



European Centre of Expertise (ECE) in the field of labour law, employment and labour market policy

Labour Market Policy Thematic Review 2018: An in-depth analysis of the emigration of skilled labour

Poland



EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Directorate DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion

Unit B.2 – Working Conditions

Contact: Krzysztof Bandasz

E-mail: Krzysztof.BANDASZ@ec.europa.eu

European Commission

B-1049 Brussels

European Centre of Expertise (ECE) in the field of labour law, employment and labour market policy

Labour Market Policy Thematic Review 2018: An in-depth analysis of the emigration of skilled labour

Poland

Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion
European Centre of Expertise (ECE)

January, 2018

**Europe Direct is a service to help you find answers
to your questions about the European Union.**

Freephone number (*):

00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11

(*) The information given is free, as are most calls (though some operators, phone boxes or hotels may charge you).

LEGAL NOTICE

The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of the author. The contents of this publication do not necessarily reflect the position or opinion of the European Commission. Neither the European Commission nor any person/organisation acting on behalf of the Commission is responsible for the use that might be made of any information contained in this publication.

This publication has received financial support from the European Union Programme for Employment and Social Innovation "EaSI" (2014-2020).

More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (<http://www.europa.eu>).

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2018

PDF ISBN: 978-92-79-88893-9

doi:10.2767/44134

KE-04-18-647-EN-N

© European Union, 2018

Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged.

Table of Contents


1	Introduction: the demographic and labour market situation in Poland	1
2	Emigration of skilled labour	2
3	Emigration of skilled labour and its impact on domestic economies beyond the labour market	7
4	Emigration of skilled labour and its impact on labour market conditions	8
5	Actions undertaken by Member States to address the outflows of skilled labour .	11
6	Conclusions.....	12
7	Bibliography.....	14

1 Introduction: the demographic and labour market situation in Poland


Poland, similar to virtually all Eastern European countries, faces significant population ageing. The systemic and economic transition led to a fast drop in fertility levels. While in the late 1980s, the total fertility rate exceeded 2.0, within merely a decade it dropped below 1.4, and in 2002, prior to the EU accession, it reached the lowest point at below 1.3. As a result, there is a persistent gap between the average fertility in EU countries and Poland (see Figure 1, left panel). At the same time, average life expectancy in Poland was increasing. Between 1990 and 2015, life expectancy at birth for men increased from 66.3 years to 73.5 years and for women from 75.3 to 81.6 years. Life expectancy in Poland remains below the average EU-28 level. The gap for men is 4.4 years (at birth) and for women 1.7 years. Lower fertility and rising life expectancy, combined with the waves of baby booms (post-war in the 1950s and 1980s) lead to pronounced changes in the age structure of the Polish population (Figure 1, right panel): a fall in the number of children and youth and a rise in age groups 45 and over. Before and after accession, the size of the population in the age group with the highest propensity to migrate (20-44 years) remained relatively stable.

Figure 1. Low fertility levels affect the age structure of the Polish population

Total fertility rate Polish population by age groups (million)



Polish population by age groups (million)




Source: Eurostat [demo_find] [demo_pjangroup], data extracted on 04.09.2017

According to population projections, as the developments mentioned above continue, so the Polish population will continue to decline. At the same time, the age structure will also change, with a rise in the share of older people and a fall in the number of youths and younger adults.

The labour market in Poland also faces significant change. From the late 1990s until pre-accession time, the employment rate fell to the lowest level of 57 % (total) in 2004. Following EU accession, the employment rate began to increase. This increase was faster before 2008 and after 2013. Between 2009 and 2012, due to the economic slowdown, the employment rate growth was smaller but still positive. In 2015, the male employment rate reached the EU average, but for women the gap remains. The labour market situation in Poland is shaped, by among other things, demographic developments including migration, the economic situation and structural changes. For example, the removal of early retirement in 2008 was one of the causes of the apparent increase in the employment rate of those aged 50-64.

Figure 2. Labour market in Poland improves after accession



2 Emigration of skilled labour

Poland is traditionally an 'emigration country'. As set out by Kaczmarczyk and Okólski (2008a) roughly since the middle of the 19th century, the international movement of people played an important role in Poland's demographic and labour market development. Many Poles migrated, particularly to Germany, during the 1970s and 1980s, when the estimated long-term outflow of people was between 1.1 million and 1.3 million (i.e. 3 % of the total population) and short-term migration added a further 1 million (Ibid).

Providing exact measures of the size of emigration in Poland is difficult. The register of permanent residents is the main source of information on permanent change. However, many Poles migrating to another country do not inform the register about their move, so the official numbers are underestimated. In the Polish statistics, the permanent residents who stay in a foreign country for more than three months (until 2006 it was two months) are named temporary migrants. The size of this group is estimated by the combination of data from population censuses (in 2002 and 2011)


and Polish labour force survey (LFS) data (Główny Urząd Statystyczny 2016; Kaczmarczyk and Okólski 2008a) .

The available data indicates that migration patterns in Poland changed significantly following EU accession. While during the 1990s, following economic transition, the international mobility of Poles declined, it accelerated after the EU accession in May 2004. As underlined by Kaczmarczyk and Okólski (2008a), the 'increase in the spatial mobility of Poles was anticipated but the actual scale and dynamic of Polish migration is perceived as spectacular and largely unexpected'.

Estimates of the scale of migration from Poland since 2004 are made by the Central Statistical Office. These show the number of Poles living abroad at the end of each calendar year. These are people who remain permanent residents in Poland but who have lived abroad, sometimes for many years.

As the estimates show, the stock of Polish residents abroad following the EU accession more than doubled, mainly due to increased migration to EU countries (Figure 3).

Figure 3. Stock of residents of Poland abroad for more than 2 months, 2004-15



Source: GUS

Following EU accession, we can see three periods of migration trends as shown in Fig.3:

- Massive post-accession migration, between 2004 and 2007
- Economic recession between 2008 and 2010, when the number of estimated migrants fell
- Increase of migrations after 2011 but at a slower pace compared to the post-accession period.

The estimated number of Poles living abroad at the end of 2015 was 2.38 million (3.3 % more than a year before). Most migrants were living in the EU Member States, including 720 000 people in the UK and 655 000 in Germany. More than 100 000 Poles also lived in the Netherlands and the UK.


The total net loss of population in age group 15 and over between the date of EU accession and 1 January 2007 is estimated by Kaczmarczyk and Okólski (2008a) at 3.3 % of the respective population. The loss among those in the working age group 15-59 was higher, representing 4 % of the population at that age (Mioduszewska 2008).

The dynamics of the post-accession migrations of Poles are also confirmed by the major destination countries (Kaczmarczyk and Okólski 2008a). Numerous sources from the UK indicate the increased inflow of visitors and job seekers from Poland (Ibid). Central Statistical Office in Poland (*Główny Urząd Statystyczny - GUS*) estimates indicate that the number of Poles living in the UK increased from 150 000 in 2004 to 690 000 in 2007. By 2006, the size of migration to the UK surpassed that to Germany, traditionally a destination country for Polish migrants. After the decline of migrations, which lasted until 2010, there was once again an increased flow of migrants to Germany. GUS estimates also show that the number of migrants in countries in Southern Europe (Italy, Spain) or those with poorer economic performance (Ireland) decreased in 2015.

The post-accession migrations from Poland are assessed by Kaczmarczyk and Okólski (2008a) as predominantly labour-market driven, which also impacted the composition of migrants by destination countries. There were also changes in the selectivity of migrations, measured by migrant selectivity index, estimated by Kaczmarczyk and Okólski (2008a). Their assessment shows that 'the post-accession migrants were more evenly distributed across regions' and the regional selectivity of migrants [...] diminished" (Ibid). Particularly among the regions with the highest share of total outflow initially, the value of the selectivity index declined significantly. The type of settlement also matters. The population loss in rural areas was slightly higher than in urban areas (3.5 % and 3.1 % respectively).

The regional pattern of the Polish migrations is illustrated on the chart below. Following accession, the dominance of the traditionally sending regions - podkarpackie, podlaskie and opolskie - diminished.

Figure 4. Regions of origin of Polish migrants 1999-2008



Source: (Kaczmarczyk 2014)

Both before and after the accession, migrants from rural settlements were overrepresented. However, following accession the share of migrants from urban areas increased. The patterns related to sex and age composition of migrants also remain similar. Men are weakly selected, but the outflow of men was more than 50 % greater than that of women: loss in male population was 4.4 % and for female it was 2.2 %. Migrants in the age group 20-39 are strongly positively selected. The total estimated loss in the age group 25-29 was 9.3 %. The age group 20-24 years lost 8.8 % and those between the ages of 30-44 lost 3.8 %. In the case of both age and

sex, the selectivity indices increased after the accession. Post-accession migrants are considerably younger than previous cohorts (median age of post-accession migrants is 28 years compared to 30 years in the pre-accession period) (Kaczmarczyk 2014).

In the context of the brain drain analysis, the change in the pattern of migrations related to level of education is also important. Until 2007, i.e., during the period of the most dynamic migrations, those with tertiary, other-post secondary and completed secondary as well as vocational education lost around 4 % of the total population. These shares differ for men and women. Men with post-secondary and secondary education lost 5.8 % and those with vocational education 5.4 %. For those with tertiary education Kaczmarczyk and Okólski (2008a) estimated the loss at 5 %. Population of women with tertiary education lost 3.3 % and those with post-secondary education lost 3 %. According to Kaczmarczyk (2014), 20 % of Polish migrants have a university degree (compared to 15 % in the pre-accession period).

The selectivity of migrants with respect to the educational attainment is also confirmed by the level of selectivity indices estimated by Kaczmarczyk and Okólski (2008a), shown in Tables 1 and 2.

Table 1. Migrant selectivity indices (SI) for post-secondary and vocational education before and after EU accession (all migrants), by selected countries of destination

Educational level/country of destination	Before accession	After accession
All countries		
Post-secondary, including tertiary	0.02	0.42
Vocational	0.34	0.30
United Kingdom		
Post-secondary, including tertiary	1.09	1.13
Vocational	0.07	0.11
Germany		
Post-secondary, including tertiary	-0.29	-0.52
Vocational	0.51	0.57

Source: Kaczmarczyk and Okólski (2008a)

Table 2. Migrant selectivity indices (SI) for post-secondary and vocational education after EU accession (all migrants), by categories of settlement (migrants' places of residence prior to migration)


Category of settlement	Post-secondary	Vocational
Town, 100 000+ inhabitants	0.27	0.18
Town, up to 100 000 inhabitants	0.55	0.18
Village	1.10	0.46
All settlements	0.42	0.30

Source: Kaczmarczyk and Okólski (2008a)

Before accession, overall, those with vocational education had a modest positive value of selectivity index, which was close to zero for those with post-secondary and tertiary education. Following accession, the selectivity for those with vocational education did not change, but it increased significantly for those with education above secondary level (including tertiary). But if we analyse the situation for two major destination countries - the UK and Germany - there are striking differences. The UK strongly attracted higher educated, both before and after accession. In Germany, the selectivity index is high for those with vocational education, while for those with post-secondary education it is negative, meaning Germany was deterring those with higher education. As the scale of migrations to the UK increased significantly following accession, the overall value of the indices changed. Selectivity indices by the category of settlement also differ. The smaller the category of settlement, the higher the index for those with post-secondary education. This evidence is even more striking for younger migrants. For those aged 25-29 years, i.e., the group with the highest noted outflows, a third of post-accession migrants had higher education, compared to 21.6 % before accession (Kaczmarczyk and Okólski 2008b).

As cautiously concluded by Kaczmarczyk and Okólski (2008a), following accession, the opening of the British labour market attracted more highly educated Poles, particularly originating from villages or medium-size and small towns. This contributes to the regional diversity of human capital loss, due to post-accession migrations. Figure 5 shows the comparison of selectivity indices before and after accession. There are clear increases in those with tertiary education, those between 20 and 40 years old and males.

Figure 5. Migration selectivity indices of Polish migration in pre- and post- 2004 periods



Source: Kaczmarczyk (2014)

Kaczmarczyk (2014) emphasises that 'one of the most specific features of post-accession migrations from Poland is the predominance of labour mobility'. More than 90 % of Polish migrants take up employment while staying abroad, contributing to the destination country state budget.

The propensity to migrate remains strong among the Polish population. An opinion survey conducted among 654 adult Poles (representative sample) in August 2016 (WorkServiceS.A. 2016) shows that 12 % of Poles of productive age consider emigration for work and 5 % have decided to emigrate. Potential migrants are predominantly between 24 and 35 years old (40 %), live in rural areas or small towns of up to 100 000 inhabitants (60 %), most do not have tertiary education (79 %) and they work in Poland (76 %). Around 70 % of people say they have considered

migration because of higher expected earnings. These profiles are consistent with previously observed migration patterns.


Massive outflows of people also affect the domestic economy of the sending country. The most important issues relate to the impact of remittances, impact on productivity and overall impact on the labour market, discussed in the sections below.

3 Emigration of skilled labour and its impact on domestic economies beyond the labour market

Large-scale emigration impacts the domestic economies in various ways (Atoyan et al. 2016). On the one hand, migrants moving abroad seek to improve their own well-being and that of their families. Therefore, they send remittances back to the home country, which contributes to economic growth. On the other hand, the externalities of large-scale emigration include the reduced size of the labour force and productivity, 'adversely affecting growth in sending countries and slowing per capita convergence' [Ibid].

Globally, over the past few years, remittances have risen significantly because of increased migration flows and a reduction in bank transfer costs. The same applies to Poland, particularly following accession. Between 2003 and 2007, the level of remittances relative to GDP tripled. Following the economic crisis, the inflow of remittances gradually fell to around 1.4 % of GDP annually, more than double the level observed before the accession.

Figure 6. Flow of remittances to Poland (% of GDP)



Source: World Bank database

The impact of remittances on economic growth in Poland was developed by CASE-Advisors (Barbone, Piętka-Kosińska, and Topińska 2012; Western Union 2012) and indicates that in the scenario that includes the impact of remittances compared to the no-transfer scenario, over 17 years(1995-2011), the following effects were seen:


- Total household income was higher by some EUR 41 billion (PLN 177 billion);
- Average disposable income grew more quickly (2.9 % vs. 2.7 %);
- Average household consumption grew faster (4.2 % vs. 4.1 %);
- Annual GDP growth accelerated, with the annual growth in the analysed period of 4.2 % compared to 4.1 % in no transfer scenario.

At household level, the beneficiaries of remittances include more frequently those living in small towns (of up to 20 000 inhabitants) and rural areas. Usually these are also younger families, proving that migrants are more likely to support their spouses and children, rather than elderly parents or relatives (Barbone et al. 2012; Western Union 2012).

Concerning the impact of a reduced labour force and productivity, the IMF estimates (Atoyan et al. 2016) indicate that between 1999 and 2014, the impact of migration contribution to growth was very small and did not hamper economic growth much, further explained in Section 4. The migration of skilled labour reduced real labour productivity growth by some 2 % and generated an increase in domestic wages. IMF estimates show that the indicative growth in Poland, cumulative between 1995 and 2012 would have been higher by some 3 p.p. if there was no emigration, one of the lower estimates among the countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltics.

The macroeconomic impact of the migrations in the new member states is assessed by Bruecker (2009), who argues that the impact on short-run wages and unemployment was moderate. At the same time, the impact on the overall GDP level in the short-run was also moderate, but in the long-run, it is expected to increase, more in Poland than in other Member States.

Figure 7. Macroeconomic impacts of the post-accession migration: sending and receiving countries.



Note: in %, as compared to the counterfactual scenario assuming migration at the pre-accession level.

Source: Kaczmarczyk (2014) elaboration based on Bruecker (2009).

4 Emigration of skilled labour and its impact on labour market conditions

Kaczmarczyk and Okólski (2008a) indicate that the scientific discourse on 'the impacts of migration on the labour market in the Central and Eastern European countries (CEE) including Poland, is limited'. They analyse the labour market developments post-EU accession, taking into account the pre-accession hypothesis of 'the so-called

unemployment export' (Ibid) It 'predicted a positive impact of the outgoing migration on the situation in the [...] labour market' in Poland [Ibid]'.

During the economic transition, prior to EU accession, the Polish labour market struggled with an oversupply of labour. This was due to economic changes but also demographic development: the arrival of those born during the 1980s baby boom into the labour market. As a result, the pre-accession unemployment rate was high and employment rates were low.

The assessment of Kaczmarczyk and Okólski (2008a) indicates that massive migration contributed initially to a reduction of unemployment. After the initial period, it also had an impact on the emerging shortage of workers, particularly in the construction sector and in manufacturing. They point out that '[s]ince 2007, labour shortages were declared by companies as the most important barriers to growth'. Bukowski, Koloch, and Lewandowski (2008) attempted to distinguish the sources of change in the labour market between demographic changes, changes in the participation and changes in the number of employed. According to their assessment, the fall in participation rate combined with job creation led to less unemployment. The drop in the statistical level of participation rates could be caused by migrations, since migrants still registered as permanent citizens are attributed to the group of economically passive citizens. Such a tendency was particularly noticeable in those in the younger age brackets who migrated more frequently.

A quantitative attempt to assess the impact of migration on the labour market was made by Budnik (2007). She used a steady-state solution to evaluate the effect on the Polish labour market with two scenarios: migration vs. no-migration. According to her assessment, the post-accession mobility 'had [] a moderate impact on the estimated steady-state shares of people with different labour market statuses' (OECD 2012). The unemployment rate bias in 2005-06 was estimated at around 0.4 percentage points (Budnik, 2007). However, it should be noted that the impact of the migration can be more severe for certain local and regional labour markets, which was not measured (OECD 2012).

Budnik (2007) also analysed the quarterly gross flows on the Polish labour market between different states in 2000-06, adding a fourth status i.e. migration, to the three statuses looked at in the traditional approach to such analysis i.e. employed, unemployed and non-participating (passive) on the labour market. As a result, she estimated transition probability for all labour market statuses including also migration, based on the LFS data.

Table 3. Transition probabilities on the Polish labour market, average for years 2000-06

	Employment	Unemployment	Non- Participation	Migration
Employment	97.2	1.3	1.4	0.1
Unemployment	9.1	85.1	5.3	0.5
Non-participation	1.1	1.3	97.5	0.1
Migration	1.7	1.5	1.5	95.4

Source: (Budnik 2007)

The results of this analysis, shown in Table 3, reveal that the probability of transition from local to foreign labour market is low (0.1 %). It is higher for those moving from

the unemployment status (0.5 %), which may indicate that some of the Polish migration patterns support the export-of-unemployment hypothesis.

Another potential impact of migrations on the labour market is related to wage levels. As indicated earlier, the IMS estimates show that the impact of migrations on the wage level in Poland was moderate. This is also confirmed by the assessment of Kaczmarczyk and Okólski (2008a), who assess that the increased migration outflows in 2004-06 was accompanied by moderate growth of wages, of around 2 % annually. The rise of wages was higher in 2007, particularly in agriculture and construction, i.e. sectors affected by the migration flows. With the economic slowdown after 2008, wage growth was again hampered. Budnik (2008) estimated steady-state impact of an outflow of around 4.5 % of workers from Poland between 2002 and 2006 on the wage rate was 1 %. This may lead to the conclusion that the impact of migrations on wage levels was also limited. This may change, however, as we observe that in recent years the increase of migrations was accompanied by rising shortages of workers and increased wage pressures. But no evidence is currently available to assess this impact.

Large-scale migrations can also have qualitative impact on the labour market in Poland. KPMG (2008) analysed the perception of the migration movement by employers. According to their assessment, companies perceive the risk of migration of their employees as a potential threat. Almost half of employers experienced the outflow of their workers to other countries, where they are offered better wages and more development opportunities. Around a third of companies could not hire recruited workers, who decided to live abroad. Given the above, Polish employers are focusing more on human resources management, including development of workers, better training opportunities or increasing wages as well as offering extended fringe benefits.

Kaczmarczyk and Okólski (2008a) in their final assessment state that, 'taking into account selectivity of migrants and [...] labour market conditions, a significant portion of the outflow from the Polish labour market should be understood in terms of brain overflow and not drainage'.¹ But it is too early to draw longer-term conclusions. With progressive shrinking of the working-age population due to demographic trends and tightening of the labour market, observed in recent years, Poland may face higher brain-drain risk.

This risk is related to the general situation of the Polish labour market, particularly youth unemployment. Kaczmarczyk et al. (2014) emphasise that 'in terms of potential push factors of migration it is important to assess youth unemployment. While a very high unemployment rate among the younger part of the population (as high as 40 % in years 2002-05) was commonly presented as the major driver of post-enlargement migration from Poland, since 2008 the youth unemployment rate is again on the rise and in 2012 reached almost 30 % (much higher than the EU15 average). The situation of young people on the Polish labour market may turn to be one of the decisive factors with respect to future migration flows'.

Shortages of workers have also affected labour market policy towards migrant workers. The simplification of procedures to employ foreign workers also resulted in an increased share of foreigners working in Poland, particularly from the Ukraine. The size of the Ukrainian labour force in Poland is estimated at around 1 million, compensating for some of the losses observed due to emigration (Anon 2017;

¹ Overflow is understood as the excess supply over demand for educated labour in a country that migrates while drainage caused by emigration tends to be motivated by better pay and living conditions abroad, leading to skill shortages in the country.

Brunarska et al. 2016), particularly in quickly developing labour markets, such as in mazowieckie voivodship.

5 Actions undertaken by Member States to address the outflows of skilled labour

Kaczmarczyk et al. (2014) state that 'Polish migration policy and the Polish law on foreigners is formed in circumstances slightly different from those in most of EU countries, especially in "the old 15". In Poland illegal or massive immigration is not perceived as a serious social problem and, as a result, politicians' attention is focused on emigration from Poland and its wide socio-economic consequences. It is connected with a low percentage of foreigners in the Polish society and their high participation in the labour market. In Poland, the phenomenon of immigration is regarded as one of the many social processes and does not raise such controversy as in the Western or Southern Europe.'

Łodziński and Szonert (2016) emphasise that the 'Polish post-accession migration policy was forged by regulatory requirements as well as domestic labour market needs'. On the one hand it concerned the adoption of further EU regulations leading to the details of the legal framework related to foreigners and also the development of discussions on the integration of foreigners in Poland. On the other hand, it had become increasingly necessary to consider the specific needs of the domestic labour market and the interests of the Polish diaspora. It was also a time of lively debate on the principles of this policy, culminating in the adoption of its official programme in 2012 and its implementation at the end of 2014. However, the programme was officially discontinued in 2017.

One of the policy initiatives to tackle the outflow of skilled labour were programmes attracting return migration. In April 2008, the Working Group on Return Migration formulated a programme based on several assumptions of which the most important were the following: returns are an inevitable consequence of mass emigration, but they should not take the form of mass mobility; the government should not try to influence individual migrants' decisions to return but should rather provide migrants with a tool enabling them to make a rational choice (Duszczuk et al. 2009). Barcevicus et al. (2012) stress 'that in spite of declarations made at the time of the election campaign, the authorities were not planning to encourage return migration. This can be explained by the changing economic context – the onset of the economic crisis, which inclined politicians to consider "massive" returns as a possible disaster for Polish labour markets in uncertain economic conditions'. Estimates of the return migration indicate that the impact of the re-emigration policy in Poland was limited. Between 2004 and 2010, the size of the return migration was estimated by Fuller and Ward (2011) at 500 000 people, which is considered to be relatively small.

Support of return migrations is included in the Government Programme of Cooperation with Polish Communities Abroad in Years 2015-2020 (*Rządowy Program Współpracy z Polonią i Polakami za Granicą w latach 2015-2020*). One of the programme's policy goals is 'To support Poles in returning to Poland; to incentivize people of Polish descent to settle in Poland'. Within this programme, the tasks for the government administration for years 2017-18 in relation to the countries with a high share of Polish migrants include the following²:

² Internet: <http://www.msz.gov.pl/resource/62f746de-ea6a-49e7-a42b-5de9fa9ea6aa:JCR>

1. Overarching goals:
 - a) To promote Poland as a potential business location among Polish community business circles.
 - b) To ensure the best possible conditions for holding elections abroad so as to deepen the ties between Polish nationals abroad and Poland.
2. Specific goals:
 - a) To support Polish community schools for the children of Polish migrants
 - b) To provide migrants with easy access to Polish culture
 - c) To support placements and internships in Polish companies offered to Polish students studying abroad
 - d) To collaborate with the Ministry of National Education to ensure as many children of Polish migrants as possible visit Poland on educational and recreational trips
 - e) To ensure high-quality consular service for Polish citizens.
 - f) To promote Poland as a potential business location among Polish community business circles abroad.

Currently, there are no formal policies formulated to address the outflows of skilled labour. The growing need of such policy is emphasised, among others, by the Government Demographic Council (*Rządowa Rada Ludnościowa*) as well as regional authorities. Solga (2016) emphasises that a significant fall in population and serious changes to its structure according to age and growth in the population of older people become an important challenge that Polish society has to face. Therefore, a migration policy can be a tool for solving problems that result from these changes.

It should also be noted that the mitigation of the consequences of skilled labour outflow also falls into the area of education policy. The share of young people with tertiary education is increasing which also allows some matching of the skills needed to address the shortages in Poland.

6 Conclusions

As the analysis presented in the review shows, the size of emigration in Poland following EU accession was unprecedented. While it is difficult to precisely assess its level, the estimates indicate that almost 2.5 million Poles live and work abroad, mainly in EU countries.

Analysis of the profile of Polish migrants indicates that following accession, the incidence of migration of skilled people with tertiary education increased. This contributed to the loss of human capital, particularly in rural areas and smaller cities, which can lead to the further divergence of regional development in Poland.

However, as the Polish labour market struggled with significant problems before EU accession, rather than being perceived as a brain *drain*, the up-to-date view of emigration is that it contributes to a reduction in the brain *overflow* resulting from the excess supply of educated labour in the labour market resulting from the baby boom years, rather than brain drain.

The initial large-scale movement of Polish workers, seen between 2004 and 2007, slowed down after the economic crisis, but accelerated again in recent years, albeit at a slower pace. The outflow of workers, according to estimates, in the short-run had a

positive impact on the Polish labour market as a whole, contributing to a fall in the unemployment level and moderate wage growth. Furthermore, some qualitative improvements in labour relations can also be seen, as employers are more actively engaging in human resources policy. Some of the losses from the labour market are also mitigated by increased employment of immigrants in Poland, particularly from the Ukraine.

However, the up-to-date effects can change with the change of the demographic situation in Poland. While in the past two decades the Polish working-age population was rather stable, demographic projections indicate the quickly shrinking labour force, mainly caused by low fertility levels seen since the early 1990s. In such a case, further emigration of the young and educated Poles may increase the gap between the demand and supply on the labour market in the future. As a result, the economic growth potential in the long-run is expected to be more hampered, compared to the short-run.

Regional patterns of migration in Poland may also further contribute to growing disparities between regions as well as rural and urban areas. Educated young people migrate more frequently from villages and smaller cities, since they have lower prospects for employment there and the cost of migration to bigger cities in Poland or abroad are similar.

There is no specific migration policy in Poland that addresses the increasing risk of brain drain, but there is increasing evidence that such policy will be needed in the coming years. The government runs a programme with one of the goals being to support the return of migrants.

7 Bibliography

- Anon. (2017), "Ukrainian Immigrants Are Powering Poland's Economy." *The Economist*.
- Atoyan, Ruben et al. (2016), *Emigration and Its Economic Impact on Eastern Europe*. Retrieved. <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2016/sdn1607.pdf>
- Barbone, Luca, Katarzyna Piętka-Kosińska, and Irena Topińska, (2012), *The Impact of Remittances on Poland's Economy*.
- Barcevičius, Egidijus, Krystyna Iglicka, Daiva Repeckaite, and Dovile Zvalionyte (2012), "Labour Mobility within the EU: The Impact of Return Migration."
- Bruecker, H. (2009), *Labour Mobility within the EU in the Context of Enlargement and the Functioning of Transnational Arrangements*. Nuremberg: IAB.
- Brunarska, Zuzanna, Marta Kindler, Monika Szulecka, and Sabina Toru (2016), "Ukrainian Migration to Poland: A 'Local' Mobility?" 115–31. <http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-319-41776-9>
- Budnik, Katarzyna B. (2007), "Migration Flows and Labour Market in Poland." *National Bank of Poland Working Papers* 44(44). <http://ideas.repec.org/p/nbp/nbpmis/44.html>
- Budnik, Katarzyna B. (2008), "Search Equilibrium with Migration: The Case of Poland." *National Bank of Poland Working Papers* 45(45). <http://ideas.repec.org/p/nbp/nbpmis/45.html>
- Bukowski, Maciej, Grzegorz Koloch, and Piotr Lewandowski, (2008), "Labour Market Macrostructure in NMS8 - Shocks and Institutions." in *Employment in Poland 2007 - Safety on the Flexible Labour Market*, edited by M. Bukowski. Warsaw: MPiPS.
- Duszczyk, M., P. Kaczmarczyk i A. Rusielewicz (2009), *Raport z działania grupy roboczej ds. migracji powrotnych Polaków* [Report from activity of the Working Group on Return Migrations in Poland] Warszawa: Kancelaria Prezesa Rady Ministrów.
- Fuller, A. and T. Ward. (2011), *Mobility in Europe 2011*.
- Główny Urząd Statystyczny, (2016), "Informacja o Rozmiarach i Kierunkach Czasowej Emigracji z Polski w Latach 2004-2015." [Information on the size and directions of temporary emigration from Poland in years 2004-2015] 1–5.
- Kaczmarczyk, Paweł, (2014), "EU Enlargement and Intra-EU Mobility - Lessons to Be Drawn from the Post-2004 Migration of Poles." Pp. 123–28 in *Intereconomics: Labour mobility in the EU: Dynamics, patterns and policies*, vol. 49.
- Kaczmarczyk, Paweł, Paweł Dąbrowski, Agnieszka Fihel, and Renata Stefańska (2014), "Recent Trends in International Migration in Poland." *CMR Working Papers* (71/129):1–70.
- Kaczmarczyk, Paweł and Marek Okólski, (2008a), "Demographic and Labour-Market Impacts of Migration on Poland." *Oxford Review of Economic Policy* 24(3):600–625.
- Kaczmarczyk, Paweł and Marek Okólski, (2008b) "Economic Impacts of Migration on Poland and the Baltic States." *Fafo Paper*.
- KPMG, (2008), "Migracja Pracowników – Szansa Czy Zagrożenie? [Migration of Workers: Opportunity or Threat?]."

- Łodziński, Sławomir and Marek Szonert. (2016.) "Niepolityczna Polityka"? Kształtowanie się Polityki Migracyjnej w Polsce w Latach 1989-2016. [Non-political policy? Shaping of the migration policy in Poland in years 1989-2016]
- Mioduszevska, Marta (2008), "Najnowsze Migracje z Polski w Świetle Danych Badania Aktywności Ekonomicznej Ludności." [Recent migrations from Poland in the light of the Labour Force Survey].
- OECD (2012), *Free Movement of Workers and Labour Market Adjustment: Recent Experiences from OECD Countries and the European Union*, OECD Publishing
- Solga, Brygida (2016), "Polityka Migracyjna Polski i jej Regionalny Wymiar." [Migration Policy in Poland and its Regional Dimension] *Studia Ekonomiczne. Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego W Katowicach* (290).
- Western Union (2012), "The Economic Benefits of Remittances A Case Study from Poland." Analysis by Centre for Social and Economic Research 1–30.
- WorkServiceS.A. (2016), "Migracje Zarobkowe Polaków 2014." [Earnings-related Migrations of Poles] 1–11.

HOW TO OBTAIN EU PUBLICATIONS

Free publications:

- one copy:

via EU Bookshop (<http://bookshop.europa.eu>);

- more than one copy or posters/maps:
 - from the European Union's representations (http://ec.europa.eu/represent_en.htm);
 - from the delegations in non-EU countries (http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/index_en.htm);
 - by contacting the Europe Direct service (http://europa.eu/europedirect/index_en.htm) or calling 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (freephone number from anywhere in the EU) (*).

(*) The information given is free, as are most calls (though some operators, phone boxes or hotels may charge you).

Priced publications:

- via EU Bookshop (<http://bookshop.europa.eu>).

Priced subscriptions:

- via one of the sales agents of the Publications Office of the European Union (http://publications.europa.eu/others/agents/index_en.htm).

