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The Future of Social Protection -- what works for non-standard workers?

Motivation

Independent and contingent workers in contributory social protection systems


Potential policy solutions

Purpose and approach of this study

Policy examples



One in six workers is self-employed across the OECD





Independent and contingent workers in contributory social protection systems

Independent workers do not easily fit into the framework:



Double contribution issue: Who pays their employer contributions?

– Customers? Example: Germany




↑ **\$** Fluctuating earnings



Moral hazard problems:

- Involuntary quits and search efforts hard to establish
- Private information on future earnings



Record individual entitlements in one account

- ✓ Solves earnings fluctuation and multiple income sources
- ✓ Funds could be used for education / further training

But:

- No risk-sharing
- No redistribution
- Does not solve double contribution issue
- Fungibility can be problematic



Potential solutions II: Making social protection more universal

Uncouple social protection from the employment relationship

- ✓ Solves double contribution issue
- ✓ No coverage gaps

But:

- Can crowd out employer contributions
- Means-testing makes earnings fluctuations more pertinent
 - → BI would solve overpayments, but: budgetary constraints, effects on labour supply unclear



This issue is not new – models exist

- Seven country studies on
 - Special schemes for the self-employed



- Interaction between SP and non-standard work
- Incorporation of (certain) self-employed into the SP system
 separate schemes
- Voluntary insurance schemes
- Non-contributory schemes






Assessment of schemes

- How do existing schemes insure the self-employed?
- How do they deal with earnings fluctuations, moral hazard?
- A scheme "works" if
 - ✓ It does not incentivise misclassification of workers (regulatory arbitrage)
 - √ Reaches high coverage among the self-employed
 - ✓ Does not lead to adverse selection
 - ✓ Is affordable for contributors
 - √ Has reasonable administration costs



Policy example I/1: Coverage of the self-employed in France

- Self employed are covered for some risks only
- Complex system of differing contribution rates, thresholds, rebates





Policy example I/2: the Régime social des indépendants (RSI)

Created to unify the social protection of the selfemployed → "one-stop-shop"

But struggled with administrative problems:



Delegates the collection of contributions to the URSSAF network, but IT systems incompatible



Under- and over collection of contributions, late payments of benefits


Abolished as per 1st January 2018

→ RSI to be absorbed by the general system



Policy example II: customers contribute to social protection

German artists' insurance scheme:





- All expenditure on artists and writers is subject to a contribution
- German pension fund in charge of compliance

But:

- Low incomes select into the fund mainly used to access health insurance
- Pensions will not protect against poverty



Policy example III: voluntary unemployment insurance

Publicly subsidised, voluntary unemployment insurance for independent workers:



More stringent eligibility criteria



Gig workers rarely receive benefits

Very responsive to individual contribution rates:

→ Require generous subsidies to be viable





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