by Member States and the EU.

In 2021, progress with vaccination and the gradual relaxation of containment measures led to a strong rebound in economic activity. The EU massive vaccination rollout and related relaxation of the social distancing measures resulted in a strong recovery. ([1]) Vaccine campaigns were anticipated by a broad testing strategy that, as shown later in the chapter, spurred people's confidence. Despite the pick-up in growth, in the second quarter of 2021 GDP was 2.6% below the level of the last quarter of 2019 in the EU (3% for the euro area).

Graph 1.1: **Employment, GDP, hours worked and productivity in the EU, 2000Q1-2021Q2**



Source: Eurostat, National Accounts.

Taking into account the size of the shock, the EU labour market has been quite resilient. The job retention schemes, the financial support to firms and, in some countries, the ban on dismissals have prevented the health crisis from becoming a job crisis. In 2020, employment dropped by about 1.5% in the EU and the euro area, which is a limited fall compared to the contraction in GDP. Only a fraction of these losses translated into a higher unemployment rate because many left the labour force. The drop of GDP at the end of 2020 and in the first quarter of 2021 put a brake on the hesitant job creation, which had resumed over summer. From the second quarter of 2020 to the second quarter of 2021, employment increased by 4 million (3 million in the euro area). However, compared to the pre-crisis period, there was a shortfall of two million jobs, mostly in the euro area (Graph 1.2).

Graph 1.2: **Employment and unemployment in the EU, million persons, 2001Q1-2021Q2**



Source: Eurostat, National Accounts and LFS, seasonally adjusted data

The unemployment rate changed little over the different waves of the pandemic. Between 2019 and 2020, the EU unemployment rate increased from 6.7% to 7.1%. For all quarters of 2020, this increase was much lower than the one predicted on the basis of GDP growth (Graph 1.3). The decline in hours worked combined with the use of short-time work schemes mitigated the response of unemployment to the fall in GDP. But the increased inflows into inactivity have also made the impact on unemployment less visible.([2]) With unemployment increasing in the second half of 2020, the gap between the actual and expected rate narrowed, hovering around 0.6 pps in the first half of 2021, when the unemployment rate reached 7.4%.

([1]) On 19 January 2021, The European Commission adopted a Communication setting the objective to vaccinate at least 70% of the adult population. At the end of October, 75.6% of adult were fully vaccinated.

([2]) In the second quarter of 2020, the share of inactive that *would like to work but are not seeking* reached 14% – a rise of almost 4 pps compared to the last quarter of 2019 – before falling to 12% at the end of the year.

Graph 1.3: **Actual unemployment rate and predicted on the basis of GDP growth**



(1) The predicted unemployment rate is based on an estimate for the EU of an Okun's law regression of the change in unemployment rate on the current and two lags of quarter-on-quarter GDP growth over 2000Q4-2019Q4.
Source: European Commission.

The dispersion of unemployment rates across countries continued to fall. After a temporary increase during the first half of 2020, the gap between the maximum and minimum unemployment rate in the EU dropped in October 2021 to 11 pps – the lowest since January 2009. ([3]) The dispersion fell not only for countries with the highest rates, but also for those with unemployment rates between the median and the third quartile (Graph 1.4).

Graph 1.4: **Unemployment rates by quartile, January 2000-October 2021**



(1) The first quartile is the middle number between the minimum and the median (the second quartile). The third quartile is the point that lies between the median and the maximum. The median splits the distribution in half. (2) Each point in time may represent a different country.
Source: Eurostat, LFS.

([3]) The countries with the minimum and the maximum unemployment rate change overtime. In 2020 and 2021, Greece and Spain had the highest unemployment rate in the EU; Czechia, the lowest.

The lockdown has led to a temporary increase in the flows from unemployment to inactivity. In the first half of the 2020, differences across countries in the stringency of the lockdown explain differences across countries in labour force exits beyond what would be normally expected during recessions (Graph 1.5). By the third quarter of 2020, most countries had reduced the stringency of the lockdown measures and the excess inflow into inactivity had almost vanished. For some countries, the actual probability of entering inactivity went even below the predicted one.

Graph 1.5: **Excess inflow into inactivity and stringency of the lockdown**



(1) The excess inflow into inactivity is the gap between the actual probability of going from unemployment to inactivity and the one expected based on the pre-pandemic relation between job flows and GDP. Estimates based on column 1 of Box 1.1. A positive (negative) gap means that the actual transition rate is higher (lower) than the predicted.
Source: European Commission

Flows out and into the labour force explain the V-shaped pattern of the activity rate. With economic activity rebounding, also labour supply kept up with the brisk increase in labour demand. The activity rate dropped by 2.3 pps – from 73.5% in the fourth quarter of 2019 to 71.8% in the second quarter of 2020 – but returned in the second quarter of 2021 to the pre-pandemic rate (73.6%). These developments are consistent with the cyclical behaviour of inflows into and out of the labour force, even though the peculiarities of a pandemic recession, namely the fear of infections and the feeble employment opportunities associated to the risk of recurrent lockdown, may have contributed to the high inflows into inactivity (Box 1.1). Thus, as the economy gains strength, more people re-enter the labour force, which moderate the increase in labour market tightness at the early stages of the recovery.

The Covid-19 shock had a severe and persistent effect on sectors exposed to social distancing. While after the 2008-2009 financial crisis it took eight years for employment to return to pre-crisis levels, at the aggregate level the effect of the Covid-19 recession has been less persistent. Yet, industries where physical distancing is not possible have been hit hard (Graph 1.6). At the trough, employment in *high-contact affected sectors* shrank by 5.5%, while industries where physical distancing or remote work is possible or essential sectors responded much better. Even so, by the end of the second quarter of 2021 total employment remained below the pre-crisis level, as sectors strongly hit by the pandemic account for 30% of total employment. ([4])

Graph 1.6: **Employment by sector group (quarters since the start of the recession)**



(1) For the 2008-2009 financial crisis and the Covid-19 recession quarter 0 is 2007Q4 and 2019Q4 respectively. High-contact affected sectors: wholesale, retail trade; transports, accommodation, food services, arts, household activities. High-contact less affected sectors: construction, public administration, health. Low-contact services: information and communication, financial, professional activities, real estate. Low-contact other: manufacturing and agriculture.
Source: Eurostat

Young people have borne a disproportionate share of the job losses. They account for 7.5% of total employment, yet, for a higher share (12.3%) in the most hit sectors such as accommodation and food services, wholesale and retail, and arts and entertainment (Graph 1.7). As the economy reopened in spring 2021, the fall in employment reversed. From the second to the fourth quarter of 2020, the economy added 2.7 million jobs, recovering almost fully its losses. Youth employment improved albeit modestly; young women, in particular with children, continue to face very challenging labour market conditions as discussed in section 1.2.3.

([4]) In the second quarter of 2021, employment in wholesale, retail, transports and horeca was about 2.3 million lower.

Graph 1.7: **Employment growth by age group and sectors between 2019Q4 and 2021Q2**



Source: Eurostat

1.2.2. The adjustment of hours worked

The strong contraction of hours worked per worker has been only partially recovered. In 2020, the drop of hours worked per worker was almost in line with that of GDP (Graph 1.1). While the larger adjustment of hours worked per worker relative to employment is a typical response during recessions, its size was unique. With the gradual reduction of containment measures, hours worked recovered partially over the summer, but they fell again in autumn, when new containment measures were introduced in response to the second wave of infections. The decline in hours worked was sizable for business services, while for industry and construction the gap with the pre-crisis level was almost closed by the first quarter of 2021 (Graph 1.8).

Box 1.1: **Determinants of flows into and out of inactivity**

Using data on the transition rates between labour market states, a model is estimated relating the flows into and out of the labour force to cyclical and structural variables. The probabilities of transiting in and out of the labour force are supposed to be determined by the cyclical conditions, distinguishing between positive and negative quarter-on-quarter GDP growth rates, and a set of structural variables, i.e. the share of employment in food and accommodation services, in wholesale and retail trade services and the share of temporary employees in the total number of employees. The relative shorter job tenure in these sectors and their size might affect the overall probability of transiting between activity and inactivity. Similarly, temporary contracts are a source of labour market segmentation and inactivity (Eurofound, 2019).

The table below presents estimates of the determinants of the transition rates between activity and inactivity. Since unemployment across EU countries exhibits persistent differences possibly attributable to country-specific structural factors which may not be captured in available statistics and indicators, country-fixed effects are included. Period-fixed effects are included to control for trends in labour market flows common across countries. Estimates over the period 2010Q2-2019Q4 confirm that the probability of leaving the labour force rises during recessions. During periods of positive GDP growth, the probability of entering inactivity from employment falls. Similarly, when the economy is expanding, it is less likely to transit from inactivity into unemployment, because the time spent searching for a job is probably short and people do not qualify as unemployed according to the official statistics, but enter quickly into employment. While a high share of employment in wholesale and retail reduces exits from the labour force, the opposite holds for accommodation and services. This finding might be related to the smaller firm size in accommodation, to higher destruction rates of small firms and over-representation in small firms of individuals at higher risks of inactivity.([1]) The share of temporary employees has a positive effect on the transition between employment and inactivity and between inactivity and unemployment, suggesting that temporary employment generates fluctuations between in and out of the labour force.

Determinants of the transition rates between activity and inactivity statuses

	Unemployment to inactivity	Employment to inactivity	Employment to inactivity	Inactivity to unemployment	Inactivity to employment
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
GDP positive % change	0.002	-0.00029*	-0.00026*	-0.0006***	0.000
	[0.7]	[-1.8]	[-1.7]	[-2.97]	[0.1]
GDP negative % change	-0.012***	-0.0009***	-0.0008*	-0.000	-0.001**
	[-2.94]	[-2.01]	[-1.82]	[-0.80]	[-2.37]
Share of employment in accomodation and food services	0.011**	0.00081**			0.002**
	[2.09]	[2.05]			[3.8]
Share of employment in wholesale and retail trade	-0.008*	-0.001**	-0.001***		-0.002***
	[-1.8]	[2.2]	[-2.6]		[-4.1]
Share of temporary employees			0.0004***	0.001***	
			[3.32]	[5.58]	
Observations	918	918	918	918	918
Country fixed effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Period fixed effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
R-squared	0.86	0.81	0.81	0.90	0.83

Sample period: 2010Q2-2019Q4; Cross-sections included 25. Due to data missing, Germany and Malta are excluded from the sample; t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

([1]) In wholesale and retail, about one third of the employment in the sector is in firms with more than 250 employees, while in accommodation and food services this is less than 14%. Buscha and Urwin (2020).

Graph 1.8: **Sectoral hours worked per workers: 2019Q4-2021Q2 (2019Q4=100)**



Source: Eurostat, National accounts

Graph 1.9: **Hours worked per worker : 1995Q1-2019Q4**



Source: Eurostat, National accounts

The loss of hours worked per worker experienced during the recession may not be fully recovered. There is a longer term downward trend in hours worked per worker (Graph 1.9). This trend reflects both changes in the supply of labour, driven by an increased demand for leisure and work-life balance choices, ([5]) and shifts in the demand for labour resulting from the adoption of technologies requiring a lower volume of routine work to produce a certain amount of output. ([6]) The Covid-19 induced recession has hastened ongoing trends in automation. This acceleration in the adoption of new technologies is expected to reduce employment and hours worked in routine intensive occupations, dragging down the total hours worked. Yet, new technologies may shift the demand for labour towards more skilled workers, who usually work longer hours, which could partially offset the effect of the reduction of routine employment. ([7])

([5]) Higher labour productivity has enabled workers to earn more with less hours worked, and this has led them to ask more leisure. This contributes to the increase of part-time employment. Also more women have joined the labour force and they are more likely to work part-time.

([6]) Bock and Fontaine (2020) show that the decline in total hours worked is driven by routine-biased technology shocks through a decline in routine hours.

([7]) Acemoglu and Restrepo (2021) show that task displacement would lead to a relative decline in hours worked per worker.

1.2.3. Is the Covid-19 recession a she-cession?

The pandemic was expected to be particularly harmful for female employment. For the Covid-19 recession, women were expected to suffer more job losses than men because the lockdown concerned mainly hospitality and tourism, sectors that employ a relatively higher share of women. In addition, school closures reduced the childcare offer putting more care responsibilities on families, in particular on women who usually shoulder most of them. Thus, women with young children and single mothers were expected to fare worse than women without children or in a couple. ([8]) This section analyses the channels through which the pandemic has affected female employment focussing on the role of sectoral structure, family composition and childcare needs.

Data do not fully support the initial concerns of a *she-cession*. Except for young women, female employment did not perform worse than for male; the gender employment rate gap remained unchanged in 2020 and even dropped in the second of 2021 (Graph 1.10). ([9])

([8]) Alon et al (2021) found for selected EU countries and for the period 2019Q4-2020Q2 that women were more negatively affected than men.

([9]) Between 2019Q4 and 2020Q4, the male activity rate dropped by 0.4pps while the female increased by 0.2 pps.

Graph 1.10: **Gender gap in the employment rate (20-54) (2008Q1=0, 2019Q4=0, pps changes)**



(1) Ratio between male and female employment rates
Source: Eurostat, LFS

Gender differences in sectoral employment growth are small. Within several industries, employment losses were about the same for men and women (Graph 1.11). Women did worse than men only in *water supply* where they have a probability of being employed 70% lower than men – and *other services* – where they are twice as likely to have a job in comparison to men. Employment losses in *accommodation and food services*, a sector denominated by women, are comparable across genders. ([10])

Graph 1.11: **Employment growth by sector and gender: 2019Q4-2020Q4**



(1) Points above (below) the dotted line imply higher (lower) employment growth for women than for men. The numbers show the employment probability of women relative to men in a specific sector. A value higher (lower) than 1 means that women have a higher (lower) probability than men of being employed in a specific sector.
Source: Eurostat

The impact of the crisis on employment growth gap is more negative for young women and single mothers. During the 2020 recession, about 55% of women in employment experienced larger employment losses than men, with some variation across age groups and family types. A number of facts emerge from Graph 1.12 and Table 1.2:

Married mothers have better employment growth than married fathers relative to all other household types, except single women without children. This is consistent with what was observed during the 2008-2012 recession (Graph 1.12 *left panel* and Table 1.2);

Women aged below 35 without children fared better than men of the same age; having a child has only a small negative impact on the gender employment growth gap. Women above 35 years of age experienced larger employment losses than men, except for those with children. The better outcomes of mothers aged above 35 compared to men of the same age suggests that for certain age groups parenting does not constrain female employment. This may be due to the longer tenure and more stable employment of mothers aged between 36 and 50 compared to younger women. ([11])

Except for those in a couple, women with children had larger employment losses than women without. Single mothers suffered large employment losses compared to single women without children. Relative to women in a couple without children, being in a couple increases substantially employment growth of mothers (by almost 3 pps, see row *Difference* in Table 1.2). Between 2019 and 2020, the activity rate of married mothers increased by 0.2 pps, while for married women without children it dropped by 0.7 pps; this suggests that women with children joined the labour force to compensate for the income losses of their husbands, likely in furloughed schemes.

([10]) A similar pattern is observed for the actual hours worked.

([11]) The costs of raising children influences female labour supply through an income effect; rising children in a couple with one earner is more difficult than in a couple where both are working. This effect strengthens labour market attachment of women with children compared to women without. This is consistent with the role of within-family insurance. Married couple provide each other insurance against income shocks.

Graph 1.12: **Gender gap in employment growth in the EU**



(1) Ad-hoc LFS extraction, in "oth hh" ("in other households") refers to households with more than 3 adults.
Source: European Commission on Eurostat unpublished LFS data

Table 1.2: **Employment growth by different family types and gender**

	Great recession		Covid-19 recession	
	Men	Women	Men	Women
Single with children - Single without children	5.3	-0.2	3.7	-4.0
Couple with children - couple without children	-0.4	0.8	0.6	2.9
In other households with children - In other households without children	-0.2	-0.4	-2.3	-2.6

(1) Average annual growth rate over the period 2007-2012 and growth rate in 2020. Ad-hoc LFS extraction
Source: Eurostat

School closures did not penalise female employment more than that of men. Box 1.2 shows that school closures had an equally negative effect on female and male employment growth, while hours worked dropped more for women than for men. This finding is at odds with the expectation that childrearing would have affected negatively female labour supply during the lockdown. One explanation is that women who decided to work while raising children have stronger labour market attachment than women in other status. ([12]) Indeed, those groups, notably women with children, that were resilient to the pandemic shock experienced prior to the health crisis a steady increase in participation and employment rates (see Graphs in the Annex). ([13]) This suggests that policies that favour female employment contribute to the overall resilience of the labour market.

The behaviour of labour supply is a key factor that might influence a rapid rebound of employment. Evidence from past recessions suggests that men remain in the labour force when unemployed before returning to full-employment during the recovery. Conversely, women tend to stay out of the labour force for longer. As shown in Tables 1.2 and 1.3, the activity rate dropped for single mothers, women in couple without children and women living in other households. ([14]) Thus, an increase of female participation, notably of women most hit by the recession, during the current recovery would be essential to reduce the gender employment gap and support the growth of total employment.

ICT may favour female employment. During the lockdown, many firms were able to operate by allowing to their employees flexible work schedule to combine childcare with work from home. By reducing the conflict between work and parenting, these arrangements may favour a different distribution of the burden of raising or parenting of a child or children within the families that would support female employment. However, the available evidence suggests that the burden of childrearing was mainly on women. ([15])

([12]) In 2019, the female participation and employment rates (20-54) were respectively 79.6%, and 73.8%; for married mothers, they were 76.7% and 72.1%. In 2020, both the employment and activity rate increased for the latter group, while it dropped for the aggregate female group.

([13]) For single mothers there is no difference in the relative employment rates between women with and without children; women in other family households with children experience a stronger decline than women in the same group without children, but along a downward trend that starts before the pandemic.

([14]) They account overall for about 50% of total female population aged between 20 and 54.

([15]) Alon et al. (2020) show that Dutch women allocated a larger fraction of working time than men to provide

Table 1.3: **Activity rates changes by different family types and gender**

	Great recession		Covid-19 recession	
	Men	Women	Men	Women
Single with children	0.1	0.0	0.6	-0.3
Single without children	-0.3	0.0	0.4	0.2
Difference	0.3	0.1	0.1	-0.5
Couple with children	-0.1	0.9	-0.4	0.2
Couple without children	0.1	0.4	-0.2	-0.7
Difference	-0.1	0.5	-0.2	1.0
In other households with children	-0.1	0.3	-1.0	-1.7
In other households without children	-0.3	0.3	-1.4	-1.6
Difference	0.2	0.1	0.4	-0.1

(1) Average annual percentage point changes over the period 2007-2012 and percentage change in 2020.
Source: Ad-hoc EU-LFS extraction

However, without policies facilitating female employment, the gender pay gap may worsen. There are many more single mothers than single fathers, mostly in part-time or not employed at all (Table 1.4). ([16]) Faced with a spike in childcare needs, employment of single mothers dropped more than the average. ([17]) Moreover, if the pandemic persists, it might be difficult for women working from home to combine career progression with childcare needs. Such differences in work-status between men and women and the fact that becoming unemployed during a recession may result in persistent earning losses might increase the gender pay gap. Policies facilitating parental leave and flexible working arrangements for men would benefit female labour supply and career prospects and wages. ([18])

childcare. Similar findings are reported for Spain (Farré, 2020) and Italy (Del Boca, 2020). This is consistent with the evidence in Box 1.2. The European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) calculated that prior to the Covid-19 outbreak, women in the EU spent 13 hours more than men every week on unpaid care and housework.

([16]) Married mothers are six times more likely than fathers to be in a part-time job.

([17]) Adda et al. estimate that spells of non-participation are responsible for 13% of the gender pay gap. Adams (2020) shows that fragmented work patterns among mothers with children is associated with lower pay. Single mothers have a high likelihood of being in part-time or temporary employment, and often employed in sectors closed due to Covid-19 (Blundell et al., 2020).

([18]) Other factors that influence female labour supply include second earners tax wedge, childcare benefits, anti-discrimination laws (e.g. Jaumotte 2003).

Table 1.4: **Households by working status in the EU, 2020**

		Population	Employed, full-time	Employed, part-time	Not employed
Single adult with children	Males	15.6	22.6	4.6	8.4
	Females	84.4	77.4	95.4	91.6
Adult living in a couple with children	Males	48.2	62.9	14.2	21.3
	Females	51.8	37.1	85.8	78.7

(1) Percentage of persons out of total in each work status
Source: Eurostat, LFS

1.2.4. The effect of testing policy and vaccines rollout on unemployment expectations and employment

The pandemic has brought heightened economic uncertainty. The restrictions to individual mobility forced many firms to reduce their operations. This increased the uncertainty about future income losses. Faced with an uncertain environment, households accumulated precautionary savings. ([19]) From the fourth quarter of 2019 to the first quarter of 2021, the household saving rate in the EU rose from 12.4% to about 21%. This is the second highest rate since 1999 (the highest was 24% in the second quarter of 2020), suggesting that, despite the reopening of the economy, consumers are still uncertain about labour market prospects.

Graph 1.13: **Consumers' and employers' confidence indicators, January 2007-October 2021**



Source: European Business and Consumers Survey

([19]) Coibion et al., 2021; Gebauer et al., 2021. Precautionary savings is more likely among uncertain households (Ben David et al., 2018). For France, part of the "excess savings" can be attributed to lockdown measures (Gebauer et al., 2021). Households with financial difficulties wished to increase their savings, but had no resources to do so (Ercolani et al., 2021).

Box 1.2: **The gendered impact of the COVID-19 recession on employment and hours**

In 2020, school closures do not appear correlated with lower female employment outcomes, but only with lower hours worked. Table 1 reports the results of a regression relating the growth of hours worked by women – columns (1) to (3) Panel a – and of female employment– columns 4 to 6 Panel a – to the stringency of school closures (source: Oxford Stringency index) and the share of women employed in accommodation and food services. Panel b reports the results for the gender gaps in hours worked and employment growth. The analysis reveals a number of findings.

First, strict school closures provisions are associated with lower hours worked by women, likely because of childcare obligations. Countries with stricter regulation on school closures do not experience neither a fall of female employment nor lower hours worked or employment compared to men (column 4 Panels A and B).

Second, both within and between countries, a more days of school closures (source: UNESCO) are associated to lower growth of both female hours worked and employment (Panel C). Yet, days of school closures are not associated with a negative gender gap in employment growth (Panel D).

Third, stricter regulation concerning school closures is associated to lower hours worked with no difference by gender and no employment impact. A higher employment share in hospitality is correlated with a stronger growth of the average hours actually worked by women and to a stronger female employment growth relative to men of about 0.6 pps. An increase in the number of days of school closusre is accompanied by lower female hours worked and employment, but no effect on the gender gap in the growth of employment and hours.

Table 1 Correlates of growth of female hours and female employment growth during the pandemic

Panel A	Hour growth: Women	Hour growth : Women	Hour growth: Women	Hour growth: Women	Employment growth women	Employment growth women	Employment growth women	Employment growth women
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
School closure stringency index	-0.7*	-0.8*	-0.8***	-0.97***	-0.3	-0.3	-0.49*	-0.68***
	[-1.64]	[-1.83]	[-2.19]	[-2.84]	[-1.31]	[-1.01]	[-1.87]	[-2.59]
Hours women lagged			-4.0***	-3.8***				
			[-11.9]	[-11.64]				
Female Employment lagged							-0.013***	-0.010***
							[-4.07]	[-3.2]
Employment in Accomodation lagged				-1.77***				-1.94***
				[-2.70]				[-4.51]
Observations	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Country fixed effects	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
R-squared	0.02	0.04	0.61	0.66	0.02	0.06	0.06	0.27

Panel B	Hour growth: Women vs Men	Hour growth: Women vs Men	Hour growth: Women vs Men	Hour growth: Women vs Men	Employment growth Women vs Men	Employment growth Women vs Men	Employment growth Women vs Men	Employment growth Women vs Men
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
School closure stringency index	0.31	0.37**	0.48***	0.47***	-0.12	-0.14	-0.22	-0.15
	[1.57]	[1.75]	[3.0]	[3.0]	[-0.76]	[-0.66]	[-1.50]	[-1.03]
Hours women relative to men lagged			-1.2***	-1.2***				
			[-8.19]	[-9.5]				
Female Employment relative to Male employment lagged							-1.07***	-1.11***
							[-7.27]	[-7.70]
Employment in Accomodation lagged				-0.11				0.61***
				[-0.39]				[2.35]
Observations	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Country fixed effects	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
R-squared	0.03	0.09	0.52	0.51	0.02	0.02	0.43	0.46

Panel C	Hour growth: Women	Hour growth : Women	Hour growth: Women	Hour growth: Women	Employment growth women	Employment growth women	Employment growth women	Employment growth women
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Number of days of school closed due to COVID-19 as % of total number of days	-0.03***	-0.05***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.04***	-0.03***	-0.02***
	[-3.53]	[-3.36]	[-4.81]	[-3.61]	[-5.26]	[-5.10]	[-3.91]	[-3.17]
Hours women lagged			-3.8***	-3.76***				
			[-12.4]	[-12.7]				
Female Employment lagged							-0.008***	-0.006***
							[-2.75]	[-2.2]
Employment in Accomodation lagged				-0.39				-0.99***
				[-0.73]				[-4.51]
Observations	104	104	104	104	100	104	104	104
Country fixed effects	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
R-squared	0.11	0.15	0.66	0.69	0.25	0.13	0.20	0.26

Panel D	Hour growth: Women vs Men	Hour growth: Women vs Men	Hour growth: Women vs Men	Hour growth: Women vs Men	Employment growth Women vs Men	Employment growth Women vs Men	Employment growth Women vs Men	Employment growth Women vs Men
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Number of days of school closed due to COVID-19 as % of total number of days	0.01***	0.02***	0.04	0.008*	-0.003	-0.004	0.001	-0.006
	[2.40]	[2.42]	[1.2]	[1.9]	[-0.73]	[-0.67]	[0.25]	[-1.1]
Hours women relative to men lagged			-1.2***	-1.2***				
			[-6.82]	[-8.0]				
Female Employment relative to Male employment lagged							-1.16***	-1.16***
							[-7.7]	[-8.90]
Employment in Accomodation lagged				-0.41				0.71***
				[-1.43]				[2.74]
Observations	104	104	100	100	104	104	104	104
Country fixed effects	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
R-squared	0.08	0.15	0.40	0.51	0.02	0.07	0.46	0.50

t-statistics in parentheses | robust standard error : cross section clustered | *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Box 1.3: The effect of stringency on social distancing

The social distancing index correlates with stringency index. This box explores how the impact of policy restrictions on mobility have changed over time. Following Atkinson *et al.* 2020, a social distancing index (SDI) is constructed as a weighted average of Google mobility indicators, with weights chosen by means of a principal component analysis. A linear model, shows that the Oxford stringency index explains on average 66% of fluctuations in the SDI. Graph 1 shows the effect of stringency on the SDI estimated with the technique of the rolling regression on a panel of 25 Member States; each point represents the effect of stringency on SDI estimated with the technique of the rolling regression on 311 samples of 90 days each from 15 of February 2020 until 21 December 2020. The effect of stringency reached a maximum at the beginning of 2020, when the lockdown measures were just introduced. It dropped to zero over summer in parallel with the reduction of the degree of stringency. Over the autumn, new restrictions were introduced to cope with a new wave of infections. Compared to the very stringent measures of the first phase, the containment measures introduced in Autumn 2020 were more selective (Conteduca et al 2020 a) and b)). These measures continued to support social distancing, though less than during that first waves of infections. Graph 1 right panel shows an estimate of the average SDI that does not depend on stringency. The fact that it dropped over time is consistent with a lower perception of infections risks amidst more effective testing and the rolling out of vaccine campaigns. However, it may also reflect social distancing fatigue.

Graph 1 Effect of stringency on mobility and average SDI (rolling regression on a window of 90 days)



The left graph shows the estimated effect for all sample of 90 days that have the 15 of February 2020 as initial date. The right graph shows the same for the SDI that does not depend on the level of stringency.

Throughout 2020, employers' and consumers' labour market expectations diverged. From April 2020, employers expected rising hiring needs, while consumers anticipated higher unemployment (Graph 1.13). This pessimism on the side of consumers reflects both the general concerns about the recovery and the risks that recurrent waves of infections could plunge the economy in subsequent lockdowns. It was compounded by governments' containment measures, which hit mainly industries with a large share of low-wage workers. ([20])

The increasing testing rate and the rollout of vaccines improved unemployment expectations. With the rollout of vaccination campaigns and the reopening of the economy in the first half of 2021, consumer and business confidence improved significantly. ([21]) The pessimism of early 2021 waned, mobility picked up and confidence reached the highest levels since June 2019. The analysis in Box 1.4 suggests that an increase in the vaccination rate improves unemployment expectations. ([22]) Box 1.3 shows that an increase in the percentage of vaccinated people reduces unemployment expectations, but the effect gets smaller over time. Thus, unemployment

([20]) In 2018, low wage workers in accommodation and food service, administrative and support service (that includes persons employed by interim agencies), arts and wholesale and retail trade represented about 8% of total employment.

([21]) Countries that tested more had better unemployment expectations than countries that tested less. There is also a negative correlation between the unemployment expectations and the share of vaccinated people.

([22]) Eichenbaum et al., (2021) show that without testing and quarantining, the lockdown reduces the severity of the recession but prolong its duration.

expectations respond to the share of vaccinated people, but its effect is temporary. ([23]) This suggests that people confidence improves if vaccination campaigns are complemented by non-pharmaceutical interventions (e.g. masks) that reduce the risk of infections and the likelihood of lockdowns.

([23]) This may also be due to the emergence of new variants.

Box 1.4: The impact of testing and vaccination on unemployment expectations

The rollout of vaccines makes people less concerned of being infected, which affects their consumption plans. Fear of COVID-19 has proved to be a strong deterrent of social interactions (*Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe*, 2020). The deployment of several vaccines to a large number of people have raised expectations that a large part of the population will reach immunity, allowing for a return to social interactions which would boost economic growth. The expectation is that as the proportion of vaccinated people increases, the perceived risks of infection fall and people change their consumption behaviour (Auld and Toxvaerd, 2021). This box provides a first evidence of the impact of testing and vaccination on unemployment expectations.

Unemployment expectations can be driven by various variables. The following relationship between the weekly change in households' unemployment expectations and the testing rate (number of Covid-19 tests performed per 1000 population) is estimated with a panel regression controlling for the effect of other variables that influence people's expectation of unemployment. ([1])

$$\Delta unemp.exp_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Testing\ rate_{it} + X_{it}\gamma + \alpha_i + u_{it}$$

The other variables included are the stringency index([2]), the yearly changes in the households' unemployment expectations (chosen to factor in the differences in the expectations before the Covid-19 pandemic), the share of self-employed and temporary employees, the average number of hours worked during a week and the share of workers in contact-intensive sectors; α_i is the country-specific effect, while u_{it} is the error term, Data are aggregated at a country and daily level. A similar relation is estimated for the vaccination rate.

A higher testing rate is accompanied by lower unemployment expectations. In all estimates (Table 1), the elasticity of the change in the unemployment expectations to the testing rate is negative. An increase in the weekly testing rate decreases the change of unemployment expectations from one month to the next by 0.25 to 0.4 pps. This means that a 10 unit increase of the testing rate (a change from 20 to 30 people tested per thousands in a given month) would reduce the unemployment expectations between 2.5 and 4 percentage points, which is relatively large compared to the variability of unemployment expectations over the period. The stringency index has a positive and significant effect on unemployment expectation. An increase in the average number of weekly hours worked makes consumers' less concerned about the labour market in the year to come (despite significant only at the 10% level); the effect of the other variables is correctly signed but estimated imprecisely. A number of robustness checks (i.e. that include four different U.S. regions and the U.K) did not invalidate the main results. Estimates are robust to the inclusion of different types of controls (i.e. the unemployment rate, GDP per capita, the daily new confirmed deaths per million people, the share of part-time employees, the total number of vacancies and the vacancy rate).

The number of vaccinated people is negatively correlated to unemployment expectations. In cross-country comparisons, an increase of the share of partially vaccinated people is accompanied by lower unemployment expectation; a one percentage point increase in the share of the partially vaccinated people in one country reduces its unemployment expectations relative to other countries by 0.6 pps. The effect is lower but it remains statistically different from zero when, the positivity rate and the stringency index are included (model 2). Model 3 looks at the impact within countries. In this case, an increase in the vaccination rate in one country leads to lower unemployment expectations also when controlling for the effect of the positivity rate and the stringency index. A number of robustness checks confirm the validity of these findings. The inclusion of the daily new confirmed Covid-19 deaths per million people or of lags of the social distancing

([1]) The Hausman test suggests employing fixed rather than random effects. The unemployment expectations, available at monthly frequency, are assumed to be unchanged within the month.
([2]) Controlling for the stringency index implies estimating the effects of testing not caused by specific changes in other policies, which can also be influenced by the testing rate itself.

(Continued on the next page)

Box (continued)

index does not alter the results. ([3]) The effect is stronger when the share of fully vaccinated people is considered.

Table 1 The effect of testing rate on unemployment expectations

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 3
Testing rate	-0.25*** [0.03]	-0.30*** [0.04]	-0.40*** [0.06]	-0.39*** [0.09]
Stringency index	0.14*** [0.02]	0.17*** [0.03]	0.25*** [0.03]	0.15** [0.05]
Share of self-employed			2.87 [1.53]	0.74 [1.61]
Share of temporary workers			0.94 [0.63]	1.32 [0.67]
Average week hours workerd			-4.97 [2.73]	-7.47 [3.77]
Share of jobs in services				0.50 [0.55]
Unemployment expectation (2019)				0.33*** [0.06]
Constant	-3.41*** [0.85]	-4.31*** [1.53]	132.8 [103.3]	236.0 [141.6]
Observations	1781	1781	1384	1384
FE		YES	YES	YES
Adjusted R-Squared	0.07	0.08	0.12	0.21

Table 2 The effect of vaccination on unemployment expectations: December 2020-September 2021

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Share of people vaccinated	-0.56*** [0.01]	-0.46*** [0.01]	-0.46*** [0.04]			
Stringency index		0.10*** [0.02]	-0.02 [0.09]		0.18*** [0.02]	0.19 [0.10]
Positivity rate		0.52*** [0.03]	0.56*** [0.14]		0.76*** [0.04]	0.71*** [0.19]
Share of people full vaccinated				-0.53*** [0.01]	-0.36*** [0.02]	-0.30*** [0.06]
Constant	39.76*** [0.35]	27.92*** [1.23]	34.74*** [5.97]	33.49*** [0.34]	19.69*** [1.64]	13.76 [6.90]
Observations	5316	5033	5033	4970	4674	4674
FE			YES			YES
Adjusted R-Squared	0.40	0.41	0.69	0.27	0.32	0.53

Standard errors in parentheses; unbalanced panel
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Note: for the stringency index, weekly averages of daily data;

([3]) By doing so, it is easier to isolate the effects of vaccination on unemployment expectations. A higher vaccination rate can influence negatively the outcomes of social distancing across the population (Auld and Toxvaerd, 2021), thus leading to multi-collinearity. Introducing lags of social distancing reduces multicollinearity.

1.3. RECENT LABOUR MARKET DEVELOPMENTS IN MAJOR WORLD REGIONS

The pandemic plunged the world economy into the worst recession since World War II. The labour market effects have been quite heterogeneous across world regions and more contained in the EU than in the US. In the US and Canada, the unemployment rate skyrocketed before returning to values that are still higher than the pre-pandemic levels (Graph 1.14 and Table 1.5). Conversely in the EU and Japan, the increase in unemployment was gradual and softened by the widespread use of short-time work schemes. Yet, in all countries except Japan, there has been a temporary fall in the labour supply (Graph 1.15). Employment losses were mostly concentrated in hospitality, information, arts and entertainment and construction. Among the socio-economic groups, the young were the most hit.

In 2020, the US unemployment rate hit record levels. Unlike the EU, the drop in total hours worked was larger than that of GDP on account of a greater reduction of employment (5.8% against 1.4% for the EU). The unemployment rate peaked in April 2020 at 14.8%, while the share of temporary layoffs reached all-time high levels.([24]) Compared to past shocks, the GDP rebound was been much faster. The labour market improved substantially in the first three quarters of 2021, yet it did not fully recover. In August 2021, the unemployment rate at 5.2% was 1.7 pps above the pre-pandemic level. In August, permanent job losses dropped to 2.5 million but were still half way between the 1.3 million losses of February 2020 and 3.7 million losses of November 2020. The official unemployment rate understates the actual shortfall in employment as a result of the fall in the activity rate. ([25]) With the broadly used measure of labour market utilisation ([26]) at 8.3% in October, the labour market slack remained high. The employment rate (15-64), at 70% in October, is below trend. With a dwindling pool of workers in temporary layoffs, hiring involved an increasing reallocation of workers between firms and industries. Faced with rising hiring rates, firms raised wages. In the second quarter of 2021, wage and salaries increased by 2.8% year-over-year. The sudden and massive increase in layoffs and furloughs, mostly affecting low-wage earners, also impacted on average hourly wages, which rose at an unprecedented rate of 4.8%. ([27]). Between January and August 2021, hourly earnings in good-producing industries grew at an average rate of 2.8% against 2.3% for the total private services sector.

Graph 1.14: **Unemployment rates in the EU, the US and the 'Group of seven' advanced economies, January 2007-October 2021**



EU27 from 2020.
Source: OECD.

([24]) Temporary layoffs are dismissals where workers expect to be recalled to previous job. Before the pandemic, they accounted for one-tenth of total unemployed but increased to more than one-fourth in March 2020. They are an alternative to the scarcely used short-time compensation programs (STCs) that exists in 27 state only. Workers whose hours are reduced become eligible for unemployment benefits commensurate with the reduction of their hours. In July 2020, STCs rose from 0.2% of unemployment insurance claimants before the pandemic to historical high level of almost 0.8% (Krolikowski and Weixel, 2020).

([25]) Federal Reserve (2021) shows that safety in the workplace remained a strong disincentive for many workers to supply labour. The share of the population out of the labour force and retired accounted for more than one-half of the 1.7 pp decline in the activity rate since early 2020.

([26]) U6 is the most comprehensive measure of labour market slack. It includes the unemployed, the marginally attached workers, the part-time workers who still have a job but are working part-time when they would like to be full-time (*part-time for economic reasons*). This aggregate expressed as a percentage of the labour force plus marginally attached workers.

([27]) The fall of employment of low skilled employment implies a composition effect that account for three-quarters of the total change in hourly wages (Howard et al., 2021).

Table 1.5: **GDP growth and unemployment in selected economies**

	GDP growth %					Unemployment rate %				
	2013 -2019	2019	2020	2021 Q1	2021 Q2	2013 -2019	2019	2020	2021 Q1	2021 Q2
EA	1.6	1.6	-6.4	-1.2	14.2	9.9	7.6	8.0	8.3	8.0
EU	1.8	1.8	-6.0	-1.2	13.7	9.1	6.3	6.7	7.6	7.3
CAN	2.0	1.9	-5.4	0.3	12.7	6.6	5.7	9.6	8.4	8.0
JPN	1.0	0.3	-4.8	-1.3	7.7	3.1	2.4	2.8	2.8	2.9
USA	2.3	2.3	-3.4	0.5	12.2	5.1	3.7	8.1	6.2	5.9
UK	1.9	1.4	-9.8	-5.8	23.6		3.8	4.5	4.9	4.7
OECD	2.0	1.7	0.1	-0.3	13.1	6.5	5.4	7.2	6.7	6.5
BRIC:	5.4	5.2	-4.6	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
BRA	0.0	1.4	-4.1	2.3	12.4	0.0	12.1	12.0	14.4	14.5
RUS	1.1	2.0	-3.0	-0.1	8.1	0.0	4.6	4.4	5.5	5.0
IND	6.9	4.8	-6.9	1.6	20.9	0.0	5.4	5.4	6.6	9.7

Source: Eurostat, Ameco and OECD. Values for 2013-2019 are yearly averages

Graph 1.15: **The activity rate in the EU and selected advanced economies, 2009Q1-2021Q2**



(1) The activity rate is the ratio of active to total population. Active population includes those employed and unemployed, but excludes those inactive (e.g. not seeking work). (2) Age group: EU27 is15-74 years old, US and Canada 16+, Japan, 15+
Source: Eurostat and FRED.

In Canada, the recovery is under way amidst persisting uncertainty. During the first wave, more than 5.5 million workers lost their jobs or had their hours reduced. Employment recovered from the third wave and in August 2021 hovered close to its pre-pandemic level, while hours worked remained 2.6% below. After peaking at an all-time high of 13.7% in May 2020, the unemployment rate dropped to 7.1% in August 2021, still far from its historical low rate reached in February 2020 (5.7%). The share of long-term unemployed in total unemployment declined - from 30.7% in March 2021 to 27.4% in August - but remains high. The activity rate increased from 61.7% in May 2020 to 65.1% in August 2021, which should alleviate rising labour shortages. In the first quarter of 2021, hourly wages rose by 4.4%, while they declined in the second quarter by 1.2%.

In the United Kingdom, the labour market recovery was V-shaped and appears to be levelling off as firms struggle to find workers. In 2020, GDP fell by almost 10%; the total hours worked dropped by 2.4%, mostly accounted by a decline in the hours worked per worker while employment dropped only by 0.6% (much less than the 1.6% reduction of the 2008-2009 financial crisis. By spring 2021, job losses were mostly concentrated among the young, who are overrepresented in occupations more affected by social distancing measures. In September, the unemployment rate was at 4.6%, 0.6 pps higher than before the pandemic but 0.3 pps lower than the February to April average, ([28]). With employment returning to pre-pandemic levels in August, the labour market recovery has been quite quick. The number of unemployed people per vacancy reached a record high and strong labour demand supported large wage increases: in the second quarter of 2021, average weekly earnings grew by 8.8% year-on-year.

In Japan, job retention measures supported employment. In Japan, GDP fell by 4.8%, the greatest decline since the mid-1950s. In 2020, hours worked and real wages dropped respectively by 2.8% and 1.2%. Employment losses were modest and involving mainly part-timers and temporary workers. Government support measures substantially cushioned the increase in unemployment, which reached 3.1% in October 2020, before dropping to 2.8 in August 2021.

The Chinese labour market has recovered quickly following the sharp economic downturn caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. The contraction of GDP by 9% in the first quarter 2020 was followed by a strong recovery, especially in the second half of the year (4.9% and 6.5% in the third and fourth quarter, respectively). While widespread lockdown measures in early 2020 pushed large numbers of Chinese workers out of the labour market, successful containment of the virus allowed most of these workers to return relatively quickly. The unemployment rate peaked at 6.2% in January 2020 but dropped in August 2021 to the lowest rate for two years (5.1%).

([28]) By June 2021, a cumulative total of 11.5 million jobs have been supported by the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme. The Office for Budget Responsibility estimated that in absence of this scheme unemployment would have reached 10% in the second quarter of 2020.

1.4. WAGES AND LABOUR COSTS

In 2020, nominal compensation per employee decreased. After 2019, when compensation per employee in the euro area increased by 2% (2.5% for the EU), in 2020 it fell by 0.7% (0.1% for the EU). The yearly growth rate reflects a sharp decline of 4.7% (4.3% in the EU) quarter-on-quarter in the second quarter of the year, followed by a rebound of 6.4% and 0.5% in the remaining quarters (5.9% and 0.6% in the EU) (see Graph 1.16). In the first quarter of 2021, compensation per employee expanded at a rate close to their pre-pandemic average of 2% year-over-year. In the second quarter, it increased at a very rapid pace: by 7.3% in the EU and 7% in the euro area compensating for the decline over the same period of the previous year. As compared to the previous quarter, nominal compensation per employee rose by 0.2% in the second quarter of 2021, which is about half of the average quarterly growth rate of 2019. This increase reflects the rebound from the deep recession of 2020 and the recovery of hours worked linked to the phasing-out of short-time work schemes

Graph 1.16: **Compensation per employee and unit labour costs in the euro area, annualised growth rates, 2005Q1-2021Q2**



Source: Eurostat

In 2020, the unit labour costs displayed wide fluctuations, that reflect the effect of short-time work schemes on wages and productivity. At the peak of the recession, nominal unit labour costs in the euro area recorded a strong growth since output fell more than labour costs, but receded thereafter. In the second quarter of 2020, the significant drop in GDP combined with the small decline in employment led to a reduction of productivity growth that was stronger than the fall in compensation, i.e. an increase in unit labour costs (Graph 1.16). Thus, in the first half of 2020, unit labour costs expanded in the EU and the euro area by 6% year-on-year. With the recovery gaining momentum in the second half of the year, productivity growth became less negative and unit labour costs expanded by 3% in the euro area and 3.6% in the EU, contributing to offsetting the increase of the first half. On a yearly basis, in 2020 the unit labour costs grew by 4.4% and 4.7% in the euro area and the EU, respectively (from about 1.8% for both in 2019). The productivity growth continued in the first half of 2021 and euro area nominal unit labour costs dropped year-on-year by 1.3% (by 1% for the EU).

In 2020, hourly wages increased significantly. Due to the drastic adjustment of hours worked, the annual growth of hourly compensation stood at about 4.6% and 5.2% in 2020 in the EU and the euro area, up from 2.7% and 2.2% in 2019 – the highest growth rate since 2001. On a quarterly basis, the change in hourly compensation mirrors the change in compensation per employee, increasing by almost 10% in the euro area in the second quarter (7.6% in the EU) and expanding at a lower rate in the second half of the year (about 4% in the EU and the euro area), still above the average of the pre-pandemic period (1.9% and 1.6% for the EU and the euro area). This symmetric development suggests that the fall in compensation per employee was mainly due to the fall in hours worked, largely related to the widespread use of short-time work schemes. ([29]) In the first quarter of 2021, hourly compensation expanded at a lower rate than in the last quarter of 2020 (0.2% quarter-on-quarter against 2% in the EU and 0.5% against 2% in the euro area). This slowdown is larger than the one of compensation per employee and reflects an increase of hours worked stronger than employment.

([29]) Workers in a short-time working scheme keep their job, while working fewer or no hours and receive only a partial replacement for the wage lost for not working.

Table 1.6: **Growth of compensation per employee and of wages and salaries per employee**

	2020		2021q2	
	Compensation	Wages	Compensation	Wages
Agriculture	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.7
Manufacturing	-3.0	-3.5	9.8	9.5
Construction	-1.3	-1.3	10.4	10.0
Wholesale and retail trade	-4.4	-5.0	11.0	11.3
Information and communication	0.7	0.8	13.9	14.2
Financial and insurance activities	0.1	0.5	7.1	7.1
Real estate activities	-0.7	-0.5	2.0	2.4
Prof., scien. and tech.	-1.0	-1.2	10.4	10.6
Public administration	2.6	2.9	8.6	8.9
Arts	-3.2	-3.9	3.1	3.0
Total	-0.6	-0.9	12.1	11.4

Source: Eurostat data

In 2020 and the first half of 2021, the response of wages to unemployment has deviated from its historical relationship. At first sight, the decline of nominal compensation per employee in 2020 without a substantial increase of unemployment might seem puzzling (Graph 1.17). As mentioned above, the widespread use of short-time work schemes implies that a large number of workers received lower wages, which biases the statistical measure of compensation per employee. Second, the drop in hours worked per worker and in the activity rate has blurred the effective unmet demand for jobs. Yet, even considering extended measures of labour market slack – which comprise all persons who have unmet needs for employment and underemployed persons working part-time – the drop of wages is below what would be expected (Graph 1.17) based on the pre-crisis relationship. In the first half of 2021, wage growth turned positive as hours worked increased and worker returned gradually to a full time working hours pattern. ([30]) This brought wage growth in the first quarter to 1.9% in line with what would be expected based on the pre-pandemic relationship between wage growth and unemployment. In the second quarter of 2021, wages expanded at a higher rate (8%), reflecting the recovery of hours worked linked to the phasing-out of short-time work schemes as well as the tightening of the labour market.

([30]) In the second half of 2020 and first of 2021, hours worked picked up but stay below the pre-pandemic average.

Graph 1.17: **Phillips curve for the euro area (compensation per employee): 2000-2021**



For 2021, the growth rate is computed on the first half of the year assuming no change in the second half. For slack 2021Q1.
Source: DG ECFIN AMECO database and Eurostat, LFS.

In 2020 and 2021, the growth of negotiated wages was moderate. The changes observed in the hours per worker, together with the widespread application of short-time work schemes complicate the reading of indicators of compensation per input of labour. Negotiated wages are not affected by these changes and provide a more suitable measure of wage developments (Graph 1.18). Their growth slowed in 2020 (from 2.2% to 1.8%), but kept on decelerating throughout 2020 and the first quarter of 2021 (1.4% from 2% in the last quarter of 2020), when they started to reflect the labour market slack. As the labour demand gained strength in spring 2021, the growth of negotiated wages picked up in line with the growth rate of 1.7% of the 2013-2019 recovery and with comparable unemployment rates.

Graph 1.18: **Phillips curve for the euro area (negotiated wages): 2000Q1-2021Q2**



Source: Eurostat and ECB

Graph 1.19: **Labour shortages and wages by sector**



Source: Eurostat and Business and Consumers survey

Labour shortages are emerging in a number of industries. Since the start of the recovery in the first quarter of 2021, labour shortages have increased both in manufacturing and services. The increase is particularly high in economic activities related to hospitality and manufacture of computer and electronic equipment. Yet, labour shortages appear to have fully recovered to their pre-pandemic high levels only in a few industries - i.e. those in the first quadrant of Graph 1.19 – accounting for one quarter of employment in industry or less than 4% of total employment. Conversely, in services labour shortages remain below the maximum level reached in the 2013-2019 period. In some (e.g. real estates, security, repair of computer) substantial slack remains compared to 2013-2019.

Graph 1.20: **Labour shortages in Industry and Services in the current recovery relative to 2013-2019 recovery**



(1) On the horizontal axis is shown the change in labour shortages between 2021Q1 and 2021Q3 divided by the length of the Covid-19 recession minus the change between 2013Q1 and 2019Q4 divided by the length of the 2008-2013 recession. A recession is defined as two consecutive quarters of negative growth. Due to the lack of data, Services exclude wholesale and retail trade.
Source: Eurostat

In all sectors, wages are recovering from the deep losses of 2020, but wage pressures remain subdued. After plunging in the second quarter of 2020, wages expanded at very high rates, with some heterogeneity across sectors that reflects the characteristics of the sectoral response to the Covid-19 recession. As the lockdown hit particularly services, many activities in this sector had to interrupt completely their operations. The adjustment occurred mainly at the extensive margin (i.e. labour shedding). ([31]) As shown by Graph 1.20, wages dropped in services less than in industry and construction where firms and workers were shielded by short-time work schemes and partially allowed to continue to run their businesses. ([32]) Since wages in services dropped less during the Covid-19 recession, they also increased less than manufacturing or construction during the current recovery. Yet, in general, the link of wages with labour shortages appears weaker, while that with the size of the wage losses during the recession is stronger.

1.5. LONG-TERM UNEMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR MARKET MATCHING

With rising labour shortages amidst labour market slack, the question arises what this implies in terms of structural unemployment. When the economy recovers, employment

([31]) The fact that 60% of temporary contract are in services (excluding wholesale and retail trade) may have favoured the adjustment at the extensive margin).

([32]) Short-time work schemes are more prevalent in construction and industry, which implies that firms adjust labour cost by reducing working hours. In services these schemes are less common and firms adjust labour costs by reducing employment.

responds with a lag as it takes time for job seekers and employers to find each other and complete the hiring process (so-called *frictional unemployment*). This implies that the job finding rate lags the increase in labour demand and labour shortages emerge. At the same time, the presence of unutilised labour resources (due to inactivity, unemployment, or involuntary part-time) signals the difficulty of matching vacant posts with job seekers. This section describes the characteristics of the recovery in the aftermath of the Covid-19 recession and the risks of rising structural unemployment.

The flows between unemployment and inactivity have been driving the change in unemployment. The uncertain economic outlook deterred many firms from opening new vacancies, while the short-time work schemes and the liquidity support to firms mitigated the increase in dismissals. As shown in Box 1.5, while in the first half of 2020 there was a surge in the transition from unemployment to inactivity due to the difficulty of searching during a pandemic, this fell sharply below the pre-pandemic level in the second half of the year, suggesting the prevalence of "income effects" and perhaps people's adaptation to a pandemic environment. ([33]) This suggests that the fall in labour supply was temporary. The probability of finding a job remains significantly below the pre-pandemic level, while the job separation rates increase only slightly (Graph 1.21 and Box 1.5,).

Graph 1.21: **Job finding and separation rates in the euro area, 2005Q1-2020Q4**



(1) Job finding and separation rates are based on transitions between three states. See Box 1.5.
Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat data.

([33]) The growth of household disposable income dropped from 3.3% of 2019 to 1% of 2020.

The distribution of unemployment by duration has shifted towards the shortest unemployment spells. At the early stage of a recession, the increase in dismissals rises the share of short-term unemployed. This was evident in 2020, when the share of the long-term unemployment dropped from 42% in the last quarter of 2019 to 34.8% in the last quarter of 2020 (Graph 1.23). This contrasts with the US, where those without a job for more than one year kept rising throughout the crisis (Graph 1.22). The increase in overall unemployment was driven by the unemployed between 3 and 12 months, whose share increased from 31.5% in the first quarter of 2020 to 37.5% in the fourth quarter. The share of the newly unemployed increased only temporarily, mainly due to the exit from the labour force of those who lost a job at the early stages of the pandemic and gave up search during the lockdown.

Graph 1.22: **Long-term unemployed (for 1 year or more) in the EU, the euro area and the US (% of total labour force), 2005Q1-2021Q2**



Source: Eurostat and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Graph 1.23: **Unemployment by duration (share in total unemployment), 2007Q1-2021Q2**



(1) 3 quarters moving averages on seasonal adjusted data
Source: DG EMPL computations on Eurostat data

The job-finding rate for short duration has picked up quickly, while for duration longer than six months it remains low. The long-term unemployed have a lower probability to find a job than those that just entered unemployment. Since the onset of recovery, the job-finding rate for short durations have been improving, while for duration of more than six months it remained low (Graph 1.24). The fact that employability remained low for those unemployed for more than six months constrained the increase in the overall job-finding rate and the drop of the long-term unemployment; ([34]) the low job-finding rate for longer spells of unemployment might signal growing labour market mismatches and structural unemployment.

Graph 1.24: **Job-finding rate by duration of unemployment, euro area**



Source: Commission services based on Eurostat data

1.5.1. Job flows and structural unemployment

Inflows into and out of unemployment hint at a temporary and small increase of unemployment looking forward. Differences in the probability of losing and finding a job affect the speed with which unemployment reverts to its initial level after a shock. A fast adjustment means that the unemployment rate is close to the rate consistent with equality between inflows into and out of unemployment (*steady state*). A slow adjustment means that shocks persist. Graph 1.25 shows that changes in the *steady-state* unemployment rate anticipates changes in the actual rate; ([35]) for 2020, the increase in the *steady-state* rate is temporary and the difference between the two series small. This suggests that an increase in the unemployment rate would be small and temporary. ([36]) This shows the effectiveness of the policy response to limit dismissals during the recession. To give an order of magnitude, an increase in job destruction similar to the 2008-2009 crisis would have raised the steady-state unemployment rate from 6% to 13% and would have been followed by an increase in the unemployment rate to almost 9% – i.e. 1 pp above the rate of the third quarter of 2020. ([37])

Graph 1.25: **Actual and steady-state unemployment rate**



(1) Due to the lack of data, the EU aggregate excludes Germany. The simulated steady state is based for 2020Q2 and 2020Q3 on the 2008Q1-2009Q1 average job destruction rate and the actual job-finding rate; for the period 2020Q4-2020Q1, on the average rates for the periods 2012Q1-2013Q4 and 2014Q1-2014Q4.
Source: European Commission based on Eurostat data.

Evidence from the Beveridge curve does not unilaterally point to higher structural unemployment. Vacancies fell considerably at the onset of the recession, as many firms withdrew their job openings during the lockdown (Graph 1.26). They continued to fall in the third quarter of 2020, while unemployment started to increase. Following the easing of the lockdown measures and the swift economic recovery, job vacancies started to rise again, getting closer to pre-pandemic levels in the second quarter of 2021 while unemployment moved only slightly. This jump in vacancies with no change in unemployment could hint at hiring difficulties and rising structural unemployment. Yet, it is too early to interpret this as a signal of rising mismatches, as usually vacancies react faster than unemployment to

([34]) In the first half of 2021, about 56% of the unemployed had spells of unemployment longer than six months, close to the average of 2019 (57%); in 2020, this was 54%.
([35]) See Elsby et al., (2008) or Barnichon and Nekarda (2012).
([36]) The European Commission Spring Forecast predict for the EU an unemployment rate of 7.6% for 2021 and 7% in 2022.
([37]) This is based on equation 1 in Barnichon and Garda (2016).

cyclical swings, without the Beveridge curve being permanently shifted. ([38])

Graph 1.26: **Beveridge curve for the euro area, 1997Q1-2021Q2**



The survey-based indicator of labour shortages in industry approximates job vacancies (factors limiting production: labour).
Source: European Commission, based on Labour Force Survey and the Business and Consumer Survey.

So far the pandemic has not led to major disruptions of the process linking vacant jobs to unemployed people (*matching efficiency*). A deeper understanding of the effect of the recession on matching efficiency can be gauged looking at the relationship linking the job finding probability to the vacancy-to-unemployed ratio. ([39]) Graph 1.27 indicates that the labour market tightness predicts well the movements in the actual probability of finding job. A probability lower than the one expected on the basis of the labour market tightness is interpreted as a deterioration of matching efficiency. ([40]) Only in the first half of 2020, the actual job finding probability was lower than the expected one. However, rather than pointing to a worsening of labour market matching, this gap might reflect the effects of the lockdown on job search. ([41]) Social distancing may have made it more difficult to match employers' needs with the available workforce and reduced overall job vacancies; however, when constraints were loosened, posted vacancies increased and the actual job finding probability got closer to the expected. ([42])

Graph 1.27: **Job finding probability**



(1) The predicted job finding rate is obtained fitting the relation: ft = a0 + a1 (vt/ut)+ εt . where vt/ut is the labour market tightness; all variables are in logs. Estimates for 2010Q1-2020Q4 give an elasticity of job finding to labour market tightness of 0.37, in line with the literature (Barnichon et al., 2012).
Source: European Commission

Graph 1.28: **Distribution of unemployment by occupations of previous employment**



Source: Eurostat

([38]) Over the business cycle, vacancies and unemployment move in opposite directions (the Beveridge curve is negatively sloped). An outward (inward) shift of the curve indicates a deterioration (improvement) of the process linking unemployed to vacant posts (matching efficiency). During a full business cycle, the curve displays a counter-clockwise movement (vacancies adjust faster than unemployment), rather than just moving along a downward-sloping interval. The adjustment to labour demand shocks is characterised by counter-clockwise loops in the vacancy-unemployment space.

([39]) The matching function describes the process through which job openings can be filled. It relates hires to the stock of vacancies and unemployment (Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001).

([40]) The probability of finding a job worsens if there is mismatch between workers' characteristics and firms' demand independently of the state of the labour market.

([41]) During the period 2011Q2-2013Q1, the actual job finding probability was constantly below the predicted one.

([42]) Balgova et al., (2021) show that during the pandemic unemployed people search less than expected; the uncertainty about the recovery, sector-specific restrictions and work related changes explain the lower job-search intensity.

1.5.2. Reallocation and employment prospects

There is little evidence so far that the recession has triggered a massive reallocation between different occupations. As the recovery proceeds, labour market reallocation implies that some firms will lose market shares and reduce their workforce. The redeployment of workers may take time and mismatches may increase, with some occupations expanding at the cost of others. Graph 1.28 shows that some occupations are more prone to creating unemployment. ([43]) Since for some occupations unemployment is more likely, the dispersion of unemployment rates across different occupations provides a measure of reallocation. ([44]) Graph 1.29 shows that the dispersion increased during the recession, but much less than during the recessions of 2008-2009 and 2011-2013, which are periods of rising structural unemployment in several countries. The dispersion also returned towards its pre-pandemic levels, although it was still above at the end of 2020. This suggests little reallocation across occupations so far.

Graph 1.29: **Dispersion in the unemployment rates by occupation: 2005Q1-2020Q4**



(1) Standard deviation of the unemployment rates by occupation weighted with the share of unemployment. Recessions periods are shaded in grey.
Source: European Commission, LFS

The lack of reallocation across occupations does not exclude the possibility of reallocation across sectors. Recent research for the US and the UK shows that reallocation rates doubled after Covid-19 crisis and that a more negative impact on employment is expected in low productivity firms. ([45]) Given the nature of the Covid-19 shock, reallocation is more likely to be between rather than within sectors. ([46]) This would make the recovery relatively poor in jobs as, without policy support, it is harder for workers to move across sectors than across firms of the same sector. This is consistent with the findings obtained for Italy (Basso et al. 2021), where there is little reallocation potential for workers previously employed in the worst hit sectors (hospitality, arts and entertainment) due to their low skill levels.

Graph 1.30: **Bankruptcies and unemployment rate in the EU (2015=100)**



Source: Eurostat

The increase in bankruptcies typical of recessions did not materialise during the Covid-19 recession. Yet, their rise may lead to higher unemployment. In 2020, the number of bankruptcies fell significantly (Graph 1.30). ([47]) This reflects mainly the policy interventions taken to soften the impact of the shock, but also firms' stronger financial position at the onset of the crisis than during previous recessions. ([48]) The usual lag of about one year with which bankruptcies respond

([43]) The medium-skilled represent respectively 30%, 60% and 53% of the total employed in these occupations
([44]) Anayi et al., 2021, Bloom et al., 2021. The dispersion may also increase if some occupations are more cyclical than others; in this case the dispersion should have only temporary changes around a constant level.
([45]) These firms belongs to labour-intensive industries, with a relative low adaptability to social distancing.
([46]) In the UK, the between-industry share of job reallocation more than doubled relative to the pre-Covid average of 10% (Anayi et al., 2021). Reallocation rates based on sales increased more than for employment, particularly in the UK where furlough schemes are more prominent than in the US. This hints at a relatively smaller impact on employment in this country. David (2021) found that except for leisure and hospitality jobs have been reallocated across sectors much less during the pandemic than in previous recessions.
([47]) For France, there is no differences between sectors in the fall of company liquidations (Conseil Nationale de Productivité, 2021). In some countries, the obligation to file for bankruptcy was suspended, which artificially reduced the number of insolvencies (ESRB, 2021).
([48]) Ebeke et al., 2021

to the fall of GDP may have also played a role. ([49]) After the initial drop in the first half of 2020, bankruptcies picked up again, but stayed below the pre-pandemic trend. As expected, this increase went along with rising unemployment.

The phasing-out of support measures to companies has raised concerns that firms may be unable to roll over their debt and stay in the market. The unwinding of government support measures may increase firms' insolvencies and unemployment. This effect is compounded by the fact that the Covid-19 shock may lead to bankruptcies in specific sectors and cause disruptions in the functioning of the labour market, as it is more difficult to re-employ workers between firms of different sectors than within sectors. It is too early to say whether government support measures have delayed an efficient reallocation of resources or provided liquidity to companies keeping alive healthy firms, thereby delaying rather the distorting the selection of profitable firms. If this is the case, there could be an increase of job losses only for insolvent firms. ([50]) Evidence for France suggests that government support has prevented productive firms to go bankrupt, but not delayed the process of reallocation from low to high productivity firms. ([51]) This suggests that having in place strategies to solve insolvency issues and accompany restructuring would ensure the profitability of viable firms and the reallocation of resources from the least productive firms ([52]).

The possibility of weak employment growth cannot be excluded in light of pre-existing trends in automation and digitalisation accelerated by the pandemic. In the medium term, new technologies increase job opportunities offsetting the weak or negative growth of occupations more at risk of automation. ([53]) The pandemic has changed the nature of work, increasing telework and forcing automation. ([54]) If the job losses that this process entails are not quickly reinstated, the overall rebound of employment might be delayed. ([55])

The pandemic has led to a shift of employment towards low-contact and high tele-workable occupations. The lockdown has particularly affected occupations that are more exposed to physical contact (Graph 1.31). Low tele-workable occupations suffered large employment losses than high tele-workable occupation, with no major difference between low tele-workable occupations that are low- or high-contact intensive. For high tele-workable occupations, the degree of contact intensity favours those occupation with tasks that do not require close contacts with other people. Thus, labour market slack in contact-intensive sectors coexists with labour market shortages in sectors where remote working is possible. So far, the slack seems to prevail as signalled by the moderate wage pressures. Yet, the emergence of structural labour shortages might lead to higher wage pressures as labour demand for routine tasks falls.

([49]) Banerjee et al., 2020.
([50]) The ECB (2021) reports that reliance on debt has increased among vulnerable firms and that, as the economy recovers, corporate insolvencies may increase partly driven by a backlog of insolvency cases. For France, debt financing facilitated by the State-guaranteed loan scheme helped a majority of companies to maintain or even improve their cash position despite declining sales (Doucinet et al., 2021, Banque de France).
([51]) Cros et al., (2021) show that the determinants of the probability of bankruptcies in 2020 are the same than in 2019 and that their coefficients do not change between the two years. Sectors more affected by the Covid-19 shock are more likely to file for bankruptcy. However, the predictive power of the shock is smaller than that of firms' productivity or debt. This implies that public policies have mitigated the spread to all economy of a large part of the sectoral nature of the Covid-19 shock. The nature of the Covid-19 shock implies that many firms could be classified "zombies" when in fact they are viable (IMF, Laeven et al. 2020).
([52]) European Systemic Risks Board, 2021.
([53]) For the OECD countries, employment among the riskiest half of occupations grew by 6% compared to 18% for the least risky; the low-skilled have not been more negatively affected than average as their share has been falling; yet automation risks and job instability are higher for low-skilled workers (Georegieff and Milanez 2020).
([54]) Autor and Reynolds, 2021; Sedik and Yoo, 2021. Industries that make greater use of robots face lower risks of contagion and are less exposed to lockdown (Caselli et al. 2020). In a survey of nearly 300 companies by the World Economic Forum, 43% indicated that they expect to reduce their workforce through the use of new technologies.
([55]) Workers with low levels of wages and education are at high risks of job losses or low wages (Chernoff and Warman, 2020; Casselman, 2021). Workers in sectors most hit by the pandemic show limited sectoral transitions and with weak labour demand have lower chance of being employed in sectors where they can perform tasks similar to their previous job (Basso et al., 2020).

Graph 1.31: **Characteristics of occupations based on proximity and tele-workability index and probability of automation**



Source: DG EMPL and Nedelkosa and Quintini (2018)

Graph 1.32: **Employment in occupations with different degrees of contact intensity and tele-workability**



(1) Employment in different ISCO categories (2-digits) is grouped according to the index of tele-workability and proximity developed in the 2020 issue of this report. Occupations with high values of teleworkable and proximity index are Administrative and commercial managers, Business professionals, legal, social and cultural professions, Chief executives, Numerical and material recording clerks, Managers, Science and engineer associate professionals.
Source: LFS and O*Net

Weak employment growth is more likely in routine occupations. There is a long-term trend of employment shifting from routine to non-routine occupations. ([56]). Historical evidence suggests that jobless recoveries are largely driven by disappearing routine occupations during downturns that are never recovered. ([57]) The pandemic has hastened the structural trends towards automation as low tele-workable occupations are more vulnerable to automation. Based on a detailed classifications of the occupations, Graph 1.33 shows that the employment structure shifted from high- towards low-routine tasks occupations. ([58]) In the second quarter of 2021, employment in occupations less at risk of automation had almost recovered the losses of the crisis; conversely, in those more exposed employment was almost 5% lower than its level in the last quarter of 2019 (closer to the level of early 2016). ([59])

Graph 1.33: **Employment in high- and low-routine intensive occupations (2015=100)**



(1) Routine tasks intensive occupations are based on a index (RTI) built as in Autor and Dorn, 2013; see Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe 2019. The chart shows employment for ISCO categories (2-digits) with a value of RTI respectively below and above the median RTI index.
Source: Eurostat and O*Net

But automation may affect also occupations that are less affected by social distancing. Table 1.7 shows that only 9% of total employment is in jobs with a high routine task intensity, low tele-

([56]) *Labour market and Wage Developments in Europe* (2019) showed that technologies that reduce the demand of routine tasks increases skills mismatches. Jobs that require non-routine tasks are at the top and bottom of the skills distribution, while jobs that require routine tasks tend to be in the middle; Autor et al., (2003).

([57]) Jaimovich and Siu (2020); Hershbein and Kahn (2018).

([58]) Routine task occupations are identified as in Autor and Dorn (2013), see Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, 2019. See Table 1.8 for precise list.

([59]) Routine task-intensive occupations are also more volatile and experience larger employment losses than occupations that are less routine intensive, which is consistent with the international evidence on the market impact of the pandemic; Ding and Molina (2020) and IMF (2021).

Table 1.7: **Share of employment in low- and high-routine task intensive occupations and with different combination of proximity and tele-workability**

	Incidence on total employment			Incidence on total employment in each category		
	Total	High RTI	Low RTI	Total	High RTI	Low RTI
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
High contact and High tele-workable	29%	11%	18%	100%	38%	62%
High contact and Low tele-workable	31%	9%	22%	100%	28%	72%
Low contact and High tele-workable	13%	4%	9%	100%	33%	67%
Low contact and Low tele-workable	27%	20%	7%	100%	73%	27%
Total	100%	44%	56%	100%	44%	56%

(1) RTI is the routine task index built as in Autor and Dorn, see "Labour market and Wage Developments in Europe, 2019.
Source: European Commission calculations based on Eurotat LFS and O*Net

workability and high-contact. This group gathers the most exposed workers to social distancing for whom scarring effects are expected to be significant in the medium run; it accounts for about one fifth of employment in high routine task intensity occupations. Together with the low-contact and low-teleworkable occupations, it represents the jobs with tasks that can be easily automatized; this group accounts for 64.5% of total employment. Occupations less exposed to economic risks as a result of social distancing policies have also tasks that can be routinized; they account for about 35% of employment in high routine task intensity occupations. All occupations are subject to routinisation; at least one third of employment in the different categories that characterise the exposure to social distancing are in jobs with task that can be automatized (columns 5). ([60])

Remote work is expected to persist as a new form of work in many occupations and the demand for digital skills may permanently rise. At the same time, the increase in the time spent working from home will imply less time commuting, on business trip or spent in the office. ([61]) This may have consequences on occupations – such as cleaners, security, maintenance, hotel and restaurant workers – that before the pandemic accounted for a large share of employment growth due to the central role of cities in the process of economic growth. ([62]) During the recovery, firms' demand for digital skills will go up rapidly while it might take time for workers without these skills to be trained. ([63]) This may increase the labour market mismatches and slowdown the recovery. In the absence of policy interventions in favour of the vulnerable segments of the labour force, the duration of unemployment may increase. Investment in digital literacy is needed to speed up the transition.

([60]) This contrasts with the US where, based on a similar classification, occupations susceptible to automation are mostly in low tele-workable occupations or in high tele-workable/low-contact occupations of employment; Albanesi and Kim (2021).

([61]) For the US, employers expect the share of working delivered from home to triple (Altig et al., 2020); 20% of workdays will be supplied from home after the pandemic and expect a 5% productivity boost due to re-optimised working arrangements; yet, the benefit will accrue mainly to high earners (Barrero et al., 2021).

([62]) Glaeser (2020); Autor and Reynolds (2021).

([63]) In Italy, remote working increased from 1.5% of 2019 to above 14% in the second quarter of 2020; it was largely used by women, employees of large firms or sectors such as finance and ICT (Depalo and Giorgi (2021)).

Box 1.5: **Labour market flows**

Labour market flows provide a better characterisation of labour market dynamics than changes in the unemployment rate. Upward and downward movements in the unemployment rate provide a sign of the state of the economy at one point in time, usually the week before the survey. In practice, a continuous process of job creation and job destruction drives the fluctuations of unemployment. Since 2010, the report describes movements in the unemployment rate using a flow-decomposition of changes in the unemployment rate. The calculation based on Elsby et al. (2013), determines the rates at which workers enter unemployment and unemployed people exit unemployment. At any point in time, the change in the unemployment rate equals the net inflows in and out of unemployment:

$$\Delta u_t = s_t(L_{t-1} - U_{t-1}) - f_t U_{t-1} \qquad (1)$$

The unemployment rate rises (falls) when inflows are higher (smaller) than outflows. Inflows equal the rate at which workers flow from employment to unemployment in a given period (s_t *job separation rate*) multiplied by the stock of employed: $I_t = s_t * E_{t-1}$, where number of employed (E) equals the difference between the labour force (L) and the unemployed (U). Similarly, outflows equal the rate at which workers flow from unemployment to employment (f_t henceforth *job finding rate*) in a given period times the stock of unemployed: $S_t = f_t * U_{t-1}$. Equation (1) clarifies that changes in unemployment are determined by the interactions between job finding and separation rates and the outstanding stock of employed and unemployed individuals. For example, the unemployment rate increases in a recession because the job separation rate s_t jumps; this leads to a higher number of people entering unemployment. With no further change in the separation rate, higher flows into unemployment leads subsequently to higher flows back to employment even when the finding rate f_t does not change. On the other hand, flows back into employment are reduced by a lower job-finding rate. Therefore, the process that links vacant jobs to unemployed people determines whether the labour market absorbs quickly the excess unemployment created during a recession.

Multiple transitions between different statuses represent a non-negligible fraction of the transitions occurring between two consecutive points in time. Elsby et al. (2013) proposed a methodology to approximate from existing LFS data transition rates that take into account the multiple transitions that individuals may experience between two subsequent surveys. One limitation of this approach is that the estimated transition rates do not consider flows into and out of the labour force. As discussed by the same authors, this assumption is valid when the unemployment rate fluctuations derive from transitions between unemployment and employment. However, it is less compelling when the participation margin presents wide cyclical fluctuations, as during the Covid-19 recession. Elsby et al. (2015) develop a methodology that consider all possible transitions between employment, unemployment and inactivity, keeping the original correction for the possibility of multiple transitions between successive surveys. This approach is applied here for the EU Member States. The starting point is the quarterly labour market flows estimated by Eurostat on an experimental basis (Kiiver and Espelage, 2016). The probability that an unemployed finds a job in a given quarter equals the fraction of the unemployed in the previous quarter that is employed in the current quarter. Graph 1 shows that, in countries such as Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Italy and Austria, ignoring the possible transitions occurring at frequency higher than the quarter would lead to miss between 40 and 50 per cent of the transitions between employment and unemployment. Similarly, the correction for multiple transitions implies higher transition rates between unemployment and inactivity; conversely.

Graph 1a



Graph 1b



(Continued on the next page)

Box (continued)

Note: Chart 1a shows the percentage change difference between the labour market turnover based on the time aggregation adjusted hazard rates and the turnover based on the gross flows obtained comparing worker flows at a discrete point in time. The latter are based on transition rates published on experimental basis by Eurostat (Kiiver and Espelage, 2016), corrected to make flows consistent with the evolution of the published unemployment and participation rates (Elsby et al. 2015). Chart 1b does the same for the sum of the rates between unemployment and inactivity.

Graph 2 Job finding and separation rates: two vs three states



Note: The finding and separation rates are adjusted for temporal aggregation. Due to lack of German data, the EU aggregate does not include this country.
Source: DG EMPL calculations on Eurostat data

Ignoring the transitions between unemployment and inactivity would miss the drop of the job-finding rate during the pandemic. Graph 2 (left panel) shows the job finding rate calculated assuming that individuals experience three labour market states (employment, unemployment or inactivity) with the job finding rate obtained assuming only two states (employment and unemployment). While there is no major difference in their pre-pandemic trends, the finding rate based on two states rises during the pandemic, which contradicts the conventional view that during recessions it is more difficult to find a job. Conversely, the job separation rate increases, although to a smaller extent which is consistent with the effect of the employment protection policies introduced in response to the pandemic (Graph 2 right panel). It is also worth noticing that the separation rate computed on two states is 30% lower than the one computed based on three states.

Graph 3 Quarterly transition rates corrected for multiple transitions



Source: DG EMPL calculations on Eurostat data

Table 1.8: **Share of employment in occupations (two digits) with a routine task index below and above the median**

High RTI	
Agricultural, forestry and fishery labourers	0.8
Assemblers	1.0
Building and related trades workers, excluding electricians	3.9
Cleaners and helpers	3.4
Customer services clerks	1.9
Food preparation assistants	0.6
Food processing, wood working, garment and other craft and related trades workers	2.0
General and keyboard clerks	4.4
Handicraft and printing workers	0.5
Information and communications technicians	1.0
Information and communications technology professionals	2.3
Labourers in mining, construction, manufacturing and transport	2.8
Metal, machinery and related trades workers	3.9
Numerical and material recording clerks	3.1
Other clerical support workers	0.9
Personal service workers	3.8
Refuse workers and other elementary workers	1.0
Science and engineering associate professionals	3.6
Stationary plant and machine operators	2.5
Subsistence farmers, fishers, hunters and gatherers	0.0
Total HIGH RTI	**43.6**
Low RTI	
Administrative and commercial managers	1.3
Business and administration associate professionals	6.9
Business and administration professionals	4.4
Chief executives, senior officials and legislators	0.8
Drivers and mobile plant operators	4.3
Electrical and electronic trades workers	1.6
Health associate professionals	3.2
Health professionals	3.1
Hospitality, retail and other services managers	1.3
Legal, social and cultural professionals	3.1
Legal, social, cultural and related associate professionals	1.7
Market-oriented skilled agricultural workers	2.9
Market-oriented skilled forestry, fishery and hunting workers	0.2
Personal care workers	3.3
Production and specialised services managers	1.7
Protective services workers	1.7
Sales workers	7.2
Science and engineering professionals	3.6
Street and related sales and service workers	0.1
Teaching professionals	5.7
Total LOW RTI	**58.1**

Source: Own computations on Eurostat data

APPENDIX 1
Annex to the chapter 1

Graph 1.A1.1:**Employment rate gender gap by age group (2005=100)**



Source: Ad-hoc EU LFS extraction. (1) Ratio between female and male employment rates.

Graph 1.A1.2:**Participation rate gender gap by age group (2005=100)**



Source: Ad-hoc EU LFS extraction. (1) Ratio between female and male participation rates.

2. LABOUR MARKET DEVELOPMENTS IN MEMBER STATES

In 2020, the Covid-19 pandemic plunged almost all Member States in the worst recession since World War II. With the exception of Ireland, GDP dropped in all countries with a reduction larger than 5% in 11 Member States. In 2021, economic growth rebounded quite strongly, with GDP returning to the level of 2019 in 15 countries in the third quarter.

The massive decline of GDP was accompanied by a relatively minor rise in the unemployment rate in 2020, with an increase of less than one percentage point in 21 Member States. Higher increases were recorded in some countries with looser firing restrictions (the Baltic countries), segmented labour markets (Spain), or where short-time work schemes cover a relatively low share of the work-force (Sweden). In Greece, France, Italy and Poland, the fall in the unemployment rate was driven by the reduction in the activity rate.

The subsequent increase in the activity rate in the second quarter contributed to delaying the response of unemployment to the recovery in several Member States. The unemployment rate was higher than the pre-pandemic level of the fourth quarter 2019 in 14 countries, notably Croatia, Estonia, Austria, Ireland and Sweden. Had the activity rate remained unchanged at its low rate of the second quarter of 2020, this would have happened for only nine countries. Similarly, the fall in the activity rate reduced the impact on the unemployment rate of the drop in the employment rate, notably in Latvia and Romania by 5 pps and in Estonia and Sweden by 3.5 pps. Conversely, in 15 countries the increase in the activity rate had blurred the effect of the increase in employment on unemployment, notably in Hungary, Malta, Slovenia, Spain and the Netherlands.

Unemployment expectations improved in all countries, but with different intensities that reflect the pace at which restrictions were loosened and vaccination progressed.

The effect of the shock on overall employment has been largely V-shaped. Yet, the large decline in the second quarter of 2020 was only followed by a partial recovery. In the second quarter of 2021, the level of employment was below the pre-pandemic level in 20 Member States. In 11 countries, the growth of temporary contracts accounted for more than 50% of the increase in the total number of employees between the first and the second quarter of 2021.

Wages followed a V-shaped adjustment that mirrors the adjustment in employment and hours worked to the recession and the subsequent recovery. In 2020, wages rose at a lower rate than 2019 in all countries and in some it even declined; yet, in all countries hourly wages increased. In 2021, with the increase of employment and hours worked, wage growth rebounded in almost all Member States, particularly in catching-up countries. Real wage growth followed a similar pattern as nominal wage growth, with more heterogeneity in 2020. In 2021, in the majority of countries real wages expanded below productivity, reflecting the rebound in productivity that followed the decline of 2020 due to labour hoarding.

Member States' labour markets are undergoing major changes in the structure of employment. In manufacturing and high-contact sectors more affected by the lockdown, employment remains below pre-pandemic levels; conversely, it is expanding in high-contact less affected sectors (e.g. construction, public administration and health) or low contact sectors (e.g. information and communication, scientific and technical activities, and real estate). The reduction of the share of routine occupations in the large majority of the Member States – with a median decline of 2 pps and a maximum drop of about 5 pps in France and Spain – is a sign of ongoing reallocation.

These changes in the employment structure coexist with labour shortages. In 2021, labour shortages have been on the rise in most countries, but more pronounced in the industry than in the services sector. The rise in labour shortages without major drops of unemployment does not necessarily imply a worsening of the process linking vacant posts to unemployed people due to skills or geographical mismatches. Over the business cycle, labour shortages fluctuate more than unemployment, as employers post vacancies in anticipation of future increases in their activity while it may takes time to fill a post. However, labour shortages may reflect also structural factors such as ageing, wage convergence within the EU reducing the incentives

Graph 2.1: **Unemployment rate: 2013-2021 (September)**



(1) Countries are ranked by ascending order of unemployment rate 15-74 in 2020. EU27 from 2020.
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey.

to cross-border mobility, poor working conditions or pre-existent skills mismatches.

2.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter describes how labour markets have been hit by the recession and are responding to the recovery. It looks into selected indicators at the Member States' level, by identifying common trends and differences across countries in the labour market responses to the Covid-19 recession and the ongoing recovery. Section 2 starts with an analysis of developments in unemployment rates, labour market slack and the impact of vaccination campaigns on households' unemployment expectations. For each Member State, the section quantifies the impact of the changes in the activity rate observed on the unemployment rate. Section 2.3 reviews the aggregate developments in employment and hours worked and analyses how the structure of employment has changed since the start of the pandemic. It examines the employment developments for various socio-economic groups and contract types. Section 2.4 describes in which countries labour shortages, a determinant of the probability of finding a job, are constraining economic activity and discusses briefly whether this signals a difficulty of the labour market to deliver job matches, possibly due to skills mismatches. Wage and productivity growth and their implications for external cost competitiveness developments are analysed respectively in Section 2.5 and 2.6.

2.2. UNEMPLOYMENT RATES

In 2020, in all Member States the unemployment rate increased only marginally thanks to unprecedented policy support and inflows into inactivity. In 2020, the highest increases in unemployment rates were recorded in the Baltics (2.4 pps in Estonia; 2.3 pps in Lithuania and 1.8 pps in Latvia, respectively) and Sweden (1.5 pps) (Graph 2.1). In 16 countries, the jobless rate moved up by just one percentage point. ([64]) The unemployment rate even fell in Poland, France, Italy and Greece due to high inflows into inactivity. Indeed, in almost all countries a temporary drop of the activity rate mitigated the impact of the crisis on unemployment. This effect was significant in Ireland, Spain and Portugal, where the participation rate dropped by respectively 4.1, 3.6 and 2.5 pps in the second quarter of 2020. In six countries, the decline in the participation rate hovered between 1 pp and 1.5 pps. Only in Croatia and Germany, the activity rate remained unchanged; however, in the latter, the activity rate was gradually falling until the first quarter of 2021 (Graph 2.4).

After the drop in the second quarter of 2020, the increase of the participation rate has played a role in the rise of unemployment in almost all

([64]) Within this group, the highest increase in unemployment are in Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia and Slovakia (0.9 pps); Hungary and Malta (0.8 pps); Germany (0.7 pps), In Czechia, Denmark, the Netherlands, Portugal, Cyprus and Slovenia, it was just around half a percentage point, and less than one percentage point in ten other countries including Austria, Czechia, Denmark, and Germany.

countries. From the second quarter of 2020, higher inflows into the labour force delayed the drop in unemployment in 20 countries (Graph 2.4). This effect was sizeable in Ireland, Croatia and to a lesser extent Spain and France where the rise in the unemployment rate was mainly due to larger inflows into the labour force. In contrast, in Germany, Latvia and Romania, the decline in the participation rate kept the unemployment rate low. In the second quarter of 2021, the gap with the activity rate of 2019 remained large (more than 1 pp) in Latvia, Italy, Estonia, and Greece. Conversely, in 13 countries, the activity rates rebounded and were higher than in 2019 (the Netherlands, Hungary, Malta, Luxembourg, Croatia, Poland, Sweden, Ireland, Cyprus, Finland, Slovakia, Denmark and Belgium).

Divergence in growth performance across Member States increased, while for unemployment it remained unchanged. While the dispersion in GDP growth has been higher than before the pandemic, for the unemployment rates it hovered around the pre-pandemic level (Graph 2.2). This is partly due to the fact that some Member States with the largest increases in unemployment rates had lower unemployment rates before the pandemic (e.g. Sweden and the Baltics). Some Member States witnessing decreases in unemployment rates had higher unemployment rates before the pandemic, like France, Italy or Greece. Spain is an exception, with a high unemployment rate before the pandemic and a strong increase during the pandemic.

Graph 2.2: **Dispersion of GDP growth and unemployment rates in the EU: 2008-2021**



(1) Standard deviation.
Source: Eurostat, National Accounts.

Labour underutilization also increased, with differences across countries. The labour market slack – the unmet demand for employment – points to an increase in the underutilisation of labour. ([65]) The slack increased in 2020 by more than 2 pps in Austria, Sweden, Spain, Lithuania, Estonia and Ireland. It fell in countries such as Greece, France, Italy and Poland, where the number of unemployed people dropped due to the inflows into inactivity. With the economy rebounding in 2021, the labour market slack dropped in most Member States. Yet, in the first quarter of 2021 almost all countries had a level of slack higher than the one of the end of 2019. In contrast, the level of slack was lower than before the pandemic in Denmark, Greece, France, and Malta. ([66]) Thus, while the dispersion in the unemployment rates across countries remain small, there are divergences in underutilisation of labour when a wider measure of labour market slack is considered. (Graph 2.3).

Graph 2.3: **Dispersion across countries of different measures of labour utilisation: 2008-2021Q2**



(1) Narrow definition: unemployment as percentage of the extended labour force; Broad definition adds to the unemployed those available to work but not seeking, those seeking work but not immediately available, and the involuntary part-time workers. The extended labour force is the sum of the labour force and the previous components. A box plot describes the variability of a distribution with key parameters (median, and quartile). The dots are outliers.
Source: Eurostat, LFS

([65]) It includes "persons available to work but not seeking employment", "underemployed part-time workers" and persons seeking work but not immediately available". The persons available to work but not seeking increased by 1.5 million, mostly in Germany, Spain, Italy and France.

([66]) In Greece and France, this is due to a lower level of unemployment and involuntary part-time and in Denmark and Malta to a lower number of persons seeking work but not immediately available and of persons available to work but not seeking in Denmark and Malta.

Graph 2.4: **Unemployment and activity rates: 2019Q1-2021Q2**



Source: Eurostat, LFS

Graph 2.5: **Stringency of containment measures and consumers' unemployment expectations one year ahead: January 2020-October 2021**



Source: DG ECFIN Business and consumers Surveys and Oxford Tracker data. The unemployment expectations are part of the Joint Harmonised EU Programme of Business and Consumer Surveys run by DG ECFIN. The unemployment expectations variable is the balance between the positive and negative answers to the survey. More than the level what matters is their change over time

In 2021 a sharp improvement in households' unemployment expectations occurred in all countries, but with different patterns reflecting the loosening of the restrictions. The positive evolution of households' expectations was gradual in Austria and Germany, but concentrated in spring 2021 in Greece, Italy, France and Spain (Graph 2.5). This improvement occurred despite the stringency of the containment measures being only partially relaxed. In all countries, there was a strong impact of the share of people fully vaccinated on households' unemployment expectations (Annex). An increase in the vaccination rate allows many restrictions to be eased which fuels expectations of economic growth and better labour market prospects.

In countries with a high share of vaccinated people, households' unemployment expectations are less responsive to changes in the stringency of the containment measures. Graph 2.6 shows the effect of stringency on unemployment expectations. ([67]) This effect mirrors the evolution of different lockdown phases. From the end of 2020, this response increases again despite the looser and more selective lockdown measures. This reflects the different pace at which Member States have advanced in their vaccination campaigns. From spring 2021 the unemployment expectations have been less reactive to changes in the stringency of the lockdown in countries with a relatively higher percentage of vaccinated people. This suggests that vaccination softens the trade-off between flattening the pandemic and the recession curves. In a context where the pandemic brings drastic economic hardship and some social distancing is still needed, vaccination moderates the economic costs of these restrictions.

([67]) The graph shows the effect of stringency on unemployment expectation estimated over a period of 90 days starting with the date shown on the horizontal axis. This allows identifying how the effect changes over time. So the first point correspond to the estimate for the period 21/01/2020-21/04/2020. Countries are split in two groups depending on whether they had in April 2021 a share of vaccinated people lower or higher than the median share.

Graph 2.6: **Impact of stringency on unemployment expectations in countries with low and high vaccination rates.**



(1) The graph shows the response of unemployment expectations to changes of stringency. The graph reports this effect estimated on a panel of 27 countries with rolling regression technique.
Source: European Commission

2.3. EMPLOYMENT DEVELOPMENTS

Contrary to the financial crisis of 2008-2009, the Covid-19 recession was generally V-shaped. In most countries, labour markets were significantly affected at the very onset of the crisis, but a partial rebound in employment rapidly followed in a few of them (Graph 2.7). In nine countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, Malta, Hungary, Netherlands, Poland and Portugal) employment had even overtaken the pre-recession levels by the end of the second quarter of 2021. However, employment did not clearly rebound or continued to decrease in Bulgaria, Germany, Romania and Slovakia. Despite the overall employment recovery, in the second quarter of 2021 EU employment was 1% lower than at the peak of the last quarter of 2019. The largest gaps with the pre-pandemic level were observed for Romania (-10.2% but there is a break ([68])), Spain (-4.4%), Estonia (-3.1%) and Greece (-2%).

([68]) As a consequence of the new European regulations entered into force on 1 January 2021 - affecting the methodology of the Household Labor Force Survey - in Romania persons producing agricultural goods intended exclusively or mainly for self-consumption (around 720 thousands) were excluded from employment estimates and considered either inactive or unemployed.

Graph 2.7: **Employment during the 2008-2009 recession and the COVID-19 recession**



(1) For the 2008 recession, quarter 0 is 2007Q4; For COVID-19 recession, quarter 0 is 2019Q4.
Source: Eurostat

2.3.1.1. *The adjustment of hours worked*

Hours worked sharply declined in several Member States in 2020, but rebounded in 2021. In all Member States, the use of job retention schemes translated the drop of GDP into a large reduction in hours per worker compared to the reduction in the number of employees (Table 2.1). However, their contribution to the change in total hours differed across countries. In 12 of them, the drop in total hours was driven by a large decline in hours per worker. This includes countries with well-developed short-time work schemes (Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal, and Germany) and those where, in past recessions, changes in total hours were driven by changes in employment Denmark, Slovakia, Cyprus, Slovenia, Czechia and Lithuania). In 11 Member States, the change in the total hours comes from the reduction of employment. ([69]) This group is made of countries with more flexible labour markets, limited use of job retention schemes and dual labour markets. In the first half of 2021, hours worked gradually picked up, but, with few exceptions remained below the pre-pandemic levels.

Table 2.1: **GDP, hours and employees, 2019-2020 (percent changes)**

	GDP	Hours	Employees	Average hours per employee
MT	-6.5	-7.4	2.4	-9.8
EL	-9.6	-1.9	-1.0	-0.9
IT	-7.8	-9.8	-1.7	-8.1
AT	-5.1	-9.3	-2.0	-7.3
PT	-5.4	-8.6	-1.7	-6.9
FR	-5.5	-8.0	-1.0	-7.0
SK	-2.5	-8.3	-1.9	-6.4
CY	-6.5	-6.6	-0.6	-6.0
LU	1.0	-3.2	1.9	-5.1
SI	-4.3	-4.7	-0.9	-3.8
ES	-9.9	-9.4	-4.3	-5.1
EU27	-4.6	-5.7	-1.5	-4.2
CZ	-1.7	-5.8	-1.7	-4.1
DE	-3.3	-3.9	-0.6	-3.3
LT	0.2	-4.8	-1.4	-3.4
HU	0.5	-7.9	-2.7	-5.2
EE	-3.4	-5.7	-2.1	-3.6
DK	0.5	-3.0	-0.7	-2.3
LV	-3.6	-6.3	-3.6	-2.7
NL	-1.6	-3.4	-1.1	-2.3
BG	-1.0	-4.8	-2.8	-2.0
SE	-1.4	-3.1	-1.4	-1.7
IE	2.9	-2.4	-1.7	-0.7
PL	1.3	-1.4	-0.8	-0.6
HR	-7.7	-1.7	-1.3	-0.4
FI	-1.2	-2.7	-2.1	-0.6
RO	-0.2	-0.9	-1.0	0.1
BE	-5.3	-6.5	-0.4	-6.1

Source: Eurostat, National Accounts

([69]) Spain, Hungary, Greece, Latvia, Estonia, Bulgaria, Sweden, Ireland, Poland, Croatia, Finland.

Graph 2.8: **Employees and hours per worker, cumulative % change since 2009Q1**



(1) Countries are ranked by ascending order of % change in the number of employees between 2009q1 and 2019q4. Values for number of employees for Luxembourg and Malta are out of scale (+30 and +51%).
Source: Eurostat, National Accounts.

Graph 2.9: **Sectoral contribution to total employment growth: 2020Q4-2021Q2 (cumulated growth rates)**



(1) The chart shows the contribution of employment growth in each sector to total employment growth. Sectoral employment growth rates are reported in the Annex.
Source: Eurostat, National accounts

2.3.2. Employment developments at sectoral level

In 2020, the drop of employment wiped out part of the gains of the 2013-2019 recovery, with the most significant impact in manufacturing, wholesale, retail trade and accommodation. The Covid-19 caused job losses amounting to about 21% of the 14 million jobs created during the 2013-2019 recovery. The sectors contributing the most to these job losses were wholesale and retail trade and accommodation (-1.7 million) and manufacturing (-750 thousands). More than half of the employment growth of the 2013-2019 period was lost in Greece, Spain, Estonia and Germany. In trade and accommodation, employment reductions were severe in Bulgaria, Lithuania, and Czechia. In contrast, employment rose in

construction in 18 countries, notably in Hungary, Italy, Germany, France, Poland and Romania. In Germany, France and the Netherlands, the reduction of employment was substantial in professional and administrative and support services; in Italy, arts and activities of households were badly hit. With few exceptions, employment in the public sector grew, particularly in the Netherlands and Germany (Graph 2.9).

In the first half of 2021, job creation in industry and wholesale and retail trade drove the increase of employment in most Member States. Retail was the main engine of employment growth in almost all countries, notably in Austria, Portugal, Poland and Bulgaria where it expanded or in Spain and Estonia, where job destruction was less intense than in 2020 (Graph 2.9). The sectoral contribution of industry to total employment turned positive in almost all countries, in particular in Lithuania, Estonia, Czechia, Slovenia and Portugal where it accounted for more than 40% of total growth. In a few countries, including Spain, Croatia, Poland, and, to a lesser extent, Germany and Italy, job destruction in this sector has held back total employment growth. Employment in construction rebounded in almost all Member States, notably in Italy, Portugal, Poland, Sweden and Spain.

Not all sectors have recovered from the recession, in particular high-contact services and manufacturing. In general, the effect of the recession has been persistent in sectors more exposed to the lockdown (Graph 2.11). In particular, *high-contact affected sectors* ([70]) have been strongly hit. Compared to the last quarter of 2019, the median employment reduction in the second quarter of 2021 was 3.5 pps, with very high declines of about 11 pps and 18 pps in Spain and Ireland. In some countries, the impact has been protracted also in *low-contact, other* sectors – which includes manufacturing. For several countries (e.g. Bulgaria, Denmark, Germany, Czechia, France, Poland, Slovakia and Spain) the drop of employment in manufacturing was quite significant even when output has recovered. In *low-contact services* employment expanded during the crisis in most countries, especially in Lithuania (20 pps), Poland (7 pps) and Bulgaria (3 pps). Finally, in all countries, except Lithuania and Slovakia, employment increased in *high-contact less affected sectors*, which comprises construction, public administration and health.

During the pandemic, the share of routine intensive occupations dropped in almost all countries. Graph 2.12 reports the developments of employment with 44 ISCO occupations clustered according to their degree of automation. Especially in Ireland, France, Poland and Slovenia, employment in routine intensive occupations declined during the pandemic. In several other countries, employment in less routine intensive occupations increased (Portugal, Spain, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Czechia, and Poland) or contracted less (Ireland, Slovenia, and Austria) than in routine intensive occupations. The drop of employment in manufacturing may be due to supply-chain bottlenecks linked to divergences on a global scale in the reopening of the economy and overwhelmed transportation networks. However, it may also reflect the effect on labour demand of the acceleration of long-term trends such as artificial intelligence and additive manufacturing. ([71]) As a consequence, the structure of employment changed with reductions in the share of routine jobs in total employment larger than 4 pps in Greece, Spain and France (Graph 2.10). ([72])

Graph 2.10: **Share of routine occupations (as % of total employment)**



(1) Routine tasks intensive occupations are based on a routine task index built as in Autor and Dorn, 2013; see Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe 2019.
Source: Eurostat, O*Net.

([70]) See the legend to Graph 2.11 for a description of the groups.

([71]) Additive manufacturing enables the creation of lighter and stronger components. Using a single machine to craft a complex finished part may replace vast numbers of production jobs. Yet, higher product customization and shorter time-to-market entail an expansion of the market, thus fostering labour demand.

([72]) See Chapter 1 (Section 1.5.2) for a brief discussion of how routinisation may influence employment growth.

Graph 2.11: **Employment developments by sector groups (2019Q4=100)**



(1) High-contact affected sectors are Wholesale and retail Trade, Transports, Accommodation and food services, Arts and household activities. High-contact, less affected sectors are Construction, Public administration, and Health. Low-contact Services are Information and Communication, Financial, Professional, scientific and technical activities and Real estate. Low-contact other are Manufacturing and Agriculture.
Source: Eurostat, National Accounts

Graph 2.12: **Employment in high- and low-routine intensive occupations (2015=100)**



(1) Routine tasks intensive occupations are based on a routine task index built as in Autor and Dorn, 2013; see Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe 2019.
Source: DG EMPL computations on Eurostat and O*net

Box 2.1: **Female employment performance by age groups and family types in 2020**

In thirteen countries, women with children have higher employment growth than men with children. In 6 Member States, employment growth of mothers is larger than employment growth of fathers. Employment reduction for both groups are found in 17 countries; in this group, women with children experience a lower contraction than men children in 10 countries (notably in Latvia, Slovakia, Greece and Portugal). Graph 1 shows for different family types the gender employment growth gap for those with and without children. Since the presence of school-age children may influence the decision to work, the focus is on the 25-54 age group. Countries are grouped in four quadrants. In the first quadrant, female employment growth is higher than men, independently of the presence of children. Eight countries belongs to this group (including Germany, Denmark, and Sweden). In the second quadrant, there are countries where employment growth for women with children is larger than for men but lower for women without children (e.g. Malta, Slovakia, and Latvia). In the third quadrant, female employment growth is always below male's growth. Finally, in the fourth quadrant, there are countries where having a child is associated to worse female performance than men compared to not having it.

In terms of labour market performance, single women are not always penalised for having a child. In 5 countries, single women have higher employment growth than men, either with children (Romania, Estonia and Luxembourg) or irrespectively of whether with or without children (Malta and Denmark).

In fourteen countries, women in a couple with children have higher employment growth than men in a couple with children. In six countries, Including Luxembourg, Portugal, Denmark and Slovakia, women in a couple had in 2020 higher employment growth than men. In nine countries (e.g. Spain, Lithuania, Greece and Finland), female employment in a couple without children fell relative to men, while it increased for women with children. In Germany and Malta, compared to couples without children, married mothers have a significant advantage relative to married fathers; at the opposite side stand Bulgaria, Czechia and Hungary.

Gender employment growth gap, with and without children 2019-2020



2.3.3. Employment developments by socio-economic groups and contract status

2.3.3.1. *The effect of the pandemic on female employment*

The fall in female employment and participation rates (relative to the men) of the second quarter of 2020 was generally temporary. Six countries (Bulgaria, Finland, Luxembourg, Latvia, Malta and the Netherlands) did not suffer from a decline in female employment and participation rate relative to men. For 12 countries, (e.g. Croatia, Hungary and Poland), both rates declined. Only for 11 (15) countries, the female employment (participation) rate relative to men was lower in the first quarter of 2021 than in 2019 (Graph 2.A1.2 in the Annex).

Having children is not always a constraint for female employment relative to men, in particular for married mothers in Germany and Malta and single mothers in Luxembourg, Slovakia and Croatia (Box 2.1). In most Member States, married mothers show a stronger labour market attachment than other female groups. Moreover, compared to women in a couple without children, married mothers have a better employment growth. This is observed in 14 countries, with a gap in the respective growth rates between 0.4 in Sweden and 31 pps in Malta (Table 2.A1.3 in the Annex, row "*difference in couple*").

Graph 2.13: **Percentage of countries with female employment growth larger than male by age group and presence of children**



Source: European Commission based on Eurostat ad hoc extraction

There are significant cross-countries differences in the gender employment gap by age. In the majority of countries, in 2020 younger women without children fared better than men (either in absolute terms or compared to women with children). As depicted in Graph 2.13 and the table in the Annex, women performed better than men in a large number of countries and for most age groups (except the age group 20-30 with children).

Youth employment remain below the pre-crisis levels in several countries. In the second quarter of 2021, youth employment remained below the pre-pandemic level in all countries except Cyprus and France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands. The largest gaps (between 10% and 20%) were recorded in Slovakia, Bulgaria, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Greece, Romania, and Lithuania.

2.3.3.2. *Employment developments by contract type and employment status*

During the Covid-19 recession, temporary employment dropped sharply in most Member States. With the outbreak of the pandemic, the majority of expiring temporary contracts was not renewed. Compared to 2019, temporary employees fell in the EU by 2.8 million in 2020. About three quarters of these losses were concentrated in Spain, Germany Poland, Italy and France. ([73]) Conversely, large reductions were recorded in Greece (20%), Slovakia (18.8%) and Slovenia (17.4%). Therefore, the share of temporary contracts fell in all countries except Denmark (see Graph 2.15 and Table 2.A1.2 in the Annex). In the first half of 2021, temporary employment in the EU was 2.2 million below the level of the fourth quarter of 2019, but around 700 thousands (3.2 %) higher than in the first half of 2020; the aggregate figure reflected a strong rebound in the Netherlands and to a lesser extent in Spain, Italy and Romania. Conversely, Poland, France and Slovakia recorded significant negative changes. Boosted by increases in Italy, Spain and the Netherlands, female temporary employment rebounded by +490 thousands (4.4%), significantly more than the male component. When considering younger workers (25-34 years), in the EU the share of temporary employment slightly declined, with increases in 16 countries, most notably in the

([73]) In France, however, and similarly to Belgium, the intensity of the decline was milder (-6.4%), given the extension of the eligibility of national short-time work schemes to temporary workers.

Graph 2.14: **Employment growth by contract type, cumulative changes since 2008Q1**



(a) Age group: 15-64 years old. (b) Moving averages on seasonal adjusted data
Source: European Commission based on Eurostat data, Labour Force Survey.

Netherlands, Malta, Bulgaria, Romania and Belgium.

Self-employment was also affected, in particular the solo self-employed and with some differences across countries. In 2020, the EU self-employed (LFS data) fell by 1.5%, mostly solo self-employed. Particularly hit were self-employed in Germany (-11.2%) and Italy (-2.4%); 14 countries, however, recorded a growth, particularly Poland, France, the Netherlands and Hungary. Compared to one year earlier, in the first quarter of 2021 self-employed in the EU was down by 5.2% (-1.4 million), almost entirely due to the solo self-employed. Largest gaps relative to the pre-pandemic levels were recorded in Romania, Italy and the Netherlands. In the first half of 2021, EU self-employment was 1.6 million below the pre-pandemic level of the fourth quarter 2019. Weak signs of rebounding are being recorded in 11 countries, most notably in Poland, Hungary and France.

The employment recovery has been driven by temporary contracts. Between the first and the second quarter of 2021, in most countries total employment growth was supported by fixed-term contracts (Graph 2.14). In 11 Member States, the growth of temporary contracts accounted for more than 50% of the increase in the total number of employees, notably in France, Finland, Slovakia, Sweden, Spain, Austria and Italy. In some countries (Lithuania, Estonia, Czechia and Croatia), it was the only source of total employment growth. This reflected the economic rebound of sectors such as tourism, but also remaining uncertainty at the onset of the recovery. Conversely, a strong increase in permanent employment was recorded in Greece, Malta, Luxembourg and Denmark (Table 2.A1.2 in the Annex and Graph 2.15).

Graph 2.15: **Contribution of temporary and permanent contracts to the growth of employees: 2021Q1-2021Q2**



Source: Eurostat, LFS

2.3.3.3. *Employment developments by level of education*

Since the fourth quarter of 2019, EU employment of workers with a lower educational attainment declined significantly. In the second quarter of 2021, it remained about 8% below the pre-pandemic level. Major losses were recorded in Portugal – where the share of the lower educated remains considerably higher than the EU average (35% versus 16%) – in Latvia, Slovenia, Romania, and Slovakia. Employment also declined, though to a lesser extent (3%), for those with secondary education. With the relevant exception of Germany and Finland, employment of those with tertiary education have been increasing throughout the crisis and subsequent recovery. In 18 countries, employment growth for the tertiary education group more than offset losses of the less educated.

2.4. LONG-TERM UNEMPLOYMENT

In 2020, the share of long-term unemployment fell in most countries, mirroring the rise in the unemployment probability. At the early stages of a recession, higher job destruction implies an increase in the share of short-term unemployed. In 2020, the share of those who are looking for a job for at least a year fell in all countries. The largest drops were recorded in countries with more flexible labour markets (e.g. Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Latvia, Lithuania and Ireland, Romania) or a high share of temporary contracts (e.g. Portugal, Spain and the Netherlands) - Graph 2.17.

In the second quarter of 2021, long-term unemployment increased in almost all countries, reflecting the low probability of finding a job. The EU share of long-term unemployed increased from 36% in the first quarter to 40.4% in the second quarter, which is slightly below the 41.8% reached before the pandemic in the fourth quarter of 2019. The gap with the pre-pandemic level remains high both in countries where the long-term unemployment represents less than one third of total unemployment (e.g. Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Luxembourg, Poland and Sweden) and countries where it accounts for a larger share, notably Italy, Greece and, to a less extent, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain. The reallocation pressures that may stem from the pandemic may increase long-term unemployment. Policies combating the scarring effects of the crisis and supporting a fast reallocation of labour will help to reduce long-term unemployment.

Graph 2.16: **Labour shortages index**



(1) For 2021 average of first three quarters. Data unavailable for Luxembourg. Countries ranked in ascending order of labour shortages in 2021 (average of first three quarters). Shortages are proxied by the variable "factors limiting production: labour".
Source: The European Business and Consumer Survey

Graph 2.17: **Long-term unemployment (12 months or more) as percentage of total unemployment, 2013-2021**

(1) 2021 refers to 2021Q2
Source: Eurostat, LFS

2.4.1. Labour shortages

In 2020, labour shortages declined in most Member States as a result of the pandemic. Following the declines in hours worked across Europe as a result of the pandemic, vacancies fell in almost all Member States. This reduction was driven by the government restrictions and the resulting limitations to the economic activity. However, compared to the 2008 financial crisis, firms reported stronger labour shortages in 2020. With the easing of the lockdown measures and the

gradual economic recovery, in several Member States vacancies started to rise again, getting closer to pre-pandemic levels in the third quarter of 2021, while unemployment declined only marginally (Austria, Croatia, Denmark, Hungary), remained unchanged (Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Baltics) or even increased slightly (Croatia, Poland, the Netherlands, Sweden) – see Annex).

It is too early to interpret the increase in labour shortages without a reduction of unemployment as a signal of hiring difficulties and rising skills mismatches. Labour shortages are on the rise again in most Member States with sizable increases in Austria, Belgium, Germany, Croatia, Germany, Lithuania, Portugal, Slovenia and Slovakia. The change in vacancies needs to be assessed jointly with the evolution of the unemployment rate. The sharp increase in vacancies with no major drops in the unemployment rate do not necessarily imply a deterioration of the process linking unemployed people to vacant posts due to skills or geographical mismatches, and thus a signal of rising structural unemployment. Indeed, employers post vacancies in anticipation of future developments in their activities, while it may take time to find and select candidates for new posts.

Labour shortages display quite differentiated patterns across countries and sectors. They are rising in most Member States, and in 2021, they were highest both in countries with relatively high labour market slack (e.g. France, Greece, Italy and Ireland), and in countries with low slack (e.g. Germany and many Eastern European countries) (Graph 2.16).

Patterns differ across sectors (Graph 2.18). In industry, labour shortages are rising rapidly and exceed their pre-pandemic levels in many Member States, and particularly in sub-sectors severely hit during the lockdown. In services, they remain overall below their pre-pandemic levels. In all Member States, labour shortages are emerging in sectors that account for a larger share of employment in services than industry. In terms of employment, in eight Member States (Slovenia, Germany, Italy, Croatia, Hungary, Lithuania, Finland and Austria), sub-sectors of industry with a strong increase in labour shortages account for at least 25% of total employment in industry; for services, sub-sectors with a strong increase of labour shortages represent at least 40% of total employment in services. ([74]) Although labour shortages are reported in more branches of industry than of services, in terms of employment they represent a lower share than services. ([75])

The possibility of persistent labour shortages cannot be excluded as the economic recovery gains pace. According to Eurofound (2021), job vacancy rates are currently escalating in the construction and information and communication sectors, where skills shortages constituted a structural problem already before the Covid-19 pandemic and are hence mainly unrelated to the short-term changes during the crisis. Labour demand exceeds labour supply because of the rapid increase in the labour demand during the current swift recovery, but also because of the drop in the labour supply linked to ageing and health risks ([76]) and the lower inflow of mobile and migrant workers due to restrictions. It is unclear whether labour mobility and migration would recover to pre-pandemic levels, as these new risks could have re-shaped the preferences of mobile workers, while the process of wage convergence within the EU also weakened incentives for mobility from low- to high-income countries. In services, notably high-contact occupations, individuals' concerns of contracting the virus and the risk of possible recurrent lockdowns might have induced people to reconsider returning to their previous jobs. This might have restrained labour supply or led to a reallocation between high- and low-contact occupations.

([74]) Due to the lack of data, services excludes wholesale and retail trade.

([75]) For industry, especially for Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, France and Italy. The increase in labour shortages in services is generalised across sub-sectors in Denmark, Slovenia, Portugal and, to some extent, Sweden, Latvia and Austria. Strong increases in specific sub-sectors of services have occurred in Belgium (rental and leasing activities), Finland (employment activities), Malta (computer programming), Netherlands (air transport), and Slovenia (postal and courier activities). In Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Estonia, Czechia, Malta and Slovakia, labour shortages increases in industry are concentrated in fewer activities.

([76]) Demographic factors may also have contributed to the weak expansion of labour supply.

Graph 2.18: **Labour shortages in main macro-sectors**



Source: The European Business and Consumer Survey

Graph 2.19: **Nominal compensation per employee, 2018, 2019, 2020, annual % change**



(1) Wages are measured by the indicator "Nominal compensation per employee", which is calculated as total compensation of employees divided by the total number of employees. The total compensation is defined as the total remuneration, in cash or in kind, payable by an employer to an employee in return for work done by the latter during the accounting period and it has two components: i) Wages and salaries payable in cash or in kind; and ii) Social contributions payable by employers. The indicators are based on national currency values. Aggregates are weighted averages. Countries are ranked in descending order of growth in 2020.
Source: Eurostat, National accounts

2.5. TRENDS IN WAGES AND LABOUR COSTS

2.5.1. Nominal wage developments

In 2020, compensation per employee expanded at a lower rate than in 2019 in most of the Member States and even declined in some, reflecting the use of short-time work schemes. In 2020, wages continued to expand in 20 Member States, although at a lower rate than in 2019 (Graph 2.19). This deceleration reflected both the effect of short-time work schemes ([77]) and of the weak demand for labour during the recession – in particular in some central and Eastern European countries such Latvia and Romania (graph Phillips curve in annex). In seven Member States, compensation per employee dropped with large reductions in countries with a high share of workers in short-time work schemes.

Yet, all Member States experienced large increases in compensation per hour in 2020 (Graph 2.20). The largest gaps between compensation per hour and per person employed were recorded in Greece, Spain, Malta, Austria, Portugal, Slovakia and Italy (all above 7 pps). Only in a few countries the gap between the two measures of wages was relatively small (i.e. less than one pp), namely Romania, France, Croatia, Poland and Ireland.

Graph 2.20: **Growth of compensation per person employed and per hours worked: 2020-2019**



Source: Eurostat, National accounts

In the first half of 2021, these trends were reverted. Compensation per employee turned positive in almost all Member States, and following the economic recovery as result of the

([77]) The effect on wages depends on the design of national schemes. In countries where benefits are paid directly to the employees and recorded as social transfers, the short-time working leads to a drop of wages, which is larger than in countries where benefits are paid as a subsidy to employers that continue paying full salary to for the reduced number of hours (da Silva et al. 2020).

gradual withdrawal of lockdown measures and normalising working hours, nominal compensation per hour fell in several Member States (Graph 2.21). Yet, in some countries both measures of wages increased, reflecting the ongoing swift recovery (e.g. Spain, Finland or Italy, Portugal and Sweden) or underlying catching-up or both (e.g. Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania). Generally, in countries where nominal wages dropped between the fourth quarter 2019 and the second quarter of 2020, the wage loss was recuperated during the recovery; the only exception is Greece where nominal wages are about 1% below the level of the last quarter of 2019. In Central and Eastern European Member States, wages continued to increase, supporting convergence to western levels.

Graph 2.21: **Growth of compensation per person employed and per hours worked : 2021Q2-2020Q4**



Source: Eurostat, National accounts

In 2020, the compensation per employee adjusted for labour productivity (i.e. nominal unit labour costs) increased in almost all countries. The growth of unit labour costs (NULC) was higher than the growth of the compensation per employee, notably in Malta, France, Croatia, Greece, Belgium and Portugal (Table 2.2). Only in Ireland, Italy and Lithuania was the growth of unit labour costs lower than compensation per employee due to the increase in productivity (per person). In 19 countries, the NULC based on hours were lower than based on persons, especially in Belgium, Bulgaria and Austria.

The aggregate wage figure masks differentiated patterns across sectors and countries. In 2020, nominal compensation per employee in the public sector increased in all countries except Italy (Graph 2.22). The largest increases were recorded in Central and Eastern European countries. In contrast, in the private sector they decreased in half of the countries. Within the private sector, nominal compensation per employee followed similar patterns in services and industry across Member States (Graph 2.23). The largest drops in compensation per employee were recorded in trade, transport and accommodation, followed by the building and construction. Eastern European countries as well as Cyprus, Italy, France, Malta and Spain were particularly hit, experiencing falls in these sectors of more than 6%. In the first quarter of 2021, while compensation per employee in industry recovered in all countries, it continued to fall in wholesale and retail trade, as a new wave of contagion led to more selective lockdown measures that hit mainly services. In the second quarter of 2021, wages grew in all countries except Croatia, where they continued falling in wholesale and retail trade.

Graph 2.22: **Nominal compensation per employee in public and private sector, 2020 and 2021Q2, % change**



(1) The public sector is defined as public administration and defence, education, health and social work, personal service activities. (2) Countries are ranked by ascending order of growth of compensation per employee in the public sector in 2020.
Source: Eurostat.

Table 2.2: **Compensation per employee, productivity and unit labour costs (NULC) growth rates, 2020**

	Compensation per employee	Labour productivity	NULC, per hour	NULC, per person	GDP deflator
LT	7.3	1.5	6.7	5.7	1.5
BG	7.2	-2.1	7.6	9.5	4.2
RO	7.0	-2.2	9.7	9.3	3.8
LV	5.5	-1.3	6.2	6.9	-0.1
EE	5.3	-0.3	5.1	5.5	-0.3
NL	4.7	-3.3	8.4	8.3	2.3
PL	3.7	-2.4	8.0	6.3	4.1
SK	3.6	-2.5	5.8	6.3	2.4
SI	3.5	-3.7	7.0	7.4	1.2
CZ	3.2	-4.2	7.1	7.7	4.4
IT	2.8	1.5	0.9	1.3	1.2
SE	2.5	-1.5	4.0	4.1	1.5
IE	2.4	7.5	-5.6	-4.7	-1.2
DK	2.3	-1.4	4.0	3.8	2.6
HR	2.1	-7.0	10.0	9.8	-0.1
PT	2.0	-6.7	9.1	9.3	1.9
HU	1.9	-3.7	7.7	5.9	5.9
AT	1.7	-5.2	5.4	7.3	2.3
ES	1.3	-3.5	4.8	5.0	1.1
FI	0.8	-0.8	1.3	1.6	1.3
LU	0.4	-3.6	2.8	4.1	4.3
DE	0.4	-3.8	3.4	4.3	1.6
MT	-0.3	-10.7	10.4	11.7	1.3
EL	-0.7	-7.9	7.3	7.8	-0.8
BE	-1.5	-5.6	0.0	4.4	1.3
FR	-3.0	-7.0	4.2	4.3	2.5
CY	-3.1	-4.7	1.6	1.6	-1.2

(1) Countries are ranked in descending order of compensation per employee. (2) The growth of nominal unit labour costs per person (NULC) is the difference between the growth of nominal compensation per employee and the growth of labour productivity.
Source: Eurostat, National Accounts, and ECB

2.5.2. Real wages and productivity

After a reduction in 2020 in about half of the Member States, real wages turned positive in the first half of 2021 in all countries. In the EU (euro area) real compensation per employee decreased by 0.9% (1.3). Negative wage growth was recorded in Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czechia, Spain, Italy, France, and Luxemburg (Graph 2.24). Positive wage growth continued along the pre-pandemic trend in countries with GDP per capita catching up to the EU average, namely Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Slovenia and the Baltics. This led to a decline in the dispersion of real wages within the EU. In the first half of 2021 all Member States recorded positive wage growth. The largest increases were recorded in the Netherlands (11.2%), Croatia (10.4%), Latvia (9.8%) and Bulgaria (7.7%).

In 2020, the decline of productivity growth was much larger than the decline of real wages. Labour productivity decreased in all Member States except for Ireland, Estonia and Lithuania (Table 2.2). The most significant declines were recorded in Southern European countries, namely in Malta (-10%), France (-7.2%), Italy and Spain (-7.1%), Greece (-6.7%), Portugal (-6%) and in Cyprus (-4.7%). This large drop in productivity (per person) is the counterpart of the large reduction in hours worked in these countries and the widespread use of job retention schemes. The

Graph 2.23: **Real compensation per employee and productivity, 2020 (left panel) and 2021Q2 (right)**



(1) Real compensation is nominal compensation per employee deflated with the GDP deflator. (2) On the 45 degree line, real wage growth equals productivity growth. Points above (below) the line represent countries where productivity growth is above (below) real wage growth.
Source: European Commission based on Eurostat data.

biggest differences between real wages and productivity were recorded in some Southern and Eastern European countries, namely Malta (9.1 pps), Croatia (8.4 pps), Greece (8 pps), Lithuania (7.9 pps), Latvia (6.6 pps) and Slovenia (both at 6.1 pps) (Graph 2.23, left panel, countries below the diagonal line). For Italy and France, the sharp fall in productivity was followed by an almost similar fall in real wages.

In the first half of 2021 productivity developments started improving in all Member States. The significant negative drop in labour productivity in 2020, as a result of labour hoarding and reduced working hours as employees were kept on the payroll during the recession, was followed by positive productivity growth in the first half of 2021 in almost all Member States in particular in Ireland, Estonia, Croatia, Latvia, Slovenia and Greece).

2.6. COST COMPETITIVENESS

2.6.1. Real effective exchange rate developments

The pandemic has curbed cost pressures in all Member States; yet, competitive developments continued to reflect the catching-up process in low-wage countries. Over the period 2013-2018, Central and Eastern European countries experienced an appreciation of their real effective exchange rates, an indicator of loss of cost competitiveness relative to their main trading partners (Graph 2.24). This increase concerned more wages than prices of output or exports, implying a fall of profit margins. The pandemic has reduced the rate of real appreciation of catching-up countries, without modifying the characteristics of the convergence process, namely a strong increase in wages and a gradual decline of

Graph 2.25: **Nominal compensation per employee by sector, 2020, annual % change**



(1) Countries are ranked by ascending order of changes in average compensation per employee (total economy) in 2020.
Source: Eurostat

profit margins. Exceptions to this pattern are Lithuania, Slovenia and Croatia that all experienced a strong real depreciation.

Graph 2.24: **REERs based on various deflators, cumulative % change over the period 2019-2020**



(1) Countries are ranked by descending order of the variation in the ULC-based REER in 2019-2020.
Source: AMECO

In 2020, developments in euro area countries were less supportive of rebalancing than in past years. Since 2021 nominal unit labour costs have continued to grow faster in countries characterised by a current account surplus before the 2008-2009 financial crisis ('surplus countries') than in countries with previous current account deficits ('deficit countries'). This divergence increased in 2019 and reached almost 2 pps, while nominal unit labour costs gained pace in both groups of countries (Graph 2.26), thanks to positive wage developments. Compared to 2019, nominal unit labour costs increased in 2020 at a higher rate in 'surplus' than in 'deficit' countries, respectively from 3% to 5% and from 0.9% to 3.5%. However, caution should be paid in comparing cost competitiveness developments based on unit labour costs across countries; the different institutional settings through which governments have subsidised job retention schemes during the pandemic (i.e. via transfers to firms or workers to compensate labour earners for the reduced working hours) makes the indicator based on unit labour costs less informative of underlying cost competitiveness developments.

Graph 2.26: **NULC in deficit and surplus countries within the euro area, weighted average, 1999-2020, annual % change**



(1) Surplus countries are Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria and Finland. Deficit countries are all other euro area Member States. This classification is based on the current account situation around 2008.
Source: Eurostat

APPENDIX 1
Annex to the chapter 2

Table 2.A1.1: **Employment and activity rates and shares of marginally attached and discouraged workers over all inactive workers, various time periods**

	Employment rate				Activity rate				Share of marginally attached workers				Share of discouraged workers			
	2018	2019	2020	2021Q2	2018	2019	2020	2021Q2	2018	2019	2020	2021Q2*	2018	2019	2020	2021Q2
NL	67.8	68.8	68.4	71.0	80.3	80.9	80.9	84.2	11.9	11.6	12.1	29.7	6.0	6.0	5.7	6.3
DE	67.3	68.2	67.4	66.5	78.6	79.2	79.2	78.4	8.8	8.8	15.3	14.7	3.0	3.0	3.0	5.2
SE	68.3	68.3	67.2	67.6	82.7	82.9	82.5	84.3	7.8	10.3	12.3	17.3	5.4	5.4	6.7	12.7
EE	68.3	68.7	66.9	65.8	79.1	78.9	79.3	78.3	19.2	17.7	19.2	16.7	11.4	11.4	10.4	9.6
DK	65.0	66.0	65.6	66.4	78.2	79.1	79.0	79.3	15.3	17.0	17.0	14.0	3.9	3.9	4.2	3.2
MT	62.4	64.0	64.7	65.8	74.7	75.9	77.1	77.2	11.8	9.3	8.4	2.6	1.6	1.6	2.0	:
LT	65.0	65.6	64.5	64.7	77.3	78.0	78.5	77.9	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.0	1.4	1.4	1.4	2.5
CZ	64.9	65.0	64.2	63.6	76.6	76.7	76.4	76.0	3.9	3.7	3.5	4.1	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.8
LV	64.5	65.0	64.2	62.3	77.7	77.3	78.2	75.7	14.0	15.0	13.4	12.5	6.9	6.9	6.8	7.9
AT	64.9	65.3	64.1	63.1	76.8	77.1	76.6	76.6	19.3	18.9	20.8	15.4	5.4	5.4	5.6	4.9
CY	61.8	63.4	62.9	63.4	75.0	76.0	75.8	76.7	6.7	5.1	4.6	8.5	4.1	4.1	2.8	5.7
IE	62.9	63.7	62.1	63.2	72.9	73.3	71.9	74.2	23.1	21.8	25.6	24.6	9.2	9.2	8.4	13.3
FI	61.9	62.4	61.5	62.9	77.9	78.3	78.3	80.9	13.5	12.0	14.2	11.3	9.3	9.3	8.3	6.4
SI	62.3	62.2	61.2	62.0	75.0	75.2	74.6	75.2	9.6	7.4	6.5	6.5	2.1	2.1	1.7	6.4
LU	61.0	61.7	61.1	63.8	71.1	72.0	72.2	74.0	17.1	15.7	16.6	13.0	7.0	7.0	6.1	7.3
PT	61.8	62.4	61.1	61.5	75.1	75.5	74.3	75.3	11.3	10.9	13.1	8.8	7.3	7.3	6.7	5.7
HU	60.1	60.8	60.2	62.8	71.9	72.6	72.8	76.0	8.5	9.1	10.5	6.6	3.8	3.8	3.9	4.6
SK	60.1	60.6	59.5	60.2	72.4	72.7	72.4	74.0	5.4	4.7	5.5	5.4	2.8	2.8	2.5	3.0
EU27	59.5	60.0	59.2	59.4	73.1	73.4	72.9	73.6	10.9	10.5	12.6	12.1	6.2	6.2	5.9	6.8
PL	59.1	59.4	59.2	59.9	70.1	70.6	71.0	72.6	11.9	11.4	10.9	6.6	3.7	3.7	3.0	2.3
BG	58.3	60.4	58.8	58.2	71.5	73.2	72.2	71.9	7.2	5.6	6.0	7.8	6.7	6.7	5.3	5.5
EA19	59.1	59.7	58.8	59.2	73.4	73.6	72.9	73.6	11.5	11.2	13.9	13.8	6.9	6.9	6.6	7.8
RO	58.2	58.6	57.8	53.7	67.8	68.6	69.2	65.8	5.3	3.3	3.2	3.7	4.0	4.0	2.0	3.2
BE	56.4	57.0	56.4	56.6	68.6	69.0	68.6	69.3	8.7	8.9	9.4	8.1	3.6	3.6	3.4	3.4
FR	56.5	56.6	56.1	57.6	71.9	71.7	71.0	72.8	7.1	7.0	8.4	8.2	4.2	4.2	4.0	4.5
ES	54.9	55.7	53.6	54.9	73.7	73.8	72.2	73.8	10.1	9.7	13.3	11.5	6.7	6.7	6.2	7.8
HR	52.5	53.6	53.1	54.2	66.3	66.5	67.1	69.0	9.4	8.4	8.5	7.3	9.3	9.3	8.3	5.2
IT	51.2	51.6	50.7	50.7	65.6	65.7	64.1	64.5	19.5	19.0	20.1	19.9	15.1	15.1	14.8	15.6
EL	47.9	49.2	49.0	49.7	68.2	68.4	67.4	67.8	5.3	4.8	6.0	7.9	3.5	3.5	3.2	5.4

(1) Marginally attached workers are the inactive persons (aged 15-74) who are available to work but are not actively searching for a job, expressed as a share of the total inactive population. (2) Discouraged workers are marginally attached workers who are not seeking employment because they think no work is available. Employment is based on the resident concept. Employment and activity rates refer to age group 15-64. (3) Countries are ranked by descending order of the employment rate in 2020.
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey.
[*] Break in the time series

Table 2.A1.2: **Distribution employment by contract types and position, 2020 and 2021Q2, % and pps.**

	Open-ended contracts				Temporary contracts					Self -employed			
	2020	chg	2021Q2	chg	2020	chg	2021Q2	chg	2020Q4-2021Q2	2020	chg	2021Q2	chg
EU27	73.4	1.1	73.6	0.0	11.5	-1.3	12.1	1.1	-0.6	14.0	0.0	13.6	-0.6
LT	87.2	0.1	86.2	-0.9	1.1	-0.2	2.0	1.1	0.7	11.2	0.2	11.3	-0.3
EE	86.7	0.4	87.0	0.3	2.5	-0.2	1.9	-0.2	-1.2	10.6	-0.2	10.8	-0.4
BG	85.8	0.4	86.2	0.7	3.2	-0.7	3.0	-0.1	-1.2	10.4	0.3	10.2	-0.5
LV	84.9	-0.7	84.2	-0.2	2.4	-0.4	2.1	0.4	-0.9	12.1	1.2	13.0	-0.1
LU	83.4	0.6	81.2	-2.1	6.8	-1.4	8.7	2.3	0.8	8.0	0.4	8.3	0.3
HU	82.8	-0.5	82.9	-0.1	5.2	-0.7	4.7	-0.1	-0.9	11.8	1.2	12.1	0.2
DK	81.5	-0.2	82.6	1.2	10.0	0.1	9.0	-1.2	-1.2	8.1	0.2	8.2	0.2
AT	80.8	0.4	80.6	-0.7	7.2	-0.5	7.8	1.1	0.7	10.9	-0.1	10.3	-0.6
DE	80.7	1.0	81.5	0.0	9.8	-1.0	10.4	0.0	-0.2	8.3	-0.9	7.8	0.0
SK	79.3	1.3	81.5	2.2	5.8	-1.2	3.4	-2.3	-4.0	14.9	-0.1	15.0	0.0
IE	78.2	0.6	78.0	-0.6	7.7	-0.6	8.4	1.3	-0.5	13.6	-0.1	12.7	-0.9
SI	78.0	3.0	75.6	-2.5	9.6	-2.0	9.9	1.7	-1.7	10.9	-1.1	12.6	0.8
MT	77.2	0.6	78.9	0.6	6.8	-0.9	6.1	0.1	-2.2	15.9	0.3	15.0	-0.7
CZ	77.1	0.6	77.9	0.7	6.1	-0.7	6.3	0.4	-0.3	16.3	0.1	15.4	-1.0
BE	76.7	0.1	77.0	0.1	8.7	-0.6	9.0	0.7	-0.5	13.8	0.5	13.4	-0.6
SE	76.2	0.9	76.0	-0.4	13.9	-1.0	14.5	0.8	-0.8	9.6	0.0	9.2	-0.4
RO	75.3	0.6	81.7	7.0	1.0	-0.1	2.0	1.0	0.9	16.6	-0.2	13.2	-3.3
CY	74.9	0.1	76.8	1.9	11.5	-0.3	11.6	-0.4	-1.1	13.1	0.4	10.8	-1.8
FR	74.2	0.6	74.4	-0.3	13.5	-0.9	13.0	0.3	-1.5	12.1	0.3	12.1	-0.2
HR	74.2	2.4	73.7	-1.5	13.5	-2.5	12.8	0.4	-3.8	11.3	0.3	12.0	0.5
FI	73.8	0.8	70.6	-2.8	12.8	-0.8	15.3	2.0	0.3	13.0	0.0	13.4	0.5
EA19	73.3	1.1	72.8	-0.8	12.2	-1.3	13.1	1.6	-0.3	13.8	-0.1	13.4	-0.5
PT	69.3	2.7	70.7	0.9	15.0	-2.5	14.6	0.3	-2.6	15.4	-0.2	13.9	-1.7
NL	68.1	1.4	61.4	-6.9	14.8	-1.9	22.9	8.4	7.1	16.7	0.6	15.4	-1.4
IT	66.0	1.7	65.2	-1.5	11.7	-1.5	13.2	2.3	-0.3	21.1	-0.1	20.7	-0.7
PL	64.7	2.1	68.1	3.6	14.8	-2.7	12.5	-2.5	-4.1	18.3	0.5	18.2	0.0
ES	63.7	1.6	62.9	-1.9	20.2	-1.9	21.0	2.4	-1.0	15.6	0.4	15.5	-0.6
EL	61.3	1.7	60.9	-0.4	6.9	-1.6	7.0	0.3	-1.7	28.8	0.1	29.1	0.3

(1) Countries are ranked by descending share of open-ended contracts in 2020. (2) "chg" refers to the change (in pps) in the share compared with the previous year.
Source: Eurostat

Graph 2.A1.1:**Gender gap in the employment rates, 25-54 years**



(1) Gender gap is the ratio of female-to-male employment rates
Source: DG EMPL computations on Eurostat data

Table 2.A1.3: **Differences in employment growth rate and participation rate in percentage points between women with children of age less than 15 years and women without children, by household type**

	AT				BE				BG				CY			
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Single with children	36.9	-1.9	6.8	0.8	25.2	16.7	-0.1	-0.5	27.3	6.3	10.7	4.5	40.3	-26.4	-8.7	-1.3
Single without children	-7.2	-2.8	-1.5	-1.8	4.6	0.4	-0.7	-1.2	-10.0	-11.8	-0.8	-5.0	-4.5	6.1	1.1	-0.8
Difference	44.1	0.9	8.3	2.6	20.6	16.2	0.6	0.7	37.3	18.1	11.6	9.6	44.8	-32.5	-9.8	-0.6
Couple with children	0.1	1.2	-0.6	0.1	2.0	1.0	-0.3	-0.1	12.3	1.4	-1.3	-2.6	2.3	4.2	-0.3	0.6
Couple without children	-0.4	-0.5	-0.3	0.0	5.2	2.3	0.1	1.9	10.5	8.0	0.8	1.7	-9.5	-10.8	3.4	-1.6
Difference	0.5	1.7	-0.4	0.2	-3.2	-1.2	-0.4	-2.0	1.8	-6.6	-2.0	-4.3	11.9	15.0	-3.8	2.2
In other households with children	0.0	-1.3	1.0	2.8	-28.7	-25.6	-5.4	-1.6	-5.1	-2.2	-3.2	0.0	-13.0	5.6	-0.5	1.9
In other households without children	-5.7	-5.6	-1.7	-1.4	-7.3	-4.8	-1.3	-1.5	-13.6	-11.4	-1.4	-0.1	5.3	1.0	-0.7	-2.9
Difference	5.8	4.3	2.7	4.1	-21.4	-20.8	-4.1	-0.2	8.6	9.2	-1.9	0.0	-18.3	4.6	0.2	4.8
	CZ				DE				DK				EE			
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Single with children	4.1	4.5	-4.2	2.4	-7.6	-9.8	4.0	0.0	-6.2	1.1	0.0	0.0	-20.6	-8.9	0.8	-3.3
Single without children	-5.2	-1.3	-0.3	-0.2	-11.9	-7.8	-0.2	0.5	-3.3	4.6	11.4	9.1	-0.4	0.2	-0.2	1.8
Difference	9.3	5.8	-4.0	2.6	4.3	-2.0	4.2	-0.5	-2.9	-3.6	-11.4	-9.1	-20.2	-9.1	1.1	-5.1
Couple with children	0.2	-3.6	0.7	-1.1	2.7	10.2	-0.2	5.1	-2.9	-2.3	-0.3	-22.7	-1.2	-1.8	0.5	0.7
Couple without children	7.2	6.5	1.4	0.7	4.2	1.0	-0.5	-1.2	-2.1	-0.3	-21.7	-0.4	3.8	6.2	1.5	0.5
Difference	-7.0	-10.1	-0.7	-1.8	-1.5	9.2	0.3	6.3	-0.7	-2.0	21.3	-22.3	-5.0	-8.1	-0.9	0.2
In other households with children	-17.7	-18.6	-1.4	-5.7	-10.0	-13.1	-1.1	-0.9	20.0	35.0	0.0	0.0	-29.4	-9.6	2.4	4.3
In other households without children	-3.9	-7.2	-1.6	-2.4	-4.8	-4.7	-2.0	-0.8	1.5	-13.3	0.0	0.0	-10.2	-12.9	-2.2	5.0
Difference	-13.8	-11.5	0.1	-3.3	-5.2	-8.3	1.0	-0.2	18.5	48.3	0.0	0.0	-19.1	3.3	4.6	-0.7
	ES				FI				FR				EL			
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Single with children	-8.2	-9.6	-3.4	-2.0	:	-3.7	:	0.0	7.4	-7.0	1.7	-0.7	3.3	1.1	4.0	-3.0
Single without children	0.2	5.1	-1.3	-2.2	-2.0	-0.5	-10.1	32.7	1.7	1.5	3.5	0.1	-5.8	-5.4	-0.1	2.7
Difference	-8.3	-14.7	-2.1	0.1	:	-3.2	:	-32.7	5.7	-8.5	-1.8	-0.8	9.1	6.5	4.1	-5.7
Couple with children	-2.5	-2.4	-1.0	-1.1	-0.4	2.4	54.4	-7.9	0.4	0.5	0.1	0.0	-3.6	-1.1	-0.5	-0.9
Couple without children	-7.0	-9.4	-1.1	-0.7	-4.2	-6.5	-26.0	4.0	-3.1	-3.4	0.3	-1.1	5.7	2.8	-0.3	-1.1
Difference	4.6	7.0	0.1	-0.3	3.9	8.9	80.4	-11.9	3.5	3.9	-0.2	1.1	-9.2	-3.9	-0.3	0.2
In other households with children	-11.6	-14.9	-4.5	-2.7	14.8	-6.5	0.0	0.0	-13.2	-16.2	0.0	-2.2	-10.1	-12.1	-0.5	-7.2
In other households without children	-8.2	-8.7	-2.6	-3.0	-4.0	-9.7	-3.4	20.0	-8.3	-12.8	-2.3	-3.6	-4.1	-4.1	-3.1	-1.4
Difference	-3.4	-6.2	-1.9	0.3	18.8	3.2	3.4	-20.0	-4.9	-3.4	2.3	1.4	-5.9	-8.0	2.6	-5.8
	HR				HU				IE				IT			
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Single with children	-5.5	4.1	12.6	3.9	11.5	-6.0	-0.5	-1.1	:	-7.7	:	0.0	-8.3	-2.9	-2.3	-3.4
Single without children	-10.3	-13.8	-0.9	-0.2	4.0	-7.9	-1.8	0.6	-3.9	2.3	0.0	0.0	-1.4	-4.9	-1.3	-1.7
Difference	4.8	17.9	13.5	4.1	7.5	1.9	1.2	-1.7	:	-10.0	:	0.0	-6.9	1.9	-1.0	-1.6
Couple with children	-0.6	-1.5	0.3	-0.4	1.7	-1.6	-0.7	-2.5	-0.6	1.4	0.0	0.0	-1.7	-2.7	-1.2	-2.2
Couple without children	-2.4	2.4	-3.4	0.0	0.8	-1.1	1.0	-0.4	-4.3	-4.1	0.0	0.0	-4.0	-4.1	-1.3	-1.6
Difference	1.8	-3.9	3.6	-0.3	0.9	-0.5	-1.7	-2.1	3.7	5.4	0.0	0.0	2.4	1.4	0.1	-0.6
In other households with children	2.5	-1.9	2.7	-0.3	-7.5	-8.7	-0.5	-1.5	-9.5	-8.4	0.0	0.0	-14.6	-11.9	-3.9	-4.4
In other households without children	1.0	-1.0	2.6	-0.2	-5.5	-2.4	-0.1	0.7	-6.6	-7.8	-1.2	24.5	-1.9	-5.1	-1.8	-2.7
Difference	1.5	-0.9	0.1	-0.2	-2.0	-6.3	-0.3	-2.2	-3.0	-0.6	1.2	-24.5	-12.7	-6.8	-2.1	-1.6
	LT				LU				LV				MT			
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Single with children	11.9	1.1	3.8	2.0	-42.2	-13.7	6.4	-0.1	15.3	45.9	-4.2	10.1	5.9	26.7	0.0	6.8
Single without children	14.2	6.7	2.8	0.5	0.5	1.4	0.0	0.1	33.3	12.4	2.8	-0.7	-12.0	7.0	1.4	4.8
Difference	-2.3	-5.7	1.0	1.5	-42.7	-15.1	6.4	-0.2	-17.9	33.5	-7.0	10.8	17.8	19.7	-1.4	2.0
Couple with children	3.0	4.1	-0.2	0.8	2.7	4.5	-0.4	0.2	-16.5	-19.5	-1.9	-2.1	3.8	10.8	-0.1	4.7
Couple without children	0.5	-2.2	0.2	0.3	0.0	3.2	-0.2	3.7	-6.1	-2.5	5.0	6.4	-9.7	-20.6	-1.1	-3.7
Difference	2.5	6.3	-0.4	0.5	2.7	1.3	-0.2	-3.5	-10.5	-17.0	-7.0	-8.5	13.5	31.4	1.0	8.4
In other households with children	-16.2	-12.7	-0.7	0.4	5.4	-3.8	-0.9	7.1	2.4	-8.2	0.5	-3.5	13.5	30.2	-3.4	5.4
In other households without children	-13.1	-19.0	-2.5	-1.1	-0.7	12.1	-1.1	4.0	-8.4	-8.1	0.0	2.4	5.5	-2.3	-0.2	0.6
Difference	-3.1	6.3	1.8	1.5	6.1	-15.9	0.3	3.1	10.7	0.0	0.5	-5.9	8.1	32.6	-3.3	4.8
	NL				PL				PT				RO			
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Single with children	18.5	-1.5	1.1	0.0	0.7	-0.2	-2.1	0.6	9.2	-1.0	0.0	0.0	-0.3	10.9	-1.8	6.7
Single without children	-0.7	-5.3	1.8	0.0	-1.6	3.0	1.7	1.1	-10.0	-11.8	0.0	0.0	3.0	3.3	-0.9	1.2
Difference	19.2	3.8	-0.7	-0.1	2.4	-3.2	-3.8	-0.5	19.3	10.8	0.0	0.0	-3.3	7.6	-0.9	5.5
Couple with children	-2.3	-1.4	-1.2	-0.4	0.1	1.1	0.0	0.8	-6.5	-5.6	27.9	5.8	-3.2	-4.0	0.0	-0.6
Couple without children	0.1	0.3	-0.2	0.9	-9.4	-10.0	0.7	-0.1	-16.8	-13.4	0.0	0.0	5.5	2.9	0.9	-1.1
Difference	-2.4	-1.8	-1.0	-1.3	9.5	11.1	-0.8	1.0	10.3	7.9	27.9	5.8	-8.7	-6.9	-0.9	0.5
In other households with children	7.3	3.3	2.6	1.9	-0.7	-2.8	-0.1	-1.8	3.3	6.6	0.0	-1.6	2.0	-3.6	1.8	-0.4
In other households without children	-2.9	-0.6	0.3	-1.0	1.8	-0.6	1.3	0.1	3.2	4.2	-19.8	10.0	-2.1	-3.8	0.7	-0.1
Difference	10.2	3.8	2.3	2.9	-2.6	-2.2	-1.3	-1.8	0.1	2.4	19.8	-11.7	4.1	0.1	1.2	-0.3
	SE				SI				SK				EU 27			
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women

Source: Source: Eurostat ad hoc data extraction.

Graph 2.A1.2:**Gap between female and male employment and participation rates, 2020Q1-2021Q1 (relative to2019 average) age 25-54 years**



Source: DG EMPL computations on Eurostat data

Graph 2.A1.3: **Gender employment growth gap 2019-2020, by age groups, with children < 15 years if age, and without children**



Source: DG EMPL computations on Estat microdata
(1) Gender gap is the ratio of female-to-male employment rates

Graph 2.A1.4:**The Beveridge curve in EU Member States, 2001Q1-2021Q2, quarterly data, Industry**



(1) Share of manufacturing firms indicating that labour is a "factor limiting production", EU-Business and Economic survey.
Source: European Commission based on Eurostat data.

Graph 2.A1.5:**The Beveridge curve in EU Member States, 2001Q1-2021Q2, quarterly data, Industry, cont.**



(1) Share of manufacturing firms indicating that labour is a "factor limiting production", EU-Business and Economic survey.
Source: European Commission based on Eurostat data.

Graph 2.A1.6:**The Beveridge curve in EU Member States, 2001Q1-2021Q2, quarterly data, Services**



(1) Share of services firms indicating that labour is a "factor limiting production", EU-Business and Economic survey.
Source: European Commission based on Eurostat data

Graph 2.A1.7:**The Beveridge curve in EU Member States, 2001Q1-2021Q2, quarterly data, Services, cont**



(1) Share of services firms indicating that labour is a "factor limiting production", EU-Business and Economic survey
Source: European Commission based on Eurostat data

Table 2.A1.4: **Employment growth in different sectors, cumulative % change 2019-2020 and second quarter 2021**

	Industry		Construction		Wholesale and retail trade		Information, communication		Financial, insurance act.		Real estate activities		Prof., scientific and tech. act.		Public admin, health, edu.	
	2019-2020	2021 Q2	2019-2020	2021 Q2	2019-2020	2021 Q2	2019-2020	2021 Q2	2019-2020	2021 Q2	2019-2020	2021 Q2	2019-2020	2021 Q2	2019-2020	2021 Q2
MT	0.5	0.5	11.0	2.3	1.8	-1.2	-0.2	4.6	0.6	0.2	2.6	6.7	4.7	-0.8	2.3	1.4
LU	-0.4	0.0	3.6	0.0	0.4	0.0	2.8	0.0	1.7	0.0	3.8	0.0	0.6	0.0	5.1	0.0
PL	-3.3	-0.9	2.1	4.7	-1.9	5.2	6.4	8.1	2.5	-2.9	-11.7	1.3	5.8	4.2	0.7	2.3
BE	-0.4	0.7	0.9	1.1	-1.2	0.0	0.7	1.8	-1.8	-0.4	1.7	1.0	-0.6	2.0	1.1	0.7
CY	0.9	0.4	2.8	1.1	-3.9	0.3	1.6	1.8	-0.2	-1.0	0.3	-0.3	1.1	0.7	1.4	1.2
NL	-0.3	-0.1	0.8	1.5	-1.5	0.2	4.1	2.7	1.9	1.4	1.3	2.6	-4.9	2.8	2.5	1.3
DK	-2.7	-0.2	1.5	2.6	-2.3	0.3	1.7	2.9	2.1	0.4	0.9	0.2	-0.8	2.6	0.8	2.8
SI	-2.1	1.8	0.9	1.0	-1.6	-0.5	2.6	2.3	-2.1	-1.1	3.1	0.3	-4.0	0.4	2.1	1.5
DE	-2.3	-0.2	0.8	0.8	-2.1	-1.5	1.3	1.4	-0.8	-0.1	-0.2	0.4	-2.4	0.7	1.5	1.0
FR	-0.9	0.2	1.4	1.5	-1.1	0.2	0.4	1.7	-0.9	0.7	0.0	0.2	-3.1	1.4	-0.5	0.0
HR	-0.5	4.2	5.5	9.9	-1.5	-0.2	-1.7	-0.5	0.0	23.2	10.9	-8.7	-2.0	-3.6	-1.7	10.7
SE	-1.8	0.9	-0.8	1.6	-3.9	0.2	4.9	3.2	2.3	1.6	1.5	6.8	-1.4	-0.7	-0.7	0.6
EL	-2.0	5.1	-3.4	-3.4	-1.8	-2.9	-2.3	2.5	0.3	-9.7	-3.7	2.0	-0.2	-2.2	3.3	0.6
CZ	-3.3	0.9	1.5	0.0	-3.0	0.1	3.5	0.3	-1.9	0.7	0.3	-0.8	-4.6	2.2	2.1	1.5
FI	0.0	-1.5	-0.7	-1.2	-7.2	0.1	3.1	4.7	0.0	0.9	4.2	12.3	1.5	5.2	0.1	2.2
EU27_	-2.4	0.2	0.9	2.8	-3.3	-0.3	2.2	3.3	-0.6	0.2	-1.0	0.2	-2.1	1.5	0.6	1.2
IE	2.1	0.0	-6.5	0.0	-6.3	0.0	7.5	0.0	8.1	0.0	30.3	0.0	-4.6	0.0	2.8	0.0
LT	-1.0	9.2	-5.0	7.5	-4.5	-4.6	5.9	23.9	27.6	10.1	-16.6	29.5	7.2	1.6	0.4	-1.2
EA19	-1.9	0.1	0.4	2.4	-3.6	-1.0	1.4	3.0	-0.7	0.2	-0.3	-0.2	-2.4	1.4	0.7	1.0
AT	-1.2	0.9	0.1	2.5	-4.9	1.1	2.0	2.5	-0.4	1.0	4.5	0.7	-2.4	2.4	0.5	1.3
PT	-2.0	3.0	0.5	4.8	-4.6	3.2	5.8	7.7	0.2	1.5	-5.1	5.2	-3.8	-0.2	1.3	1.2
RO	-5.3	0.5	3.9	0.2	1.5	1.5	7.3	-11.5	-8.3	-6.5	-2.5	8.1	-1.7	2.9	0.3	5.6
SK	-4.3	0.1	-0.2	0.9	-2.6	-0.7	1.0	7.6	-2.5	-2.4	-0.5	14.1	-0.5	-2.6	0.4	-0.6
IT	-0.5	-0.3	1.4	5.8	-4.7	-1.3	-0.5	3.8	-2.6	0.3	-1.6	7.1	-1.8	2.6	-0.4	0.2
HU	-3.6	1.9	3.5	4.6	-3.9	1.9	6.0	2.2	-3.9	2.0	-0.4	-0.9	-3.3	3.4	-1.9	1.3
BG	-4.5	0.1	-1.7	2.3	-6.5	0.0	6.0	4.6	0.4	1.2	-1.5	-2.1	-0.1	-0.9	1.2	2.0
LV	-3.0	1.4	-4.5	3.5	-4.7	0.2	2.9	7.9	-3.5	0.4	-1.1	2.2	-2.8	0.9	0.7	0.5
EE	-2.9	4.6	1.6	-2.6	-8.5	-1.1	-4.0	1.9	-5.8	11.1	-7.7	0.4	-1.5	1.2	1.3	0.8
ES	-5.9	-1.9	-1.0	5.0	-8.1	-2.2	2.1	4.5	-2.3	-1.9	-1.1	-14.0	-1.7	0.4	0.1	2.6

(1) Countries are ranked by descending order of cumulative total employment growth over the year 2019-2020.
Source: Eurostat, National Accounts

Graph 2.A1.8:**Real wages growth and productivity growth, 2004-2022**

Estimates for 2020-2022
Source: Ameco

Graph 2.A1.9:**Share of people fully vaccinated and households' unemployment expectations: January 2021- August 2021**



(1) September 2021 for Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Italy, Lithuania, Croatia, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden

Source: European household and business survey and Ourworldindata.org

Table 2.A1.5: **Percentage of employment in activities where firms report labour shortages**

	Level in 2021Q3 relative to the maximum of the 2013-2019 period	Change 2021Q1-2021Q3 relative to change 2013Q1-2019Q4	Level in 2021Q3 relative to the maximum of the 2013-2019 period	Change 2021Q1-2021Q3 relative to change 2013Q1-2019Q4
AT	10.1	26.3	17.2	64.1
BE	12.5	9.8	15.9	39.6
BG	1.6	6.6	9.8	30.6
CY	1.7	5.0	6.3	21.9
CZ	2.3	13.4	5.8	20.8
DE	8.0	35.6	24.0	44.0
DK	20.7	23.7	38.5	65.8
EE	10.8	24.1	39.0	58.6
EL	4.4	7.5	16.8	34.2
ES	1.4	15.6	4.6	16.3
FI	9.3	26.8	43.3	58.2
FR	1.4	17.6	17.4	52.6
HR	4.1	29.5	1.6	33.6
HU	0.7	29.5	12.5	27.0
IE	14.1	22.2	39.7	76.9
IT	19.3	30.0	22.4	53.6
LT	20.2	27.9	12.6	41.3
LU	2.3	4.8	89.0	89.0
LV	3.3	20.0	21.6	63.4
MT	5.9	9.9	15.6	35.3
NL	5.7	19.0	11.6	27.9
PL			1.3	2.6
PT	1.0	23.0	4.8	47.3
RO	0.4	23.0	6.0	29.2
SE	9.9	15.0	9.7	58.8
SI	11.3	39.4	14.8	43.3
SK	0.2	11.9	8.7	10.8

(1) DG ECFIN Business and consumer surveys reports data on labour shortages for 32 sub-sectors of industry and 36 of services based on a 2-digits NACE classification. The table report the share of employment in total employment in industry and services for all those subsectors with both a level and change of shortages higher than the maximum reached before the pandemic and the pre-pandemic average change.

Source:

3. POLICY DEVELOPMENTS: LABOUR MARKET POLICIES IN RESPONSE TO COVID-19 CRISIS

In response to the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, all EU Member States adopted emergency support measures to preserve economic structures and sustain the labour market, limiting the negative economic and social consequences of the crisis. In particular, short-time work schemes and similar job retention measures played an extremely important role, effectively preventing a dramatic rise in unemployment.

As the pandemic progressed, these emergency measures have been refined and adapted. While the use of job-retention measures reached a peak during the first wave of the pandemic, its use remained substantial in many Member States throughout the end of 2020 and first half of 2021.

Following the successful rollout of vaccination campaigns across Europe in the course of 2021 and the subsequent phasing out of containment measures, economic activity picked up again and allowed Member States to gradually scale back the crisis-related job retention measures. Such phasing-out of crisis-related support does not mean that short-time work schemes cease to operate. Rather, the pre-crisis rules return to apply, with stricter eligibility conditions and a higher cost-sharing by businesses. Also the emergency measures being prolonged further into 2021 have become more targeted and less generous. Overall, a growing number of Member States is establishing short-time work schemes on a permanent basis.

As the economy strengthens, with the volume of output having reached its pre-crisis level in the third quarter of 2021, European labour markets are confronted with new challenges. First, many companies – especially those in sectors most affected by the pandemic – will emerge from the crisis in fragile financial conditions, which could lead to an increase in insolvency proceedings. Second, the twin transition towards a green and digital economy will require a reconversion of productive activities, which is likely to have significant repercussions on the labour market.

An effective management of business restructuring processes and a strengthened provision of active labour market measures (notably hiring incentives, upskilling and reskilling opportunities and enhanced support by employment services) can help address such challenges, by stimulating job creation and easing the reallocation of workers across sectors and occupations.

In this vein, Member States have increasingly been shifting from job-retention to active labour market policies to sustain employment and promote job-to-job transitions in the recovery. These policies also benefit from the financing made available at EU level under NextGenerationEU, notably under the Recovery and Resilience Facility and REACT-EU.

A large number of Member States have introduced hiring incentives – in the form of employment subsidies, social security rebates and apprenticeship premia – to stimulate employment creation and improve the employability of specific groups (such as the long-term unemployed, youth, people with disabilities, people with a migrant background or older workers).

Many Member States are reforming their public employment services to improve their operational capacity. This includes increasing human resources, digitalising and modernising administrative processes and improving the quality and intensity of service provision, notably counselling.

All Member States have relied strongly on skills policies to tackle the economic consequences of the pandemic and support the up- and re-skilling of the workforce. Many of them focus their national skills policies also on providing green and digital skills across the workforce, and orient them towards the youth, in particular young persons not engaged in education, employment or training (NEETs), and towards the low-skilled and unemployed. Some Member States foresee the provision of adult learning entitlements, in the form of individual learning accounts or vouchers, to promote equal access to training, and to contribute to the achievement of adult learning targets.

3.1. INTRODUCTION

The Covid-19 crisis has not only been extremely severe, but it has also led to a high level of uncertainty. EU Member States responded very effectively to the immediate challenges posed by the pandemic. Strict sanitary measures adopted to curb contagion were accompanied by extraordinary measures to support businesses and protect workers. Such a swift and resolute policy response has been successful in preserving the economic fabric and uphold the provision of essential services, avoiding dramatic consequences on the labour market. At the same time, the evolution of the pandemic has been very difficult to predict, posing additional challenges to policy-makers.

A robust economic recovery is not a guarantee for strong employment growth. As illustrated in Chapter 1, while EU GDP has returned to its pre-crisis levels in the third quarter of 2021, sooner than previously expected ([78]), the prospects of strong employment growth remain uncertain.

This chapter reviews how employment support measures have evolved during the pandemic. Section 3.2 discusses the main emergency employment retention measures put in place by Member States in response to the Covid-19 outbreak, and their progressive phasing-out in line with the improving health situation and gradual recovery of the economy. Section 3.3 discusses the different types of policies required to sustain employment growth in a context characterised by structural changes brought by the pandemic and the need to move towards a greener and more digital economy.

([78]) See: European Commission (2021), *European Economic Forecast – Autumn 2021*, Institutional Paper 160, November 2021.

3.2. PHASING-OUT OF TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT RETENTION MEASURES

Short-time work schemes and similar job-retention measures have been used extensively throughout the Covid-19 crisis. In April-May 2020, during the first wave of the pandemic, the number of jobs benefiting from public support reached unprecedented levels, covering about 20% of employees in the EU as a whole. This share reached 40% in some Member States such as Croatia, Italy, and Cyprus. The share of companies being supported has also been very high, having reached 60% in Belgium, France and Italy (see Graph 3.1). Albeit at lower levels, the take-up of these schemes remained significant also in the second half of 2020 and first half of 2021, with a pattern following closely the evolution of the pandemic and the associated imposition of restrictions to economic activities to curb the spread of the virus.

The coverage of short-time work support has been much broader than in the past. Not only many more Member States introduced such type of schemes in response to the crisis, but their use has been much more widespread. While traditionally short-time work support mainly concerned prime-age workers employed in large companies in the industry sector, during the Covid-19 crisis the usage of short-time work schemes increased considerably in the service sector and across micro-firms. For example, in Germany more than 50% of the companies receiving short-time work support before the crisis were operating in the industry sector, 13.7% in wholesale, retail, transport, accommodation and food services, and just 1.5% in arts, entertainment and recreation. With the Covid-19 crisis, the proportions almost reversed: only 12% of companies supported belonged to industry, while 44% to wholesale and retail trade, and 10% to arts, entertainment and recreation. Similarly, in Italy 70% of supported companies in the period 2018-2019 belonged to the construction sector. With the pandemic, this share dropped to 10.8%, while the share for wholesale, retail, transport, accommodation and food services increased from 2.4% to 48.6%. Moreover, the participation of women and youth has been substantially higher compared to the pre-pandemic levels. For instance, in Austria, Germany, Belgium and Italy (countries with well-

Graph 3.1: **Proportion of jobs and local units supported by employment retention schemes**



Note: Data not available for Czechia and Romania.
Source: Eurostat.

established short-time work programmes) the share of women went from around 20% in the period 2018-2019 to 40-45% during the pandemic.

At EU level, job-retention measures have been supported by the structural funds and the SURE instrument. The latter, in particular, has contributed to ensuring that all Member States had the necessary liquidity to finance the economic response to the crisis. ([79]) By the end of October 2021, almost EUR 90 billion of SURE financial assistance had been disbursed to 19 countries, allowing them to save some EUR 8.2 billion in interest payments. More than half of the financial assistance has been used for short-time work schemes, and another 40% for similar measures, notably in support to the self-employed. Overall, it is estimated that SURE helped supporting approximately 31 million people and 2.5 million firms in 2020, contributing to reduce unemployment by almost 1.5 million people. ([80])

Member States' policies have been adapted constantly in response to the evolving sanitary situation. Following the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, all EU Member States introduced emergency measures to help companies affected by the pandemic to remain in business and retain their workforce. Those Member States that did not have short-time work schemes in place before the crisis ([81]) introduced new emergency schemes on a temporary basis, and those that already had such schemes in place temporarily changed the rules in order to increase their take-up, coverage and

([79]) Financing from SURE has been attractive for Member States with a poorer credit rating and with more significant spending on short-time work schemes and similar measures. In general, the activation of the general escape clause under the Stability and Growth Pact was also instrumental in enabling Member States to finance their economic response to the crisis.

([80]) For a more exhaustive review of the SURE instrument, see: European Commission (2021).

([81]) Bulgaria, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Croatia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia.

generosity (see European Commission (2020) for a detailed description). The period of validity of these measures has been repeatedly prolonged, and their design adjusted.

Some Member States were phasing out emergency support already in the summer of 2020, but emergency measures had to be quickly reinstated in the autumn. In Estonia and Latvia, emergency short-time work support was interrupted in the summer of 2020, and then subsequently re-introduced in the autumn to deal with the second wave of the pandemic. Similarly, in Denmark, the temporary 'wage compensation scheme' introduced in March 2020 by means of a tripartite agreement to compensate businesses affected by the pandemic for keeping their workers employed was phased out in September 2020 (and replaced by the less generous 'Division of labour' scheme, whereby working time is reduced and workers can claim unemployment benefits for the days not worked). However, it was then reinstated again in early December 2020 in response to the second wave of infections. In Belgium, the simplified procedure that facilitated access to short-time work support (with Covid-19 being assimilated to a cause of *force majeure*) was restricted in September 2020 to specific sectors and companies particularly affected, but was reinstated after just one month to cover all sectors and firms again.

Plans for a gradual phasing-out of emergency support became more concrete in 2021. With the progress of the vaccination campaigns and the improving prospects for a recovery, many Member States started to prudently withdraw the emergency support measures put in place in response to the Covid-19 crisis. In a number of Member States, emergency support measures ended during summer 2021 (Table 3.1). France had originally envisaged a gradual scaling-back of its short-time work scheme starting from end-2020, but the calendar had to be adjusted in light of the subsequent waves of infections. Public support started being reduced gradually as of June 2021. This involved a moderate increase in the share of the costs borne by employers and a decrease in the level of the indemnity for workers. At the same time, companies subject to forced closures and those in 'protected' sectors, still suffering from a severe reduction in turnover, were still offered a more generous treatment.

Table 3.1: **End-date of main emergency employment support measures**

Country	Type of measure	End-date (realised or expected)
Finland	STW	Dec-2020
Hungary	STW / wage subsidy	Dec-2020 / May-2021
Estonia	STW	Jun-2021
Latvia	STW	Jun-2021
Luxembourg	STW	Jun-2021
Poland	STW / wage subsidy	Jun-2021
Greece	STW	Sep-2021
Netherlands	Wage subsidy	Sep-2021
Slovenia	STW	Sep-2021
Sweden	STW	Sep-2021
Cyprus	STW	Oct-2021
Portugal	STW	Nov-2021*
Denmark	Wage subsidy / STW	Jun-2021 / Dec-2021
Croatia	Wage subsidy / STW	July-2021 / Dec-2021
France	STW	May-Dec 2021
Belgium	STW	Dec-2021
Bulgaria	STW	Dec-2021
Czechia	STW	Dec-2021
Germany	STW	Dec-2021
Italy	STW	Dec-2021
Lithuania	STW	Dec-2021
Malta	Wage subsidy	Dec-2021
Slovakia	STW	Dec-2021
Spain	STW	Feb-2022
Romania	STW	Mar-2022*
Ireland	Wage subsidy	Apr-2022
Austria	STW	Jun-2022

Note: Countries sorted in order of date of expiry of emergency measures. The category 'STW' includes short-time work and temporary layoff schemes.

* For Portugal and Romania, the validity of the emergency measures is linked to the continuation of declared 'state of emergency', which is being renewed periodically.
Source: Commission services based on national sources.

In the autumn of 2021, in light of a resurgence of the pandemic, a number of Member States further extended their support measures at least until the end of 2021. Some Member States, such as Austria, Germany, Spain, Ireland, Italy, Malta and Slovakia, had already decided by the end of the summer to prolong the validity of the emergency support until the end of 2021 or early 2022. In October-November 2021, when a fourth wave of infections started to gain ground, more Member States (including Bulgaria, Belgium, Czechia, Ireland and France) decided to adjust

their calendar for the phasing-out of emergency support.

On average, the support measures being prolonged further into 2021 have become more targeted and less generous. In particular, many Member States introduced more stringent eligibility criteria, linked the generosity of support to the extent of reduction in turnover, restricted access to specific sectors classified as 'vulnerable' (i.e. more severely affected by the pandemic) and/or to specific geographical regions, depending on the local evolution of the epidemiological situation (and the consequent imposition of local restrictions to economic activities).

Some Member States are reforming their short-time work schemes on a permanent basis. In the majority of Member States, job retention schemes are not a temporary measure that is activated only in case of a systemic crisis, but they are a permanent feature of the labour market. ([82]) In these cases, the phasing-out of emergency support generally implies a return to the (less generous) pre-crisis rules. At the same time, the Covid-19 crisis represented a severe stress-test for national social protection schemes, and an occasion for national governments to re-assess their efficiency and effectiveness, creating momentum for structural reforms. Notably, Slovakia decided to introduce a new permanent contributory (insurance-based) short-time work scheme to replace the temporary schemes used so far, which will enter into force in January 2022. Similarly, Slovenia is planning to establish a permanent short-time work scheme in 2022, while Czechia has replaced its temporary employment support measure (the 'Antivirus' programme) with a permanent short-time work scheme, but to be activated by government decision only in case of a major crisis (e.g. following a natural disaster, a new epidemic or some other emergency situation). In Spain, the government is currently planning to replace the Spanish short-time work scheme ('*ERTE*') with a new permanent scheme. A broader reform of short-time work support ('*Cassa integrazione guadagni*') is also being considered in Italy, notably to make smaller companies (not eligible for support under 'standard' pre-Covid rules) eligible for support on a permanent basis.

([82]) Countries with permanent job retention schemes in place include: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Spain, France, Croatia, Italy, Luxembourg, Austria, Portugal, Slovakia, Finland and Sweden.

3.3. LABOUR MARKET POLICIES IN THE RECOVERY

This Section discusses the policies needed to support employment creation in the aftermath of the Covid-19 crisis. Sub-section 3.3.1 discusses the employment challenges that are expected to emerge in the context of the recovery, and reviews the type of policies that can be put in place to address them. Sub-section 3.3.2 elaborates further on the issue of business restructuring processes, building on the analysis of bankruptcy declarations presented in Chapter 1. Finally, sub-section 3.3.3 reviews the set of labour market measures being taken by Member States to actively support employment.

3.3.1. Employment challenges and policy response

As the recovery takes hold and economic activities gradually resume, European labour markets are confronted with new challenges. First, many companies are likely to emerge from the Covid-19 crisis in a state of financial distress, and some may not survive. Second, some of the changes induced by the Covid-19 pandemic (for instance with respect to mobility, consumption patterns, work organisation) may be long-lasting, thereby continuing to affect specific sectors and businesses. Third, the twin transition towards a green and digital economy will require a reconversion of productive activities, which is likely to have significant repercussions on the labour market.

In particular, a strong reallocation can be expected to take place ([83]). Achieving the EU employment target of 78% by 2030 ([84]) will require removing the barriers faced by those

([83]) See Chapters 1 and 2 for further details on these processes and their drivers.

([84]) The European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan has established three headline targets, to be achieved by 2030 at EU level: an employment rate of at least 78% for the population aged 20-64; an annual participation rate in training of at last 60% of the adult population; and, a reduction of at least 15 million in the number of people at risk of poverty and social exclusion.

population groups which are currently underrepresented on the labour market (such as the young, people with disabilities, the long-term unemployed, people with a migrant background, and women in some countries), so as to ensure that these groups are not left behind amid the reallocation of labour.

Finally, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, labour shortages are re-emerging in some sectors and occupations. On the one hand, they are due to the rapid increase in labour demand triggered by the swift recovery, and hence are expected to be in part temporary. On the other hand, they are also driven by structural trends including ageing leading to a decline in the working age population, rapid technologic change, the green and digital transition and globalization leading to increasing skill needs and mismatches.

Strengthened active labour market policies can help manage these new challenges. Studies show that active labour market policies (ALMPs) – and, among them, training programmes and employment incentives subsidising private employment – have a larger impact in periods of slow growth and high unemployment. They are particularly successful when participants are enrolled in a programme during a downturn, and exit it during a period of more favourable economic conditions (Card, Kluve and Weber 2018). In the context of the Covid-19 crisis, this evidence has implied the importance to keep investing in active labour market policies in the early stages of the recovery and, possibly, increase this investment when labour market conditions improve. Investments in skills development have already been relevant in the early stages of recovery. The focus could be gradually increased on hiring incentives as the recovery picks up while economic uncertainty still remains high.

Indeed, training programmes and employment incentives are key in supporting the recovery and managing labour market transitions. These are the two types of active labour market policies with the largest medium- to long-run effects, due to their emphasis on human capital accumulation and on improving employability (Card et al., 2018; Vooren et al., 2019; Levy Yeyati et al., 2019). These policies have smaller effects in the short run. Their impact on employment and earnings turns typically positive a year after the programme starts and grows in the subsequent 2-3 years (Vooren et al., 2019; Card et al., 2010 and 2018). This is because an initial investment is needed and undertaken during the training and the subsidised employment, which brings returns when participants in subsidised employments remain in their jobs even after the subsidy ends, or when they are successful to secure a new non-subsidised job in the labour market, relying on their new skills and work experience ([85]). Subsidised employment can involve on-the-job training, which better suits the needs of firms and may therefore be expected to be more effective than training detached from work experience (Heckman et al., 1999).

Concerns about possible drawbacks of employment incentives can be mitigated by policy design. Possible drawbacks include deadweight, displacement and substitution effects, which are observed for example when hiring subsidies are used for workers who would have been hired even in the absence of the subsidy, or when non-subsidised employees are replaced with unemployed subsidised workers. These effects may reduce the effectiveness of employment incentives (Ecorys & IZA, 2012). In a (post-)crisis context, a still uncertain economic outlook discourages otherwise viable firms from hiring and hence deadweight losses and substitution effects are likely to be smaller. On the other hand, a policy design that involves continued employment requirements and monitors employment in the subsidised firms can mitigate deadweight and substitution costs. A certain minimum duration of a work contract can be specified and the subsidies can be designed with a progressive decrease in time, proportional to the increase of productivity of the person hired. Targeting subsidies to groups on the labour market that benefit the most can also be a way to reduce these costs.

([85]) Card, Kluve and Weber (2018) review a broad range of studies with a strong research design and find that the medium and long term impact of training programmes (including both classroom training and on-the-job training) exceeds the impact of subsidies to private sector employment. At the same time, meta-analytic reviews of experimental evaluations (Levy Yeyati et al., 2019), or experimental and quasi-experimental studies (Vooren et al., 2019) find evidence of the medium and long term impact of employment incentives to exceed the impact of pure training programmes. The reason for this difference lies in the different sampling used.

Box 3.1: The economic rationale for the provision of employment incentives

Employment incentives are active labour market measures aimed at stimulating labour demand. They provide employers with wage subsidies, or targeted (as opposed to 'across the board') reductions in social security contributions for employers. They are an element of the broader toolkit of active labour market policies. Such incentives should be designed to support the creation of jobs that would not have happened absent those incentives, to avoid deadweight losses. Targeting subsidies to groups vulnerable in the labour market can contribute to this. Other design options to reduce the risk of deadweight loss could be the monitoring of employment in subsidized firms and continued employment requirements. Furthermore, these incentives should be temporary, until economic growth and job creation pick up and the uncertainty induced by the pandemic recedes.

By lowering the employers' wage costs or employers' social security contributions and if contributing to the costs of job-relevant training, employment incentives can boost job creation. They could provide confidence to firms to go ahead with their business strategies, which could lead to a future expansion of their activities, including in new (e.g. green and digital) areas. In addition, if properly designed, the subsidies could incentivise companies to hire and train new workers. Overall, the subsidies could reduce uncertainty and improve the economic outlook and if including a relevant element of training, they could support a faster, green and digital recovery.

Employment incentives contribute to employability and skills formation of the supported workers in various ways. They shorten unemployment spells and hence prevent the depreciation of the skills of unemployed workers and in fact help build up new skills. They allow workers to gather valuable work experience that improves their future employability. Employment is usually coupled with informal learning and on-the-job training opportunities and it opens up further pathways towards more formal up- and re-skilling options that are not available to unemployed workers.

Employment incentives can also be beneficial for promoting the employment of groups that are in a vulnerable position in the labour market. The productivity of such workers is often perceived to be lower: the subsidies allow employers to learn about the productivity of the applicants during the subsidized period (Vooren et al, 2019), which in turn increases thanks to the work experience and learning opportunity. In recessions, the subsidies can be especially important for the youth. Young people may be more likely to stay unemployed, or take up lower paid, more precarious jobs when they enter the labour market in an economic downturn (Schwandt and Von Wachter, 2019), which may have a lasting negative impact on their labour market trajectories. The increase in the youth unemployment rate has been triple that of the general unemployment rate between the first and third quarters of 2020. Improving the employment outcomes of young people can bring long-term economic and social benefits for the concerned individuals and for society as a whole.

A strong focus needs to be placed on the design and implementation of programmes for young people. Youth unemployment has been severely exacerbated by the Covid-19 crisis. As illustrated in Chapter 1, young workers not only tend to have temporary or atypical contracts, but they are overrepresented in those occupations that were more severely affected by social distancing measures. In addition, very few job opportunities were available to young people finishing education and entering the labour market for the first time. Therefore, it is now a key priority for policymakers to find effective programmes that support young people, to avoid scarring effects arising from adverse experiences in their early labour market career. At the same time, ALMPs focusing on youth have a particularly pronounced time profile, with increasing impacts in the longer run (Card et al., 2018). This makes ALMP investment towards youth particularly worthwhile, due to the longer payoff period. Evidence also shows that skills training, employment subsidies and job search assistance increase employment and earnings outcomes for youth.

Active labour market policies have heterogenous impacts on different population groups. Training programmes and subsidised

private sector employment provide relatively large benefits to the long-term unemployed. For disadvantaged participants (such as the low skilled, people from a minority ethnic background or with a migrant background and people with a disability) and for older workers, job search assistance is an important component of supportive policies.

Similarly, different training programmes should be promoted for different segments of the working population based on their needs and the identified needs in the labour market. Early school leavers may benefit the most from a complete Vocational and Educational Training (VET) programme, but may be less motivated to take up this type of commitment. Shorter training courses can be used to motivate and empower people to engage in training. Short, targeted training leading to micro-credentials can support upskilling and reskilling in a more flexible, low-cost way that workers or job-seekers can complete at a pace that fits with their lives. Such short

Box 3.2: **Active support to employment**

To respond to the challenges brought by the Covid-19 pandemic and the green and digital transitions, the Commission adopted in March 2021 the Recommendation on Effective Active Support to Employment following the COVID-19 crisis (EASE). The Recommendation, which was adopted together with the European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan, outlines a strategic approach to gradually transition from the emergency measures taken to preserve jobs during the pandemic to new measures needed for a job-rich recovery. Specifically, Member States are invited to develop coherent policy packages to address the labour market challenges triggered by the pandemic, bridge the skill shortages that are likely to hold up economic growth during the recovery, and help every individual to successfully navigate the green and digital transitions.

Effective policy packages providing active support to employment should be built around three components:

(1) **Hiring incentives and entrepreneurial support**. Member States' support for hiring and job transitions through incentives for businesses can effectively promote quality job creation, notably in the initial phases of the recovery. Such measures should be targeted and designed in such a way to ensure that the newly created jobs are maintained after the incentives have expired.

(2) **Upskilling and reskilling opportunities**. Investing in people is essential to respond to the social and economic impact of the COVID-19 crisis and to prepare and accompany the green and digital transitions. For this, comprehensive skills strategies should be put in place for the different economic sectors, supporting cooperation among relevant stakeholders. Upskilling and reskilling measures should cater to the needs identified in the labour market and the needs of each individual. In particular, vocational education and training programmes should offer a balanced mix of vocational skills and competences and create work-based learning and apprenticeships opportunities. Short courses more aligned with the needs of working professionals can facilitate flexible career pathways.

(3) **Enhanced support by employment services.** Well-functioning and targeted employment services are critical to deliver policies that foster job creation and job-to-job transitions. To this end, Member States are invited to improve their capacities to offer individualised support to jobseekers, including counselling and mentoring, job-search assistance, entrepreneurship support, and referrals to social services when needed. Public employment services should also be able to support workers affected by company restructurings, in close cooperation with other companies in search of additional skills and workers.

Funding is available at the EU level to support such policy measures. The EASE Recommendation invites Member States to make full use of the support available at EU level, notably from the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+), the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the Just Transition Fund, the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF), the Recovery Assistance for Cohesion and the Territories of Europe (REACT-EU) and the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF).

courses can be designed and updated by training organisations in collaboration with employers and Social Partners, to deliver on-demand training that aligns with the shifting needs of the labour market. Longer training programmes impose costs on adults (in terms of foregone earnings and in terms of participation costs) but such trainings can gain prominence due to the important structural changes that are taking place in the labour market and in certain sectors that have been severely affected by the Covid-19 pandemic. Short and longer training programmes can facilitate the move to new types of jobs/sectors. Investments in adult learning entitlements can facilitate access to training. To foster participation in the intense re-training necessitated by structural changes, support can be modulated according to people's up- and reskilling needs and the needs in specific sectors. Validation of informal and non-formal learning can also be a key route to motivating people, giving visibility to their skills and opening up access to further learning.

More intensive job search assistance can help address the information failures of market actors in an environment that will continue to change rapidly. In particular, employment services can play an important role in mediation and information management, identifying which profiles are needed in the labour market and supporting jobseekers in the aftermath of the Covid-19 crisis in acquiring skills that are needed.

Member States are adapting their policies to anticipate and manage the upcoming challenges of labour reallocation. These measures include, in addition to the possible reforms to national short-time work schemes, considerable investment in human capital with upskilling and reskilling, and enhanced support by the employment services. At EU level, in addition to the funding made available through the various financial instruments, the Commission issued a Recommendation on effective active support to employment (EASE) inviting Member States to put in place suitable strategies to address these challenges on the basis of a coherent package of policy measures (Box 3.2). The policy recommendations of other international institutions such as the OECD and the IMF for the recovery in the European labour market have been largely similar.

3.3.2. Business restructuring processes

The policy response to the Covid-19 crisis was successful in preventing corporate insolvencies. As already illustrated in Chapter 1, the increase in bankruptcies that is typically observed during recessions did not materialise in the case of the Covid-19 crisis. This can be largely attributed to the broad set of policy measures adopted by national governments in support of business activities, in addition to the job-retention measures already discussed above. These included, in particular:

- *Temporary changes to national insolvency laws*, such as the lifting of obligations to file for insolvency in case of over-indebtedness, the limitation of right of creditors to apply for insolvency proceedings, the deferral of deadlines of insolvency proceedings and the introduction of moratoria on bankruptcy procedures and creditor enforcement;

- *Deferred payment of taxes and social contributions*, to improve the liquidity situation of businesses.

- *Moratoria on loan repayments*, which provide a financial relief to borrowers by allowing the suspension or postponement of payments within a specified period; ([86])

- *Public guarantee schemes*, to facilitate the continued provision of credit to the real economy – especially in favour of small businesses and SMEs – by transferring some of the credit risk from banks to governments. In general, public guarantees have longer maturities (typically of 5 years) than moratoria on loan repayments (typically between 3 and 6 months).

A delayed surge in insolvencies, however, cannot be excluded. With the progressive withdrawal of the emergency support measures, liquidity constraints of companies can become more pressing. Further, access to credit is

([86]) The European Banking Authority issued specific guidelines to clarify under which conditions such moratoria would not be considered as forbearance and would not trigger an assessment of 'distressed restructuring' under the definition of default (thereby avoiding a reclassification of banks' exposures as non-performing).

influenced by a company's creditworthiness, which may have deteriorated for many firms due to more leveraged financial positions (resulting from new loans and deferral of liabilities) and a weakened repayment capacity, especially for companies operating in the sectors more severely impacted by the pandemic. While at aggregate EU level the number of quarterly bankruptcy proceedings has not picked up (except for the accommodation and food sector – Graph 3.2), a sharp increase can be observed in Spain and Romania since the beginning of 2021 (Graph 3.3.a).

Graph 3.2: **Bankruptcy declarations and new business registrations by sector of activity, EU27, 2021-Q3**



Notes: NACE rev. 2 sector classification. Seasonally adjusted data. Eurostat estimate for EU27 based on available information.
Source: Eurostat.

Short-time work schemes can help preserve employment in companies undergoing restructuring. Short-time work schemes can be used not only to deal with temporary disruptions of activity, but also to address permanent reductions in business activities in the context of business restructuring processes. This is the case in Member States such as Germany, Italy, France or Luxembourg. Access to this form of public support is conditioned on the adoption of a restructuring plan aimed at restoring the viability of the company and safeguarding to the extent possible the labour force.

Graph 3.3: **Bankruptcy declarations and new business registrations, index change compared to 2019-Q4**



Notes: Change in the index compared to the fourth quarter of 2019 (index = 100). Quarterly data, seasonally adjusted. Information not available for the Member States not displayed.
Source: Eurostat.

Training provision for workers affected by restructuring processes is another key tool to improve employment prospects. A number of Member States (Austria, Germany, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden) provide incentives for the provision of training to workers on short-time work. In Germany and Italy, this implies that employees on short-time work are eligible to participate in publicly funded training courses. In Austria, France and Portugal, increased public support is provided for those workers that take part in training while on reduced hours. In Austria and

Sweden, part of the training costs of such workers is publicly covered. In Spain, from September 2020, workers on short-time work have been considered a priority group for access to training initiatives of the vocational training system, to promote their employment. In Hungary, the Covid-19 short-time work scheme introduced a training obligation, for 30% of the working time, for firms with hours reduced to below 50% of working time, and an optional training component for firms reducing their hours to a smaller extent. Slovenia proposed to put in place a new, permanent short-time work scheme, with a training component, in its Recovery and Resilience Plan (RRP). In its RRP, Belgium committed to remove regulatory obstacles hindering the participation of workers on long term or structural temporary unemployment in publicly subsidised training. Luxemburg foresees in its RRP the provision of vouchers for workers on short-time work, for digital skills training.

Member States are introducing measures explicitly aimed at favouring job-to-job transitions in the context of business restructurings. In January 2021, France introduced a new scheme (*'Transitions Collectives – Transco'*) to support companies and workers of sectors affected by structural change. The employees identified as being at risk of losing their job are offered training opportunities, in view of making a professional transition towards occupations that are in high demand in their local labour market. Part of the salary and training costs (between 40% and 100% depending on the size of the enterprise) are covered by the State. Also the Netherlands introduced a new job-to-job scheme ('*van werk(loosheid) naar werk*'), which provides active support to unemployed persons as well as to workers who are at risk of losing their job. The support, which can consist in career guidance, mediation and matching, the offer of vocational trainings, the referral to social services and occupational health experts, is provided through newly-established 'regional mobility teams' and promotes job-to-job transitions towards professions and sectors that are expanding. In Italy, companies undergoing business restructuring can sign a 'relocation agreement', whereby workers on short-time work that are identified as being at risk of dismissal can benefit from job-search assistance services (with a 'relocation check') and a hiring subsidy in view of finding new employment.

3.3.3. Active labour market policies in support to employment

Member States are shifting from job retention policies to active labour market support to promote new employment during the recovery. In the course of 2021, the majority of Member States started strengthening their systems of active labour market policies to accompany the phasing-out of their emergency support measures. This process follows the Commission Recommendation on Effective Active Support to Employment following the COVID-19 crisis (EASE) (Box 3.2).

Traditionally, there are large relative differences in the way Member States administer active labour market policies. Prior to the pandemic, the overall level of expenditure ranged from 0.04% of GDP in Romania to 1.76% in Denmark (see Graph 3.4). Besides expenditure levels, there are also important differences regarding the types of measures utilised.

- A group of Member States (including Denmark, Germany, Belgium, France, Sweden, Malta, Austria and the Netherlands) invest considerably in the *provision of employment services*, which include counselling, vocational guidance and job-search assistance through individual case-management.

- While all Member States provide *training programmes*, this category of expenditure is particularly high in Austria, Finland, France Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg, Belgium and Portugal.

- *Employment incentives* are also found in all Member States, but play a relatively more important role in countries such as Sweden, Luxembourg, Belgium, Denmark, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia and Greece.

- Expenditure on *supported employment and rehabilitation* (which encompasses employment support measures for persons with a reduced working capacity) is extremely high in Denmark, and plays an important role also in

Graph 3.4: **Expenditure on active labour market policies, 2019**



Source: European Commission, Labour Market Policy database.

the Netherlands, Sweden, Estonia, Poland, Belgium, Finland, Spain and Czechia.

– Only few Member States have sizable direct job creation programmes, notably Hungary, Greece, Finland and to a lesser extent Ireland, Bulgaria, Spain and Croatia.

– Finally, expenditure on *start-up incentives* is significant only in Spain, Croatia, France and Poland.

Many Member States have increased the use of hiring incentives after the reopening of their economies. In order to strengthen labour demand following the lifting of sanitary restrictions, a large number of Member States introduced measures to reward firms hiring new employees. These incentives are granted under specific conditions, e.g. employing people for a minimum amount of time, or under the obligation to offer the newly employed a permanent contract after a fixed amount of time. While in some Member States such measures were introduced already after the first wave of the pandemic in the summer/autumn of 2020, in most countries these have been put in place during the first half of 2021. The newly introduced incentives tend to be short-term, ending in 2021 or 2022 in a majority of cases. Nevertheless, in some countries their validity goes beyond 2023 (e.g. in Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Sweden) or they have been introduced on an open-ended basis (e.g. in Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany, Spain and Italy).

Employment subsidies, social security rebates and apprenticeship premia are the most commonly used types of incentives. Among the different types of incentives adopted by Member States to promote hiring workers across firms, one-off subsidies and monthly payments (often linked to the salary of the hired person, and with a duration of about 1 year on average) are the most common ones. Other commonly found measures are reductions in social security contributions for newly hired workers (applying in Belgium, Bulgaria, Italy, Hungary, Spain and Sweden) and subsidies for apprenticeships contracts (applying in Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, France, Italy, Cyprus, Austria, Luxembourg). In Cyprus, a traineeship bonus is foreseen for unemployed people registered within the PES system.

Member States target their hiring subsidies to specific groups in a vulnerable position in the labour market, such as the (long-term) unemployed, youth, people with disabilities and older workers. This can ensure a higher impact of the policies, reduce the likelihood of deadweight,

displacement and substitution effects and hence reduce efficiency costs. Indeed, such a targeting can also promote an inclusive job recovery, as subsidies are focused on those groups that have been most hardly hit by the crisis, and/or that are at greater risk of remaining excluded from the labour market (Table 3.2). The most addressed category are the unemployed, often specifying the need to be registered as such and in some cases (e.g. in Belgium, Denmark, Estonia and Spain) including specific provisions for long-term unemployed (LTU). The second most targeted group are the young people, and specifically those neither in employment, education nor training (so-called 'NEETs'), addressed in Croatia and Cyprus. Other incentive schemes apply to apprenticeship or internship programmes, but also to people with disabilities and to women. In some cases, the hiring subsidies target specific sectors, e.g. in Belgium, where social security rebates have been introduced for new hires in the Events, hotel and travel sector, or in Estonia, where hiring incentives focus on agriculture. Finally, Italy reinforced some specific measures promoting employment in the South.

In some cases, hiring subsidies are designed to pursue specific objectives such as promoting green-sector jobs or favouring ICT-based mobile work. In order to better shape the ecological transition promoted across the EU, in 2020 Sweden increased its spending for promoting green jobs and subsidised employment in the nature and forest conservation. And more recently, Greece and Slovenia introduced similar measures for green jobs. Greece also applied specific subsidies to sustain Roma, homeless and minimum income beneficiaries. Portugal in the summer of 2020 introduced hiring subsidies for people teleworking in the interior regions for coastal companies. Finally, Romania provided incentives to hire Romanian young employees who decide to

Table 3.2: **Hiring incentive measures adopted after Covid-19 outbreak, by target population (2020-2021)**

	Unemployed	Young / NEET	Apprenticeship / internship	Disabled	Elderly	LTU	Specific sectors	Women	Fired after Covid-19	Green jobs	Specific regions
BE	X	X	X			X	X		X		
BG	X	X			X			X			
CZ				X							
DK			X	X	X	X					
DE			X								
EE	X	X				X	X				X
IE	X	X	X								
EL	X	X		X	X	X	X	X		X	X
ES	X			X	X	X			X		
FR		X	X	X							
HR		X				X					
IT	X	X	X	X			X	X			X
CY	X	X	X								
LV	X										
LT	X										
LU	X		X	X	X			X			
HU	X	X				X					
MT	X	X		X	X						
NL											
AT	X	X	X	X	X	X		X			
PL											
PT	X	X	X	X							X
RO	X	X			X		X		X		
SI	X						X			X	
SK	X	X		X	X	X					
FI							X				
SE		X					X			X	

Notes: No measures detected for Netherlands and Poland.
Source: European Commission.

return from working abroad.

In the second half of 2020, the EU agreed on an ambitious recovery plan for Europe, to support the recovery and build a more resilient EU. NextGenerationEU, the temporary instrument designed to boost the recovery (Box 3.3), is the largest stimulus package ever financed in Europe. The centrepiece of NextGenerationEU is the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), a new instrument aimed at supporting reforms and investments undertaken by Member States to mitigate the economic and social impact of the Covid-19 pandemic and make European economies and societies more sustainable, resilient and better prepared for the challenges and opportunities of the green and digital transitions. To benefit from RRF support, Member States have to submit national 'recovery and resilience plans' (RRPs) to the Commission. Each plan sets out the reforms and investments to be implemented by end of 2026.

Among the different national Recovery and Resilience Plans, some Member States have included hiring subsidies to promote an inclusive and job-rich economic recovery. Ten Member States have included hiring incentives in their Recovery and Resilience Plans (RRPs), in the sections dedicated to the labour market policies. In order to promote an economic recovery that is grounded on job creation and inclusiveness, the majority of the measures planned concern specific categories of workers. Cyprus for example highlighted the promotion of incentives schemes and grants to hire NEETs. Nevertheless, young people are the focus of other RRPs (e.g. in Estonia, France, Lithuania, Slovenia). Estonia, for example, is reinforcing its 'My first job scheme', combining wage subsidies and training allowances to employers hiring unemployed people aged 16-29. Moreover, it will make the scheme more focused toward green and digital skills. Likewise, the Lithuanian RRP will focus part of its measures to the workers hit by Covid-19 and the twin transition. France and Germany will further support hiring young people through apprenticeships and vocational contracts and will incentivise the retention of those. Finally, Portugal's subsidies are higher if the quality of the job guaranteed is more (i.e. good-paid jobs, permanent contracts).

To promote the re-qualification of the labour force, Member States across the EU are adopting several measures concerning up-skilling and re-skilling. Already prior to the adoption of the EASE Recommendation, Member States have been investing and reforming their skills/training policies. Member States have provided subsidies for apprenticeships linked to the provision of trainings by the firms (e.g. in Estonia, Cyprus, Luxemburg and Portugal). Public subsidies have been provided to vocational training. In October 2020, Germany subsidised companies that, despite the pandemic, have not diminished or increased their vocational training offer. In August 2020, Denmark implemented a temporary measure to provide higher unemployment benefits (up to 110%) to low-skilled jobseekers initiating a vocational training course.

Member States have implemented subsidies and incentives for training across the public or private sector. Ireland unveiled ambitious investment plans in 2020, while Spain foresees additional investments in the last quarter of 2021, for youth employment and dual learning. The plans of Spain include a focus on green and digital skills. Member State investments are often targeted to social groups vulnerable in the labour market. Italy's new learning organizations will target the young and the NEETs, Finland aims to focus training on the long-term unemployed and people with a migrant background, while Denmark focuses training on areas most hit by the pandemic. Czechia and Bulgaria plan to create training centres, to support the up- and re-skilling of young people.

Box 3.3: Support for the labour market recovery under NextGenerationEU

To help repair the economic and social damage brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic, the EU established **NextGenerationEU**, a temporary recovery instrument allowing the Commission to raise up to EUR 806.9 bn to support the recovery and reinforce the commitment to the green and digital transitions.

The largest share of funds under NextGenerationEU (EUR 723.8 bn) goes to the **Recovery and Resilience Facility**, a new instrument providing financial support to Member States (EUR 338 bn in grants and EUR 385.8 bn in loans) to fund reforms and investments outlined in national recovery and resilience plans (RRPs). The aim is to mitigate the economic and social impact of the coronavirus pandemic and make European economies and societies more sustainable, resilient and better prepared for the challenges and opportunities of the green and digital transitions.

Graph 1: **Share of RRPs total budget dedicated to EASE related measures**



Source: Commission services, based on approved national Recovery and Resilience Plans.

Note: The values shown are based on a preliminary classification of measures included in the national Recovery and Resilience Plans, not yet fully validated. They should therefore be considered as preliminary and indicative.

By end-November 2021, 26 EU Member States had submitted their recovery and resilience plans, of which 22 were endorsed by the Commission. Overall, the preliminary figures on 18 EU Member States RRPs shows that EUR 28.2 bn contribute to EASE-related measures ([1]). This corresponds to about 6.7% of the total RRPs budget to be financed through the RRF for the next years. These are part of the broader social policy measures allocation, which constitute about 30% of the overall RPPs. There is a large cross-country heterogeneity, considering the huge difference between countries that allocated over 10% of their budget (i.e. France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Finland, and Belgium) to policies related to hiring incentives, public employment services reforms and trainings, and countries that decided to invest less than 2% (i.e. Sweden, Denmark and Slovakia). The vast majority of the measures fall in the remit of digitalisation, skills and education and employment and social policies components of the RRPs.

([1]) RRP measures are considered as 'EASE-relevant' if they fall under the (broad) policy areas of: i) employment support and job creation (including hiring and job transition incentives and support for self-employment); ii) adult learning (including continuous vocational education and training, and recognition and validation of skills); iii) and, modernisation of labour market instutions (notably employment services and forecasting of skills).

(Continued on the next page)

Box (continued)

Another EUR 50.6 bn of funds under NextGenerationEU are allocated to the **Recovery Assistance for Cohesion and the Territories of Europe** (**REACT-EU**). ([2]) This is a new temporary instrument that allows Member States to top-up existing cohesion policy programmes funded from the Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF) and the European Fund for Aid to the Most Deprived (FEAD). Resources from REACT-EU are distributed across EU Member States taking into account the economic and social impact of the crisis, the GDP drop and rise of unemployment including among young people, as well as the relative wealth of the countries (see Graph 2.a). Almost 80% of the total envelope (EUR 39.8 bn) is available for programming in 2021, while the remaining EUR 10.8 bn will be made available in 2022. Graph 2.b shows how Member States have decided to allocate these additional resources across the different cohesion policy programmes in 2021. More than a third of the Member States have decided to allocate at least half of REACT-EU resources to the ESF, primarily for the financing of labour market measures.

Graph 2a: **Total REACT-EU allocations (2021)**



Graph 2b: **Allocation of REACT-EU resources across cohesion funds and ESF areas of support (2021)**



([2]) The remaining EUR 32.5 bn available under NextGenerationEU are destined to the following European programmes and funds: Horizon Europe, InvestEU, Rural Development, the Just Transition Fund (JTF) and RescEU.

Among the Member States whose Recovery and Resilience Plans have been endorsed by the Commission, seven Member States foresee the provision of adult learning entitlements. Belgium, Croatia, France, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania and Luxembourg plan to support such entitlements, in the form of individual learning accounts or vouchers. These reforms and investments aim to reduce the fragmentation of the provision of training to adults, are open to both the employed and the unemployed and are typically linked to improved quality assurance. In each of these Member States, the reforms and investments will heavily focus on the provision of digital skills.

Green skills are particularly important for the strategies that Member States are adopting for the up-skilling and re-skilling of the labour workforce. A number of Member States focused on providing green skills across the workforce, such as Denmark who set aside resources for upskilling and education in climate and green transition in 2021 or Sweden, which develop skills and employability among migrants and the long-term unemployed and alleviate skills shortages in the green industries. Generally, many Member States either planned it or already implemented something similar (e.g. Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Cyprus, Lithuania and Spain).

In addition to the expansion of hiring incentives, and the introduction of skills policies, several Member States strengthened their public employment services. The role played by public and private employment agencies of matching labour demand with supply is crucial for achieving an inclusive and job-rich recovery. In the course of 2021, a number of Member States introduced reforms of their system of public employment services (PES) to enhance their

functioning and to better respond to the challenges posed by the pandemic as well as the green and digital transition. Some countries, such as Ireland and Greece, increased the capacity to provide services, by hiring additional personnel and increasing the involvement of private employment services. Other Member States, such as Spain, Greece, Romania and Lithuania, have invested in the training of PES staff, including specific training devoted to topics related to the twin transition and the circular economy. Cyprus set up a new performance management system for its PES, while Belgium improved the exchange of data between the federal level and regional PES. Finally, specific provisions have been adopted to better address the needs of jobseekers with a migrant background (Belgium), women (Spain), NEETs (Croatia and Cyprus) and most 'vulnerable' groups (Belgium, Romania).

The Covid-19 pandemic has accelerated the digitalisation of PES. Most of the recent PES reforms are related to digitalisation. In many Member States, reforms included the digitalisation of the agencies and the automation of administrative procedures. In Belgium, for example, the 'TIM' reform (April 2021) helped out the roll-out of digital tools and matching system, with a specific focus on most vulnerable categories. Czechia recently removed the obligation to apply for services in person, allowing applications on line. Lithuania plans to develop in 2022 a multifunctional interoperable employment platform with a life-long learning and a career guidance system, enabling to provide at least 90% of the services digitally. Finally, on-line job-matching portals have been developed by Estonia and Hungary.

Many Member States included further reforms and investments related to public employment services within their national recovery and resilience plans. The RRP of Cyprus foresees investments aimed at improving the operational performance of the Public Employment Service (PES) through increased digitalisation of the administration, the development of a performance management system and of a new digitalised early warning and tracking system to better assist young NEETs, and increased capacity to provide counselling, guidance and coaching services. As a complement to a broader reform of its active labour market policies, Greece has foreseen in its RRP an increase in the capacity of its PES (to improve the quality and intensity of service provision, notably counselling), a restructuring of the local offices and a digitalisation and modernisation of administrative processes. Italy foresees a deep renovation of its system, making employment services more effective with the hiring and training of additional personnel, a better integration of national and regional information systems and further investment in digitalisation. Also in Spain, where employment services are decentralised at the regional level like in Italy, the RRP foresees a reinforced coordination at the national level. For Finland, the RRP includes a reform to overhaul the jobseeker service process (towards a 'Nordic employment service model'), making employment support more intensive and customised.

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Statistical annex

APPENDIX 1
Statistical annex

Belgium	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2019-2020
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	11331	11375	11427	11489	11535	0.4 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	7290	7266	7289	7307	7326	0.3 %
(% of total population)	64.3	63.9	63.8	63.6	63.5	-0.1 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	4929	4940	5000	5044	5022	-0.4 %
Male	2649	2652	2664	2681	2670	-0.4 %
Female	2281	2289	2335	2362	2352	-0.4 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	67.6	68.0	68.6	69.0	68.6	-0.5 pps
Young (15-24)	28.5	28.1	29.6	31.0	28.4	-2.6 pps
Prime age (25-54)	85.1	84.8	85.0	84.8	84.5	-0.3 pps
Older (55-64)	48.1	51.3	52.6	54.3	55.6	1.3 pps
Nationals (15-64)	68.0	68.3	69.0	69.6	69.2	-0.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	65.4	65.8	66.0	65.0	63.7	-1.2 pps
Male	72.3	72.8	72.8	73.1	72.6	-0.5 pps
Young (15-24)	30.7	30.6	31.4	32.5	30.3	-2.2 pps
Prime age (25-54)	90.4	90.0	89.6	89.3	88.7	-0.6 pps
Older (55-64)	53.6	56.9	57.9	59.8	61.5	1.7 pps
Female	62.9	63.2	64.3	64.9	64.5	-0.4 pps
Young (15-24)	26.1	25.4	27.8	29.4	26.5	-2.9 pps
Prime age (25-54)	79.8	79.6	80.3	80.3	80.3	-0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	42.8	45.8	47.4	48.9	49.8	0.9 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	62.3	63.1	64.5	65.3	64.7	-0.6 pps
Young (15-24)	22.7	22.7	25.0	26.6	24.1	-2.5 pps
Prime age (25-54)	79.1	79.5	80.4	80.8	80.3	-0.5 pps
Older (55-64)	45.4	48.3	50.3	52.1	53.3	1.2 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	36.0	35.5	35.5	36.0	34.8	-1.3 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	64.4	65.1	66.6	67.6	65.9	-1.8 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	82.2	82.2	83.4	83.8	83.5	-0.3 pps
Nationals (15-64)	63.3	64.1	65.4	66.3	65.8	-0.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	55.7	56.6	57.9	58.2	57.1	-1.2 pps
Male	66.5	67.5	68.2	68.9	68.4	-0.5 pps
Young (15-24)	24.0	24.4	26.4	27.3	25.6	-1.7 pps
Prime age (25-54)	83.8	84.4	84.5	84.7	84.2	-0.6 pps
Older (55-64)	50.7	53.8	55.1	57.3	58.7	1.4 pps
Female	58.1	58.7	60.7	61.7	61.0	-0.7 pps
Young (15-24)	21.4	20.9	23.5	25.8	22.5	-3.3 pps
Prime age (25-54)	74.3	74.6	76.2	76.8	76.4	-0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	40.2	42.8	45.6	47.0	48.0	1.0 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	4540.6	4587.2	4699.4	4770.7	4740.6	-0.6 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	1.3	1.6	1.5	1.6	0.0	-1.6 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	0.9	1.0	2.4	1.5	-0.6	-2.1 pps
Male	1.5	1.2	1.4	1.2	-0.4	-1.6 pps
Female	0.2	0.9	3.7	1.8	-0.9	-2.7 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	13.5	13.1	12.7	12.9	13.4	0.5 pps
Male	17.3	16.3	15.8	16.1	16.8	0.7 pps
Female	9.2	9.3	9.1	9.2	9.4	0.2 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	9.1	10.4	10.7	10.8	10.1	-0.7 pps
Male	8.3	9.7	9.8	10.2	9.6	-0.6 pps
Female	10.0	11.2	11.7	11.5	10.7	-0.8 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	24.7	24.5	24.5	24.9	24.4	-0.5 pps
Male	9.5	10.2	10.0	10.5	10.5	0.0 pps
Female	42.1	41.2	41.0	41.0	40.1	-0.9 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	2.2	1.9	1.7	1.4	1.1	-0.3 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	7.8	7.1	6.0	5.4	5.6	0.2 pps
Young (15-24)	20.1	19.3	15.8	14.2	15.3	1.1 pps
Prime age (25-49)	7.1	6.2	5.4	4.8	5.0	0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	5.7	5.9	4.3	4.1	4.2	0.1 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	16.1	14.8	13.3	12.2	12.3	0.1 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	8.1	7.2	6.0	5.3	5.8	0.5 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	4.2	4.3	3.5	3.2	3.5	0.3 pps
Nationals (15-64)	7.0	6.2	5.2	4.8	5.0	0.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	14.8	14.0	12.2	10.3	10.4	0.1 pps
Male	8.1	7.1	6.3	5.7	5.7	0.0 pps
Female	7.6	7.1	5.6	4.9	5.4	0.5 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	51.6	48.8	48.7	43.5	41.6	-1.9 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	41.3	40.3	40.2	40.2	39.1	-2.7 %
Male	42.2	41.1	41.0	41.1	40.0	-2.7 %
Female	39.5	38.7	38.7	38.6	37.6	-2.6 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	-1.5	-1.3	0.7	1.4	0.7	-0.7 pps
Building and construction	0.8	0.9	2.5	1.7	0.9	-0.8 pps
Services	1.6	1.8	1.6	1.7	-0.8	-2.5 pps
Manufacturing industry	0.0	0.7	0.7	0.8	-0.6	-1.4 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	0.6	1.9	1.8	2.1	-1.8	-3.9 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	-1.3	0.1	0.2	0.4	-2.6	-3.0 pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	0.1	1.2	1.6	2.0	1.6	-0.4 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	0.5	1.9	2.2	2.6	1.5	-1.1 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	0.0	0.1	0.3	0.2	-6.3	-6.5 pps

Bulgaria	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2019-2020
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	7128	7076	7025	6976	6932	-0.6 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	4659	4595	4531	4474	4417	-1.3 %
(% of total population)	65.4	64.9	64.5	64.1	63.7	-0.4 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	3200	3278	3240	3276	3190	-2.6 %
Male	1710	1751	1737	1755	1714	-2.4 %
Female	1490	1526	1503	1521	1477	-2.9 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	68.7	71.3	71.5	73.2	72.2	-1.0 pps
Young (15-24)	23.9	26.3	23.7	23.9	21.9	-2.0 pps
Prime age (25-54)	82.0	84.3	84.3	85.8	84.7	-1.1 pps
Older (55-64)	58.8	61.8	63.7	66.9	67.1	0.2 pps
Nationals (15-64)	68.7	71.4	71.5	73.3	72.2	-1.0 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	60.0	57.8	55.9	56.0	59.4	3.4 pps
Male	72.7	75.4	75.9	77.6	76.8	-0.9 pps
Young (15-24)	28.0	30.5	27.9	27.6	25.3	-2.2 pps
Prime age (25-54)	85.7	88.0	88.3	90.0	89.1	-1.0 pps
Older (55-64)	63.4	66.8	69.1	72.0	72.6	0.6 pps
Female	64.6	67.1	67.0	68.7	67.6	-1.1 pps
Young (15-24)	19.6	21.8	19.3	20.0	18.2	-1.8 pps
Prime age (25-54)	78.2	80.5	80.2	81.4	80.1	-1.3 pps
Older (55-64)	54.6	57.3	58.7	62.2	62.0	-0.2 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	63.4	66.9	67.7	70.1	68.5	-1.6 pps
Young (15-24)	19.8	22.9	20.7	21.8	18.8	-3.0 pps
Prime age (25-54)	76.2	79.4	80.1	82.3	80.5	-1.8 pps
Older (55-64)	54.5	58.2	60.7	64.4	64.2	-0.1 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	29.6	33.4	34.8	38.4	35.2	-3.2 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	67.8	71.7	72.4	74.6	72.7	-1.8 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	84.2	85.5	86.1	88.5	87.6	-0.9 pps
Nationals (15-64)	63.4	66.9	67.8	70.1	68.5	-1.6 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	54.3	53.2	53.9	56.0	0.0	-56.0 pps
Male	66.7	70.6	71.5	74.1	72.5	-1.6 pps
Young (15-24)	23.1	26.5	24.2	25.0	21.7	-3.3 pps
Prime age (25-54)	79.2	82.8	83.5	86.0	84.4	-1.7 pps
Older (55-64)	58.3	62.5	65.4	69.2	69.4	0.2 pps
Female	60.0	63.1	63.9	66.0	64.3	-1.7 pps
Young (15-24)	16.3	19.1	17.0	18.4	15.7	-2.7 pps
Prime age (25-54)	73.0	75.8	76.5	78.3	76.4	-1.9 pps
Older (55-64)	51.0	54.3	56.4	59.9	59.4	-0.5 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	2954.3	3073.4	3068.9	3136.3	3024.3	-3.6 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	0.5	1.8	-0.1	0.3	-2.3	-2.6 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	-0.6	4.0	-0.1	2.2	-3.6	-5.8 pps
Male	-0.2	4.4	-0.1	2.3	-3.3	-5.7 pps
Female	-1.2	3.6	-0.2	2.0	-3.9	-5.9 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	10.8	10.8	10.6	9.9	10.1	0.3 pps
Male	13.5	13.5	13.4	12.5	12.8	0.3 pps
Female	7.8	7.6	7.3	6.9	7.1	0.2 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	4.1	4.4	4.0	4.3	3.5	-0.8 pps
Male	4.5	4.9	4.4	4.6	3.9	-0.7 pps
Female	3.6	3.9	3.7	4.0	3.1	-0.9 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	2.0	2.2	1.8	1.9	1.8	-0.1 pps
Male	1.8	2.0	1.7	1.7	1.6	-0.1 pps
Female	2.2	2.4	2.0	2.1	2.1	0.0 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	1.2	1.3	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.0 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	7.6	6.2	5.2	4.2	5.1	0.9 pps
Young (15-24)	17.2	12.9	12.7	8.9	14.2	5.3 pps
Prime age (25-49)	7.1	5.9	5.0	4.1	4.9	0.8 pps
Older (55-64)	7.3	5.9	4.6	3.9	4.3	0.4 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	22.5	18.3	15.7	13.2	14.2	1.0 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	6.8	5.3	4.6	3.4	4.8	1.4 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	3.4	3.1	2.4	1.9	2.5	0.6 pps
Nationals (15-64)	7.7	6.2	5.3	4.3	5.2	0.9 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0 pps
Male	8.1	6.4	5.7	4.5	5.4	0.9 pps
Female	7.0	6.0	4.7	3.9	4.8	0.9 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	58.9	54.9	58.3	56.5	44.9	-11.6 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	40.6	40.4	40.2	40.0	39.7	-0.7 %
Male	40.8	40.6	40.5	40.2	40.0	-0.5 %
Female	40.3	40.1	39.9	39.7	39.4	-0.8 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	-3.7	6.4	-6.1	-4.4	-0.2	4.2 pps
Building and construction	-3.9	0.1	5.2	6.0	-1.7	-7.7 pps
Services	3.0	0.6	1.3	1.7	-3.9	-5.6 pps
Manufacturing industry	1.3	1.1	0.5	-0.8	-4.8	-4.0 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	5.8	10.5	9.7	6.9	5.9	-1.0 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	3.2	6.3	5.4	1.6	2.5	0.9 pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	6.4	12.4	7.1	11.3	6.3	-5.0 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	6.4	12.3	6.8	11.1	6.3	-4.8 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	3.3	1.7	3.2	3.3	-1.9	-5.2 pps

Czechia	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2019-2020
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	10565	10590	10626	10669	10700	0.3 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	6968	6917	6879	6856	6838	-0.2 %
(% of total population)	66.0	65.3	64.7	64.3	63.9	-0.3 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	5226	5248	5267	5259	5224	-0.7 %
Male	2906	2912	2915	2914	2909	-0.2 %
Female	2321	2336	2352	2345	2315	-1.3 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	75.0	75.9	76.6	76.7	76.4	-0.3 pps
Young (15-24)	32.0	31.7	30.4	29.7	27.3	-2.4 pps
Prime age (25-54)	88.9	89.1	89.3	89.1	88.7	-0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	60.8	63.6	66.5	68.0	69.6	1.5 pps
Nationals (15-64)	74.9	75.7	76.4	76.5	76.2	-0.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	82.8	82.0	83.6	83.9	83.0	-1.0 pps
Male	82.2	82.9	83.3	83.4	83.3	-0.1 pps
Young (15-24)	37.5	36.5	34.4	33.4	32.9	-0.5 pps
Prime age (25-54)	95.4	95.7	95.9	95.9	95.8	-0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	70.9	73.2	75.3	76.2	76.5	0.3 pps
Female	67.6	68.7	69.6	69.8	69.2	-0.6 pps
Young (15-24)	26.2	26.6	26.2	25.8	21.4	-4.4 pps
Prime age (25-54)	82.1	82.1	82.3	81.8	81.1	-0.7 pps
Older (55-64)	51.2	54.5	58.0	60.1	62.8	2.7 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	72.0	73.6	74.8	75.1	74.4	-0.7 pps
Young (15-24)	28.6	29.1	28.4	28.0	25.1	-2.9 pps
Prime age (25-54)	85.7	86.7	87.5	87.4	86.5	-0.9 pps
Older (55-64)	58.5	62.1	65.1	66.7	68.2	1.5 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	23.7	26.1	26.5	28.1	27.6	-0.5 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	77.4	78.9	80.1	80.7	80.0	-0.7 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	83.4	84.2	85.6	84.9	83.9	-1.0 pps
Nationals (15-64)	71.8	73.5	74.7	75.0	74.2	-0.8 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	79.4	79.9	81.8	81.9	80.7	-1.2 pps
Male	79.3	80.9	81.8	81.9	81.4	-0.5 pps
Young (15-24)	33.8	33.8	32.2	31.6	30.5	-1.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	92.7	93.7	94.4	94.5	93.8	-0.7 pps
Older (55-64)	68.2	71.7	74.0	74.7	75.2	0.5 pps
Female	64.4	66.2	67.6	68.1	67.1	-1.0 pps
Young (15-24)	23.2	24.3	24.3	24.3	19.4	-4.8 pps
Prime age (25-54)	78.4	79.3	80.1	80.0	78.8	-1.1 pps
Older (55-64)	49.3	53.0	56.6	58.9	61.3	2.4 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	5015.9	5093.9	5146.8	5151.0	5086.9	-1.2 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	1.6	1.5	1.3	0.2	-1.7	-1.9 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	1.7	1.6	1.0	0.1	-1.2	-1.3 pps
Male	1.1	1.3	0.7	0.0	-0.7	-0.8 pps
Female	2.4	1.8	1.5	0.1	-1.9	-2.0 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	16.2	16.1	16.0	15.7	15.8	0.0 pps
Male	19.5	19.8	19.9	19.5	19.4	-0.1 pps
Female	11.9	11.6	11.1	11.1	11.2	0.1 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	9.7	9.6	8.4	7.8	7.0	-0.8 pps
Male	8.1	7.8	6.5	6.2	5.9	-0.3 pps
Female	11.6	11.7	10.6	9.6	8.2	-1.4 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	5.7	6.2	6.3	6.3	5.7	-0.6 pps
Male	2.3	2.4	2.6	2.8	2.4	-0.4 pps
Female	10.0	10.9	10.9	10.6	9.9	-0.7 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	0.8	0.6	0.4	0.4	0.3	-0.2 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	4.0	2.9	2.2	2.0	2.6	0.6 pps
Young (15-24)	10.5	7.9	6.7	5.6	8.0	2.4 pps
Prime age (25-49)	3.5	2.7	2.0	1.8	2.4	0.6 pps
Older (55-64)	3.8	2.4	2.0	2.0	2.0	0.0 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	20.9	13.3	10.8	10.9	10.7	-0.2 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	3.6	2.7	2.1	1.8	2.4	0.6 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	1.9	1.5	1.2	1.0	1.5	0.5 pps
Nationals (15-64)	4.0	2.9	2.3	2.0	2.6	0.6 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	4.1	2.6	2.1	2.5	2.8	0.3 pps
Male	3.4	2.3	1.8	1.7	2.2	0.5 pps
Female	4.7	3.6	2.8	2.4	3.0	0.6 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	42.1	35.0	30.6	30.0	22.0	-8.0 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	40.5	40.3	40.1	40.1	38.8	-3.2 %
Male	41.5	41.3	41.1	41.0	39.6	-3.4 %
Female	39.2	38.8	38.8	38.7	37.8	-2.3 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	-1.1	0.5	1.3	-3.1	-0.4	2.7 pps
Building and construction	-0.8	0.0	1.2	1.2	1.4	0.2 pps
Services	1.3	1.5	1.4	0.4	-2.3	-2.7 pps
Manufacturing industry	2.5	1.5	0.8	-0.6	-4.2	-3.6 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	4.0	7.2	8.1	7.2	3.2	-4.0 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	2.8	5.8	5.4	2.4	-1.4	-3.8 pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	3.8	7.8	7.7	7.9	5.0	-2.9 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	3.8	7.8	7.8	7.7	6.8	-0.9 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	0.9	3.6	1.8	2.8	-4.2	-7.0 pps

Denmark	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2019-2020
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	5729	5765	5794	5817	5830	0.2 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	3669	3684	3695	3704	3700	-0.1 %
(% of total population)	64.0	63.9	63.8	63.7	63.5	-0.2 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	2842	2870	2892	2930	2921	-0.3 %
Male	1486	1501	1514	1534	1528	-0.4 %
Female	1356	1369	1378	1395	1393	-0.2 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	77.5	77.9	78.2	79.1	79.0	-0.1 pps
Young (15-24)	59.5	60.4	60.1	61.1	60.2	-0.9 pps
Prime age (25-54)	86.0	85.8	86.1	86.5	86.3	-0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	68.6	70.9	71.8	73.8	74.6	0.7 pps
Nationals (15-64)	77.9	78.6	78.9	79.8	79.5	-0.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	72.1	70.8	71.3	71.6	74.0	2.3 pps
Male	80.2	80.7	81.1	82.0	81.8	-0.2 pps
Young (15-24)	57.9	59.6	59.4	60.5	60.1	-0.4 pps
Prime age (25-54)	89.6	89.3	89.6	90.1	89.7	-0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	73.2	75.0	76.5	78.4	79.1	0.7 pps
Female	74.7	75.1	75.3	76.1	76.0	-0.1 pps
Young (15-24)	61.2	61.2	60.8	61.8	60.4	-1.4 pps
Prime age (25-54)	82.4	82.2	82.6	82.8	82.9	0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	64.1	66.7	67.2	69.3	70.1	0.8 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	72.7	73.2	74.1	75.0	74.4	-0.6 pps
Young (15-24)	52.3	52.9	53.7	55.0	53.2	-1.7 pps
Prime age (25-54)	81.5	81.4	82.2	82.6	82.1	-0.5 pps
Older (55-64)	65.8	68.2	69.2	71.3	71.4	0.1 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	53.3	52.9	52.9	53.2	52.1	-1.1 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	77.4	78.3	79.4	79.9	78.6	-1.3 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	85.0	85.5	86.1	87.2	87.1	-0.1 pps
Nationals (15-64)	73.5	74.3	75.2	75.9	75.2	-0.8 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	62.1	62.1	62.9	65.1	66.6	1.5 pps
Male	75.5	76.0	76.9	78.0	77.3	-0.6 pps
Young (15-24)	50.1	51.9	52.4	54.2	52.5	-1.7 pps
Prime age (25-54)	85.5	85.0	85.9	86.3	85.8	-0.5 pps
Older (55-64)	70.1	72.2	73.8	75.8	75.8	0.0 pps
Female	69.8	70.5	71.3	72.0	71.4	-0.6 pps
Young (15-24)	54.6	53.9	55.2	55.8	54.0	-1.8 pps
Prime age (25-54)	77.3	77.7	78.5	78.8	78.3	-0.5 pps
Older (55-64)	61.6	64.4	64.6	66.9	67.1	0.2 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	2667.5	2698.1	2739.3	2779.1	2752.8	-0.9 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	1.7	1.5	1.5	1.4	-0.7	-2.1 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	1.7	1.1	1.5	1.5	-0.9	-2.4 pps
Male	1.3	1.0	1.6	1.6	-1.0	-2.5 pps
Female	2.2	1.3	1.5	1.3	-0.9	-2.2 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	7.8	7.4	7.2	7.4	7.5	0.1 pps
Male	10.4	10.0	9.7	9.9	10.0	0.1 pps
Female	4.9	4.5	4.3	4.7	4.8	0.2 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	12.9	12.3	10.7	10.8	10.9	0.1 pps
Male	11.4	11.2	9.3	9.6	9.3	-0.3 pps
Female	14.4	13.4	12.0	12.0	12.5	0.5 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	25.0	24.7	23.9	24.2	23.4	-0.8 pps
Male	15.2	15.3	14.5	15.3	14.8	-0.5 pps
Female	35.9	35.0	34.3	33.9	32.9	-1.0 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	3.4	3.3	2.8	2.6	2.7	0.1 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	6.0	5.8	5.1	5.0	5.6	0.6 pps
Young (15-24)	12.2	12.4	10.5	10.1	11.6	1.5 pps
Prime age (25-49)	5.3	5.1	4.5	4.5	4.9	0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	4.1	3.7	3.6	3.4	4.2	0.8 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	9.5	10.0	8.9	8.7	9.7	1.0 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	5.3	4.8	4.2	4.2	4.9	0.7 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	4.8	4.7	4.3	4.2	4.7	0.5 pps
Nationals (15-64)	5.6	5.5	4.7	4.8	5.4	0.6 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	13.9	12.3	11.8	9.1	9.9	0.8 pps
Male	5.6	5.6	4.9	4.8	5.3	0.5 pps
Female	6.4	6.1	5.3	5.3	6.0	0.7 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	20.4	20.5	19.1	16.5	16.4	-0.1 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	38.9	39.0	38.6	38.2	38.1	-0.3 %
Male	40.2	40.2	39.7	39.3	39.1	-0.5 %
Female	37.0	37.2	37.0	36.6	36.6	0.0 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	-1.3	1.0	-1.9	-2.8	2.9	5.7 pps
Building and construction	3.1	3.5	3.4	1.8	1.6	-0.2 pps
Services	2.9	2.4	1.8	1.6	-1.5	-3.1 pps
Manufacturing industry	1.2	1.2	1.5	1.8	-2.7	-4.5 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	1.3	1.7	1.6	1.9	2.3	0.4 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	1.1	0.5	1.2	0.7	-0.5	-1.2 pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	2.0	1.9	2.2	2.1	1.8	-0.3 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	1.8	1.6	2.2	2.1	2.5	0.4 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	1.5	1.3	0.5	0.8	-1.4	-2.2 pps

Germany	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2019-2020
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	82349	82657	82906	83093	83161	0.1 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	53802	53797	53524	53545	53284	-0.5 %
(% of total population)	65.3	65.1	64.6	64.4	64.1	-0.4 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	41932	42094	42094	42427	42224	-0.5 %
Male	22399	22504	22485	22619	22286	-1.5 %
Female	19533	19590	19609	19809	19938	0.7 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	77.9	78.2	78.6	79.2	79.2	0.0 pps
Young (15-24)	49.2	49.9	50.3	51.4	52.0	0.5 pps
Prime age (25-54)	87.3	87.3	87.7	88.0	88.3	0.3 pps
Older (55-64)	71.3	72.6	73.6	74.7	74.1	-0.6 pps
Nationals (15-64)	79.4	79.8	80.1	80.6	80.7	0.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	68.1	68.2	70.0	71.6	71.1	-0.5 pps
Male	82.2	82.4	82.9	83.5	82.6	-0.9 pps
Young (15-24)	50.9	51.3	52.5	54.2	53.7	-0.5 pps
Prime age (25-54)	91.9	91.9	92.3	92.7	92.0	-0.7 pps
Older (55-64)	76.9	77.9	78.7	79.5	78.2	-1.3 pps
Female	73.6	74.0	74.3	74.9	75.8	0.9 pps
Young (15-24)	47.4	48.3	47.8	48.4	50.1	1.7 pps
Prime age (25-54)	82.6	82.5	82.9	83.3	84.5	1.2 pps
Older (55-64)	65.9	67.5	68.6	70.0	70.1	0.1 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	74.7	75.2	75.9	76.7	76.2	-0.5 pps
Young (15-24)	45.7	46.5	47.2	48.5	48.3	-0.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	83.9	84.2	84.9	85.4	85.1	-0.3 pps
Older (55-64)	68.6	70.1	71.4	72.7	71.8	-0.9 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	47.0	47.6	48.3	49.4	49.8	0.4 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	78.9	79.5	80.2	80.8	80.2	-0.6 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	87.9	88.1	88.5	89.0	87.9	-1.0 pps
Nationals (15-64)	76.5	77.3	77.8	78.4	78.2	-0.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	62.3	62.7	64.8	66.7	64.5	-2.2 pps
Male	78.4	78.9	79.7	80.5	79.0	-1.4 pps
Young (15-24)	46.9	47.4	48.8	50.6	49.7	-0.9 pps
Prime age (25-54)	88.1	88.4	89.0	89.6	88.2	-1.4 pps
Older (55-64)	73.7	75.0	76.1	77.1	75.5	-1.6 pps
Female	70.8	71.5	72.1	72.8	73.2	0.4 pps
Young (15-24)	44.5	45.5	45.4	46.1	46.8	0.7 pps
Prime age (25-54)	79.7	80.0	80.6	81.1	81.9	0.7 pps
Older (55-64)	63.5	65.4	66.9	68.4	68.1	-0.3 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	40165.1	40481.6	40635.7	41065.1	40578.6	-1.2 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	1.2	1.4	1.4	0.9	-0.8	-1.7 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	2.5	0.8	0.4	1.1	-1.2	-2.2 pps
Male	2.7	0.8	0.3	0.9	-2.2	-3.1 pps
Female	2.3	0.7	0.5	1.2	0.0	-1.2 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	9.3	9.1	8.8	8.5	7.7	-0.9 pps
Male	11.6	11.2	10.9	10.7	9.6	-1.1 pps
Female	6.7	6.6	6.3	6.1	5.5	-0.6 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	13.2	12.9	12.6	12.0	10.8	-1.2 pps
Male	13.2	13.0	12.9	12.3	10.8	-1.5 pps
Female	13.2	12.9	12.4	11.7	10.8	-0.9 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	26.7	26.9	26.8	27.2	27.9	0.7 pps
Male	9.4	9.7	9.6	9.9	10.1	0.2 pps
Female	46.5	46.4	46.3	46.7	48.0	1.3 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	3.2	3.0	2.7	2.5	2.1	-0.4 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	4.1	3.8	3.4	3.1	3.8	0.7 pps
Young (15-24)	7.1	6.8	6.2	5.8	7.0	1.2 pps
Prime age (25-49)	3.9	3.5	3.2	3.0	3.7	0.7 pps
Older (55-64)	3.9	3.4	2.9	2.7	3.2	0.5 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	10.3	9.7	9.0	8.1	9.3	1.2 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	3.8	3.4	2.9	2.8	3.3	0.5 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	2.2	2.0	1.9	1.9	2.6	0.7 pps
Nationals (15-64)	3.6	3.2	2.9	2.6	3.1	0.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	8.6	8.1	7.5	6.9	9.3	2.4 pps
Male	4.5	4.1	3.8	3.5	4.2	0.7 pps
Female	3.8	3.3	2.9	2.7	3.4	0.7 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	41.1	41.9	41.3	38.1	29.5	-8.6 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	41.2	40.9	40.7	40.6	39.4	-3.0 %
Male	42.0	41.6	41.4	41.3	40.1	-2.9 %
Female	39.8	39.5	39.4	39.4	38.1	-3.3 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	-1.6	-1.3	-1.1	-1.5	-3.2	-1.7 pps
Building and construction	1.0	1.2	1.5	1.3	1.3	0.0 pps
Services	1.4	1.5	1.3	0.5	-1.7	-2.2 pps
Manufacturing industry	0.3	0.8	1.6	0.6	-2.4	-3.0 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	2.3	2.6	2.9	3.4	0.4	-3.0 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	1.0	1.2	1.2	0.8	-1.1	-1.9 pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	2.2	3.3	2.8	2.7	2.2	-0.5 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	2.1	3.0	2.7	2.8	2.3	-0.5 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	1.0	1.3	-0.3	0.1	-3.8	-3.9 pps

Estonia	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2019-2020
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	1316	1316	1319	1325	1329	0.3 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	849	844	843	842	841	-0.1 %
(% of total population)	64.5	64.1	63.9	63.6	63.3	-0.3 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	658	665	666	665	667	0.3 %
Male	343	346	347	345	347	0.6 %
Female	315	320	320	319	320	0.1 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	77.5	78.8	79.1	78.9	79.3	0.4 pps
Young (15-24)	43.2	46.1	47.3	44.6	43.0	-1.6 pps
Prime age (25-54)	87.8	88.6	88.3	87.8	88.2	0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	71.0	72.2	72.9	75.5	77.1	1.6 pps
Nationals (15-64)	77.6	78.8	79.0	78.9	79.0	0.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	76.6	79.2	79.4	78.9	80.7	1.8 pps
Male	81.9	82.7	82.6	82.1	82.3	0.2 pps
Young (15-24)	46.2	49.7	49.5	46.3	44.9	-1.4 pps
Prime age (25-54)	93.7	93.3	93.4	92.5	92.8	0.3 pps
Older (55-64)	70.4	71.9	70.8	73.4	74.5	1.2 pps
Female	73.2	75.1	75.6	75.8	76.3	0.5 pps
Young (15-24)	40.4	42.5	45.1	43.1	41.1	-2.0 pps
Prime age (25-54)	81.8	83.7	83.0	82.8	83.3	0.6 pps
Older (55-64)	71.4	72.3	74.5	77.4	79.3	1.9 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	72.1	74.1	74.8	75.3	73.7	-1.6 pps
Young (15-24)	37.5	40.5	41.7	39.7	35.4	-4.4 pps
Prime age (25-54)	82.6	83.9	84.2	84.3	83.0	-1.3 pps
Older (55-64)	65.2	68.0	69.0	72.5	71.9	-0.6 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	41.8	44.9	45.0	41.3	38.2	-3.2 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	74.0	76.2	77.4	78.1	76.5	-1.5 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	84.1	85.5	85.2	86.4	84.9	-1.5 pps
Nationals (15-64)	72.9	74.6	75.3	75.7	73.9	-1.8 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	67.4	71.2	71.7	73.1	72.6	-0.5 pps
Male	75.7	77.4	78.1	78.7	76.4	-2.2 pps
Young (15-24)	38.8	42.8	43.5	41.5	37.1	-4.4 pps
Prime age (25-54)	87.9	88.5	89.5	89.5	87.5	-2.1 pps
Older (55-64)	63.8	66.7	65.9	69.6	68.8	-0.8 pps
Female	68.6	70.9	71.4	71.9	71.0	-1.0 pps
Young (15-24)	36.1	38.2	39.9	38.0	33.6	-4.4 pps
Prime age (25-54)	77.2	79.2	78.7	78.7	78.3	-0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	66.5	69.3	71.5	74.9	74.8	-0.2 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	612.3	625.6	630.2	634.1	620.2	-2.2 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	0.3	2.7	-0.4	0.6	-2.3	-2.9 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	-0.1	2.2	0.7	0.6	-2.2	-2.8 pps
Male	0.2	2.0	1.3	0.9	-2.5	-3.4 pps
Female	-0.5	2.4	0.1	0.3	-1.9	-2.2 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	9.5	9.9	10.4	10.8	10.5	-0.2 pps
Male	12.1	13.3	14.0	14.6	14.5	-0.1 pps
Female	6.7	6.3	6.5	6.7	6.3	-0.4 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	3.7	3.1	3.5	3.1	2.8	-0.3 pps
Male	3.9	3.4	3.6	3.1	2.8	-0.3 pps
Female	3.5	2.9	3.3	3.2	2.8	-0.4 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	9.9	9.5	11.1	11.3	12.3	1.0 pps
Male	6.8	6.0	7.2	7.1	8.2	1.1 pps
Female	13.3	13.3	15.3	15.9	16.8	0.9 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	1.0	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.9	0.2 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	6.8	5.8	5.4	4.4	6.8	2.4 pps
Young (15-24)	13.4	12.1	11.8	11.1	17.9	6.8 pps
Prime age (25-49)	5.9	5.3	4.6	4.0	5.9	1.9 pps
Older (55-64)	8.1	5.7	5.4	4.0	6.7	2.7 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	13.4	11.4	10.7	10.3	13.6	3.3 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	8.0	6.8	5.9	4.9	7.6	2.7 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	3.8	3.3	3.5	2.9	4.9	2.0 pps
Nationals (15-64)	6.1	5.2	4.7	4.1	6.5	2.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	12.1	10.2	9.8	7.3	10.0	2.7 pps
Male	7.4	6.2	5.4	4.1	7.0	2.9 pps
Female	6.1	5.3	5.3	4.8	6.6	1.8 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	31.6	33.2	23.7	19.5	16.7	-2.8 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	40.1	40.3	39.8	39.9	39.2	-1.8 %
Male	40.8	40.9	40.6	40.5	39.7	-2.0 %
Female	39.3	39.6	38.8	39.1	38.5	-1.5 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	0.8	-9.0	-10.8	0.0	-10.1	-10.1 pps
Building and construction	-12.1	3.1	4.3	3.5	0.6	-2.9 pps
Services	4.5	6.1	-0.8	0.7	-4.5	-5.2 pps
Manufacturing industry	0.7	3.5	-1.9	-2.3	-3.8	-1.5 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	6.2	7.1	10.3	8.8	4.7	-4.1 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	-0.1	7.2	4.6	5.9	2.9	-2.9 pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	5.4	7.7	5.6	7.2	1.5	-5.7 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	5.3	7.9	5.7	7.1	1.8	-5.3 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	2.9	3.0	4.6	3.5	-0.7	-4.2 pps

Ireland	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2019-2020
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	4749	4802	4861	4927	4980	1.1 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	3110	3141	3176	3219	3254	1.1 %
(% of total population)	65.5	65.4	65.3	65.3	65.3	0.0 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	2260	2282	2316	2358	2339	-0.8 %
Male	1221	1227	1241	1264	1253	-0.9 %
Female	1039	1055	1075	1094	1086	-0.7 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	72.7	72.7	72.9	73.3	71.9	-1.4 pps
Young (15-24)	50.5	46.7	46.7	47.1	43.7	-3.4 pps
Prime age (25-54)	82.0	82.9	83.2	83.5	82.5	-1.1 pps
Older (55-64)	60.7	62.0	63.3	64.1	64.4	0.3 pps
Nationals (15-64)	72.2	72.0	72.0	72.5	71.2	-1.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	75.6	76.1	78.0	77.2	75.1	-2.1 pps
Male	79.2	78.8	78.8	79.2	77.7	-1.5 pps
Young (15-24)	52.6	47.8	48.4	48.2	44.3	-3.9 pps
Prime age (25-54)	89.3	90.1	90.0	90.6	89.5	-1.1 pps
Older (55-64)	70.1	70.8	72.1	72.5	72.7	0.2 pps
Female	66.3	66.6	67.1	67.4	66.2	-1.2 pps
Young (15-24)	48.3	45.5	45.0	45.9	43.1	-2.8 pps
Prime age (25-54)	74.9	75.9	76.7	76.7	75.6	-1.1 pps
Older (55-64)	51.4	53.3	54.7	55.9	56.4	0.5 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	66.4	67.7	68.6	69.5	67.7	-1.8 pps
Young (15-24)	42.0	40.0	40.3	41.2	37.0	-4.2 pps
Prime age (25-54)	75.8	78.0	79.2	80.1	78.7	-1.4 pps
Older (55-64)	56.8	58.4	60.4	61.8	61.8	0.0 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	37.5	37.0	37.0	37.7	35.4	-2.3 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	67.1	67.5	69.4	70.3	66.3	-3.9 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	82.5	84.2	84.6	85.2	83.8	-1.4 pps
Nationals (15-64)	66.1	67.1	67.9	68.9	67.4	-1.6 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	68.7	70.4	72.6	72.7	69.6	-3.1 pps
Male	71.8	73.0	74.1	75.0	73.2	-1.8 pps
Young (15-24)	42.2	40.2	41.2	41.4	37.5	-3.9 pps
Prime age (25-54)	82.3	84.5	85.7	86.7	85.3	-1.4 pps
Older (55-64)	65.1	66.5	68.5	69.9	69.6	-0.3 pps
Female	61.1	62.4	63.3	64.2	62.4	-1.8 pps
Young (15-24)	41.7	39.7	39.4	41.0	36.5	-4.5 pps
Prime age (25-54)	69.6	71.7	72.9	73.6	72.2	-1.5 pps
Older (55-64)	48.5	50.3	52.3	53.9	54.3	0.4 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	2066.4	2125.1	2180.0	2238.5	2203.9	-1.5 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	3.7	3.0	3.2	2.9	-1.5	-4.4 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	3.6	2.8	2.6	2.7	-1.5	-4.2 pps
Male	3.3	2.7	2.6	2.5	-1.4	-3.9 pps
Female	3.9	3.1	2.5	2.9	-1.7	-4.6 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	14.0	13.4	12.9	12.5	12.3	-0.2 pps
Male	19.9	19.1	18.3	17.5	16.7	-0.8 pps
Female	7.1	6.8	6.8	6.6	7.2	0.6 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	9.0	9.1	9.9	9.7	9.0	-0.7 pps
Male	8.6	8.8	9.5	8.9	8.4	-0.5 pps
Female	9.4	9.4	10.4	10.4	9.5	-0.9 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	21.9	20.1	19.5	19.7	18.2	-1.5 pps
Male	12.9	10.9	10.6	10.1	9.6	-0.5 pps
Female	32.4	30.6	29.9	30.6	28.2	-2.4 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	6.7	4.7	3.5	3.2	2.5	-0.7 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	8.4	6.7	5.8	5.0	5.7	0.7 pps
Young (15-24)	16.8	14.4	13.8	12.5	15.3	2.8 pps
Prime age (25-49)	7.5	5.8	4.8	4.1	4.6	0.5 pps
Older (55-64)	6.5	5.8	4.6	3.6	4.0	0.4 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	15.6	12.6	10.8	9.7	9.1	-0.6 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	10.2	8.6	7.1	6.1	7.1	1.0 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	5.1	4.1	3.8	3.2	4.2	1.0 pps
Nationals (15-64)	8.5	6.8	5.7	4.9	5.5	0.6 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	9.1	7.5	6.9	5.7	7.3	1.6 pps
Male	9.1	7.1	5.8	5.2	5.6	0.4 pps
Female	7.6	6.3	5.7	4.7	5.7	1.0 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	52.2	46.4	37.1	33.0	23.7	-9.3 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	40.1	40.2	40.6	40.5	39.7	-2.0 %
Male	42.0	42.1	42.5	42.4	41.5	-2.1 %
Female	37.1	37.1	37.6	37.5	36.8	-1.9 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	3.6	-2.4	-3.0	-4.4	-0.1	4.3 pps
Building and construction	9.3	8.4	11.4	2.6	-6.5	-9.1 pps
Services	3.8	3.0	3.4	2.8	-3.1	-5.9 pps
Manufacturing industry	6.2	1.1	-1.3	2.0	3.2	1.2 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	2.4	2.9	2.5	3.4	2.4	-0.9 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	1.4	1.3	2.3	0.4	2.1	1.7 pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	1.8	2.2	3.1	3.7	-3.6	-7.3 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	1.7	2.2	3.4	3.4	3.4	0.0 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	-1.6	5.8	5.7	2.0	7.5	5.5 pps

Greece	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2019-2020
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	10776	10755	10733	10722	10707	-0.1 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	6937	6886	6831	6771	6719	-0.8 %
(% of total population)	64.4	64.0	63.6	63.1	62.8	-0.4 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	4732	4701	4657	4634	4526	-2.3 %
Male	2613	2605	2590	2571	2514	-2.2 %
Female	2119	2096	2068	2063	2013	-2.4 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	68.2	68.3	68.2	68.4	67.4	-1.1 pps
Young (15-24)	24.6	25.1	23.3	22.5	21.2	-1.3 pps
Prime age (25-54)	85.5	85.0	85.0	85.4	84.0	-1.4 pps
Older (55-64)	44.9	46.7	48.5	49.8	50.8	1.0 pps
Nationals (15-64)	67.8	68.0	68.0	68.2	67.2	-1.0 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	73.9	71.9	70.9	72.1	70.7	-1.4 pps
Male	76.2	76.4	76.6	76.7	75.5	-1.2 pps
Young (15-24)	26.4	26.2	25.1	23.9	23.1	-0.8 pps
Prime age (25-54)	93.2	93.0	93.2	93.2	91.6	-1.6 pps
Older (55-64)	57.3	59.8	61.4	63.8	64.5	0.7 pps
Female	60.4	60.3	59.9	60.4	59.4	-1.0 pps
Young (15-24)	22.9	23.9	21.5	21.0	19.3	-1.7 pps
Prime age (25-54)	77.7	77.0	76.7	77.6	76.3	-1.3 pps
Older (55-64)	33.6	34.9	36.8	37.3	38.6	1.3 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	52.0	53.5	54.9	56.5	56.3	-0.2 pps
Young (15-24)	13.0	14.1	14.0	14.6	13.8	-0.8 pps
Prime age (25-54)	66.0	67.4	68.9	70.8	70.4	-0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	36.3	38.3	41.1	43.2	44.6	1.4 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	39.4	39.8	39.9	39.0	37.7	-1.3 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	50.1	51.8	53.1	55.1	54.8	-0.3 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	69.6	70.8	73.3	75.2	74.5	-0.7 pps
Nationals (15-64)	52.0	53.6	55.1	56.7	56.6	-0.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	52.0	51.9	51.8	53.0	50.4	-2.6 pps
Male	61.0	62.7	64.7	65.9	65.2	-0.7 pps
Young (15-24)	14.7	15.9	15.9	15.9	15.9	-0.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	76.0	77.5	79.6	80.8	79.7	-1.1 pps
Older (55-64)	46.2	49.6	53.3	56.1	57.0	0.9 pps
Female	43.3	44.4	45.3	47.3	47.5	0.2 pps
Young (15-24)	11.3	12.4	12.0	13.2	11.7	-1.5 pps
Prime age (25-54)	55.9	57.2	58.2	60.8	61.1	0.3 pps
Older (55-64)	27.2	28.0	30.0	31.6	33.5	2.0 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	3610.3	3682.7	3751.1	3824.6	3780.3	-1.2 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	3.4	-0.5	1.4	1.2	-1.3	-2.5 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	1.8	2.0	1.9	2.0	-1.2	-3.1 pps
Male	2.1	2.2	2.4	0.9	-1.8	-2.7 pps
Female	1.2	1.7	1.1	3.5	-0.3	-3.8 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	29.5	29.4	29.1	27.9	27.9	0.0 pps
Male	34.2	34.4	34.0	32.9	32.9	0.0 pps
Female	22.9	22.4	22.1	21.1	21.2	0.1 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	11.2	11.4	11.3	12.6	10.1	-2.5 pps
Male	10.3	9.9	9.5	10.9	8.8	-2.1 pps
Female	12.3	13.3	13.5	14.5	11.7	-2.8 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	9.8	9.7	9.1	9.1	8.6	-0.5 pps
Male	6.9	6.6	6.1	5.9	5.5	-0.4 pps
Female	13.7	14.1	13.2	13.5	12.7	-0.8 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	7.1	6.8	6.4	6.0	5.6	-0.4 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	23.6	21.5	19.3	17.3	16.3	-1.0 pps
Young (15-24)	47.3	43.6	39.9	35.2	35.0	-0.2 pps
Prime age (25-49)	22.8	20.7	18.9	17.1	16.2	-0.9 pps
Older (55-64)	19.2	18.1	15.3	13.4	12.2	-1.2 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	26.9	24.8	22.8	21.6	19.8	-1.8 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	26.2	24.0	21.9	19.7	18.6	-1.1 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	18.1	16.6	14.3	12.3	12.2	-0.1 pps
Nationals (15-64)	23.3	21.2	19.0	16.8	15.7	-1.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	29.6	27.8	26.9	26.5	28.7	2.2 pps
Male	19.9	17.8	15.4	14.0	13.6	-0.4 pps
Female	28.1	26.1	24.2	21.5	19.8	-1.7 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	71.8	72.6	70.1	69.9	66.3	-3.6 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	43.1	42.9	42.6	42.4	41.8	-1.4 %
Male	44.6	44.4	44.1	43.8	43.1	-1.6 %
Female	40.8	40.7	40.4	40.2	39.7	-1.2 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	-2.3	0.7	0.7	-1.9	-9.2	-7.3 pps
Building and construction	1.0	-3.3	1.6	-0.5	-3.4	-2.9 pps
Services	6.2	-0.6	1.3	1.8	-1.5	-3.3 pps
Manufacturing industry	4.6	-1.5	1.3	2.7	-1.4	-4.1 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	-3.7	1.5	1.8	1.0	0.0	-1.0 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	-3.1	1.1	1.9	0.8	1.5	0.7 pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	-1.4	2.5	2.5	3.3	4.0	0.7 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	-0.7	1.4	2.0	2.1	4.0	1.9 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	-3.8	1.8	0.2	0.6	-7.0	-7.6 pps

Spain		2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2019-2020
1	- **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	46450	46533	46729	47105	47354	0.5 %
2	- **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	30536	30531	30671	30909	31110	0.6 %
	(% of total population)	65.7	65.6	65.6	65.6	65.7	0.1 pps
3	- **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	22657	22558	22607	22804	22475	-1.4 %
	Male	12120	12064	12089	12145	11961	-1.5 %
	Female	10536	10495	10518	10659	10513	-1.4 %
4	- **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	74.2	73.9	73.7	73.8	72.2	-1.5 pps
	Young (15-24)	33.0	33.3	33.0	33.0	29.9	-3.1 pps
	Prime age (25-54)	87.4	87.0	86.9	87.0	85.5	-1.5 pps
	Older (55-64)	59.2	59.6	60.5	61.6	62.5	0.9 pps
	Nationals (15-64)	73.8	73.5	73.4	73.5	72.1	-1.4 pps
	Non-nationals (15-64)	77.2	76.8	76.1	75.9	73.5	-2.5 pps
	Male	79.2	78.9	78.8	78.5	76.9	-1.7 pps
	Young (15-24)	34.7	35.1	35.1	35.1	32.2	-2.9 pps
	Prime age (25-54)	92.5	92.0	91.9	91.7	90.1	-1.6 pps
	Older (55-64)	67.0	67.9	68.4	69.2	69.6	0.5 pps
	Female	69.2	68.8	68.6	69.0	67.6	-1.4 pps
	Young (15-24)	31.3	31.5	30.8	30.7	27.5	-3.2 pps
	Prime age (25-54)	82.3	82.0	81.8	82.3	80.8	-1.4 pps
	Older (55-64)	51.7	51.8	52.9	54.4	55.7	1.2 pps
5	- **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	59.5	61.1	62.4	63.3	60.9	-2.4 pps
	Young (15-24)	18.4	20.5	21.7	22.3	18.5	-3.8 pps
	Prime age (25-54)	71.5	73.2	74.7	75.8	73.1	-2.7 pps
	Older (55-64)	49.1	50.5	52.2	53.8	54.7	0.8 pps
	Low-skilled (15-64)	48.1	49.6	51.3	52.2	49.5	-2.7 pps
	Medium-skilled (15-64)	58.7	59.8	60.6	61.1	57.6	-3.5 pps
	High-skilled (15-64)	77.9	79.4	80.1	80.3	78.2	-2.1 pps
	Nationals (15-64)	59.9	61.4	62.8	63.7	61.8	-1.9 pps
	Non-nationals (15-64)	56.6	58.5	59.5	60.7	55.3	-5.4 pps
	Male	64.8	66.5	67.9	68.7	66.1	-2.6 pps
	Young (15-24)	19.4	21.2	22.7	24.3	20.3	-4.0 pps
	Prime age (25-54)	77.4	79.2	80.8	81.6	78.8	-2.8 pps
	Older (55-64)	55.7	57.8	59.7	61.1	61.6	0.5 pps
	Female	54.3	55.7	56.9	57.9	55.7	-2.2 pps
	Young (15-24)	17.2	19.7	20.5	20.1	16.6	-3.6 pps
	Prime age (25-54)	65.6	67.1	68.6	69.9	67.4	-2.5 pps
	Older (55-64)	42.8	43.5	44.9	46.9	48.0	1.1 pps
6	- **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	18182.7	18648.5	19136.3	19567.9	18957.5	-3.1 %
7	- **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	2.1	2.6	2.2	2.8	-4.1	-6.9 pps
	Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.3	-3.1	-5.4 pps
	Male	2.4	2.5	2.5	2.0	-3.1	-5.1 pps
	Female	2.9	2.6	2.7	2.6	-3.1	-5.7 pps
8	- **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	16.1	15.7	15.2	14.9	15.3	0.4 pps
	Male	19.7	19.3	18.6	18.2	18.5	0.4 pps
	Female	11.9	11.4	11.1	11.0	11.4	0.4 pps
9	- **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	26.1	26.8	26.9	26.3	24.2	-2.1 pps
	Male	25.8	26.0	26.0	25.4	22.7	-2.7 pps
	Female	26.5	27.6	27.8	27.3	25.7	-1.6 pps
10	- **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	15.1	14.9	14.5	14.5	13.9	-0.6 pps
	Male	7.6	7.2	6.7	6.8	6.5	-0.3 pps
	Female	24.1	24.1	23.9	23.7	22.6	-1.1 pps
11	**Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	9.3	9.1	8.1	7.9	7.3	-0.6 pps
12	- **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	19.6	17.2	15.3	14.1	15.5	1.4 pps
	Young (15-24)	44.4	38.6	34.3	32.5	38.3	5.8 pps
	Prime age (25-49)	18.2	15.9	14.0	12.9	14.5	1.6 pps
	Older (55-64)	17.0	15.3	13.8	12.6	12.5	-0.1 pps
	Low-skilled (15-64)	28.2	25.2	22.3	20.5	21.9	1.4 pps
	Medium-skilled (15-64)	19.2	17.0	15.5	14.5	16.6	2.1 pps
	High-skilled (15-64)	11.7	10.0	9.0	8.7	10.3	1.6 pps
	Nationals (15-64)	18.8	16.4	14.4	13.3	14.2	0.9 pps
	Non-nationals (15-64)	26.7	23.9	21.9	20.1	24.7	4.6 pps
	Male	18.1	15.7	13.7	12.5	13.9	1.4 pps
	Female	21.4	19.0	17.0	16.0	17.4	1.4 pps
13	- **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	48.3	44.4	41.7	37.8	32.0	-5.8 pps
14	- **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	40.4	40.1	40.3	39.9	39.1	-2.0 %
	Male	41.3	41.0	41.2	40.8	39.9	-2.2 %
	Female	39.0	38.8	38.9	38.7	38.0	-1.8 %
15	- **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
	Agriculture	4.5	2.9	0.0	-3.9	-7.8	-3.9 pps
	Building and construction	1.5	4.3	6.8	7.1	-0.9	-8.0 pps
	Services	1.8	2.9	1.5	4.3	-5.5	-9.8 pps
	Manufacturing industry	3.5	2.7	2.2	1.3	-5.7	-7.0 pps
16	- **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
	Compensation per employee	-0.1	0.7	1.6	2.3	-1.4	-3.7 pps
	Real compensation per employee based on GDP	-0.9	-0.5	-0.2	0.7	0.7	0.0 pps
	Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	0.2	0.8	1.8	2.2	3.9	1.7 pps
	Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	0.4	0.8	1.9	1.8	3.1	1.3 pps
	Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	0.9	0.3	0.1	-0.7	-7.0	-6.3 pps

France	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2019-2020
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	66831	67116	67393	67624	67813	0.3 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	40895	40846	40791	40730	40692	-0.1 %
(% of total population)	61.2	60.9	60.5	60.2	60.0	-0.2 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	29200	29207	29316	29192	28902	-1.0 %
Male	15093	15119	15128	15007	14846	-1.1 %
Female	14107	14088	14189	14185	14056	-0.9 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	71.4	71.5	71.9	71.7	71.0	-0.6 pps
Young (15-24)	37.0	36.9	37.5	36.8	35.6	-1.2 pps
Prime age (25-54)	87.5	87.4	87.6	87.4	86.9	-0.5 pps
Older (55-64)	53.7	54.9	56.0	57.0	57.1	0.1 pps
Nationals (15-64)	72.0	72.1	72.3	72.2	71.5	-0.7 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	64.0	63.9	66.2	65.5	65.5	0.0 pps
Male	75.3	75.5	75.7	75.3	74.5	-0.7 pps
Young (15-24)	39.9	40.3	41.0	39.6	38.2	-1.4 pps
Prime age (25-54)	92.4	92.6	92.4	91.9	91.5	-0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	56.2	56.9	58.4	59.5	59.4	-0.1 pps
Female	67.6	67.6	68.2	68.2	67.6	-0.6 pps
Young (15-24)	34.2	33.5	33.9	33.9	33.1	-0.9 pps
Prime age (25-54)	82.8	82.5	83.1	83.1	82.6	-0.6 pps
Older (55-64)	51.5	53.1	53.9	54.6	54.9	0.3 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	64.2	64.7	65.3	65.6	65.3	-0.3 pps
Young (15-24)	28.0	28.7	29.7	29.6	28.5	-1.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	79.7	80.0	80.5	80.9	80.8	-0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	49.9	51.3	52.3	53.1	53.8	0.7 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	38.8	39.7	39.5	38.8	38.8	0.1 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	66.1	66.2	66.7	66.2	64.8	-1.4 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	82.4	82.9	82.8	83.3	82.5	-0.7 pps
Nationals (15-64)	65.1	65.8	66.2	66.4	66.1	-0.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	51.4	52.0	55.1	55.7	55.7	0.1 pps
Male	67.5	68.4	68.9	68.8	68.5	-0.4 pps
Young (15-24)	29.9	31.0	32.2	31.4	30.4	-1.0 pps
Prime age (25-54)	84.3	85.0	85.2	85.2	85.0	-0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	51.6	52.8	54.2	55.5	56.0	0.5 pps
Female	60.9	61.2	61.9	62.5	62.2	-0.3 pps
Young (15-24)	26.0	26.4	27.2	27.8	26.5	-1.3 pps
Prime age (25-54)	75.3	75.2	76.1	76.8	76.7	-0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	48.2	49.9	50.4	50.9	51.8	0.9 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	26239.1	26434.3	26646.1	26710.9	26563.1	-0.6 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	0.6	1.1	1.0	1.2	-0.9	-2.1 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	0.4	0.7	0.8	0.2	-0.6	-0.8 pps
Male	0.4	1.1	0.5	-0.3	-0.6	-0.4 pps
Female	0.4	0.4	1.1	0.8	-0.5	-1.3 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	11.0	10.8	10.9	11.3	11.6	0.3 pps
Male	14.3	13.8	14.0	14.5	14.5	0.0 pps
Female	7.5	7.7	7.6	8.0	8.6	0.6 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	16.2	16.8	16.6	16.2	15.3	-0.9 pps
Male	15.7	16.2	16.1	15.9	14.7	-1.2 pps
Female	16.6	17.4	17.2	16.6	15.9	-0.7 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	18.3	18.2	18.0	17.5	17.0	-0.5 pps
Male	7.6	7.7	7.8	7.6	7.6	0.0 pps
Female	29.7	29.5	28.8	28.0	27.0	-1.0 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	8.1	7.9	7.5	6.6	6.5	-0.1 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	10.1	9.4	9.0	8.4	8.0	-0.4 pps
Young (15-24)	24.5	22.1	20.8	19.5	20.2	0.7 pps
Prime age (25-49)	8.9	8.5	8.1	7.4	7.1	-0.3 pps
Older (55-64)	7.2	6.6	6.8	6.8	5.8	-1.0 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	18.3	17.3	16.3	15.7	14.2	-1.5 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	10.7	10.1	9.7	9.2	8.9	-0.3 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	5.8	5.3	5.5	5.1	5.3	0.2 pps
Nationals (15-64)	9.5	8.8	8.5	8.0	7.6	-0.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	19.7	18.6	16.7	15.0	14.9	-0.1 pps
Male	10.3	9.5	9.0	8.5	8.1	-0.4 pps
Female	9.8	9.4	9.0	8.4	8.0	-0.4 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	45.8	45.4	42.0	40.3	36.8	-3.5 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	39.1	39.0	39.0	38.8	38.1	-1.8 %
Male	40.2	39.9	40.0	39.8	39.1	-1.8 %
Female	37.5	37.6	37.5	37.4	36.8	-1.6 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	-0.8	-0.4	0.3	-0.1	-1.3	-1.2 pps
Building and construction	-2.3	-0.7	1.5	3.0	1.7	-1.3 pps
Services	1.5	2.6	2.1	1.2	-1.6	-2.9 pps
Manufacturing industry	-0.6	-0.6	0.0	3.0	-0.8	-3.8 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	1.2	2.0	1.7	0.0	-2.9	-2.8 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	0.8	1.4	0.8	-1.4	-4.8	-3.4 pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	1.2	1.5	2.7	1.7	2.3	0.6 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	1.3	2.0	1.9	1.8	3.1	1.3 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	0.5	1.1	0.9	0.6	-7.0	-7.6 pps

Croatia	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2019-2020
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	4172	4130	4091	4067	4049	-0.4 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	2753	2720	2689	2658	2629	-1.1 %
(% of total population)	66.0	65.9	65.7	65.4	64.9	-0.4 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	1806	1807	1783	1768	1764	-0.3 %
Male	968	973	953	951	955	0.4 %
Female	838	835	829	818	809	-1.1 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	65.6	66.4	66.3	66.5	67.1	0.6 pps
Young (15-24)	37.2	35.7	33.5	33.2	32.5	-0.7 pps
Prime age (25-54)	82.0	83.3	83.4	83.6	83.9	0.3 pps
Older (55-64)	42.2	43.6	44.8	45.5	47.8	2.2 pps
Nationals (15-64)	65.7	66.5	66.3	66.5	67.1	0.6 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	37.8	43.7	67.5	69.9	55.7	-14.2 pps
Male	70.3	71.5	70.9	71.5	72.6	1.1 pps
Young (15-24)	41.9	40.9	37.9	38.8	39.2	0.4 pps
Prime age (25-54)	85.2	86.7	86.4	86.9	88.1	1.2 pps
Older (55-64)	50.7	52.8	53.4	54.2	55.7	1.6 pps
Female	60.9	61.4	61.7	61.5	61.6	0.0 pps
Young (15-24)	32.3	30.2	28.8	27.3	25.3	-2.0 pps
Prime age (25-54)	78.8	79.9	80.3	80.2	79.8	-0.5 pps
Older (55-64)	34.2	35.1	36.7	37.5	40.4	2.9 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	56.9	58.9	60.6	62.1	62.0	-0.1 pps
Young (15-24)	25.6	25.9	25.6	27.7	25.6	-2.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	72.4	74.9	77.0	78.3	78.3	-0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	38.1	40.4	42.8	44.0	45.5	1.6 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	27.4	24.4	25.8	26.7	25.3	-1.4 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	59.5	62.6	63.9	65.5	64.9	-0.6 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	79.7	81.5	81.5	81.8	83.4	1.5 pps
Nationals (15-64)	57.0	59.0	60.6	62.1	62.0	0.0 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	34.1	42.5	58.1	61.4	54.4	-7.0 pps
Male	61.4	63.8	65.4	67.0	67.1	0.1 pps
Young (15-24)	28.9	29.8	30.5	33.2	31.9	-1.3 pps
Prime age (25-54)	76.3	78.7	80.4	81.7	82.0	0.3 pps
Older (55-64)	45.1	49.0	51.0	52.6	53.4	0.8 pps
Female	52.4	54.0	55.9	57.1	56.9	-0.2 pps
Young (15-24)	22.2	21.8	20.3	21.9	19.0	-2.9 pps
Prime age (25-54)	68.5	71.1	73.5	74.9	74.5	-0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	31.6	32.3	35.2	35.9	38.2	2.3 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	1566.6	1603.0	1630.2	1649.6	1629.8	-1.2 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	0.2	2.4	2.6	3.1	-1.2	-4.3 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	0.5	2.3	1.7	1.2	-1.2	-2.4 pps
Male	0.6	2.7	1.3	1.4	-0.9	-2.3 pps
Female	0.4	1.9	2.2	1.0	-1.5	-2.5 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	11.8	10.5	10.2	10.5	11.0	0.5 pps
Male	14.9	12.6	12.2	13.3	14.3	1.0 pps
Female	8.1	7.9	7.8	7.2	7.2	0.0 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	22.2	20.7	19.9	18.1	15.2	-2.9 pps
Male	21.9	20.6	19.4	16.9	14.3	-2.6 pps
Female	22.4	20.7	20.6	19.3	16.2	-3.1 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	5.6	4.8	5.2	4.8	4.5	-0.3 pps
Male	4.4	3.8	3.8	3.1	3.2	0.1 pps
Female	7.1	6.0	6.8	6.7	6.1	-0.6 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.4	1.3	-0.1 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	13.1	11.2	8.5	6.6	7.5	0.9 pps
Young (15-24)	31.3	27.4	23.7	16.6	21.1	4.5 pps
Prime age (25-49)	11.6	10.1	7.7	6.3	6.8	0.5 pps
Older (55-64)	9.6	7.5	4.4	3.4	4.7	1.3 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	18.1	20.5	12.1	9.6	10.3	0.7 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	14.7	11.7	9.2	7.0	8.2	1.2 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	7.9	7.2	6.1	5.4	5.4	0.0 pps
Nationals (15-64)	13.3	11.3	8.5	6.7	7.6	0.9 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	0.0	0.0	14.2	0.0	0.0	0.0 pps
Male	12.5	10.6	7.7	6.2	7.5	1.3 pps
Female	13.8	11.9	9.4	7.2	7.6	0.4 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	50.6	41.0	40.2	35.9	28.2	-7.7 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	39.7	39.9	39.7	39.5	39.1	-1.0 %
Male	40.2	40.4	40.1	39.9	39.3	-1.5 %
Female	39.2	39.3	39.3	39.1	38.8	-0.8 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	-17.4	-6.2	-8.6	1.3	-1.3	-2.6 pps
Building and construction	2.7	-1.4	12.2	5.7	5.5	-0.2 pps
Services	3.2	5.5	1.3	0.4	-1.4	-1.8 pps
Manufacturing industry	3.0	2.4	3.4	5.3	-1.3	-6.6 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	0.4	0.2	3.8	1.5	2.1	0.6 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	0.5	-0.9	1.8	0.0	1.7	1.7 pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	-9.6	5.0	6.5	3.2	-2.6	-5.8 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	-9.3	5.0	6.6	3.8	-1.7	-5.5 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	3.2	1.0	0.2	-0.2	-6.9	-6.7 pps

Italy		2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2019-2020
1	- **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	60115	60002	59877	59729	59450	-0.5 %
2	- **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	38871	38726	38588	38428	38261	-0.4 %
	(% of total population)	64.7	64.5	64.4	64.3	64.4	0.0 pps
3	- **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	25243	25340	25327	25254	24520	-2.9 %
	Male	14464	14467	14450	14367	14035	-2.3 %
	Female	10779	10873	10877	10887	10485	-3.7 %
4	- **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	64.9	65.4	65.6	65.7	64.1	-1.6 pps
	Young (15-24)	26.6	26.2	26.1	26.1	23.8	-2.3 pps
	Prime age (25-54)	77.5	77.9	77.9	78.1	76.5	-1.6 pps
	Older (55-64)	53.4	55.4	57.0	57.4	57.1	-0.3 pps
	Nationals (15-64)	64.3	64.8	65.0	65.1	63.9	-1.3 pps
	Non-nationals (15-64)	70.4	70.8	71.2	70.9	66.0	-4.9 pps
	Male	74.8	75.0	75.1	75.0	73.5	-1.4 pps
	Young (15-24)	30.2	30.0	29.9	29.8	28.5	-1.3 pps
	Prime age (25-54)	88.2	88.5	88.4	88.5	87.0	-1.5 pps
	Older (55-64)	65.9	67.0	68.6	68.6	68.0	-0.6 pps
	Female	55.2	55.9	56.2	56.5	54.7	-1.8 pps
	Young (15-24)	22.8	22.1	21.9	22.0	18.8	-3.2 pps
	Prime age (25-54)	66.8	67.3	67.4	67.8	66.0	-1.8 pps
	Older (55-64)	41.7	44.5	46.1	47.0	46.9	-0.1 pps
5	- **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	57.2	58.0	58.5	59.0	58.1	-1.0 pps
	Young (15-24)	16.6	17.1	17.7	18.5	16.8	-1.7 pps
	Prime age (25-54)	68.8	69.4	69.8	70.5	69.6	-0.9 pps
	Older (55-64)	50.3	52.2	53.7	54.3	54.2	-0.1 pps
	Low-skilled (15-64)	42.9	43.4	43.8	44.0	43.0	-1.0 pps
	Medium-skilled (15-64)	63.7	64.1	64.3	64.9	63.5	-1.4 pps
	High-skilled (15-64)	77.5	78.2	78.7	78.9	78.0	-0.9 pps
	Nationals (15-64)	57.0	57.7	58.2	58.8	58.2	-0.6 pps
	Non-nationals (15-64)	59.5	60.6	61.2	61.0	57.3	-3.7 pps
	Male	66.5	67.1	67.6	68.0	67.2	-0.8 pps
	Young (15-24)	19.2	20.1	20.8	21.5	20.5	-1.0 pps
	Prime age (25-54)	79.3	79.9	80.3	80.8	80.1	-0.7 pps
	Older (55-64)	61.7	62.8	64.2	64.6	64.5	-0.1 pps
	Female	48.1	48.9	49.5	50.1	49.0	-1.1 pps
	Young (15-24)	13.7	13.9	14.3	15.2	12.8	-2.3 pps
	Prime age (25-54)	58.5	59.0	59.4	60.1	59.1	-1.0 pps
	Older (55-64)	39.7	42.3	43.9	44.6	44.6	-0.1 pps
6	- **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	22241.1	22443.6	22585.7	22687.1	22222.7	-2.0 %
7	- **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	1.4	1.2	0.9	0.5	-2.1	-2.6 pps
	Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	1.2	0.9	0.6	0.4	-2.0	-2.5 pps
	Male	1.1	0.6	0.6	0.2	-1.6	-1.7 pps
	Female	1.4	1.3	0.7	0.8	-2.7	-3.5 pps
8	- **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	21.5	20.8	20.6	20.4	20.2	-0.2 pps
	Male	25.6	25.2	24.8	24.4	24.3	-0.1 pps
	Female	15.8	14.9	14.9	14.9	14.6	-0.3 pps
9	- **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	14.0	15.5	17.1	17.1	15.2	-1.9 pps
	Male	13.5	15.1	16.6	16.8	14.9	-1.9 pps
	Female	14.7	16.0	17.7	17.5	15.5	-2.0 pps
10	- **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	18.5	18.5	18.4	18.7	18.2	-0.5 pps
	Male	8.2	8.3	8.0	8.2	8.0	-0.2 pps
	Female	32.7	32.5	32.4	32.9	32.1	-0.8 pps
11	**Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	11.9	11.6	12.1	12.3	12.0	-0.3 pps
12	- **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	11.7	11.2	10.6	10.0	9.2	-0.8 pps
	Young (15-24)	37.8	34.7	32.2	29.2	29.4	0.2 pps
	Prime age (25-49)	11.1	10.9	10.3	9.8	9.0	-0.8 pps
	Older (55-64)	5.7	5.8	5.7	5.4	5.0	-0.4 pps
	Low-skilled (15-64)	16.0	15.8	14.9	14.1	13.1	-1.0 pps
	Medium-skilled (15-64)	11.2	10.6	10.2	9.6	8.9	-0.7 pps
	High-skilled (15-64)	6.9	6.5	6.1	5.9	5.5	-0.4 pps
	Nationals (15-64)	11.4	11.1	10.4	9.7	8.9	-0.8 pps
	Non-nationals (15-64)	15.4	14.4	14.1	13.9	13.2	-0.7 pps
	Male	10.9	10.4	9.8	9.1	8.4	-0.7 pps
	Female	12.8	12.4	11.8	11.1	10.2	-0.9 pps
13	- **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	58.3	58.7	59.0	56.9	52.3	-4.6 pps
14	- **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	39.9	40.0	40.1	40.1	38.8	-3.2 %
	Male	41.1	41.2	41.3	41.2	39.9	-3.2 %
	Female	37.7	37.7	37.8	37.9	36.7	-3.2 %
15	- **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
	Agriculture	2.7	-1.7	1.9	-1.3	0.0	1.3 pps
	Building and construction	-0.1	-0.9	0.0	-0.1	1.3	1.4 pps
	Services	2.2	2.5	1.3	1.0	-3.5	-4.5 pps
	Manufacturing industry	0.9	0.6	1.0	0.6	-0.6	-1.2 pps
16	- **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
	Compensation per employee	0.4	0.4	2.0	1.3	-5.1	-6.3 pps
	Real compensation per employee based on GDP	-1.0	-0.1	1.0	0.7	2.5	1.8 pps
	Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	-0.6	0.6	1.7	2.4	3.9	1.5 pps
	Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	0.1	0.4	1.0	1.8	4.3	2.5 pps
	Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	-0.1	0.5	0.0	-0.1	-7.0	-6.9 pps

Cyprus	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2019-2020
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	852	860	870	882	892	1.1 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	556	564	568	572	579	1.2 %
(% of total population)	65.2	65.6	65.3	64.9	64.9	0.1 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	408	417	426	435	439	0.9 %
Male	209	215	220	226	231	2.3 %
Female	199	202	207	209	208	-0.6 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	73.4	73.9	75.0	76.0	75.8	-0.3 pps
Young (15-24)	37.3	36.6	39.2	38.8	38.3	-0.5 pps
Prime age (25-54)	86.8	87.5	87.2	88.3	87.9	-0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	59.0	60.0	64.7	65.2	64.8	-0.4 pps
Nationals (15-64)	73.0	73.7	75.3	75.9	75.4	-0.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	75.2	74.8	73.6	76.8	77.0	0.2 pps
Male	78.7	78.8	79.9	81.5	82.3	0.9 pps
Young (15-24)	35.8	33.2	36.5	37.6	40.3	2.7 pps
Prime age (25-54)	92.2	93.0	92.8	93.4	93.2	-0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	70.5	71.6	75.2	76.7	77.7	1.0 pps
Female	68.5	69.3	70.4	71.0	69.7	-1.3 pps
Young (15-24)	38.5	39.9	41.7	39.8	36.7	-3.2 pps
Prime age (25-54)	81.8	82.5	82.1	83.5	82.7	-0.7 pps
Older (55-64)	47.8	48.9	54.7	54.2	52.2	-2.0 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	63.7	65.6	68.6	70.5	69.9	-0.6 pps
Young (15-24)	26.3	27.5	31.3	32.4	31.3	-1.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	76.6	78.4	80.4	82.6	81.7	-1.0 pps
Older (55-64)	52.2	55.3	60.9	61.1	61.0	-0.1 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	42.6	41.7	44.2	46.2	47.3	1.1 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	62.6	66.4	69.8	70.9	68.5	-2.4 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	78.3	79.1	80.8	83.2	83.1	-0.1 pps
Nationals (15-64)	63.2	65.2	68.8	70.1	69.8	-0.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	65.7	67.1	67.5	72.2	70.3	-1.9 pps
Male	68.6	70.0	73.3	76.2	75.9	-0.3 pps
Young (15-24)	26.5	24.2	27.3	30.4	30.5	0.2 pps
Prime age (25-54)	81.7	83.6	86.2	88.4	87.1	-1.4 pps
Older (55-64)	60.9	64.9	70.3	72.0	73.2	1.2 pps
Female	59.2	61.4	64.2	65.2	64.3	-0.9 pps
Young (15-24)	26.3	30.7	35.1	34.1	32.2	-2.0 pps
Prime age (25-54)	72.0	73.5	75.0	77.1	76.4	-0.7 pps
Older (55-64)	43.7	46.2	52.0	50.8	49.3	-1.5 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	353.9	369.8	389.7	403.5	404.8	0.3 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	4.7	5.4	5.3	3.8	-0.6	-4.4 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	1.1	4.5	5.4	3.5	0.3	-3.2 pps
Male	2.4	4.6	5.7	4.9	0.9	-4.0 pps
Female	-0.2	4.4	5.0	2.1	-0.2	-2.3 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	12.2	11.4	11.7	12.0	12.1	0.2 pps
Male	15.5	13.7	14.1	14.4	14.9	0.4 pps
Female	8.6	8.9	9.1	9.3	9.1	-0.2 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	16.5	15.3	13.8	13.7	13.4	-0.3 pps
Male	11.7	12.0	10.5	9.5	8.9	-0.6 pps
Female	21.3	18.6	17.2	18.2	18.1	-0.1 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	13.4	12.2	10.8	10.2	10.0	-0.2 pps
Male	11.3	9.1	7.5	6.3	6.8	0.5 pps
Female	15.6	15.6	14.4	14.6	13.6	-1.0 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	9.3	8.2	6.9	5.8	5.7	-0.1 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	13.0	11.1	8.4	7.1	7.6	0.5 pps
Young (15-24)	29.1	24.7	20.2	16.6	18.2	1.6 pps
Prime age (25-49)	11.7	10.4	7.8	6.4	7.1	0.7 pps
Older (55-64)	11.5	7.8	5.8	6.3	5.8	-0.5 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	16.4	14.9	10.4	8.2	7.8	-0.4 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	14.5	11.6	8.9	8.1	8.6	0.5 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	10.9	9.8	7.7	6.2	7.1	0.9 pps
Nationals (15-64)	13.4	11.5	8.6	7.6	7.5	-0.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	12.6	10.5	8.3	6.1	8.8	2.7 pps
Male	12.7	10.9	8.1	6.3	7.6	1.3 pps
Female	13.4	11.3	8.8	8.0	7.6	-0.4 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	44.5	40.7	31.6	29.1	28.0	-1.1 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	40.9	40.7	40.3	39.9	39.5	-1.0 %
Male	42.0	42.0	41.4	40.8	40.4	-1.0 %
Female	39.6	39.2	38.9	38.7	38.4	-0.8 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	3.5	-1.3	-2.0	1.0	-0.2	-1.2 pps
Building and construction	8.0	15.0	13.9	9.6	2.8	-6.8 pps
Services	5.8	6.4	5.7	3.4	-2.2	-5.6 pps
Manufacturing industry	5.3	5.9	6.3	3.7	0.9	-2.8 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	-0.9	1.5	1.5	4.4	-3.1	-7.6 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	-0.4	0.6	0.1	1.0	-2.5	-3.5 pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	-0.5	2.3	3.6	5.0	-4.5	-9.5 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	-0.3	2.7	3.6	3.2	-4.1	-7.3 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	1.7	0.4	0.3	1.4	-4.7	-6.1 pps

Latvia	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2019-2020
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	1959	1941	1926	1913	1901	-0.6 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	1254	1230	1216	1204	1190	-1.2 %
(% of total population)	64.0	63.3	63.1	62.9	62.6	-0.3 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	957	946	945	931	931	0.0 %
Male	479	475	475	468	469	0.2 %
Female	478	471	470	463	461	-0.3 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	76.3	77.0	77.7	77.3	78.2	0.9 pps
Young (15-24)	39.7	39.7	37.7	36.3	34.8	-1.5 pps
Prime age (25-54)	87.8	88.5	89.1	88.3	89.3	0.9 pps
Older (55-64)	67.6	67.9	70.8	72.1	74.7	2.6 pps
Nationals (15-64)	76.9	77.5	78.2	77.7	78.2	0.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	72.8	73.4	74.3	74.1	78.0	3.9 pps
Male	78.8	79.8	80.4	79.8	80.7	1.0 pps
Young (15-24)	43.2	42.8	40.6	39.6	38.0	-1.6 pps
Prime age (25-54)	90.2	91.8	92.1	91.2	92.0	0.8 pps
Older (55-64)	69.5	69.2	72.5	73.0	76.8	3.8 pps
Female	74.0	74.3	75.1	75.0	75.8	0.8 pps
Young (15-24)	35.9	36.6	34.8	32.8	31.5	-1.3 pps
Prime age (25-54)	85.5	85.4	86.0	85.5	86.6	1.1 pps
Older (55-64)	66.1	66.9	69.4	71.4	72.9	1.5 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	68.7	70.1	71.8	72.3	71.6	-0.7 pps
Young (15-24)	32.8	33.0	33.1	31.8	29.7	-2.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	79.7	81.2	82.7	83.1	82.2	-0.9 pps
Older (55-64)	61.4	62.3	65.4	67.3	68.6	1.3 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	35.5	35.8	35.1	36.4	35.3	-1.1 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	68.2	70.5	72.7	72.4	72.4	0.0 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	86.5	86.9	88.9	89.0	86.3	-2.7 pps
Nationals (15-64)	69.6	70.9	72.7	72.8	71.9	-0.9 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	63.5	64.5	65.9	68.4	69.8	1.5 pps
Male	70.0	71.9	73.6	73.9	73.1	-0.8 pps
Young (15-24)	34.0	35.0	35.5	33.9	32.5	-1.4 pps
Prime age (25-54)	81.4	83.5	84.6	85.2	83.8	-1.4 pps
Older (55-64)	61.3	62.4	66.4	67.6	69.5	1.8 pps
Female	67.6	68.4	70.1	70.7	70.2	-0.5 pps
Young (15-24)	31.6	30.9	30.6	29.6	26.7	-2.9 pps
Prime age (25-54)	78.1	79.0	80.7	81.0	80.6	-0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	61.4	62.2	64.6	67.1	67.9	0.8 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	862.3	861.9	873.3	870.3	852.2	-2.1 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	-0.3	0.0	1.5	-0.1	-2.3	-2.2 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	-0.6	0.0	1.3	-0.3	-2.1	-1.7 pps
Male	-1.4	0.7	1.5	-0.1	-2.1	-1.9 pps
Female	0.0	-0.8	1.2	-0.5	-2.1	-1.6 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	11.8	11.8	11.0	11.0	12.2	1.2 pps
Male	14.7	13.9	12.9	12.7	14.0	1.2 pps
Female	9.0	9.8	9.1	9.3	10.5	1.2 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	3.7	3.0	2.7	3.2	2.8	-0.4 pps
Male	4.6	3.7	3.0	3.9	3.0	-0.9 pps
Female	2.8	2.4	2.4	2.5	2.6	0.1 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	8.5	7.7	7.3	8.4	8.9	0.5 pps
Male	6.1	4.8	4.7	5.8	6.5	0.7 pps
Female	10.8	10.6	9.8	10.9	11.3	0.4 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	3.1	2.7	2.4	1.8	2.1	0.2 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	9.6	8.7	7.4	6.3	8.1	1.8 pps
Young (15-24)	17.3	17.0	12.2	12.4	14.9	2.5 pps
Prime age (25-49)	9.3	8.3	7.2	5.9	7.9	2.0 pps
Older (55-64)	9.2	8.3	7.6	6.6	8.1	1.5 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	21.1	19.2	16.8	14.1	18.9	4.8 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	11.6	10.4	8.7	7.3	9.1	1.8 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	4.4	4.0	3.8	3.7	5.3	1.6 pps
Nationals (15-64)	9.5	8.5	7.1	6.3	8.1	1.8 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	12.7	12.1	11.4	7.7	10.5	2.8 pps
Male	10.9	9.8	8.4	7.2	9.1	1.9 pps
Female	8.4	7.7	6.4	5.4	7.1	1.7 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	41.5	37.4	42.0	37.9	27.4	-10.5 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	40.3	39.9	39.9	39.6	39.3	-0.8 %
Male	40.6	40.3	40.3	39.9	39.5	-1.0 %
Female	39.9	39.5	39.5	39.4	39.0	-1.0 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	-3.4	-3.4	-0.1	0.8	0.4	-0.4 pps
Building and construction	-8.0	5.4	9.4	2.4	-4.5	-6.9 pps
Services	-0.1	-0.2	1.7	-0.8	-3.4	-2.6 pps
Manufacturing industry	0.4	0.0	1.1	0.6	-3.3	-3.9 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	7.3	7.6	8.1	7.8	5.5	-2.3 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	6.4	4.5	4.0	6.4	5.3	-1.1 pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	6.8	6.6	12.1	7.2	5.7	-1.5 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	6.1	6.6	10.7	7.1	5.9	-1.2 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	2.7	3.3	2.5	2.6	-1.3	-3.9 pps

Lithuania	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2019-2020
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	2868	2828	2802	2794	2795	0.0 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	1899	1854	1828	1814	1812	-0.1 %
(% of total population)	66.2	65.6	65.2	64.9	64.8	-0.1 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	1433	1408	1413	1416	1423	0.5 %
Male	709	697	704	707	719	1.7 %
Female	724	711	709	709	704	-0.7 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	75.5	75.9	77.3	78.0	78.5	0.5 pps
Young (15-24)	35.4	35.0	36.5	37.3	36.6	-0.7 pps
Prime age (25-54)	89.3	89.3	89.6	90.3	90.4	0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	70.0	71.3	73.9	73.5	75.0	1.5 pps
Nationals (15-64)	75.5	76.0	77.3	78.0	78.5	0.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	71.2	73.9	77.5	80.6	81.4	0.8 pps
Male	77.1	77.4	78.9	79.2	79.9	0.7 pps
Young (15-24)	38.7	37.8	38.7	38.9	38.9	0.0 pps
Prime age (25-54)	90.2	90.4	91.0	91.4	91.4	0.0 pps
Older (55-64)	73.6	73.3	76.2	74.6	76.6	2.0 pps
Female	73.9	74.6	75.8	76.9	77.2	0.3 pps
Young (15-24)	31.8	32.2	34.1	35.7	34.2	-1.4 pps
Prime age (25-54)	88.5	88.1	88.3	89.2	89.4	0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	67.2	69.6	72.0	72.5	73.6	1.1 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	69.4	70.4	72.4	73.0	71.6	-1.4 pps
Young (15-24)	30.2	30.4	32.4	32.9	29.4	-3.5 pps
Prime age (25-54)	82.7	83.3	84.6	85.1	83.7	-1.3 pps
Older (55-64)	64.6	66.1	68.5	68.4	67.6	-0.8 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	19.2	20.9	22.7	23.2	22.7	-0.5 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	67.6	68.8	71.0	70.6	68.4	-2.2 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	90.4	90.0	90.5	90.8	89.5	-1.3 pps
Nationals (15-64)	69.4	70.4	72.4	73.0	71.6	-1.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	64.4	71.2	73.2	77.1	77.1	0.1 pps
Male	70.0	70.6	73.3	73.5	72.2	-1.2 pps
Young (15-24)	32.5	32.3	34.1	33.4	30.5	-2.9 pps
Prime age (25-54)	82.6	83.1	85.2	85.4	84.0	-1.3 pps
Older (55-64)	66.9	67.1	70.5	69.4	68.4	-1.0 pps
Female	68.8	70.2	71.6	72.5	71.0	-1.5 pps
Young (15-24)	27.8	28.4	30.6	32.3	28.3	-4.0 pps
Prime age (25-54)	82.9	83.6	84.1	84.8	83.4	-1.4 pps
Older (55-64)	62.8	65.2	67.0	67.5	66.9	-0.6 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	1317.7	1305.6	1323.7	1324.3	1297.6	-2.0 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	2.3	-0.7	1.4	0.6	-1.6	-2.2 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	1.3	-0.9	1.4	0.0	-2.0	-2.1 pps
Male	0.9	-1.1	2.9	0.2	-0.9	-1.1 pps
Female	1.7	-0.7	0.0	-0.1	-3.1	-3.0 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	11.1	10.9	10.8	10.9	11.1	0.1 pps
Male	14.3	13.8	13.4	14.2	14.4	0.2 pps
Female	8.1	8.1	8.3	7.7	7.7	0.0 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	2.0	1.7	1.6	1.5	1.2	-0.3 pps
Male	2.2	2.1	1.7	1.5	1.4	-0.1 pps
Female	1.7	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.1	-0.3 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	7.1	7.6	7.1	6.4	6.1	-0.3 pps
Male	5.4	5.7	5.2	4.7	4.8	0.1 pps
Female	8.8	9.4	8.9	8.0	7.5	-0.5 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	2.2	2.3	1.7	1.5	1.8	0.3 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	7.9	7.1	6.2	6.3	8.5	2.2 pps
Young (15-24)	14.5	13.3	11.1	11.9	19.6	7.7 pps
Prime age (25-49)	7.4	6.6	5.6	5.8	7.4	1.6 pps
Older (55-64)	7.7	7.3	7.2	6.9	9.9	3.0 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	25.9	21.6	18.5	18.8	23.3	4.5 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	10.6	9.6	8.2	8.6	11.9	3.3 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	3.0	3.0	2.9	3.0	4.2	1.2 pps
Nationals (15-64)	8.1	7.3	6.3	6.5	8.9	2.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0 pps
Male	9.1	8.6	6.9	7.1	9.3	2.2 pps
Female	6.7	5.7	5.4	5.5	7.7	2.2 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	38.2	37.7	32.2	30.6	29.0	-1.6 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	39.7	39.3	39.4	39.5	39.0	-1.3 %
Male	40.3	39.9	39.9	39.9	39.5	-1.0 %
Female	39.1	38.7	38.9	39.0	38.4	-1.5 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	-10.3	-3.0	-6.3	-9.8	-11.7	-1.9 pps
Building and construction	-1.4	-3.5	3.2	3.3	-4.9	-8.2 pps
Services	4.0	-0.6	1.7	2.0	-0.8	-2.8 pps
Manufacturing industry	3.4	-0.6	5.3	0.0	-1.3	-1.3 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	6.4	9.5	7.9	10.6	7.3	-3.3 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	4.7	5.1	4.2	7.2	7.0	-0.2 pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	8.2	9.6	10.0	3.0	6.1	3.1 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	8.2	8.8	9.7	38.2	9.9	-28.3 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	0.2	5.0	2.6	4.0	1.5	-2.5 pps

Luxembourg	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2019-2020
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	584	597	609	622	631	1.5 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	396	407	415	423	431	2.0 %
(% of total population)	67.7	68.2	68.1	68.0	68.3	0.3 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	277	286	295	304	311	2.2 %
Male	151	153	158	165	166	0.7 %
Female	126	133	137	140	146	4.2 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	70.0	70.2	71.1	72.0	72.2	0.2 pps
Young (15-24)	30.7	30.5	33.1	34.6	32.4	-2.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	87.2	88.0	88.4	88.5	89.1	0.6 pps
Older (55-64)	41.7	41.0	41.9	45.0	45.9	0.9 pps
Nationals (15-64)	66.1	65.7	66.1	66.9	67.4	0.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	73.8	74.4	75.8	76.9	76.8	-0.1 pps
Male	75.1	74.0	74.7	76.4	75.4	-1.0 pps
Young (15-24)	30.5	32.5	33.8	37.9	33.8	-4.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	93.0	91.9	92.2	92.8	92.9	0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	49.1	46.7	47.4	51.2	49.7	-1.4 pps
Female	64.7	66.2	67.4	67.4	68.7	1.4 pps
Young (15-24)	30.9	28.2	32.2	31.5	30.9	-0.6 pps
Prime age (25-54)	81.1	84.0	84.5	84.0	85.3	1.3 pps
Older (55-64)	34.0	35.2	36.2	38.5	41.8	3.3 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	65.6	66.3	67.1	67.9	67.2	-0.7 pps
Young (15-24)	24.9	25.8	28.4	28.7	24.9	-3.8 pps
Prime age (25-54)	82.5	83.7	83.9	84.3	84.0	-0.3 pps
Older (55-64)	39.6	39.7	40.5	43.1	44.1	0.9 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	42.1	42.0	44.8	44.2	44.0	-0.2 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	65.3	67.8	67.6	66.7	66.7	0.0 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	83.8	84.0	83.7	84.7	83.2	-1.5 pps
Nationals (15-64)	63.3	63.2	63.2	64.1	64.2	0.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	67.7	69.2	70.8	71.6	70.2	-1.4 pps
Male	70.5	69.9	70.6	72.1	70.4	-1.7 pps
Young (15-24)	24.3	26.8	28.5	31.2	25.2	-6.0 pps
Prime age (25-54)	88.5	87.4	88.0	88.6	88.0	-0.6 pps
Older (55-64)	46.4	45.3	45.5	48.8	47.2	-1.6 pps
Female	60.4	62.6	63.4	63.6	63.9	0.3 pps
Young (15-24)	25.5	24.7	28.4	26.2	24.3	-2.0 pps
Prime age (25-54)	76.4	79.8	79.7	79.9	80.0	0.0 pps
Older (55-64)	32.4	34.0	35.0	37.1	40.5	3.4 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	259.4	269.9	278.4	287.3	290.0	0.9 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	3.0	3.5	3.6	3.5	1.9	-1.6 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	1.6	4.0	3.1	3.2	0.9	-2.3 pps
Male	1.6	1.8	3.1	4.2	-0.4	-4.5 pps
Female	1.7	6.7	3.1	2.2	2.5	0.3 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	9.0	8.9	7.5	7.4	7.8	0.3 pps
Male	10.3	9.7	8.4	8.4	9.0	0.6 pps
Female	7.5	8.0	6.4	6.4	6.4	0.0 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	9.0	9.1	9.8	9.2	7.7	-1.5 pps
Male	8.9	8.8	9.1	9.3	7.1	-2.2 pps
Female	9.1	9.4	10.7	9.1	8.3	-0.8 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	19.2	19.6	17.8	17.0	18.1	1.1 pps
Male	6.2	6.1	5.8	5.6	6.8	1.2 pps
Female	35.1	35.3	31.8	30.4	31.0	0.6 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	2.2	2.6	2.2	2.2	2.1	-0.1 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	6.3	5.5	5.6	5.6	6.8	1.2 pps
Young (15-24)	18.9	15.4	14.2	17.0	23.2	6.2 pps
Prime age (25-49)	5.3	4.9	5.0	4.7	5.7	1.0 pps
Older (55-64)	5.0	3.3	3.6	4.1	4.1	0.0 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	9.9	8.9	8.4	8.9	11.5	2.6 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	6.8	5.3	5.6	6.3	6.9	0.6 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	4.0	3.9	4.3	3.6	4.7	1.1 pps
Nationals (15-64)	4.2	3.9	4.4	4.1	4.8	0.7 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	8.2	6.9	6.6	6.9	8.6	1.7 pps
Male	6.0	5.6	5.3	5.7	6.6	0.9 pps
Female	6.6	5.5	5.9	5.5	7.0	1.5 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	34.9	38.1	24.7	22.7	25.4	2.7 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	41.1	40.8	40.6	40.5	39.8	-1.7 %
Male	42.0	41.6	41.3	41.2	40.5	-1.7 %
Female	39.5	39.5	39.4	39.4	38.6	-2.0 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	0.1	-0.6	-0.4	-0.9	0.0	0.9 pps
Building and construction	3.0	2.9	3.8	3.9	3.7	-0.2 pps
Services	3.8	4.0	4.1	3.8	1.2	-2.6 pps
Manufacturing industry	1.2	0.2	1.5	0.4	-1.4	-1.8 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	0.7	3.1	2.8	1.9	0.4	-1.5 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	0.0	1.2	0.7	-1.7	-3.0	-1.3 pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	1.1	2.6	2.0	2.7	0.7	-2.0 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	1.2	4.0	2.2	2.7	0.3	-2.4 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	1.9	-2.1	-1.6	-0.2	-3.6	-3.4 pps

Hungary	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2019-2020
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	9814	9788	9776	9771	9750	-0.2 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	6478	6415	6370	6327	6280	-0.7 %
(% of total population)	66.0	65.5	65.2	64.8	64.4	-0.3 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	4543	4565	4582	4595	4572	-0.5 %
Male	2465	2485	2500	2521	2518	-0.1 %
Female	2079	2080	2083	2074	2054	-1.0 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	70.1	71.2	71.9	72.6	72.8	0.2 pps
Young (15-24)	32.3	32.4	32.3	32.2	31.2	-1.0 pps
Prime age (25-54)	86.1	86.9	87.0	87.0	86.2	-0.8 pps
Older (55-64)	52.1	53.6	55.8	58.0	61.4	3.4 pps
Nationals (15-64)	70.1	71.2	72.0	72.6	72.8	0.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	68.4	62.5	64.1	72.4	72.5	0.1 pps
Male	76.9	78.2	79.1	80.0	80.3	0.3 pps
Young (15-24)	36.1	36.5	37.1	37.3	35.3	-2.0 pps
Prime age (25-54)	92.4	93.3	93.3	93.4	93.1	-0.3 pps
Older (55-64)	62.4	64.5	67.1	70.6	74.0	3.4 pps
Female	63.5	64.2	64.9	65.3	65.3	0.0 pps
Young (15-24)	28.2	28.2	27.2	26.9	26.9	0.0 pps
Prime age (25-54)	79.8	80.4	80.7	80.6	79.1	-1.4 pps
Older (55-64)	43.5	44.3	46.3	47.2	50.6	3.4 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	66.5	68.2	69.2	70.1	69.7	-0.4 pps
Young (15-24)	28.1	29.0	29.0	28.5	27.2	-1.3 pps
Prime age (25-54)	82.2	83.7	84.1	84.4	82.9	-1.5 pps
Older (55-64)	49.8	51.7	54.4	56.7	59.6	2.9 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	36.6	38.5	39.4	39.4	37.7	-1.7 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	71.5	73.1	73.7	74.8	74.3	-0.5 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	84.4	84.3	85.1	85.2	85.2	0.0 pps
Nationals (15-64)	66.5	68.2	69.3	70.1	69.7	-0.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	65.3	60.6	60.3	69.2	66.5	-2.7 pps
Male	73.0	75.2	76.3	77.3	77.0	-0.3 pps
Young (15-24)	31.5	32.9	33.4	32.8	31.1	-1.7 pps
Prime age (25-54)	88.2	90.1	90.4	90.8	89.8	-1.0 pps
Older (55-64)	59.7	62.5	65.5	69.0	71.6	2.6 pps
Female	60.2	61.3	62.3	63.0	62.3	-0.6 pps
Young (15-24)	24.6	24.8	24.3	24.0	23.1	-0.9 pps
Prime age (25-54)	76.2	77.2	77.7	78.0	75.9	-2.1 pps
Older (55-64)	41.5	42.4	44.9	46.2	49.2	3.0 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	4309.4	4373.4	4410.7	4436.0	4375.8	-1.4 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	3.7	1.9	2.3	1.1	-1.0	-2.1 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	3.2	1.5	0.9	0.6	-1.4	-1.9 pps
Male	3.2	2.2	0.9	1.0	-0.8	-1.8 pps
Female	3.2	0.6	0.8	0.1	-2.0	-2.0 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	10.0	9.7	9.7	10.1	11.2	1.2 pps
Male	12.1	11.5	11.6	12.2	13.4	1.1 pps
Female	7.5	7.5	7.4	7.5	8.6	1.1 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	9.7	8.8	7.3	6.6	5.9	-0.7 pps
Male	9.4	8.2	6.7	6.1	5.3	-0.8 pps
Female	10.2	9.5	7.9	7.1	6.5	-0.6 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	4.8	4.3	4.2	4.4	4.8	0.4 pps
Male	3.1	2.7	2.5	2.5	2.8	0.3 pps
Female	6.8	6.3	6.3	6.8	7.3	0.5 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	1.4	1.2	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.0 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	5.1	4.2	3.7	3.4	4.3	0.9 pps
Young (15-24)	12.9	10.7	10.2	11.4	12.8	1.4 pps
Prime age (25-49)	4.5	3.7	3.4	3.0	3.8	0.8 pps
Older (55-64)	4.4	3.6	2.6	2.2	3.0	0.8 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	13.3	11.2	10.4	9.8	11.1	1.3 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	4.8	3.8	3.4	3.0	4.1	1.1 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	1.8	1.6	1.5	1.6	1.9	0.3 pps
Nationals (15-64)	5.2	4.2	3.7	3.4	4.3	0.9 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	8.2	8.2 pps
Male	5.1	3.8	3.5	3.4	4.1	0.7 pps
Female	5.1	4.6	4.0	3.5	4.5	1.0 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	46.5	40.4	38.6	32.0	26.1	-5.9 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	39.8	39.3	38.8	39.1	38.9	-0.5 %
Male	40.4	39.9	39.3	39.5	39.2	-0.8 %
Female	39.1	38.6	38.1	38.6	38.5	-0.3 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	7.9	2.8	-1.7	-2.3	1.7	4.0 pps
Building and construction	7.0	8.8	11.1	5.4	4.2	-1.2 pps
Services	3.6	1.9	2.4	2.0	-1.1	-3.1 pps
Manufacturing industry	4.6	4.3	2.6	0.7	-3.7	-4.4 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	2.4	7.0	6.4	6.9	1.9	-5.0 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	1.1	2.9	1.6	0.4	-0.2	-0.6 pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	4.8	9.3	9.0	10.1	7.1	-3.0 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	5.1	13.4	11.3	11.0	8.1	-2.9 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	-1.5	2.3	3.0	3.4	-3.7	-7.1 pps

Malta		2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2019-2020
1	- **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	456	469	485	505	516	2.2 %
2	- **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	304	313	326	341	347	1.8 %
	(% of total population)	66.8	66.9	67.1	67.5	67.2	-0.3 pps
3	- **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	215	226	243	259	267	3.3 %
	Male	129	135	144	153	158	2.7 %
	Female	86	91	100	105	110	4.3 %
4	- **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	70.6	72.2	74.7	75.9	77.1	1.1 pps
	Young (15-24)	51.8	52.9	56.0	55.9	53.9	-2.0 pps
	Prime age (25-54)	83.2	84.6	86.1	87.2	88.2	0.9 pps
	Older (55-64)	47.5	48.3	51.9	51.9	54.8	2.9 pps
	Nationals (15-64)	69.4	70.6	72.7	74.1	74.8	0.7 pps
	Non-nationals (15-64)	77.5	80.8	82.9	82.3	84.2	2.0 pps
	Male	82.5	83.4	84.8	85.3	85.4	0.1 pps
	Young (15-24)	54.5	54.3	55.7	56.6	55.4	-1.1 pps
	Prime age (25-54)	95.8	96.1	96.4	96.6	95.9	-0.7 pps
	Older (55-64)	65.0	66.1	69.5	67.2	69.4	2.2 pps
	Female	58.0	60.2	63.8	65.5	67.6	2.1 pps
	Young (15-24)	48.8	51.4	56.3	55.1	52.2	-2.9 pps
	Prime age (25-54)	69.6	71.9	74.6	76.5	79.1	2.6 pps
	Older (55-64)	30.0	30.5	34.0	36.1	39.7	3.6 pps
5	- **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	67.2	69.2	71.9	73.2	73.7	0.5 pps
	Young (15-24)	46.2	47.3	50.9	50.7	48.0	-2.7 pps
	Prime age (25-54)	80.0	81.8	83.6	84.5	85.0	0.5 pps
	Older (55-64)	45.8	47.2	50.1	51.1	52.8	1.7 pps
	Low-skilled (15-64)	55.0	55.9	59.7	62.4	62.5	0.2 pps
	Medium-skilled (15-64)	71.1	73.0	73.1	73.5	72.9	-0.6 pps
	High-skilled (15-64)	89.0	90.2	90.7	88.3	89.3	1.1 pps
	Nationals (15-64)	66.0	67.9	70.3	71.8	72.0	0.1 pps
	Non-nationals (15-64)	75.1	76.5	78.4	77.5	79.1	1.6 pps
	Male	78.9	80.1	81.5	82.4	81.7	-0.7 pps
	Young (15-24)	48.7	48.6	49.3	50.9	48.2	-2.7 pps
	Prime age (25-54)	92.3	93.1	93.5	93.9	92.7	-1.2 pps
	Older (55-64)	62.7	64.5	67.2	66.2	67.1	0.9 pps
	Female	55.0	57.6	61.5	62.8	64.6	1.7 pps
	Young (15-24)	43.5	45.9	52.7	50.8	47.8	-3.0 pps
	Prime age (25-54)	66.7	69.4	72.5	73.7	75.9	2.2 pps
	Older (55-64)	29.0	29.8	32.7	35.4	37.7	2.2 pps
6	- **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	204.6	216.8	234.4	249.3	255.5	2.5 %
7	- **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	4.5	8.0	6.0	5.7	2.7	-3.0 pps
	Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	5.2	6.0	8.1	6.4	2.5	-3.9 pps
	Male	4.4	5.0	6.9	7.2	1.6	-5.5 pps
	Female	6.5	7.4	10.0	5.2	3.8	-1.4 pps
8	- **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	13.6	14.4	13.7	15.0	15.5	0.6 pps
	Male	18.7	18.6	17.6	18.9	19.8	0.9 pps
	Female	5.9	8.1	8.0	9.2	9.3	0.1 pps
9	- **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	7.6	6.0	7.9	9.1	8.0	-1.1 pps
	Male	6.6	5.3	7.3	7.8	6.1	-1.7 pps
	Female	8.9	6.9	8.6	10.8	10.4	-0.4 pps
10	- **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	13.9	13.7	13.2	12.2	11.2	-1.0 pps
	Male	6.0	6.3	6.5	5.9	4.7	-1.2 pps
	Female	25.9	24.6	22.8	21.4	20.5	-0.9 pps
11	**Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	1.7	1.5	1.3	1.0	0.8	-0.1 pps
12	- **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	4.7	4.0	3.7	3.6	4.3	0.7 pps
	Young (15-24)	10.7	10.6	9.1	9.3	10.9	1.6 pps
	Prime age (25-49)	3.9	3.2	2.9	3.2	3.7	0.5 pps
	Older (55-64)	3.4	2.5	3.3	1.5	3.6	2.1 pps
	Low-skilled (15-64)	7.5	6.2	5.5	4.7	6.1	1.4 pps
	Medium-skilled (15-64)	3.8	3.5	3.5	3.8	4.3	0.5 pps
	High-skilled (15-64)	1.7	2.0	1.9	2.6	3.0	0.4 pps
	Nationals (15-64)	4.9	3.8	3.3	3.0	3.8	0.8 pps
	Non-nationals (15-64)	2.8	5.3	5.4	5.7	6.1	0.4 pps
	Male	4.4	3.8	3.8	3.4	4.2	0.8 pps
	Female	5.2	4.3	3.5	4.0	4.4	0.4 pps
13	- **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	50.0	50.8	48.1	25.2	25.3	0.1 pps
14	- **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	40.7	40.0	40.3	41.2	39.9	-3.2 %
	Male	41.7	41.0	41.2	42.0	40.5	-3.6 %
	Female	38.6	38.2	38.5	39.7	38.8	-2.3 %
15	- **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
	Agriculture	1.5	3.5	2.5	-2.3	2.1	4.4 pps
	Building and construction	1.4	4.0	5.4	11.9	11.1	-0.8 pps
	Services	7.1	9.9	7.7	8.2	2.1	-6.1 pps
	Manufacturing industry	-2.3	2.7	1.9	-0.5	-1.0	-0.5 pps
16	- **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
	Compensation per employee	5.7	2.2	3.6	3.6	-0.3	-3.8 pps
	Real compensation per employee based on GDP	4.4	-1.6	1.3	0.1	-1.4	-1.5 pps
	Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	1.1	3.5	2.7	-0.4	-7.0	-6.6 pps
	Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	1.1	3.3	2.8	-0.3	3.9	4.2 pps
	Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	-0.7	2.8	0.1	0.0	-10.7	-10.7 pps

Netherlands	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2019-2020
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	17030	17131	17232	17345	17441	0.6 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	10988	11044	11070	11116	11160	0.4 %
(% of total population)	64.5	64.5	64.2	64.1	64.0	-0.1 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	8754	8805	8884	8993	9030	0.4 %
Male	4645	4659	4699	4745	4752	0.1 %
Female	4109	4146	4185	4247	4278	0.7 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	79.7	79.7	80.3	80.9	80.9	0.0 pps
Young (15-24)	68.2	68.3	68.9	70.0	68.7	-1.3 pps
Prime age (25-54)	86.9	86.7	87.0	87.4	87.6	0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	68.4	69.5	70.8	72.0	73.0	0.9 pps
Nationals (15-64)	80.3	80.4	81.0	81.6	81.8	0.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	68.8	68.4	68.7	70.7	69.0	-1.7 pps
Male	84.4	84.2	84.7	85.1	84.8	-0.3 pps
Young (15-24)	67.2	67.0	68.0	69.7	67.7	-2.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	91.7	91.3	91.7	91.5	91.5	0.0 pps
Older (55-64)	78.2	79.0	80.0	81.0	81.5	0.6 pps
Female	75.0	75.2	75.8	76.7	77.0	0.3 pps
Young (15-24)	69.2	69.7	69.8	70.3	69.9	-0.5 pps
Prime age (25-54)	82.2	82.0	82.4	83.3	83.7	0.3 pps
Older (55-64)	58.6	60.2	61.8	63.1	64.4	1.3 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	74.8	75.8	77.2	78.2	77.8	-0.4 pps
Young (15-24)	60.8	62.3	63.9	65.3	62.5	-2.8 pps
Prime age (25-54)	82.9	83.5	84.6	85.2	85.1	-0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	63.5	65.7	67.7	69.7	71.0	1.3 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	57.8	58.8	60.4	61.3	60.2	-1.1 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	77.4	78.0	79.1	80.2	79.2	-1.1 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	87.4	87.8	88.5	88.6	88.4	-0.2 pps
Nationals (15-64)	75.6	76.7	78.1	79.1	78.8	-0.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	61.5	62.8	63.8	66.1	63.9	-2.2 pps
Male	79.6	80.4	81.6	82.2	81.6	-0.6 pps
Young (15-24)	59.6	61.0	62.8	64.7	61.4	-3.2 pps
Prime age (25-54)	88.1	88.4	89.2	89.3	89.0	-0.3 pps
Older (55-64)	72.8	74.8	76.6	78.3	79.4	1.1 pps
Female	70.1	71.3	72.8	74.1	73.9	-0.2 pps
Young (15-24)	62.1	63.6	65.2	66.0	63.6	-2.4 pps
Prime age (25-54)	77.7	78.6	79.9	81.1	81.2	0.0 pps
Older (55-64)	54.2	56.6	58.8	61.2	62.6	1.4 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	8223.4	8376.4	8543.3	8689.2	8681.0	-0.1 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	1.5	2.4	2.7	2.0	-0.5	-2.5 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	1.3	1.9	2.0	1.7	-0.1	-1.8 pps
Male	1.1	1.5	1.7	1.4	-0.2	-1.6 pps
Female	1.6	2.3	2.3	2.1	0.1	-2.1 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	15.5	15.5	15.4	15.4	15.8	0.4 pps
Male	18.6	18.4	18.4	18.4	18.9	0.5 pps
Female	12.1	12.2	12.0	12.0	12.4	0.3 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	20.6	21.7	21.4	20.2	18.0	-2.2 pps
Male	19.3	20.4	19.9	19.0	17.0	-2.0 pps
Female	22.0	23.1	23.0	21.4	19.0	-2.4 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	49.7	49.8	50.1	50.2	50.8	0.6 pps
Male	26.2	27.0	27.5	27.9	28.6	0.7 pps
Female	76.4	75.8	75.6	75.2	75.5	0.3 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	4.9	4.1	3.5	2.7	3.0	0.3 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	6.0	4.9	3.8	3.4	3.8	0.4 pps
Young (15-24)	10.8	8.9	7.2	6.7	9.1	2.4 pps
Prime age (25-49)	4.6	3.7	2.8	2.6	2.9	0.3 pps
Older (55-64)	7.2	5.5	4.5	3.2	2.7	-0.5 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	10.0	8.5	6.7	5.9	7.0	1.1 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	6.1	4.8	3.6	3.2	3.7	0.5 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	3.5	2.9	2.4	2.2	2.6	0.4 pps
Nationals (15-64)	5.8	4.7	3.6	3.1	3.6	0.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	10.6	8.2	7.2	6.6	7.4	0.8 pps
Male	5.6	4.5	3.7	3.4	3.7	0.3 pps
Female	6.5	5.3	4.0	3.4	4.0	0.6 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	42.4	40.0	36.8	30.1	23.4	-6.7 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	41.7	41.5	41.3	41.2	40.3	-2.2 %
Male	42.3	42.0	41.8	41.7	40.8	-2.2 %
Female	39.9	39.8	39.5	39.4	38.5	-2.3 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.0	1.0	1.0 pps
Building and construction	0.7	3.3	4.7	3.1	2.6	-0.5 pps
Services	2.5	3.0	3.1	1.5	-2.3	-3.8 pps
Manufacturing industry	0.5	0.8	2.1	2.0	-0.6	-2.6 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	1.6	1.0	1.9	2.9	4.7	1.8 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	0.8	-0.3	-0.6	-0.1	2.0	2.1 pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	0.5	1.4	2.3	2.5	0.9	-1.6 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	0.6	1.6	2.1	2.1	5.9	3.8 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	0.6	0.5	-0.4	0.0	-3.3	-3.3 pps

Austria	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2019-2020
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	8740	8795	8838	8878	8917	0.4 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	5790	5800	5809	5819	5835	0.3 %
(% of total population)	66.3	65.9	65.7	65.5	65.4	-0.1 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	4412	4433	4461	4484	4467	-0.4 %
Male	2340	2350	2369	2378	2362	-0.7 %
Female	2072	2083	2092	2106	2105	-0.1 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	76.2	76.4	76.8	77.1	76.6	-0.5 pps
Young (15-24)	57.5	56.1	56.6	56.4	56.1	-0.3 pps
Prime age (25-54)	88.4	88.7	88.5	89.0	88.3	-0.8 pps
Older (55-64)	51.7	53.6	56.2	56.4	57.0	0.7 pps
Nationals (15-64)	77.2	77.3	77.4	77.8	77.2	-0.6 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	71.4	72.6	74.2	73.7	73.8	0.2 pps
Male	80.7	81.0	81.6	81.8	81.0	-0.8 pps
Young (15-24)	60.2	58.4	59.5	60.3	59.5	-0.8 pps
Prime age (25-54)	91.8	92.3	92.1	92.4	91.4	-0.9 pps
Older (55-64)	61.2	63.0	66.0	65.6	65.5	-0.1 pps
Female	71.7	71.8	72.0	72.3	72.1	-0.2 pps
Young (15-24)	54.6	53.7	53.8	52.5	52.8	0.3 pps
Prime age (25-54)	84.9	85.0	84.8	85.7	85.1	-0.6 pps
Older (55-64)	42.7	44.5	46.6	47.4	48.8	1.3 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	71.5	72.2	73.0	73.6	72.4	-1.2 pps
Young (15-24)	51.0	50.6	51.3	51.6	50.2	-1.4 pps
Prime age (25-54)	83.6	84.1	84.5	85.3	83.9	-1.4 pps
Older (55-64)	49.2	51.3	54.0	54.5	54.7	0.3 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	47.3	46.9	48.2	48.2	47.5	-0.6 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	73.8	74.5	75.4	76.1	74.1	-2.0 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	84.0	84.6	84.5	84.7	84.6	-0.1 pps
Nationals (15-64)	73.3	73.8	74.4	75.0	74.1	-1.0 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	62.8	64.8	66.9	67.0	65.3	-1.7 pps
Male	75.4	76.2	77.4	78.0	76.5	-1.5 pps
Young (15-24)	52.9	52.1	53.9	54.8	52.7	-2.0 pps
Prime age (25-54)	86.6	87.2	87.8	88.5	86.9	-1.6 pps
Older (55-64)	57.6	60.1	63.5	63.1	62.7	-0.5 pps
Female	67.7	68.2	68.6	69.2	68.3	-0.8 pps
Young (15-24)	49.0	49.0	48.7	48.4	47.8	-0.7 pps
Prime age (25-54)	80.6	81.0	81.3	82.1	80.8	-1.3 pps
Older (55-64)	41.1	42.8	44.8	46.0	47.0	1.0 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	4142.7	4185.3	4241.1	4280.2	4224.0	-1.3 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	1.3	1.6	1.7	1.1	-1.6	-2.7 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	1.8	1.0	1.3	0.9	-1.3	-2.2 pps
Male	2.0	1.0	1.8	0.8	-1.6	-2.4 pps
Female	1.7	1.1	0.8	1.0	-1.0	-2.0 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	10.8	10.6	10.4	10.6	10.5	-0.2 pps
Male	13.2	12.9	12.6	12.9	12.7	-0.2 pps
Female	8.1	7.9	7.9	8.1	7.9	-0.1 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	9.0	9.2	9.1	8.7	8.2	-0.5 pps
Male	8.9	9.2	8.8	8.5	8.3	-0.2 pps
Female	9.1	9.2	9.4	8.9	8.1	-0.8 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	27.8	27.9	27.3	27.2	27.2	0.0 pps
Male	10.5	10.6	10.0	9.5	9.7	0.2 pps
Female	47.1	47.2	46.9	47.1	46.9	-0.2 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	3.6	3.5	2.9	2.4	2.5	0.1 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	6.0	5.5	4.9	4.5	5.4	0.9 pps
Young (15-24)	11.2	9.8	9.4	8.5	10.5	2.0 pps
Prime age (25-49)	5.4	5.1	4.4	4.2	5.0	0.8 pps
Older (55-64)	5.0	4.2	3.9	3.4	4.0	0.6 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	13.0	13.3	11.6	10.8	12.5	1.7 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	5.8	5.1	4.3	4.0	5.0	1.0 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	3.6	3.2	3.3	3.0	3.4	0.4 pps
Nationals (15-64)	5.0	4.5	3.9	3.6	4.1	0.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	12.0	10.8	9.8	9.1	11.6	2.5 pps
Male	6.5	5.9	5.0	4.6	5.5	0.9 pps
Female	5.6	5.0	4.7	4.4	5.2	0.8 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	32.2	33.3	28.9	25.1	24.5	-0.6 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	41.0	40.7	40.8	40.7	38.7	-4.9 %
Male	41.7	41.4	41.4	41.4	39.5	-4.6 %
Female	39.5	39.4	39.4	39.4	37.3	-5.3 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	-2.7	-2.4	-6.3	-4.6	1.8	6.4 pps
Building and construction	1.3	2.4	2.5	2.9	-0.1	-3.0 pps
Services	1.4	1.9	2.2	1.4	-3.4	-4.8 pps
Manufacturing industry	0.5	1.3	2.6	1.5	-1.4	-2.9 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	2.4	1.6	2.9	2.8	1.7	-1.1 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	0.5	0.8	1.2	1.1	-0.9	-2.0 pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	1.0	3.5	3.3	2.6	5.1	2.5 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	1.1	2.7	2.9	2.9	3.4	0.5 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	0.7	0.6	0.8	0.3	-5.2	-5.5 pps

Poland	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2019-2020
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	38427	38422	38413	38386	38354	-0.1 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	24649	24317	23941	23596	23372	-1.0 %
(% of total population)	64.1	63.3	62.3	61.5	60.9	-0.5 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	16961	16919	16790	16650	16583	-0.4 %
Male	9315	9304	9213	9167	9154	-0.1 %
Female	7646	7616	7577	7483	7429	-0.7 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	68.8	69.6	70.1	70.6	71.0	0.4 pps
Young (15-24)	34.5	34.8	35.1	35.2	31.8	-3.3 pps
Prime age (25-54)	84.9	84.9	85.2	85.3	85.6	0.3 pps
Older (55-64)	48.3	50.1	50.3	50.7	52.9	2.2 pps
Nationals (15-64)	68.8	69.5	70.1	70.5	70.9	0.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	68.0	77.5	78.3	80.4	80.6	0.2 pps
Male	75.7	76.6	77.0	77.7	78.3	0.6 pps
Young (15-24)	39.8	39.7	39.2	39.2	36.1	-3.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	90.8	91.1	91.0	91.5	92.1	0.5 pps
Older (55-64)	58.6	60.8	61.9	62.6	65.3	2.6 pps
Female	62.0	62.6	63.3	63.4	63.6	0.2 pps
Young (15-24)	28.9	29.7	30.7	31.0	27.4	-3.6 pps
Prime age (25-54)	79.0	78.7	79.3	79.0	79.1	0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	39.0	40.5	39.9	40.0	41.7	1.7 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	64.5	66.1	67.4	68.2	68.7	0.5 pps
Young (15-24)	28.4	29.6	31.0	31.7	28.4	-3.3 pps
Prime age (25-54)	80.3	81.4	82.4	82.9	83.3	0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	46.2	48.3	48.9	49.5	51.8	2.3 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	23.0	23.3	23.6	24.7	24.1	-0.7 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	65.6	67.0	68.1	68.6	69.0	0.4 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	85.8	86.8	87.6	87.9	88.1	0.1 pps
Nationals (15-64)	64.5	66.1	67.4	68.2	68.6	0.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	60.6	71.2	74.0	75.5	76.6	1.1 pps
Male	71.0	72.8	74.0	75.3	75.9	0.6 pps
Young (15-24)	32.9	33.9	34.7	35.4	32.3	-3.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	86.1	87.3	88.1	89.2	89.7	0.5 pps
Older (55-64)	55.7	58.3	59.8	61.0	63.7	2.6 pps
Female	58.1	59.5	60.8	61.1	61.5	0.4 pps
Young (15-24)	23.7	25.2	27.0	27.8	24.2	-3.6 pps
Prime age (25-54)	74.5	75.3	76.5	76.4	76.7	0.3 pps
Older (55-64)	37.6	39.3	39.1	39.2	41.0	1.9 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	15901.8	16078.8	16133.4	16094.1	16049.3	-0.3 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	0.8	1.3	0.5	0.0	-0.1	-0.1 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	0.6	1.1	0.3	-0.2	-0.3	0.0 pps
Male	0.5	1.2	0.1	0.4	-0.2	-0.5 pps
Female	0.6	1.0	0.6	-1.0	-0.4	0.6 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	17.7	17.4	17.4	17.4	17.9	0.5 pps
Male	21.7	21.8	21.6	21.6	22.5	0.9 pps
Female	12.7	12.0	12.3	12.3	12.3	0.0 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	27.5	26.1	24.3	21.7	18.4	-3.3 pps
Male	27.3	25.6	23.5	20.6	17.4	-3.2 pps
Female	27.6	26.6	25.1	22.9	19.5	-3.4 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	6.4	6.6	6.4	6.1	5.9	-0.2 pps
Male	3.7	3.7	3.8	3.5	3.4	-0.1 pps
Female	9.7	10.0	9.7	9.3	8.9	-0.4 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	1.6	1.4	1.0	0.9	0.8	-0.1 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	6.2	4.9	3.9	3.3	3.2	-0.1 pps
Young (15-24)	17.7	14.8	11.7	9.9	10.8	0.9 pps
Prime age (25-49)	5.4	4.2	3.4	2.9	2.8	-0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	4.4	3.7	2.8	2.4	2.1	-0.3 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	14.9	12.6	10.3	8.6	8.8	0.2 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	7.0	5.7	4.5	3.7	3.5	-0.2 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	3.3	2.5	2.0	2.0	2.0	0.0 pps
Nationals (15-64)	6.2	5.0	3.9	3.3	3.2	-0.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	10.9	8.3	5.5	6.0	0.0	-6.0 pps
Male	6.1	4.9	3.9	3.0	3.1	0.1 pps
Female	6.2	4.9	3.9	3.6	3.3	-0.3 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	34.9	31.0	26.9	21.5	20.1	-1.4 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	41.2	40.8	40.2	40.1	39.6	-1.2 %
Male	42.3	41.9	41.2	41.1	40.5	-1.5 %
Female	39.6	39.3	38.8	38.7	38.4	-0.8 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	-7.6	-2.4	-5.6	-5.1	4.5	9.6 pps
Building and construction	1.3	-0.2	2.5	4.9	1.2	-3.7 pps
Services	1.7	1.6	0.9	1.1	-1.6	-2.7 pps
Manufacturing industry	5.4	4.4	1.5	-1.7	-4.2	-2.5 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	4.8	5.8	8.1	7.3	3.7	-3.6 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	4.4	3.9	6.8	5.2	0.4	-4.7 pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	4.4	6.6	7.0	6.1	5.3	-0.8 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	4.4	6.6	7.0	6.1	5.3	-0.8 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	2.3	3.4	4.8	4.8	-2.4	-7.2 pps

Portugal	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2019-2020
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	10326	10300	10284	10286	10297	0.1 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	6700	6659	6623	6603	6603	0.0 %
(% of total population)	64.9	64.6	64.4	64.2	64.1	-0.1 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	4940	4972	4976	4987	4905	-1.7 %
Male	2498	2506	2499	2495	2444	-2.0 %
Female	2441	2466	2477	2493	2460	-1.3 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	73.7	74.7	75.1	75.5	74.3	-1.2 pps
Young (15-24)	33.2	34.0	34.2	34.3	30.2	-4.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	89.1	89.6	89.8	90.3	89.5	-0.8 pps
Older (55-64)	58.5	61.5	63.4	64.4	64.5	0.1 pps
Nationals (15-64)	73.6	74.6	75.1	75.4	74.1	-1.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	78.6	79.5	77.1	80.0	78.4	-1.7 pps
Male	77.2	77.9	78.1	78.3	76.9	-1.4 pps
Young (15-24)	35.0	35.6	36.6	36.0	32.2	-3.8 pps
Prime age (25-54)	91.9	92.3	92.6	92.7	91.8	-0.9 pps
Older (55-64)	66.9	69.2	69.0	70.9	70.3	-0.5 pps
Female	70.5	71.6	72.4	72.9	71.8	-1.1 pps
Young (15-24)	31.3	32.3	31.7	32.4	28.0	-4.4 pps
Prime age (25-54)	86.6	87.0	87.3	88.0	87.4	-0.6 pps
Older (55-64)	51.0	54.6	58.4	58.8	59.5	0.7 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	65.2	67.8	69.7	70.5	69.0	-1.4 pps
Young (15-24)	23.9	25.9	27.2	28.0	23.4	-4.7 pps
Prime age (25-54)	80.2	82.5	84.3	85.2	84.2	-1.0 pps
Older (55-64)	52.1	56.2	59.2	60.4	60.7	0.3 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	57.0	59.8	61.3	61.2	60.1	-1.2 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	68.3	70.5	72.0	73.3	69.3	-4.1 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	81.8	83.5	85.5	85.5	84.4	-1.1 pps
Nationals (15-64)	65.3	67.8	69.7	70.5	69.0	-1.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	64.8	68.6	68.8	70.7	68.2	-2.4 pps
Male	68.3	71.1	72.7	73.6	71.6	-2.0 pps
Young (15-24)	25.5	27.6	29.3	30.4	25.5	-5.0 pps
Prime age (25-54)	83.0	85.6	87.5	88.1	86.7	-1.3 pps
Older (55-64)	58.5	63.0	64.5	66.5	65.6	-0.8 pps
Female	62.4	64.8	66.9	67.6	66.6	-0.9 pps
Young (15-24)	22.2	24.1	25.1	25.5	21.2	-4.3 pps
Prime age (25-54)	77.6	79.7	81.4	82.5	81.8	-0.7 pps
Older (55-64)	46.3	50.2	54.6	55.1	56.5	1.4 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	4371.2	4515.4	4615.0	4652.9	4557.4	-2.1 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	1.6	3.3	2.3	0.8	-1.9	-2.7 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	1.4	3.3	2.2	0.8	-2.1	-2.9 pps
Male	1.3	3.4	1.8	0.7	-2.9	-3.6 pps
Female	1.6	3.2	2.6	1.0	-1.2	-2.2 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	13.9	13.4	13.1	13.6	13.4	-0.2 pps
Male	17.1	16.6	16.2	16.6	16.3	-0.3 pps
Female	10.7	10.1	9.8	10.5	10.5	0.0 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	22.3	22.0	22.0	20.8	17.8	-3.0 pps
Male	22.5	22.3	22.0	20.6	17.4	-3.2 pps
Female	22.1	21.7	22.0	21.1	18.1	-3.0 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	9.5	8.9	8.1	8.1	7.5	-0.6 pps
Male	6.8	6.1	5.7	5.4	4.9	-0.5 pps
Female	12.1	11.7	10.5	10.9	10.1	-0.8 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	4.6	4.2	3.7	3.5	3.3	-0.2 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	11.2	9.0	7.1	6.5	6.9	0.4 pps
Young (15-24)	28.0	23.9	20.3	18.3	22.6	4.3 pps
Prime age (25-49)	10.0	7.9	6.1	5.7	6.0	0.3 pps
Older (55-64)	11.0	8.5	6.5	6.2	5.9	-0.3 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	12.7	10.2	7.7	7.2	6.9	-0.3 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	12.3	10.0	8.3	7.3	8.5	1.2 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	8.4	6.6	5.4	5.4	5.9	0.5 pps
Nationals (15-64)	11.4	9.1	7.2	6.5	6.9	0.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	17.5	13.6	10.9	11.7	12.9	1.2 pps
Male	11.1	8.5	6.7	5.9	6.6	0.7 pps
Female	11.3	9.4	7.5	7.2	7.1	-0.1 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	55.2	49.6	43.4	42.2	33.0	-9.2 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	40.7	40.6	40.4	40.2	39.1	-2.7 %
Male	41.7	41.6	41.5	41.3	40.1	-2.9 %
Female	39.6	39.4	39.3	39.0	38.0	-2.6 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	-4.3	-1.5	-2.6	-8.2	-0.6	7.6 pps
Building and construction	1.2	4.6	4.6	4.8	2.2	-2.6 pps
Services	3.5	5.2	3.8	2.4	-4.1	-6.5 pps
Manufacturing industry	1.7	3.6	3.4	-0.6	-2.2	-1.6 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	1.2	2.3	3.9	4.8	2.0	-2.8 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	-0.5	0.8	2.0	1.7	0.2	-1.5 pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	1.5	2.0	1.9	1.1	7.6	6.5 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	1.9	2.1	1.9	1.0	8.5	7.5 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	0.4	0.2	0.5	1.9	-6.7	-8.6 pps

Romania	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2019-2020
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	19706	19593	19477	19376	19262	-0.6 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	13263	13095	12930	12774	12611	-1.3 %
(% of total population)	67.3	66.8	66.4	65.9	65.5	-0.5 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	8696	8812	8761	8761	8723	-0.4 %
Male	5006	5034	5036	5049	5040	-0.2 %
Female	3690	3778	3725	3712	3683	-0.8 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	65.6	67.3	67.8	68.6	69.2	0.6 pps
Young (15-24)	28.0	29.9	29.5	29.6	29.7	0.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	81.9	83.4	83.6	84.1	84.3	0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	44.2	46.0	47.5	48.9	50.2	1.3 pps
Nationals (15-64)	65.6	67.3	67.8	68.6	69.2	0.6 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	0.0	74.5	72.1	0.0	0.0	0.0 pps
Male	74.8	76.2	76.9	78.0	78.7	0.7 pps
Young (15-24)	33.9	34.6	34.6	35.7	35.5	-0.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	91.0	92.2	92.5	93.1	93.6	0.6 pps
Older (55-64)	55.1	57.4	59.7	61.6	62.5	0.9 pps
Female	56.2	58.2	58.3	58.9	59.3	0.5 pps
Young (15-24)	21.8	25.0	24.2	23.3	23.6	0.3 pps
Prime age (25-54)	72.4	74.2	74.2	74.6	74.5	-0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	34.4	35.7	36.4	37.3	38.8	1.5 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	61.6	63.9	64.8	65.8	65.6	-0.2 pps
Young (15-24)	22.3	24.5	24.7	24.7	24.6	-0.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	77.6	79.9	80.6	81.4	80.6	-0.8 pps
Older (55-64)	42.8	44.5	46.3	47.8	48.5	0.7 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	41.0	42.5	42.6	44.4	43.4	-1.0 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	65.2	67.5	68.6	68.6	68.1	-0.5 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	86.2	87.9	88.4	89.2	88.8	-0.3 pps
Nationals (15-64)	61.6	63.9	64.8	65.8	65.6	-0.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	0.0	68.2	68.6	0.0	0.0	0.0 pps
Male	69.7	71.8	73.2	74.6	74.4	-0.1 pps
Young (15-24)	27.2	28.4	29.0	29.8	29.2	-0.7 pps
Prime age (25-54)	85.5	87.6	88.7	89.7	89.3	-0.3 pps
Older (55-64)	53.0	55.3	57.9	60.1	60.4	0.3 pps
Female	53.3	55.8	56.2	56.8	56.5	-0.4 pps
Young (15-24)	17.1	20.4	20.3	19.3	19.7	0.5 pps
Prime age (25-54)	69.2	71.8	72.1	72.7	71.4	-1.3 pps
Older (55-64)	33.6	34.9	35.7	36.5	37.5	1.0 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	8166.1	8363.2	8381.8	8407.9	8272.2	-1.6 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	-1.1	2.4	0.1	0.1	-1.8	-1.9 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	-0.8	2.4	0.2	0.3	-1.6	-1.9 pps
Male	-0.8	1.6	1.0	0.7	-1.2	-1.9 pps
Female	-0.9	3.5	-0.8	-0.2	-2.2	-2.0 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	16.5	16.4	15.5	15.2	15.1	-0.1 pps
Male	21.2	21.1	19.9	19.6	19.4	-0.2 pps
Female	10.2	10.1	9.8	9.4	9.3	-0.1 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	1.4	1.2	1.1	1.4	1.2	-0.2 pps
Male	1.7	1.4	1.2	1.7	1.6	-0.1 pps
Female	1.0	0.9	0.9	1.0	0.8	-0.2 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	7.4	6.8	6.5	6.1	5.9	-0.2 pps
Male	7.3	6.7	6.2	6.0	5.8	-0.2 pps
Female	7.7	6.9	6.9	6.2	6.0	-0.2 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	4.3	3.8	3.5	3.4	3.4	0.0 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	5.9	4.9	4.2	3.9	5.0	1.1 pps
Young (15-24)	20.6	18.3	16.2	16.8	17.3	0.5 pps
Prime age (25-49)	5.3	4.2	3.6	3.2	4.4	1.2 pps
Older (55-64)	3.2	3.2	2.5	2.4	3.4	1.0 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	8.6	7.6	6.6	7.0	9.0	2.0 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	6.3	5.2	4.4	4.0	5.2	1.2 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	3.1	2.4	2.1	1.6	2.2	0.6 pps
Nationals (15-64)	6.1	5.1	4.3	4.0	5.2	1.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0 pps
Male	6.6	5.6	4.7	4.3	5.3	1.0 pps
Female	5.0	4.0	3.5	3.4	4.7	1.3 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	50.0	41.5	44.1	42.5	29.9	-12.6 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	40.2	40.1	40.0	40.1	39.6	-1.2 %
Male	40.6	40.5	40.4	40.5	40.0	-1.2 %
Female	39.6	39.6	39.5	39.6	39.0	-1.5 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	-10.7	0.3	-0.1	-4.2	-5.6	-1.4 pps
Building and construction	6.6	3.2	-2.7	6.1	3.9	-2.2 pps
Services	2.4	3.2	2.6	1.9	0.9	-1.0 pps
Manufacturing industry	2.9	3.5	-0.5	-1.9	-6.0	-4.1 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	15.5	14.8	12.9	10.9	7.0	-3.9 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	12.7	9.7	6.4	3.7	3.0	-0.8 pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	10.4	14.3	12.4	12.3	6.9	-5.4 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	10.5	14.2	33.1	12.3	6.8	-5.5 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	5.9	4.8	4.4	4.1	-2.2	-6.3 pps

Slovenia	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2019-2020
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	2065	2066	2072	2089	2103	0.7 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	1371	1362	1352	1350	1362	0.9 %
(% of total population)	66.4	65.9	65.3	64.6	64.7	0.1 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	982	1011	1015	1015	1016	0.0 %
Male	524	538	544	546	547	0.2 %
Female	458	473	470	469	469	-0.1 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	71.6	74.2	75.0	75.2	74.6	-0.6 pps
Young (15-24)	33.7	39.1	38.5	36.2	31.5	-4.7 pps
Prime age (25-54)	90.5	91.9	92.0	92.4	92.4	-0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	41.2	45.6	49.5	50.9	52.4	1.6 pps
Nationals (15-64)	71.4	74.1	75.1	75.2	74.4	-0.8 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	76.7	76.0	74.3	75.6	78.4	2.8 pps
Male	74.5	77.1	78.2	78.0	77.1	-0.9 pps
Young (15-24)	36.9	42.9	42.4	39.1	33.9	-5.2 pps
Prime age (25-54)	92.0	93.4	94.0	94.4	94.2	-0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	47.1	51.7	55.1	55.8	56.3	0.5 pps
Female	68.6	71.2	71.7	72.2	71.9	-0.4 pps
Young (15-24)	30.5	34.9	34.4	32.9	28.7	-4.2 pps
Prime age (25-54)	88.9	90.2	89.9	90.3	90.3	0.0 pps
Older (55-64)	35.2	39.5	43.9	46.0	48.5	2.5 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	65.8	69.3	71.1	71.8	70.9	-1.0 pps
Young (15-24)	28.6	34.7	35.1	33.3	27.0	-6.3 pps
Prime age (25-54)	83.5	86.1	87.5	88.6	88.1	-0.5 pps
Older (55-64)	38.5	42.7	47.0	48.6	50.5	1.9 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	32.3	35.4	36.3	34.4	30.4	-4.0 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	67.4	70.7	72.8	73.2	70.9	-2.3 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	84.0	86.2	88.0	89.5	89.4	-0.1 pps
Nationals (15-64)	65.8	69.3	71.3	71.9	70.7	-1.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	66.4	69.0	68.6	70.3	72.7	2.4 pps
Male	68.9	72.5	74.5	74.8	73.7	-1.2 pps
Young (15-24)	31.1	38.6	38.8	36.2	29.6	-6.6 pps
Prime age (25-54)	85.6	88.5	90.1	90.9	90.4	-0.5 pps
Older (55-64)	43.6	48.0	52.2	53.2	54.3	1.1 pps
Female	62.6	65.8	67.5	68.6	67.8	-0.8 pps
Young (15-24)	26.0	30.4	31.0	29.9	24.1	-5.8 pps
Prime age (25-54)	81.2	83.5	84.8	86.0	85.6	-0.5 pps
Older (55-64)	33.4	37.4	41.9	44.0	46.6	2.6 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	902.5	943.5	961.9	969.7	964.7	-0.5 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	1.8	2.9	3.2	2.5	-0.6	-3.1 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	0.1	4.5	2.0	0.8	-0.5	-1.3 pps
Male	-1.6	4.6	2.5	1.0	-0.3	-1.3 pps
Female	2.1	4.5	1.3	0.6	-0.8	-1.4 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	11.5	11.4	12.1	11.8	10.7	-1.0 pps
Male	15.1	14.3	15.4	15.2	13.4	-1.8 pps
Female	7.4	8.1	8.3	7.8	7.6	-0.2 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	16.9	17.6	15.7	13.2	10.8	-2.4 pps
Male	15.9	16.4	14.4	11.7	9.5	-2.2 pps
Female	18.0	18.9	17.1	14.9	12.2	-2.7 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	9.3	10.3	9.7	8.4	8.3	-0.1 pps
Male	6.0	6.7	5.9	4.8	5.1	0.3 pps
Female	13.1	14.5	14.3	12.7	12.1	-0.6 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	1.3	1.1	0.6	0.4	0.5	0.1 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	8.0	6.6	5.1	4.5	5.0	0.5 pps
Young (15-24)	15.2	11.2	8.8	8.1	14.2	6.1 pps
Prime age (25-49)	7.7	6.3	4.9	4.2	4.6	0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	6.5	6.4	4.9	4.5	3.7	-0.8 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	15.1	11.5	9.1	9.9	11.5	1.6 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	8.1	6.8	5.6	4.7	5.6	0.9 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	6.2	5.3	3.7	3.0	3.2	0.2 pps
Nationals (15-64)	7.9	6.5	5.1	4.4	4.9	0.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	13.4	9.2	7.6	7.1	7.3	0.2 pps
Male	7.5	5.8	4.6	4.0	4.4	0.4 pps
Female	8.6	7.5	5.7	5.0	5.6	0.6 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	53.3	47.5	42.9	43.0	38.8	-4.2 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	40.5	39.9	40.1	40.1	40.4	0.7 %
Male	41.2	40.5	40.7	40.6	40.8	0.5 %
Female	39.6	39.2	39.3	39.3	39.9	1.5 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	-1.3	-1.0	-0.4	-0.6	-0.9	-0.3 pps
Building and construction	-0.8	2.3	6.5	9.1	1.9	-7.2 pps
Services	2.3	3.8	3.2	2.1	-1.8	-3.9 pps
Manufacturing industry	3.1	3.7	4.6	2.6	-2.0	-4.6 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	3.1	3.0	3.9	5.0	3.5	-1.5 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	2.3	1.5	1.7	2.6	1.0	-1.6 pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	1.8	5.6	3.3	4.8	1.9	-2.9 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	1.4	5.1	3.6	4.9	2.8	-2.1 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	1.3	1.9	1.2	0.8	-3.7	-4.5 pps

Slovak Republic	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2019-2020
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	5431	5438	5446	5453	5461	0.1 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	3810	3781	3749	3718	3689	-0.8 %
(% of total population)	70.2	69.5	68.8	68.2	67.6	-0.6 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	2738	2726	2713	2702	2672	-1.1 %
Male	1499	1489	1487	1478	1459	-1.3 %
Female	1239	1237	1225	1223	1213	-0.8 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	71.9	72.1	72.4	72.7	72.4	-0.2 pps
Young (15-24)	32.4	33.2	32.3	29.7	28.1	-1.6 pps
Prime age (25-54)	87.6	86.6	86.5	86.5	85.9	-0.6 pps
Older (55-64)	53.9	56.4	57.2	59.8	61.3	1.5 pps
Nationals (15-64)	71.8	72.1	72.3	72.6	72.4	-0.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	75.8	79.4	78.1	80.6	70.9	-9.7 pps
Male	78.3	78.2	78.7	78.8	78.3	-0.5 pps
Young (15-24)	39.7	39.6	39.7	36.8	34.9	-1.9 pps
Prime age (25-54)	93.5	93.1	93.2	93.2	92.2	-0.9 pps
Older (55-64)	60.1	60.0	61.1	62.9	64.5	1.6 pps
Female	65.4	65.9	65.9	66.4	66.4	0.0 pps
Young (15-24)	24.7	26.5	24.5	22.2	21.0	-1.2 pps
Prime age (25-54)	81.5	79.8	79.7	79.6	79.3	-0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	48.2	53.0	53.7	57.0	58.3	1.3 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	64.9	66.2	67.6	68.4	67.5	-0.9 pps
Young (15-24)	25.2	26.9	27.5	24.9	22.7	-2.2 pps
Prime age (25-54)	80.0	80.0	81.2	82.0	80.6	-1.4 pps
Older (55-64)	49.0	53.0	54.2	57.0	58.3	1.3 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	19.8	21.4	21.1	20.7	18.2	-2.5 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	70.9	72.5	74.1	75.0	73.3	-1.7 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	77.3	78.5	79.3	80.6	80.2	-0.4 pps
Nationals (15-64)	64.9	66.2	67.6	68.4	67.5	-0.9 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	69.7	74.8	68.8	76.3	62.7	-13.6 pps
Male	71.4	72.0	73.9	74.4	73.3	-1.1 pps
Young (15-24)	31.9	32.4	34.0	31.6	28.5	-3.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	86.3	86.3	87.9	88.3	86.9	-1.5 pps
Older (55-64)	55.1	56.6	58.4	60.4	61.7	1.3 pps
Female	58.3	60.3	61.2	62.4	61.7	-0.7 pps
Young (15-24)	18.2	21.1	20.6	17.8	16.5	-1.3 pps
Prime age (25-54)	73.5	73.4	74.4	75.3	74.0	-1.3 pps
Older (55-64)	43.5	49.6	50.4	53.9	55.2	1.3 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	2471.7	2502.1	2533.3	2543.8	2490.9	-2.1 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	2.4	2.2	2.0	1.0	-1.9	-2.9 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	2.8	1.2	1.2	0.4	-2.1	-2.5 pps
Male	2.2	0.2	1.8	0.0	-2.2	-2.1 pps
Female	3.5	2.5	0.6	1.0	-2.0	-2.9 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	15.2	15.0	14.6	14.8	14.7	-0.1 pps
Male	19.1	19.0	18.7	19.1	19.1	0.0 pps
Female	10.4	10.2	9.6	9.7	9.4	-0.2 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	9.9	9.4	8.1	7.8	6.5	-1.3 pps
Male	9.7	9.1	7.5	7.1	5.8	-1.3 pps
Female	10.2	9.8	8.7	8.6	7.3	-1.3 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	5.8	5.8	4.9	4.5	4.6	0.1 pps
Male	4.1	4.0	3.2	2.9	2.7	-0.2 pps
Female	7.9	8.0	7.0	6.5	6.8	0.3 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	2.0	1.8	1.3	1.2	0.9	-0.3 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	9.7	8.1	6.5	5.8	6.7	0.9 pps
Young (15-24)	22.2	18.9	14.9	16.1	19.3	3.2 pps
Prime age (25-49)	8.7	7.6	6.1	5.3	6.2	0.9 pps
Older (55-64)	9.0	6.0	5.3	4.7	4.8	0.1 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	31.7	29.9	30.0	31.3	30.7	-0.6 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	9.2	7.6	5.8	4.9	6.4	1.5 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	5.7	4.2	3.1	2.5	3.5	1.0 pps
Nationals (15-64)	9.7	8.2	6.6	5.8	6.8	1.0 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0 pps
Male	8.8	7.9	6.1	5.6	6.4	0.8 pps
Female	10.8	8.4	7.0	6.0	7.1	1.1 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	60.2	62.4	61.7	58.2	47.7	-10.5 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	40.1	39.7	39.8	39.8	39.2	-1.5 %
Male	40.8	40.5	40.5	40.6	39.8	-2.0 %
Female	39.1	38.7	38.9	38.9	38.3	-1.5 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	-1.1	-0.3	-0.2	0.1	-2.6	-2.7 pps
Building and construction	1.6	2.3	2.3	5.2	-0.7	-5.9 pps
Services	2.5	1.8	2.9	0.6	-1.9	-2.5 pps
Manufacturing industry	3.7	3.9	1.7	0.2	-4.3	-4.5 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	2.2	5.1	6.0	6.8	3.6	-3.3 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	2.8	4.1	3.7	4.0	-0.4	-4.4 pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	2.9	6.7	6.6	7.1	5.6	-1.5 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	2.8	6.1	6.5	7.0	8.5	1.5 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	-0.4	0.8	1.8	1.5	-2.5	-4.0 pps

Finland	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2019-2020
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	5495	5508	5516	5522	5531	0.2 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	3445	3434	3421	3410	3401	-0.3 %
(% of total population)	62.7	62.3	62.0	61.7	61.5	-0.3 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	2615	2635	2665	2669	2662	-0.3 %
Male	1350	1362	1375	1379	1377	-0.2 %
Female	1265	1273	1290	1290	1285	-0.4 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	75.9	76.7	77.9	78.3	78.3	0.0 pps
Young (15-24)	52.2	53.2	53.1	53.9	52.2	-1.7 pps
Prime age (25-54)	86.3	86.8	87.8	87.7	87.5	-0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	66.4	67.8	70.3	71.5	72.9	1.5 pps
Nationals (15-64)	76.3	77.1	78.3	78.7	78.6	-0.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	67.4	68.9	68.8	68.4	71.3	2.9 pps
Male	77.7	78.5	79.5	79.9	80.0	0.0 pps
Young (15-24)	51.2	52.3	51.5	54.3	53.1	-1.2 pps
Prime age (25-54)	89.7	89.8	90.8	90.3	90.0	-0.3 pps
Older (55-64)	65.2	67.5	69.7	70.5	72.4	1.9 pps
Female	74.1	74.9	76.3	76.6	76.5	-0.1 pps
Young (15-24)	53.2	54.2	54.7	53.5	51.3	-2.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	82.8	83.6	84.6	84.9	84.9	0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	67.6	68.2	70.8	72.4	73.5	1.1 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	69.1	70.0	72.1	72.9	72.1	-0.9 pps
Young (15-24)	41.7	42.5	44.0	44.6	41.1	-3.6 pps
Prime age (25-54)	79.9	80.6	82.5	83.2	82.4	-0.8 pps
Older (55-64)	61.4	62.5	65.4	66.8	67.5	0.7 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	38.6	38.5	39.5	39.0	36.6	-2.4 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	70.6	71.1	73.2	74.4	72.1	-2.3 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	82.9	84.4	86.2	86.2	86.2	0.0 pps
Nationals (15-64)	69.7	70.5	72.7	73.5	72.6	-1.0 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	55.5	58.3	57.7	59.8	61.2	1.4 pps
Male	70.5	71.4	73.5	74.1	73.4	-0.7 pps
Young (15-24)	40.1	41.3	42.6	44.1	40.7	-3.4 pps
Prime age (25-54)	83.0	83.3	85.3	85.6	84.7	-0.9 pps
Older (55-64)	59.8	61.6	64.3	64.8	66.6	1.7 pps
Female	67.6	68.5	70.6	71.8	70.7	-1.1 pps
Young (15-24)	43.3	43.7	45.5	45.1	41.4	-3.7 pps
Prime age (25-54)	76.7	77.9	79.5	80.7	80.0	-0.7 pps
Older (55-64)	63.0	63.4	66.5	68.7	68.4	-0.3 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	2379.5	2402.6	2464.8	2487.0	2450.4	-1.5 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	0.5	1.0	2.5	1.8	-2.1	-3.9 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	0.5	1.0	2.6	0.9	-1.5	-2.4 pps
Male	1.6	1.0	2.6	0.6	-1.1	-1.7 pps
Female	-0.6	0.9	2.6	1.2	-1.8	-3.0 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	12.4	11.6	11.6	11.8	11.8	0.0 pps
Male	16.4	15.0	14.8	14.9	15.1	0.2 pps
Female	8.2	8.1	8.2	8.6	8.2	-0.3 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	15.6	15.8	16.2	15.5	14.6	-0.9 pps
Male	12.9	12.9	13.1	12.7	12.0	-0.7 pps
Female	18.2	18.6	19.2	18.2	17.1	-1.1 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	14.9	15.1	15.1	15.5	14.8	-0.7 pps
Male	10.0	9.9	10.0	10.1	10.2	0.1 pps
Female	20.2	20.5	20.6	21.3	19.8	-1.5 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	5.1	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.8	0.0 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	8.8	8.6	7.4	6.7	7.8	1.1 pps
Young (15-24)	20.1	20.1	17.0	17.2	21.4	4.2 pps
Prime age (25-49)	7.4	7.1	6.0	5.1	5.8	0.7 pps
Older (55-64)	7.5	7.8	6.9	6.6	7.5	0.9 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	17.6	18.9	16.7	17.1	20.0	2.9 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	9.7	9.6	8.4	7.3	9.1	1.8 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	5.9	5.3	4.3	4.0	4.4	0.4 pps
Nationals (15-64)	8.7	8.6	7.2	6.6	7.7	1.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	17.6	15.3	16.2	12.6	14.2	1.6 pps
Male	9.0	8.9	7.4	7.2	8.0	0.8 pps
Female	8.6	8.4	7.3	6.2	7.5	1.3 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	25.9	24.4	21.9	17.6	15.4	-2.2 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	38.8	38.7	38.5	38.5	38.2	-0.8 %
Male	40.2	40.0	39.8	39.8	39.4	-1.0 %
Female	37.1	37.0	37.0	36.9	36.8	-0.3 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	-6.8	-3.2	-3.4	-0.1	-1.4	-1.3 pps
Building and construction	4.8	3.6	4.5	-1.7	-2.4	-0.7 pps
Services	1.0	1.4	3.2	2.4	-4.3	-6.7 pps
Manufacturing industry	-1.0	0.0	1.7	0.2	-0.7	-0.9 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	0.9	-1.1	1.3	1.3	0.8	-0.5 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	0.8	-1.9	-0.6	-0.2	-1.8	-1.5 pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	0.6	-0.7	1.4	0.8	0.2	-0.6 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	0.1	0.4	2.1	1.5	1.5	0.0 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	2.3	2.1	-1.3	-0.4	-0.8	-0.4 pps

Sweden	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2019-2020
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	9923	10058	10175	10279	10353	0.7 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	6214	6290	6347	6404	6443	0.6 %
(% of total population)	62.6	62.5	62.4	62.3	62.2	-0.1 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	5100	5190	5251	5310	5317	0.1 %
Male	2658	2709	2739	2773	2791	0.7 %
Female	2442	2481	2513	2538	2525	-0.5 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	82.1	82.5	82.7	82.9	82.5	-0.4 pps
Young (15-24)	54.8	54.7	54.1	55.0	52.1	-2.9 pps
Prime age (25-54)	90.9	91.2	91.3	91.3	91.2	-0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	79.7	80.5	81.7	81.5	82.4	0.9 pps
Nationals (15-64)	82.9	83.2	83.6	83.9	83.3	-0.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	73.7	75.9	74.5	74.6	75.5	0.9 pps
Male	83.9	84.3	84.4	84.6	84.6	0.0 pps
Young (15-24)	54.2	54.1	52.8	53.9	52.2	-1.7 pps
Prime age (25-54)	93.3	93.6	93.6	93.7	93.8	0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	82.5	83.2	84.7	84.1	85.4	1.3 pps
Female	80.2	80.7	81.0	81.2	80.3	-0.9 pps
Young (15-24)	55.5	55.4	55.5	56.2	51.9	-4.3 pps
Prime age (25-54)	88.5	88.8	88.9	88.7	88.4	-0.3 pps
Older (55-64)	76.9	77.8	78.6	78.9	79.4	0.4 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	76.2	76.9	77.4	77.1	75.5	-1.7 pps
Young (15-24)	44.5	44.9	44.7	43.9	39.6	-4.3 pps
Prime age (25-54)	85.9	86.3	86.6	86.4	85.0	-1.4 pps
Older (55-64)	75.5	76.4	78.0	77.7	77.6	-0.1 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	45.8	46.5	46.8	46.0	41.9	-4.0 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	81.6	82.6	83.0	82.5	81.0	-1.4 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	88.1	88.1	88.6	88.8	88.0	-0.8 pps
Nationals (15-64)	78.0	78.6	79.4	79.2	77.8	-1.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	57.6	59.8	58.8	59.5	56.5	-3.0 pps
Male	77.5	78.3	78.8	78.8	77.4	-1.4 pps
Young (15-24)	43.1	43.9	43.0	42.9	39.2	-3.7 pps
Prime age (25-54)	88.1	88.5	88.8	89.0	87.7	-1.2 pps
Older (55-64)	77.5	78.4	80.4	79.8	79.8	0.0 pps
Female	74.8	75.4	75.9	75.4	73.5	-1.9 pps
Young (15-24)	45.9	46.0	46.4	45.1	40.1	-5.0 pps
Prime age (25-54)	83.7	84.1	84.2	83.7	82.2	-1.6 pps
Older (55-64)	73.5	74.4	75.7	75.6	75.3	-0.3 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	4735.6	4833.9	4910.2	4938.5	4862.6	-1.5 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	1.9	2.5	1.6	0.6	-1.3	-1.9 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	1.6	2.1	1.6	0.6	-1.5	-2.1 pps
Male	1.6	2.3	1.7	1.0	-1.1	-2.1 pps
Female	1.7	1.8	1.5	0.1	-2.0	-2.1 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	8.7	8.6	8.6	8.7	8.6	-0.2 pps
Male	11.8	11.8	11.9	12.2	11.8	-0.3 pps
Female	5.3	5.1	5.0	5.0	5.0	0.0 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	16.1	16.1	15.9	15.7	14.8	-0.9 pps
Male	14.5	14.5	14.3	14.0	13.2	-0.8 pps
Female	17.7	17.7	17.6	17.3	16.5	-0.8 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	23.9	23.3	22.6	22.5	22.3	-0.2 pps
Male	13.0	13.1	12.9	13.4	13.8	0.4 pps
Female	35.6	34.4	33.3	32.5	31.7	-0.8 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	6.8	6.3	5.5	5.2	5.1	0.0 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	7.0	6.7	6.4	6.8	8.3	1.5 pps
Young (15-24)	18.9	17.9	17.4	20.1	23.9	3.8 pps
Prime age (25-49)	5.5	5.4	5.2	5.3	6.8	1.5 pps
Older (55-64)	5.3	5.1	4.4	4.7	5.8	1.1 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	19.7	19.4	19.5	21.6	25.8	4.2 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	5.8	5.2	4.7	5.1	6.5	1.4 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	4.1	4.1	3.7	3.8	4.8	1.0 pps
Nationals (15-64)	5.9	5.5	5.1	5.5	6.7	1.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	21.8	21.3	21.1	20.2	25.2	5.0 pps
Male	7.4	7.0	6.5	6.7	8.3	1.6 pps
Female	6.6	6.4	6.2	7.0	8.3	1.3 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	19.4	19.6	18.3	14.3	14.4	0.1 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	39.4	39.1	39.0	38.8	37.8	-2.6 %
Male	40.1	39.8	39.7	39.5	38.5	-2.5 %
Female	38.3	38.0	38.0	37.7	36.8	-2.4 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	-2.9	0.3	-2.9	0.4	3.4	3.0 pps
Building and construction	1.8	7.3	3.5	0.1	-0.8	-0.9 pps
Services	1.8	2.9	1.9	1.2	-1.7	-2.9 pps
Manufacturing industry	-1.8	2.4	2.6	-0.5	-2.5	-2.0 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	2.6	2.1	3.8	3.0	2.5	-0.4 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	1.1	-0.1	1.4	0.5	0.9	0.4 pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	3.8	2.8	2.0	2.6	0.5	-2.1 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	2.6	2.3	1.6	2.8	2.1	-0.7 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	0.2	0.1	0.3	1.4	-1.5	-2.9 pps

United Kingdom	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2019-2020
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	65648	66040	66436	66797	:	: %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	41430	41539	41656	41757	:	: %
(% of total population)	63.1	62.9	62.7	62.5	:	: pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	32025	32215	32442	32631	:	: %
Male	16982	17003	17102	17162	:	: %
Female	15043	15212	15340	15469	:	: %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	77.3	77.6	77.9	78.1	:	: pps
Young (15-24)	58.3	57.5	57.1	56.6	:	: pps
Prime age (25-54)	86.1	86.5	86.9	87.2	:	: pps
Older (55-64)	65.8	66.4	67.5	68.3	:	: pps
Nationals (15-64)	77.5	77.7	77.9	78.1	:	: pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	76.2	76.7	77.7	78.6	:	: pps
Male	82.4	82.3	82.6	82.5	:	: pps
Young (15-24)	59.2	58.2	58.5	57.6	:	: pps
Prime age (25-54)	92.2	92.4	92.5	92.6	:	: pps
Older (55-64)	72.6	72.1	72.7	73.3	:	: pps
Female	72.2	72.9	73.2	73.8	:	: pps
Young (15-24)	57.5	56.8	55.6	55.7	:	: pps
Prime age (25-54)	80.1	80.8	81.3	81.9	:	: pps
Older (55-64)	59.2	60.9	62.5	63.5	:	: pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	73.5	74.1	74.7	75.2	:	: pps
Young (15-24)	50.7	50.5	50.6	50.3	:	: pps
Prime age (25-54)	82.9	83.8	84.3	84.8	:	: pps
Older (55-64)	63.4	64.1	65.3	66.3	:	: pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	58.3	59.6	61.1	60.3	:	: pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	73.8	74.2	74.4	75.0	:	: pps
High-skilled (15-64)	84.9	85.0	85.3	85.9	:	: pps
Nationals (15-64)	73.7	74.3	74.8	75.2	:	: pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	71.8	72.6	74.1	75.0	:	: pps
Male	78.2	78.6	79.1	79.2	:	: pps
Young (15-24)	50.4	50.3	51.4	50.1	:	: pps
Prime age (25-54)	89.0	89.6	89.8	90.2	:	: pps
Older (55-64)	69.5	69.2	70.3	70.9	:	: pps
Female	68.8	69.7	70.3	71.1	:	: pps
Young (15-24)	51.1	50.8	49.9	50.6	:	: pps
Prime age (25-54)	77.0	78.1	78.8	79.6	:	: pps
Older (55-64)	57.4	59.1	60.6	61.8	:	: pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	30443.6	30785.5	31112.0	31382.2	:	: %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	1.5	1.0	1.2	1.1	0.0	-1.1 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	1.4	1.1	1.1	0.9	:	: pps
Male	1.4	0.7	1.0	0.5	:	: pps
Female	1.4	1.6	1.1	1.3	:	: pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	14.1	14.0	13.8	14.3	:	: pps
Male	17.9	17.7	17.4	18.0	:	: pps
Female	9.9	10.0	9.8	10.1	:	: pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	5.9	5.6	5.5	5.1	:	: pps
Male	5.4	5.2	5.1	4.6	:	: pps
Female	6.5	6.1	5.8	5.5	:	: pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	25.2	24.9	24.6	24.4	:	: pps
Male	11.3	11.1	11.1	10.8	:	: pps
Female	40.9	40.4	39.7	39.4	:	: pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	4.0	3.6	3.4	3.2	#VALUE!	: pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	:	:	:	:	:	: pps
Young (15-24)	13.0	12.1	11.3	11.2	:	: pps
Prime age (25-49)	3.6	3.2	3.0	2.7	:	: pps
Older (55-64)	3.7	3.5	3.3	3.0	0.0	-3.0 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	8.6	7.6	6.6	6.8	:	: pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	5.5	4.9	4.8	4.1	:	: pps
High-skilled (15-64)	3.0	2.8	2.5	2.5	0.0	-2.5 pps
Nationals (15-64)	4.8	4.3	4.0	3.7	:	: pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	5.8	5.3	4.6	4.5	0.0	-4.5 pps
Male	:	:	:	:	:	: pps
Female	:	:	:	:	:	: pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	27.1	25.9	26.3	24.8	:	: pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	41.4	41.2	40.9	40.9	:	: %
Male	42.7	42.5	42.2	42.1	:	: %
Female	39.2	38.9	38.8	39.0	:	: %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	-0.6	5.0	-2.7	-1.3	:	: pps
Building and construction	3.8	4.1	0.1	1.7	:	: pps
Services	2.1	0.7	1.3	1.5	:	: pps
Manufacturing industry	-0.3	1.5	1.6	-1.2	:	: pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	3.0	3.0	2.6	4.2	:	: pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	0.9	1.1	0.3	1.9	-6.3	-8.2 pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	1.5	3.1	3.1	3.0	:	: pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	1.8	2.7	3.0	3.2	:	: pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	0.2	0.7	0.1	0.3	:	: pps

European Union (28 countries)	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2019-2020
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	510835	511950	513137	514439	:	: %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	328886	328055	327124	326671	:	: %
(% of total population)	64.4	64.1	63.7	63.5	:	: pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	239740	240554	241027	241753	:	: %
Male	128933	129232	129374	129566	:	: %
Female	110807	111322	111653	112187	:	: %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	72.9	73.3	73.7	74.0	:	: pps
Young (15-24)	41.5	41.6	41.6	41.7	:	: pps
Prime age (25-54)	85.5	85.7	85.9	86.1	:	: pps
Older (55-64)	59.1	60.6	61.9	63.0	:	: pps
Nationals (15-64)	73.1	73.5	73.8	74.1	:	: pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	71.3	71.5	72.4	72.9	:	: pps
Male	78.5	78.8	79.2	79.4	:	: pps
Young (15-24)	44.0	44.0	44.2	44.3	:	: pps
Prime age (25-54)	91.4	91.6	91.7	91.8	:	: pps
Older (55-64)	66.6	67.8	69.1	70.1	:	: pps
Female	67.3	67.8	68.2	68.6	:	: pps
Young (15-24)	38.9	39.1	38.9	39.0	:	: pps
Prime age (25-54)	79.5	79.8	80.0	80.4	:	: pps
Older (55-64)	52.0	53.8	55.2	56.4	:	: pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	66.6	67.6	68.6	69.3	:	: pps
Young (15-24)	33.7	34.6	35.3	35.7	:	: pps
Prime age (25-54)	78.7	79.6	80.4	81.1	:	: pps
Older (55-64)	55.2	57.1	58.7	60.0	:	: pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	44.5	45.4	46.2	46.6	:	: pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	69.9	70.9	71.6	72.1	:	: pps
High-skilled (15-64)	83.4	84.0	84.5	84.9	:	: pps
Nationals (15-64)	67.0	68.1	69.0	69.7	:	: pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	61.5	62.5	64.0	65.1	:	: pps
Male	71.8	72.9	73.8	74.4	:	: pps
Young (15-24)	35.4	36.3	37.2	37.6	:	: pps
Prime age (25-54)	84.6	85.5	86.2	86.8	:	: pps
Older (55-64)	62.0	63.7	65.4	66.6	:	: pps
Female	61.3	62.4	63.3	64.1	:	: pps
Young (15-24)	32.0	32.8	33.2	33.7	:	: pps
Prime age (25-54)	72.9	73.7	74.6	75.4	:	: pps
Older (55-64)	48.9	50.8	52.4	53.7	:	: pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	218907.3	221881.3	224256.5	226231.0	:	: %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	1.3	1.5	1.4	1.0	0.0	-1.0 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	1.4	1.4	1.1	0.9	:	: pps
Male	1.4	1.3	1.0	0.7	:	: pps
Female	1.5	1.4	1.2	1.1	:	: pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	14.0	13.7	13.5	13.5	:	: pps
Male	17.5	17.2	16.9	16.9	:	: pps
Female	9.9	9.7	9.5	9.6	:	: pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	14.2	14.3	14.1	13.6	:	: pps
Male	13.8	13.8	13.6	13.2	:	: pps
Female	14.7	14.8	14.7	14.1	:	: pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	19.5	19.4	19.2	19.1	:	: pps
Male	8.8	8.8	8.7	8.7	:	: pps
Female	31.9	31.7	31.3	31.3	:	: pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	5.4	5.1	4.8	4.5	#VALUE!	: pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	:	:	:	:	:	: pps
Young (15-24)	18.7	16.9	15.2	14.4	:	: pps
Prime age (25-49)	7.9	7.0	6.3	5.8	:	: pps
Older (55-64)	6.5	5.8	5.2	4.8	0.0	-4.8 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	16.6	15.2	13.7	12.8	:	: pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	7.9	7.0	6.3	5.8	:	: pps
High-skilled (15-64)	5.1	4.6	4.2	4.0	0.0	-4.0 pps
Nationals (15-64)	8.2	7.3	6.5	6.0	:	: pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	13.7	12.5	11.5	10.7	0.0	-10.7 pps
Male	:	:	:	:	:	: pps
Female	:	:	:	:	:	: pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	46.8	45.1	43.4	40.5	:	: pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	40.6	40.3	40.2	40.1	:	: %
Male	41.5	41.3	41.1	41.0	:	: %
Female	39.0	38.8	38.7	38.7	:	: %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	-4.1	0.0	-1.8	-2.8	:	: pps
Building and construction	1.3	1.9	2.3	2.4	:	: pps
Services	2.0	2.0	1.7	1.2	:	: pps
Manufacturing industry	1.5	1.6	1.4	0.2	:	: pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	-0.5	1.2	2.4	2.8	:	: pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	:	:	:	:	:	: pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	1.5	2.6	2.9	2.8	:	: pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	1.6	2.6	2.9	2.9	:	: pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	0.6	1.1	0.6	0.7	:	: pps

Euro Area	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2019-2020
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	339722	340489	341324	342301	342811	0.1 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	218802	218484	218087	218121	217894	-0.1 %
(% of total population)	64.4	64.2	63.9	63.7	63.6	-0.2 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	159341	159650	160019	160573	158798	-1.1 %
Male	85437	85560	85667	85740	84596	-1.3 %
Female	73904	74090	74353	74833	74202	-0.8 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	72.8	73.1	73.4	73.6	72.9	-0.7 pps
Young (15-24)	39.7	39.8	40.0	40.1	38.7	-1.4 pps
Prime age (25-54)	85.5	85.5	85.6	85.8	85.2	-0.6 pps
Older (55-64)	59.8	61.3	62.6	63.7	63.8	0.2 pps
Nationals (15-64)	73.1	73.4	73.6	73.9	73.2	-0.6 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	70.1	70.2	71.1	71.6	70.1	-1.5 pps
Male	78.3	78.5	78.7	78.8	77.8	-1.0 pps
Young (15-24)	42.0	42.1	42.6	42.7	41.1	-1.6 pps
Prime age (25-54)	91.4	91.4	91.4	91.4	90.5	-0.9 pps
Older (55-64)	66.9	68.1	69.3	70.2	70.0	-0.2 pps
Female	67.4	67.7	68.0	68.5	68.0	-0.5 pps
Young (15-24)	37.3	37.4	37.3	37.4	36.2	-1.3 pps
Prime age (25-54)	79.6	79.6	79.8	80.2	79.8	-0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	53.1	54.9	56.3	57.5	57.9	0.5 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	65.4	66.4	67.3	68.0	67.1	-0.9 pps
Young (15-24)	31.4	32.3	33.2	33.8	32.0	-1.8 pps
Prime age (25-54)	77.4	78.1	79.0	79.7	78.8	-0.8 pps
Older (55-64)	55.3	57.1	58.8	60.0	60.2	0.2 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	44.7	45.6	46.3	46.7	45.7	-1.0 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	69.7	70.3	71.1	71.5	69.9	-1.6 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	82.4	83.0	83.6	84.0	83.0	-1.0 pps
Nationals (15-64)	66.1	67.1	67.9	68.6	67.9	-0.7 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	59.2	60.3	61.9	63.0	60.4	-2.6 pps
Male	70.5	71.5	72.5	73.0	71.8	-1.2 pps
Young (15-24)	33.0	33.9	35.2	35.8	33.9	-1.9 pps
Prime age (25-54)	83.2	84.1	84.9	85.3	84.2	-1.2 pps
Older (55-64)	61.5	63.3	65.0	66.1	66.0	-0.1 pps
Female	60.3	61.2	62.1	63.0	62.3	-0.6 pps
Young (15-24)	29.7	30.6	31.2	31.7	30.0	-1.7 pps
Prime age (25-54)	71.6	72.2	73.1	74.0	73.5	-0.5 pps
Older (55-64)	49.4	51.3	52.9	54.2	54.7	0.4 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	143146.5	144978.1	146723.3	148256.4	146135.4	-1.4 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	1.4	1.6	1.5	1.2	-1.5	-2.7 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	1.7	1.3	1.2	1.0	-1.4	-2.5 pps
Male	1.7	1.3	1.1	0.8	-1.7	-2.5 pps
Female	1.6	1.3	1.3	1.4	-1.1	-2.5 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	13.8	13.5	13.3	13.3	13.1	-0.1 pps
Male	17.2	16.8	16.6	16.5	16.3	-0.2 pps
Female	9.8	9.7	9.5	9.5	9.5	0.0 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	15.6	16.1	16.2	15.8	14.3	-1.5 pps
Male	15.2	15.6	15.7	15.4	13.7	-1.7 pps
Female	16.0	16.5	16.7	16.1	14.8	-1.3 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	21.6	21.5	21.3	21.4	21.4	0.0 pps
Male	9.4	9.4	9.3	9.3	9.4	0.1 pps
Female	35.8	35.7	35.3	35.3	35.1	-0.2 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	6.5	6.3	5.9	5.6	5.3	-0.3 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	10.0	9.1	8.2	7.6	7.9	0.3 pps
Young (15-24)	20.9	18.8	16.9	15.7	17.3	1.6 pps
Prime age (25-49)	9.5	8.6	7.8	7.2	7.4	0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	7.6	6.8	6.2	5.7	5.7	0.0 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	18.2	16.8	15.2	14.1	14.1	0.0 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	9.0	8.2	7.4	6.9	7.3	0.4 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	6.2	5.5	5.1	4.8	5.3	0.5 pps
Nationals (15-64)	9.6	8.7	7.8	7.2	7.3	0.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	15.5	14.1	12.9	12.0	13.8	1.8 pps
Male	9.7	8.7	7.9	7.2	7.6	0.4 pps
Female	10.4	9.5	8.6	7.9	8.2	0.3 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	50.2	48.9	46.9	44.0	37.9	-6.1 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	40.4	40.2	40.2	40.1	39.1	-2.5 %
Male	41.4	41.2	41.1	41.0	40.0	-2.4 %
Female	38.8	38.6	38.6	38.5	37.6	-2.3 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	-0.3	-0.5	-0.5	-1.8	-3.1	-1.3 pps
Building and construction	0.3	1.2	2.7	2.1	0.7	-1.4 pps
Services	2.0	2.2	1.9	1.3	-2.6	-3.9 pps
Manufacturing industry	0.9	1.0	1.4	1.1	-2.0	-3.1 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	1.2	1.7	2.2	2.1	-0.7	-2.8 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	0.2	0.7	0.8	0.3	-0.7	-1.0 pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	1.2	2.1	2.5	2.4	2.5	0.1 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	1.3	2.2	2.3	2.5	3.2	0.7 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	0.4	1.0	0.3	0.3	-4.9	-5.2 pps

European Union (27 countries)	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2019-2020
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	445187	445910	446701	447642	448109	0.1 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	287456	286516	285468	284914	284184	-0.3 %
(% of total population)	64.6	64.3	63.9	63.6	63.4	-0.2 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	207716	208339	208585	209122	207091	-1.0 %
Male	111952	112229	112273	112404	111206	-1.1 %
Female	95764	96110	96312	96718	95886	-0.9 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	72.3	72.7	73.1	73.4	72.9	-0.5 pps
Young (15-24)	38.8	39.1	39.1	39.3	37.8	-1.5 pps
Prime age (25-54)	85.4	85.5	85.7	85.9	85.4	-0.5 pps
Older (55-64)	58.2	59.8	61.2	62.3	62.9	0.6 pps
Nationals (15-64)	72.4	72.9	73.2	73.6	73.1	-0.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	70.2	70.4	71.3	71.8	70.4	-1.4 pps
Male	77.9	78.3	78.7	78.9	78.2	-0.7 pps
Young (15-24)	41.5	41.7	41.9	42.1	40.6	-1.6 pps
Prime age (25-54)	91.3	91.5	91.5	91.6	91.0	-0.6 pps
Older (55-64)	65.8	67.2	68.6	69.6	69.9	0.3 pps
Female	66.6	67.1	67.5	67.9	67.5	-0.4 pps
Young (15-24)	35.9	36.3	36.2	36.4	34.9	-1.5 pps
Prime age (25-54)	79.5	79.6	79.9	80.2	79.8	-0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	51.0	52.8	54.2	55.4	56.3	0.8 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	65.6	66.7	67.7	68.4	67.6	-0.8 pps
Young (15-24)	31.0	32.0	32.8	33.4	31.5	-1.9 pps
Prime age (25-54)	78.1	79.0	79.9	80.5	79.8	-0.8 pps
Older (55-64)	54.2	56.1	57.8	59.1	59.6	0.5 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	43.0	43.9	44.6	45.2	44.1	-1.0 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	69.4	70.4	71.3	71.7	70.5	-1.2 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	83.0	83.8	84.3	84.7	83.9	-0.8 pps
Nationals (15-64)	66.1	67.3	68.2	68.9	68.3	-0.6 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	59.3	60.5	62.1	63.1	60.6	-2.5 pps
Male	70.9	72.1	73.0	73.7	72.8	-1.0 pps
Young (15-24)	33.0	34.0	35.0	35.7	33.7	-2.0 pps
Prime age (25-54)	83.9	84.9	85.7	86.3	85.4	-0.9 pps
Older (55-64)	61.0	62.9	64.7	66.0	66.2	0.2 pps
Female	60.3	61.3	62.3	63.0	62.5	-0.6 pps
Young (15-24)	28.9	29.9	30.5	31.0	29.1	-1.9 pps
Prime age (25-54)	72.3	73.1	74.0	74.7	74.2	-0.6 pps
Older (55-64)	47.8	49.7	51.3	52.6	53.4	0.8 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	188464	191096	193145	194849	192189	-1.4 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	1.3	1.6	1.4	1.0	-1.4	-2.4 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	1.5	1.4	1.1	0.9	-1.4	-2.2 pps
Male	1.4	1.4	1.0	0.8	-1.5	-2.3 pps
Female	1.5	1.4	1.2	1.0	-1.2	-2.2 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	14.0	13.7	13.5	13.4	13.4	0.0 pps
Male	17.5	17.1	16.8	16.7	16.7	-0.1 pps
Female	9.9	9.6	9.5	9.5	9.5	0.0 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	15.6	15.7	15.5	15.0	13.5	-1.5 pps
Male	15.1	15.2	15.0	14.5	12.9	-1.6 pps
Female	16.0	16.3	16.2	15.5	14.2	-1.3 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	18.6	18.5	18.3	18.3	18.2	-0.1 pps
Male	8.5	8.5	8.3	8.4	8.4	0.0 pps
Female	30.4	30.2	29.9	29.9	29.7	-0.2 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	5.6	5.4	5.0	4.7	4.4	-0.3 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	9.1	8.2	7.3	6.7	7.1	0.4 pps
Young (15-24)	20.1	18.0	16.1	15.1	16.8	1.7 pps
Prime age (25-49)	8.5	7.6	6.8	6.3	6.6	0.3 pps
Older (55-64)	6.9	6.2	5.5	5.1	5.2	0.1 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	17.6	16.2	14.6	13.6	13.9	0.3 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	8.2	7.3	6.5	6.0	6.5	0.5 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	5.6	4.9	4.5	4.3	4.8	0.5 pps
Nationals (15-64)	8.7	7.8	6.9	6.3	6.6	0.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	15.5	14.1	13.0	12.1	13.9	1.8 pps
Male	8.9	7.9	7.0	6.4	6.8	0.4 pps
Female	9.4	8.5	7.6	7.1	7.4	0.3 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	48.5	46.7	44.9	41.9	35.7	-6.2 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	40.4	40.2	40.1	40.0	39.1	-2.3 %
Male	41.4	41.1	41.0	40.9	39.9	-2.4 %
Female	38.9	38.8	38.7	38.6	37.8	-2.1 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	-4.2	-0.2	-1.8	-2.9	-2.2	0.7 pps
Building and construction	0.8	1.5	2.7	2.5	1.0	-1.5 pps
Services	2.0	2.2	1.8	1.2	-2.3	-3.5 pps
Manufacturing industry	1.6	1.6	1.4	0.3	-2.5	-2.8 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	1.4	2.2	2.5	2.4	-0.3	-2.7 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	0.5	0.9	1.2	0.6	-0.8	-1.3 pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	1.5	2.5	2.9	2.8	2.6	-0.2 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	1.6	2.6	2.9	2.9	3.4	0.5 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	0.7	1.2	0.7	0.7	-4.6	-5.3 pps

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