INTRODUCTION

ATLANTIC FUTURE

MARITIME SECURITY IN THE ATLANTIC BASIN

The Atlantic Basin concentrates some of the main routes for drug trafficking in the world. The availability of drugs and arms is very significant in the Americas, but drug cartels are also developing illegal activities in some West African countries with fragile institutions. Additionally, the Gulf of Guinea is emerging as the hotspot of pirate attacks in the Atlantic. Trafficking in arms, drugs, people and money are common challenges in the Atlantic Space that present important risks but also an opportunity to increased international cooperation across the Basin.

The Atlantic Basin has over the recent decades been considered a relatively pacific zone in military terms. However, non-traditional security concerns are growing. As the Global trends 2030 report by EUISS predicts, the major global conflict issues will be driven by challenges such as weapons proliferation, or instability caused by failing states, humanitarian crisis, piracy and organized crime. The Atlantic Basin concentrates some of the main routes for drug trafficking in the world. The availability of drugs and arms is very significant in the Americas, but drug cartels are also developing illegal activities in some West African countries with fragile institutions. Additionally, the Gulf of Guinea is emerging as the hotspot of pirate attacks in the Atlantic. Trafficking in arms, drugs, people and money are common challenges in the Atlantic Space that present important risks but also an opportunity to increased international cooperation across the Basin.

Further, the OECD 2014 Fragile States Report counts 51 fragile states and economies in the world - 12 of those are in the Atlantic space. All, but Haiti, are in Africa. Additionally, the economic globalization together with the development of communication technology has contributed to the expansion of illicit activities and money laundering.
Global trends have led to an increased strategic significance of maritime trade in the Atlantic Basin. Maritime transport has been growing steadily from the 1970s and is already handling over 80% of the volume of global trade in merchandise, accounting for more than 70% of its value. UNCTAD's 2012 Review of Maritime Transport forecasts that it will grow by 36 per cent in 2020 and double by 2033. The continuing growth in the seaborne merchandise trade has been driven by the developing countries in Latin America and Africa, and South-South links have been increasing. The main driver has been China's domestic demand but also increased intra-Asian and South-South trade. Of the 9.2 billion tons of goods that were loaded in world's ports, the vast majority was dry cargo with tanker trade (crude oil, petroleum products and gas) accounting for less than one third. In 2012, the developing countries as a group accounted for 60 per cent of global goods loaded and 58 per cent of goods unloaded in 2012.

Evidence and Analysis

Trafficking and Piracy challenges in the Atlantic
The combination of a growing volume of shipping, the institutional weakness of some coastal countries, the internationalization of organized crime and the virtual absence of systematic mechanisms for international control of flows and the maritime traffic in the Atlantic Ocean lead to the increase of the crime associated with drug trafficking. The same reasons, combined with the low level of development and lack of opportunities for a significant part of the society triggered the proliferation of piracy activities in West Africa and specifically in the Gulf of Guinea. These two emerging threats are creating a circle of violence that is, in many cases, threatening states governability in the Atlantic Space. An Ocean Strategy with multidimensional policies in line with a Human Security perspective is needed to face these common challenges in the Atlantic.

Drug trafficking and arms trade
South America produces almost all the world's cocaine and the biggest consumer markets are the United States and the European Union (EU). Therefore, it should not be a surprise that the Atlantic Basin concentrates some of the main routes for drug trafficking in the world. Drugs and the availability of arms play a very significant part in the Americas. Since the most famous member of the New York mafia - Lucky Luciano - lay the foundation for transnational organized crime in Cuba, the Caribbean sea has been a privileged geographical location to maintain contacts with the United States, Latin America and Europe for highly profitable business of drug trafficking with Colombia, Bolivia and Peru as top cocaine producers. The Colombian cartels spread the organized crime throughout to Central America and Mexico as a corridor to the North America market. Mexico serves as an example of the threat posed by the illegal drugs and arms trafficking and its negative impact on the regional security status.

Drugs also flow from Colombia and Venezuela to Europe by shipments via Azores, Cape Verde and Canary Islands. But these flows also traverse Brazil and other coastal countries from South America to West Africa as a base to Europe and beyond. Colombian and Mexican cartels are known to be developing illegal activities in some West African countries, sometimes in collusion with political and military elites. The West Africa region is becoming a central region for drug trafficking. Nigerian cartels and criminal networks are increasingly involved in the illegal trade and distribution of drugs to Europe and North America. Guinea-Bissau remains the central hub of narcotics trafficking in Africa, transiting cocaine produced in South America to the European market. In East, West, and Central Africa, the amount of heroin seized has risen by 500 % since 2009 (UNODC 2013, p. 33). West African criminal networks are also heavily involved in the sale of cocaine, having earned between $1.8 and

$2.8 billion in 2009. Additionally, roughly 27% of cocaine consumed in Europe is now transited through West Africa alone.

Heroine and synthetic drugs are also becoming a pan-Atlantic challenge as the traditional division between consumers and producers is dissolving; consumption is growing in the South and synthetic drugs are being produced in the North. Rising additions both in North and South require to take into account also health consequences for the population. Furthermore, organised crime is associated with high levels of violence and corruption involving local authorities and justice institutions. Crime and violence associated to organised crime is spreading in West Africa and is undermining the states’ capacities to fight against criminality and, in extreme cases, such as Guinea Bissau, the country itself has become a narco-state. The danger of West-Africa becoming a black-hole for drug and arms trafficking associated with terrorism is a true danger for the Atlantic Space and is challenging maritime safety and security across the Basin.

**Piracy in the Atlantic Basin**

Maritime security is a relatively new sector in the African debate about security issues, as it entered onto regional and continental agendas only around 2005. The initial debate on African maritime security reflected a wide field of interests and a complex set of African international relations. While for many years, the main piracy activity used to occur in the Gulf of Aden, according to the International Maritime Bureau the incidence of piracy attacks has steadily declined from 2008 (61 attacks committed) to 2013 (8 attacks committed). At the same time, 31 piracy incidents were recorded off the West African coast, 9 off the Nigerian coast and 22 outside its territorial waters in 2013. The Gulf of Guinea is emerging as the hotspot of pirate attacks in the Atlantic. Not only the incidence but also greater brutality of attacks compared to those in Gulf of Aden is a concern. In the Gulf of Guinea, attacks are focused largely on oil-laden vessels, as the main aim of the pirates is to sell petroleum products on the black markets. Although there is no correlation between piracy in East Africa and Gulf of Guinea, the underlying root causes overlap: poverty, weak governance, limited law enforcement capacity and social and political tensions.

Beyond safety of maritime trade routes, these acts have consequences both in terms of costs to the local economy and social structures, and food security. Insecurity and oil theft in several countries have caused the reduction in energy production, increase in insurance rates affecting an important source of government income, much needed to their development. Nigeria, for example, has oil as the source of 95% of its foreign exchange earnings and approximately 80% of budgetary revenues (UNODC Transnational Organized Crime in the Gulf of Guinea 2013).

One may also consider the fact that the Gulf of Guinea, where the largest number of collaborative Atlantic security projects is currently taking place, has seen what is essentially a reproduction of traditional patterns of North-driven leadership, rather than the formation of a wider Atlantic action. Most projects are US and European driven, and include Northern and African partners. Although there is coordination and cooperation among countries located in both hemispheres to tackle maritime security issues in the region, as in the case of the piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, our reading is that this type of initiative normally occurs in circumstances where general economic interests are at stake, not indicating the emergence of a wider Atlantic connection. On the other hand there is not a sufficient level of coordination in fighting piracy and trafficking as multilateral mechanisms are still lacking.

Fusing proposals by consultants and African Union debates draft of a “2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy (2050 AIM Strategy)” was completed in 2012. AIM Strategy addresses thirteen different issue areas: illegal oil unkering/crude oil theft; money laundering, illegal arms, and drug trafficking; environmental crimes; a container security and control program; flag state and port state control; hydrography, oceanography, and meteorology; aids to navigation; piracy and armed robbery

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at sea; maritime terrorism; human trafficking, human smuggling, and asylum seekers traveling by sea; strategic communications systems; maritime spatial planning; and environmental and biodiversity monitoring. The strategy stresses the importance of insert the AIM in a more general developmental discourse⁴.

For the purpose of driving an Atlantic security community in Africa, US is a crucial player to attract power yet still arguably missing the moral leverage a Southern actor such as Brazil retains with its fellow Southern partners in Africa. Brazil has emerged as a credible challenger to the dominance of the US in the Atlantic. It has actively promoted not only regional South-South security structures like ZOPacas but also regional initiatives as the South American Security Council of Unasur. As a result of this political strategy Brazil has become a leading reference in the global south.

**The EU and maritime security**

The European Union - as a combination of its member states - is a global maritime power. It has a coastline along two oceans – the Atlantic and Arctic Oceans – and four seas, i.e. the Baltic, the North Sea, the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. Around 40% of its GDP is provided by maritime regions. 23 of its member states are coastal states and 26 are flag states. The vast majority (90%) of its external trade is transported by sea, as well as more than one third of its internal trade. European ship owners manage 30% of the world’s vessels and 35% of the world shipping tonnage, representing 42% of the value of global seaborne trade. The EU companies control over 40% of the world fleet, and its fishing fleet – which operates worldwide – counted in 2011 83,014 vessels with gross tonnage of 1,696,175. More than 400 million passengers pass through EU ports annually.⁵ That said, the EU’s participation in seaborne trade has been shrinking, as the bloc has been affected by severe economic crisis since 2008, but it is now starting to recuperate.

The EU’s maritime security interests are invariably linked to its interests in boosting free trade and economic development, in a context of stability. With the increasing incidence of piracy and an awareness of an array of maritime threats and risks, the EU has seen itself pressurised to pool its vast resources to face up to these risks. In particular, the bloc has been heavily involved in combating piracy off the coast of Somalia. In November 2008, the EU launched its first ESDP naval mission – operation Atalanta or EU NAVFOR, in order to fight piracy and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid in the coastal regions of the Horn of Africa. By having a mandate to deter, prevent, and repress acts of piracy and robbery at sea, including in the territorial waters of Somalia, it was also the first mission that was tasked to go well beyond the traditional Petersberg tasks.⁶ The mission was successful and the number of attempted and successful attacks decreased substantially, although the threat of piracy and hijacking is far from being eradicated. The EU mission is to run until the end of 2016, and its mandate has been extended in order for it to be able to combat the root causes of piracy more effectively (poverty, lack of rule of law, weak state structure), i.e. by coordinating with and providing assistance to other EU initiatives in the area, as well as monitoring and reporting on illegal fishing activities.

The work on a European Maritime Security Strategy started in Spring 2010, when the Council invited the High Representative, together with the Commission and the Member States “to undertake work with a view to preparing options for the possible elaboration of a Security Strategy for the global maritime domain”. The EU’s Limassol Declaration (2012) stressed the “importance of improved maritime governance including increased cooperation”. In December 2013, the European Council stressed in its conclusions the importance of defending the EU’s strategic security interests against a broad range of risks and threats.

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⁴ Engel (2014)


The European Commission pointed out in its March joint communication to the European Parliament and the Council that there was room for looking coherency and synergies between a number of policy frameworks and instruments available to the EU. In particular, the 2003 European Security Strategy and the Integrated Maritime Policy (2007) had given birth to different policy frameworks that have been developing separately. Also sector specific legislation is already in place like the maritime transport security legislation - Regulation (EC) No 725/2004 on enhancing ship and port facility security and Directive 2005/65/EC on enhancing port security, the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) improving the situational awareness and reaction capability of Member States and of the EU Border Agency Frontex at the external borders - Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013, SafeSeaNet, a Union maritime traffic monitoring and information system for EU waters, managed by EU Maritime Transport agency EMSA, or the 3rd Maritime Safety Package.

The EU’s Maritime Security Strategy was adopted in June 2014. The strategy covers both internal and external aspects the Union’s maritime security, and seeks to provide a coherent framework to contributing to stability and security at seas in accordance with the European Security Strategy and in coherence with the relevant EU policies, in particular the Integrated Maritime Policy and the Internal Security Strategy. The three overarching goals of the strategy are: identifying and articulating the main strategic maritime interests for the EU; identifying and articulating the maritime threats, challenges and risks to the EU’s strategic interests; organising the appropriate response.

The strategy identifies a wide range of risks and threats, including: a) threats or use of force against Member States’ rights and jurisdiction over their maritime zones; b) threats to the security of European citizens and to economic interests at sea following acts of external aggression including those related to maritime disputes, threats to Member States’ sovereign rights or armed conflicts; c) cross-border and organised crime, including maritime piracy and armed robbery at sea, trafficking of human beings and smuggling of migrants, organised criminal networks facilitating illegal migration, trafficking of arms and narcotics, smuggling of goods and contraband; d) terrorism and other intentional unlawful acts at sea and in ports against ships, cargo, crew and passengers, ports and port facilities and critical maritime and energy infrastructure, including cyber-attacks; e) proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats; f) threats to freedom of navigation, such as the denial of access to the sea and straits and the obstruction of sea lanes; g) environmental risks, including unsustainable and unauthorized exploitation of natural and marine resources, threats to biodiversity, IUU fishing, environmental degradation due to illegal or accidental discharge, chemical, biological and nuclear pollution, in particular sea-dumped chemical munitions and unexploded ordnance; h) potential security impact of natural or man-made disasters, extreme events and climate change on the maritime transport system and in particular on maritime infrastructure; i) illegal and unregulated archaeological research and pillage of archaeological object.

One of the most crucial aspects of the strategy is that it promotes a regional approach to maritime security, arguing that “the network of shipping lanes between continents is of particular importance, as well as some maritime areas because of their strategic value or potential risk for crisis or instability”. It suggests that the “principles enshrined and the objectives identified in this Strategy should be embedded in the implementation of existing and future regional EU strategies, such as those for the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Guinea.”

External action is included as one of the main areas where the EU action could be beneficial. The strategy calls for the EU to act autonomously and with international partners, saying that “the Union's capacity to cooperate with the UN, NATO, regional partners like the African Union or ASEAN, as well as multilateral civil cooperation platforms, has a direct impact on its ability to safeguard its interests and to strengthen regional and international maritime security.”

A rolling Action Plan is to be proposed shortly.

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In this context, it is worth remembering that a Maritime Strategy for the Atlantic Ocean Area exists since 2011, but is limited to five EU member states with an Atlantic coastline – France, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom within the EU and then expands to international waters reaching westward to the Americas, eastward to Africa and the Indian Ocean, southward to the Southern Ocean and northward to the Arctic Ocean. The objectives of such a strategy are: implementing ecosystem approach, reducing Europe’s carbon footprint, sustainable exploitation of the Atlantic seafloor’s natural resources, responding to threats and emergencies, including accidents, natural disasters or criminal activity; socially inclusive growth. As can be seen, the objectives of the EU’s strategy for the Atlantic Ocean are wide and far-reaching and also include a security and safety component (defending trade routes). This calls for obvious synergies with the above-mentioned EU Maritime Security Strategy.

**The EU and Maritime Security in Africa**

While the EU has been visible and successful in fighting piracy off the coast of Somalia, its presence in the Gulf of Guinea, which has become the global hotspot for piracy, has been less pronounced for a variety of reasons. The EU has a long history of engaging with Africa but the relationship has also required sensitivity, particularly in areas of peace and security, given the complicated colonialist past the two regions share. The regional and multilateral nature of the EU has facilitated relations with regional organizations, in particular with the African Union. Regular Africa-EU summits are organised every three years and the relationship is guided by the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES). One of the “priority areas” of the JAES concerns peace and security, building on already existing EU funding support for African security, in particular the EUR300 million (2008-13) Africa Peace Facility (APF). The APF has provided funding support to AU peacekeeping missions such as AMISOM in Somalia and also crucial help for African Peace and Security Architecture – an ambitious AU rationalisation of its security functions and mechanisms (Europeaid).

Since 2007 the EU has also had the Instrument for Stability (IFS) at its disposal; a rapid reaction funding mechanism, designed to finance conflict prevention, crisis management and peace building initiatives quickly and when other sources of EU funding are not available. Complimenting the IFS is the 2009 Peace-building Partnership (PbP), which seeks to build the capacity of partner countries in addressing crisis and conflict situations. Further strengthening the EU’s capacity in this area is the Conflict prevention, Peace building and Mediation Instruments Division, housed at the European External Action Service (EEAS).

Though not an Atlantic actor *per se*, the AU as the continent’s comprehensive security actor cannot be overlooked since much of the EU’s support of Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS) is of a complimentary nature to the greater ambitions of the AU for continent-wide security integration and regional conflict prevention (Constitutive Act of the African Union) (11 July 2000). The AU is mandated to encourage regional integration on the continent. While the main focus is on integration in terms of trade facilitation, attempts have also been made to better coordinate the security instruments of regional organisations with those of the AU (Schaefer 2012). This has included cohesion with respect to rapid response and early warning intelligence – areas in which the EU is playing a supportive role.

The EU's support to the member states of SADC comes in the form of development assistance channelled through the European Development Fund. Funding is divided into project, sector and budget approaches and guided by country strategy reports. Explicitly security-related activities tend to fall within the human security category, including for example food security support (Angola) and humanitarian assistance (Mozambique). South Africa stands as something of an exception, since it also enjoys an enhanced relationship with the EU, manifested in a partnership agreement concluded in 2007. Regular summits since then touch on an expansive range of mutually shared issues, including dialogue on peace and security on the continent (South Africa-EU Summit Communiqué, 2013).
Several of the EU’s “Atlantic” members make a contribution to SADC security initiatives either as funders or capacity builders (UK, France, Germany). Some states also retain lucrative arms deals with members of SADC. Despite the array of security initiatives, broader inclusion of non-European Atlantic actors is limited. This may be a consequence of inter-regional relations themselves, which tend not to favour the ad hoc since, as in the EU-SADC case, they already possess a degree of structure, which limits the entry of third parties. There is of course the prospect of triangularisation of regional relations, such as the case of the EU-Africa and China Dialogue (FT)9.

The EU-ECOWAS relationship, as in the case of SADC, is largely guided by the Cotonou Agreement and five year Regional Strategy Papers and a Regional Indicative Programme. Relative to SADC, the EU has apportioned a greater share of its EDF funding to ECOWAS, earmarking EUR571 million under the 10th EDF. Approximately 70% of that amount was allocated for strengthening regional integration and addressing food security (e.g. productivity, upgrading, investment support). Another 20% targeted peace and security, “the systems developed in connection with early warning, conflict prevention, conflict management, peacekeeping, humanitarian aid and the Convention on the control of small arms”, all in respect of the African Union’s APSA (EC-West Africa Regional Strategy Paper 2008-13).

EU support is mostly in the form of technical assistance and funding rather than operations. Notable is the EU Support to ECOWAS Regional Peace, Security and Stability Mandate. The two sides also hold regular political dialogue meetings, where peace and security issues are placed at the top of the agenda (EU-ECOWAS 2013). Despite the plethora of security challenges in the region, in terms of operations, the only CSDP mission in the region took place in Guinea Bissau in support of Security Sector Reform. An EU Strategy for the Gulf of Guinea – as mentioned earlier in the paper - was released in March 2014, but it is too early to assess just what the consequences of this new strategy will be. The colonial ties of several EU member states may explain why operations in the region have largely been driven at that level.

Other two important organisations for maritime security on the Atlantic shores should be mentioned (although they won’t be discussed further by this paper): Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Commission of the Gulf of Guinea (CGG). When it comes to maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, these two organisations play almost as important a role as ECOWAS, and there is also an interregional dialogue between the three. The EU is funding a number of peace and security activities of ECCAS, which poses certain problems with its member state France, who is deeply involved with the overlapping and somewhat competing Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States (CEMAC).

Another current EU capacity building venture garnering member state cooperation is the Critical Maritime Routes in the Gulf of Guinea Programme (CRIMGO). It is financed by the IFS and designed to help African countries in the region better coordinate action by creating a network for sharing information. Training of coastguards is also provided. France, the UK, Italy, Portugal and Germany, to name a few member states, are involved. Given the shared history, France is the most prominent of EU member states in the region, in terms of security operations, funding, capacity building and arms trade. The most prominent recent operations example is of course the French military intervention in Mali in January 2013. French forces also intervened twice in Cote d’Ivoire, in 2004 and 2011, first in retaliation to Ivoirien bombing of a French military installation and more recently as an intervention in the post-electoral crisis between the losing incumbent Laurent Gbagbo and the winner-designate Alassane Ouattara. Food security has also been a focus, with Guinea, Nigeria and Senegal all targeted for assistance (Agence Française de Développement 2012). A separate 2011 agreement with ECOWAS and its Water Resources Coordination Centre designated more than EUR10 million for food security.

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The spate of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea has also driven France to action; a Priority Solidarity Fund (FSP) was created in 2011 to strengthen the maritime capacities of Benin, Ghana and Togo. Training exercises have also been provided. Between 2011-2013 the European Commission's Joint Research Centre developed a Piracy Incident Reporting And Information Exchange System (PIRATES) to register, analyse and share piracy incident information in the Gulf of Guinea. The programme's future is under discussion.

France is also the largest Atlantic exporter of small arms to the region, with armaments sold to almost all of the ECOWAS member states in 2012. It is also a notable seller of heavier equipment, such as patrol craft. Considering the conflict or post-conflict scenarios affecting a wide swath of ECOWAS countries, it is not surprising that the EU targets individual member states with well funded programmes and capacity building projects. In the case of Africa's largest country by population, Nigeria, the 10th EDF allocated EUR677 million to fund three focal areas: peace and security; governance and human rights; trade and regional integration.

The EU has played an instrumental role in rebuilding Malian institutions undermined after the coup in 2012. In 2013 it brought together 108 delegations representing governments, the private sector and civil society and garnered EUR 3.285 billion in pledges – EUR1.35 billion stemmed from the EU and its member states, including EUR524 million from the European Commission (Europaid). Likewise, Cote d’Ivoire, another ECOWAS member having suffered conflict in the 21st century, has received EUR255 million in EU support for peace building, good governance, social cohesion and economic infrastructure.

The following tables provide a synopsis of initiatives stemming from the EU and its members states. The categories assessed are security operations, capacity building initiatives, funding and arms trade. Since the African REGs assessed (ECOWAS and SADC) are more loosely bound to their member states than in the case of the EU, the charts include initiatives in specific ECOWAS and SADC countries, which are not necessarily beneath any REC umbrella.

**Table 1 - EU security presence in West and Southern Africa**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU-SADC (+member states)</th>
<th>Operations</th>
<th>Capacity Building</th>
<th>Funding</th>
<th>Trade</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CSDP DRC</td>
<td>Regional Political Cooperation Programme</td>
<td>Diverse allocation</td>
<td>EDF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-ECOWAS (+member states)</td>
<td>CSDP Guinea Bissau</td>
<td>CRIMGO Conflict prevention technical assistance</td>
<td>Diverse allocation</td>
<td>EDF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlantic Cooperation</td>
<td>Cooperation limited to EU member states</td>
<td>Limited to EU members</td>
<td>Limited to EU members</td>
<td>No</td>
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**Table 2- EU member state security presence in West and Southern Africa**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU member states-SADC (+member states)</th>
<th>Operations</th>
<th>Capacity Building</th>
<th>Funding</th>
<th>Trade</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Naval training exercises (UK, France)</td>
<td>Food security</td>
<td>Arms scandal in South Africa including European partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU member states-ECOWAS (+member states)</td>
<td>France (Mali, Cote d'Ivoire), UK (Sierra Leone)</td>
<td>Gulf of Guinea Maritime Strategy (UK)</td>
<td>Food security</td>
<td>Large scale small and heavy arms sales to ECOWAS member states, particularly from France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlantic Cooperation</td>
<td>Yes (Saharan Express USA)</td>
<td>Yes (G8++, ECOWAS-development-partners, Operation Flintlock, CRIMGO)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| EU member states-ECOWAS (+member states) | France (Mali, Cote d'Ivoire), UK (Sierra Leone) | Gulf of Guinea Maritime Strategy (UK) | Food security | Large scale small and heavy arms sales to ECOWAS member states, particularly from France |
| Atlantic Cooperation                  | Yes (Saharan Express USA)   | Yes (G8++, ECOWAS-development-partners, Operation Flintlock, CRIMGO) | No |
Due to the scale and variety of challenges facing the ECOWAS region, the range of sophisticated ECOWAS security instruments, as well as a linguistic and historical diversity, which binds several key European Atlantic countries to the area, many security initiatives are in play. The EU and France provide the largest and most comprehensive presence but the USA has also clearly targeted the region because of the international implications of insecurity there (particularly in the Gulf of Guinea). Cooperation at the Atlantic level is thus more discernible here, even if still modest, than in the SADC region.

In conclusion, EU Member States tend to have less of a soft power attraction in the region given their colonial histories and the sensitivity they can still elicit on the continent. Missions such as France’s recent foray into Mali, while applauded by many including the majority of locals, were not designed to include even the EU (which has the collective tools to participate), let alone an Atlantic Community (which does not yet have a shape, let alone the collective tools).

It should be underlined that EU’s security focus has tended to be on the African Union first, rather than on any one regional African organisation. Hence support of Atlantic oriented organisations such as SADC, ECOWAS, ECCAS and the CGG is often predicated on the premise of enhancing coordination with the AU. The AU, after all, boasts its ambitious African Peace and Security Architecture project and a determined agenda to unify security initiatives on the continent. Given that the AU’s chief institutional strength is indeed in the domain of peace and security, this leads to the observation that an Atlantic community should be one that engages Africa at the pan-African level.

The EU and Atlantic Security with Latin America
The interregional security agenda between the EU and Latin America, despite not being a dorsal area of relations has developed various instruments of interregional cooperation. The fight against drug trafficking has acquired letter of nature in the regional dialogue. Closer cooperation started due to the fact that the Andean countries are the main producers of cocaine that goes to the European market (Europeans consume a quarter of total world production of cocaine, just behind the US) but it has been extended to the entire region, as associated crime is widespread. In 1995 the specialized Dialogue on Drugs between the EU and the CAN countries to develop cooperation mechanisms at national and regional level was created. The same year the European Council in Madrid in 1995 decided to create a Mechanism for Coordination and Cooperation on Drugs between the European Union, Latin America and the Caribbean. The First High Level Meeting on Drugs between the EU, LA and the Caribbean was held in Brussels on 23 and 24 March 1998 and thereafter meets once a year.

A new qualitative step came after the launch of the bi-regional Strategic Partnership at the 1999 Rio Summit, where political dialogue was established at the highest level with the whole region, including the Caribbean. During the summit, Global Action Plan on Drugs for the EU and LAC was adopted as part of the Action Plans for Barbados and Panama, (1999) and was afterwards concretised with the Lisbon priorities adopted in 2000. In the next Summit in Madrid in 2002 paragraphs about security addressed; the condemnation of terrorism, the fight against organised crime and drug trafficking and references to the Colombian conflict and the crisis in Haiti. The leadership of Brazil and Chile in the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and other Latin American countries participation lead to establish avenues of cooperation in the field of shared responsibility in maintaining Peace and Security. The Guadalajara Summit Declaration held in 2004 devoted an entire section to multilateralism as the best approach to peacekeeping and issues such as the role of regional organizations was addressed. The drug issues were subject of a comprehensive treatment according to different branches of the problem and not just the illegal trafficking.

On 5 and 6 March 2008 the International Conference: “A Latin American Agenda for Security Cooperation with the European Union” was held in Lima. The Lima Protocol urged governments to cooperate to structure security systems as part of the Human Rights and public goods protection. It also called for encouraging the participation of civil society to mainstream human rights and promote the role of parliaments in the control and supervision of security and defence sectors. By then the Parliamentary Assembly Euro-Latin American (EuroLat), which was created in 2006 as a parliamentary body of the strategic partnership had already incorporated the discussions on security...
agenda through a more holistic approach. Hence the initiative for a Euro-Latin American Charter for Peace and Security was drafted and adopted in 2009.

The Charter was intended to help bring coherence to the actions of cooperation on security issues including aspects related to public security, state security and regional security in both conceptual and materials. Despite its political and non-normative nature, this document pretends to be recognized as binding by the countries and institutions of the Bi-regional Strategic Partnership. Its greatest contribution is to give visibility to the bi-regional relationship in a sector that has had little projection on the agenda. The most pronounced deficiency is the absence of reference to existing regional Security Strategies, instrument and regional and bi-regional existing institutions or mechanisms for cooperation and the lack of any attempt to conceptual clarification on the extent of global challenges. The twelfth meeting of the High-level coordination and cooperation mechanism on Drugs celebrated in Madrid in 2010 insisted on the full adoption of the principle of common and shared responsibility.

The last summit between the EU and LAC held in Santiago, Chile on 26 and 27 January 2013, was the first edition after the creation of the CELAC (Latin America and Caribbean States Community) but previously the XIV high-level meeting of the cooperation mechanism on drugs held on 12 June 2012 in Brussels took the CELAC as interlocutor incorporating the entire body of pre-existing cooperation. CELAC is a symptom of the changes in Latin American regionalism, which tend towards increased autonomy for the region in the international system. The new regional initiatives that incorporate security issues in Latin America will impact the contents of interregional dialogue and cooperation.

The escalation of criminality occurred throughout much of the Americas, especially in Mexico and Central America, but it also concerns other South American countries, leading thus to the increased priority of the security issue on the agenda of integration. Among these new initiatives, the creation in 2008 of the South American Defence Council and the South American Council on global problems of Drugs in May 2010, both in UNASUR (Union of South American Nations) and the Central American Security Strategy adopted 2007 are the more consistent frameworks for inter-regional cooperation.

The South American Council on global problems of Drugs proposes developing a South American identity to address this problem and to elaborate a common position in international forums. This forum was formally presented to the EU High Level Meeting of the Coordination Mechanism and Cooperation between the EU CELAC meeting in Brussels in March 2012. Finally, in November 2012 the South American Council on citizen security, justice and coordination of actions against transnational organised crime was created. This Council should coordinate its tasks with the South American Council on the World Drug Problem, because of the existence of common thematic areas in both Councils. Besides promoting coordination of policies on citizen security, justice and action against Transnational Organized Crime between Member States the Council’s objectives is to improve the capabilities to undertake international commitments.

The 2007 Central American Security Strategy aimed to update and strengthen the Treaty on Democratic Security in 1995. The strategy tried to involve all sectors of the societies and the international cooperation in a common effort commensurate with the size of the transnational problem. For the implementation of the strategy under the Central American Integration System (SICA) Security Commission drew up an action plan with costs proposal that was revised at the International Conference of Support for the Central American Security Strategy held in Guatemala in June 2011. This also served to update supports countries friendly to the strategy and to approve the establishment of a coordination, evaluation and monitoring mechanism.

The strategy is based on four components including: 1) the fight against crime both internally and across borders; 2) preventive action of all forms of violence, including prevention of risks derived from disasters related to climate change; 3) the actions of rehabilitation, reintegration and prison security; 4) institutional strengthening of the state apparatus responsible for developing and implementing security strategy from inter-national, national and local. The program establishes priorities and a portfolio of projects. The EU introduced support for this strategy in regional programming 2007-2013
and is committed to increase its contribution in the new programming 2014-2020. In turn, several members of the EU and Spain, Germany and to a lesser extent Italy, Finland, Netherlands and UK countries have offered technical assistance and financial support.

In the field of cooperation between EU and LAC countries for combating organised crime the main instrument was the launch of the ambitious COPOLAD program on 31 January 2011, with which it is intended to bring coherence to cooperation on drug policy based on four components: consolidation of existing coordination mechanism, strengthening of national drug observatories in Latin America and capacity building in the field of supply reduction and demand reduction respectively. The EU recognises to be the origin of the production of large quantities of drugs from cannabis and especially of synthetic drugs in Europe, but it is also the source of much of the precursors needed to manufacture cocaine then head to the market European. Hence it is working to better control the fate of the precursors for which the cooperation of the public and private sector is needed. In 2009, a programme called "Prevention of the Diversion of Drugs Precursors in the Latin American and Caribbean Region" (PRELAC) was established in collaboration with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and since 2012 has been integrated into the "Cocaine Route Programme" – a new programme.

This initiative aims to combat trafficking on the cocaine route and is financed by the Instrument for Stability in the EU. It is to coordinate the actions of the bodies and security forces and the judiciary of cocaine route from America to Europe through West African countries. The action incorporates Airports Communication Program (AIRCOP) Project Cooperation Sea Ports (SEACOP), the AMERIPOL project to enhance the capacities of the authorities and the GAFISUD project against money laundering and organized crime. This is a first attempt to address the illegal trafficking across the Atlantic Basin with three regions involved.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The EU, as a global actor and as a one of the main maritime traders in the Atlantic Basin has the responsibility to take a leading role in the fight against two of the main challenges for the maritime security: piracy attacks and illegal trafficking in drugs, arms, and humans and associated crimes. However, it is a shared responsibility that requires establishing partnerships with countries of the Atlantic Space to develop strategies for medium and long term to combat the causes of these phenomena and not just the consequences.

Since piracy and illegal trafficking are transnational and trans-regional multi-sectoral phenomena, they also required strategies that integrate different policies and partnerships. The existing programmes and projects show a growing area of cooperation on security issues, but not a global shared strategy for the Atlantic Basin that would integrate a common vision on security issues. Achieving coherency, coordination and synergies between a number of policy frameworks and instruments available to the EU is paramount. With the new EU Maritime Security Strategy still in its embryonic stages, the EU should seize the opportunity to truly interconnect the various existing tools in its toolbox. In particular, the 2003 European Security Strategy and the Integrated Maritime Policy (2007) have given birth to different policy frameworks that have been developing separately, but also the Maritime Strategy for the Atlantic Ocean Area is in existence since 2011, limited to five EU member states with an Atlantic coastline. The latter could be enlarged to cover the whole of the EU and be complementary with the two above mentioned policies.

These sectoral policies should be connected with the regional partnerships, such as the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) and the EULAC Plan of Action. The European Security Strategy and parallel initiatives that are being developed in Latin America, particularly within the South American Defence Council and the Central American Security Strategy show an affinity when defining a new broad agenda that
incorporates the concept of human security but in practice there are discrepancies that prevent the realisation of a working strategic agenda planned for the whole relationship and projected to the global agenda and neither to a common vision of the Atlantic Basin security challenges as maritime exchanges and illegal trafficking.

When it comes to combating piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, improving coordination between different actors is key. There are a multitude of organisations and associations with overlapping responsibilities. The EU’s main dilemma is that there is not yet a consolidated organisation in Africa to deal with piracy and insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea. So far, the EU strategy seems to oscillate between the AU and various regional organisations but there is no general consensus on the institutional question. The EU could push for one organisation and concentrate its funding on that arena, or equally distribute funding in all organisations involved, claim observer seats and be ready to follow an African lead. The mix of both is confusing.

A major challenge is that on the one side the EU needs African partners but at the same time even the petrol rich countries such as Angola and Nigeria, who have the greatest interest to secure their export routes, do not really have functioning navies. If rapid response against security threats is required, the French and US military bases in Central Africa (Gabon, STP, etc.) are probably the only ones to be able to be reacting. The EU’s role, in concert with the AU, should be to facilitate dialogue and coordination between the existing regional security schemes. The 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy is a point of departure on political consensus on objectives but still lacks of political commitment and concretise operative capacities and resources.

Strengthening dialogue on the common Atlantic security challenges is needed within international organizations with platforms for cooperation in the Southern Atlantic, such as ECOWAS, SADC, UNASUR and with those with special attention to interregional agendas, such as ZOPACAS. A broad strategy needs to involve peer institutions and organizations dedicated to security issues broadly in all the regions of the Atlantic Basin. The necessary cooperation with the US combating piracy and maintaining maritime security must support greater operational autonomy of regional actors and a greater leadership of emerging actors in the South Atlantic as Brazil and South Africa and other medium powers in the Atlantic Space. Triangular cooperation is a way to promote a new relationship between countries in the Atlantic Space that replace the traditional North-South relationship.

It is crucial for the EU to engage lead parties, particularly those most exposed to piracy (e.g. Nigeria) to agree on coordinated steps to addressing the problem. This won’t be easy considering the state of Nigeria’s naval capacity. The USA might, however, play a central role here since it too is engaged in the region (capacity building) and has a strong interest in ensuring minimal disturbance of oil supply chains in the Gulf. The EU must “step softly” since it can also swiftly be criticised for interference, as it was when discussion began surrounding outside help to Nigeria for its battle against Boko Haram.

Combating drug trafficking and organised crime have been and remain the main themes in interregional cooperation, which is essential for its transnational nature. Initiatives of trilateral cooperation such as the Cocaine Route Programme should be enhanced in a more broad comprehensive human security perspective including causes and including the protection of the people in the heart of the policies. If the objectives of the strategies against drug trafficking arise depending on the causes and not just the consequences, it must be assured the coherence of the security agenda with the development strategies.

The convergence of objectives, however, should not lead to a confusion of instruments; security policies should not replace development policies; they should be coordinated, but not confused. A key step is to give greater legitimacy to the decisions, involving more actors, expanding the dialogue, both in the design and the implementation of security policies. One of the least developed aspects in practice, but that is emerging, as a priority is the citizen security and the fight against violent crime, which has become one of the major challenges facing the region. This implies the need to incorporate issues of justice and home affairs in the debate on security dialogue.
RESEARCH PARAMETERS

The aim of the Atlantic Future is to study the rationales of cooperation in the Atlantic space and to suggest strategies to the European Union on how to engage with the wider transatlantic relationship, in a context of on-going redistribution of power and overall rebalancing of relations around and within the Atlantic space. During the first period of the project, Atlantic Future has dedicated its efforts to conceptualising what the project understands by the Atlantic area as a geopolitical space and to identifying the fundamental trends that are shaping the relations in this area. All of this, by providing a solid empirical basis about the evolution of Atlantic links in four key strategic areas: economic and finances, security, people and institutions and resources and environment.

In order to achieve these objectives the research made use of an interdisciplinary approach where the political geography, international relations and political economy provide the conceptual tools to explain the causes and consequences of political changes in the Atlantic. Specifically, the research in this first period of the project was organized into four thematic Work Packages (economic and trade; security; people and institutions; energy).

The project considers two types of geographical scopes since the research includes not only the description of the intra-oceanic flows (Atlantic as a biophysical reality) but it also aims to identify the links and changes among the major regions bordering the Atlantic (Atlantic as a laboratory of globalisation), in the thematic areas of this project (economy and trade; security; energy and environment; people and institutions). Due to this dual objective, the project adopted two working definitions about the Atlantic as a “space” and as a “basin”.

The Atlantic Space is the wider definition that includes the four regions as a whole that are bordering the Atlantic Ocean: North America, Central and South America and the Caribbean, Europe and Africa. Europe is understood to include all EU member states except Croatia (for it was not an EU member yet for the time period the research will focus on, i.e. 1992-2012) as well as Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein and Switzerland. The rationale behind including these three countries is that they are part of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) (Liechtenstein, Iceland and Norway as also part of the European Economic Area). The Atlantic Basin includes those countries bordering the Atlantic Ocean, those countries with a direct coastline in the Caribbean, and all EU-member states (except Croatia) and Switzerland.

PROJECT IDENTIFY

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FURTHER READING

