

**EXPERT EVALUATION NETWORK
DELIVERING POLICY ANALYSIS ON THE
PERFORMANCE OF COHESION POLICY 2007–2013
YEAR 1 – 2011**

**TASK 2: COUNTRY REPORT ON ACHIEVEMENTS OF
COHESION POLICY**

SWEDEN

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**A report to the European Commission
Directorate–General Regional Policy**

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- AIR Annual Implementation Report
- CBC Cross-Border Cooperation
- ERDF European Regional Development Fund
- EU European Union
- OP Operational Programme(s)
- RTI Research Technology and Innovation
- RTDI Research Technology Development and Innovation

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Swedish economy was hit harder by the financial crisis than the EU as a whole but has also recovered stronger than most other countries. The combination of a strong economic recovery and a history of fiscal discipline made short-term fiscal consolidations unnecessary. With an expected growth rate of 4.4% in 2011, unemployment of 6.9% and decreasing, balance in public finances and a public debt of less than 40% of GDP the economic situation in Sweden is radically different from most other EU countries.

Two thirds of the resources have been allocated to enterprise support and 21% of total resources available are allocated to transport policy. The third largest policy area is territorial development receiving 7% of resources while environment and energy receive only 2% of resources. With one exception, no significant changes in priorities were made in 2010.

In programmes for regional competitiveness and employment, support was committed to another 251 projects in 2010. In the 2007–2010 period, a total of EUR 722 million, corresponding to 77% of the budget, was committed to a total of 1,088 projects. The commitment rate varies between regions from 92% to 57%. For Territorial programmes, the commitment rate is 56.5%, significant lower than for programmes for regional competitiveness and employment due to a slow start.

In the programmes for regional competitiveness and employment, expenditure carried out in 2010 was of the same as in 2009. At the end of 2010, in total payments amounted to EUR 313 million, which corresponds to 44% of commitments and 34% of resources allocated. In the territorial programmes, expenditure in 2010 was twice as high as in 2009 but expenditure is still significantly lower for this programme than for the other.

On-going evaluations conclude that the programmes have contributed to improve existing cooperation in the counties and have created new opportunities to develop cooperation between the counties that constitute the NUTS 2 regions. The focus on larger strategic projects and on cross-country projects strengthened existing cooperation inside the counties and created new cross-border cooperation patterns. However, it is unclear to what extent and how this cooperation has influenced the impact of the programmes.

At the end of 2010 the Swedish programmes were estimated to have created 6,600 new firms (36% of the target) and 14,000 new jobs (42% of the target). In 2010, the ERDF-programmes created an estimated 5,400 new firms and 11,400 new jobs. 95% of the new firm and almost 99% of the new jobs are related to enterprise support and Research Technology and Innovation (RTI) policy area and 3% of the new firms and 1% of the new jobs to territorial development efforts, while only 0.2% of the new firms and 0.4% of the new jobs were created in the transport and telecommunication policy area. Five new transport projects were initiated.

Consideration of the wider effects of the programmes is normally an area for wishful thinking or speculation. The scale of most programmes is generally small compared to the

regional economies they are supported. Most changes that are taking place in the economies of the regions are not related to the programmes. Other factors, in most cases not under regional policy-makers' control, are more critical. Macro data, therefore, hardly register the effects of the programmes carried out.

Sweden has an ambitious evaluation programme as regards the programmes and projects co-financed by ERDF. On-going evaluations have been carried out in the period 2008–2010 for each of the 8 programmes and for a number of larger or strategic projects. On-going evaluations are undertaken for all projects which are larger than EUR 1 million. The focus in these evaluations is on the implementation process and the aim is to obtain the empirical basis for making new choices in order to increase the chances of attaining the goals set. This process of adjustment requires ability to learn among programme managers and the flexibility to address lessons learned.

The concentration on ongoing evaluation of programmes and large projects is a manifestation of the efforts to initiate a learning process. Significant progress has been made in this programming period but there are still some shortcomings. One problem is the insufficient feedback from on-going projects to programme management. There are several reasons for this problem. The existing system of targets and indicators make an efficient evaluation of outcomes and long term effects difficult. It is also important that the on-going evaluations deliver results that can be better used for an overall evaluation of implementation and results. To achieve this, on-going evaluations need to be more homogenous and better at delivering information and knowledge that management authorities can use.

1. THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT

Main points from last year's country report:

- Sweden has recovered fast after the financial crisis in 2008.
- Sweden is one of few EU countries that in 2011 fulfils the conditions of the stabilisation pact.
- The financial exposure to the PIIGs-countries (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain) is small.
- The growth in employment after the financial crisis has been concentrated in the three metropolitan regions.
- The financial crisis has had no impact on the implementation of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF)-programmes.

The Swedish economy was harder hit by the financial crisis than the EU as a whole but has also recovered stronger than most other countries. A 5.3% decline in GDP 2009 was followed by 5.7% growth in 2010 and the prognosis for 2011 is 4.4%. The dramatic decline in GDP in 2009 turned the surplus in public finances 2008 to a deficit of 2.8% of GDP. The strong growth in 2010 reduced the deficit to 1.4% of GDP in 2010 and the budget is expected to be in balance this year.¹ Unemployment increased significantly in 2009 and 2010 to reach 11% in 2011. During the last 12 months, unemployment has declined by around 1 percentage point. The combination of a strong economic recovery and a history of fiscal discipline made short-term fiscal consolidations unnecessary. With an expected growth rate of 4.4% in 2011, unemployment of 6.9%, improving public finances and a public debt of less than 40% of GDP the economic situation in Sweden is radically different from in most other EU countries.

The lack of data makes it difficult to analyse the regional impact of the global economic recession. There is no data on regional GDP after 2008. However the data for the period 2003–2008 shows that the three northern regions – Upper Norrland, Mid Norrland and North Central Sweden – which include most of the area that since the 1960s has been eligible for national regional support, had a growth rate significantly below the national average. Stockholm, with a growth rate that exceeded the national average, was in the years before the financial crisis the outstanding growth engine of Sweden.

When it comes to the regional impact of the global financial crisis different statistics give a different picture. The change in regional GDP in 2008 shows that Stockholm, with a 3.4% decline in GDP that year, was the region hardest hit by the crisis, while Upper Norrland (3.4%) and Middle Norrland (4.9%) continued to grow. The latter two regions experienced an increasing growth rate in the last few years up to 2008.

¹ National Institute of Economic Research (WWW.konj.se)

From the point of view of employment a slightly different picture is obtained. Employment decreased by 0.6% in 2008, mainly caused by a significant decline in the public sector, Stockholm being the only region in Sweden with growing employment. Stockholm combined a small decline in public sector and a significant increase of employment in the private service sector. Upper Norrland and Mid Norrland were, on the other hand, the only regions in Sweden where employment in private sector decreased in 2008. In addition, these two regions had a stronger decline in the public sector than other regions. Thus the employment statistics tend to indicate that the financial crisis in 2008 hit the peripheral regions in the north particularly strongly, while employment in Stockholm continued to grow.

In order to assess recovery after 2008 employment data are the only source of information because there are no updated regional accounts. The pattern indicated above has continued. Employment in Stockholm has grown by 3.4 % from the end of 2008 to April 2011, while in the same period employment decreased by 4.4 and 7.8 % in Upper Norrland and Mid Norrland. South Sweden – Scania–Bekinge –and West Sweden have performed better than the other Swedish regions. Thus based on employment data the three “metropolitan regions” – Stockholm, West Sweden and South Sweden – were less affected by the crisis and have recovered faster from it than the other regions. This reflects the strength of the private service sector in these regions. While total employment in Sweden has decreased by 2.1% since 2008, employment in the private service sector has increased by 0.7%. This growth has been concentrated in the metropolitan regions. The three northern regions have combined a small decrease of employment in the private sector with a 9–12% decline in the public sector.

One of the indicators most often used in public debate on region development in Sweden is population change. A reason for the focus on this indicator is that regional policy was introduced in Sweden in the 1960s as a response to migration from the north to the south of Sweden. The major aim of the new regional policy was to create balanced regional development and to stop outward migration from the north and the population growth in the metropolitan regions in the south. In the 1990s northern regions, together with Småland and the Islands in the southeast, still had declining population. After the global financial crisis all regions in Sweden, with the exception of Upper Norrland, have experienced an increase in their population. In Mid Norrland, North Central Sweden and Småland and the Islands the population growth is explained solely by inward migration. In terms of population growth therefore the crisis has been followed by a more balanced regional development. This is a pattern well known from Swedish history. Periods of high growth rates tend also to be periods with growing regional imbalances, while periods of low growth tend to be associated with more balanced regional development.

2. THE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY PURSUED, THE EU CONTRIBUTION TO THIS AND POLICY ACHIEVEMENTS OVER THE PERIOD

THE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY PURSUED

Main points from last year's country report:

- The main priority in all Swedish regions is enterprise support and Research Technology Development and Innovation (RTDI).
- Småland and the Island differ from the other regions by giving high priority to accessibility.
- Some regions have reallocated resources from accessibility and territorial development to enterprise support and RTDI in response to demand.
- No fiscal consolidation has been necessary as a response to the economic downturn.

Two thirds of the resources were allocated to the policy area Enterprise and RTDI. In West Sweden and East Central Sweden this policy area predominates and receives 90% of total allocation, while the share allocated to this is only 55% in Småland and the Islands and 61% in Stockholm. On average 21% of the resources are allocated to transport with Småland and the Island on top with 37% followed by North Mid Sweden 19%. The figure for Småland and the Islands reflects the fact that one of the main objectives of the programme is to increase accessibility of different areas of the region. The third largest policy area is territorial development receiving 7% of the resources. Stockholm gives the highest priority to this policy area with 19% of the resources allocated to it. Environment and energy has received only 2% of the resources allocated to Sweden as a whole, but it is the second highest priority area in Stockholm receiving 20% of the resources. In the ongoing evaluation project, the only indicators used for all policy areas are the number of new companies and of new jobs.

The evaluators studying how the horizontal objective of sustainable development has been integrated into programmes concluded that integration in this programming period has taken a significant step forward. The environmental aspect is now visible in many parts of programmes and many of the environmental projects are considered to have functioned better on average than the other projects. About 25% of projects have the explicit purpose of improving the environment. While 38% of the projects belong to this category in Scania-Blekinge, only 7% in Stockholm do so.² The gender equality aspect has also been accorded higher priority in Operational Programmes (OPs) in this programming period. The focus on large projects and few priority areas has created better opportunities for integrating this

² Tillväxtverket Tematisk rapport från strukturfondsarbetet: Hållbar utveckling. Stockholm 2010

aspect, especially in entrepreneurship and innovation projects, though it has been more difficult to integrate gender equality in measures for improving accessibility.³

With the exception of Småland and the Islands, no significant changes in priorities have been made in 2010. In Småland and Islands, EUR 5.5 million, or an additional 15%, has been reallocated to transport projects.

However, when it comes to the commitment of resources the relative importance of different priorities changed in 2010. The share of resources committed to enterprise support and RTDI was reduced from 71% to 66%, while the resources committed to the information society (6%), transport (14%) and tourism (4%) each increased by 1 percentage point.

The ongoing evaluations raised the question as to the advantages and disadvantages of open versus targeted programmes.⁴ In planning terminology, it is a question of a top-down approach as against a bottom-up one. The top-down approach is based on the conviction that policy-makers are able to identify future regional growth areas and leaves little room for local initiatives outside the strategic framework of the programme. In this case, if the regional business community does not share the strategic priorities made by policy-makers, the possibilities of them participating in the programme may be weakened. Cluster platforms for combined innovation and entrepreneurial support systems are strategic tools in the Scania-Blekinge programme. Promising areas were identified and platforms that offer project options in these have been established. The identification of areas to receive support was not driven by demand. In some cases there might be insufficient demand and this might hamper the development of the platforms which make up the core of the programme.⁵

The bottom-up approach is aimed at giving room to local initiatives in order to include as many participants as possible in the programme. From this point of view North Central Sweden has chosen to adopt a broadly formulated programme that gives room for a great deal of adaptability in terms of programme implementation.⁶ As a result the programme has been given a structure that gives many opportunities to respond to a wide variety of local initiatives. Critics of this approach, however, draw attention to the lack of strategic focus which may result in a wide spread of projects.

³ Tillväxtverket Tematisk rapport från strukturfondsarbetet: Jämställdhet. Stockholm 2010.

⁴ Tillväxtverket Följeforskning i programområde Småland och öarna. Slutrapport. Stockholm 2011, Tillväxtverket Följeforskning i programområde Östra Mellansverige Slutrapport Stockholm 2011.

Tillväxtverket Följeforskning i programområde Västsverige Slutrapport Stockholm 2011.

⁵ Tillväxtverket Följeforskning i programområde Skåne-Blekinge Slutrapport Stockholm 2011.

⁶ Tillväxtverket Följeforskning i programområde Norra Mellansverige Slutrapport Stockholm 2011

POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

Main points from last year's country report:

- The average commitment rate in 2009 was 49% of the budget. It was highest in North Central Sweden (54.6%) and lowest in East Central Sweden (39.3%).
- The largest commitment rate was in enterprise support, which in Scania-Blekinge was close to 100%.

In 2010 support was committed to another 251 projects. In the period 2007–2010, a total of EUR 722 million, corresponding to 77% of the budget, has been committed to 1,088 projects. At end-2010, upper Norrland had committed 92% of its budget, while Småland and the Islands, at the other end of the spectrum, had committed 57%. The other regions had committed between 65% and 80% of their budget. All regions, except Upper Norrland and East Central Sweden, committed fewer resources in 2010 than the year before. In Upper Norrland and East Central Sweden, the resources committed increased by 56% and 48% which raised total commitments by 50%. In Stockholm and Småland and the Island, commitments increased by less than 10%. In Småland and the Islands the commitment rate was slowed because there was a reallocation of the budget and the request to the EU to do this took some time.

Two comments on the figures in Table A should be made. In Upper Norrland, commitments for transport projects are in parenthesis because no allocation was made to this policy area in the preliminary budget presented in the OP. The figures in parenthesis indicate the amount committed to transport as a share of the total budget for Upper Norrland.

In a few cases commitments exceed the figures in the budget. This is the case for transport in Sweden as a whole, primarily reflecting the fact that East Central Sweden has committed almost twice as much as is indicated in the budget to this area and that Upper Norrland has committed resources to transport despite the fact that there was no such allocation in the budget.

Scania– Blekinge has in a similar way committed 104% of the budget to Enterprise support and Mid Norrland has committed more than twice as much as indicated in the budget to territorial development. Småland and the islands shows similar figures for 2009. Since then they have received permission to reallocate EUR 5.5 million to transport bringing the commitment rate for this down from 118.4% to 80.3%.

Table A also shows that little was committed to the environment and energy. At end-2010 only 23% of the resources allocated to this area had been committed. The commitment rate was particularly low in Scania-Blekinge and Upper Norrland where only 2.5% and 6.7% have been committed. It is worth noting that no new commitments were made in this area in the two regions in 2010.

The differences between the budget allocated and the commitments made reflect the gap between the priorities of policy-makers and the interests of the regional business community, universities, municipalities and so on. In areas where they have a great deal of interest, the demand for project financing is high while it is low in areas where interest is low. The strong interest in transport projects can partly be explained by the fact that many consider the national allocation to transport investment insufficient. From this point of view, ERDF financing is regarded as an opportunity to increase accessible resources through pooling national and EU funding. There is on the other hand at the moment a low interest for environmental and energy projects.

Table A – Committed resources in different programmes and broad policy areas as a share of allocation (2009 and 2010)

	Enterprise environment	Human Resources	Transport	Environment, energy	Territorial development	Total
Upper Norrland						
2010	86.5		(14.6*)	6.7	68.3	91.8
2009	68.6		(5.2*)	6.7	38.1	58.7
Mid Norrland						
2010	54.6		62.2	56.2	218.1	72.7
2009	62.2		58.1	42.8	178.1	60.3
North C. Sweden						
2010	73.6		181.7	56.2	62.7	80.5
2009	58.5		148.5	56.2	36.4	61.4
Stockholm						
2010	86.2			65.4	82.3	77.1
2009	80.5			56.5	82.3	71.9
East C. Sweden						
2010	72.9		73.6			64.7
2009	52.4		30.9			43.8
West Sweden						
2010	65.7				110.6	61.9
2009	10.4				70.4	46.9
Småland						
2010	55.4		80.3	19.4	40.4	56.8
2009	45.3		118.5	19.4	40.4	53.5
Scania-Bl.						
2010	104.3		59.8	2.5	76.7	76.3
2009	92.4		56.1	2.5	33.4	60.9
Sweden						
2010	73.4		141.3	23	87.5	77.1
2009	57.4		100.1	20.3	66.4	59

* percentage of total allocation in Upper Norrland

The commitment rate for the Cross-Border Cooperation (CBC) programmes was 56.5%, significant lower than for the regional competitiveness and employment programmes. CBC programmes had a slow start. Unfortunately it is not possible, because of a lack of data to examine either the increase in the commitment rate in 2010 or the commitment rate in relation to budget in the different policy areas. The figures in Table B relate to 2010 and the commitment rates in different policy areas represent commitments relative to total allocation. In comparison with the regional competitiveness and employment programme, human resources and the environment and energy play a more prominent role.

Table B – Committed resources in different CBC programmes and broad policy areas as a share of allocation (2010)

	Enterprise environment	Human resources	Transport	Environment, energy	Territorial development	Total
IVA Sweden –Norway	20.5	8	3.2	11.4	56.9	62.9
IVA North	67.8	2.9	2	8.4	18.8	54.6
IVA Botnia–Atlantica	52.8	0	4.9	18.3	24.1	50.4
IVA The Sound–Categat–Skagerrak	33.8	24.3	0	12.8	29.1	56.7

In regional competitiveness and employment programmes the expenditure carried out in 2010 was 15.2% of the budget very similar to the share spent (15.7%) in 2009. At end-2010 a total of EUR 313 million had been spent which corresponds to 44% of the committed funding and 34% of the allocated funding. In 2010 annual expenditure increased in four regions. In Småland and the Islands and Upper Norrland the growth in expenditure were respectively 32% and 25%. In the other four regions the expenditure was lower in 2010 than in 2009. There was a significant decline in expenditure in 2010 in Stockholm (–40%) and Scania–Blekinge (–32%).

North Central Sweden had the highest expenditure rate (43%), while Småland and the Islands (24.2%) and Scania–Blekinge (25.2%) had the lowest rates. If expenditure is compared to commitments the picture changes slightly. West Sweden and North Central Sweden have paid out 53% of the resources they have committed, while in Scania and Blekinge and Upper Norrland, the figures are only 33% and 35 %, respectively. The low expenditure rate in Scania–Blekinge reflects the fact that only 3% of the resources allocated for special urban initiatives have been spent. In Upper Norrland an explanation for the low expenditure rate might be that the programme is the second biggest with nearly 300 projects. Its management requires that at least 20% of the projects are visited. In addition, the region has been involved in ERDF projects since Sweden entered the EU in 1995 and gradually the projects have become more complex involving a growing number of participants. This makes it more time-consuming to scrutinize project proposals and lengthens the selection process. As a result, expenditure tends to be delayed.

The expenditure on CBC programmes in 2010 was twice as high as in 2009. The main reason was that the Sound–Categat–Skagerack programme started making payments and the budget for this represents over 50% of the total budget for the CBC programmes. However, expenditure is still significantly lower for this programme than for the others. (Table D).

Table C – Programme for regional competitiveness and employment – Expenditure in relation to total allocation (2009 and 2010) (%)

	2009	2010
Upper Norrland	15.8	32.5
Mid Norrland	20.8	34.0
North Central Sweden	23.1	42.6
Stockholm	23.6	37.3
East Central Sweden	18.0	30.5
West Sweden	18.1	33.1
Småland and the Islands	11.4	24.2
Scania–Blekinge	15.8	25.2
Sweden	18.6	33.8

Table D – CBC programmes – Expenditure in relation to total allocation (2009 and 2010) (%)

	2009	2010
IVA Sweden–Norway	9.1	22.8
IVA North	7.7	17.1
IVA Botnia–Atlantica	6.9	11.2
IVA The Sound–Categat–Skagerrak	0	6.9

ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE PROGRAMMES SO FAR

Main points from last year's country report:

- The number of jobs created in 2009 amounted to 7.5% of the target.
- The number of new firms created was 7.6% of the target.

The on-going evaluations conclude that the programmes have contributed to improving existing cooperation in the counties and have created new opportunities to develop cooperation between the counties in the NUTS 2 regions. The focus on large strategic projects and cross-county projects has strengthened existing cooperation inside the counties and has created new cross-border cooperation patterns. However, it is unclear how and to what extent this cooperation has influenced the impact of the programmes.

Representatives from industry involved in the projects have a very pragmatic view on the benefits of cooperation. They mention access to new knowledge and contacts as the main outcome of participating in projects financed by the ERDF. These results, however, are only to be expected. In general if people are asked about the benefit from participating in a programme they will tend to be positive, because if they are not they cannot justify to

themselves why they have spent time on it. From this point of view, access to new contacts and new knowledge are standard answers when justifying participation. The fact that the private sector contributes only around a fifth of the co-financing indicates that business investment in the programmes is limited. In two of the regions the contribution of the private sector to co-financing is less than 5% of the total. Only in one region does the contribution exceed 50% of total co-financing. Based on this, it is difficult to draw any serious conclusions from the above answers. Moreover, it is even more difficult to see how the new instances of collaboration and the new knowledge gained have been transformed into practical results.

There are practical as well as conceptual problems in evaluating the results of programmes. The practical problems are related to the fact that the flow of reports to the national monitoring system is normally delayed. In addition, the procedure for reporting data to the system is not the same for all projects. For some projects, progress is reported on a continuing basis while for others progress is reported only when a project is completed. In any case there needs to be reporting three months after the project finishes at the latest but in practice for many projects this deadline is not respected. This means that the database contains a mix of data from projects that have been finalised within the three months and data from on-going projects. Therefore, the data available at end-2010 does not reflect the real situation at this date.

A further problem is that only few projects had been completed by end-2010. In Scania-Blekinge 25% of the projects were completed on the 1 June 2011⁷. Based on this it can be expected that reported outcomes will increase substantially in the coming years. The more serious conceptual problem is that the definitions of the indicators are unclear and that the interpretations given to them differ between project leaders. A new job is defined as a direct job created in the private or the public sector but which is not funded by the project. In practice there are many problems in estimating the number of new jobs which leads to uncertainty over the estimates. The employment effect is based on estimates presented by the participants in the projects and it is difficult to validate the quality of the data delivered.

The major difficulty with these definitions is to identify the causal link between the project and the new firms or the new jobs. We can assume that the influence of contextual circumstances external to the projects would have made possible the creation of a number of these new jobs and new firms in a situation where the programme did not exist. We can then take one step back and argue that one of the aims of the programme is to influence the regional context in order to promote new jobs and firms. The problem is to identify the extent to which the projects have contributed to changing the regional context. The difficulties in identifying the importance of a single factor in a complex process like regional development means that the data reported is arbitrary to a significant extent.

⁷ Tillväxtverket Redovisning från inlämnade slutrapporter. Stockholm 2011

Two conclusions can be drawn from these considerations. First, the reported figures do not give an accurate picture of the results from the programmes and secondly, the figures on new jobs and new firms systematically overestimate the short-term achievements of the programme⁸.

Having this in mind the figures presented in the Annual Implementation Report (AIR) show that the Swedish programmes created 6,600 new firms (36% of the target) and 14,000 new jobs (42% of the goal) by end-2010. In 2010, 5,400 new firms and 11,400 new jobs were created according to the data on ERDF programmes. So 2010 is the first year in which a substantial outcome from the programmes is seen. There are significant differences in achievements between the programmes. The result of the Stockholm programme stands out. At end-2010 this programme had generated 8% more new firms (15% more firms by February 2011⁹) and 63% more jobs than the targets set in the programme. At the other end of the spectrum is Scania-Blekinge, where the number of new firms and new jobs generated by the programme amounts to only 22% and 9% of the targets set. This difference in achievements may have four different explanations. First, the difference in results reflects the quality of management of the two programmes. Secondly, the difference reflects different ambitions expressed in the targets. Thirdly, the difference reflects the fact that the two programmes have different focuses. Finally the low figures for Scania-Blekinge may reflect some technical problem in reporting the results to the monitoring system.

We have no basis for assessing the quality of the management of the two programmes but it seems unlikely that this factor is the main explanation of the difference. A superficial comparison of the resources and the goals indicates that unrealistic target setting does not explain the difference. The budget for the Scania-Blekinge programme is about twice as high as the budget for Stockholm while the goals in terms of new firms and new jobs are only 46% and 66% higher. Given the focus chosen in the Scania-Blekinge programme the targets were probably too ambitious. The problem was aggravated by slow reporting of results.

The favourable result of the Stockholm programme is explained by the fact that the programme is small and is focused on large projects. The programme consists of a total of 17 projects, but the success in generating new firms and new jobs is mainly linked to a single project, "Entrepreneur Stockholm", which has created 94% of the new firms and 96% of the new jobs. The project complements the existing support structure for potential entrepreneurs. The complementary character of the project makes it even more difficult to isolate its impact from the rest of the support system. The results observed in Stockholm also raise a question as to how to assess programme results generally. On the one hand, the programme is successful in terms of fulfilling the goals. The number of new firms and new jobs exceeds the targets set. On the other hand, the targets have been achieved thanks to a

⁸ Ledningskonulterna Investeringar I tillväxt? Slutrapport från följeforskningen 2008–2011 av Strukturfondsprogrammet Mellersta Norrland. Stockholm 2011 (manuscript)

⁹ Tillväxtverket Följeforskning i programområde Stockholm. Slutrapport. Stockholm 2011.

single project. Accordingly, it is possible to argue the programme has failed because the other projects have not reached their goals. Only one of 17 projects has been successful.

The low figures in Scania–Blekinge can to some degree be explained by slow reporting. A few months after the 2010 AIR was finalised the achievement rate in terms of new firms created has increased to 72% of the target and for new jobs to 61%. In this programme, 96% of the new firms and 88% of the new jobs were created by projects in the innovation priority area. As in Stockholm a small number of successful projects accounted for most of the outcome. A detailed study of 15 projects shows that 88% of the new firm and 74% of the new jobs created by these projects was a result of only three projects¹⁰. The situation is similar in Småland and the Island and, to a lesser degree, in West Sweden.¹¹

Table E – Main physical indicators

Policy area	Main indicators	Outcomes and results (physical outcomes plus brief note on what has been achieved)
Enterprise support and RTDI	New Firms	3,753 new firms
	New Jobs	14,397 new jobs
Human Resources (ERDF only)		
Transport and telecommunications	New firms	8 new firms
	New jobs	64 new jobs
	New transport and communication solutions	10 new transport and communication solutions
Environment and energy		
Territorial development (urban areas, tourism, rural development, cultural heritage, health, public security, local development)	New firms	130 new firms
	New jobs	153 new jobs

It is difficult to link the results of the projects to the different policy areas. In the AIR the results are shown for each programme and each indicator – new jobs, new firms, number of participants, new networks, broadband and transport solutions – but these not divided into different priority or policy areas. In the final reports of the on-going evaluation, the results from the project are split by priority area. New firms and new jobs are the only indicators used. Based on this we can make only a rough calculation of the result for different policy areas.

The calculation shows that 95% of the new firm and almost 99% of the new jobs are related to enterprise support and RTDI, 3% of the new firms and 1 % of the new jobs are linked to territorial development, while only 0.2% of the new firms and 0.4% of the new jobs were created by transport and telecommunication projects. Surprisingly no new firms or new jobs

¹⁰ Tillväxtverket Följeforskning i proramområde Skåne–Blekinge. Slutrapport. Stockholm 2011.

¹¹ Tillväxtverket Följeforskning i proramområde Smaland and the Islands. Slutrapport. Stockholm 2011, Tillväxtverket Följeforskning i proramområde Västsverige. Slutrapport. Stockholm 2011.

were reported for transport projects in Småland and the Islands despite the fact that 37% of the resources were allocated to this area. However, it can be argued that new firms are not a relevant indicator in this policy area and that new jobs are primarily an indirect effect of such measures. A further indicator included in the programmes for this area is new transport 'solutions'. The AIR indicates that three new transport 'solutions' have been developed in Småland and the Islands, as compared with the target of 9 new solutions mentioned in the AIR. There is however no explanation of how a "new transport solution" is defined.¹² It should also be mentioned that the end-target indicated in the programme is five new transport- and-communication solutions¹³. North Central Sweden allocated 16% of the resources to transport and also uses new jobs, new firms and new transport solutions as indicators. The target is to create 500 new jobs and an unspecified number of new firms and new transport solutions. The result so far is 8 new firms, 64 new jobs and two new transport solutions.¹⁴

In Sweden, the first ERDF co-financed venture capital funds started in 2005. Pilot funds, modelled after the Scottish Co-investment Fund, were established in three regions. They were operational between 2005 and 2008¹⁵. The role of the funds was to increase access to equity capital for SMEs in order to make it easier for them to obtain further loans from banks. The funds were given a special responsibility for financing the start-up phase of firms and their early development. Priority was given to "environmental driven" firms and firms owned and/or managed by women. The pilot funds invested their financial resources (EUR 12.5 million) in 71 projects. Since no evaluation of the pilots has been carried out, it is not possible at this stage to assess whether the investment mainly went to firms with growth potential and to calculate the return on the investment made. However, Swedish policy-makers considered the pilot project successful and decided to extend the system to all regions. In this programming period 12 regional investment funds covering all parts of Sweden have been established in the form of ERDF co-financed projects. In total EUR 275 million has been allocated to each of the funds.

The most innovative element in the Swedish programmes is how the regions have approached the task to support innovation. The standard approach is to support research projects at universities or to development projects in industry. Instead some regions have put the focus on building regional systems of innovation based on research into clusters and systems of innovation¹⁶. The aim of ERDF co-financing was not to stimulate innovation directly as such but to take one step back and to build a system that stimulates the

¹² Tillväxtverket Samlad lägesrapport per 2010-12-31. En investering för framtiden. Stockholm 2011.

¹³ Tillväxtverket Regionalt strukturfondsprogram för regional konkurrenskraft och sysselsättning i Småland och öarna 2007-2013. Stockholm 2007

¹⁴ Tillväxtverket Regionalt strukturfondsprogram för regional konkurrenskraft och sysselsättning i Norra Mellansverige 2007-2013. Stockholm 2007

¹⁵ An evaluation of these three pilot funds has been made. Tillväxtverket Utvärdering: Pilotsatsning på regionala investeringsfonder. Stockholm 2011.

¹⁶ M. Porter The Competitive Advantage of Nations. London 1990; Bengt-Åke Lundvall (ed.) National Systems of Innovation London 1992.

innovation capacity of the region and thus generates innovations that create new firms and new jobs. In other words the strategy was to build an institutional infrastructure that permanently fosters innovation in the region. The main advantage of such a strategy is that, if successful, it will have strong long-term impacts that may transform the industrial structure of the region and enhance growth. The drawback is that it is a highly risky strategy. The long-term aim of building an institutional structure is initially financed by short-term project money. A necessary condition for success is to find long term financial resources to ensure that the platforms survive after the projects come to an end.

3. EFFECTS OF INTERVENTION

Main conclusion from last year's report was that: it was too early to evaluate the extent to which the programmes have strengthened the competitiveness of the regions.

The goal of most programmes is to have a long-term impact on regional development. In the competitive regions this means to increase the competitiveness of the region through structural changes. If it is difficult to measure the direct outcome of each project, it is almost impossible to assess the wider effects of intervention on the development of the regions. Consideration of those wider effects is normally a case of wishful thinking and speculation. The size of most programmes is generally small compared to regional economies. Most changes that occur in the economies are not connected to programmes. Other factors which in most cases are not under the control of regional policy-makers are more important. It is, therefore, almost impossible to separate the effects caused by programmes in macro data. The point can be illustrated by the Stockholm programme. As noted above, the Stockholm programme can be considered to be successful, at least when results in terms of the creation of jobs and firms are compared with the targets set. But the 324 new firms and the 2,118 new jobs represent less than 1% of the 39,000 new firms and 57,000 new jobs created in the region in 2009 and 2010. It is possible that some of the firms supported by the programme will have a long-term structural impact on the growth of the region. Only the future will tell whether this will be the case in practice and it is not possible to know at present.

However, Stockholm is an extreme case because it is the biggest region in Sweden and has the smallest programme. In the other regions the reported number of new firms created by the programmes corresponds to 0.8% to 7.3% of the total number of new firms in 2009–2010. The share is largest in small regions with big programmes. If economic development is regarded as a complex process characterised by randomness, the probability of achieving strong wider effects is for statistical reasons highest in small regions. It is promising from this point of view that the two regions in Sweden with the smallest population also have the two largest programmes. The reason for this is not their small size but rather that these sparsely population regions have been eligible for regional support since the 1960s. Overall, the Swedish experience of “project based regional policy” is that, in spite of the fact that the

ERDF-programme dispose of relatively large economic resources, it is difficult to identify positive effects on industry and employment.¹⁷

The point of departure for Cohesion Policy in the EU is the belief that economic development is a process that can be managed. Specific efforts are expected to have a strong impact on development. The challenge is to identify the efforts in question. History gives some support for such a view. Historical analysis of regional development gives many examples of new projects and initiatives that under particular circumstances have had a profound impact on regional development. However, it also teaches us two other things. First, these efforts are only in a few cases the result of public policy. In most cases, they consist of initiatives taken by firms without any public support. Secondly, it normally takes a long time before the impact becomes visible. The initiative by some young and radical computer freaks, with radical political ideas and no love for IBM and the computer establishment, to found Homebrew Computer Club in Silicon Valley in the early 1970s one example. The club thrived in a kind of joyous anarchy but the club also happened to become an important step in the development of a multi-billion industry in Silicon Valley in the 1980s. From such a perspective, it is strange to consider the wider impact of programmes that have been running only for three years. Sometimes afterwards, it is possible to see a pattern, like the importance of Homebrew Computer Club in Silicon Valley. In the midst of the process many signs of what the future may bring might be visible, but the major problem is that without hindsight it is not possible to separate the false signs from the real ones. What is possible is to consider the potential of on-going projects and the challenges they have to overcome in order to have an impact on development.

Some Swedish regions are focusing on building up cluster platforms as a tool for creating a more growth oriented industrial structure. Scania-Blekinge's platform projects are example of this. Regional development platforms are defined as "*regional resource configurations based on the past development trajectories, but presenting the future potential to produce competitive advantage existing in the defined resources configurations.*"¹⁸ Instead of focusing on individual innovations these projects are aimed at supporting the creation of local systems of innovation involving many different kinds of participant representing industry, academia and government. Some of these platform projects have a strong focus on research while others focus more on local industry. The primary short-term ambition is to build a system of participants that will foster innovative activities in the region. One example of this kind of project is "Innovative food in innovative packaging" in which networks based on the Triple Helix approach are created with the aim of them in the next stage using the open innovation method to develop new products. If this is successful, new firms will emerge in the next step and new jobs will be created, but this will take much

¹⁷ ITPS (2004:009) Effektutvärdering av de geografiska målprogrammen inom EG:s strukturfonder, SOU 2005:93 Stärkt konkurrenskraft och sysselsättning i en ny geografi – en samlad förvalting med politisk styrning.

¹⁸ Vesa Harmaakorpi The 'Regional Development Platform Method' as a Tool for Innovation Policy. In Arne Eriksson (ed.) The Matrix. Post Cluster Innovation Policy. VINNOVA REPORT VR 2010:10

longer time than the three years the project lasts. Often it is a question of decades rather than years. Many of these projects have until now produced few new firms and new jobs. From this point of view they do not seem to be successful at the moment and the long-term potential is still unknown. The strong focus on building local systems of innovation may explain why the programme in Scania-Blekinge up till now has delivered fewer new jobs than the other programmes, but it may – if all pieces fell to place – be the one having the largest long-term impact on regional development.

These platform projects represent an interesting initiate a process that may under fortunate circumstances result in a long-term industrial transformation of the region in which the Structural Funds played an important role in the early stage. However, the long-term success of the projects cannot be taken for granted. There is an obvious risk that this kind of project becomes too complex or that it transforms into a project financed organisation more focused on its own survival than on strengthening the regional system of innovation. Those platform projects that are able to successfully overcome these obstacles and have successfully identified promising growth areas for the region have the potential to exert a strong long-term impact on the development of the region. The dilemma of these projects is that their short-term impact, measured by the “standard” indicators and presented in the evaluation made when the projects are completed, will be low. On the other hand, in the cases where the projects will have a strong long-term impact on regional development, the time gap between the project and the impact will in most case be too long to make it possible to trace back the changes to the original project. The sad fate of long-term successful projects of this kind is that their impact many years after the project is finished will in most case not be recognized.

The situation is similar for the accessibility priority. Småland and the Island, that has allocated almost 40% of the budget to transport, has up till now reported no new firms and new jobs from these efforts. Transport projects take the form of infrastructure, like building a new combi-terminal or a new node in the railway network. Except for the jobs in the construction period, which are not counted in an evaluation, such projects do not directly result in new firms or new jobs. They result in investment that may possibly support the growth of existing companies and help attract new firms to the region. This impact on growth cannot start taking place before the construction is over and the project is finished and it will take some years before anything happens. The result, measured in terms of new firms and new jobs, will be limited at the end of the project but the new infrastructure may, if successful, affect regional growth for a long time. For infrastructure projects as well, the new firms and new jobs created soon after the projects are finished seem to be misleading as indicators.

4. EVALUATIONS AND GOOD PRACTICE IN EVALUATION

Title and date of completion	Policy area and scope	Main objectives	Main findings	Full reference or link to publication
Följeforskning I programområde Norra Mellansverige. Slutrapport; June 2011	North Mid Sweden	Ongoing evaluation of the implementation process	The programme has been implanted in line with the direction laid down in the programme document	http://publikationer.tillvaxtvverket.se/ProductView.aspx?ID=1631
Följeforskning I programområde Stockholm. Slutrapport June 2011	Stockholm	Ongoing evaluation of the implementation process	The operative work has been carried out in line with the programme's overall ambitions. Goal achievement is good, but it is uncertain whether the projects that are still not completed will reach the established goals.	http://publikationer.tillvaxtvverket.se/ProductView.aspx?ID=1633
Följeforskning I programområde Östra Mellansverige. Slutrapport June 2011	East Central Sweden	Ongoing evaluation of the implementation process	The focus of the implementation is in line with the intentions of the programme	http://publikationer.tillvaxtvverket.se/ProductView.aspx?ID=1632
Följeforskning I programområde Västsverige. Slutrapport July 2011	West Sweden	Ongoing evaluation of the implementation process	There is a need to address and renew strategic discussion. The most urgent issue to address is how to establish a structure that can guarantee a lasting impact of some of the projects	http://publikationer.tillvaxtvverket.se/ProductView.aspx?ID=1627
Följeforskning I programområde Småland och öarna. Slutrapport July 2011	Småland and the Islands	Ongoing evaluation of the implementation process	There is a need for: * closer view on the question of deadweight * discussion of how a better impact from large scale entrepreneurship and business development projects may be achieved * a more strategic address when looking at the most innovative projects	http://publikationer.tillvaxtvverket.se/ProductView.aspx?ID=1628
Följeforskning I programområde Skåne-Blekinge. Slutrapport July 2011	Scania-Blekinge	On going evaluation of the implementation process	The cluster platforms represent a promising beginning of a structural change for which the ERDF has played an important role	http://publikationer.tillvaxtvverket.se/ProductView.aspx?ID=1629
Tematisk rapport från	Sustainable	Study the handling of	The criteria used to	http://publikationer.tillvaxtvverket.se/ProductView.aspx?ID=1630

Title and date of completion	Policy area and scope	Main objectives	Main findings	Full reference or link to publication
strukturfondsarbetet. Hållbar utveckling June 2010	development	the horizontal goals in the implementation process	evaluate the environmental aspects varies between the programmes	ioner.tillvaxtv rket.se/Search. aspx
Tematisk rapport från strukturfondsarbetet. Jämställdhet March 2010	Gender equality	Study the handling of the horizontal goals in the implementation process	Awareness of the requirements of equality has increased, the description of the nature of the problem has improved and the integration of equality aspects in project operations has increased.	http://publikat ioner.tillvaxtv rket.se/Search. aspx?pageid=75
Tematisk rapport från strukturfondsarbetet. Integration March 2010	Social integration	Study the handling of the horizontal goals in the implementation process	The concept of integration is unclear making different programmes relate different to the concept.	http://publikat ioner.tillvaxtv rket.se/Search. aspx?pageid=75
Tematisk rapport från strukturfondsarbetet. Kluster March 2010	Cluster development	Identify qualitative cluster success factors	Success factors; *idea *initiatives and engagement * Activities * Critical mass * Organization	http://publikat ioner.tillvaxtv rket.se/Search. aspx?pageid=75
Tematisk rapport från strukturfondsarbetet. Inkubatorer March 2010	Incubators	Management of incubators	The requirements for support measures offered to new ventures in their start up process differs, as well as the type of competences and resources within the incubator to produce these services. All incubators benefit from some general success-factors such as long-term financing, entrance criteria for incoming new ventures, and a high degree of commitment and business experience among the incubator's staff	http://publikat ioner.tillvaxtv rket.se/Search. aspx?pageid=75
Så kan EU bidra till regional utveckling March 2011	Assessment of project management (case study of 16 projects)	Presentation of project managers experiences in Scania-Blekinge	Project leaders underlined that the results of the project will not be seen until long after the project is finalized. They also question if it is possible to measure the outcome of	http://publikat ioner.tillvaxtv rket.se/Search. aspx?pageid=75

Title and date of completion	Policy area and scope	Main objectives	Main findings	Full reference or link to publication
			project focusing on creating new knowledge and new networks in order to influence the innovation climate in the region	
Projekt ARENA NetPort. Karlshamn	Project evaluation	Ongoing evaluation of the implementation of a project	A project aiming at creating a new competence that in the next step will result in a new industry in the region. The process of building new competence at the local university has been successful, but much of the competences in the field belongs to firms/organisations located outside the region, which imply a risk that the industrial spill-over effects will happen in other regions	http://publikationer.tillvaxtvetket.se/Search.aspx?pageid=75
Automation Region April 2011	Project evaluation	Ongoing evaluation of the implementation of a project	Well anchored among the local automation firms a strong growing cluster has emerged. However it is expected to take another couple of years before strong effects of the project will be seen	http://publikationer.tillvaxtvetket.se/

Sweden has an ambitious evaluation programme for the programmes and projects co-financed by ERDF. On-going evaluations have been carried out in the period 2008–2010 of each of the eight regional competitive programmes and of a number of larger or strategic projects in these. On-going evaluations are carried out for all projects larger than EUR 1 million. The focus in these evaluations is on the implementation process and the aim is to obtain an empirical basis for making new choices in order to increase the chances of reaching the objectives set. The approach implies that programme managers have the ability to learn and are flexible enough to respond to the lessons learned. The theoretical point of departure for the on-going evaluations is the body of theory on learning organisations. These theories teach us that an important difference between successful and not so successful organisations is reflected in their ability to learn from the past and to translate the learning into behavioural changes. In order to achieve this, the on-going evaluations should stimulate reflective learning processes based on a critical but constructive analysis of the programmes that are translated into improvements in them.

In the 2007–2013 programming period three teams of evaluators are responsible for the on-going evaluations of the eight programmes. In addition, other teams are performing on-going evaluations of large and/or strategic projects. This evaluation approach has stimulated a general interest in on-going evaluations. A number of Swedish universities now offer courses on this subject, textbooks in the topic has been published, and networks of evaluators specialised in on-going evaluation are emerging.¹⁹

Under the on-going evaluation of the programmes, the teams are expected to produce four reports for each of the regions. The first report, published in 2009, focused on the content of the programme and analysed the portfolio of approved projects. In the second report, also published in 2009, the portfolio analysis was combined with a questionnaire to all project leaders and interviews with a small number of them. In addition, case studies of a number of projects were undertaken. In the third report, published in 2010, the focus was moved from the implementation process to the results of the programme with a special focus on innovation projects. The method used in the report was a combination of questionnaires to project leaders and case studies of projects. In the case studies project leaders and other stakeholders were interviewed. In the final report, published in 2011, the focus is on the result of the programme. The reports are written as feedback to the managing authorities and also give s recommendations. The last step in the on-going evaluation of the programmes is to prepare three thematic reports and one synthesis report covering all the 8 programmes.

One advantage of this evaluation approach is that evaluation is carried out in parallel with the implementation of the programme making it possible to use the insights that are generated by the evaluations in its further implementation. The fact that the evaluators follow the programme for three years gives an opportunity to establish a t relationship of trust between the evaluators and project management. The approach creates conditions for an on-going dialogue between the two so creating favourable good conditions for a learning process.

On-going evaluations are also carried out for many strategic or large projects²⁰. These project evaluations have, like the programme evaluations continually delivered reports to the participants in the projects. However, only the final report is normally published on the Tillväxtverket's web site. The final reports cover the purpose, basis and organisation of the project and the implementation process is described before the results after three year are

¹⁹ Lennart Svensson, Göran Brulin, Sven Jansson & Karin Sjöberg (eds.) *LEARNING Through Ongoing EVALUATION*. Lund 2009

²⁰ Edit Andresen *Utvärdering av projektet det regionala startegiska nätverket MIDSCAND*. Sundsvall 2011; Björn Eriksson *Automation Region. Följeforskning*. Stockholm 2011; Mattias Norrling & Jenny Hollstrand *Projekt ARENA NetPort*. Karlshamn. *Koncept för vägavgifter och regionalt innovationssystem*. Stockholm 2011; Stig Westerdahl *Om konsten i regional utveckling. Exemplet Färgfabriken Norr 2008–2010*. Östersund 2011; Erik Jakobsson & Lennart Svensson *Att stimulera innovationer och företagsutveckling i Hälsningland. Slutrapport följeforskning 3M-projek*. Linköping 2011; Bengt Arne Larsson, Martin Persson & Christer Wallin *Slutrapport: Följeforskning av project Våga & växa & Vinna*. Kristianstad 2011; Anna Kremel *"Att hjälpa företag är en kick"*. Slutrapport Entreprenörcentrum, Norrbotten och Västerbotten. Örebro 2011.

discussed. The focus in these evaluations is on the implementation process. Normally the discussion of the outcome of the project is rather fragmented and superficial. The evaluations combine desk study, interviews and questionnaires. The desk study is used to obtain an overview of the project and of the decisions made by the management team. Interviews and questionnaires are used to find out what the participants are expecting from the programme. In many cases the results from these investigations have resulted in organisational changes or changes in activity. These on-going project evaluations, focusing on the implementation of the project, provide some examples of good practice. Some of the evaluations²¹ focus primarily on the implementation process itself, while others²² pay more attention on the outcome. All on-going evaluations are undertaken in close contact with project teams and in the best cases the feedback from the evaluators has generated insights that led to changed behaviour.

The on-going evaluations have been complemented with five thematic evaluations focusing on specific aspects. Three of them focused on the horizontal goals – sustainable development, social integration and gender equity – while the other two are concentrated on incubators and cluster.²³ The aim of the three evaluations on sustainable development, social integration and gender equality was to study how the horizontal goals were handled in the programmes and the conditions for the programme to contribute to achieving these goals.

5. CONCLUDING REMARKS – FUTURE CHALLENGES

The main points made in last year's report were:

- One major challenge is to combine the top-down approach expressed in the EU strategic guidelines and the national strategy with a bottom-up approach in order to include support of innovative initiatives in the regions.
- Another challenge is to deal with the fact that short-term projects with expected long-term effects normally are evaluated before these long-term effects are visible.

The present report has confirmed the importance of these two challenges and identified one more. An important ambition has been to stimulate learning processes and so make the implementation process more efficient. The concentration on on-going evaluation of programmes and large projects is a manifestation of these efforts. Significant progress has been made but there are still some shortcomings. One problem is the insufficient feedback

²¹ Bengt Arne Larsson, Martin Persson & Christer Wallin *Slutrapport: Följeforskning av project Våga & växa & Vinna*. Kristianstad 2011

²² Mattias Norrling & Jenny Hollstrand *Projekt ARENA NetPort. Karlshamn. Koncept för vägavgifter och regionalt innovationssystem*. Stockholm 2011

²³ Tillväxtverket *Tematisk rapport från strukturfondsarbetet. Hållbar utveckling*. Stockholm 2010; Tillväxtverket *Tematisk rapport från strukturfondsarbetet. Integration*. Stockholm 2010; Tillväxtverket *Tematisk rapport från strukturfondsarbetet. Jämställdhet*. Stockholm 2010; Tillväxtverket *Tematisk rapport från strukturfondsarbetet. Kluster*. Stockholm 2010; Tillväxtverket *Tematisk rapport från strukturfondsarbetet. Inkubatorer*. Stockholm 2010,

from on-going projects to programme management. There are several reasons for this. The existing system of targets and indicators make an efficient evaluation of outcomes as well as of the long term effects difficult to achieve. It is also important that the on-going evaluations deliver results that can be better used than now for an overall evaluation of the implementation of programmes and the results. To achieve this, on-going evaluations need to be more homogenous and better at providing information and knowledge that managing authorities can use.

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TABLES

See Excel file for Tables 1–4

Table 1 – Regional disparities and trends

Table 2 – Macro-economic developments

Table 3 – Financial allocation by main policy area

Table 3 CBC – Financial allocation by main policy area

Table 4 – Commitments by main policy area (by end-2010)

Table 4 CBC – Commitments by main policy area (by end-2010)

Annex Table A – Broad policy areas and correspondence with fields of intervention (FOI)

Policy area		Code	Priority themes
1. Enterprise environment	RTDI and linked activities	01	R&TD activities in research centres
		02	R&TD infrastructure and centres of competence in a specific technology
		05	Advanced support services for firms and groups of firms
		07	Investment in firms directly linked to research and innovation (..)
		74	Developing human potential in the field of research and innovation, in particular through post-graduate studies
	Innovation support for SMEs	03	Technology transfer and improvement of cooperation networks
		04	Assistance to R&TD, particularly in SMEs (including access to R&TD services in research centres)
		06	Assistance to SMEs for the promotion of environmentally-friendly products and production processes (...)
		09	Other measures to stimulate research and innovation and entrepreneurship in SMEs
		14	Services and applications for SMEs (e-commerce, education and training, networking, etc.)
		15	Other measures for improving access to and efficient use of ICT by SMEs
	ICT and related services	11	Information and communication technologies (...)
		12	Information and communication technologies (TEN-ICT)
		13	Services and applications for citizens (e-health, e-government, e-learning, e-inclusion, etc.)
	Other investment in firms	08	Other investment in firms
2. Human resources	Education and training	62	Development of life-long learning systems and strategies in firms; training and services for employees ...

Policy area		Code	Priority themes
		63	Design and dissemination of innovative and more productive ways of organising work
		64	Development of special services for employment, training and support in connection with restructuring of sectors ...
		72	Design, introduction and implementing of reforms in education and training systems ...
		73	Measures to increase participation in education and training throughout the life-cycle ...
	Labour market policies	65	Modernisation and strengthening labour market institutions
		66	Implementing active and preventive measures on the labour market
		67	Measures encouraging active ageing and prolonging working lives
		68	Support for self-employment and business start-up
2. Human resources (Cont.)	Labour market policies (Cont.)	69	Measures to improve access to employment and increase sustainable participation and progress of women ...
		70	Specific action to increase migrants' participation in employment ...
		71	Pathways to integration and re-entry into employment for disadvantaged people ...
		80	Promoting the partnerships, pacts and initiatives through the networking of relevant stakeholders
3. Transport	Rail	16	Railways
		17	Railways (TEN-T)
		18	Mobile rail assets
		19	Mobile rail assets (TEN-T)
	Road	20	Motorways
		21	Motorways (TEN-T)
		22	National roads
		23	Regional/local roads
	Other transport	24	Cycle tracks
		25	Urban transport
		26	Multimodal transport
		27	Multimodal transport (TEN-T)
		28	Intelligent transport systems
		29	Airports
		30	Ports
		31	Inland waterways (regional and local)
		32	Inland waterways (TEN-T)
4. Environment and energy	Energy infrastructure	33	Electricity
		34	Electricity (TEN-E)
		35	Natural gas
		36	Natural gas (TEN-E)
		37	Petroleum products
		38	Petroleum products (TEN-E)
		39	Renewable energy: wind
		40	Renewable energy: solar

Policy area		Code	Priority themes
		41	Renewable energy: biomass
		42	Renewable energy: hydroelectric, geothermal and other
		43	Energy efficiency, co-generation, energy management
	Environment and risk prevention	44	Management of household and industrial waste
		45	Management and distribution of water (drink water)
		46	Water treatment (waste water)
		47	Air quality
		48	Integrated prevention and pollution control
		49	Mitigation and adaption to climate change
		50	Rehabilitation of industrial sites and contaminated land
		51	Promotion of biodiversity and nature protection (including Natura 2000)
		52	Promotion of clean urban transport
		53	Risk prevention (...)
		54	Other measures to preserve the environment and prevent risks
5. Territorial development	Social Infrastructure	10	Telephone infrastructure (including broadband networks)
		75	Education infrastructure
		77	Childcare infrastructure
		78	Housing infrastructure
	Tourism and culture	79	Other social infrastructure
		55	Promotion of natural assets
		56	Protection and development of natural heritage
		57	Other assistance to improve tourist services
		58	Protection and preservation of the cultural heritage
		59	Development of cultural infrastructure
	Planning and rehabilitation	60	Other assistance to improve cultural services
	Other	61	Integrated projects for urban and rural regeneration
		82	Compensation of any additional costs due to accessibility deficit and territorial fragmentation
		83	Specific action addressed to compensate additional costs due to size market factors
6. Technical assistance		84	Support to compensate additional costs due to climate conditions and relief difficulties
		81	Mechanisms for improving good policy and programme design, monitoring and evaluation ...
		85	Preparation, implementation, monitoring and inspection
		86	Evaluation and studies; information and communication

ANNEX

Evaluation grid for examples of good practice in evaluation

BASIC INFORMATION		
Country: Sweden		
Policy area: RTDI		
Title of evaluation and full reference : Mattias Norrning & Jenny Hollstrand <i>Projekt ARENA NetPort. Karlshamn. Koncept för vägavgifter och regionalt innovationssystem.</i> Stockholm 2011		
Intervention period covered 2007–2013		
Timing of the evaluation (when it was carried out) 2009–2010		
Budget (if known): EUR ?		
Evaluator; External evaluators		
Method; process analysis		
Main objectives and main findings (very short description – 3–4 lines) The main objective of the ARENA project is to establish a research environment and a test bed for testing different models of road tolls. The evaluators found that the project had succeeded in establishing a group of researchers and professionals with unique competence. However, due to the fact that important parts of the competences are anchored in organisations located outside the region there is a risk much of the long-term effects will occur in other regions.		
Appraisal (Why you consider the evaluation an example of good practice: – 2–3 lines) A systematic qualitative critical analysis focusing both on the implementation process and the outcome.		
CHECK LIST	YES	NO
UTILITY		
Report Clarity and Balance		
Are the objectives, methods and findings of the evaluation clearly described?	X	
Are the conclusions and recommendations clearly supported by the analysis?	X	
Are the strengths and weaknesses of the intervention being evaluated fairly assessed and reported?	x	
Is the outcome of the intervention clearly reported?	x	
RELIABILITY OF FINDINGS		
Evaluation design		
Is the approach adopted by the evaluation and method used clearly set out?	x	
Is the approach and methods suitable given the objectives of the valuation and the intervention being assessed?	x	
Are the details of the operation of the intervention clearly described?		x
Are the mechanisms through which the intervention is intended to achieve its objectives clearly identified?		x
Context		
Is the socio-economic and policy context clearly set out?	x	
Are the effects of the economic and/or policy context on the outcome of the intervention clearly described?		x
Information Sources		
Are the quantitative and/or qualitative data used suitable for the purpose for which they are used?	x	
Is the reliability of the data fairly assessed and described?		x
Analysis		
Are appropriate procedures/techniques used to analyse the data and/or qualitative information?	x	
Are suitable procedures used to check the validity of findings?		x
Is the validity of the findings reached clearly demonstrated?		x
Do the policy recommendations follow clearly from the findings of the analysis?		x