



# **Ex post evaluation of the European Union Solidarity Fund 2002-2016**

Case Study - Austria

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# **Ex post evaluation of the European Union Solidarity Fund 2002-2016**

Case Study - Austria

ÖIR GmbH

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## **AUSTRIA, FLOODS IN THE REGIONS OF LOWER AUSTRIA, UPPER AUSTRIA, VIENNA, SALZBURG, STYRIA, TYROL AND VORARLBERG, MAY AND JUNE 2013**

### **1. INTRODUCTION**

This section presents a case study for the Ex-Post Evaluation of the European Union Solidarity Fund, assessing the EUSF application relating to **floods in the regions of Lower Austria, Upper Austria, Vienna, Salzburg, Styria, Tyrol and Vorarlberg in May and June, 2013 (case 102)**.<sup>1</sup> The aim of the case study is to analyse the implementation and performance of the EUSF as a contribution to understanding the effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, added value and solidarity of the EU funding. The following section sets out the context for the EUSF support and a brief overview of the intervention. It subsequently examines the experience of implementation, the factors influencing implementation, the relevance of EUSF, the administrative burdens and costs associated with the intervention, the achievements and added value of the EUSF support, and the lessons learned.

### **2. CONTEXT**

The Danube River basin, encompassing territories of 19 countries and home to 83 million people, is the second largest river basin in Europe with an area of 801,463 km. In May and June of 2013, severe flooding of the Danube river basin affected several countries including Austria, Germany, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Serbia and Hungary.<sup>2</sup> In some areas, the flooding of 2013 exceeded levels seen in the floods of 2002, although due to the implementation of preventative measures, many communities suffered less damage than in 2002.

The months leading up to the flooding disaster were particularly wet, with May 2013 being one of the three wettest in the last 156 years in Austria.<sup>3</sup> The wet conditions of May and the subsequent saturation of the ground led to rapid runoff and ultimately extreme flooding.

As a result of the heavy rainfall and the already saturated ground, seven of Austria's nine provinces experienced varying degrees of flooding, with two months of rain falling within the first two days of June.<sup>4</sup> The rain continued from 29 May to 4 June and caused an extreme flood situation within Austrian Danube and its tributaries, with a total of 400mm of rain falling. Regions situated alongside the Alps saw the most severe rainfall, whereas Eastern and Southern Austria were affected by the rainfall to a lesser degree.<sup>5</sup>

Due to high temperatures, large volumes of moisture from the Black Sea and Mediterranean Sea had evaporated in to the atmosphere to form a 'blocking high' (a large stationary area of high pressure) known as Sabine. However, areas of low pressure from the Adriatic Sea pushed Sabine in a north-easterly direction into the Alps.

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<sup>1</sup> This case study was researched and originally drafted by Daniela Fessler, ÖIR, and edited and revised by the EPRC Core Team.

<sup>2</sup> International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River (2014). *Floods in June 2013 in the Danube River Basin – Brief overview of key events and lessons learned*.

<sup>3</sup> Zentralanstalt für Meteorologie und Geodynamik (2013). *Update Starkregen und Rückblick Mai*.

<sup>4</sup> Zentralanstalt für Meteorologie und Geodynamik (2013).

<sup>5</sup> Implementation report for EU Solidarity Fund – Austrian Floods of 2013, p.8.

The lifting of the high pressure Sabine in to the Alps led to intense precipitation on 29 May 2013.

Localised flooding and landslides caused high levels of destruction to both private and public property. The disaster had serious consequences for the economy and affected approximately 54 percent of the total population of Austria (8.5 million). The floods affected/destroyed public infrastructure such as transport links, energy supply, water supplies and many public buildings. Over EUR 163 million of damage was caused to the transport sector alone. 22,000 ha of agricultural land were flooded, 14,000 ha of which was farmland. The total direct damage caused by the disaster was estimated by the Austrian authorities to be EUR 866.462 million, representing 0.28 percent of the GNI of Austria.

### 3. OVERVIEW OF EUSF INTERVENTION

The Austrian authorities submitted an application to the Commission within the ten-week deadline, requesting financial assistance from the EUSF. The estimated total direct damage of EUR 866.462 million represented 48.19 percent of the major disaster threshold of EUR 1.798 billion applicable to Austria in 2013, therefore it did not qualify as a major disaster. However, as Austria was affected by the same natural disaster that caused a major disaster in Germany, the Austrian authorities applied under the 'neighbouring country' criterion.

**Table 1: Timeline of the EUSF intervention**

Intervention stage	Date
Disaster occurrence	30/05/2013
Application submission	08/08/2013
Date of proposal	03/10/2013
Date of EP and Council Decision	20/11/2013
Commission Decision	09/12/2013
Implementation agreement	22/01/2014
Payment date	14/02/2014
Implementation period end	17/02/2015
Implementation report due	17/08/2015
Implementation report received	04/08/2015
Closure date	19/08/2016

Source: DG REGIO, 2018.

The estimated cost of eligible operations (following Article 3 of the EUSF Regulation) totalled EUR 350.334 million. The majority of the eligible cost – 63 percent – was attributed to the immediate restoration to working conditions of infrastructure (EUR 223.4 million; other damage related to preventative infrastructure (EUR 79.6 million), temporary accommodation (EUR 41.5 million), and clean-up of the disaster area (EUR 5.9 million). After approval by the Commission, the Parliament and the Council, the implementation agreement was signed on 22 January 2014 and payment was made on 17 February 2014.

During the implementation period, the Commission carried out a monitoring visit to Vienna on 12 June 2014. Within the agreed deadline, Austria provided an implementation report in August 2015, and a translated version was made available at the end of October 2015. The operations undertaken focused on measures required



rapidly to secure, renovate and restore protective structures on riverbanks and associated infrastructure (see Table 2).

**Table 2: EUSF granted and reported (EUR millions)**

Categories of damage	EUSF awarded	EUSF reported
Infrastructure restoration	:	:
Temporary accommodation	:	:
Preventative infrastructure	21.661	22.353
Clean-up of disaster	:	:
<b>Total</b>	<b>21.661</b>	<b>22.353</b>

According to the Implementation Report: "On the basis of the information provided by Austria, the eligible expenditure under the EU Solidarity Fund amounted to EUR 22 353 891.57 which was higher than the EU Solidarity Fund financial contribution of EUR 21 661 550."<sup>6</sup>

The statement of validity was accepted by the internal consultation at DG REGIO and the case was closed on the 19 August 2016.

Comparison of the timetable for this case with other EUSF cases<sup>7</sup> confirms that most of the administrative processes for the case were conducted speedily. The time period between the occurrence of the disaster and payment of aid was (at 37.1 weeks) significantly shorter than the average for all 47 EUSF flooding cases (56.7 weeks) and the average for all three Austrian cases (45 weeks) (see Table 3). Much of this was due to a timely and update-free submission of the application by the Austrian authorities and then rapid Commission assessment and EP and Council assessment/approval compared to other flooding disasters. The duration of the closure process (54.4 weeks) was also shorter than the average of all EUSF flooding cases (70.8 weeks), but much longer than the average of all EUSF cases in Austria (19 weeks).

<sup>6</sup> European Commission (2016) Note to file. Closure of the EU Solidarity Fund intervention in relation to the flooding of May/June in Austria of 2013 – Commission Decision C(2013)8884

<sup>7</sup> Based on analysis of all EUSF cases undertaken for the Interim Report.

**Table 3: Comparison of administration of the case study with other EUSF cases**

Indicators	Case study : AT102 (weeks)	Average of all other Floods (weeks) (n=7)	Average of all AT interventions (weeks) (n=4)
Submission of application in relation to deadline	0.0	:	:
Application completion duration	9.7	14.9	16
Commission assessment duration	8.3	14.6	8.4
EP & EC assessment duration	6.9	12.5	11
Time between disaster occurrence and payment of aid to beneficiary country	37.1	56.3	43
Submission of IR in relation to deadline	-1.4	6.5	-7.4
Duration of updates to implementation report	:	88.8	52
Duration of closure process	54.4	72.6	28.1

Source: DG REGIO, 2018.

#### 4. IMPLEMENTATION OF EUSF

The following sections describes the implementation of EUSF in more detail, covering the institutional context, application/submission, evaluation/assessment and approval, implementation, closure, and publicity and visibility.

##### 4.1 Institutional context

The Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI) has been tasked with managing the implementation of the EUSF in Austria since the first flood for which the EUSF intervened in 2002. In the case of a disaster, the Ministry of the Interior coordinates the grant, cooperating with the Federal Ministry of Finance (BMF) on financial tasks. The Ministry of the Interior is responsible for drafting the application and the final report and delegates tasks to other institutions and authorities.

Three institutions are responsible for water management and the financing of flood protection measures in Austria.

- The control of torrents is the responsibility of Torrent and Avalanche Control, which is a department of the Federal Ministry for Sustainability and Tourism (BMNT).<sup>8</sup> It consists of seven sections (one section responsible for Vienna, Lower Austria and Burgenland and six sections for the other Federal States) and 21 regional headquarters. The section in Vienna is responsible for strategic planning in addition to operational tasks. All headquarters of the affected Federal States were involved in the 2013 flood.

<sup>8</sup> The current title of the ministry is the Federal Ministry of Sustainability and Tourism; in 2013, it was called the Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water Management (BMLFUW).

- The maintenance of federal rivers lies within the competence of Federal Water Engineering, another department of the BMNT. The demarcation of competences between these two departments is based on a decree of the state governments concerning the catchment areas of the torrents. A third category of rivers includes waterways like the Danube, Traun or Enns, which are the responsibility of the Federal Ministry of Transport, Innovation and Technology (BMVIT).
- At sub-national level, the Federal States fulfil an important key role in the event of a flood. In 2013, seven out of nine Federal States were affected by the flood, the exceptions being Burgenland and Carinthia. The structure of institutional participants was different in each Federal State. For example, in Lower Austria the Deputy Governor and the Department of Finance were responsible for the general coordination of EUSF implementation in the state, while the Department of Hydraulic Engineering was responsible for the verification of the use of EU funds. Five other departments (e.g. departments for fire and civil defence) were involved in the process. Operational management in the field of federal water management is carried out by the departments of the State Governments.

Table 4 summarises the name and role of the institutions sending the application, the key implementing authorities, and the key stakeholders.

**Table 4: Institutional arrangements for the EUSF intervention**

	Organisation name	Role
Institution sending application	BMI Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior	Coordination of the grant, reports and communication with EC
Key implementing authorities		
Head of Department	BMF Austrian Federal Ministry of Finance	Financial coordination
Head of Department Federal Water Engineering	BMNT Austrian Federal Ministry for Sustainability and Tourism	DPM – responsible for federal rivers
Head of Department Torrent and avalanche control	BMNT Austrian Federal Ministry for Sustainability and Tourism	DPM – responsible for torrents
Head of Department Austrian Federal Ministry for Transport, Innovation and Technology – (Via Donau)	BMVIT Austrian Federal Ministry for Transport, Innovation and Technology	DPM – responsible for waterways
Head of Department WA 3, Water Engineering	Government of Lower Austria	Federal State flood protection
Head of Department – Directorate Environment and Water Management	Government of Upper Austria	Federal State flood protection
Head of Department 7, Water	Government of Salzburg	Federal State flood protection
Head of Department 14, Water Management, Resources and Sustainability	Government of Styria	Federal State flood protection
Head of Department Protection Water Management and Aquatic Ecology	Government of Tyrol	Federal State flood protection

Head of Department, Interior and Security	Government of Vorarlberg	Federal State flood protection
City of Vienna Municipal Department 45 – Vienna Waters	City of Vienna Municipal Department 45 – Vienna Waters	Municipality flood protection
Key stakeholders		
Fire Brigades	Fire Brigade of Melk in Lower Austria	Clean up of disaster area
Central Institute of Meteorology	Central Institute of Meteorology	Providing Information about the hydrological situation in the aftermath of an event
Volunteers	Caritas	Voluntary help as required
Military	Austrian Military	Clean up of disaster area
Newspapers	NOEN, Die Presse, etc.	Press releases

## 4.2 Application/submission phase

Germany, Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia were affected by the same event in 2013. Germany applied for the EUSF, having a total damage of around EUR8 billion. The Republic of Austria submitted an application as a neighbouring country to Germany (Neighbourhood criterion), because the direct damage – EUR 866,462,000 – fell below the EUSF mobilisation threshold of EUR 1 billion.<sup>9</sup>

Based on previous experience with the application for the EUSF,<sup>10</sup> the Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior conducted the submission phase without any problems or challenges in July and August 2013.

In line with EUSF requirements, the application included an accurate estimate of direct damage undertaken by the affected local, regional and national public administrations and private entities. In particular, the Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior requested the relevant Austrian Ministries (Ministry for Sustainability and Tourism, Ministry for Transport, Innovation and Technology, Ministry of Defence and Ministry for Education, Science and Research) for assistance in the determination of the extent of damages.<sup>11</sup>

The Austrian system of financial assistance after natural disasters involves 'municipal damage commissions' collecting data and evaluating the damage as local experts. The commissions, which consist of local councillors, experts and administrative staff, are responsible for visiting sites to draw up damage reports. These reports are forwarded to the Federal or State Governments as required for assessment and initiation of the disbursement of the aid. Most of the damage estimates for a EUSF application are therefore based on municipal assessments. In the field of preventative infrastructure, experts from the Torrent and Avalanche Control Department, the Federal Water

<sup>9</sup> BMI Austria, Report from the Republic of Austria on the use of the post-flood financial aid in June 2013.

<sup>10</sup> Floods in 2002, 2005 and 2012.

<sup>11</sup> BMI Austria, Report from the Republic of Austria on the use of the post-flood financial aid in June 2013.

Authority and the local waterway administration also collect information and assess damage.

In the case of the 2013 flood, three methods of assessing damage were used, depending on the availability of the data (the last two methods were used only in selected cases):<sup>12</sup>

- direct assessment and evaluation of damages based on known costs;
- if this was not possible, an estimate was made using experience and averages in conjunction with the known extent of damage; and
- if the previous steps were not possible, a plausible estimate by using the best-available information was made.

The consensus of interviewees at the national and regional levels of administration was that problems during the application phase were minimal; the process of completing and submitting the application was considered straightforward.

The same applied to the data-collection process, where no problems were experienced. The national departments for flood prevention and recovery stated that the EUSF does not differ substantially from the Austrian Disaster Fund.<sup>13</sup> The EUSF application process was considered to be similar to the process for submitting an application to the Federal Ministry of Finance when a disaster of any magnitude occurs. In 2013, the departments of the Ministry for Sustainability and Tourism already had a complete listing of damage to public buildings.

The application was submitted on 6 August 2013.<sup>14</sup>

**Table 5: Assessment of application/submission phase**

Assessment of application phase	Straight-forward	Neutral	Fairly complex	Excessively complex
Federal Ministry of the Interior	X			
Federal Ministry of Sustainability and Tourism – Federal Water Engineering	X			
Federal Ministry of Sustainability and Tourism – Torrent and Avalanche Control	X			
Government of Salzburg – Protection Water Management	X			
Government of Upper Austria	X			
Government of Styria	X			

Note: Assessment based on six interview respondents.

<sup>12</sup> BMI Austria, Short application to mobilize the European Union Solidarity Fund (2013), BMI-ZB1330/0008-II/13/a2013.

<sup>13</sup> According to the Austria Disaster Fund Act 1996.

<sup>14</sup> BMI Austria, Short application to mobilize the European Union Solidarity Fund (2013), BMI-ZB1330/0008-II/13/a2013

### 4.3 Appraisal / evaluation and approval phase

The European Commission received the application within the deadline of ten weeks after the first damage was recorded on 30 May 2013. The applicant organisation did not receive any requests from the Commission for additional information, so there were no obstacles to approval. The Commission accepted the eligibility of the application under the 'neighbouring country' criterion within the meaning of the Regulation for mobilising the Solidarity Fund.<sup>15</sup> There was evidence that the flood in Austria had the same cause as the one in Germany. In line with the methodology for calculating Solidarity Fund aid set out in the 2002-2003 Annual Report on the Solidarity Fund, the award for Austria was based on a calculation of 2.5 percent of the eligible costs of direct damage.<sup>16</sup>

The European Parliament and Council decided to make the EUSF award on 20 November 2013. On 9 December 2013, Austria received the decision to grant financial assistance from the European Union Solidarity Fund, followed by the implementing agreement on 22 January 2014.

Similar to the application and submission process, the evaluation and approval phase was considered by all the institutions involved to be timely and straightforward.

**Table 6: Assessment of evaluation/approval phase**

Assessment of evaluation/approval phase	Straight-forward	Neutral	Fairly complex	Excessively complex
Federal Ministry of the Interior	X			
Federal Ministry of Sustainability and Tourism – Federal Water Engineering	X			
Federal Ministry of Sustainability and Tourism – Torrent and Avalanche Control	X			
Government of Salzburg – Protection Water Management	X			
Government of Upper Austria	X			
Government of Styria	X			

Note: Assessment based on six interview respondents.

### 4.4 Implementation Phase

A specific legal and organisational framework was established for the EUSF funding. The Federal Ministry of the Interior and the affected Federal States concluded administrative agreements for processing the financial aid and the distribution of rights and obligations. With these agreements as a basis, the selection, processing and accompanying

<sup>15</sup> European Commission (2012) Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 of 11 November 2002 establishing the European Union Solidarity Fund, Art. 2(2)

<sup>16</sup> European Commission (2013) Communication to the Commission on an application for European Union Solidarity Fund financial aid presented by Romania relating to drought and forest fires in the summer of 2012 and on four applications presented by Germany, Austria, the Czech Republic and Hungary following the flooding disaster in May and June 2013

monitoring of part of the measures throughout the implementation period lay with the Federal States (as noted above).

Austria received the funding of EUR 21,661,550 on 17 February 2014, with which the EUSF-funded measures could be implemented. This amount was split between the Federal Government and the Federal States on the basis of the damage assessment and the experience gained from previous flood disasters. In accordance with standard Austrian practice, the Federal Government was allocated two-thirds (around EUR14 million) and the seven Federal States together one-third (EUR7 million).<sup>17</sup> The allocation to the Federal States was made in relation to their share of the total damage. The largest shares were received by Lower Austria (24 percent), Upper Austria (40 percent), Salzburg (10 percent) and Tyrol (23 percent). Styria, Vorarlberg and Vienna received a small amount – together approximately 2.5 percent of the funding. The respective shares were transferred to the recipient bodies on 1 August 2014, following the conclusion of administrative arrangements with the Federal States. No further transfers were made to the relevant ministries, because the Federal Ministry of Finance pre-financed the operations from national budget funds.

The EUSF was only used to finance public preventive infrastructure, which is an indirect benefit for people affected by the flood. Private persons were supported financially from the Federal Government, Land Governments, municipalities and several donation accounts of aid organizations or associations which were opened during the disaster for the victims (e.g. Caritas, Radio Ö3, Red Cross, Hilfswerk, etc.).

Other Community or international sources of funding were not used to fund the operations mentioned in the report, according to the Implementation Report.

In line with EUSF requirements, support from the Fund was mainly used for the immediate rebuilding of protective infrastructure and measures for the immediate protection of the cultural heritage (safety and short-term restoration measures in the field of protection of water and torrent including accompanying measures.) In total, 106 projects were implemented. The number of projects is broadly in proportion to the funding amount. Most projects were implemented in Upper Austria (52), Lower Austria (21) and Tyrol (20), then Salzburg (5), Vorarlberg (4), Vienna (3) and Styria (1).<sup>18</sup>

The projects were selected by the respective regional authorities of the Torrent and Avalanche Control and the Federal Water Engineering Administration in coordination with the strategic levels of the departments.

In Salzburg, for instance, the projects selected mainly supported stabilization of the riverside areas. These projects had to be carried out immediately after the flood, but for security reasons at the earliest in autumn/winter of 2013, otherwise the department of water management Salzburg would have to wait a year. River works are mainly carried out in autumn and winter. The Königsseeache project was started in early October and was completed over the winter. The following table shows a detail of the

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<sup>17</sup> BMI Austria, Report from the Republic of Austria on the use of the post-flood financial aid in June 2013.

<sup>18</sup> BMI Austria, Annex 2 of the Report from the Republic of Austria on the use of the post-flood financial aid in June 2013; BMI-ZK1330/0005-II/13/2015.

project list, which is attached to the implementation report – these five projects were accomplished.

**Table 7: Indicative examples of EUSF-funded projects**

No.	Project examples	Total costs	EUSF EUR mill)
74	Frauenbach, Oberndorf, Alt-Oberndorf, HWSB 2013	1.243	0.934
75	Königsseeache, Grödig, St. Leonhard, HWSB 2013	0.339	0.257
76	Statzenbach, Neumarkt, entire upper reaches of the river, HWSB 2013	0.143	0.109
77	Wallerbach, Neumarkt, Wallerbachbridge river bank protection, HWSB 2013	0.184	0.142
78	Wallerbach, Neumarkt Wallerbachbridge Flood Protecion, HWSB 2013	0.590	0.445

Source: Attachment 2 to the Implementation Report; statement of operations, 2015.

The financial control required by Article 6(4) of the agreement<sup>19</sup> was carried out by the inspection body for EU Funds of the Federal Ministry of the Interior. The foundations of the control were legislation at national and EU levels and the reports and expenditure lists of the Federal States and federal ministries.

The Audit Authority IV/IR/a of the Federal Ministry of the Interior undertook a system check as well as an individual project examination. An error risk analysis was carried out, and a sample of operations for the individual project examination was undertaken. The audit inspections revealed a very low incidence of error. The deficiencies that were identified were either corrected during the on-site audit or subsequently handled satisfactorily with the involvement of the authorities responsible and have no bearing on the level of EU aid paid out.

The period between the Commission's decision and the receipt of the money was about two months. The applicant authority was satisfied with the speed of EUSF payment, as measures could be funded while operations were underway (although one of the implementing departments considered that it should have been shorter).

As far as the implementation phase is concerned, most of the interviewees stated that they encountered limited problems linked to the complexity of EUSF implementing procedures. Both eligibility criteria and reporting requirements were clear and proportionate to the needs of the territories. The departments of the Federal Ministry of Sustainability and Tourism both noted that the phase was similar to the implementation phase in other cases.

Table 8 provides an overview of the evaluation of the implementation phase in relation to problems by the interviewees. Overall, as mentioned, the problems in implementation can be assessed on average as limited.

<sup>19</sup> European Commission (2013) Agreement of 22.01.2014 on the implementation of the decision of the Commission of 9.12.2013 to grant a grant from the EUSF for the financing of emergency aid in Austria, p.3.



**Table 8: Assessment of the implementation phase**

Extent of problems in implementation phase	Minimal	Limited	Moderate	Significant	Excessive
Federal Ministry of the Interior	X				
Federal Ministry of Sustainability and Tourism – Federal Water Engineering			X		
Federal Ministry of Sustainability and Tourism – Torrent and Avalanche Control		X			
Government of Salzburg – Protection Water Management		X			
Government of Lower Austria		X			
Government of Upper Austria	X				
Government of Styria	X				

Note: Assessment based on seven interview respondents.

#### 4.5 Closure

The phase of implementation ended on 17 February 2015. Six months later, on 4 August 2015, a report<sup>20</sup> on the use of the grant was delivered as specified in the implementing agreement. The final deadline for delivery of the report was 17 August 2015, so the Federal Ministry of the Interior delivered it two weeks earlier. No administrative problems were identified by the national authorities. An internal consultation was launched by the Commission on 11 November 2015 and was closed on 23 May 2016 with an accepted statement of validity. After an inter-service consultation, OLAF was consulted on 7 July 2016, which reported that there were no irregularities.

The Federal Ministry of the Interior noted that the whole process from application through approval to closure was characterised by an acceptable level of bureaucracy and complexity, partly because in the case of the floods only one category of expenditure was relevant for the EUSF (reconstruction of protective infrastructure). This also meant that fewer authorities were involved in the EUSF-process: *'depending on the number of participants, the process will be easier or more complicated'* (see Table 9).

A caveat to this generally positive assessment was provided by regional-level institutions, who considered that an implementation phase of one year was rather short. As all the EUSF funding was used for the rehabilitation and restoration of river bank protection structures and related infrastructure, the focus was on implementing these preventive measures, which some authorities considered as long-term measures. It was noted that greater flexibility in terms of the time frame in the EUSF would be more helpful in implementing sustainable solutions for preventive infrastructure.

<sup>20</sup> BMI Austria, Report from the Republic of Austria on the use of the post-flood financial aid in June 2013.

**Table 9: Assessment of closure procedures**

	Minimal	Moderate	Excessive
Bureaucracy involved	X		
Complexity of information demanded	X		
Time constraints		X	

Note: Assessment based on seven interview respondents.

#### 4.6 Publicity and visibility

In the case of the 2013 floods, according to the Federal Ministry of the Interior, no special events were organised or EU flags/EU boards set up. There is also no record of publicity/visibility measures in the Implementation Report or national reports on the flood.

All authorities and some NGOs and citizens interviewed were aware of the EUSF and confirmed that there were several press releases through newspapers or other news platforms (e.g. webpage of the Tyrolian Police).

From the interviews conducted with regional and national authorities, it can be argued that the visibility of the EUSF was 'under-promoted'. Most regional authorities reported that no visibility measures were implemented at their level; as one interviewee noted: *'The assistance from the EUSF was communicated in higher-level media coverage. The assistance provided general financial support for a sum of expenses related to managing disaster events. It supports individual projects, but not directly. A direct project-related public relations work was therefore not possible.'* Reasons for the lack of visibility named by national authorities were the short implementation phase and the relatively late receipt of funding in relation to the date of the original disaster.

Interviews with citizens support the above findings. Most citizen interviewees were completely unaware of the EUSF, and those respondents who had heard of the Fund did not differentiate between the EUSF and other EU instruments. As one remarked: *'I think I heard then that the EU helped.'* One interviewee knew that the Fund supported the reconstruction of national damage, but not that the grants were not transferred at the time of the disaster but some months later. In general, citizen interviewees lacked any detailed awareness about the EUSF.

Further insights are available from the Media Survey conducted for this evaluation.<sup>21</sup> The Austrian press published 21 EUSF-relevant articles after the flood disaster of which 18 articles were assessed as neutral to mildly positive. Two out of the remaining three articles were negative or very critical towards EUSF and one was positive. In many cases, the EUSF was only mentioned in citations of politicians. In general, there was a lack of detailed media information about the Solidarity Fund. The oldest article from 5 June 2013, immediately after the disaster, was the only one providing deeper description of the mechanisms of the EUSF.

<sup>21</sup> Further details are provided in the Media Survey published as a separate report.

## 5. FACTORS INFLUENCING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF EUSF SUPPORT

The most important factors influencing the implementation of EUSF support are considered to be governance, institutional factors and economic resources. Table 10 provides a summary of the influences of specific factors based on responses by interviewees at different levels.

**Table 10: Assessment of factors influencing EUSF implementation**

Factor	No influence	Slight influence	Moderate influence	Highly influential	Most influence
Governance				X	
Institutional factors			X		
Economic resources			X		
Accountability		X			
Public procurement requirements	X				
Time needed for the transfer of funding from the State to the regional accounts		X			
Lack of specific competences for managing emergency at municipal level	X				

Note: Assessment based on seven interview respondents.

- Governance.* This is considered as a highly significant factor. Austria is characterised by a well-developed governance structure with clear assignment of roles and responsibilities and quality of administrative resources. The experienced administrative capacity of the federal ministries, federal states and municipalities with flood protection in Austria and the resulting good cross-institutional cooperation facilitated (what was perceived to be) efficient EUSF implementation – a view shared by interviewees at all levels.
- Institutional factors.* As noted above, relatively few authorities were involved in the administration processes of the EUSF, and institutional factors are judged to have had only a moderate effect on the implementation of the EUSF. Also, the experience of previous EUSF cases meant that the institutions involved already had good cooperation mechanisms in place. For example, a domestic problem experienced with the distribution of funding in the first case of EUSF in 2002 was subsequently resolved and did not affect subsequent EUSF cases. Further, administrative agreements were concluded between national and sub-national levels in order to fully guarantee the correct execution of the operations of the Federal States.
- Economic resources.* Following the disaster, many measures were paid out of national and regional funds, which were later refinanced by the EUSF, thus alleviating the strain on public budgets. Further, the interaction of national and EU funding was considered by interviewees to be important for ensuring the

selection of suitable and sustainable measures. Thus, this factor is considered as moderate-to-highly influential.

- Neither *Accountability* nor *Public procurement requirements* were considered to have any significant influence.
- *Time needed for the transfer of funding from the State to the regional accounts.* This factor was emphasised by the Federal State of Lower Austria. The interviewee stated that the process of granting aid from the EUSF should be accelerated, although in practice this did not pose a major problem, as measures were pre-financed by the Federal and State Governments, and the payment timing had little-to-no impact on implementation.
- *Lack of specific competences for managing an emergency at municipal level.* No lack of *competence* was mentioned at local level, and the EUSF in 2013 was coordinated and implemented mostly by regional and national authorities.

## **6. ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN AND COST**

Overall, the interviews with public authorities and main stakeholders did not highlight any administrative obstacles in the implementation process (see Table 11). As noted above, the Austrian authorities already had experience with managing and implementing EUSF support on three previous occasions, and the administrative effort required could therefore be relatively accurately estimated. All national authorities assessed the administrative burdens as limited.

The Government of Salzburg stated that the whole application and implementation process was not at all bureaucratic. Upper Austria confirmed the incidence of relatively limited administrative burdens. It was not considered more time-consuming or difficult than in other cases of disaster relief. The total bureaucratic time effort was estimated at less than a month of working time. Likewise, the Styrian authorities (who only received a small share of the grant for a few measures) considered that the administrative effort and the administrative costs were proportionate to the funding. The Lower Austrian Government agreed with these conclusions, though also considered that '*a simplified implementation would be desirable*' – this referred to the simplification of reporting on implementation and more trust in national authorities to ensure the correctness of expenditure.

**Table 11: Assessment of administrative burdens**

Administrative burdens	Minimal	Limited	Moderate	Significant	Excessive
Federal Ministry of the Interior		X			
Federal Ministry of Sustainability and Tourism – Federal Water Engineering		X			
Federal Ministry of Sustainability and Tourism – Torrent and Avalanche Control		X			
Government of Salzburg – Protection Water Management	X				
Government of Lower Austria		X			
Government of Upper Austria		X			
Government of Styria	X				

Note: Assessment based on seven interview respondents.

For reconstruction projects in Austria, the Federal Ministry for Sustainability and Tourism usually controls the projects according to its own administrative regulations. For the EUSF, a double control was involved, with a second control undertaken by the Federal Ministry of the Interior. This process was considered excessive by some interviewees, on the basis that Austrian audit standards are considered 'very high' without a need for double-checks.

**Table 12: Assessment of administrative costs**

Administrative costs	Minimal	Limited	Moderate	Significant	Excessive
Federal Ministry of the Interior		X			
Federal Ministry of Sustainability and Tourism – Federal Water Engineering	X				
Federal Ministry of Sustainability and Tourism – Torrent and Avalanche Control	X				
Government of Salzburg – Protection Water Management		X			
Government of Lower Austria		X			
Government of Upper Austria		X			
Government of Styria	X				

Note: Assessment based on seven interview respondents.

The administrative burdens as well as the administrative costs were evaluated as minimal-to-limited by the national authorities. The costs were estimated by a national authority at about one percent or less of the funding received, a level considered as low

compared with similar tasks.<sup>22</sup> The regional authorities also considered the administrative costs as acceptable and low in relation to the grant.

## **7. RELEVANCE OF EUSF SUPPORT**

The 2013 floods were classified as an extraordinary disaster and fulfilled the Neighbourhood criterion, as Germany was particularly severely affected. Almost all the Federal States of Austria were affected to different degrees. Especially along the Danube regions in Lower and Upper Austria, the damage was very high. In Vienna, the relief channel was flooded, so that no major damage occurred. Overall, the replacement costs were estimated at around EUR866 million.

The consensus of national and regional authorities was the high financial relevance of the EUSF. As an additional support, it helped Austria finance the reconstruction after the flood. The following statement from a national authority interviewee is illustrative: *'We see the EUSF as a very important and meaningful instrument. For us, it represents an additional opportunity for the provision of financial resources. We consider it important to contribute to this idea at the European level, i.e. to enter into a kind of solidarity community in the event of a disaster. From an Austrian point of view, we got out more than we paid into the EUSF. That should not be neglected.'*

Further, the EUSF was considered as a valuable support for local authorities facing financial constraints. A local authority described the financial difficulties faced by some municipalities, making it increasingly challenging to cope with the consequences of flooding. Some communities are dependent on such additional financial support. Another regional authority advocated an expansion of the EU financed aid: *'The EUSF is a very relevant tool to offset increased financial burdens on the institutions concerned. An accelerated availability of EU funds from the EUSF and an increase in funding would be necessary.'*

Taking a longer-term perspective, a national authority stated that the relevance of the EUSF varies between disasters. In the case of the 2013 floods, the EUSF aid was significantly lower than, for example, in 2002. Similarly, the 2012 flood in Carinthia was of major importance for the recovery of the region. The Fund should cover only necessary measures and it does.

## **8. ASSESSMENT OF ACHIEVEMENTS**

### **8.1 Operational achievements**

On 22 January 2014, Austria was granted EUR 21,661,550 for the restoration of protective infrastructure only. The EUSF co-financed 106 projects divided proportionally among the Federal States. According to the Annexes (2 and 4) of the Implementation Report, the report itself and the interview research, the measures were implemented in accordance with the agreement with the European Commission of 22 January 2014. Austria managed to spend the requested grant. The Implementation Report lists the total costs and shares of the selected projects (see Table 13). To ensure a margin for potential corrections, the Implementation Report presents a higher amount of costs eligible for EUSF grant (EUR 22.353 million) than the value of the grant award (EUR

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<sup>22</sup> Exact cost statements regarding the administration were requested but were not available and were therefore estimated by interviewees.

21.661 million). The grant was part of the financing of 106 projects which collectively accounted for total costs of EUR 32.015 million.

**Table 13: Division of costs and EUSF funding by authorities (EUR millions)**

Authorities	Federal	Land (State)	Other authorities	Total
Total cost of disaster (EUR mill)				866.462
Total eligible costs of disaster (EUR mill)				350.334
Total costs of selected projects (EUR mill)	16.263	11.418	4.334	32.015
Eligible Expenditure under EUSF (EUR mill)	14.539	7.814		22.353
EUSF received (EUR mill)	14.441	7.220		21.661
EUSF % of total costs of disaster				2.5
EUSF % of total eligible costs of disaster				6
EUSF % of the costs of selected projects	89	6		70 <sup>23</sup>

Source: BMI Austria, Report on the use of the post-flood financial aid in June 2013.

The EUSF covered only six percent of the total eligible costs of the flood disaster in 2013, and only 2.5 percent of the total costs of the disaster. Regarding the selected projects the fund covered 70 percent of the costs.

All the authorities' interviewees confirmed that there were no implementation issues and that the operational objectives had been achieved in the single category of preventative infrastructure (see Table 14). The Implementation Report describes the adopted and planned prevention measures in Austria that were implemented in accordance with Art.8 of the Solidarity Fund Regulation.

**Table 14: Assessment of operational achievements**

Activity	Not significant	Limited significance	Moderate significance	High significance	Most significance
Restoration of infrastructure to working order	X				
Temporary accommodation & rescue for population	X				
Securing of preventative infrastructure & cultural heritage					X
Immediate clean-up of disaster areas	X				

Note: Assessment based on three interview respondents.

<sup>23</sup> These percentages refer to the eligible expenditure under EUSF.

## 8.2 Added Value

The added value of the EUSF support in 2013 is regarded as primarily in the fields of economics and politics (see Table 15).

- *Economic added value.* The EUSF refinanced many measures in Austria in 2013. Immediately after the disaster, national and regional funds were needed. Generally, the purpose of these is to finance frequently occurring minor damage and to invest in preventive measures. The EUSF therefore has an added value in supporting national subsidies. Moreover, the national funds are not necessarily designed for major disasters. A national-level interviewee noted that '*Our flood-protection structures are dimensioned only for a certain event. We cannot guarantee absolute protection and that's what the EUSF is all about - for emergencies.*'
- *Political added value.* The political added value of the EUSF is represented by its capacity to increase awareness of EU solidarity, which the interviewed authorities recognised. National authorities highlighted good cooperation between different levels - EU, national, regional. The political structures in Austria were strengthened due to the collaboration of Federal and State Governments. The monitoring visit of the Commission to Austria on 12 June 2014<sup>24</sup> was also mentioned as good practice by national authorities in the context of political added value.
- *Policy added value.* The added value of the EUSF in relation to the 2013 case is considered to be limited, as changes and adjustments had already been made in the years before when a catastrophe took place and the EUSF provided support. For example, directives have been aligned with those of the EU. The implementing provisions of the Federal Waterways Management Directive, RIWATE, have been adapted to those of the EUSF.
- *Operational added value and Learning added value.* No significant operational or learning added value was identified from the research, attributable to a well-developed administrative capacity with experience of managing funding (under both EUSF and national sources) for previous disasters.

**Table 15: Assessment of added value**

	Not significant	Limited significance	Moderate significance	High significance	Most significance
Economic				X	
Political			X		
Policy		X			
Operational	X				
Learning	X				

Note: Assessment based on eight interview respondents.

<sup>24</sup> European Commission (2016) Note to file, Closure of the EU Solidarity Fund intervention in relation to the flooding of May and June in Austria of 2013, para. 5.



## 9. SYNERGIES AND COMPLEMENTARITY WITH ESIF

In the course of the research, relevant programmes for relevant ESI Funds (ERDF and EAFRD) were considered in terms of coherence and potential synergies with EUSF with respect to the regulatory framework, governance, thematic focus, spatial coverage, and joint funding or projects. For the most part the coherence was found to be moderate to weak – and non-existent for joint activities. No mechanisms have been put in place to ensure coherence or synergies.

The coherence of the regulatory framework as well as the governance between EUSF and ESIF can be considered rather weak. Interviewees regarded ESIF as being relatively inflexible in adapting to evolving DPM needs. As one noted: *"The ESIF programmes are strategic programmes over a medium-term period. You have to do analyses, develop demand surveys, develop strategies, and for these instruments an abrupt ad hoc event is not suitable. EAFRD can't respond so quickly when a disaster is suddenly there."*

In practice, there is a perceived moderate complementarity in terms of the distinct thematic and spatial foci of the different EU funding sources, each with separate objectives and projects. The perception of interviewees was that the EUSF and the ERDF/EAFRD are very different, but that they complement each other well with little need for change. The DPM authority perceived the value of the EUSF as currently structured: *"my opinion would be that you just leave the EUSF for rebuilding. That is the main focus - then it (the EUSF) is recognised as such. If programmes were mixed together, they are losing their contours."*

One interviewee commented that disaster prevention lies within the competence of the Member States, but for huge unpredictable catastrophes the EUSF is essential. *"The Solidarity Fund is clearly defined as an ex-post and a financial instrument. If a catastrophe happens, the EUSF is used. Other measures and activities concerning disaster risk management are matters of national disaster prevention."*

The managing authority for EAFRD noted that there was no overlap, such as double funding. The EAFRD programme and the EUSF were never in conflict, in particular as the EUSF represents additional, unplanned funding. Complementarity is perceived to be 'given', as the EAFRD programme has (inter alia) a focus on disaster prevention whereas the EUSF is regarded as 'helping out when a disaster happens'

Considering the ERDF measures, there is no perceived connection at all. *"At the moment the topic of disaster management is not intended in the ERDF programme, as well as there are no relevant measures. The issues of ERDF are research and innovation. We have to concentrate on that. We set different goals. "*

For some interviewees, the complementarity between EU funding sources was facilitated by the wider legal framework and obligations. The European Floods Directive (Directive 2007/60/EC on the assessment and management of flood risks) was cited as an example: *"...it necessarily complements the European Solidarity Fund. That helps a lot. This Directive focuses on flood risk management which not only applies to the construction of flood defences, but also to the entire risk cycle, from prevention to event / clearing up, concrete flood measures, planning measures, from spatial planning to disaster planning."*

One of the obstacles to coherence/synergies identified during interviews is a lack of publicity and knowledge about EUSF among ESIF managing authorities. As one

interviewee noted, *“It is not a good sign if, as manager of a large programme, I know very little about the EUSF. Then you see that there is room for improvement in the information or publication.”* More generally, there appeared to have been little consideration among ESIF managing authorities about the potential for assessing or developing synergies. Indeed, it was said that *“There is no need for coordination between the ERDF program and the EUSF. What I could imagine would be synergies with cross-border programs such as ETC.”*

## 10. LESSONS LEARNED

The overall assessment of the experience of the EUSF intervention was broadly considered to be very positive by the interviewees consulted for the research at different levels (see Table 16).

**Table 16: Overall assessment of administrative lessons learned**

Activity	Very negative	Negative	Neutral	Positive	Very positive
Application process					X
Information on how to apply					X
Support by the Commission					X
Extent of administrative demand				X	
Reporting requirements				X	
Overall experience of dealing with EUSF					X

Note: Assessment based on seven interview respondents.

Examining the lessons learned in more detail, the following points can be made to elaborate on the rankings in the table.

First, the application process and the information on how to apply were considered very positive. The requirements were considered to be clearly defined and capable of being fulfilled efficiently by the Austrian institutions. The handling of subsidies and the documentation in this process, which is already well developed in Austria, also contributed to effective implementation.

Second, the above conclusion is associated with the support provided by the Commission, which was highlighted as very effective. National authorities described the cooperation with the Commission as good, informal and without problems. This applied to the application process as well as to the implementation and closure processes. An in-country meeting conducted with representatives of the European Commission was considered very useful.

Third, the extent of administrative demand and the reporting requirements were assessed as proportionate to the funding. Authorities at all levels confirmed that the administrative burden is low, and at national level the administrative costs are very low in relation to the grant. One exception to this – stressed at both regional and national

levels – is that the verification process of the list of costs is not considered appropriate, and that currently too much administrative effort is spent on this task.

Finally, although the EUSF was visible in the media, the interviews and citizen discussions showed that the awareness of the EUSF in the population is little-to-non-existent. As such, better communication of the EUSF activities targeted at the general population could be beneficial in increasing the public knowledge of the intervention. Using EU flags, boards, advertising space or/and organising symposia or other events at local and regional levels would be ways to improve the visibility of the EUSF.

## **11. REFERENCES**

### **EU-level documents**

Council Regulation (EU) No 2012/2002 of 11 November 2002 establishing the European Union Solidarity Fund.

European Commission, *Proposal for a decision of the European parliament and of the council on the mobilisation of the EU Solidarity Fund*, Brussels, 3.10.2013, COM (2013) 692 final.

European Commission, *Decision of the Commission, granting financial assistance from the European Union Solidarity Fund to finance emergency operations following the floods in Austria in May and June 2013*, 9.12.2013 Brussels, C (2013) 8884 final.

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European Commission, Note to file, Closure of the EU Solidarity Fund intervention in relation to the flooding of May/June in Austria of 2013 – Commission Decision C(2013) 8884 CCI 2013AT16SPO002.

European Commission (2013) Communication to the Commission on an application for European Union Solidarity Fund financial aid presented by Romania relating to drought and forest fires in the summer of 2012 and on four applications presented by Germany, Austria, the Czech Republic and Hungary following the flooding disaster in May and June 2013.

### **National documents**

Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior, *Application to mobilize the European Union Solidarity Fund*, BMI-ZK1330/0008-II/13/a/2013, August 2013.

Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior, *Implementation Report on the expenses under the European Union Solidarity Fund to finance emergency operations after the flood in May and June 2013*, BMI-ZK1330/0005-II/13/2015, July 2015.

Austrian Federal Ministry of Finance (2018), Katastrophenfondsgesetz 1996, 12. Report of the Federal Minister of Finance, March 2018.

Austrian Federal Ministry for Sustainability and Tourism, *National Flood Risk Management Plan*, GZ: BMLFUW-IL.99.1.1/0191-IV/2015, 18.03.2016.

University of Natural Resources and Life Sciences, Vienna (2013) *Documentation of the Flood in Austria 2013*; online:

[https://www.bmvit.gv.at/service/publikationen/verkehr/schifffahrt/downloads/hochwasserdonau2013\\_v2.pdf](https://www.bmvit.gv.at/service/publikationen/verkehr/schifffahrt/downloads/hochwasserdonau2013_v2.pdf).

### **Main websites**

[http://ec.europa.eu/regional\\_policy/de/funding/solidarity-fund/](http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/de/funding/solidarity-fund/)

<https://www.help.gv.at/Portal.Node/hlpd/public/content/295/Seite.2950046.html>

<https://www.bmf.gv.at/budget/finanzbeziehungen-zu-laendern-und-gemeinden/katastrophenfonds.html>

[https://www.bmnt.gv.at/wasser/schutz\\_vor\\_naturgefahren/beratung\\_information/organisation\\_hws.html](https://www.bmnt.gv.at/wasser/schutz_vor_naturgefahren/beratung_information/organisation_hws.html)

### **Press releases**

<https://www.noen.at/niederoesterreich/kultur-festivals/rasche-hilfe-fuer-hochwasseropfer-4892520>

<https://derstandard.at/1369362492382/Milliarden-Schutz-konnte-Flut-nicht-eindaemmen>

<http://www.polizei.gv.at/tirol/presse/eu/eu.aspx?nwid=794431623537686A6A54633D&ctrl=AB13CD03FG60>

## **12. ANNEX: METHODOLOGY OF THE CASE STUDY RESEARCH**

### **Methodology**

In this case study on the implementation of the European Solidarity Fund in Austria in 2013, several methods were used. First, a desk analysis reviewed EU regulations and official documentation produced for the purpose of mobilising the EUSF support as well as institutional websites to understand and describe the institutional structures where coordination took place and tasks were fulfilled to ensure the correct use of the funds. Second, interviews were conducted with relevant stakeholders at national, regional and municipality levels (three Ministries, four State Governments, a municipality and a Fire Brigade) as well as with NGOs (Press and a social aid organisation). And third, interviews were held with five citizens from different regions. The contacts with citizens were either recommended by regional authorities or by acquaintances. The interviews were conducted principally by telephone. For resource-related reasons (time constraints and distance) no focus groups were held.

Invitations to participate in the research, including a presentation letter by the European Commission, were sent by email to a list of public authorities and other stakeholders whose contact details were initially detected through web research and later in the process were provided by other authorities (see the following tables 'List of contacted public authorities' and 'List of other stakeholders'). In addition to the emails, phone recalls were made to ask for interview dates.

Part of the interviews was conducted face-to-face. This was possible with national authorities with offices in Vienna and a newspaper. The interviews with the regional authorities, NGOs and citizens were carried out by telephone.

The table below shows the names of interviewees, the institutions they represent and the dates of the interviews.

**Interviews**

<b>Institution</b>	<b>Type of institution</b>	<b>Name of interviewee</b>	<b>Date</b>
BMI – Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior	Public		19.07.2018
BMNT Austrian Federal Ministry for Sustainability and Tourism	Public		23.07.2018
BMNT Austrian Federal Ministry for Sustainability and Tourism	Public		13.08.2018
Government of Lower Austria, Department of Hydraulic Engineering	Public		10.08.2018
Government of Salzburg, Department for Flood Control	Public		13.08.2018
Government of Styria, Department Water Resources and Sustainability	Public		16.08.2018
Government of Upper Austria, Department Water management, Flood Protection	Public		14.08.2018
Municipality of Melk	Public		08.08.2018
Fire Brigade Melk	Public		09.08.2018
Caritas	NGO		10.08.2018
Standard	Press		08.08.2018

The following table shows the full list of public authorities by region, province, organisation and role in the institution contacted by email and/or by telephone.

**List of contacted public authorities**

Region	Organisation name	Province	Role
National	Austrian Federal Ministry for Interior (BMI)	All provinces	State crisis and disaster management
National	Austrian Federal Ministry for Finance (BMF)	All provinces	Responsible for finance in case of a disaster
National	Austrian Federal Ministry for Transport, Innovation and Technology (BMVIT)	All provinces	Owens VIA DONAU – Austrian Waterways GmbH
National	Austrian Federal Ministry for Sustainability and Tourism (BMNT)	All provinces	DPM – responsible for strategic planning
National	Austrian Federal Ministry for Sustainability and Tourism (BMNT)	All provinces	DPM – responsible for regions Lower Austria, Upper Austria and Vorarlberg
National	Austrian Federal Ministry for Sustainability and Tourism (BMNT)	All provinces	DPM – responsible for regions Carinthia, Salzburg and Styria
National	Austrian Federal Ministry for Sustainability and Tourism (BMNT)	All provinces	DPM – responsible for torrent and avalanche control
Lower Austria	Lower Austrian State government	Lower Austria	Government
Lower Austria	Lower Austrian State government	Melk	Mayor
Upper Austria	Upper Austrian State government	Upper Austria	Government
Upper Austria	Upper Austrian State government	Upper Austria	Water management
Salzburg	Salzburg State government	Salzburg	Government
Salzburg	Salzburg State government	Salzburg	Water management
Styria	Styrian State government	Styria	Government
Styria	Styrian State government	Styria	Water management
Tyrol	Tyrol State government	Tyrol	Government
Tyrol	Tyrol State government	Tyrol	Water management

Vorarlberg	Vorarlberg State government	Vorarlberg	Government
Vorarlberg	Vorarlberg State government	Bludenz	Water management
Vienna	Municipal department 45 Vienna Waters	Vienna	Responsible for Vienna waters
Vienna	Municipal department 5 Finance	Vienna	Responsible for the finance of Vienna

### List of other stakeholders contacted

Region	Organisation name	Type of organisation	Name/Role
Vienna, Lower Austria	Caritas der Erzdiözese Vienna	NGO	
National (Vienna)	Austrian Federal Fire Service	Emergency Service	
Lower Austria	District Fire Department	Emergency Service	
Tyrol	District Fire Department	Emergency Service	
National (Salzburg)	Military Command Austria	Military	
Lower Austria - Klosterneuburg	NOEN	Press	
Vienna	Standard	Press	





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