



'Territorial Centre of Economic Cooperation'

**Case study of French ESF project under the study
'Progress Assessment of the ESF Support to
Public Administration' (PAPA)**

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PROJECT BACKGROUND

TERRITORIAL CENTRE OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION

Operational Programme (OP)	Programme Operationnel FSE Guyane- ETAT - 2014-2020 Version 3.1 approved by the EU Commission on 16/05/2019
Beneficiary organisation	Ancrage Guyane
Target groups	Social and solidarity economy sector, public and private institutions, unemployed population
Project duration	12/2016 – 05/2019
Budget	EUR 746,352.54 (ESF contribution: EUR 482,770.54)
Project manager (email address)	Prefecture of French Guyana (communication.ancrageguyane@gmail.com)
Partners	Prefecture, local government, municipalities, business and community association
Project/ organisation website	http://ancrageguyane.org/

This case study was produced during the 'Progress Assessment of the ESF Support to Public Administration - PAPA' project that was contracted by DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion of the European Commission. The purpose of this project was to present specific cases of ESF-funded public administration reform and capacity building initiatives, as well as to show the role of ESF financial support to public administration for accountability purposes. This report provides a story on the project '**Territorial Centre of Economic Cooperation**' (TCEC), which discusses its context and purpose; characteristics of the team implementing it; main challenges faced and difficulties encountered during implementation; key developments during the implementation process; results and impacts achieved; as well as lessons learnt and the contribution of ESF.

Disclaimer: This report is based on materials publicly available and on interviews carried out with several public officials. It has been drafted for informative purposes only.

TERRITORIAL CENTRE OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION

Introduction: the context of the project

'The story of Ancrage Guyane is probably not the best example to emphasise the usefulness of ESF TO11 funds in French Guyane, even though the status of the "Territorial Centre of Economic Cooperation (TCEC)" is a windfall for our territory', confessed Isabelle Cabassud, civil servant at the prefecture of Guyana. Since she started to work in this French overseas department, Isabelle has been tracking the evolution of Ancrage over the last 18 months as project manager for ESF funds at the prefecture of Guyane. Sadly, the Ancrage project ended abruptly: 'It is unfortunate to see that such an innovative structure, which played a much necessary role as coordinator, has failed.'

As this case study will demonstrate, the facts support Isabelle Cabassud's testimony. The difficulties that Ancrage encountered tarnish its accomplishments. The creation of Ancrage generated some enthusiasm at the beginning, because it boosted a network of actors involved in social and economic integration. Yet, Ancrage and its partners failed to establish their projects over the long term. It stopped its activities at the beginning of 2019 and it finally went bankrupt on May 9, 2019¹ without producing any activity report.²

In France, ESF money under Thematic Objective 11 (Enhancing the institutional capacity of public authorities and stakeholders and efficient public administration) is exclusively granted to four overseas regions and departments: Guadeloupe, French Guyana, Martinique, and Mayotte. During the 2014-2020 financial framework, the total TO11 allocation amounted to EUR 20,205,359, of which EUR 5,548,930 (27.5%) was dedicated to French Guyana³.

Among the TO11 funded projects in French Guyana was a Territorial Centre for Economic Cooperation (TCEC), a recently-introduced (at the time) administrative status granted to private associations, allowing them to play a coordinating role between the public sector and individual or collective socio-economic initiatives. This TCEC was Ancrage Guyane⁴ and received an amount of EUR 482,777.54 of ESF funds.

TCEC status was created as a category by the 2014 Social and Solidarity Economy Act.⁵ The centres are networks set up on a voluntary basis in relevant economic areas, irrespective of administrative districts' boundaries. Their aim is to '[set up] a common and permanent strategy of mutualisation and cooperation, in the service of economic and social projects, sociologically and/or technologically innovative, and initiating local sustainable development'. Members of the network may be all the stakeholders interested in the economic development or economic consolidation of the considered areas: 'private businesses, local governments, state agencies, universities, training organisations, or any other natural or legal person' that are part of the social and solidarity economy (SSE). This is a branch of the economy that brings together private and public organisations that are seeking to reconcile economic activity and social equity. It has

¹ See Annex.

² While it was able to collect testimonies from public servants in charge of supervising the distribution of ESF funds, ENA's team, in charge of compiling this PAPA case study, could not find any documented evidence of Ancrage's own point of view. Therefore, one should read the following case while keeping in mind the absence of such information.

³ European Commission, 2016

⁴ Anchorage in English.

⁵ Loi n° 2014-856 du 31 juillet 2014 relative à l'économie sociale et solidaire.

been calculated that the SSE employs nearly 2.4 million workers (14% of private paid employment in France), among which 46,620 can be found in French overseas territories (approximately 8.8% of these territories' private paid employment) and 3,807 in French Guyana (approximately 8% of Guyanese private paid employment)⁶.

Such networks are created in response to inter-ministerial calls for projects. The first call was launched in 2013 on an experimental basis and the second in 2015 with a budget of EUR 2.7 million. Usually the creation is made at the initiative of pre-existing associations active in the third sector answering the call. These associations assume the responsibility of coordinating the members and leading the economic and social projects of the network⁷. This was the case with Ancrage Guyane, which won the 2015 call and created its TCEC in 2016, seven years after it was founded as an association in 2009.

Ancrage Guyane: from an active coordinator to a bankrupt association

Since its foundation, Ancrage Guyane aimed to strengthen the skills of socio-economic stakeholders and associations by encouraging social dialogue and networking. Its mission was to federate the actors involved in social inclusion on the French Guyanese territory by moderating the network and hosting events. The parties involved included individuals and corporate entities, such as private association, businesses and public institutions. Thanks to counselling and supervision, the members of Ancrage's network should have been able to structure themselves and develop new techniques and management skills in order to increase social integration.

Ancrage Guyane coordinated a network of over 20 private and public local stakeholders and specialised in social inclusion, and more particularly in the professional integration of French Guyana's youth. The 15-24 year olds' group represents 43% of the population in French Guyana and 40% of them are unemployed. Moreover, only half of them attend or attended school on a regular basis. One out of four is illiterate. Combined with a difficult economic situation, youth unemployment is the source of most of the social problems undermining French Guyana's economic development. Such issues represented the core concern for Ancrage Guyane. In line with the TO11 Operational Programme's objectives, Ancrage tried to implement a new and more grounded vision of social and professional integration policies, and to tackle these issues in an innovative way by giving its public stakeholders, and in particular the local administrations, new tools to answer this social and economic crisis.

Before applying for the status of TCEC, Ancrage Guyane was just another association in the French Guyana SSE sector. Its role was limited to the support of unemployed individuals and Guyanese youth. It was only after 2017 that Ancrage's mission was extended to include networking and the global professionalisation of SSE actors. The nature of the association has changed by focusing on a major part of its activities on supporting initiatives that meet the OP's objectives.

Ancrage organisation

Ancrage was organised in four 'poles': mutualisation, emergence, animation and professionalisation. Each of poles' teams consisted in around three people: head, administrative

⁶ Lauret, 2012

⁷ Bernon, 2014

manager and assistant. The executive level was made of a director, a poles' coordinator and an assistant. In total around 15 people were involved. Ancrage was also steered by a board of nine people.

The Story of Ancrage Guyane

Purpose of TCEC status in the TO11 intervention logic

The priority axis 5 of the French Operational Programme (OP) called 'Programme opérationnel FSE Guyane Etat - 2014-2020' Version 3.1 is to 'Conduct a concerted policy, in relationship with the territorial realities and professionalise the actors, for effective implementation of public policies related to integration, training and employment'⁸. One of its major goal is to increase the professionalisation of services, to enhance their responsiveness to service users and to contribute to better results, particularly in the context of the EU 2020 targets on employment, promoting social inclusion and combating poverty. The logic of the TCEC is precisely to achieve these objectives⁹. Ancrage entrenched its activities in the pursuit of helping the local unemployed population to access the job market long before to manifest its willingness to answer the TCEC call. It is only after the award of TCEC status that it developed new competencies and purposes by structuring a wide network of public and private institutions. To understand the role of Ancrage, it is necessary to present the main steps of its evolution in the light of the characteristics of the French Guyanese territory. This inevitably involves assessing its failures, but also paying due consideration to the few accomplishments achieved in relation to the objectives set by the OP.

Starting activities

French Guyana is a relatively vulnerable territory because of its demographic, geographic, economic and social situation. In order to better understand the prevalence of the SSE sector – and therefore the much needed role of a structure such as Ancrage – it is important to stress the special features of this outermost regions (OR).

French Guyana is the second largest French region, but it is also the second least populated area in France, a characteristic which makes it the territory with the lowest density of population¹⁰. Obviously, this situation sets up an important challenge: the majority of Guyanese municipalities are located far away from one another. Some towns' remoteness generates economic isolation. For instance, 237km separates Cayenne, the largest city of the region and Maripa-Soula, a city in the Amazon forest only accessible by plane or canoes. As Sylvie Jarles, the department manager in charge of employment at the Directorate of Businesses, Competition, Consumption and Employment (DIECCTE), a directorate which reports to the prefecture (i.e. State administration), rightly points out, 'one of the first objectives is to connect distant economic networks, as businesses, public services and inhabitants are suffering from a lack of integration. As a TCEC, Ancrage was meant to endorse this coordinating role by acting as the sole driving force within the social and solidarity economic sector and a gateway to economic encounters.'

Therefore, one of Ancrage's first goals was to federate the actors involved in social inclusion on the Guyanese territory. Ancrage created gateways between local employers and potential

⁸ Dieccte Guyane, 2019

⁹ European Commission, 2016

¹⁰ INSEE, 2019; Pommiers, 2017

employees by, for example, attending professional events and organising some of its own. The key success for Ancrage was their numerous 'After work' events, which they organised to allow their beneficiaries to meet and exchange good practices. The parties involved in such gatherings included individuals and corporate entities, such as private associations, businesses and public institutions. One example is the 'Integration Day 2016', organised in partnership with the Technological University Institute of Kourou, in November 2016. The association sponsored young students and encouraged them to access internships in public and private partners by arranging a meeting with businesses, entrepreneurs and public recruiters. According to Camille Bigou 'the impact of networking and coordination missions can often appear as vague. If it is difficult to measure the impact of such events on social integration'. This example illustrates the will of Ancrage and local institutions to collaborate.

Another important activity of Ancrage was to help the local population to secure a place on the job market by providing them with training seminars to acquire new professional competences. More particularly, it assisted young people in their professional projects. The seminars included a first aid training course, a security clearance course and a training to prepare a construction machine's driving license. Ancrage Guyane also delivered information about social grants, such as partial unemployment's compensation, which should help its beneficiaries to complete the other allowance-related procedures of other state agencies or local governments.

Further activities

All these actions are part of the association and local authorities' will to bring unemployed youth and local businesses together. Yet, Ancrage did not just assist individuals. Most of Ancrage's activities were dedicated to the development of innovative projects for the benefit of the social and solidarity economy. The association thus acted in favour of all its partners. At the same time it had to organise, lead and promote their activities. From this point of view, two initiatives illustrate the activities carried out by Ancrage since its request for the status of TCEC.

Figure 1. The 'Hangar', Ancrage's headquarters



Source: Ancrage Guyane/Facebook

First, Ancrage has supported private initiatives. In Isabelle Cabassud's words, 'Ancrage has been a social incubator for Guyana's territory'. To support structures in their development, Ancrage created a shared space, 'The Hangar'. This place, located in Cayenne, was a convivial meeting place for the network. Several associations and companies rented space in the Hangar at a low cost to set up their own activities. Ancrage planned to support them for a period of two to three years during which their senior executives should have met at least monthly with Ancrage's dedicated project managers. In addition, the association organised events, in collaboration with local public administrations and other institutions, such as the Kourou University and the Technological Institute.

Second, Ancrage participated in projects supporting the development of social activities run by local governments. On the one hand, the association has assisted municipalities directly. For example, it helped the town hall council of Apatou¹¹ to create a cooperative for the use of agricultural equipment, in particular by providing them with contacts. On the other hand, it participated indirectly in the economic and social development of certain territories, such as Maripa-Soula. In this town of 13,000 inhabitants, 200km from Cayenne, Ancrage helped APROSEP, a structure of the social and solidarity economy, which specialised in the development of employment, among other things. The association received training in human resources, management, and networking. Thanks to Ancrage, the association has grown rapidly and has been able to provide local authorities in the Maripa-Soula district with their logistical knowledge of the field and their expertise in social development.

¹¹ 9,000 inhabitants live in Apatou, a town located approximately 100km west of Cayenne.

Implementation of the ESF project: main developments

The TCEC project was created under the initiative of the DIECCTE. Ancrage responded to the socio-economic needs of the territory, which, in Sylvie Jarles' words, 'remains very fragile in terms of supporting existing structures and supporting innovative projects'. The idea of the DIECCTE was to appoint an actor who would take the leadership of the SSE network. The context for the project was the rise of all public and private institutions in the SSE sector.

As indicated above, Ancrage gradually expanded its activities. It included new audiences and stakeholders in its organisation. While the allocation of EU funds boosted the association's productivity in the short term, structural difficulties in terms of HR and governance issues quickly caught up.

Many challenges arose in terms of human resources and governance. The end of 2017, when its founding director suddenly left, marked a turning point for Ancrage. The Ancrage team became poorly managed. Its handling of projects degraded as did its relations with some of its partners, particularly its institutional partners. Some Ancrage projects did not comply with administrative procedures and required revision work by DIECCTE services. Sylvie Jarles in particular highlights this lack of professionalism and regrets the resignation of the founding director, who was, in her opinion, the backbone of Ancrage.

Ancrage failed to overcome most of its many challenges. It had first to manage a HR crisis. Several of its project managers resigned. This disrupted the full functioning and the distribution of responsibilities within the association. In this context, Ancrage had to call on a human resources service company, 'Uniformation', which helped for one month to restructure Ancrage's internal organisation. The Uniformation report, written at the end of this intervention, mentions a 'rather radical change in the management method compared to the pre-existing model'. The objective was, in particular, to introduce collective and participatory governance, which would be more appropriate than the pyramid hierarchy then in force. However, at this stage of Ancrage's existence, the remaining team was demotivated and the newly-introduced model did not last.

Ancrage has gradually had to face competition from within the SSE sector. As already mentioned, the associative landscape of Guyana is dense and the problems of social inclusion are numerous: it is for these two reasons that the actors need to be structured and monitored by a single entity. However, there was strong competition for acquiring the role of the official referent of this sector in French Guyana. Sylvie Jarles insisted on this characteristic. 'The SSE sector is competitive, but it is not a competition focused on raising funds. In the end, it is relatively easy to access funds in a territory like French Guyana [...]. The interplay of local powers means that there is a desire to be a leading partner in the territory.' Eventually, these rivalries can lead to real conflicts, with potential economic repercussions for associations. Ancrage has suffered the consequences of this situation. A service not paid to a 'régie de quartier' (neighbourhood development committee), another form of associative structure intending to promote the industrial and cultural life of a neighbourhood, and thus one of Ancrage's competitors, gave rise to a penal lawsuit. Over the long term, the competitiveness of the SSE sector has not eased Ancrage's establishment as a sustainable structure.

Ancrage also faced financial challenges. It did not present financial statements in 2017 and in 2018. The association was no longer able to continue carrying out its functions and consequently ceased its activities at the end of the 2018 financial year. The Prefecture decided not to continue

paying 'its part' of ESF funds to Ancrage in January 2019 (see below). The Territorial Collectivity of Guyana did the same regarding its 'own part' (see below). Five months later, Ancrage went bankrupt. On May 9, 2019, the then first vice president of Ancrage wrote to the President of the Tribunal de Grande Instance of Cayenne asking for an alert procedure. He acknowledged that Ancrage: i) had negative operational income since 2017, ii) faced a EUR 373,000 debt, and iii) was crippled by doubtful receivables amounting to EUR 713,000¹². Today, the association no longer exists.

TO11 objectives: a reflection on Ancrage's failures

One of the most important challenges was linked to Ancrage's executive management. For unknown reasons, the founding director resigned at the end of 2017. This departure marked the beginning of a long period of instability in Ancrage's governance, resulting in the cessation of activities a year later. Three directors followed one after another, the first two of whom left after only eight months. The third director was hired only to ensure the administrative closure of the association. Thus, the instability of governance considerably undermined the long-term supervision of the association's development.

Another important problem was the association's management skill policy, which explains in particular its failure. First, Ancrage struggled to hire an efficient and stable staff. Several project managers did not have the expected competence to carry out long-term support for the partners of Ancrage. According to Sylvie Jarles, the members of the association did not always measure the complexity of the projects they had to support. 'Professionalisation was cautiously lacking in several territories, and Ancrage missions' head would have needed to be more professionalised', she pointed out. Rightly so, it seems that Ancrage's desire to frame the SSE sector led to a very rapid demobilisation, mainly due to the under-performance of several of its members.

This managerial weakness was paradoxical. While it was supposed to provide training and professional support, particularly in the field of human resources, Ancrage did not prove to be competent on this point. On the contrary, the support requested from the consulting firm, Uniformation, is a good example of the situation in the SSE sector. In the words of Isabelle Cabbassud: 'in French Guyana, it is difficult to find reliable organisations that are capable of carrying out actions such as the one Ancrage had to pursue'.

Finally, doubts can be raised concerning the influence of Ancrage on the traditional administrative methods of tackling social integration. Regarding the objective of the OP of implementing new techniques and methods for addressing these issues, the Prefecture (DIECCTE) and the Territorial Collectivity of Guyana made the same observation. The public service, as a stakeholder, has benefited very little from Ancrage's activities. Interviewees do not feel that they have received a new vision of social and professional integration issues. While Ancrage was also supposed to provide a more ground-based vision of the problem, it would seem that the exchange between administrative and associative culture was not achieved. Because it failed so prematurely, it is unlikely that Ancrage succeeded in professionalising public actors and implementing any new approaches to the delivery of employment services.

¹² See Annex 1.

The role of local governments and state administrations in the distribution of ESF funds

The beginning of the ESF programming coincided with a double public administrative reform in Guyana¹³. At State level, the organisation of the Prefecture and its directorates, including the DIECCTE, was modified. At local level, the Department of Guyana was merged with the Region of Guyana as a consequence of the results of a local referendum. A new local government was thus created, the Collectivité territoriale de Guyane (Guyana's Territorial Collectivity) in place of the previous ones. These changes have not facilitated the distribution of ESF funds.

These reforms introduced changes in the allocation of managing authority competences regarding ESF funds. The main local government, the Territorial Collectivity of Guyane became ESF's managing authority but for 35% of the ESF total available. The Prefecture of Guyane (the State) remained managing authority for the 65% left¹⁴. This repartition resulted in an intricate organisation pointed by a report of the French public auditor, the Court of Auditors (Cour des comptes).¹⁵ According to the Court's study, it added more complexity to an already problematic situation, which suffered from technical and human resources difficulties. This situation may have blurred the proper follow-up of cases and multiplies the number of interlocutors. Moreover, the Guyana's Territorial Collectivity President reminds us: 'we were only able to start using European funds late, more than a year later than when the programming began'.

Besides, the management of the two managing authorities suffered from a lack of engineering capacities to carry out long-term technical projects. The territory's low attractiveness exacerbates the recruitment of competent civil servants to manage the ESF programmes, whose presence in French Guyana is most often temporary. On the other hand, involved administrations have suffered from malfunctions of the software, in charge of the tracking of ESF funds, called Synergie. According to the Court' report, Synergie was 'monolithically designed, leaving little possibility of adaption at the local level'¹⁶. Late implementation and recurring bugs led the project owner¹⁷ to end the contract and to re-ingrate it "in house". Nevertheless, the inconsistencies related to the allocation of the managing authority of ESF funds between state and local government level remained. 'As the managing authority of part of the ESF for vocational training, and as an intermediary body for social inclusion, we have had to define different procedures twice and we use two different software packages for managing the ESF: Synergy as the managing authority and Ma-démarche-FSE¹⁸ as an intermediary body. It should be simplified to avoid wasting time, money and efficiency', concludes Delphine Lasselin, a former Department manager of European Affairs at the Territorial Collectivity of Guyana.

These remarks help to understand the difficult institutional and technical landscape in which Anorage operated.

¹³ Loi n° 2014-58 du 27 janvier 2014 pour modernisation de l'action publique territoriale et d'affirmation des métropoles et loi n° 2015-991 du 7 août 2015 portant Nouvelle organisation territoriale de la République

¹⁴ See the Operational programme, p. 110 ss.

¹⁵ Court of Auditors (2019)

¹⁶ p. 352

¹⁷ The "Commissariat général à l'égalité des territoires", a state agency in charge of the coordination of the use of European structural and investment funds.

¹⁸ A dematerialised platform used to download and upload ESF grants forms and requests, see https://ma-demarche-fse.fr/si_fse/servlet/login.html

Conclusion

Main results

The OP aimed to develop networking and strengthen social dialogue. Ancrage succeeded partially to structure itself as an entity capable of promoting innovative initiatives and exchanging effective practices. Networking has always been one of Ancrage's main activities. Moreover, its role as a social incubator has been broadly commended, even though Ancrage's public partners regret that the association failed to perpetuate itself over the long term. While the funds do make it possible to increase the number of professional training courses and make them more accessible to the population, the example of Ancrage suggests that a majority of problems is of a human resources nature.

The OP also aimed to professionalise the stakeholders involved in the SSE sector. While Ancrage continued to promote social welfare after being granted the ESF funds, it failed to implement a policy of professionalisation within the Guyanese territory. Due to under-performance, and in particular a worsened dysfunction in its governance and human resources policy, Ancrage was not able to sustainably enhance the capacity building and the skills of socio-economic stakeholders. From that point of view, Ancrage has been the very example of the symptoms that the OP and TO11 intended to solve. This illustrates the difficulty of implementing a new approach to employment and social development issues that would be based on the experience of private and mainly non-professional actors.

Role of ESF support

The 2019 report of the Court of Auditors and the remarks of all the public officials interviewed, whether from the state (prefecture) or the local government, established that the 2014-2020 period was a time of difficult distribution of European funds, largely due to the territorial reform of 2015. However, the delays caused and the many technical problems further highlight the vital need for the territory to receive EU funds. As the President of the Guyana's Territorial Collectivity points out: 'European funds are necessary for the modernisation we are asking for. Without Europe, we would be totally impoverished.'

In this context, ESF support remains fundamental in the development of a structured SSE network, in which the Guyanese territory can hope to reduce its unemployment rate. The share of ESF funds in the Ancrage budget was very large. Without these funds, it would never have been able to fulfil the few successes it achieved during its lifetime. This is evidenced by the fact that the association was forced to file for bankruptcy almost immediately after losing their allocation.

Two paths for improvement can therefore be highlighted. First, a better share of responsibilities between the two managing authorities of the ESF funds is necessary in order to ameliorate the follow-up of ESF beneficiaries' projects. Second, the Guyanese territory should also try to stabilise the long-term recruitment of staff competent in the management of EU funds and especially the ESF. In a way, Ancrage faced the same skills management issue. The lack of skills and permanent dedication go hand in hand with the difficulty for associations such as Ancrage to keep its project managers and staff dedicated on the long run.

Lessons learned

With that in mind, what lessons can be learned from this experience? We can identify some positive implications. The SSE sector somewhat has been positively impacted. The example of APROSEP and the development of the associative fabric of Maripa-Soula is an example that recognises the usefulness of Ancrage for the territory of French Guyana. The Guyanese economy and society need, in Isabelle Cabassud's words, 'social incubators'. In this particular case, Ancrage was able to provide the necessary follow-up and technical support that APROSEP needed to grow. This example is interesting because it brought a certain amount of economic activity and employment opportunities in the fields of sport, culture and social assistance to a remote areas. In the end, Ancrage's action in the APROSEP file has enabled a closer understanding of ground-based issues. This was one of the main objectives in the action logic of the TO11 section.

The impacts of Ancrage are minimised by its inability to be sustainable. Measuring a change in the way administrations deal with social development issues and modernize the public employment would have required that Ancrage successfully carry out its mission.

This case draws the attention to the crucial issue of administrative capacity (systems, processes, tools and people) and capable governance structures. In all organisations, but definitely in such small ones as Ancrage, HR management and their well-functioning can be brought back to individuals. When a lack of capacity and competence is noted at this level, it has an immediate impact on the performance of the organisation and in the case of a coordinating organisation as Ancrage towards the whole network of stakeholders and partners.

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ANNEX: NOTIFICATION OF BANKRUPTCY ADDRESSED FROM ANCRAGE TO GUYANESE JUDICIARY AUTHORITIES



Aujourd'hui l'association est composée d'un effectif de 3 agents, une directrice, une chargée de mission et un agent administratif.

- De continuité de l'activité pour 2019, en effet le projet d'activité pour l'année 2019 reposait essentiellement sur du Financement FSE Etat et une subvention de la Dicccte, qui nous a confirmé ne pas pouvoir nous financer pour 2019 au regard de nos difficultés internes et de la non présentation des bilans financiers de 2017 et 2018.

C'est pour toutes ces raisons que nous faisons aujourd'hui la procédure d'alerte auprès du TGI, vous trouverez en pièce jointe le courrier du Commissaire aux comptes qui nous a été adressé.

Je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Président, l'expression de mes salutations respectueuses.

Pour le Président empêché,
Le 1ere Vice-Président par délégation,

Jean-Raymond PASSARD

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