

Ex post evaluation of the European Union Solidarity Fund 2002-2016

Case Study - Italy

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ITALY, EARTHQUAKES IN THE REGIONS OF EMILIA-ROMAGNA, LOMBARDIA AND VENETO, MAY 2012

1. INTRODUCTION

This section presents a case study for the Ex Post Evaluation of the European Union Solidarity Fund, assessing the EUSF application relating to **earthquakes in the regions of Emilia-Romagna, Lombardia and Veneto in May 2012 (case 91)**. ¹ The aim of the case study is to analyse the implementation and performance of the EUSF as a contribution to understanding the effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, added value and solidarity of the EU funding. The report sets out the context for the EUSF support and a brief overview of the intervention. It then examines the experience of implementation, the factors influencing implementation, the relevance of EUSF, the administrative burdens and costs associated with the intervention, the achievements and added value of the EUSF support, and the lessons learned

2. CONTEXT

In May 2012, two major earthquakes occurred in the regions of Emilia-Romagna, Lombardia and Veneto in northern Italy, causing 27 deaths and major damage to buildings, infrastructure and the economy.²

The first major earthquake struck the Provinces of Modena and Ferrara in the morning of 20 May 2012, with a magnitude of 5.9 on the Richter scale. The earthquake was felt throughout northern Italy and caused seven deaths and severe damage in the settlements near the epicentre. There were several hundred aftershocks, two with a magnitude of 5.1 close to the centre of Ferrara. Nine days later, a second major earthquake, with a magnitude of 5.8, occurred approximately 20km west of the initial epicentre, again followed by several aftershocks. A further 20 people were killed, mainly due to collapsing factory buildings.

These seismic events caused severe damage to the three regions that had a combined population of one million people. Total direct damage calculated by Italian authorities was EUR 13.273 billion. Damage was widespread and had long-lasting effects on the living conditions and economy of the three regions. Many manufacturing, agriculture, tertiary and mechanical industries suffered substantial losses due to damage to buildings, loss of infrastructure and transport links, and disruption to production chains. A total of 570 schools were damaged during the earthquakes, affecting approximately 70,000 students.

The short-term impact has been estimated as a 0.2 percent reduction of the GDP growth rate for the Emilia Romagna region.³ In the longer term, the main adverse consequences of the earthquake have been assessed as physical capital destruction, reduced human capital accumulation and risk of brain drain, as well as reduced social capital and risk of

¹ This case study was researched and originally drafted by Marzia Legnini, Claudia Romano and Andrea Gramillano of t33, and edited and revised by the EPRC Core Team.

² Application for EU Solidarity Fund Italy – Earthquakes May 2012 (2012IT16SPO002).

³ Barone G, Benni F, Brasili C and Mocetti S (2013) Una stima degli effetti economici di breve periodo del terremoto in Emilia Romagna, *Politica economica* – 2/2013 August version.

corruption in the use of public resources.⁴. However, there is also evidence of reconstruction representing an opportunity for public investment to improve private and public infrastructure and goods and to some extent to stimulate innovation and cooperation.⁵ Researchers consider that institutional quality is the main determinant of the effectiveness of reconstruction at regional and local levels.⁶

3. OVERVIEW OF EUSF INTERVENTION

The Italian authorities submitted an application to the Commission within 10 weeks of the date of the first earthquake, requesting financial assistance from the EUSF (see Table 1). In the application, the Italian authorities estimated the total direct damage at EUR 13.274 billion.⁷ As the initial estimated damage was more than 3.5 times the major disaster threshold applicable to Italy in 2012 (EUR 3.607 billion), the application was assessed as a major disaster.

Table 1: Timeline of the EUSF intervention

Intervention stage	Date
Disaster occurrence	20/05/2012
Application submission	27/07/2012
Date of proposal	19/09/2012
Date of EP and Council Decision	21/11/2012
Commission Decision	03/12/2012
Implementation agreement	06/12/2012
Payment date	19/12/2012
Implementation period end	19/12/2013
Implementation report due	19/06/2013
Extension granted until	19/12/2014
Implementation report received	18/12/2014
Closure note date	21/10/2015

Source: DG REGIO, 2018.

In the application, eligible costs were estimated as EUR 714.673 million, calculated as 5.38 percent of total direct damage. Most of the estimated eligible costs (69 percent) were intially accounted for by temporary accommodation. This breakdown of damage evolved during the subsequent months as more accurate assessments became available, leading to a significant increase in the proportion of costs allocated to the restoration of infrastructure in the final version of the application considered for award (see Table 2).

⁴ Signorini L F (2017) *Terremoti, economici e no Intervento conclusivo del Vice Direttore Generale della Banca d'Italia,* Bank of Italy.

⁵ See paper by Pagliacci F and Bertolini P (2019) *Il terremoto del 2012 in Emilia: specificità del settore agro-alimentare e ruolo della cooperazione nell'emergenza*, https://tinyurl.com/yaaue47x

⁶ Barone G and Mocetti S (2014) *Natural disasters, growth and institutions: a tale of two earthquakes*, Bank of Italy Working Paper, No. 949, January 2014. Oliva S, Lazzeretti L and Bianchi M (2018) *Natural disaster and recovery processes in Italy. Do Communities shape resilience*?' Paper to the RSA European Conference, Lugano, June 2018.

⁷ Summary Application form to mobilise the European Union Solidarity Fund (EUSF) from the Italian National Civil Protection Department in cooperation with Emilia-Romagna Region, Lombardia Region and Veneto Region.

The Commission decided on 19 September 2012 to grant financial aid to Italy following its assessment of the application, and proposed a financial contribution of EUR 670.2 million, based on the application of its methodology for EUSF aid.⁸

Table 2: EUSF granted and reported (EUR millions)

Categories of damage	EUSF awarded	EUSF reported
Infrastructure restoration	292.4	318.8
Temporary accommodation	337.8	324
Preventative infrastructure	28.5	42.8
Clean-up of disaster area	11.5	14.9
Total	670.2	700.5

Source: DG REGIO, 2018.

Note: breakdown by category is based on applicant estimates of eligible operations.

The European Parliament and Council accepted the proposed budget on 21 November 2012. In preparing the subsequent implementation agreement, the allocations to categories of damage were amended to increase the proportion of funding for infrastructure restoration (44 percent of the budget) reducing the allocation for temporary accommodation to 50 percent. Following the Commission Decision of 3 December 2012 and the signing of the implementation agreement on 6 December, the financial contribution was paid to the Italian authorities on 19 December 2012.

In the course of implementing the EUSF support, there were further small shifts in the balance of funding, with increased spending on restoring infrastructure and investment in preventative infrastructure and slightly less on temporary accommodation than planned in the implementing agreement (but within the same overall budget).

Despite the relatively smooth implementation of administrative processes, there was an extension of the deadline for delivering the implementation report, which was originally due by June 2014, following a request by the Italian authorities. ¹⁰ The implementation report was submitted with a short delay, agreed with the Commission, at the end of 2014, and following a satisfactory audit, closure was recorded on 21 October 2015.

Comparison of the timetable for this case with other EUSF cases¹¹ confirms that the administrative processes for the case were conducted speedily. The time period between the ocurrence of the disaster and the payment of aid was (at 30 weeks) significantly less than the average of all EUSF earthquake cases (57.4 weeks) and the average for all EUSF cases in Italy (63 weeks) (see Table 3). Much of this was due to a relatively quick submission of the application by the Italian authorities and then rapid Commission assessment compared to other disasters; the time taken for the EP and Council

⁸ European Commission (2012) Communication from the Commission on the application for the European Solidarity Fund financial aid presented by Italy relating to the series of earthquakes in Italy of May 2012, Brussels, 19.9.2012, C(2012) 6458 final.

⁹ DG Regio (2015) Closure of the EU Solidarity Fund intervention in relation to the earthquakes in the regions of Emilia-Romagna, Lombardy and Veneto of 2012 - CCI 2012IT16SP0002 - Note to File, Ref. Ares(2015)4609480 - 27/10/2015.

 $^{^{10}}$ Further details are provided in Section 5.4.5 below.

¹¹ Based on analysis of all EUSF cases undertaken for the Interim Report.

assessment/approval was broadly the same as for other disasters. Administrative efficiency also characterised the closure process; no updates to the Implementation Report were requested, and the closure period at (43.9 weeks) was around 40 percent shorter than the average for all earthquake cases and some 45 percent shorter than the average for all Italian EUSF cases.

Table 3: Comparison of administration of the case study with other EUSF cases

Indicators	Case study: IT91 (weeks)	Average of all other earthquakes (weeks) (n=7)	Average of all IT interventions (weeks) (n=9)
Submission of application relative to deadline	-0.3	:	:
Application completion duration	9.7	13	16.5
Commission assessment duration	7.7	15.8	15.9
EP & EC assessment duration	9	10.6	10.7
Time between disaster occurrence and payment of aid to beneficiary country	30	53.5	59.4
Submission of IR in relation to deadline	-0.14	3.3	6.3
Duration of updates to implementation report	:	29.4	15.7
Duration of closure process	43.9	63.1	71.2

Source: DG REGIO, 2018.

4. IMPLEMENTATION OF EUSF

The following sections describe the implementation of EUSF in more detail covering the institutional context, application/submission, evaluation/assessment and approval, implementation, closure, and publicity and visibility.

4.1 Institutional context

In the immediate aftermath of the first major earthquake, the Italian Council of Ministers declared a state of emergency for 60 days for the Provinces of Modena, Ferrara, Bologna (Emilia-Romagna) and Mantova (Lombardia).

The coordination of the response was entrusted to the Head of the National Civil Protection Department who was authorised to manage the emergency procedures, including submitting the EUSF application.

The first measure was the Decree by the Head of the National Civil Protection Department, number 1 issued on 22 May, aiming to:

 appoint the Director of the Regional Civil Protection Agency for Emilia-Romagna, and the Director-General of the Civil Protection Directorate local police and security for Lombardia, as responsible persons for assisting the population in the first aid activities;

^{*}Initial deadline for IR submission was June 2014, extension was granted and IR was submitted in December 2014.

- establish the necessary connection between the aforementioned Directors, the mayors of the municipalities hit by the earthquake and the coordination structures to be established at territorial level;
- define the activities of assistance to the population (e.g. meals, temporary accommodation, transport and checks on buildings safety standards, cleaning affected areas, etc.);
- classify urgent interventions enabling the return of the population to habitable housing, safeguarding public safety and guaranteeing assistance operations; and
- allocate the first EUR 10 million to these initial response activities.

The same Decree established the Command and Control Direction (Di.Coma.C.) - at the premises of the Regional Civil Protection Agency in Emilia-Romagna, managed by the National Civil Protection Department in cooperation with the regional administrations - to coordinate all emergency operations and act as a structure connecting the involved actors (at national, regional and local levels) and to ensure a homogeneous support throughout the affected areas. Moreover, this measure foresaw that the coordination of assistance activities would be transferred to the Presidents of the Regions of Emilia-Romagna and Lombardia as soon as the state of emergency ended. After the subsequent earthquake of 29 May, which expanded the seismic crater area, the same state of emergency was extended to the province of Rovigo (Veneto region).

By 2 August, the Di.Coma.C ceased its functions,¹² and the coordination of activities, at territorial level, was delegated to the Presidents of the Regions of Emilia-Romagna, Lombardia and Veneto as Delegate Commissioners in charge of managing the remaining emergency issues and the following reconstruction, according to the legislative decree n. 74/2012 (then converted into law no.122/2012).

Each Region adopted its own organisational model, under the coordination of the Delegate Commissioner structures and their technical personnel, with the twofold objective: (i) better cope with their communities' specific needs, including through the involvement of volunteers and local administrations; and (ii) guarantee the proper support to mayors of affected municipalities.

The roles of the institutions sending the application, key implementing authorities, and key stakeholders are set out in Table 4.

Table 4: Institutional arrangements for the EUSF intervention

Organization name	Role
Italian National Civil Protection Department	Overall coordination of the first emergency activities:
in cooperation with:	- evaluation of damages,
- Emilia-Romagna Region	- immediate restoration of
- Lombardia Region	working conditions of basic infrastructures,
- Veneto Region	,
	Italian National Civil Protection Department in cooperation with: - Emilia-Romagna Region - Lombardia Region

¹² Decree of the Head of the National Civil Protection Department no. 15 of 1 August 2012.

		 support to the affected population through temporary accommodation and rescue services, linkages between regional/local administrations. (I phase May – July 2012)
 Key implementing authorities Italian National Civil Protection Department (May-July 2012) Command and Control Direction (Di.Coma.C.) Director of the Regional Civil Protection Agency for Emilia-Romagna Director of the Regional Civil Protection Agency for Lombardia Director of the Regional Civil Protection Agency Veneto President of Emilia-Romagna Region, Delegate Commissioner for reconstruction President of Lombardia Region – Delegate Commissioner for reconstruction President of Veneto Region – Delegate Commissioner for reconstruction Municipalities 	 National Civil Protection Department Regional Civil Protection Agency Emilia-Romagna Regional Civil Protection Agency Lombardia Regional Civil Protection Agency Lombardia Regional Civil Protection Agency Veneto Region of Emilia-Romagna, Agency for reconstruction Region of Lombardia, Structure of the Delegate Commissioner for reconstruction Region of Veneto, Structure of the Delegate Commissioner for reconstruction 	Coordination of activities at regional level: • temporary accommodations for the population, • provisional buildings for public purposes, • restoring working conditions of basic infrastructures, • securing buildings and territories.
Key stakeholdersFire fightersVolunteersOther associations	Organization name: • Volunteers of the National Civil Protection • Italian Red Cross	Support in assisting the affected population.

4.2 Application/submission phase

Based on previous experience, ¹³ the National Civil Protection Department managed the phase of preparing and submitting the application for mobilising the EUSF during the period June/July 2012.

In line with EUSF requirements, the application included an accurate direct damage estimation based on the active involvement of affected local and national public administrations and private entities. In particular, the damage and usability assessment was coordinated and managed by the National Department, in cooperation with Emilia

¹³ They refer to the earthquakes in the regions of Molise (2002) and Abruzzo (2009).

Romagna, Lombardia and Veneto Regions, with a substantial technical support from other Regions, Provinces, Municipalities, the National Fire Service, specialized centres and professional orders.

The assessment was carried out through the AeDES¹⁴ survey form, which is now a standardised tool, along with its manual, according to the Decree of the President of the Council of Ministries of 5 May 2011. This form consists of nine sections and contains identification, metrics, use, typological and damage data. The form is completed by the usability classification and the short-term countermeasures considered necessary to reuse the damaged buildings.

As highlighted by local public authorities consulted for this ex-post evaluation, the assessment tools and technical support provided by the National Civil Protection Department were valued and considered effective to quantify damage to public and private properties as well as to the territory, during a very difficult and chaotic period. This enabled an optimal damage assessment and the application for mobilising the EUSF to be submitted in due time.

As shown in Table 5 below, there was a strong consensus among interviewees, at all levels of administration that problems during the application phase were minimal. Interviewees expressing a neutral opinion on this theme were not directly involved in the application phase, managed by the National Department of Civil Protection, which provided technical support to local authorities in preparing the necessary documentation for the EUSF funding request.

Given the National Department's previous experience and use of standardized assessment tools, the overall application/submission phase was considered to have been smoothly implemented.

¹⁴ Agibilità e Danno nell'Emergenza Sismica (Usability and Damage during Seismic Emergency).

¹⁵ The exception is the interviewee from Veneto, who highlighted the difficulty in assessing less serious damages, although they considered the overall methodology to be efficient.

Table 5: Assessment of the application/submission phase

Assessment of the application/submission phase	Straight- forward	Neutral	Fairly complex	Excessively complex
National Department of Civil Protection	Х			
Regional Agency for reconstruction of Emilia – Romagna	X			
Representative of the Delegate Commissioner of Lombardia	X			
Representative of the Delegate Commissioner of Veneto	X			
Municipality of Poggio Renatico (FE)		X		
Municipality of Poggio Rusco (MN)		X		
Municipality of Reggiolo (RE)		Χ		
Municipality of san Giacomo delle Segnate (MN)		X		
Municipality of San Giovanni del Dosso (MN)		X		
Italian Red Cross		Х		
Prociv - Arci		Χ		

Note: Assessment based on 11 interview respondents.

4.3 Appraisal/evaluation and approval phase

The European Commission received the application on 27 July 2012, within the deadline of ten weeks after the first damage was recorded on 20 May 2012.

The evaluation phase was undertaken expeditiously, and the Commission services concluded that, taking into consideration the size of the event and the limited time to assess the damage, the methods used by the Italian authorities for estimating the different categories of damage were generally sufficiently detailed and plausible. On 19 September 2012, the European Commission Communication approved the application to mobilise the EUSF aid, proposing to apply the percentages defining a major disaster according to the EUSF methodology and to grant the amount of EUR 670.2 million.¹⁶

The Decision to mobilise the EUSF of the European Parliament and of the Council was signed on 21 November 2012. The same day, the President of the European Parliament signed the 'Definitive adoption of the amending budget for the financial year 2012'.

The final Communication of the European Commission granting the aid under the EUSF in favour of Italy was on 3 December 2012, and the agreement between the European

¹⁶ European Commission (2012) op. cit.

Commission and the Italian Government was signed on 12 December 2012. The financial contribution was then remitted to the Italian State on 19 December, a total of 213 days after the disaster first struck.

Overall, the evaluation/approval phase was closed in due time, enabling the Italian Government, through the National Civil Protection Department, to ensure a prompt response to the affected population.

The research found a general consensus among interviewees that identified problems related to the evaluation/approval phase were also minimal or limited (see Table 6).

Table 6: Assessment of the appraisal/evaluation and approval phase

Extent of problems in appraisal/evaluation and approval phase	Minimal	Limited	Moderate	Significant	Excessive
National Department of Civil Protection	Х				
Regional Agency for reconstruction of Emilia - Romagna		X			
Representative of the Delegate Commissioner of Lombardia		X			
Representative of the Delegate Commissioner of Veneto		X			
Municipality of Poggio Renatico (FE)			X		
Municipality of Poggio Rusco (MN)			X		
Municipality of Reggiolo (RE)			X		
Municipality of san Giacomo delle Segnate (MN)				Х	
Municipality of San Giovanni del Dosso (MN)				X	
Italian Red Cross		Χ			
Prociv - Arci		X			

Note: Assessment based on 11 interview respondents.

Likewise, the application/submission phase, exchanges with the Commission during the appraisal/evaluation phase were managed by the National Department of Civil Protection, without encountering any problems and ensuring a regular communication to Regional and local administrations.

4.4 Implementation phase

Following the Law Decree no. 74/2012 (then converted into law no.122/2012), competences for managing the implementation of the operations under the EUSF, as well as the overall reconstruction, were delegated to Commissioners at regional level, who

provided technical support to the mayors of the affected municipalities to deal with implementation and reporting procedures.

In line with EUSF requirements, support from the Fund was mainly used to cover expenses for: provisional works aimed at ensuring the restoration of the functions of local authorities and public utilities; removal of rubble; urgent actions; and assistance to the population, including temporary housing provision (setting up camps and use of existing habitable buildings).

Box 1: Illustrative examples of interventions under the EUSF

Region of Emilia Romagna: EUSF-funded interventions for the immediate restoration of school facilities so as to allow the start of the 2012/2013 school year

The total school population affected by the earthquake - considering all the schools for which the municipalities reported different typologies of damages - amounted to about 63 thousand students.

Around 1,041 schools buildings were checked and classified based on damage levels: (A = accessible) 471 school buildings representing 45 perent of the total; (B/C = temporarily/partially accessible) 364 school buildings (35 percent); (D = unfit for structural risk) 160 school buildings (15 percent); (E = unavailable due to external risk) 46 school buildings representing four percent.

A total of 524 schools were damaged representing 50 percent of the schools controlled by public authorities.

Although the responsibility at local level was transferred to provinces and municipalities (for less damaged schools buildings), the Delegate Commissioner made use of a working group coordinated by expert technicians with previous experience in the management of emergencies in the Marche-Umbria earthquakes of 1997 and Abruzzo in 2009. This activity allowed the regular performance of the school year, and in safe conditions, for several thousand students from the earthquake zones.

EUSF co-financed interventions for damage classified as "A, B and C" comprised 275 out of more than 290 planned interventions, for a total value of EUR 17,966,017. "E" level schools (immediate repair of school buildings) comprisede 11 out of 24 planned interventions (EUR 1,906,556).

Other interventions under the EUSF involved:

- 31 temporary buildings built (EUR 61,263,620) and 30 modular prefabricated schools purchased (EUR 22,389,328.35);
- 25 temporary gymnasiums (EU 21,957,551);
- 72 authorized interventions of urbanization works (EUR 19,204,908);
- 14 (out of 15) temporary alternative solutions implemented for schools (rents, purchase of furniture, etc.) at a cost of EUR 3,244,371.

The remaining interventions were financed through national and regional resources.

In the opinion of most of the interviewees for this case study, contributions under the EUSF were delivered quickly. Funds were made available to the national budget in December 2012, seven months after the seismic event, enabling local authorities to plan emergency interventions (notwithstanding domestic delays in transferring resources from the State to regional accounts and providing actual funds for the local authorities).

As far as the implementation phase is concerned, most of the interviewees stated that they encountered limited (45 percent) or moderate (27 percent) problems linked to the

complexity of EUSF implementing procedures. Both eligibility criteria and reporting requirements were clear and proportionate to the territories' needs.

On the other hand, deadlines foreseen for the disbursement and reporting of expenditure – all interventions had to be completed by 19 December 2013 - was perceived as extremely tight and challenging, considering the severity and the exceptional nature of the post-earthquake context along with the timing foreseen by the national procurement code. The tightness of the timetable was highlighted as a critical issue of the EUSF contribution by the Emilia-Romagna and Lombardia regions in their assessment of strengths and weaknesses as part of the grant's final implementation report. Nonetheless, all eligible expenses were reported within the deadlines agreed with the Commission for EUSF final reporting.

Most interviewees noted the importance of the approval of the Legislative Decree no. 59/2012 of 15 May 2012, modifying the modalities of intervention by the National Civil Protection Department, and the enactment of the Law Decree no.74 of 6 June 2012, regarding urgent interventions to support the affected populations.

In Emilia-Romagna, the Regional Administration and the affected municipalities were considered to have cooperated in close synergy, ensuring the closure of the financed operations and the related reporting on time. In the absence of a specific legal basis, the Emilia-Romagna Regional Administration decided to adopt the same approach and the same operating methods as for the management of the Structural Funds, also by adopting its own audit body, which was entrusted to an external company. This made it possible to guarantee the transparency of implementation and efficient management of the reporting phase.

Some initial difficulties were met in Lombardia, since the Regional Court of Auditors raised a doubt about its legitimacy to evaluate the EUSF resource utilisation plan, leading to delays and making it more challenging to respect the reporting schedule. ¹⁸ To overcome this *impasse*, the Region advanced its own funds, enabling the start of operations and the acceleration in implementation, with great efforts by all the actors involved. These difficulties have been confirmed by the two interviewed municipalities in the Province of Mantova.

In Veneto, the 21, mostly small, municipalities in the province of Rovigo affected by the earthquake recorded less serious damage than those in Emilia-Romagna and Lombardia. However, the damages and thus the damage assessment phase were rather fragmented. This fragmentation, the lack of human resources in the municipalities involved and the rather unstructured nature of the rules derived from the existing institutional set-up had some negative repercussions on the initial use of resources under the EUSF. 19

¹⁷ Protezione Civile, Regione Emilia-Romagna, Regione Lombardia e Regione del Veneto (no date) 'Relazione di esecuzione delle spese sostenute a valere sul contributo del Fondo di Solidarietà dell'Unione Europea (FSUE) per il terremoto del maggio 2012. C(2012) 9342 final, pp. 163-164

¹⁸ Protezione Civile, Regione Emilia-Romagna, Regione Lombardia e Regione del Veneto (no date) op. cit., p. 164. The issue raised by the regional Court of Auditors delayed the deployment of the resources by months, as the President of the Region was only able to sign off the EUSF resources utilization plan only in June 2013 (Ordinance no. 22 of 24 June 2013).

¹⁹ Protezione Civile, Regione Emilia-Romagna, Regione Lombardia e Regione del Veneto (no date) *Op. Cit.*, p. 164.

Nonetheless, the Veneto Region had promptly prepared an effective organizational model, based on the experience of the 2010 flood and which ensured the active involvement of mayors. This allowed the complexities associated with the assessment procedures to be overcome. In particular, the Regional Administration supported all municipalities through the provision of administrative guidance/models for monitoring activities and organizing operational meetings during the whole implementation phase. This helped to overcome the lack of technical personnel in the affected area, characterized by small or medium-sized towns without the specific skills needed to deal with emergency procedures.

The extent of problems encountered by interviewees during the implementation phase, showing the different point of views of the actors consulted are summarised in Table 7.

Table 7: Assessment of the implementation phase

Extent of problems in implementation phase	Minimal	Limited	Moderate	Significant	Excessive
National Department of Civil Protection	Х				
Regional Agency for reconstruction of Emilia - Romagna		Х			
Representative of the Delegate Commissioner of Lombardia		X			
Representative of the Delegate Commissioner of Veneto		Х			
Municipality of Poggio Renatico			X		
Municipality of Poggio Rusco			X		
Municipality of Reggiolo			Χ		
Municipality of san Giacomo delle Segnate				X	
Municipality of San Giovanni del Dosso				X	
Italian Red Cross		Χ			
Prociv - Arci		Χ			

Note: Assessment based on 11 interview respondents.

Overall, the problems with implementation can be summarised as being limited to moderate. The Regional Administrations agreed that the problems met during implementation were mainly due to external factors (emergency conditions, timing foreseen by public procurement legislation, lack of technical personnel at municipality level, etc.)²⁰ more than the EUSF procedures themselves, which were considered reasonably clear, notwithstanding the tight timelines for reporting expenses. On the other

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²⁰ See Section 4 (Factors influencing the implementation of the EUSF support) below.

hand, municipalities were more likely to consider them as burdensome due to time pressures for dealing with unfamiliar administrative procedures.

4.5 Closure

Time constraints and administrative procedures required under national legislation were the main factors influencing the closure of interventions in the view of interviewees (see Table 8), especially the reporting of expenses for which the European Commission allowed an additional six months, postponing the final deadline.

The implementation report was originally due by June 2014 but, following a request by the Italian authorities, the Commission accepted an extension of the deadline for submission of the implementation report and statement of validity. These documents were finally received by the Commission on 18 December 2014. Despite the relatively smooth implementation of administrative processes, interviewees noted that the main challenge of closing procedures under the EUSF was the lack of flexibility. Specifically, the procedures are not considered to allow sufficient time for strict adherence to public procurement procedures or the time needed for the acquisition of opinions and authorisations for interventions in restricted buildings. On the other hand, the interviewed stakeholders did not consider the information requested to be particularly complex.

Moreover, the aforementioned delays in starting operations, along with administrative difficulties associated with the post-earthquake situation, had repercussions in the closure phase. For some municipalities, it was hard to collect invoices by service providers in due time. Nonetheless, the joint effort of regional administrations and municipalities enabled interventions to be finalised together with the related reporting.

On 31 July 2015 (ARES 3228842), the audit unit sent its conclusions and analysis stating that the statement of validity could be accepted and that the closure could proceed. Following the inter-service consultation, launched on 19 August 2015, and the OLAF consultation, which did not report any irregularities, on 21 October 2015 (ARES 4460449), a closure letter was sent to the Italian authorities stating that the EU Solidarity Fund intervention was closed.²¹

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 $^{^{21}}$ European Commission - Closure Note to File (Ref. Ares(2015)4609480 - 27/10/2015). See also section 3 'Overview of EUSF intervention' of this case study report.

Table 8: Assessment of closure procedures

	Minimal	Moderate	Excessive
Bureaucracy involved			Χ
Complexity of information demanded	X		
Time constraints			X

Note: Assessment based on 11 interview respondents.

4.6 Publicity and visibility

In line with EUSF requirements, efforts were made to communicate the implementation and impacts of the EUSF support.

From its establishment, the Di.Coma.C. activated different information and communication channels, managing relations with both national and local media through press releases, press reviews, organization of interviews and support to journalists. The Department's website was frequently updated, contributing to informing citizens on the emergency in progress, on the seismic risk and on the self-protection rules to be adopted in case of a further earthquake.

Among specific communication activities, it is worth mentioning the initiative 'Terremoto, Parliamone Insieme' (Earthquake, let's talk about it) promoted by the National Civil Protection Department, together with the INGV (National Institute of Geophysics and Volcanology), in collaboration with the University of Seismic Engineering Laboratory Network and in agreement with the Emilia–Romagna Region, the local administrations and the components of the local civil protection system. The initiative foresaw the organization of 32 public meetings, during the months of June, July and August 2012, on seismicity, assistance, emotional impact of events as well as on the appropriate measures to deal with problems linked to the emergency.²²

During implementation, flags and EU logos were used to signal works and services financed through the EUSF. Also, extensive coverage of both national and European financial support through the media was ensured and meetings with stakeholders and citizens were organized. In this regard, a further initiative worth mentioning is the online platform 'Openricostruzione' promoted by the Emilia-Romagna Region. While not specific to EUSF it provided up-to-date information on the actual state of play of reconstruction, showing quotas of public and private financial resources and donations devoted to infrastructures, buildings and economic activities in the affected areas after the EUSF support. ²³ Specific information (public notices and following interventions) under the EUSF can be found in the archive of the Region's institutional website. ²⁴ Likewise, the Region of Lombardia has set up an institutional website dedicated to the 2012 earthquake. ²⁵

Notwithstanding these efforts, the common opinion of the interviewees is that the Fund is mainly known by technical staff and all the other actors directly involved in the

²² 'Relazione di esecuzione delle spese sostenute a valere sul Fondo di Solidarietà Europeo (FSUE) per il terremoto del maggio 2012', C(2012), 9342 final, p. 16

^{23 &}lt;a href="https://openricostruzione.regione.emilia-romagna.it/">https://openricostruzione.regione.emilia-romagna.it/.

²⁴ https://www.regione.emilia-romagna.it/solr_search?query=FSUE .

²⁵ http://www.sismamantova.regione.lombardia.it/wps/portal/site/sisma-mantova-2012 .

implementation of the interventions, while the awareness of citizens is limited. This was attributed to the nature of the eligible interventions, covering short-term services to population, temporary housing and provisional works rather than permanent and more tangible infrastructure investments. Further, the combined use of multiple funds (EU, national, local, voluntary) overshadowed the use of EUSF specifically.

The limited knowledge on the EUSF support is also evident from the Media Survey conducted for this evaluation. Notwithstanding the high coverage of 2012 earthquakes by national media, only 22 articles were identified as relevant to the EUSF. These articles were published in six main media newspapers, which are among the most popular websites visited in the Italian web according to Alexa rankings.

As for content and sentiment analysis, nine articles frame the EUSF support positively, considering it as a clear evidence of EU solidarity and the fundamental values on which the EU is founded, despite the beaurocracy involved for applying for the Fund support highlighted by one of them.

Neutral framing of the EUSF is contained in four articles that were published in two different media sources mentioning the EUSF as another source of funding among others, predominantly national, supporting the restructuring efforts in the three affected regions.

The remaining articles adopted a negative framing of the EUSF, mainly focusing on the position of five EU Member States that objected to the granting of aid towards Italy.²⁶

5. FACTORS INFLUENCING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF EUSF SUPPORT

The most important factors influencing the implementation of EUSF support are considered to be governance, economic resources, public procurement requirements and the time for funding to be transferred to the regions. The roles/actions of specific institutions and local administrative factors were also influential. A summary of the influences of specific factors based on responses by interviewees at different levels is provided in Table 9.

- Governance. The execution of financed operations was partly conditioned by the tripartite management of the Fund by the three affected regions, each responsible for the territories under its jurisdiction, which led to some discrepancies during the implementation phase as a whole. Each regional administration adopted its own organisational structure with its own rules and dealt with different types of problems linked to the gravity of the damages. While this governance model ensured a greater focus on the territorial needs, it also led to heterogeneous implementation procedures. All in all, the interviewees considered that the three models succeeded albeit operating differently in involving the affected municipalities and in supporting them in assessing damages, planning and implementing interventions.
- Institutional factors. They had a moderate influence. Relations with the Commission
 were managed by the National Department of Civil Protection, which supported the
 involved Regional Administrations in their efforts to comply with EUSF
 requirements. The only event that could jeopardize the proper implementation of
 the EUSF support was limited to Lombardia where the Regional Court of Auditors

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²⁶ Further details are provided in the Media Survey published as a separate report.

raised a legitimacy doubt slowing down the initial implementation of the activities. Nonetheless, this was overcome when the Region advanced its own funds, enabling interventions to be closed in due time.

- Economic resources. Most of the interviewees highlighted that the EUSF financing was made available in a quick way, allowing local authorities to respond promptly to their communities' needs.
- *Public procurement requirements.* The timing of reporting was heavily influenced by the requirements of the public procurement code.
- Time needed for the transfer of funding from the State to the regional accounts.
 The transfer of State resources substantially delayed the start of reimbursement of subnational authorities from the Fund, partly because EU resources became available in December 2012, coinciding with a period of annual closure of domestic financial statements.
- Lack of specific competences for managing an emergency at municipal level.
 Especially in small municipalities, the lack of specialised personnel, capable of carrying out damage assessments rapidly and in accordance with the procedures established by the EUSF. In this regard, the Civil Protection was actively involved in the verification of damages and in voluntary work for the affected population, supporting local authorities to deal with both the damage assessment and the subsequent implementation of operations.

Table 9: Assessment of factors influencing EUSF implementation

Factor	No influence	Slight influence	Moderate influence	Highly influential	Most influence
Governance				Х	
Institutional factors			X		
Economic resources				Χ	
Accountability	Χ				
Public procurement requirements				X	
Time needed for the transfer of funding from the State to the regional accounts				X	
Lack of specific competences for managing emergency at municipal level			X		

Note: Assessment based on 11 interview respondents.

6. ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN AND COST

Overall, the interviews with public authorities and main stakeholders did not highlight any widespread administrative burden (with some limited exceptions) affecting the management and implementation of the EUSF support (see Table 10).

Regarding the relationships between the institutions and stakeholders:

- relationships with the European Commission were managed, at the National level, by the Department of Civil Protection and by the involved Regional Administrations based on a perceived "very collaborative approach" and a mutual exchange of information; and
- the relationship between the Regions and the affected municipalities were judged by all the consulted stakeholders as "good" and "productive".

Specifically, five interviewees stated that they encountered minimal or limited problems linked to administrative procedures or in the relations with other public authorities across all phases of the intervention.

Those considering administrative burdens as moderate (four interviewees) mainly refer to the decision to provide for three Delegate Commissioners (a national decision, not one imposed by the EU), which led to a certain lack of homogeneity in implementation, since different measures have been taken to respond to the same type of needs. This is definitely considered a 'risk factor' because contiguous Regional Administrations have applied different solutions to tackle common problems. Some interviewees suggested a single structure would probably have ensured a greater uniformity in the implementation phase.

The two municipalities rating administrative burdens as significant refer to the time schedule for reporting, considered the main internal factor influencing implementation.

Table 10: Assessment of administrative burdens

Administrative burdens	Minimal	Limited	Moderate	Significant	Excessive
National Department of Civil Protection	X				
Regional Agency for reconstruction of Emilia - Romagna			X		
Delegate Commissioner of Lombardia			Χ		
Delegate Commissioner of Veneto			X		
Municipality of Poggio Renatico (FE)		Χ			
Municipality of Poggio Rusco		Χ			
Municipality of Reggiolo (RE)				X	
Municipality of San Giacomo delle Segnate (MN)				X	
Municipality of San Giovanni del Dosso (MN)		Χ			
Italian Red Cross	Χ				
Prociv - Arci			X		

Note: Assessment based on 11 interview respondents.

A similar conclusion applies to the assessment of administrative costs (see Table 11). The interviewees considered that administrative costs had a minimal (three interviewees) or a limited (eight interviewees) effect on the implementation of interventions under the EUSF.

The costs were considered adequate and proportionate, considering the scale of the financial contribution. Furthermore, the regional administrations ensured a continuous monitoring of the use of funds, including through consultations with other local authorities (for example, the National Association of Builders, ANCE, Chambers of Commerce, and professional orders), and their compliance with indicative costs set at regional level.

Table 11: Assessment of administrative costs

Administrative costs	Minimal	Limited	Moderate	Significant	Excessive
National Department of Civil Protection	X				
Regional Agency for reconstruction of Emilia - Romagna		X			
Delegate Commissioner of Lombardia		X			
Delegate Commissioner of Veneto		X			
Municipality of Poggio Renatico (FE)		X			
Municipality of Poggio Rusco (MN)		X			
Municipality of Reggiolo (RE)		X			
Municipality of San Giacomo delle Segnate (MN)		X			
Municipality of San Giovanni del Dosso (MN)		X			
Italian Red Cross	X				
Prociv - Arci	X				

Note: Assessment based on 11 interview respondents.

7. RELEVANCE OF EUSF SUPPORT

As the largest ever EUSF intervention, the support for the recovery from the earthquakes in Emilia-Romagna, Lombardia and Veneto, was substrantial and important for the recovery from the disaster.

• Appropriateness to specific local needs. The analysis confirmed the appropriateness of EUSF support to the recovery needs of the local community in the aftermath of the earthquake. The total final resources, amounting to EUR671 million, were dedicated to addressing the most urgent needs: immediate restoration to working order of infrastructure; providing temporary accommodation and funding rescue services to meet the urgent needs of the population concerned; immediate securing of preventive infrastructures and measures of immediate protection of the cultural heritage; immediate cleaning up of disaster-stricken areas, including natural zones. The appropriateness of EUSF support is confirmed by the wide consensus among interviewees that the EUSF support was a key additional resource. It enabled local authorities to finance provisional works and assistance to the involved communities

in the months after the calamitous event, responding to the citizens' and territories' specific needs.

• Support to local authorities facing financial constraints. Most interviewees agreed that EUSF support was crucial for the municipalities involved facing financial constraints and without adequate financial and human resources to address the new challenges posed by the earthquake. Indeed, financing was received very quickly (compared to other national and EU funds) enabling municipalities to cover expenses made in the aftermath of the earthquake and to use other financial resources (national, regional, local) for subsequent stages of reconstruction. ERDF and EAFRD interventions supported investments and modernisation of physical assets, protection of territorial endowments and anti-seismic adaptation measures, with a different approach, timing and procedures from EUSF. The most relevant ERDF and EAFRD interventions have regarded Emilia-Romagna. No specific intervention has been mentioned nor reported in the Annual Implementation Report 2015 of the Rural Development Programme and in the Final Implementation Report of the ERDF Regional Operational Programme.

In Emilia Romagna, the regional rural programme contributed to support the modernisation of agricultural holdings (measure 121), the restoration of agricultural assets (e.g. temporary hangars, machineries) and prevention. In Lombardy, the sub-measure 125A supported water management and territorial protection also covering areas hit by the earthquake. In Emilia Romagna, the ERDF Regional Operational Programme supported a wide set of interventions encompassing:

- Concorso L'Europa è qui organised in Mirandola involving the students of the Galilei Institute reconstructed after the earthquake;
- Activity I.1.1 supported the creation of the laboratory of biomedical sector in Mirandola;
- Activity II.2.1 with 192 investment projects for about EUR 22 million (new areas for business activities, investments, production and commercialisation, innovations), out of 1007 eligible applications (those not funded by ERDF were covered by the resources of the Delegate Commissioner);
- Activity IV.3.1 and IV.3.2 supporting the creation of areas for economic activities and services and the restarting of business activities (six out of 20 economic areas and 733 out of 850 business restarts were achieved at the end of 2015.

8. ASSESSMENT OF ACHIEVEMENTS

8.1 Operational achievements

The EUSF succeeded in achieving the operational objectives based on the damage assessment and given the needs of the affected populations (see Table 12).

As summarised in the table below, most resources were used in the restoration of infrastructure to working order in all of the three regions hit by the earthquakes so as to quarantee fundamental services to citizens.

Temporary accommodation and rescue for population were highly significant, especially in Emilia-Romagna, which registered the most destructive damages and number of injuries and deaths. In this regard, it is worth noting that the approach of the Emilia-Romagna Region was to avoid the construction of 'new towns' in favour of reconstruction/redevelopment of existing buildings.

The resources invested in securing of infrastructure and cultural heritage can be considered of moderate significance representing a relatively minor percent of the whole support under the EUSF. A still smaller amount of resources was used for the immediate cleaning up of the disaster areas and can therefore be considered of less significance.

Table 12: Assessment of operational achievements

Activity	Not significant	Limited significance	Moderate significance	High significance	Most significance
Restoration of infrastructure to working order					Х
Temporary accommodation & rescue for population					Х
Securing of preventative infrastructure & cult. heritage			X		
Immediate clean-up of disaster areas		X			

Note: Assessment based on 11 interview respondents.

Most interviewees considered that the EUSF achieved the expected results, facilitating the restoration of services of pivotal importance for the affected communities, in a short time and in an extreme emergency situation, thereby allowing other resources to be devoted to reconstruction. A further material result was that the EUSF succeeded in demonstrating the solidarity of EU, which was primarily perceived by public institutions and technical staff directly involved in the implementation of supported operations.

8.2 Added value

The added value of the EUSF support is regarded as primarily in the economic and political sphere, although there are also important aspects of policy, operational and learning added value (see Table 12).

• Economic added value. The EUSF was considered most useful for providing financial resources, mainly for local public authorities in an emergency situation and within a relatively short time frame. For this reason, most interviewees agreed that the EUSF was a 'breath of oxygen' for the municipalities involved. It also ensured clear and flexible eligibility criteria to include a wide range of emergency interventions and implementing procedures. The resources were totally spent, and the tight

deadlines for implementation forced all the actors involved to close interventions quickly (unlike other domestic interventions still in progress), respecting the logic and the goals of the EUSF as an additional fund for managing emergencies. Overall, the EUSF allowed the prompt reactivation of public services of fundamental importance for the local community.

- Political added value. Interviewees agreed that the political added value of the EUSF is represented by its capacity to increase awareness of EU solidarity, at least among local administrators and technicians involved in the operations. At a time when EU solidarity was under pressure in Italy because of the demands of fiscal discipline, interviewees argued that this experience broadened awareness of the existence of a positive narrative about the EU. Specifically, by deploying the EUSF as a mechanism for alleviating the consequences of a natural disaster, the funds enabled the affected regions to cope better with the needs of the territory in emergency conditions.
- Policy, operational and learning added value. Based on its previous experiences (especially the earthquake in L'Aquila in 2009), the Department of Civil Protection had a set of tested methods and tools which were successfully used both for assessing damages and implementation. This has led to both an efficient use of the EUSF support and a better knowledge on how to cope with emergency conditions. Moreover, at local level, authorities in charge of assessing the damage assessment could benefit from the useful and effective support of the Department of Civil Protection, following an already tested methodology with its guidelines and tools. Some fine tuning was needed, but without jeopardizing the proper implementation of the supported operations. In the interviewees' opinions, the EUSF had a strong, positive impact on the local authorities involved, guaranteeing the timely financial contribution and facilitating efficient organisation of the implementation, notwithstanding the complications arising in the reporting of expenses.

Table 13: Assessment of added value

Added value	Not significant	Limited significance	Moderate significance	High significance	Most significance
Economic					X
Political					X
Policy				X	
Operational				Χ	
Learning				Χ	

Note: Assessment based on 11 interview respondents.

9. SYNERGIES AND COMPLEMENTARITY WITH ESIF

Analysis of the synergies and complementarity between EUSF and ERDF/EAFRD show the different approaches of the funding sources. Overall, ERDF and EAFRD interventions supported investments and modernisation of physical assets, protection of territorial

endowments and anti-seismic adaptation measures, with a different approach from the EUSF.²⁷

The coherence and complementarity between EUSF and ESIF can be assessed from different angles: regulatory framework; governance; thematic objectives; spatial coverage; and joint initiatives (strategies, measures, projects).

- Regarding the regulatory framework, the coherence and complementarity is weak because the approach of EUSF and ESIF are completely different, the first reacts to emergency situations, the others support regional and rural development with possible impact on the long-run.
- In terms of governance, the coordination is ensured by the Civil Protection department as stated in the Partnership Agreement and reinforced by the NOP Governance in the case of Apulia, Calabria, Campania and Sicily. However, the approach to governance seems very different between EUSF and ESIF. The recent experience of reprogramming in 2017 with a pro-active role of the National Agency of Territorial Cohesion and the previous experiences after other disasters proved to be rather effective. The programming experiences show that the previous disasters have necessarily affected the capacity of regional authorities to plan risk prevention and mitigation measures. This is the case for the regions hit by an event after 2014 and before 2016 (Emilia-Romagna, Liguria, Lombardia, Toscana, Piemonte), which have planned fewer resources than EU and Italian average in both ERDF and EAFRD programmes. Similarly, the recent reprogramming of ERDF programmes in the regions hit by 2016-2017 earthquakes shows that none of these regions (Abruzzo, Lazio, Marche, Umbria) had planned risk prevention and management of nonclimate related natural risks measures, even if they had experience disastrous events in the recent two decades.
- Thematic coherence and complementarity are ensured by TO 5. Moreover, NOP Governance and institutional capacity supports the increased capacity of local authorities in Southern regions for risk management and mitigation.
- Lastly, in terms of spatial coverage, joint funding of strategies/measures and projects, the coherence and complementarity is moderate and is essentially related to the experiences of use of EUSF. In general terms, EUSF covers the emergency and ESIF as well as other national funds address the reconstruction, integrating and completing the EUSF support.

10. LESSONS LEARNED

The overall assessment of the experience of the EUSF intervention was broadly considered to be positive by the interviewees at all levels consulted for the research (see Table 14).

²⁷ The website https://openricostruzione.regione.emilia-romagna.it/ provides additional details on public reconstruction, reconstruction of housing and business areas and activies and other interventions. However, this dataset does not allow a detailed breakdown of funding source.

Table 14: Overall assessment of administrative lessons learned

Activity	Very negative	Negative	Neutral	Positive	Very positive
Application process					X
Information on how to apply					X
Support by the Commission					X
Extent of administrative demand			X		
Reporting requirements				X	
Overall experience of dealing with EUSF					X

Note: Assessment based on 11 interview respondents.

Examining the lessons learned in more detail, the following points can be made to elaborate on the rankings in Table 14.

First, the experience of the EUSF intervention, enabled *further improvement of an already tested application process*. The National Department of Civil Protection managed the whole phase, building on the experience acquired in previous disasters in Italy; this included adopting an already tested approach and methodology for the application process, which ensured the active involvement of public institutions, at regional and local levels, and the efficient assessment of damages as well as the quality of the application for mobilising the EUSF support. The existing approach was fine-tuned and further improved thanks to this experience.

Second, the Commission support was assessed as 'very useful' by those involved in the application process, in particular by the National Department of Civil Protection in ensuring a smooth implementation of the EUSF support. The application of the aforementioned method allowed the immediate activation of all local authorities and a profitable involvement of the Regional Administrations, who also actively participated in meetings in Brussels and exchanges of information with the European Commission on possible fine tuning of their response.

Third, with respect to administrative demands, the EUSF was regarded as having clear criteria and deadlines. The eligibility criteria and timescales to be respected were clear to the Italian authorities from the outset. Despite implying additional efforts for the involved actors, it ensured the implementation of the interventions and the related reporting in a relatively short time period. Although the regional agencies of the Civil Protection Department considered that they provided continuous support to local authorities, some municipalities encountered difficulties in managing the implementation of operations, especially the reporting of expenses whose timelines are perceived as too tight.

For some interviewees, the absence of codified rules on the management of the interventions was thought to be risky, causing inconsistencies in the management of operations under the EUSF. In this regard, interviewees expressed the need for training to strengthen programming and analytical capacities, as well as the ability of local

authorities to cooperate with other bodies. Furthermore, the research indicated the fundamental importance of guaranteeing support to municipalities in the management of the interventions, ensuring homogenous procedures.²⁸

Fourth, while *reporting requirements* were considered largely positively, interviews highlighted a demand for the scheduling of reporting procedure to be a little more flexible and proportionate to the amount of resources to be reimbursed, without jeopardizing the effectiveness of accountability. To avoid delays in reporting expenses and possible discrepancies in implementation (especially in the application of costs currently linked to price lists at regional level), it could be useful to promote, at national level, the signing of framework agreements between public institutions and suppliers fixing fair prices to be applied in the event of other natural disasters.

Fifth, notwithstanding difficulties linked to the reporting phase, the overall experience in dealing with the EUSF was generally judged as very positive, since it is undoubtedly considered as an important additional resource supporting public institutions in dealing with the difficult and challenging management of emergency conditions after such a striking event.

Finally, while the interviewees collectively recognised what was termed "the extraordinary solidarity" shown by institutions at EU, national and regional levels, the interview research indicated that awareness of the EUSF does not extend much beyond the officials involved in the implementation process. Interviews with government authorities and other stakeholders, including citizen interviews, suggested that the wider population in the affected area does not recognise the specific contribution of the Fund. It was argued that communication activities on the goals and results obtained through the EUSF needs to be strengthened for wider awareness among citizens to be achieved.

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²⁸ This supports the academic research summarised in Section 5.2 above.

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https://openricostruzione.regione.emilia-romagna.it/

http://www.sismamantova.regione.lombardia.it/wps/portal/site/sisma-mantova-2012

https://www.regione.veneto.it/web/guest/sisma-del-maggio-2012

12. ANNEX: METHODOLOGY OF THE CASE STUDY RESEARCH

Methodology

This case study was researched through a mix of methods: (i) literature review (for the introduction and context) and desk analysis of EU regulations and official documentation produced for the purpose of mobilising the EUSF support as well as of institutional websites dedicated to the 2012 earthquakes in Northern Italy; and (ii) interviews with relevant stakeholders at national, regional and municipality levels, including representatives of the National Department of Civil Protection and NGOs.

Interview templates were drafted in both Italian and English, following EPRC guidance on the Task 3 Case Studies provided for national experts.

Invitations to participate in the research, including a presentation letter by the European Commission, were sent by email to a list of public authorities and other stakeholders whose addresses and telephone numbers were detected through web research (see the following tables 'List of contacted public authorities' and 'List of other stakeholders').

Emails were followed by phone recalls and interviews to stakeholders, who were available before the deadline of 19 July, were conducted by telephone.

Synthesis of the interviews were sent by email to the interviewees, who were invited to send possible integrations to the texts. Most of them replied accepting the synthesis and/or suggesting little fine tuning.

The table below shows the name of interviewees, the institutions they represented and the dates of the interviews.

Moreover, the evaluation team has contacted Ilias Tasias from the Italian Government (NUVAP) in order to collect preliminary information for Task 3 and on the coherence and implementation of EUSF with ESIF and national programmes (Task 4 of the study).

Interviews with with two NGOs were used instead of the focus group considering the period and limited time available to conduct the case study.

The following table 'Interviews' shows the list of the aforementioned institutions and the date when the interviews took place, while tables 'List of contacted public authorities' and 'List of other stakeholders' give evidence of all institutions and organizations which were contacted by email and/or phone calls and were not available for interviews or did not reply.

Interviews

Institution	Type of institution	Name of interviewee	Date
National Department of Civil Protection	Public		19.07.2018
Regional Agency for reconstruction of Emilia - Romagna	Public		16.07.2018
Delegate Commissioner of Lombardia	Public		13.07.2018
Delegate Commissioner of Veneto	Public		12.07.2018
Municipality of Poggio Renatico (FE)	Public		10.07.2018
Municipality of Poggio Rusco (MN)	Public		12.07.2018
Municipality of Reggiolo (RE)	Public		10.07.2018
Municipality of San Giacomo delle Segnate (MN)	Public		12.07.2018
Municipality of San Giovanni del Dosso (MN)	Public		11.07.2018
Italian Red Cross	NGO		12.07.2018
Prociv - Arci	NGO		11.07.2018

List of contacted public authorities

The following table shows the full list of public authorities by region, province, organization and role in the institution contacted by email and/or by telephone with the aim of arranging interviews.

Region	Administration/	Province	Role
- Region	Organization name	- rovince	Koic
National	Presidency of the Council of Ministers, Civil Protection Dept., International Relations and Activities Unit	National	
Emilia Romagna	Commissario delegato alla ricostruzione	Regional	
Emilia Romagna	Agenzia per la ricostruzione	Regional	
Emilia Romagna	URP Numero verde sisma	Regional	
Emilia Romagna	URP Numero verde sisma Imprese	Regional	
Emilia Romagna	Municipality of Cavezzo	MO	
Emilia Romagna	Municipality of Cavezzo	MO	
Emilia Romagna	Municipality of Cavezzo	MO	
Emilia Romagna	Municipality of Concordia sulla Secchia	МО	
Emilia Romagna	Municipality of Concordia sulla Secchia	МО	
Emilia Romagna	Municipality of Concordia sulla Secchia	МО	
Emilia Romagna	Municipality of Mirandola	МО	
Emilia Romagna	Municipality of Mirandola	MO	
Emilia Romagna	Municipality of Mirandola	MO	
Emilia Romagna	Municipality of Novi di Modena	MO	
Emilia Romagna	Municipality of Novi di Modena	MO	
Emilia Romagna	Municipality of Finale Emilia	MO	
Emilia Romagna	Municipality of Finale Emilia	МО	
Emilia Romagna	Municipality of Finale Emilia	МО	
Emilia Romagna	Municipality of San felice sul Panaro	MO	
Emilia Romagna	Municipality of San felice sul Panaro	MO	
Emilia Romagna	Municipality of Medolla	MO	
Emilia Romagna	Municipality of Medolla	МО	
Emilia Romagna	Municipality of Camposanto	MO	
Emilia Romagna	Municipality of Sant'Agostino	FE	
Emilia Romagna	Municipality of Sant'Agostino	FE	
Emilia Romagna	Municipality of Mirabello	FE	
Emilia Romagna	Province of Ferrara	FE	
Emilia Romagna Emilia Romagna	Municpality of Bondeno Municpality of Bondeno	FE FE	
Emilia Romagna	Municipality of Bondeno	FE	
Emilia Romagna	Municipality of Bondeno	FE	
Littilla Romagna	riamepancy or bondeno		

Emilia Romagna	Municipality of Poggio Renatico	FE	
Emilia Romagna	Municipality of Poggio Renatico	FE	
Emilia Romagna	Municipality of Poggio Renatico	FE	
Emilia Romagna	Municipality of Vigarano Mainarda	FE	
Emilia Romagna	Municipality of Vigarano Mainarda	FE	
Emilia Romagna	Municipality of Crevalcore	ВО	
Emilia Romagna	Municipality of Crevalcore	ВО	
Emilia Romagna	Municipality of Reggiolo	RE	
Emilia Romagna	Municipality of Reggiolo	RE	
Emilia Romagna	Municipality of Reggiolo	RE	
Lombardia	Commissario delegato alla ricostruzione		
Lombardia	Municipality of Moglia	MN	
Lombardia	Municipality of Moglia	MN	
Lombardia	Municipality of san Giacomo delle Segnate	MN	
Lombardia	Municipality of san Giacomo delle Segnate	MN	
Lombardia	Municipality of San Giovanni del Dosso	MN	
Lombardia	Municipality of San Giovanni del Dosso	MN	
Lombardia	Municipality of Quistello	MN	
Lombardia	Municipality of Quistello	MN	
Lombardia	Municiplaity of Quingentole	MN	
Lombardia	Municiplaity of Quingentole	MN	
Lombardia	Municipality of Schivenoglia	MN	
Lombardia	Municipality of Schivenoglia	MN	
Lombardia	Municipality of Poggio Rusco	MN	
Lombardia	Municipality of Poggio Rusco	MN	
Lombardia	Municipality of Pegognaga	MN	
Lombardia	Municipality of Pegognaga	MN	
Lombardia	Municipality of Pegognaga	MN	
Lombardia	Municipality of Gonzaga	MN	
Lombardia	Municipality of Gonzaga	MN	
Lombardia	Consorzio Oltrepo Mantovano	MN	
Veneto	Direzione rapporti Stato/Regioni e supporto programma del Presidente	Regional	
Veneto	Province of Rovigo	RO	

List of other stakeholders

Region	Organization name	Type of stakeholder	Name and role
Emilia-Romagna	Croce Rossa Italiana - Comitato Regionale E-R	NGO	
Lombardia	Croce Rossa Italiana - Comitato Regionale Lombardia	NGO	
Veneto	Croce Rossa Italiana - Comitato Regionale Veneto	NGO	
Emilia - Romagna	Associazione Nazionale Misericordie - Sede regionale	NGO	
Veneto	Corpo di soccorso Ordine di Malta - Gruppo di Padova-Rovigo	NGO	
Emilia - Romagna	Corpo di soccorso Ordine di Malta - Raggruppamento Romagna	NGO	
Emilia - Romagna	Prociv-Arci (Associazione Nazionale Volontari per la Protezione Civile)	NGO	
Nazionale	Prociv-Arci (Associazione Nazionale Volontari per la Protezione Civile)	NGO	

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