Good policies and practices to tackle urban challenges

Report prepared by

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1. Introduction

The context of the study

This study synthesises ten case studies completed in the framework of a reflection process on the 'Cities of Tomorrow', organised and managed by DG Regio. The main aim of this process was to highlight the main challenges for European cities over the following decade and to identify the main objectives, instruments and methods they can deploy when tackling them. These questions have been discussed within three workshops with the participation of approximately 20 experts on urban development, representing different European cities and different sectors.

The demand

Closely linked to this process, the DG Regio launched a tender for providing case studies on cities and their policies to underpin the results of the discussions process by presenting 'good practices to tackle urban challenges'. The tender required a proposal for a long list of 20 cities, out of which ten would be selected for study.

The case studies were aimed at providing positive examples on successful urban policies and experiences responding to the challenges identified by the experts group. It was also required that the experiences reveal some important learning points for future cohesion policies. By the time a first series of exchanges between the consultants and the Steering Committee were held, ten cities had been selected\(^1\), based on the following criteria:

- a wide spread of the challenges defined by the expert groups;
- the cities represent the European cities network and give a balanced selection regarding geographical position and population size;
- the cities should represent good examples that can bring some useful learning points for other cities or for European programmes in the future.

The ten cities studied are as follows:

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\(^1\) Eight were initially selected from the list of 20 cities: Amsterdam, Barcelona, Newcastle, Seraing, Plaine Commune, Leipzig, Gliwice and Prague and a further two were suggested by the Steering Committee: Florence and Växjö. Later on, following some discussions with the Czech experts, Prague was considered less relevant and so was substituted with Brno by agreement with the Steering Committee.
Table 1: The case study cities according to their size, location, main functions and main challenges they have tackled

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>SIZE* / population</th>
<th>Location in Europe</th>
<th>Main functions</th>
<th>theme/challenges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amsterdam (NL)</td>
<td>Big 767 773</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>international metropolis</td>
<td>Re thinking diversity policy to strengthen social cohesion and tackle the risk of segregation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barcelona (ES)</td>
<td>Big 1.6 million</td>
<td>South</td>
<td>international metropolis</td>
<td>Transportation as part of urban cohesion policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brno (CZ)</td>
<td>Middle 370 000</td>
<td>East</td>
<td>traditional regional industrial centre</td>
<td>Upgrading the international position of the city and its region by attracting highly qualified people and activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florence (I)</td>
<td>Middle 368 391</td>
<td>South</td>
<td>city of cultural tourism and cultural heritage</td>
<td>Reorganising cultural industries and revitalizing local manufacturing traditions in order to redefine the city’s international position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gliwice (PL)</td>
<td>Middle 192,000</td>
<td>East</td>
<td>industrial and mining city, secondary hub in a metropolitan and industrial zone</td>
<td>Improving and integrating local SMEs in order to sustain the economic revitalisation of the city based on knowledge society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leipzig (D)</td>
<td>Middle 520 000</td>
<td>West/East</td>
<td>shrinking city and regional centre with strong international connotation</td>
<td>Grounding new actions on the lessons learned from the URBAN experience and finding innovative ways to develop the west and to start regenerating the east.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newcastle (UK)</td>
<td>Middle 278,000 (+200 000 with Gateshead)</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>regional hub and traditional industrial centre</td>
<td>Response of a city to the financial crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plaine Commune (FR)</td>
<td>Middle 346 209</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>cooperation of 8 communes as part of the Paris Metropolitan region</td>
<td>Capacity of a group of cities to attract diverse economic activities, among which many service industries, in the view of providing employment to local dwellers of a deprived area in transition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seraing (BE)</td>
<td>Small 61 000</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>small industrial city as part of the Liège agglomeration</td>
<td>Urban foresight based on public participation as a tool for integrating local residents' requirements on their own neighbourhood into the Master Plan of the city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Växjö (S)</td>
<td>Small 83.000</td>
<td>North</td>
<td>Small regional centre</td>
<td>Sustainable energy policies as part of a model for managing complex urban change</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*groups created by the authors of this report:
- § small: up to 100,000 inhabitants
- § medium: 100,000 - 500,000
- § big: over 500,000

2 The population of Leipzig is a little less that 500,000. Thus the status and functions or the city led us to define it as a middle sized city, although it is the second largest city after Berlin in east Germany
Methodological remark

The aim of the study is clearly to show where, when and how policies match the challenges cities are facing and how actions decided in the framework of such policies fit. In addition to the term “policy”, the case studies report, and this synthesis often uses, the term “strategy”. Where this is so, “strategy” should not be interpreted as a full-fledged urban strategy such as a Master Plan for instance, but rather as the process of constructing a system of devices involving different actors and aimed at tackling the challenges faced by the cities. As already mentioned, such challenges are complex and so tackling them in the long run may require complex policies that can only be derived from a process of strategic thinking.

2. The method and the difficulties encountered

A first step: Identification of the main challenges

In the call for tender, eight direct and three transversal challenges were identified and the consultants were asked to suggest one city representing one challenge. From our perspective, the complexity of urban development suggests that cities are generally facing several challenges simultaneously. In addition, importantly the study has been carried out in the framework of integrated urban development. Therefore, policies and practices implemented to tackle one main challenge can only be looked at in the context of interrelated challenges and through complex policies and practices.

However, the Steering Committee confirmed its preference to define one challenge for each city in terms of the integration of the case studies into the final report to be prepared on the “Cities of Tomorrow” reflection process. Therefore a compromise was found: all cities would be dealt with from the point of view of one key challenge, but this challenge would be expressed in a more precise way than originally set out in the bid. This approach proved accurate, helping in the following ways:

- to focus on one specific experience and,
- to place this experience in the larger context of the entire city (and in the relevant cases, of its surrounding metropolitan area) taking into consideration the complexity of urban development.

Definition of the concrete challenges of the case studies was achieved in two steps. A first proposal was made at the start of the study and it was subsequently modified and articulated according to the results of interviews.

Figure 1 shows in the case of each city, the path from the general challenge(s) identified in the tender, to the more comprehensive ones identified during the study.
Fig. 1: Match of the cities with the general challenges identified in the bid

1. Countering social spatial polarisation
2. Improving social exclusion and integration of newcomers
3. City resilience to economic pressure and financial crises
4. Adapting the city to demographic changes
5. Developing public transport and sustainable urban mobility
6. Improving energy efficiency
7. Sustainable management of natural resources
8. Transition towards knowledge society
9. Fostering cities’ attractiveness
10. Accelerating the transition towards the sustainable city (housing, transport, energy)
11. Ensuring territorial coherence and cohesion

Amsterdam (NL)
Re-thinking diversity policy to strengthen social cohesion and tackle the risk of segregation

Barcelona (ES)
Transportation as part of urban cohesion policies

Venice (IT)
Sustainable energy policies as part of a model for managing complex urban change

Kerken (DE)
Urban foresight based on public participation as a tool for integrating local residents’ requirements on their own neighbourhood into the Master Plan of the city

Plaine Commune (FR)
Capacity of a group of cities to attract diverse economic activities, among which many service industries, in the view of providing employment to local dwellers of a deprived area in transition

Newcastle (UK)
Response of a city to the financial crisis

Brno (CZ)
Upgrading the international position of the city and its region by attracting highly qualified people and activities

Florence (IT)
Reorganising cultural industries and revitalizing local manufacturing traditions in order to redefine the city’s international position

Sliwice (PL)
Improving and integrating local SMEs in order to sustain the economic revitalization of the city based on knowledge society

Leipzig (D)
Grounding new actions on the lessons learned from the URBAN experience and finding innovative ways to develop the west and to start regenerating the east.
**Preparation of the case studies**

Two pilot case studies (Plaine Commune and Seraing) were prepared as the first part of the project.

On the basis of these pilot case studies and the meeting with the Steering Committee, guidelines for the further other cases were established.

Case studies are based on two-three days long field work in each city consisting of approximately eight interviews with the main actors of the city related to the given experience. In principle the interviews were made with:

- one or two high elected representatives of the city
- local technicians, and experts
- related companies or institutions
- representatives of NGOs, inhabitants’ associations
- an external expert, researcher.

However, this scheme was, of necessity, flexible and adapted to each case as appropriate to local circumstances.

**Difficulties encountered**

1. Although the main aim consisted of the analyses of ONE experience per city rather than analysing the complex strategies and actions likely to be evident in the cities, it turned out to be almost impossible to adhere to this rule. Even when concentrating on one concrete challenge, several answers, actions and policies may be found contributing to a response to this challenge in each case. Moreover, a sustainable response towards one challenge assumes the cooperation and complementary actions of several actors within the city. As a result, we aimed to present the most important actions, strategies and policies and to see in what measure they are complementary to each other. In the case of Florence for example, the experience is concentrated on one main action (the Florens2010 event), but the case study also shows how this action was related to others (especially, to the city strategy).

2. Following the in depth analysis, in some cases it turned out that the case study city cannot be regarded ONLY as representing a positive experience. Therefore, in certain case studies some critical conclusion had to be formulated (for example, on the sustainability or the possibilities of integration of the given project) in spite of the desire of the Steering Committee to concentrate only on the positive lessons. Nevertheless we consider that highlighting key problems and obstacles for a given policy or action is a realistic and potentially useful approach because it can inform the learning process and ultimately transferability.³

3. Assessing the transferability of the case studies proved to be a difficult matter. As mentioned in the Leipzig report: “you can transfer ideas but every place has its specificity” (p.15). As a result, and in agreement with the Steering Committee, the initial plan to analyse the conditions of

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³ In the case of Brno the risk of a two speed development was highlighted, and in Gliwice, the lack of articulation between the actions, etc, was an issue.
transferability were altered and so it was decided to focus on the main lessons learned from the case studies, and their possible uses in other cases.

4-The fact that all studies were prepared following similar guidelines represented advantages but also some difficulties. On the positive side, it made it easier to develop the initial focus and preparation of the questions that would form a commonly used discussion guide. More problematic was that cities and their experiences of different types and sizes had to be integrated into similar frameworks, with the inherent risks that this activity poses.

3. Synthesis of the key characteristics of the case studies

In this part of the report there is an attempt to synthesize the cases studies with regard to the following key characteristics:

⇒ Size of city (see table 1), functions, international position and networking
⇒ Territorial and administrative levels
⇒ Actors involved in policies and practices tackling the challenges
⇒ Strategies
⇒ Actions
⇒ Financial framework
⇒ Monitoring

Naturally the results of this analysis cannot be regarded as being representative for all European cities. Instead, they provide ideas and reveal questions and issues that provide a useful basis for reflection on the methods, tools, strategies, actions, etc, of the European cities of tomorrow.

City sizes, international position and networks

As has already been shown in the presentation of the ten cities, two of them (Amsterdam and Barcelona) are large cities (above 500,000 inhabitants), six are middle sized cities (Brno, Gliwice, Florence, Leipzig, Newcastle and Plaine Commune), and two (Seraing and Växjö) are small cities with less than 100,000 inhabitants in their administrative territories.

The international positioning of the ten cities is very diverse: Amsterdam and Barcelona have complex international functions (including culture, economy, tourism) as well as being important international metropolitan hubs of Europe. Florence has a particular international function as a world city of cultural tourism. For the other cities, the international functions are difficult to evaluate. As this question was not a key part of the study, no special indicators were developed concerning it. However, we attempted to give an impression on the connectivity of these cities through their participation in different European programmes and networks (URBAN I and II, URBACT and Eurocities working groups). Apart from Amsterdam and Barcelona, Brno, Leipzig and Newcastle are the cities expected to participate or having already participated in the highest number of European projects and networks. Florence’s international activity is much less extensive. The two smaller sized cities (Seraing and Växjö) and the special urban conurbation area (Plaine Commune) have virtually no network connectivity via the European programmes and networks.
Table 2: The cities according to their participation in URBACT, URBAN and Eurocities networks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cities</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>URBAN and URBACT</th>
<th>Cities networks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
<td>Big 767,773</td>
<td>URBAN I and II, URBACT (1 pjt)</td>
<td>CLIP, Eurocities (14 working groups)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barcelona</td>
<td>Big 1.6 million</td>
<td>URBACT (1 pjt)</td>
<td>Eurocities (20 w. g.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brno</td>
<td>Middle 370,000</td>
<td>URBACT (1 pjt)</td>
<td>Eurocities (18 w.g.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florence</td>
<td>Middle 368,901</td>
<td>URBACT (2 projects)</td>
<td>Eurocities (2 w.g.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gliwice</td>
<td>Middle 192,000</td>
<td>URBACT (1 pjt)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leipzig</td>
<td>Middle 520,000</td>
<td>URBAN II, URBACT (2 projects)</td>
<td>Eurocities (13 w.g.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newcastle</td>
<td>Middle 278,000 (+200 000 with Gateshead)</td>
<td>URBACT (2 projects)</td>
<td>Eurocities (14 w.g.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plaine Commune</td>
<td>Middle 346,209</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seraing</td>
<td>Small 61,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Växjö</td>
<td>Small 83,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Territorial and administrative levels covered by the case studies**

In terms of the areas covered by the case studies it is possible to differentiate between the following three levels:

- the administrative city level (the territory within the administrative boundaries of the cities),
- the metropolitan or agglomeration area that is very often not an administrative level but only a statistical unit,
- the County/Province/Region, the administrative level above the city named in different ways according to the different countries.

The administrative cities are evident in all cases except in Plaine Commune, where the urban experience is related to the Communauté d’Agglomération (administrative grouping of cities promoted within the French legislation) which comprises a group of eight cities, each of them active member of the group. In Newcastle the strategies and actions in response to the economic crises have to a great extent involved the Newcastle-Gateshead Partnership (signed in 2007), covering the two neighbouring cities but not extending to the entire city-region comprising three other local authorities.

The county/province level is referred to in almost all cases as being a larger framework for interventions. As the metropolitan level does not form any administrative unit in the majority of
the cities, planning and other interventions crossing the borders of the city may intervene through the county level. The number of the cases where the county plays an effectively active role in the experience is smaller. For instance, in the case of Brno, the county and the city strongly interact and share common goals and policies.

Seraing is the only city where the **neighbourhood** (Molinay) appears as an independent territorial level and located at the heart of the experience.  

**Table 3: Territorial and administrative levels covered by the case studies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cities</th>
<th>Administrative City</th>
<th>The closest metropolitan area</th>
<th>County / Province / Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barcelona</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brno</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florence</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gliwice</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leipzig</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newcastle</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>Newcastle-Gateshead</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plaine Commune</td>
<td></td>
<td>Plaine Commune</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seraing</td>
<td>x (+ the neighbourhood level)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Växjö</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: The ten case studies*

**The actors**

In the following section the main actors participating and taking an active role in responding to the challenge are mapped and their roles and interrelations highlighted for each case study. Finally, the way the actors systems will be examined.

**Table 4: The main actors in each case study**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cities</th>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>Metropolitan structure / counties, regions</th>
<th>Municipal companies</th>
<th>Universities</th>
<th>NGOs and grassroots org</th>
<th>Private enterprises</th>
<th>Other private investors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barcelona</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brno</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florence</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gliwice</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leipzig</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newcastle</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plaine Commune</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seraing</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Växjö</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: the ten case studies*

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4 This typology did not take into account the role of NUTSII regions that appear in almost all cases as the main authorities for the allocation of European cohesion funds.
Table 4 shows that in each city a relatively wide range of actors are active in responding to the main challenges. Nevertheless, their interactions and their place in the overall experience are very different in each case.

Local municipalities are the lead actors in all cases and they normally identify the main challenge and prepare a first strategy and an initial set of actions as response to it. Their role as “lead actor” is nevertheless different according to the cases. In city-regions or in communautés d’agglomération, a supra local actor may take this place, as is the case in Plaine Commune.

**Modes of participation when the territorial administration is the lead actor**

In some cities, the municipality prepares a strategic framework, identifies the main challenges and objectives of the city. However, following this activity, instead of identifying concrete actions and priorities it tends to play an intermediate role, leaving other actors to define their own policies and actions but helping them find partners and financial resources. This is particularly the case in Leipzig, for example, where the municipality considers its role more and more as one of moderation, relying on the one hand on inhabitants of the areas under regeneration, and on the other hand on private investment. But this by no means suggests a diminution of the role of municipal technical support.

Amsterdam is presenting its citizenship and integration policy as deeply grounded in people’s participation. The “Amsterdam District approach”, for example, is aimed at encouraging the citizens’ expression of and demands for municipal support for their projects, with the help of local participation developers and under the coordination of the Central Municipality.

Växjö is also a case that emphasizes citizens’ participation through a citizen’s panel and a citizen’s forum, the latter being organised once a year in all neighbourhoods and in every rural community. It seems, nevertheless that the main outcome of this forum is to give the opportunity to listen to questions from residents and to answer them, rather than to launch any collaborative actions.

Plaine Commune, as an agglomeration of eight cities does not take on a direct relationship with all stakeholders. Rather it relies on its 58 elected member Community Council to be aware of the wishes and demands of citizens. The community counsellors in turn implement participative actions according to their own local focus.

In other cases, municipalities play a stronger central role acting as the real “manager” of the policies that have been object of the study. In these cases, the intermediate role is one of tightening, with the local authority becoming directly involved in the realisation of the key objectives of its policy. This active role is often coupled with the creation of municipal companies that can act in the market place as independent economic actors, although mainly financed from the public budget. This model is applied in several cities (Brno, Gliwice, Newcastle, Seraing), but with different degrees of intervention by the local municipality. In Brno, for example, the local and the county (regional) authorities have created a wide network of actions and project companies in order to put in practice, action by action, the regional innovation strategy. The competences of the municipal companies are also different. In Newcastle, for example, the intervention of 1NG is also extended to the preparation of a long term intervention plan (called the 1plan). By contrast, in Gliwice, the Local Development Agency is set to become an entirely independent actor, with no municipal support.
In Barcelona, the strategies and the related actions are managed by two special authorities, the Mobility Services Department at Barcelona City and the Metropolitan Transport Authority. Instruments of democratic innovation are experimented within the City Council Mobility Pact, with working days, conferences, and training and dissemination activities.

**Modes of relations when the lead actor is non municipal**

Among the ten cities, there are only two cases, Seraing and Florence, where the lead actor is not a local municipality. In Seraing, the participative planning experience took place on the initiative of a national level NGO, called CAL for Centre d’Action Laïque (Secular Action Centre). In Florence, the ‘Florens2010’ event was organised and managed by Confindustria, a representative association of private entrepreneurs. In both cases financing of the project was achieved with resources independent from the city budget and this gave a relatively large degree of freedom for the actions that could be taken. Interestingly, however, in both cases the main objectives and principles identified by the independent lead actors were approved – but not financially sustained – by the local Municipality.

**The types of the identified challenges and the answers given by the cities**

One of the first questions in the interviews was to reveal how the challenge we identified for each case study was understood by the different actors and how they responded to it.

The strategic answers tackling the challenges may be classified according to the following two series:

1. Regarding their development in time, there are two categories as follows:
   - policies shaped as a result of a long term urban policy regarding the specific question,
   - policies developed in reaction to a crisis (economic, social, financial...).

2. Regarding contents, two types of orientations in strategies can be distinguished as follows:
   - policies related to the need for improving or deepening the integrated development and social cohesion of an urban area;
   - policies related to sectoral policies such as economic restructuring or social issues.

Table 5 roughly presents where each city’s strategy stands within both series.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>theme/challenges</th>
<th>type of answer 1: according to time</th>
<th>type of answer 2: according to content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
<td>Re thinking diversity policy to strengthen social cohesion and tackle the risk of segregation</td>
<td>result of long term policy</td>
<td>sectoral policy, social cohesion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barcelona</td>
<td>Transportation as part of urban cohesion policies</td>
<td>result of a long term policy</td>
<td>improving and deepening integrated development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brno</td>
<td>Upgrading the international position of the city and its region by attracting highly qualified people and activities</td>
<td>reaction to a crisis</td>
<td>sectoral policy, economic development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florence</td>
<td>Reorganising cultural industries and revitalizing local manufacturing traditions in order to redefine the city’s international position</td>
<td>reaction to a crisis</td>
<td>sectoral policy, economic (cultural) development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gliwice</td>
<td>Improving and integrating local SMEs in order to sustain the economic revitalisation of the city based on knowledge society</td>
<td>reaction to a crisis</td>
<td>sectoral policy, economic development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leipzig</td>
<td>Grounding new actions on the lessons learned from the URBAN experience and finding innovative ways to develop the west and to start regenerating the east.</td>
<td>reaction to a crisis (in the frame of a longer term policy lasting for more than ten years)</td>
<td>improving and deepening integrated development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newcastle</td>
<td>Response of a city to the financial crisis</td>
<td>reaction to a crisis in association with a long term development plan</td>
<td>sectoral policy: economic development and social support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plaine Commune</td>
<td>Capacity of a group of cities to attract diverse economic activities, among which many service industries, in the view of providing employment to local dwellers of a deprived area in transition</td>
<td>result of a long term policy</td>
<td>improving and deepening integrated development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seraing</td>
<td>Urban foresight based on public participation as a tool for integrating local residents’ requirements on their own neighbourhood into the Master Plan of the city</td>
<td>reaction to a crisis</td>
<td>sectoral policy: social cohesion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Växjö</td>
<td>Sustainable energy policies as part of a model for managing complex urban change</td>
<td>result of a long term policy</td>
<td>improving and deepening integrated development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The ten case studies

In terms of the time criteria, the information in Table 5 may be considered too schematic when in fact in four of the cities the observed policies are clearly a result of long term planning. However, among the other case study cities, the process of constructing policies in reaction to a crisis meant that in two of them, the policies launched were only possible because they were
grounded on a long term approach. In this respect, an important asset lies in the internal organization of municipalities and in previous experience of dealing with crises.

Cities ranked for their long run policies initiating their current strategies are mainly re thinking their previous policies in order to find new and more adequate answers or new partners. In contrast to this process, the strategies that can be observed currently in some cities are a direct response to recent important threats. Florence and Newcastle formulated specific policies because they were facing transformations stemming from the financial crisis as well as some longer term structural weaknesses. In the case of Florence, the situation is even more complex due to the fact that being a city with strong tourism potential, it is facing a challenge pointing more to the need to improve the immediate situation than to find a possible and urgent way out of the economic crisis. In Newcastle, as stated in the case study report, “in a sense the city has been in a process of change and adjustment for many years and the financial crisis and ensuing recession were simply more external shocks they had to deal with – albeit significant ones. Therefore the response from the key stakeholders was both short-term to ease the situation for those affected, but also strategic over the next 20 years, with the view that the city needs a long term plan that would hopefully transcend these short-term disturbances. Furthermore, a city with a solid strategy should be better placed to withstand these shocks in the future”.

With regarding to the contents of the policies, the distribution is similar with six cities grounding their strategies on a sectoral approach, while four of them aim at improving and deepening integrated development. Within those following the sectoral approach, four concentrate on economic development and two on social cohesion.

The improvement and deepening of integrated urban development is the objective of a quite heterogeneous group of cities, embracing very different and sometimes opposing ways of strategy making. Bottom up foresight (a micro strategy) in Seraing can be regarded as the opposite of the complex strategy making found in Barcelona for example, where the focus is on departing from a specific field of action (transportation) to tackle the main challenges of social and spatial integration on the city as well as on the metropolitan level. Florence also may be considered as part of this group because of its strategy aiming to “bring closer the historical centre to the local inhabitants”.

Brno and Gliwice are tackling the challenge of how to make their post industrial restructuring sustainable. This is a relatively new question for Central and Eastern European cities, demanding not only infrastructure but also know-how and human resources development that require both strategic programmes and financial investments. For these cities, the different European funds (especially the cohesion funds and FP7) with their own systems of priorities and objectives, have a particularly strong influence on local strategy making.

**The actions**

The actions found in the policies among the case studies are highly varied but can be divided into two basic groups according to the number of actions included in their urban experience:

1. There are only two cities where the experiences are based on one specific action – or one central action that is accompanied by secondary ones: Seraing (participatory foresight as the main action), and Florence (Florens2010 as the main action).

2. In all the other cities several parallel actions were and/or are being realised.
Interestingly, the cities where only one action has been implemented in the framework of the challenge are the same ones where the lead actor was not the municipality but a private actor or an NGO. This can be explained by the fact that in these cities the action is not directly coming from a municipal strategy (on the contrary, in the case of Seraing for example, the aim of the action was to change the municipal strategy). In the other cities, the multiple actions, to some extent, correspond to the main policy orientation of the city. However, at the same time the actions tend to be very different. Table 6 provides an overview of the types of actions engaged in by the cities.

Table 6: Types of actions in the 10 cities related to the challenges

Source: The ten case studies
It is difficult to assess the types of actions engaged in by the different cities, as they are mostly depending on the challenge, on the existing structures of the city determining the needs of intervention, or on their financial capacities. Nevertheless the frequency of the different types of actions can be informative. Creating institutional and organisational frameworks (especially, the creation of project companies for the realisation of certain projects) and different types of physical investments are the most frequently appearing actions. The latter is, of course, a basic
element for urban development. Regulation and the creation of financial incentives are less frequent actions, perhaps because these actions demand specific know how (legal and financial knowledge). Interestingly, education and training, as well as events are not much represented, although these actions (potentially demanding less financial investment than other actions) may bring very high added values in various fields of urban development (social cohesion, know-how, participation, etc). It seems likely that in a period of reduced subsidies from public sources, low cost actions will be given more attention and this was confirmed by some interviewees stating that they were thinking of ways of adapting their strategies to this situation.

**Financial tools**

It was not possible within the parameters of the case study analyses to provide a detailed analysis on project budgets, though where possible information was given on the approximate costs of the main projects and on the main financial tools and their allocations. However, a deeper financial analysis of the actions taken to tackle urban challenges was out of scope to this study.

Table 7 attempts to summarise the main financial resources in each case study city.
Table 7: The main financial resources related to the challenge

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>municipality</th>
<th>county / national level</th>
<th>European Union</th>
<th>Private</th>
<th>ONG inhabitants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EU ROP (ERDF, ESF) 2007-2013</td>
<td>FP7</td>
<td>Interreg</td>
<td>URBACT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barcelona</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brno</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florence</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gliwice</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leipzig</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newcastle</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plaine Commune</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seraing</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Växjö</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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European financing

The importance of the ERDF and ESF as financing instruments for urban policies and integrated development in cities is clear. Regional Operational Programmes have a strong influence on local strategies in various ways, including:

- in Brno or Gliwice, the main orientations and priorities of city strategies have been adapted to ROP’s priorities;
- in Leipzig, the strategy had to be adapted according to the new ROP priorities not only because of the considerable decrease of support compared to the URBAN programme (from € 20 million to € 5 million), but also because “URBAN allowed a more complex and integrated approach. The three dimensions (economic-employment, social, housing and urban) were each given approximately the same amount, whereas the ERDF operational programme is split into 50 per cent of the subsidies on building and environment, and 50 per cent on social and economic actions.”

Apart from the above mentioned cities, ERDF and in general EU funding has been mentioned as being of particular importance as follows:

- in Växjö: “EU-funding has become part of the routine of financial planning in the renewal of the municipality”;
- in Newcastle: “ERDF in particular has contributed towards major infrastructure projects including roads and bridges, but also key developments such as the emerging Science Centre in Newcastle city centre”;
- in Barcelona: for the construction of metro line 2 and “a specific lane for public transport and high-occupation vehicles in highway C-58 (in construction); Volpalleres station (completed); El Prat de Llobregat intermodal station (in tender process); and Gràcia station in Barcelona (in construction)”;
- in Plaine Commune, through the “In Europe” Programme, with the objective of reducing intra urban disparities, promoting social inclusion and equality of opportunity.

Other European programmes are playing an important role in a more dispersed way, but only in certain cities. In six cases, cities are engaged in at least one URBACT II network (Barcelona had been participating in the URBACT I programme). As has been mentioned in Gliwice, URBACT was an important experience for them as “an instrument permitting the development of new visions for cities and to strengthen the relationship between local stakeholders and the dialogue with the Managing Authority.”

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5 Leipzig report, p.9
6 Växjö report, p. 11
7 Newcastle report, p. 11
8 Barcelona report, p.14
9 Interview with Katarzyna Kobierska
Furthermore, European financing may also contribute in less “traditional” ways to the realisation of certain experiences. In the case of Seraing for instance, the participatory foresight project was partly financed in the framework of the Futurreg (Interreg) project as a result of the collaboration with foresight experts from the Destrée Institute. Thus the project was integrated into the Interreg programme by one of its partners. Being part of an Interreg programme was not only a helpful financial contribution to the project, but also offered a good opportunity to open the project and to obtain relevant professional support.

**Private investments**

In most cities, the contribution of private investment is of secondary importance in the realisation of the actions responding to the urban challenges. The already mentioned exception is the case of Florence, which is, in itself, an example on how an initiative involving important local entrepreneurs may promote the development of a local city strategy.

Interestingly, Public Private Partnership forms of investments have not been highlighted in the cities although they have been mentioned in many of cases (Table 7 shows this in those cities where it is clear. However it is safe to assume that this form of private investment appears in other cities as well), they rarely appeared as being a basic instrument for local development.

**Main results, impacts and evaluation**

**Follow up of outputs and outcomes of policies and actions by their actors**

The aim here is not to summarize the results of the policies implemented in the ten cities, but rather to sum up what kind of observations and evaluation systems are attached to policies meant to tackle the challenges cities are facing. This seems relevant since outcomes from this study should help inform how to link the various policies within urban integrated development as a major dimension of cohesion policy in cities. However, in order to reach this objective, evaluation is needed, and not only evaluation but the use of its assessments on the methods and devices which helped achieve outputs. But in reality the use of such tools is quite rare, at least in the internal management of policies and actions. The European Commission has systematic evaluations made on programmes implemented with the support of structural funds. In these cases, cities, regions and national administrations may benefit from these evaluations and may also rely on them to adhere to their objectives and methods or to partly re design them. However, it may also be beneficial if the European evaluations are aggregated in some form of meta-evaluation based on these local evaluations.

During the course of this study, the interviewees gave little information of the assessment tools used in the development of their policies and actions. It seems that policies develop mainly through empirical knowledge and according to financial opportunities and political expediency.

It also seems that when specific actors are engaged to manage programmes and actions in association with municipalities but not part of them, they may be in a more favourable position to assess results. This is reflected by the role of the CAL (Secular Action Centre) of the Liège province, for example, working with the Molinay residents in Seraing.

In Amsterdam, where there is no systematic evaluation practice, one programme called the ‘District Approach’ benefits from a follow up process thanks to the University of Tilburg whose in depth research programme explores the voluntary action and people’s empowerment through this approach.
Plaine Commune is assessing its policies on two levels, internally and externally. Inside the Community services, thought is given once each year to all launched actions and discussions among officials allow them to indicate in their annual report reasons for the success or the failure of actions, although these reasons are not always stated. On an external level, Plaine Commune being less in contact with citizens than the communal institutions, is very interested in possible feedback from inhabitants and from people coming to work in the area. To gather their views, questionnaires are used in certain circumstances, but no systematic evaluations are done.

4. The lessons learned

Strategies and policies

The ten case study cities have occasionally implemented specific policies to face specific challenges, while some of them have been engaged in broader strategies in urban development, which may be binding, depending on the individual cases.

Leipzig, for example, has experienced integrated urban renewal in two different parts of the city, firstly in the West with URBAN II, then in the East with the ERDF Stadtentwicklung (urban development). Based on these processes, the Municipality decided that an integrated development plan for the whole city was needed. A master plan (SEKo in German abbreviated form) was prepared, covering the entire city. Under this plan, priority areas (namely Leipzig West, Leipzig East and Leipzig Grünau) have more detailed plans. The Master Plan will apply in the long run. However, the state of Saxony is now asking municipalities to define very small programme areas that will not be allowed to overlap with other programmes such as the Soziale Stadt.

In another case, Brno is involved at three strategic levels as follows:

- The City strategy was approved in 2002 and its updated version in 2007. The strategy is based on the vision of how the city should be in 2020 - a city with a positive image, good economic performance and a good quality of life, offering an optimal environment for innovation and knowledge based activities. This vision is supported by three main axes of development called “pillars”: (1) turning local economic development from industry to business; (2) developing a good quality of life and (3) promoting a new dynamic for the city through the development of research, innovation and education.

- The Regional Development Strategy, South Moravian Region (DSSM R), 2007 up to 2016 has been prepared in the frame of the National Development Plan for the Czech Republic in 2006. It is an updated version of the «Development Strategy for the Brno Region” written in 1999. It defines the strategic targets for the development of the region as a whole and its functional parts, and specifies the important measures that should lead to the fulfilment of the targets in question. In this respect the DSSM R is a starting point for the updating of other programme documents in the region. Priority areas are: Economy, Environment, Human resources, Population centres, Transport and technical infrastructure.

- The Regional Innovation Strategy (RIS) is a Strategy and Action plan for the period 2009-2013 with the objective to rank the SM region among the first fifty most innovative regions in the EU: The plan identifies actions to be led, in part, by (1) the SM region, (2) the City of Brno and (3) by other actors. All actions are detailed according to the following: the initial problems they respond to; the main activities; the target group; the impact of the project; the estimated budget according to the main resources; and the company or other unit responsible for the project management.
In **Florence**, two documents exist: the Structural Plan (Piano Strutturale) and the Strategic Plan (Piano Strategico).

- The Piano Strutturale of 2010 has as its main objectives to fight urban sprawl, to bring back the historical centre to the inhabitants, and to improve the quality of life and the urban environment. It also aims at reinforcing a sustainable urban development and at improving the position and attractiveness of Florence to Italy and on the international scene, through the development of local economies and tourism.

- The Piano Strategico of 2009 was signed by the municipalities of those cities constituting the Florence Metropolitan Area, as well as by other private and public partners. It is a document dealing with the development of the whole area under the main objective of creating a pluricentres area instead of the mono central area as it is now. Several axes have been implemented: culture, arts and crafts, tourism, sustainable development, social cohesion and governance of the metropolitan area.

**Gliwice** has a Development Strategy 2002-2022, updated in 2007 with the following priorities:

- Building the economic structure
- Improving living conditions
- Developing metropolitan functions
- Strengthening the spatial attractiveness
- Building civic society

It also has a Strategy on Social problems for the period 2006-2015 whose goal is the increase of employment through the training of those starting their enterprise, promoting entrepreneurship and programmes for the creation of jobs.

In addition, Gliwice is part of the Regional Strategy of Innovation for the Silesian Voivodeship 2003-2013, which identifies, among other goals, the objective of developing SMEs.

**Seraing** adopted a Master Plan in 2006 and reviewed it in 2008. The main objective of this is to enhance the economic and spatial features of the city which have been strongly affected by the process of industrial decline. Altogether more than 300 projects have been identified. The Master Plan is a classical urban plan, based on the consideration that spatial intervention in certain core urban areas would enhance, in the long run, the economic attractiveness of the entire city.

In Seraing, Molinay 2017 is the result of the participative foresight project, identifying the main challenges of the Molinay area within Seraing until 2017. It did not define any action plan.

**The effects of the financial crisis**

The problem posed by reductions in national public funds is not only occurring in the cities where strategies are directly conceived to respond to the financial crisis (such as Newcastle) but in others situated in countries also significantly hit by the crisis. In Barcelona for example, "some planned transport infrastructures might not be entirely completed in the following years. The next metropolitan Mobility Master Plan in 2012 will manage demand but will not be able to provide supply tools until 2013-2014, due to the financial crisis,"\(^\text{10}\) In Amsterdam ‘maybe the concept of diversity and citizenship was just a way to lower or even stop financing ethnic groups’\(^\text{11}\). In Florence the

\(^\text{10}\) Barcelona study, p.17.
\(^\text{11}\) Amsterdam study, p.16.
initiative for changing the city's economy coming from the enterprise sector was also a reaction to some important cuts in national financing towards cultural issues that affected the city.

Apart from cuts of direct subsidies, the financial crisis has also hit cities through the continuing problems in financial services and in particular restrictions on bank lending. This is a particular question for cities that initially had a relatively small budget and so had to obtain loans for covering the co financing part of European projects and was particularly mentioned in the cases of Brno and Gliwice.

Another noticeable effect is the growing impoverishment of people living in deprived areas, making it even more difficult to achieve the goals of social cohesion in the cities.

Finding ways to react to this funding difficulty either by withdrawing some actions at the city level or by trying to compensate for the lacking financing from other resources are important current challenges for cities.

*Participative systems in public policies*

Participation appears in many of the projects, but through very diverse structures. Some public policies are more oriented towards the participation of citizens than others, and among them social policies. However, generally speaking, it has been assessed that policies, programmes and projects are all the more successful when beneficiaries have been involved in their management, or even in their conception. This issue can of course have a different focus, depending on whether beneficiaries are inhabitants or enterprises, though sometimes, this difference is overcome through a territorial approach.

What seems meaningful for the lead actors is to understand that participative approaches may take more time than when only experts and politicians are involved in projects. In reality, this apparent time loss is in the end advantageous because actions tend to be more deeply grounded once implemented. It is an obvious factor in terms of social cohesion, when participation processes are conducted through debate with all stakeholders involved. Nevertheless, despite all these positive features, participation is often neglected or replaced by mere communication or consultation.

Regarding multi-actor participation, the Leipzig case represents the most significant system here. The Neighbourhood Forums are places and moments where and when inhabitants think and talk with technicians, academics, elected bodies, business people, etc, ... over concrete issues and projects right up to the point of decision making. The same type of experience is presented in the case of Seraing, where a complex foresight project was implemented through the interaction of the population, experts and politicians. In such processes, the role of specialized intermediaries is crucial because they know immediately the lead actors orientations and strategies, what each category among other actors stands for and what should come out of contacts and cooperation with all of them together.

In some other cities, the concept of participation is the opposite and taken into consideration as an obligatory part of a planning process in order to have the approval of citizens to the projects. This is often the case in Central and Eastern European cities where public debates are often held after the preparation of the plans - a method that is at odds with the principles of participation.

*The risk of duplication of projects*

In cases where several activities are going on simultaneously, it is important to question to what extent they complement each other. In some cases, when actors follow very similar objectives and
methods, there is a risk of duplication, especially if these actions are coupled with uneven participation and/or a weak monitoring system. In Gliwice for example, the parallel functioning of actors and their strong dependence on EU OP financing explains the over representation of the same types of projects and with similar methods. As a result of a lack of an overall monitoring system and coordination between the actors, it has not been assessed if there was any overlap between the target groups or the main activities. This might also be levied in the case of Newcastle where the lack of coherence and coordination of initiatives has been mentioned as a problem in the past.

**The importance of the local factor**

Several cities provide lessons on how important the ‘local factor’ is for the successful implementation of urban programmes and this can be considered in various forms.

In the case of the role of private investment, it lies in the involvement of locally embedded entrepreneurs who show a direct engagement and interest in the development of the locality. This is clearly revealed in the Florence case and this necessity had also been taken into consideration in Leipzig, where one objective of the URBAN regeneration programme was to attract SMEs in order to reinforce local development. This is also the lead principle of the Fin-Urb-Act network that is attended by two of the analysed cities (Leipzig and Gliwice).

Apart from local economy, the local factor may also embrace for instance:

- innovative and original actions, responses to the local challenges (for example the Guardian Houses system in Leipzig);
- strengthening of local cultural actions and actors (arts and crafts, as in Florence, Plaine Commune, and in Leipzig);
- processes of participation (as in Seraing, Barcelona or Leipzig).

**Innovative actions**

Some actions or devices launched in the process of trying to tackle challenges can be considered innovative. This tends to be when they promote new methods to solve problems that many cities and organizations are facing without being able to go beyond a certain point.

The current main urban challenges are often said to be hindering social cohesion and a better distribution of wealth and of power. Thus, innovation is particularly sought in the fields of social change, of better relations between different social groups, and of cooperation between inhabitants and authorities.

From this perspective some examples from the case studies include the following:

- *The “Enterprises –Territory Charter for Plaine Commune economic actors”, promoted by Plaine Commune in France.* This initiative follows a strategy aimed at creating a spirit of citizenship among new enterprises coming into the territory. With this Charter, Plaine Commune is asking companies to agree to their responsibility in social cohesion along with economic growth and to demonstrate this agreement in concrete actions. Some 24 types of actions are suggested in the Charter, each company being free to choose from them. In return, Plaine Commune is engaged in several actions aimed at improving access to the zone for the staff of companies. There is an institutional innovation in developing an agreement which includes mutual obligations between the private and public spheres. It is difficult to make a definitive statement on the results from this approach because it is relatively new and also it tends to lead to cultural changes on both sides. However, an assessment could be made at some point that evaluates which specific
difficulties are encountered by both sides, but also what achievements are likely to be observable in the long run and on which conditions they depend.

- **The foresight methodology used in Seraing to insert a part of the city into the Master Plan.** The first version of the Master Plan essentially left the Molinay neighbourhood almost completely untouched until an association, (the CAL, Centre of actions for secularism) launched a participative foresight process called *Molinay 2017*. With the help of foresight specialists, the Destrée Institute, the CAL worked with the inhabitants of Molinay towards the definition of a better future for the area. Here, the main innovative aspects are the role of civil society and the duration of the process. The foresight process is the result of cooperation between an association and inhabitants of a rather poor neighbourhood and professionals used to working at a macro level. Particularly noteworthy in this case is this type of alliance formed and the length of time for the process. A third characteristic also deserves to be noted - the fact that this process has been validated by the municipality and its results included in the Master Plan.

- In Barcelona, innovation stems not from one specific action but from the process of linking the transportation system to social cohesion. If the concept of better access to mobility is often dealt with in social cohesion policies, its fulfillment is not so common. What can be underlined in the Barcelona case is the integrated concept of mobility, which is made concrete through various modes of transportation that are conceived on the basis of a deep knowledge of the population’s needs. This knowledge is reflected in the fact that in order to promote the social right to an effective mobility with the best available transportation mode, The City of Barcelona guarantees a public transport station within 200 meters. On that basis, the transportation policy reaches a visible point of social and urban integration because all Barcelona neighbourhoods have been effectively connected. Although this can be considered a loss-making policy, it nevertheless is one squarely aimed at social cohesion.

**Monitoring, evaluation and transferability**

An important focus for this study is the possible competence transfers from the ten case study cities to other cities or city-regions facing similar challenges. However, the main lesson may be that no example can be replicated exactly and what can be transferred is a method of analysing a specific situation and of deriving from that analysis guidelines for action.

**Monitoring**

Therefore, it seems important that policies are monitored to enable local actors to check if outputs are coherent with the initial objectives and if not, to make the necessary adjustments. An example is suggested by the case of Brno where innovation seems to be a main part of the municipal policy, even though it may not always be beneficial to all social groups. If key indicators are agreed and established when an action is launched, then they can form the basis of subsequent successful project monitoring. In Växjö, where an annual environmental account is implemented by the Municipality as part of the economic planning of the city, monitoring is also considered important.

**Evaluating**

Evaluations may be a good basis for transferring experience and policy lessons, under certain conditions as follows:
Comprehensive evaluations giving a sense of the complex processes at work (multifactor qualitative analysis).

- Evaluations taking into account the historical roots of present day policies and actions
- Evaluations attempting to explain why some actions are successful and others fail; this implies the use not only of quantitative indicators, but also qualitative ones – the latter representing a greater challenge but essential for a deeper understanding, in particular to identify negative effects such as deadweight, substitution and displacement.
- It would be important that assessment protocols for European programmes include qualitative indicators, which they do not always do.

**Considering conditions of transferability**

Actors in several cities are conscious that when considering transferability it does not mean a total replication of an approach. This is clearly stated in the case of Newcastle where it is said that only certain elements of the approach can be transferred rather than the whole policy.

Another issue is the size of each city. In the case of Växjö for example, the transfer potential tends to be towards cities of similar size or smaller towns. This raises the question of whether a small city could have experience to transfer to larger ones, and the answer could be in the affirmative, especially in dealing with actions on a neighbourhood level. However, it is necessary to take into account the internal administrative organisation of cities and this may be very different according to the size and status (city, city-region, metropolitan area...) and may dictate what is feasible.

Determining the real conditions of transferability would benefit from further research and assessment in the future.

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Inevitably the ten case studies underpinning this study did not intend to provide an exhaustive picture on European city development. Nevertheless, the results may give some important feedback for reflection on Cities of Tomorrow from the practical and local perspectives. They may also contribute to this debate by highlighting some new points to be explored further in any possible follow up of the reflection process.

### 5. Main conclusions

The key question underlying the launch of this study was how European Cohesion policy can best support cities confronted by the numerous urban challenges they face.

Cohesion policy is monitored in concert with the Europe 2020 strategy which is oriented towards economic growth which should be smart, sustainable and inclusive. As such, Cohesion policy is meant to help bind together these three dimensions. It is in the light of such a possible convergence that the ten case studies in this report have been carried out but what do they bring to Cohesion policy? Furthermore, what are the main achievements of the policies and practices of these ten cities and could they help define a strategy for Cohesion policy to support an integrated, sustainable and inclusive urban development?

These questions will be revisited after reviewing some characteristics of the case studies through a SWOT analysis. However, from the outset it should be noted that the questions raised, while perfectly valid, may not be able to be answered clearly, mainly due to the issues created by the
general context of the ongoing economic and financial crisis. In this scenario, the social consequences of uneven economic development are aggravated, while public policies and practices have difficulties stabilising their practices in the long run. Therefore, tackling challenges is in itself a challenge.

**General considerations**

1. In general in the present climate European cities are facing multiple challenges. Although each case study was chosen around one specific challenge, it is clearly observable that policies and practices launched to tackle one main challenge may find it hard to succeed if they do not take cognisance of other issues through integrated approaches. Thus, apart from the specific challenge identified for each city, all the cities are facing two or more of the eleven challenges forest out in the specification for the study (see annex 2 and the figure page 6). Furthermore, among the cities a concentration of policies and actions can be observed focusing on two out of the eleven challenges, namely ‘city resilience to economic pressure and financial crises’ and ‘ensuring of territorial coherence and cohesion’. This finding is quite helpful as regards the cohesion policy, since it highlights the link between the economic and financial spheres on the one hand, and urban and social integration on the other. Binding together these dimensions can therefore be considered a good approach for Cohesion policy to deal with cities and their management.

2. City administrations hold various types of power, largely dictated by the administrative and political system of the country they are located in. However the various European programmes tend to enable all of them to think of and engage in foresight for their own development and in doing so, they become full actors in the Cohesion policy. Following on from this, one more challenge should therefore be added to those identified by DG Regio. This is a combination of three transversal challenges (c.f. “foster cities’ attractiveness’, ‘accelerate transition towards a sustainable city given the inherent inertia of infrastructure provision’, and ‘ensure territorial coherence and cohesion’) and it can be defined as follows: ‘reach a comprehensive understanding of all mechanisms playing a part in sustainable urban development and manage them as being complementary with each other’.

3. It is difficult to draw a typology of cities as regards their policies aimed at those challenges. The basic idea was to mix small and large cities from all parts of Europe but the sample is rather small and with too many individual characteristics to develop a meaningful typology. However, one distinction is evident and this is with regard to network connectivity via the European programmes and networks. For example, seven of the ten cases are participating in URBACT or in Eurocities working groups, and two of them have been URBAN sites. The only three cities without any history of involvement in European networks or programme comprise two small cities and a conurbation encompassing eight cities. Therefore it is valid to conclude that the European cities networks seem to operate well in both Western and Eastern Europe. URBAN appears to have been a great help in promoting social and economic development in deprived urban areas and currently URBACT goes a step further by reinforcing the exchange of common experiences between cities from both the newer and older Member States.

**The results of a SWOT analysis**

1. **Strengths**
   Analysing the strengths of cities as regard their capacities to tackle urban challenges cannot imply any degree of universality in experience since the sample of cities is quite diverse. However, it is
possible to underline some factors behind the success of policies, some of them referring to external tools, and some to the methods used in individual cities.

As an external tool, the URBAN programme has been very successful in giving the administrations of cities a sense of the importance in dealing simultaneously with policies in several fields, by helping them manage an integrated development process and at the same time building a consistent approach to accessing structural funds. Cities that have benefited from URBAN appear to be better prepared to face new challenges, although they now have to adjust to reduced budgets both from their own States or Regions and from Europe.

The preparation and launch of the Leipzig Charter in 2007 marked a stage in the increased empowerment given to cities towards achieving integrated or sustainable development. It should be pointed out that ‘integrated’ and ‘sustainable’ do not have exactly the same meaning, though are close to each other. In this respect, “sustainable development” is understood in a broad sense taking into account all constituent aspects of urban life in the long run, namely economic prosperity, social balance, healthy environment, access for all to cultural life, and equal rights. The ten case studies provided the opportunity to observe various degrees of commitment to this integrated-sustainable approach, which is strongly underlined in the city’s fifth report on economic, territorial and social cohesion.

An internal tool lies in the capacity some cities have to forecast difficulties and adapt policies ahead of time before problems become too acute. Municipalities that are used to developing long term strategies, particularly in the field of urban planning, can take advantage of this practice in anticipating challenges, thereby putting them in a strong reactive position.

Therefore, in short a city participating in a European programme or being a leader in a European network, or being used to combining the various elements and dimensions in urban management are good pre-conditions for developing successful policies to tackle urban challenges.

2. Weaknesses

The budgets of cities are often too limited to cover their share of the co-financing required by the EU structural funds, while turning to loans as an alternative funding mechanism is too risky under the current uncertain financial conditions. Therefore, cities do not always obtain as much from the structural funds as their projects require and this is reflected in the inability of the administrations to shape actions according to the available financial resources.

Another weakness evident in some cases is the gap between the design of policies and their implementation. The more general the wording of the policies, the more chances there are to witness just partial implementation. Sometimes it is due to unforeseen obstacles, possibly grounded in a lack of proper analysis of the resistance factors when a strong change in policies is at stake. It may also reflect a failure in a governance system that displays a lack of a proactive partnership between the technical partners and local authorities.

At another level, public authorities may sometimes fail in managing and monitoring economic, social, urban and cultural development as a whole. Priority is often given to economic development, which is useful but may not necessarily lead to a socially equitable share of its benefits. Increasing poverty and exclusion in deprived areas, where live unskilled workers, unemployed people and
foreign families, are thus observable in many places where the main focus is on economic growth without sufficient attention paid to the real assets and needs of the city and its surroundings.

Public private partnerships may help bring about innovation and counter the effects of national or regional budget cuts. However local authorities are not always in a position that allows them to keep control over the destination of private investments, which could pave the way to privatisation of public facilities and services, and in doing so may result in being contradictory to territorial and social cohesion.

The objective of enhancing the attractiveness of cities is shared by many town administrations. However, not all of them make a clear assessment of where they stand among other cities in the competition for relative attractiveness (for example, for inward investment, or as a place to reside). The competition may occur between towns located in a same country or between same sized cities within the same sub-region in Europe and it is highly important to have an accurate vision of a city’s own assets and weaknesses in order to be able to properly address the requirements necessary to improve relative attractiveness.

Finally, local authorities often fail to evaluate the outcomes of their policies despite this being recognised as a valuable tool to maximise the positive outcomes of a given policy over time, for example by re-orienting it in a different way. When evaluation is done, it is often limited to a check up of how many people have benefited an action, how many houses have been demolished/built, how many jobs have been created, etc, thus focusing on monitoring numerical outputs from the policy instead of proper evaluation looking at the changes brought about by this policy as compared to expected effects. A recent text\textsuperscript{12} points out the need for a shift of focus from outputs to outcomes in evaluating performance regarding the Cohesion policy, as well as other public policies. Adoption of such an approach would open the way to better assessments of public policies, as well as public-private partnerships in Cohesion policy in urban contexts.

3. Opportunities

There is currently a growing knowledge base in energy efficiency and sustainability that should help cities become more energy efficient, help builders constructing eco-neighbourhoods, and inhabitants save money on their energy bills. However, this can be consistent with the Cohesion policy only if the frame of reference is derived from a social perspective rather than a technical one.

In the same way, the availability of programmes introducing innovations in urban management can contribute to social and territorial cohesion, particularly if they are included into “smart, sustainable and inclusive” strategies. European cities generally have a strong capacity for creativity and innovation and some of the case studies prove this through the innovative solutions set up for tackling urban challenges. However, these solutions vary, for example they may be bottom up or top down, initiated by the municipality or by independent (private) actors in the city. Furthermore, they may comprise the organisation of an event, the creation of a new form of governance or the follow up of a participatory planning process; they may have a direct effect on the local area or on a larger, regional level, etc. The main condition for their success is to have the support of a general consensus of local stakeholders and to be acceptable to local urban policy makers. In this sense, these

\textsuperscript{12} Barca F., Mc Cann Ph. (coord): \textit{Outcome indicators and targets, towards a system of monitoring and evaluation in EU cohesion policy}, June 2011

innovative solutions may also constitute a strong element of integrated and sustainable development of cities.

The active and motivated participation of cities in different European cities networks (see point 4 above) also proves their capacity and willingness to search for new solutions, exchanging know-how and experiences. This is a real opportunity for European cities: Europe's urban system is strongly based on the densely built network of its mainly middle sized cities and so regional and inter city cooperation are therefore likely to be the most important elements in their competitiveness.

4. Threats

The main threat European cities are facing now is of course the financial crisis and its various impacts. There are several studies that attempt analysing the effects of the crisis on cities; in particular the survey led in the frame of URBACT or the one of the OECD LEED programmes. These analyses show how variable these impacts are according to the size, geographical position, economic and social background of the cities, as well as the way their local authorities approach the question of governance. Yet in the present changing and unstable economic and political period, it would be extremely difficult to set up any long lasting models (even if based on multiple and much deeper case study analysis). These threats may therefore raise the necessity of setting up a system of criteria in the future programmes of the Cohesion fund that are more open to local solutions. This in turn implies tighter partnerships between DG Regio, national managing authorities of the structural funds, and local powers.

Nevertheless, in the cases where cities and their local governments that do not have a strong tradition of urban planning (a problem that mostly concerns cities of the newer Member States and their legacy of a centralised planning system), European programmes may bring about a dual opposing effect in that their positive impact of bringing financial and know how support is sometimes hindered by a standardisation of projects and urban policies related to the fact that cities concentrate almost all their political efforts to meet the demanding criteria required to be eligible for EU funding.

Innovation, as mentioned above, is a major tool for modernising economic activities, work management, housing and public facilities. Nevertheless, the fact should not be neglected that innovation policies and actions aimed at a greater attractiveness enhance the risk for a larger and larger numbers of citizens being left lagging behind the “progress”. This risk of ‘dual cities’ stems from the possible distortions that may occur in urban management even in a context of generally high competency among European cities. To some extent it can be avoided (or at least reduced) by close cooperation and mutual understanding between the different territorial and administrative levels (see recommendations below).

Recommendations for the urban dimension of the Cohesion policy

Below we set out three key categories of policy recommendations arising from the findings of the study.

1. The first category is concerned with the possibility of increasing the Commission’s knowledge of situations on the ground, so that it can better monitor location-based programmes. For instance, in-depth research would be necessary to assess how cities from various regions and countries deal with similar objectives in different contexts, what their specific assets are, which devices work better in certain places and why. The ex post evaluation of the URBAN programme provides a reference point here. However, other programmes would also benefit from longitudinal research and evaluation techniques that are outcomes oriented, thus allowing assessment of which policies do or do not change the material conditions for their target groups. This would be particularly enlightening, for example in the case of policies of integration of migrants in cities, as the very issue of the social and economic integration of migrants is not always clearly established in evaluations that are launched, whereas it questions society as a whole. In addition, pre-studies could be conducted to produce appropriate tools to help visualise the impact of European or national policies: examples could be a mapping of “innovative solutions”, or a mapping of the effects of the financial crises and the reaction of cities.

2. The second category of recommendations focuses on the management of policies. In some countries and their constituent cities, European programmes are not well known and in particular the eligibility criteria and the mechanisms of the structural funds are not fully mastered. Therefore, some training is still needed on this, as well as counselling on the ways to maximise assets. When an urban territory has important research centres and universities on one hand and leading-edge companies on the other but without any cooperation between the two, there is an obvious need to discover how the two aspects can be brought together for their mutual benefit. Providing structural funds should be accompanied, in such cases, by methodological support helping maximise the use of the funds.

In the same way, as integrated development is supposed to blend several approaches and domains, it would be useful to standardise as far as possible the management of all European funds related to Cohesion policy. There is a strong demand on behalf of local authorities for the synchronisation of the rules and the rhythm in the supply of ERDF and ESF for example, as in some cases it has proved to be very difficult to handle integrated urban programmes given the differences in the management of both funds.

3. The third category of recommendations lies in the possibility of suggesting some targeting of policy that seems crucial to the social and territorial cohesion in European cities. Considering the fifth target of the fifth report on economic, social and territorial policy, to lift at least twenty million people out of the risk of poverty and exclusion, equal access to public facilities and services must be seen as a major objective in achieving this. This is the case for two principal reasons. Firstly, it breaks down some of the advantages of living in wealthy areas compared to poor ones and it gives the people living in the latter a feeling of being properly considered in the process. Secondly, it implies construction works and facilities management that have the potential to provide new jobs. Furthermore, the same principles apply to other potential objectives of the Cohesion policy likely to act as a lever for smart, sustainable and inclusive development.
Annex

1: Experts involved in the study

ACT Consultants ([www.act-consultants.fr](http://www.act-consultants.fr)) is the lead company in the preparation of the present project. Two consultants are at the core of the study team:

- Krisztina Keresztély [kerkrisz@lunart.hu](mailto:kerkrisz@lunart.hu)
- Sonia Fayman [soniafayman@gmail.com](mailto:soniafayman@gmail.com)
- Pierre Meyer has contributed as special advisor [pierre-meyer@act-consultants.fr](mailto:pierre-meyer@act-consultants.fr)

In addition to the core group, three external experts were invited to prepare case studies as follows:

- Barcelona case study: Jordi Pascual and Frederic Borja, Barcelona [jpascual@pangea.org](mailto:jpascual@pangea.org)
- Newcastle case study: Kenneth Walsh, Training & Employment Research Network, Worcestershire, UK, [ken.walsh@tern-research.co.uk](mailto:ken.walsh@tern-research.co.uk)
- Växjö case study: Liisa Horelli and Heikki Kukkonen, ITSU Ltd. Helsinki, Finland [liisa.horelli@tkk.fi](mailto:liisa.horelli@tkk.fi)

The ACT Consultants core group was responsible for the methodological aspects of the study (including writing the bid, the pilot case study reports and the guidelines for the following reports), as well the implementation of seven out of the ten case studies and for relations with the steering committee. They are also the authors of this synthesis report.

2. Eleven challenges to be considered in the study

- Counter social/Spatial polarisation; ensure social and functional mix and cohesion; allow a cultural mix; address urban sprawl.
- Develop capacities for social inclusion and the economic integration of newcomers, especially migrants and socially disadvantaged.
- Develop city resilience to economic pressure and financial crises.
- Manage and adapt to demographic changes.
- Ensure sustained investment for public transport and shift to a more sustainable urban mobility.
- Achieve greater energy efficiency and manage the transition towards a carbon neutral city.
- Sustainable management of natural resources.
- Support a transition towards a knowledge society.
- Foster cities’ attractiveness.
- Accelerate transition towards a sustainable city given the inherent inertia of infrastructure provision.
- Ensure territorial coherence and cohesion.
II - EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES OF THE TEN CASE STUDIES
AMSTERDAM - Re thinking diversity policy to strengthen social cohesion and tackle the risk of segregation

In common with most large cities in Europe, Amsterdam is currently facing a challenge of social cohesion. Unlike some other cities that are focusing on the integration of migrants as a problem, according to Dutch policies, Amsterdam has a more open approach by attempting to deal equally with all types of minorities. In this definition, minorities not only comprise migrants, but include other underprivileged or discriminated social categories such as women, homosexuals and handicapped people.

For a long time, Amsterdam has been a welcoming place for people coming from various countries. Two types of migration flows have settled there in recent times: migration from former colonies – mainly Surinam, Antillean islands like Aruba, Curaçao, St Martin... and Moluques, and migrations from other countries, but all driven either economic deprivation or by political repression (or sometimes both).

At the national level, policies geared towards the ethnic minorities policies are recognised as broadly tolerant and in Amsterdam has been a flagship for these policies. However, the city authorities have gone further, shifting from a minorities policy towards a citizenship policy.

The city is currently experiencing this change of policy orientation which is built on a categorization of the population along ethnic lines, but with policy focused on dealing with individuals. However, if this approach allows people to be regarded and to act more independently from their group of origin, it may serve to weaken collective action and make social and professional integration more difficult for those who do not have social relations out of their own milieu and not good knowledge of the Dutch administration.

This dual aspect in the diversity policy may be the reason why the City of Amsterdam is still focusing on migrants and other underprivileged groups, while at the same time trying to implement a more global approach in terms of citizenship.

Trying to implement such an approach is a real challenge in the current European context of radicalisation of racism and xenophobia as shown by election campaigns in several countries. For city authorities, it suggests the need to promote participation of and cooperation with all inhabitants and to initiate actions likely to de-legitimize and oppose racism and discrimination. Amsterdam seems to be especially adept at the former and eager to tackle the latter and this explains why the integration and diversity staff in the city are in the process of writing a political statement on citizenship.
**BARCELONA - Transportation as part of urban cohesion policies**

The Barcelona City Council and the local metropolitan administrations maintain that mobility is a fundamental right of all citizens, as it is necessary for social interaction and for human relations. Furthermore, they consider transportation as the 4th pillar of the welfare state (along with housing, health, and education-culture). Their common perception is that a person who cannot have effective mobility loses a social right. Therefore all local administrations recognize the right of all citizens to a sustained and sustainable mobility.

However, in a surface area of merely 101 square kilometers, the city of Barcelona has a population of 1,638,000 (4,992,000 in its metropolitan region). Consequently, with 16,217 inhabitants per square kilometer, Barcelona is one of the most densely populated European cities and faces obvious mobility challenges.

During the last two decades, public administrations in the Barcelona metropolitan area have regarded transport as part of their social cohesion policies. A sustained public effort has searched to ‘democratize’ the streets and public space. New projects have often been the result of integrated mobility strategies for clean and sustainable urban transport. Good practices have been aimed, in sum, at guaranteeing the right to a sustainable mobility for all citizens.

Throughout this period, Barcelona has remarkably improved the accessibility, affordability and efficiency of the public transport network and it has recently promoted the use of cycling, walking and other alternative forms of transportation. At the same time, participation processes have been successfully implemented, resulting in the emergence of social demands and greater cooperation among all stakeholders.

Therefore, Barcelona’s main contributions to the European ‘Cities of tomorrow’ could be summarized in these three domains:

- Access improvement, social inclusion and urban regeneration policies
- Shift to a more sustainable mobility
- Implementation of participation processes

*These broad policies have enabled the introduction of a wide range of good practices in social and urban cohesion. Several of these actions – notably: access improvement, pedestrianization, promotion of bicycle use and participation processes - constitute singular and innovative experiences at this scale in the European context.*

*In this framework, the Barcelona public bicycle service, Bicing, is an example of a successful and sustainable mobility program which has been rapidly adopted by the targeted population. Finally, its introduction shows a determined commitment to promote bicycle use as an affordable, efficient, sustainable and healthier mode of transport.*

14 Some key figures illustrate the complexity of its transportation implications: the city has a road density of 6,000 cars per km² (whereas, for example, Madrid has 2,300 cars per km² and London 1,600 cars per km²). Barcelona is also the European city with most lanes of private traffic per km².
BRNO - Upgrading the international position of the city and its region by attracting highly qualified people and activities

The city of Brno has 370,000 inhabitants over an area of 230 km² and a population of 520,000 in the wider Metropolitan zone over an area of 3,170 km². As a city of universities, it counts 86,000 students, a high number compared to its population. Brno is a traditional industrial city, called the ‘Austrian Manchester’ under the Hapsburg Empire that went through deep transformation since 1990. By 2011, the tertiary sector became dominant in the local economy: 72 per cent of the total 250,000 jobs are services. Brno is not a city with an important international attraction yet, but it has some potential to upgrade this position, thanks to its favourable geographical location in Central Europe and to its rich network of universities and research centres, a capacity to host R&D development.

The challenge of Brno is therefore twofold: first, developing its innovative economies and international R&D functions and second, making them sustainable.

The main actions tackling the first challenge are related to the objective of attracting highly qualified people in the city through different research and grant programs. These programmes are conceived and managed in close cooperation between the City of Brno and the South Moravian Region, which is a NUTIII administrative unit. The Regional Innovation Programme as the main strategic document of this policy describes point by point the actions to get in charge in cooperation between the city, the Region and the universities. The carrying out of this list of actions is devoted to a certain number of project companies, created and financed by the main partners (South Moravian Innovation Centre, South Moravian Centre for International Mobility). This policy resulted in the creation of a solid network of actors operating in the same objectives in a complementary way.

Concerning sustainability, the Brno experience is much weaker. Infrastructure development is still limited on some research facilities realised in different areas of the city (The Campus of the Masaryk University, the Technology Park building, etc.), but the needs of the city of larger urban infrastructures for maintaining its international position (such as the development of its rail, road and air connections) are not responded yet.

Furthermore, the high concentration of urban strategies on the attraction of highly qualified people and activities may enhance a two speed development in the city. On the one hand no policy exists yet for a better integration of the newcomers into the city. Also, the way how local students would benefit of the new international position of the city is not clear either. The fact that the overall positive impacts of the programmes on the city’s economic situation are mainly expressed through their secondary effects (generating new urban services, improving the tourism and restoration sectors, etc) may lead to some political difficulties in convincing the local population about the necessity of these concentrated programmes on the long run.
FLORENCE - Reorganising cultural industries and revitalizing local manufacturing traditions in order to redefine the city’s international position

Florence is a eight biggest city in Italy counting 368 901 inhabitants (data of 2009) in the centre of a metropolitan area of 618 990 inhabitants and one of the most important centres for cultural tourism in Europe (five million tourists in 2009, 70 per cent coming from foreign countries). Apart from tourism, Florence is also well known for its manufacturing and arts and crafts activities. Being a world centre for cultural heritage art restoration plays a crucial role between these activities. Nevertheless, several signs indicate a distinct decline in the city’s economic and urban stability: slight decrease of the number of tourists and manufacturing units, increase of empty buildings in the city, weakening position of Florence in the growing competition of cultural cities in Italy and in Europe.

The main challenge for the city is therefore to reorganise its internal potentials related to culture, tourism and cultural industries and to find again its international position.

The challenge has been tackled in the first line by a consortium of some main stakeholders representing the entrepreneurial sector of Florence. The lead partner and initiator of this consortium is Confindustra, trade union confederation of Italian commercial and industrial enterprises. The other important actor is CNA association representing SMEs in the Province of Florence.

This consortium had organised Florens2010 - International Week on Cultural Heritage and Landscape, a nine days long event in Novembre 2010. A series of cultural events, exhibitions, fairs, and a two days long conference took place attracting altogether 90,000 visitors coming directly to the event.

The main strategy behind Florens2010, identified by Confindustra was to promote Florence as a new capital of restoration of cultural heritage by bringing together all businesses and other types of activities (education, technological development, arts and crafts, international seminars and cultural events) related to the restoration of art objects, of buildings, etc., and to organise them as complementary elements of a complex and sustainable structure of economic production. According to the author of the idea, if environment-friendly activities are designated as elements of the ‘green economy’, then activities related to restoration and revalorisation of cultural heritage could be labelled as components of a ‘golden economy’, the added value of the two being the economic model that Florence could follow in the future.

Large industrial firms are as much part of this strategy as are the small companies developing new technologies of restoration or the local arts and crafts SMEs which are themselves important elements of the city’s cultural heritage.

The above described strategy is strongly in line with other actions and strategies in the city, and in particular with the urban development strategy of Florence that has been adopted recently. Two main elements correlate strongly with the concept of Florens2010: the objective of maintaining local commercial and manufacturing activities facing the growing importance of commercial centres on the one hand and the plan for the creation of a ‘Technological District on Cultural Heritage’ as an innovative economic cluster in Florence.

The Florence case is an interesting model on how an initiative based on economic for profit interests may give a new dynamism to the city by bringing together all its actors. Of course in order to respond the conditions of integrated urban development it has to be completed by actions planned by the municipality regarding social and spatial cohesion in Florence.
GLIWICE - Improving and integrating local SMEs in order to sustain the economic revitalisation of the city based on knowledge society

With 192,000 inhabitants Gliwice is the second largest city after Katowice in the Upper Silesian industrial region, one of the main industrial zones of Poland. Contrary to most of post socialist industrial cities, after the first difficult years of political and institutional restructuring, Gliwice was able to turn to the interaction of two key positive features. Firstly, its special economic and social status, based on its historical development, and, secondly, the fact it became part of the Katowice Special Economic Zone formed in 1996. In spite of the expectations and predictions concerning its economic collapse, today, Gliwice occupies a strong position not only in the region but at the national level as well. It managed to attract important companies on its territory such as Opel, NGK Ceramics, Mecalux and Roca. On the other hand 99 per cent of the active enterprises of Gliwice being SMEs, the support of the latter is a crucial challenge for the city. Support of SMEs is also coupled with the support of knowledge base activities based on the presence of the Technical University and some research centres.

This challenge of Gliwice is tackled by local actors composed by the municipality, its agencies (Local Development Agency and NGO centre), the Silesian association of Support for Enterprises and others (the Technology Park, Chamber of Commerce, etc.). Their programmes being mainly financed by the same sources of EU Cohesion funds, a palpable similarity of their objectives, methods and actions may be observed. The activities of all of the actors are concentrated on training and advisory programmes for different target groups (unemployed, NGOs, young people, ect.) and in a less extent on some physical investment projects (such as the reconstruction of the abandoned mine in the New Gliwice economic cluster, or the construction of the Technology park). No general coordination of the different training and advisory programmes exists on the city level, therefore, although monitoring of the programmes responds to the requirements of the different tenders it is almost impossible to evaluate their real impacts on the city. Furthermore, no complementarities are defined between the different actors, risking the setting up of similar projects with similar results and target groups and so leading to wasted resources through duplication.

Gliwice provides the lesson of a city that strongly relies upon diverse EU funds and especially those allocated in the frame of the Regional Operation Programmes 2007-13, by highlighting the positive and the negative sides of this way of financing. The main advantage is, of course, that the Regional Operational Programmes bring a high added value to urban policies and to the activities of the different actors. At the same time, this overwhelming importance of EU funding represents a strong factor in the standardisation of projects. The general aim of the city to correspond to those priorities and demands defined by the EU, may hinder the implementation of original projects and the definition of objectives that are locally important and based on a well established local diagnosis. Consequently, this may be an important obstacle for the sustainability of these projects.
**LEIPZIG - The consolidation of a post socialist urban regeneration with decreasing subsidies**

Leipzig, the second largest city in Eastern Germany after Berlin, can be considered a model for redevelopment of its type after the collapse of the Soviet system.

During the 1990s, Leipzig lost a significant part of its population, employment and industrial infrastructure. However, a dynamic population and a volunteer municipality were mobilised to prevent a total melt down and to come up with incentives to attract inhabitants and economic activities. This was the key challenge at the turn of the century.

In many respects the challenge was successfully tackled, the population increased under the dual effect of inward migration and a growing birth rate, and large companies settled in Leipzig. The European structural funds have provided significant support to urban regeneration and to the restructuring of the housing stock, which in particular included a large part of the numerous (over 12 500) buildings inherited from the Gründerzeit (founding times, end of the 19th century, first two decades of the 20th), the Whileminian constructions that are Leipzig's pride.

Nevertheless, in the mid 2000s, a large part of the city's housing stock was still in poor condition and several former industrial areas had more brown fields than developed green spaces. The municipality had been working in close contact with the inhabitants and economic investors, trying to implement a global approach taking into account all weaknesses and assets in an integrated urban development.

However, the achievements in the western part of the town have not yet been replicated east of the town centre, although the intention is to cover the whole city, especially the still deprived areas. The west has been deeply transformed thanks to the URBAN II programme and new subsidized programmes would be needed to regenerate the east as well.

Now facing a shortage of subsidies, Leipzig officials are one again attempting to adapt their strategy to the current situation. It is clear that the objective of covering the whole city will take more time than thought initially. However, a stable administrative and political framework, an active partnership with private and public actors, and a network of cooperation with inhabitants are key elements regarding the possibility to pursue the strategy of integrated urban development.

The lessons of this strategy are widespread in Europe mainly due to the European programme URBAN I and II which created a network of 165 beneficiary cities, and through the evaluation of URBAN II published in 2010. In 2007 an informal meeting of European ministers of urban development and territorial cohesion took place in Leipzig. The outcome of this meeting was the 'Leipzig Charter on urban integrated sustainable development', a document which had a big impact within the Member States and cities. It opened the way to greater partnership among urban planners and local authorities, as well as national policies. An URBACT programme was launched in 2009, LC-FACIL, in which Leipzig is lead partner. In May 2011 an international Conference is scheduled in Leipzig on the completion of this URBACT programme whose objective was to work out a reference framework for a sustainable city15.

NEWCASTLE - Response of a city to the financial crisis

The city of Newcastle is the administrative capital of the North East region of England which has a total population of around 2.5 million. Newcastle itself has a population of approximately 278,000 and on the opposite bank is the separate municipality of Gateshead with a population of around 200,000.

The economy of Newcastle and its surrounding area has undergone much change over the past 30 years, moving away from a dependence on heavy industries such as shipbuilding, coal mining and heavy engineering, to a more diversified industrial base though there is a strong public sector dependency accounting for around 38 per cent of all jobs.

Newcastle has been in a process of change and adjustment for many years and the financial crisis and ensuing recession were simply more external shocks they had to deal with – albeit significant ones. The response from the key stakeholders was both short-term to ease the situation for those affected, but also strategic over the next 20 years, with the view that the city needs a long term plan that would hopefully transcend these short-term disturbances.

In June 2009 the city council set out its formal response to the recession caused by the financial crisis in the form of a ten point plan of action that included a mix of help to individuals and to businesses. The response to the downturn was reviewed in July 2010 and it concluded that the prevailing economic conditions and the prospect for further difficulties caused, for example, by the review of public expenditure merited continuation of the measures until the end of March 2011.

At the same time the city went a stage further in the setting up (with the adjacent municipality of Gateshead) of ‘1NG’ (1 Newcastle Gateshead) - the strategic body to push forward the 20 year vision for the area. The vision is set out in the 2010 ‘1PLAN’, a 20 year economic and spatial strategy. By taking the long term view, the expectation is that the vision will transcend short term set backs, though clearly circumstances will have some effect on the vision as it unfolds.

The long experience in Newcastle in dealing with change has led to a plethora of initiatives but recently the focus has been on more effective collaboration with neighbouring Gateshead culminating in the 1NG initiative that affirms the focus for development on the two municipalities. The city has not allowed short term concerns to crowd out taking a much more strategic, long term view for the city in the expectation that pushing ahead with visionary developments is essential and may eventually place the city in a much stronger position to weather the inevitable future external shocks, as typified by the financial crisis.

The approach to dealing with the economic shocks in Newcastle have relevance to other cities experiencing similar effects, though like any examination of transferability it is certain elements of the approach that are likely to be relevant rather than a transplantation of the whole policy. Nevertheless, there is much to learn including addressing the needs of individuals and businesses, collaboration with like-minded communities, focusing on sustainable growth and attention to the living and working environment. Above all, short term shocks should not deflect from a longer term vision and strategy.
PLAINE COMMUNE - Capacity of a group of cities to attract diverse economic activities, among which many service industries, in the view of providing employment to local dwellers of a deprived area in transition

Plaine Commune is the name of an Agglomerated Community (Communauté d’agglomération) grouping eight municipalities (Aubervilliers, Epinay-sur-Seine, La Courneuve, l’Île Saint-Denis, Pierrefitte, Saint-Denis, Stains, Villetaneuse) in the Seine-Saint-Denis district that belongs to the capital region in France.

It is one of the most prominent intermunicipal structures in the capital region, particularly because of its situation in a deprived area characterized by much poverty, unemployment and low skilled workers on the one hand and by a strong trend of economic relocation on the other.

Plaine Commune formulated a strategy to attract large firms in the service industry. However, the board of Plaine Commune is giving much attention to two risks: one is linked to the fact that this kind of companies do not necessarily recruit low skilled workers, the other is the unbalanced urban development between the north and the south of the area, the latter being the place where most enterprises settle down. Therefore Plaine Commune has launched specific policies to correct these problems.

The objective of the strategy is to derive access to jobs from new economic activities coming from outside, through the management of different policies under the same authorities. The main actors who are the Chairman of Plaine Commune and the Heads of several Departments, work in a transversal way in order to cross-fertilize each other’s contribution.

A flagship action of this strategy is the implementation of a project of a network of Houses for Employment in each of the eight cities. All sectoral policies are to be represented in these Houses to reinforce tools for access to jobs through individual and collective actions. This project is eligible for ERDF within the In’Europe programme from the ROP ERDF 2007-2013. Its implementation has been slowed down because a reduction of the State participation. However, it should continue.

Other actions are directed toward businessmen. For example, a Charter has been signed by Plaine Commune and about a hundred companies who agree to launch specific actions showing they are responsible for social cohesion. A large shopping Centre is opening in the area, in April 2011. An agreement with the manager is planning that 75 per cent of the recruitment be offered to inhabitants of the area.

The main strengths of the strategy of Plaine Commune are its capacity to promote a synergy within its services and between its own administration and the economic actors. Another quality is the strong link between Plaine Commune and the inhabitants of the area through their representatives in the Community Council which has monthly meetings.

Other cities or Agglomerations face to similar challenges should meet conditions as stability in the administrative organization, a will of all parties to work together, a long term strategy and openness to working with experts and the University.
SERAING - Urban foresight based on public participation as a tool for integrating local residents’ requirements on their own neighbourhood into the Master Plan of the city

Seraing is a former industrial city in the agglomeration zone of Liège with 61 000 inhabitants in an area of 36 km². Its high unemployment rate (17% in 2007) is primarily due to the permanent withdrawal of its steel industries. The city has a strong multicultural character: Belgians (85%), Italians (10%), French, Spanish, Turkish, Moroccans, and other minority groups are represented. The Molinay neighbourhood is situated in the core of the city on an area of 1.5 km² with 1700 inhabitants. It had been a prosperous commercial area within the industrial city until about 20 years ago. The industrial decline brought the disappearance of its traditional commercial activities and the changing of its local society. Today, the Molinay is a multicultural area, with a majority of young population suffering from uncertain living conditions and lacking future prospects. Since 1997 the local subdivision of the Centre for Actions for Secularism (CAL) a national NGO plays a fundamental role in the development of the local society.

In 2006 the City of Seraing adopted the first version of its Master Plan as the result of a long term planning process supported between others in the frame of the “Federal Plan for Big Cities” of Belgium. It is a physical urban plan, identifying almost 300 projects of different size. In the first version of the plan no special intervention was planned for the Molinay, considering that the neighbourhood would benefit from the secondary pull effects of the large investments to be realised in other parts of the city. As a response to this, the CAL decided to launch a participatory project in order to identify the main challenges and needs of the Molinay neighbourhood together with its inhabitants and with external experts coming from the Municipality and other institutions. The professional partner of the CAL in this process was the Destrée Institute, specialised between others in foresight expertise, who managed to integrate the Molinay 2017 process into its running Interreg project: Futurreg (Futures For Regional Development).

Molinay 2017 became a model project for participatory foresight, although its time frame was strongly limited by the finishing of the Interreg project by the end of 2007. The process was launched by nine debate workshops aiming at establishing a common vision on the neighbourhood by its inhabitants. Following this, the main challenges of the neighbourhood have been identified by the lead partners of the process (CAL and Destrée institute). The debate on the challenges with local inhabitants was organised in the frame of a lunch workshop. This event was followed by a meeting of a panel of experts ensuring the professional feedback of the process. At the end of the project a hierarchy of challenges was established by the lead partners. The process stopped without determining any strategic actions, or monitoring programmes. The reason for this, apart from the limited time was that the CAL estimated that the carry out of the challenges was already the duty of the municipality, in the frame of its Master Plan.

The challenges identified as the outcome of the participatory foresight were positively received by the municipality, and some interventions on local infrastructures were integrated into the new version of the Master Plan in 2008, albeit these are of a relatively small size compared to the main projects undertaken. Many other challenges (related to education, safety, and even housing) identified by the project are not transformed in concrete projects yet.

Molinay 2017 is an excellent example of a participatory foresight process combining successfully the local support and the professional expertise.
VÄXJÖ - Sustainable energy policies as part of a model for managing complex urban change

The municipality of Växjö in Southern Sweden comprises both a dense and cohesive urban area (appr. 15 km²) and a large environing rural landscape (appr. 1900 km²). Some 63,000 people live in the urban district and 20,000 people in the countryside. The population in the municipality grows 1-2% yearly. The share of immigrants is 18%.

Växjö has three territorial levels of action with different roles in terms of responding to the challenges and solutions to be faced. The main actors of the area are the municipality of Växjö, the County of Kronoberg, the University of Växjö and the enterprises (appr. 8000) the majority of which are small or medium sized. In addition, a great number of NGOs take part in the development work.

Växjö has been chosen as a case-study, because it is a remarkable example of a city that has been able to respond to the challenge of sustainable energy policy. The interviews of the actors demonstrate that Växjö has responded to the challenge through a long-term environmental strategy that has brought forth results on many levels and on many sectors with multiple actors and partners, thus also enhancing the social cohesion of the municipality.

The strategy has been and still is being implemented through a specific Växjö mode of action. The latter comprises the construction of strategic documents in collaboration with quadruple partners (public, private, people and academia), based on several interrelated policies that are implemented by targeted measures which are monitored with pertinent indicators. The main strategic document, since 2006, is the extensive environmental programme which has been implemented in close collaboration with the municipality, business and civil society. It contains an energy policy which responds both to local and global environmental challenges. The programme is structured into three sections: Living Life, Our Nature and Fossil Free Fuel Växjö. Each section has objectives, measures and indicators that are monitored by responsible stakeholders. For example, the carbon dioxide emissions have been reduced in ten years by 35% per inhabitant. At the same time economic growth has increased by 69% (year 2008).

The environmental programme has been carried out in practice through a set of consequent and simultaneous measures, such as cleaning the lake Trummen, building a fossil-free fuel district heating and cooling system, constructing multistorey houses of wood and making buildings more energy efficient. The largest set of measures comprises the enhancement of the cohesive urban structure and the ecological traffic planning.

The lessons learned from Växjö imply that the implementation of long term strategic programmes require coproduction and shared projects as a solution, in addition to extensive consensus over a few fundamental issues. EU-funding has also been successfully deployed (6% of the yearly budget). The Växjö mode of action can be transferred to the contexts of the same size or smaller towns. The speed of transfer is constrained by the long time frame of some of the measures in Växjö, as well as the deep-rooted democratic culture of Sweden that is embedded in the tradition of citizen discourse together with the specific characteristics of the local Småland spirit.
III - Case Studies Reports
RE THINKING DIVERSITY POLICY TO STRENGTHEN SOCIAL COHESION AND TACKLE THE RISK OF SEGREGATION

THE CASE OF AMSTERDAM, THE NETHERLANDS
Figure 1: The City of Amsterdam by 8 town boroughs, 1 May 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>town borough</th>
<th>population</th>
<th>% non-western foreigners</th>
<th>% 65 yrs and older</th>
<th>population of 15-64 yrs</th>
<th>population density per km²</th>
<th>land</th>
<th>population 1 January 2020</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A Centrum</td>
<td>82713</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>66512</td>
<td>13142</td>
<td>81099</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Westpoort</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>404</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E West</td>
<td>131203</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>102899</td>
<td>15085</td>
<td>128052</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F Nieuw-West</td>
<td>135188</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>91473</td>
<td>4694</td>
<td>137997</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K Zuid</td>
<td>133810</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>98720</td>
<td>8609</td>
<td>132172</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M Oost</td>
<td>116615</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>86404</td>
<td>6571</td>
<td>142304</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N Noord</td>
<td>86327</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>56994</td>
<td>2059</td>
<td>87919</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>T Zuidoost</td>
<td>81508</td>
<td>64.1</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>58506</td>
<td>4071</td>
<td>86846</td>
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<tr>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
<td>767773</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>561855</td>
<td>4650</td>
<td>796793</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Amsterdam 2010 Yearbook

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16 A: Center, B: Western Harbour, E: West, F: New West, K: South, M: East, N: North, T: South East
1. Introduction and main indicators\textsuperscript{17}

Migration flows have been a constant feature over time and are a structural component of the world demography, as well as of social and economic development. Furthermore, such flows help bring about mutual understanding among nations. However, at the same time it can be a catalyst for social and political tensions, especially in large cities where high numbers of migrants settle and continue to arrive even in a period of deindustrialisation, economic conversion, unemployment and financial crisis.

Therefore, one of the main urban challenges of current times is the way migration is dealt with by local powers and by civil society. For example how do they “develop capacities for social inclusion and the economic integration of newcomers, especially migrants and the socially disadvantaged”, as stated in the terms of reference of this study.

Amsterdam was selected as a case study principally for the way the Municipality has addressed that challenge in the past. Therefore, this case study report aims to analyse how the diversity policy has been formulated and developed. It will particularly try to single out the specificity of this policy and to question the new challenges the city may have to face.

A report published in 2008 on Amsterdam diversity policy as a contribution within the CLIP (Cities for Local Integration Policy) network (van Heelsum, 2008) stated that: “in the 1990s, Amsterdam’s municipal policy on minority groups was mainly concerned by providing facilities for ethnic groups and preventing discrimination and racism. By 1999, when the first- and second-generation population of foreign origins nearly reached 50%, the municipality felt that the discussion about ‘minorities’ no longer made sense. Amsterdam therefore changed the focus of its minority policy from an emphasis on group treatment to one on the responsibilities and needs of individuals. The city aspires to make all inhabitants feel at home, to provide people with opportunities to participate in city life and to use diversity as an asset for developing the city. Thus the aims of social inclusion or integration are incorporated into almost every municipal activity. This ‘diversity policy’ was originally formulated in the policy document ‘The power of a diverse city’ (De kracht van de diverse stad).”

**Population**

The metropolitan region (comprising 16 municipalities) has a total population of 1.4 million (2010) which represents 8 per cent of the total population of the Netherlands.

The city of Amsterdam covers an area of 21,933 hectares, and has 767,773 inhabitants; the population density is 4,648/sq km and the projected population growth rate is 6 per cent over the next 15 years. The 2010 population is 1.5 per cent more than in 2009. The main reason for the population increase is net surplus migration. As fewer Amsterdam inhabitants departed for a foreign destination (down by -1,700), the foreign migration surplus tripled to 3,700 persons in 2009. As usual, there was also a net domestic migration surplus in 2009 as well: 1,900 more people came to Amsterdam from the rest of the Netherlands. Amsterdam is expected to have a population of 835,000 by 2030. This growth will be made possible by new residential developments such as in Jiburg and Zeeburgereiland in East Amsterdam and Bongerd and Overhoeks in North Amsterdam.

The age structure of the population has been stable over the past few years, with 21 per cent of the total population under 20 years old, 68 per cent from 20 to 64 and 11 per cent aged 65 and over.

\textsuperscript{17} All statistics in this page come from the 2010 Amsterdam municipality Yearbook
Households by type are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Couples without children</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Couples with children</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single parent</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Inward migration to the city exceeded outward migration by 5,616 in 2010. This figure has been fast growing, as evidenced when compared with previous years as follows: +4,295 in 2006, +4,259 in 2007, -658 in 2008 and +3,212 in 2009.

**Economy**

Amsterdam was affected by the financial and economic crisis, but the main economic indicators show that the situation is improving.

**Box 1: Extract from Amsterdam 2010 Yearbook**

The recession has caused a decline in employment in the financial sector of 7 per cent in 2009. In the construction industry this was almost 3 per cent. Employment in the creative industry slightly decreased in 2009. Transshipments in the port of Amsterdam decreased by 6 per cent in 2009. The number of ocean-going ships calling on Amsterdam declined by 10 per cent. Compared to other ports in Western Europe, this was not particularly bad. At Schiphol Airport employment declined much more quickly (down 7.7 per cent) than in the country as a whole (a decrease of just 0.1 per cent) in 2009.

Increasing exports have contributed to freight traffic in May 2010 being nearly 30 per cent higher than one year before. Also, the number of passengers going through the airport increased again, though the ash cloud in April 2010 did cause a substantial fall in the number of passengers during the period affected.

While the Gross Domestic Product for the Amsterdam region decreased by 3.7 per cent in 2009, an increase of 1.6 per cent was expected for 2010, 0.3 per cent more than the national increase.

Employment and the number starting businesses are high and have increased strongly. On the other hand, the number of bankruptcies, closures, unemployment and persons on social security has decreased. In contrast to the country as a whole, the number of jobs increased in Amsterdam over 2008 to 2009 (by 2.6 per cent to 461,238). This increase is caused partly by the new Trade Register Act which stipulates that every enterprise must be registered at the Chamber of Commerce. However, if a correction is applied for this, then the increase is still 2.2 per cent.

200,000 people from outside Amsterdam commute to the city to work every day.

**Migration**

Amsterdam, one of the 25 European cities participating in the project “Cities for Local Integration Policy” (CLIP), has about 50 per cent of its population coming or whose parents or grandparents came from former colonies or from former colonies.

The Dutch represent 88 per cent of the municipal population and foreigners 12 per cent. The most numerous group of foreigners from what Dutch documents call non western countries, which are
elsewhere named « the South », is that of Moroccans. However, the statistics, offer another perspective when the “ethnic origin” is taken into account instead of nationality. In this case, native Dutch count for 50 per cent, people coming from western countries for 15 per cent and those from other countries for 35 per cent and among them the most numerous are from Surinam18, with those of a Turkish origin ranking second, the Antilleans third and the Moroccans fourth.19

While migrants from former colonies generally hold Dutch nationality, the percentage of people with a foreign nationality has been relatively stable since 1997 at around 4.3 per cent. On a national level, the number of naturalisations increased from 12,800 in 1990 to 82,700 in 1996 but then decreased to 45,300 in 2002, according to the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics (van Heelsum, 2008). Since then, in Amsterdam only, around 3,000 people have become naturalised every year.

A relatively new group of migrants in Amsterdam are the East Europeans. Since the expansion of the EU in 2004, their numbers have increased from 13,000 to more than 20,000. Some 300 Polish people come to Amsterdam every year. When Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU in 2007, the settlement of people from these countries increased spectacularly from 76 to over 1,100 persons. However, the growth has declined since and in 2009 increased by just 588).20

Groups of people of foreign origins show significantly different demographic and socio economic characteristics than the native Dutch, such as:

− A younger population than the Dutch, with a greater proportion of single parents families and families with more children on average.
− Higher unemployment: The 2006 figures showed an average unemployment rate of all foreigners higher than the Dutch unemployment rate by 5 percentage points.
− For young people unemployment is particularly high: in 2010, among 2,000 unemployed aged 20-24 years, 75% were non western foreigners.21

There are 170 different nationalities within the Amsterdam population.

2. The challenge of managing a diverse city

The challenge we identified for Amsterdam (how to manage a diverse city) is, in reality, one that the city is facing, as confirmed by our discussions with people in the Municipality and elsewhere. Furthermore, it is an issue the City has been tackling for some time and has developed some original methods which have been adapted over time.

As member of the European CLIP network (gathering 25 Cities for Local Integration Policy), a report on Amsterdam was prepared in 2008 (van Heelsum, 2008) in which the author explains the shift in the diversity policy that occurred at the end of the 90s emanated from a growing consciousness of the possible side effects of the positive actions set up in the 1980s (see above).

This previous policy oriented towards positive action is reviewed below, followed by an examination of the present policy and associated practices.

18 But the people who came from Surinam before it became independent (1975) were and are of a Dutch nationality. Between 1975 and 1980, Surinamese could still choose the Dutch nationality.
19 Source : Amsterdam 2010 Yearbook
21 Ibid
An original integration policy

The Netherlands appears to have been ahead of other Western European countries in the launching of a minority policy in the 1970s which had its maximum effect in the 1980s. Three main components were as follows (Penninx, 2006):

− A principle of equity between ethnic minorities and other citizens from Dutch origin in the economic, cultural and religious fields;
− A focus on specific disadvantaged groups, not only ethnic minorities;
− An administrative partnership to implement this policy in a coordinated way, under the management of the Ministry of the Interior.

A series of legal measures have been taken, among which are:

− An anti-discrimination law reinforced by a law on equality and by the creation of an Equal Treatment Commission;
− The right to vote and to be eligible in local elections for foreign residents (1985);
− A law opening access to naturalization (1986) with more possibilities to maintain a dual nationality (1992).

Investments were made in public schools attended by children from migrant families to help them catch up on their education where needed and in the provision of subsidies for the opening of confessional schools run by religious groups.

In 1981, the social housing system was opened up to foreign households who, until then, had no access to it.

In the cultural and religious spheres, actions from foreign groups and communities were supported to teach the children “languages and cultures of their origins”. In the same spirit, each religion was supported so that all could enjoy places to have prayers, meetings, courses and festivals. On the whole, this strategy was one of creating ‘pillars’, e.g. promoting the separated development of each community with, in principle, equal rights.

Within this national framework, the city of Amsterdam implemented positive action towards ethnic minorities more than any other Dutch city, affecting immigrants from non-western countries and refugees. Positive action mainly consisted of devices aimed at recruiting non-Dutch or Dutch from foreign origins in public services (van Heelsum, 2008). The 2001-2006 target was fixed at 27 per cent of immigrants in the total municipal work force but it remained at around 22 per cent. And because it was not achieved, the target was kept at the same level for the next planning period.

Apart from recruiting people from diverse origins in the municipal departments, the focus has also been on having minorities represented in all services dealing with migrants, and particularly in education and housing.22

Another target of the diversity policy was the inclusion of more immigrants into the jobs market but this did not lead to a major change (Penninx, 2006).

Amsterdam has had a policy of positive action following a Canadian model. It stands for fighting discrimination encountered by migrants through a specific form of compensation. It differs from the ‘affirmative action’ approach in the United States which has been criticized for its method of ethnic minority quotas that are suspected of neglecting competences when filling job vacancies. Positive

22 Interview of Mr Brieux-Yves (Mellouki) Cadat
action aims at helping underprivileged people to have access to their rights and as such is a policy above all based on equity.

**Limits and weaknesses of the first stage of the integration policy**

Various analyses have been carried out on what contributed to a change in the integration policy. On the national level, the Scientific Council for Government Policy as early as 1989 concluded that the policy was not successful, particularly in the employment and education fields. Its advice was to concentrate on employment and education and to leave aside the many cultural actions that had a tendency to isolate each community from others and to prevent them from integrating well into Dutch society. Several problems appeared in all fields where immigrants and the children of immigrants were concerned. Education was one of the most critical, as expressed in the following quote:

“**In Dutch, schools where the majority of pupils have a foreign background are called “black schools”. The term can lead to confusion, since it does not explicitly refer to the racial make-up of the schools. “Black schools” include children of Moroccan, Turkish, and Surinamese background, but also children from countries in Eastern Europe and elsewhere. A more accurate term for these schools would be minority schools.**”

A pace to change was implemented in the city of Amsterdam by the end of the 1990s, while a fierce debate was going on about school segregation. The problem stems from the unequal information on the rules giving the right to choose the schools where children go. Without information on this option, the poor residents, and among them migrants and foreigners, tend to apply to the school closest to where they live. Comments in the statistical yearbook of the City of Amsterdam read: “**In the school year 2009/2010, 24 primary schools in Amsterdam were ‘too black’ in comparison to the composition of the child population in the neighbourhood and 12 schools were ‘too white’. The segregation in the primary education is caused mainly by residential segregation and flows of pupils. These flows of pupils consist partly of ‘white flight’.”**

As explained further below, the Amsterdam Advisory Committee on Diversity has been working thoroughly on this issue, trying to encourage school desegregation.

**Intellectual and political debate about integration policy**

“**We do not talk about integration because it is always seen as a one way issue**.” We understand that this statement from the manager of the municipal department of diversity and citizenship relates to an assessment of previous policies and it has many facets.

Firstly, it states that in Amsterdam, as in many cities in western European countries, integration is generally meant as the process through which migrants have to adapt to the ways of the country where they migrated to. Such a vision fails to include efforts on the side of natives, as well as national and local institutions, to adapt themselves to the newcomers. In the Netherlands, as opposed for instance to France where migrants have been required to assimilate, the integration policy has been based on support to community development with each community given ways to maintain its original culture and to live together. Both strategies, the Dutch and the French, have the similar objective to help integration but through different methods. However, they share the objective to

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23 This statement was from John Tyler’s, a political editor, quoted on Expatica.com, the information website for the international community in the Netherlands, in 2008.

24 Interview of Ms Judith Suurmond, Manager of the Municipal Department for Diversity and Citizenship
draw a distinct line between natives and immigrants. Whether they are invited to live and act like the native population or to be free to maintain their way of living and habits within their own community, immigrants still are viewed as a separate category.

Secondly, there is a kind of paradox in the Amsterdam diversity policy that lies in the confrontation between the above statement on integration as a one way issue, and the use of words which have a strong symbolic meaning, for instance, categorizing "allochtons" people with at least one parent not born in the Netherlands, or opposing white schools to black schools.

Nevertheless, criticizing the one way issue leads to viewing the city population not only through the ethnic spectrum, but also following after a citizenship oriented model, with a specific focus on the means allowing everyone to fully enjoy a citizen status and the related rights.

Commentators have various viewpoints on the development of the diversity strategy. Rinus Penninx (Penninx, 2006) states that "the Netherlands used to have an international reputation of a tolerant country and within Europe a guide country for progressive integration policies for newcomers. The political landslide victory of the party of Pim Fortuyn and his assassination in 2002, and the subsequent murder of Theo van Gogh in 2004 seem to have radically altered that traditional image."

Another analysis (Duyvendak, Hurenkamp, Tonkens, 2009) also challenges this reputation of tolerance saying that "this tolerance for the religious practices of immigrants had little to do with national integration policies (and) ... central government policy toward socio-cultural integration... evolved from focusing on achieving group emancipation to an approach that accentuated individual integration. More recently, policy has insisted that migrants adjust to ‘Dutch’ culture, to Dutch norms and values, in order to avert the impending danger of insufficient social cohesion".

While the debate is still going on, both the national and the Amsterdam policies towards the ethnic minorities have been criticized for being patronizing towards them.

**A step forward: the citizenship policy**

The official municipal standpoint, reflected in the CLIP report (van Heelsum, 2008, see p.5), is that the approach to dealing with the ethnic minorities is likely to maintain among migrants and their descendants a feeling of being treated in a specific way and this may be contrary to the idea that all residents in Amsterdam should feel equally at home.

Some social scientists see this evolution of the integration policy along the lines of a broader societal evolution towards individual rather than community integration. But it also has a political dimension: the diversity policy of the 1980s was launched by the leftwing parties, whereas later on, the rightwing parties promoted a vision favouring individual competitiveness supposed regardless of ethnic origins.

Although the development from a policy oriented towards minorities to a citizenship policy had been thought of in the late 1990s, it took some time to be widely shared, even within the Municipality. A member of the Eastern Municipality staff said it was only two or three years ago that a diversity policy getting rid of categorizing people following their origins came to the fore.  

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25 Interview of Ms Simone Lamme, adviser on participation and former adviser on subsidies for migrants.
Main actors of the diversity policy

The diversity policy was launched by the Municipal Department for Diversity and Citizenship. The Department staff is currently involved in writing a paper stating what citizenship is all about. In this matter, it relies upon NGOs in two ways. The first one is letting them do what their goals drive them to do, and the other is supporting them if it fits the diversity policy.

This policy is supposed to be incorporated into most municipal thematic policies. Thus, several municipal departments are involved in a partnership on the diversity policy:

- The Health Service used to have 25 officers going into neighbourhoods with a large population of migrants and who would help them and the medical professionals to understand each other. Information is translated into English, Turkish and Moroccan Arab. In 2007, immigrants counted for 12 per cent of the staff of this service
- The Service on Work and Income is organised differently. There is no focus on migrants, no specific help, and no translation. But language courses are available and specific ones for refugees and migrant women. This service has about 22 per cent migrants in its staff.
- The Education and Citizenship Service is presented in more details in the appendix. Despite its mission on citizenship, this service has even less personnel from migrant groups (about 20 per cent).

Within the City services, other actors related to the diversity policy are the employees of the district municipalities, especially those involved in working on citizens’ participation. More generally speaking, all departments of the district municipalities are involved because the emphasis has been placed on integration at a neighbourhood level.

Another important actor is the Advisory Council on Diversity and Integration. Created in 2004 as an independent body, it advises the central municipal council on various issues, particularly on education, home care, care for elderly, and juvenile delinquency. Over its 6.5 years of existence it has produced 21 advisory policies, some of which are being followed, but some others not (for example, see below on teaching Dutch).

Immigrants themselves are actors of the diversity policy, mainly through grassroots associations and NGOs that are encouraged to propose actions to the municipalities.

Four programmes

The diversity policy has now four programmes: anti-radicalisation and polarisation, discrimination, empowerment, social cohesion and connecting.

The anti-radicalisation and polarisation programme is aimed at detecting processes of radicalisation in their early stages. The main target is fundamentalist Muslim radicalisation; a second one is extreme rightwing radicalisation which is felt to offer the most prospects for radical actions on the part of Muslim groups.

Radicalisation and polarisation are described as “processes by which people isolate themselves and become fundamentalists”\(^26\). An example is the case of young people going to Pakistan for holidays and becoming fundamentalists while out there. This has been a concern for the municipality since Theo van Gogh was assassinated. It may be that few people are involved, but nevertheless studies into it have been launched and a method to tackle it has been implemented. This consists of having several people joining forces (professionals and citizens) to rally round young people suspected of

\(^{26}\) Interview of Ms J. Suurmond
radicalisation and open a dialogue with them. There is no real assessment of this action but anecdotally it is said to have been successful in some cases\textsuperscript{27}.

The programme against discrimination aims to, first of all, make people aware and encourage those who suffer discrimination to testify and complain before the Commission for Equal Treatment. As a result, the number of complaints has increased and several actions have been implemented, including trials in which sentences are enforced. Employers can ask for help if they are willing to avoid discriminate but do not know exactly what are the criteria on discriminatory actions.

Campaigns have been launched with posters reading “Amsterdam is finished with it”, or “Gays bash in discrimination is finished”, and “Surinamese bash in discrimination is finished” etc. Local TV shows participate in spreading the messages and the AJAX football club joined the campaign. Also, Muslims organisations have started campaigns to mobilise Muslim groups.

A focus is put on education and City executives visit all schools over a four year programme to raise the pupils ‘consciousness. The City administration tries to provide a model of correct behaviour and training is organised in its departments for its employees.

The Empowerment programme is mainly oriented towards women and homosexuals. It is meant to strengthen women and homosexuals to resist machismo and homophobia.

One major point in the municipality perspective is to help professional or elected women of foreign origin who face pressure both from their community and from their professional or political environment. Too many talented women end up burning out because of such pressure, often leaving their job and some of them suffering from depression. However, the municipality has not launched anything specific to tackle this, relying more on Womens’ NGOs which play an important role in the empowerment of other women and girls. Although the PvdA (Labour Party) has for a long time had a strategy of promoting women which then spread to other political parties, it seems that competent women still tend to be marginalised.\textsuperscript{28}

Regarding homosexuals, the Netherlands are ahead of other European countries in terms on tolerance. In this context, Amsterdam has long been an open-minded gay city, allowing the homosexual marriage as early as 2001. However, some homosexuals still feel they cannot be out on the street without a risk of being attacked. The responsibility for violence against homosexuals is controversial and mostly it allegedly is committed by young Muslim men. But some people object to this view and suggest that it is more a problem of machismo and male behaviour in general and that the majority of physical aggression emanates from natives.\textsuperscript{29}

The social cohesion and connecting programme (also called the citizenship programme) is the umbrella for all actions covering the diversity policy. Citizenship is preferred to integration because it has to do not only with migrants, but with the whole population. The main features of the strategy are as follows:

− The objective is to promote actions favouring mutual respect and the capacity to coexist.
− The main targets are unemployment of young people because of the high representation of ethnic minorities, discriminations towards women, homosexuals, gypsies, handicapped and other underprivileged categories.

\textsuperscript{27} Interview of Ms J. Suurmond
\textsuperscript{28} Interview of Mr. Laurent Chambon, formerly elected in Amsterdam, journalist and currently consultant
\textsuperscript{29} Interview of Mr L. Chambon
– The method consists of financial support to NGOs and communities that launch actions consistent with the diversity policy.

**Participation and diversity**

As mentioned above, the City authorities do not want the municipality to generate actions themselves but rather to support actions launched by citizens that are likely to be sustainable. Furthermore, it is hoped that this approach will reinforce sustainable links between them and the citizens.

Therefore, the proposals of NGOs and other groups are welcomed. The Amsterdam municipality strongly stresses the role of participation of all stakeholders in actions on a local basis. This is called the ‘Amsterdam District Approach’ after a national policy which focused cooperation between professionals and inhabitants at the neighbourhood level, in selected Dutch cities. This national programme aims at giving a specific support to inhabitants’ initiatives in poor urban areas.

The District Approach was significantly funded up to recently when support for it started being reduced and 2011 is the final year of this programme. However, Amsterdam decided to continue even with less state funding, which has resulted in very small subsidies to a great number of actions. Over the last three years (from September 2008 to June 2010), a total of 1 211 initiatives have benefited from the programme in nine specific neighbourhoods.

Social workers, inhabitants and business people work together on youth, care, mental and physical handicap, and the neighbourhood as a living community. The idea is to train people not only to participate in initiatives launched by the Authorities, but also to take initiatives for their neighbourhood themselves. It is summed up in the term “pyramid of participation”, at the base of which is the inhabitant as a consumer and at the top, the inhabitant as an initiative taker. The intermediate levels are the inhabitant becoming a specialist out of his/her experience and the inhabitant being an active partner. This approach is built upon the rationale that working together and with professionals, the inhabitants will develop skills and take responsibilities and build up their self confidence to help solve problems.

Some of the tools used to enhance people’s participation include meetings where inhabitants are taught the vocabulary of the administration to enable them to prepare the actions they want to implement in a proper way. Another tool used is training in public speaking to help people present their projects before neighbourhood assemblies.

Actions launched by inhabitants or groups of inhabitants receive small amounts of money ranging from Euro 2 301 to 15 865 in 2008-2009 and from Euro 1 667 to 11 000 in 2010. Following the municipal records, almost half of the actions (49 per cent) are short term. However, another 15 per cent are considered short term actions likely to have long term effects. As far as the types of actions are concerned, the majority have to do with “living together” while other significant types of actions concern sports, empowerment, education and culture.

The District Approach is coordinated in the Central Municipality and implemented in district municipalities where participation developers are in charge of coordinating all initiatives in order to

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30 Joint interview of Ms Kirsten Simhoffer, Central Municipality Counselor on housing, care and living together, and of Mr Rob van Veelen, participation developer in the eastern District Municipality.

31 Bewonersparticipatie in de wijkaanpak 2010 [www.wijkaanpak.amsterdam.nl](http://www.wijkaanpak.amsterdam.nl)
help spread a communal spirit. This relates directly to the diversity policy, especially in
neighbourhoods inhabited by people of multiple origins. Amsterdam Oost is a good example. The
eastern district includes Amsterdam Oost, Watergraafsmeer, Transvaal, and Zeeburg and IJburg, the
last two ones being recent additions. There, inhabitants from different origins are active in the
participation network. For example, a man of Moroccan origin created a chess club that has been a
real success. Youth learn how to play the game and it is seen as an asset for citizenship, since even
girls from traditional Muslim families are allowed to take part. A young woman of Turkish origin has
reproduced the initiative. The two persons interviewed for this case study see another outcome of
such actions - young people who speak Dutch only at school have another opportunity to practice
the language by playing chess and getting together with youth from different backgrounds.

Religions and traditions are very sensitive issues. The Amsterdam District Approach stands for a
secular approach - it does not subsidize mosques or groups inciting children to belong for instance to
Moroccan only actions. However, at the same time, ties with traditional groups are not severed and
all inhabitants and groups are encouraged to develop good relations.

Contrary to other actions and programmes which are not evaluated, the Amsterdam District
Approach is followed up through a partnership with the University of Tilburg. A research project has
been launched on the motivation of people to act voluntarily and on their empowerment. It should
be completed in the summer of 2012. The University is also evaluating 400 out of the 14 000
initiatives to find out who had the idea, how it started and developed, with whom and what main
effects are observable in the communities. Some outputs have already been revealed such as women
gaining self confidence and people remaining involved.

Within the District approach, a specific experiment has been promoted by the Ministry of
Immigration under the name of “Vogelaargelden” (which means ‘budget from Mrs Vogelaar’, former
Minister in Amsterdam). It is aimed at delivering reinforced support to three neighbourhoods
(Venserpolder, Dapperbuurt, Holendrecht) which happen to host many families of foreign origins and
where the population is particularly in need. This experiment is known as the “Voucher Experiment”,
as it functions through allocating specific financial aid to these areas through vouchers given to
inhabitants if the actions they propose are approved. Decisions on actions to be supported are taken
by a group of inhabitants (Regiegroep) supported by the ASW service, the Support Centre for
Inhabitants. The budget has been steadily fixed at Euro 276 000 for each of the years 2008, 2009 and
2010.

3. Significant actions

Some actions described by the interviewees for this case study are presented here to illustrate the
diversity policy in its citizenship stage.

The BOMO

The BOMO or Board of Migrant Organisations was created in the eastern municipality with 20
organisations, including 12 subsidised organisations for migrants, as well as the police, schools and
other local stakeholders. Its operation has been suspended since the Zeeburg and IJburg
neighbourhoods were added to the Eastern District, because the territory is now too big for the
board, as presently constituted, to handle. However, the possibility of resuming its activities on a
new and larger scale is currently being appraised.

During its period of operation, the BOMO had five to six meetings a year, normally attended by
around 40 people. Three working groups were created covering women, young people and older
people, each of them charged with reflection and action. In addition, BOMO had meetings with the Municipal Council, was well known and played an important role in social cohesion and mutual understanding, as well as in innovative projects. The eastern municipality consulted the BOMO about the possibility of having women from different foreign origins attending a training course to help older people from same origins in their homes. The BOMO agreed on the project and a group of women subsequently attended the training course and were recruited to do the task.

**Dutch language courses**

Since 2007, the Dutch integration law obliges non European immigrants and any immigrant asking for naturalisation to pass a language test. To facilitate this, there is access to language courses. However, non European former migrants did not have this obligation and so many of them are not proficient in the Dutch language. While these courses are not compulsory, they can attend if they choose to do so. Those unemployed and in receipt of welfare benefits may also be required to attend a language course if it is likely to enhance their chances of finding a job. The courses are language oriented but also cover relevant areas of citizenship. Since 2007, a competitive system of allocating contracts for the provision of these courses has been introduced and subsidies are distributed to course providers following certain criteria. About 40 language and citizenship course providers are active in different neighbourhoods of Amsterdam (van Heelsum, 2008).

The Advisory Council on Diversity and Integration has done much work on the issue of language courses. On the basis that statistics were not enough to evaluate the achievements of such courses, they took a deeper look, trying to understand why some people did not manage to speak Dutch even after attending the course. They singled out some explanatory factors, for instance the fact that illiterate migrants had much more trouble learning Dutch than young people who had been to school. As a result, their advice was to adapt methods to different categories of learners. They also wanted to investigate the quality of course provision and so visited many schools where the courses were being run. They noticed that schools in deprived areas tended to have poor teachers or teachers without any qualifications and this led to recommendations to improve the quality of the teaching and to act against segregation. The Deputy Mayor was interested in the results of their inquiry but he would only launch an action on quality and was not prepared to do anything on segregation. The Advisory Board continued its work, talking to parents and teachers and this led to additional recommendations underpinning the need to act both on quality and on segregation. In the meantime, the Municipality had been supporting a training course for managers but not for teachers and this was shown to be wasteful. In the end, after two months, it was the Ministry of Education that decided that something had to be done simultaneously on quality and on segregation. The resulting programme is starting in 2011, but with less funding than it would have had two or three years earlier.

**The 9-10 of April gathering on discrimination**

Fifty community leaders from East Amsterdam were scheduled to meet on the 9th and 10th April 2011 for a working weekend on discrimination. The objective is to discuss the feeling of being discriminated on the part of migrants, homosexuals and women, and to face the facts of discrimination. Two trainers from New York are due to manage the session. In addition, school

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32 More in Appendix

33 Interview of Ms Ankie Verlaan, Chairwoman of the Advisory Council on Diversity and Integration
children rehearsed a play on discrimination which is going to be on stage during that weekend. Parents were invited and for some of them it may be the first time they attended a theatre play.

**Public debate launched by grassroots organisations**

Young people whose parents came from abroad have had an opportunity to be active in the city life. Many of them take part in grassroots organizations in which they do social, cultural and education work for other youth. NGOs managed by people of Moroccan origin are in the forefront of actions against discrimination. One of these, Argan, launched a debate on homosexuality and discrimination which attracted a large attendance that included the Mayor. As Moroccan youngsters who perpetrate acts of discrimination towards homosexuals are, on one hand, the “offenders”, at the same time they can also be “victims” of discrimination. The idea was that they wanted to demonstrate that all types of discrimination lead to the same painful outcomes, be they from Dutch towards Moroccans or from Moroccans towards homosexuals or any other combination.  

4. Lessons learned

First of all we will deal here with the lessons learned by the Municipality itself. Then we will present the main lessons that can be learned from the Amsterdam diversity policy to tackle the risk of exclusion and segregation and to promote social cohesion in all parts of the city.

**Lessons learned by the municipality**

**An evaluation**

Amsterdam has a long tradition of tolerance and appears to be proud of it. Therefore, moving from protecting ethnic minorities to a citizenship policy was a clear attempt to establish a policy of equity based on diversity, without stressing differences but rather highlighting common points.

The District approach is the flagship device of this evolution of the diversity policy, because the emphasis is more on the process rather than the results. Nevertheless, an evaluation made in 2009 led to some changes being made in the management of this approach and from this, in 2010 the municipality noted some positive points, the principal ones being as follows:

− A special effort to be made to include marginalised groups such as women, young people, and unskilled people;
− Files that have to be presented to obtain support for actions have been simplified and counselling has been implemented to help people in the application process;
− Inhabitants have been encouraged to take part in decisions on the supported actions through participation in think tanks and “regiegroeps”, the latter being gatherings of inhabitants and professionals with equal right to speak and take decisions.

A first result of these efforts is visible in a higher quality of actions proposed by inhabitants - they are said to be more structured, to have greater scope and to be more general interest oriented.

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[^34]: Interview of Mr. Taoufik Ben Yahia, project assistant in Argan
Two conferences

In addition, two large conferences took place at the beginning of 2010 (February 15 and March 10) in order to define citizenship and to find ways of consolidating the diversity policy with regard to the concept of citizenship.

The introductory talk by Ms Andrée van Ees, town councilor on diversity and citizenship, underlined the parallel between diversity, participation and emancipation and defined the 2010-2014 action plan, with as the following main objectives:

- To strengthen social structures to encourage people to participate in public affairs;
- To fight the fact that tolerance becomes indifference and to work on common values;
- To reinforce the ties between the people and the town in order that people feel responsible for themselves and for the town.

The Municipality adopted the following method in order to fulfill these objectives:

- A partial retreat from, leaving more space to inhabitants’ initiatives likely to reinforce citizenship;
- An effort to enhance confidence among inhabitants, between neighbourhoods, and between inhabitants and civil servants or elected bodies.

The final word at this stage was that if change cannot be an obligation, nevertheless the Municipality wanted to underline its ambition.

The conferences went on by giving the floor to representatives of different groups including religious leaders, representatives of grassroots organizations, a football club of people of Moroccan origin, a research institute, an historian, etc. In all, eight neighbourhood actions were presented and discussed.

One key phrase from the debate was “to think global and to act local”, illustrated by the fact that all kinds of inhabitants (migrants included) strongly identify with Amsterdam and with their neighbourhood more than with the Netherlands, and at the same time felt related to what was going on worldwide.

One of the main concerns was said to be the need to re invent the Amsterdam society through the greater participation of social groups and direct contacts between institutions and inhabitants that have somehow been lost.

The Mayor of Amsterdam, Mr Van der Laan, praised the over arching mentality embodied in the respectfulness of each citizen’s rights in Amsterdam. In his view, facing an increase in socio economic differences, the municipal authorities have to work to grant security, benefits from the wealth of the city for all, and tolerance.

Other contributions stressed the need to find a new mindset grounded on respect, dialogue, and networks. Furthermore, one main conclusion again underlined the importance of processes over results.

35 Following the Statistical Bureau of Amsterdam, 90 per cent of foreigners and people of a foreign origin strongly identify with Amsterdam, more than with the Netherlands.
Lessons learned by the case study

Achievements

Empowerment

More people take part not only in actions but also in management of the District approach. And some groups are clearly engaged in actions that go beyond their own interest to reach a broader social concern.

Civil servants and politicians from diverse origins

More and more people from diverse origins run for elections not only as representatives of their community, but as citizens interested in the general affairs of the city. Their number is also growing in the management of public offices and organisations working with the Municipality.

Limits

The main limit is that, despite a theoretical discourse on citizenship, most actions are designed in relation to ethnic groups. It could be concluded from this that there exists a gap between theory and practice and is illustrated by the following example. On the one hand, it has been decided to stop translating official texts in foreign languages and to encourage all foreigners to learn Dutch, but on the other members of the Municipality staff consider important that employees of diverse origins be at the Town hall reception or in services helping old people at home so they can feel at ease. Each of these two decisions can be considered good for integration, but they come from different backgrounds and the fact that they happen simultaneously is a sign of some confusion, or at least difficulty, there is in adhering to one strategy.

Uncomfortable social and professional promotion

Civil servants and elected representatives of foreign origin are under strong pressure from both sides. Some youth from migrant families are propelled on the public scene by political parties without enough training and background and as a result are unable to withstand the pressures they have to face for very long.

Deep knowledge versus limited results of action

The municipality maintains very detailed statistics. For instance, a 200 hundred page monitoring document exists on the way of living for all ethnic groups in the city. From this it is possible to know, for example, the unemployment rate of each group and to act consequently. However, it may be relevant to question the use of such knowledge and its capacity to fight unemployment if nothing is said on specific factors causing the high rate of unemployment in each group.

Lower subsidies

As in other cities and countries, Amsterdam is facing a financial shortfall, coupled with State funding getting scarce. As a result, all improvements and innovations in public policies incur a risk of not being sufficiently funded. One of the interviewees in the City even suggested that maybe the concept of diversity and citizenship was just a way to lower or even stop financing ethnic groups.

Citizenship versus violence, discrimination and poverty

In some fields, Amsterdam has been so well ahead of other places that maybe a point has been reached where achievements are being questioned in a global context of increasing racism and xenophobia. Thus, Amsterdam Gay capital is the scene of violence against homosexuals.
Targeting citizenship does not erase ethnic references in every respect. Two examples can be given: first, although most attacks against homosexuals are perpetrated by Dutch people, young Moroccans are targeted as attackers. Second, when people there is no segregation in housing and that some neighbourhoods are mixed and others white only, they reflect a serious bias in their perception of what segregation is. One of the interviewees for this case study recognised that “youth unemployment is a very ethnic biased fact”.

On the whole, for the future and following Mr Cadat, three scenarios can be foreseen, according to the attitudes of the ethnic groups as follows:

− Corralling of ethnic groups each one in its own territory, be it physical or symbolic;
− Interest for other cultures, eventually encouraged by teachers and other educators;
− Cooperation among groups and individuals from different groups in launching actions in a shared citizenship approach.

4. Transferability of Amsterdam diversity policy

The challenge of handling differences while maintaining common goals and values in cities populated with a large variety of people coming from abroad and living alongside the native population is one of the most crucial. Combined with scarcity of resources, in the public as well as in the private spheres, this challenge is threatening social cohesion.

For a long time, the city of Amsterdam has been attempting to tackle this challenge and it has made significant progress but it seems to become more and more difficult to achieve positive outcomes. The choice of leaving the minorities approach to reach a citizenship perspective can be considered a sign of maturity in the diversity policy. However, such a policy is being launched in a context of growing xenophobia and fear of migrants all over Europe. As a result, it is in some ways hazardous to think of the transferability of Amsterdam’s experience here.

What can definitely be said is that developing such a policy requires much thinking and partnership. Several municipal departments and services have been working in their own fields as well as in collaboration to experiment with positive action. Nevertheless, at some point they had to realize that such action has its limits and possible counter effects. It could be regretted however, that actions and devices were not systematically evaluated in a qualitative way.

It appears to be difficult to implement a citizenship policy when all professional and political habits keep referring to ethnic groups and while, at the same time, city dwellers tend to act along ethnic lines. This is why the latest initiative of the town councilor on diversity and citizenship (e.g. the two conferences on citizenship gathering numerous Municipalities staff) is an important way of going forward.

In brief, a diversity policy needs to be grounded on deep thinking and on assessment of previous programmes, as well as on steady work with all population groups.

One main asset of Amsterdam is relying in a multilevel cooperation between services and, in neighbourhoods, between inhabitants, grassroots organizations, municipal staff and any other relevant local actors.

36 Interview Ms Suurmond
37 Interview Mr Cadat
Annex

1. What diversity is about

In the Netherlands, immigrants are mainly people coming from former colonies (Surinam, Antilles, Moluques in Indonesia) and from Southern countries and Eastern European countries. Those coming from Western and Northern countries are called expatriates, but many of them do not like this denomination which refers to the finance and business spheres where English speaking staff members spend some time in Amsterdam and then move on elsewhere.

Expatriates are people coming to work in the finance sector and other highly qualified jobs, mainly from western European countries or the United States. There are about 100,000 in Amsterdam.

Inhabitants whose mother or father (or both) were not born in the Netherlands used to be called allochtons. The term has been officially abandoned, since it had a discriminatory connotation. However, it did not disappear from the ordinary vocabulary. Another expression had the same fate: “black schools” is supposed to be replaced by “minority schools” and even the term “minority school” is in principle of limited use but is still frequently heard.  

Diversity refers not only to foreigners and ethnic minorities but to other underprivileged categories, e.g. women, homosexuals, handicapped and poor families.

2. Education and Citizenship

“The obliged citizenship programme is meant for anyone between 16 and 65 years old, who lives in one of the city districts of Amsterdam, who have a valid staying permit, who is not a citizen of the EU or Switzerland or a country with a treaty, who has been less than eight years in the Netherlands during the compulsory education age, and who is not in the Netherlands for a temporary reason such as study, temporary work, visit or medical treatment. When this type of person actually speaks Dutch well, he or she has to get through a test (NT2 test level 2). The unemployed in receipt of welfare benefit are obliged make every effort to reintegrate into the labour market and to follow a reintegration programme according to the law on welfare; if necessary they also have to follow a language or citizenship programme. A general problem is that immigrants who fail to get through the examination have to pay for the courses themselves. The chances that lower educated immigrants fail the examination is greater than for higher educated ones, even though they follow the specific course for lower educated people.

Specific for Amsterdam is:

- Both immigrants and Dutch without the sufficient level of language and citizenship knowledge have to take the courses. The target group of the citizenship policy is: all groups that cannot connect to society. The language policy, as formulated in the document ‘Nobody aside’ (‘Niemand aan de Kant’) is directed towards Dutch and ‘associate Dutch’ or in effect immigrant, so illiterate unemployed Dutch may also be obliged to take the course.

- The cost of the obligatory exam (€276) is refunded when people that come under the municipal regulation pass the exam. Over the past ten years, waiting lists for courses have been long, but this situation has recently improved because more course providers have been contracted. Providers have to present a detailed structure for their programmes. The municipality assesses them against

38 See more on “Black schools” in the next paragraph
39 This appendix is quoted from A. van Heelsum, ibid. p.29
quality criteria, which course providers are considered good and represent value for money and which get subsidised. Though the new institutions have been carefully chosen, it is not yet clear whether they can really organise the courses in a professional way; this will only become apparent after the evaluation of the new courses.

3. Amsterdam interviews, April 21 – 23, 2011

Laurent Chambon: Journalist, political studies and researcher with an experience of allochton local elected representative

Judith Suurmond: Manager of the Diversity and Citizenship Department, Amsterdam central municipality

Kirsten Simhoffer: Senior political advisor on Housing, Care and Living Together municipal policies, Amsterdam central municipality

Rob van Veelen: “Participatie makelaar”: participation developer in the eastern districts on behalf of the eastern municipality Amsterdam Oost

Ankie Verlaan: Chairwoman of the Advisory Council on Diversity and Integration for the city of Amsterdam, education specialist

Tanguy Le Breton: Representative of the union of French community in Amsterdam

Ewoud Butter: ONG policy manager of ACB, researcher, working on religious fundamentalism, blogger

Taoufik Ben Yahia: ONG Argan: project assistant

Simone Lamme: Senior policy advisor on participation for the Eastern Municipality

Lieke Thesing: Head of the Social policy for the Eastern Municipality

Brieux-Yves Cadat (by phone): Researcher and counselor in MOVISIE, National Institute for social work

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TRANSPORTATION AS PART OF URBAN COHESION POLICIES

THE CASE OF BARCELONA, SPAIN
1. **Presentation of the urban area and main actors**

**Urban Area**

- Municipality of Barcelona: 1.6 million population across 10 districts
- Barcelona metropolitan area: 3.2 million population across 36 municipalities
- Barcelona metropolitan region: 4.9 million population across 164 municipalities

**Main actors**

A complex system, with three levels of stakeholders:

1) Public administration managing infrastructures:
   - Government of Spain
   - Government of Catalonia

2) Public administration managing services:
   - Government of Catalonia: Suburban trains (RENFE, FGC), metro (FGC) and private bus concessions
   - EMT (Metropolitan Transport Entity):
     - Bus, metro, indirect bus management and taxi (TMB)
   - ATM (Metropolitan Transport Authority):
     - Tram (Tramvia Metropolità)

3) Transport operators:
   - RENFE: suburban trains
   - FGC: suburban trains and metro
   - TMB: bus, metro, indirect bus management and taxi
   - Tramvia Metropolità: tram
   - Private bus concessions

**Other key actors from civil society:**

- PTP (Association for the Promotion of Public Transport);
- *Federació de Veïns* (Neighbour’s Federation),
- *Amics de la Bici* (Friends of Cycling),
- ONCE (National Organization for the Visually-Impaired of Spain),
- RACC (Royal Automobile Club of Catalonia), etc.

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40 Map of the urban area in Annex I
41 List of interviewees in Annex II
42 Competencies over the Barcelona metropolitan area
43 Competencies over the Barcelona metropolitan region
2. How do local actors express the main challenge they are facing?

In a surface area of just 101 square kilometers, the city of Barcelona has a population of 1,638,000 (and 4,992,000 in its metropolitan region). Consequently, with 16,217 inhabitants per square kilometer, Barcelona is one of the most densely populated European cities and faces obvious mobility challenges. Therefore, it is essential to ‘democratize’ the streets and public space, promoting integrated strategies for clean and sustainable private and public urban transport.

However, Barcelona is a focus for travel and its associated mobility and environmental problems reach beyond the competences of the central city. But unlike in France, where there is a metropolitan entity with a remit to manage metropolitan finances, in Spain this issue has not been effectively resolved. Furthermore, the Spanish Government does not have a specific Ministry of Transport. Mobility affairs are divided between the Home Affairs Ministry (Ministerio del Interior) and the Ministry of Infrastructures (Ministerio de Fomento). Therefore, the multiplicity of stakeholders intervening in the design and financing of different mobility policies increases the difficulties of coordinated mobility plans and coherent urban cohesion policies over the entire metropolitan region.

Nevertheless, both the Mobility Services Department at the Barcelona City Council and the Metropolitan Transport Authority share similar views with regards to the main challenges affecting transportation and urban cohesion.

According to Mr. Àngel López, Director of Mobility Services at the Barcelona City Council, the municipality recognizes four main areas of challenge, around which it formulates all its sustained and sustainable mobility strategies:

- **Vital:**
  - road safety
- **Planet:**
  - sustainable modes of transport
  - CO₂ and NO₂ emissions
  - noise emissions
- **Social:**
  - equal opportunities
  - accessibility for everyone
  - access to public transportation
  - participation processes
- **Economic:**
  - efficiency
  - effectiveness
  - energy consumption

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44 Some key figures illustrate the complexity of its transportation implications: it has a road density of 6,000 cars per km² (whereas, for example, Madrid has 2,300 cars per km² and London 1,600 cars per km²). Barcelona is also the European city with most lanes of private traffic per km².
Similarly, Mr. Lluís Alegre, Director of Transportation Services at the Metropolitan Transport Authority, acknowledges that five key challenges drive all their actions at the metropolitan level:

- Road Safety
- Environmental concerns and sustainability
- Quality of Life
- Equality
- Efficient mobility

Successful management of urban transportation requires the city and its metropolitan region to coordinate transport and land-use planning, construction, and to rethink the use of public space, which must serve as a space for work and residence as well as a space for movement. Sustainable urban mobility means making the best use of all transport infrastructures, co-ordination between the various transportation modes and the promotion of the least polluting modes.45

In this context, the key strategic policy of the Barcelona metropolitan region is the commitment to establish the railway system (in all its forms: tram, metro, suburban trains, regional trains and long-distance high-speed trains) as the predominant, as well as the most efficient, clean and sustainable mode of transport.

The commitment to develop all railway infrastructures and networks was brought up in the first interview46 as the key strategy in the region’s mobility planning, primarily in terms of urban cohesion in its “territorial, spatial” sense. However, in relation to urban cohesion in its broader “social” sense, we consider this issue to be less relevant. More importantly, most interviewees perceived current investment standards as a long overdue response to the region’s mobility limitations and deficiencies in the sense of merely an effort to put Barcelona at the same level as other European cities, since its metropolitan railway infrastructures were severely lagging behind.47 Therefore, in the European context, we cannot consider this as a central and innovative experience to be analyzed in this study.

On the other hand, it is clear that during the last two decades the metropolitan region of Barcelona has regarded transport as part of its social cohesion policies. New projects have often been the result of integrated mobility strategies. Good practices have been aimed at guaranteeing the right to a sustained and sustainable mobility for all citizens.

Throughout this period, Barcelona has improved the accessibility, affordability and efficiency of the public transport network significantly and it has successfully promoted the use of cycling, walking and other alternative and sustainable forms of transportation. At the same time,

45 Other relevant but more specific challenges, as expressed by key local actors, are selected in Annex III.

46 Interview conducted with Mr. Joan Trullén, President of the Institute of Regional and Metropolitan Studies of Barcelona.

47 “Long-needed metro and train infrastructures are finally being built now,” argues Ms. Cristina Jiménez, Head of Mobility and Transportation Studies at Barcelona Regional – Metropolitan Agency of Urban Development and Infrastructures. Similar investment efforts were already evident in Madrid, for example, throughout the last decade. Highlights of the current undertaking of major railway infrastructures in the Barcelona metropolitan area are listed in Annex V.
participation processes have been successfully implemented, resulting in the emergence of social demands and greater cooperation among all stakeholders.

Therefore Barcelona’s main contributions to the European ‘Cities of tomorrow’ could be summarized in these three domains:

- Improvements in access, social inclusion and urban regeneration policies;
- A shift to a more sustainable mobility;
- Implementation of participation processes\(^\text{48}\).

These broad policies have enabled the introduction of a wide range of good practices in social and urban cohesion which will be reviewed in this case study. Several of these actions – notably improvements in access, pedestrianization, promotion of bicycle use and participation processes - constitute singular and innovative experiences at this scale in the European context.

Finally, the Barcelona public bicycle service (Bicing) will be analyzed as an example of a successful and sustainable mobility program which has been rapidly adopted by the targeted population.

3. **What are the main processes that are logically derived from the challenge?**

The Barcelona City Council maintains that mobility is a fundamental right of all citizens, as it is necessary for social interaction and for human relations. Furthermore, it is considered as the 4th pillar of the welfare state (along with housing, health, and education-culture). The perception is that a person who cannot have effective mobility loses a social right. Therefore the City recognizes the right of all citizens to sustained and sustainable mobility.\(^\text{49}\)

*Access Improvement, Social Inclusion and Urban Regeneration Policies*

**A. Access improvement**

Based on the fundamental right to mobility, a priority of the local mobility policies is to guarantee that any citizen can travel without difficulties along the public roadway and access the best possible means of transport to satisfy his or her mobility needs.\(^\text{50}\) It is estimated that access improvement directly benefits 30% of the population: in other words, not only people with reduced mobility (PRM) and the visually-impaired, but also the elderly, children, injured people, pregnant women, families with baby strollers, cyclists, etc.

\(^{48}\) Therefore, three of the four main objectives of the EC Cohesion Policy in its support to urban development (as cited in ACT’s technical proposal) have been successfully addressed in the Barcelona mobility experience, namely: promoting equality, social inclusion and urban regeneration; protecting and improving urban environment in order to ensure a sustainable development at local and global levels; contributing to good governance and to reinforcing local power.

\(^{49}\) The origin of the local concepts of social cohesion and sustainable mobility, according to Mr. Francesc Magrinyà, Professor of the Department of Urban Planning and Transportation at Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya (UPC) and Head of the Urban Services Department at the Human Development and Cooperation Research Group, are developed in Annex IV.

\(^{50}\) “Associations of people with reduced mobility, of the visually-impaired, etc. have a voice in different committees in the participation processes with public administrations and transport operators. In some cases,” argues Mr. Ricard Riol, President of the Association for the Promotion of Public Transport, “it would be more cost-effective to arrange taxis or special transports, but the social demand prioritizes equality and autonomy.”
The wide range of measures implemented over the past years in access improvement “are very costly, and few cities have the same ambitious objectives regarding this issue,” argues Mr. Àngel López (Barcelona City Council).

1) **Roadside Accessibility:**

   - 98% of street crossings have ramps for people with reduced mobility and others (access provisions pending in less than 30 km. out of a total of 1,300 street km.)
   - 142 reformed streets, substituting stairs with elevators and escalators in the period 2008-2011
   - An objective to adapt all crossroads with traffic lights for the visually-impaired (26% completed in 2009)
   - 100 km. of mountain streets are now accessible

2) **Accessibility in Public Transport:**

   - 74% of metro stations are accessible (all the existing non-connecting stations are already adapted and all new stations are access adapted). First “classic metro” (dating from 1924) with the impending objective to be 100% access adapted.
   - 95% adapted FGC suburban train stations
   - 100% adapted TMB buses (with street-level platform)

3) **Accessibility in Private Transport:**

   - Over 100% increase in roadside reserved parking spaces for people with reduced mobility (from 2,301 reserved parking spaces in the City in 2005 to 4,738 reserved parking spaces in 2009). PRM can park free of charge in the city in front of their home, workplace and public facilities.

B. **Social Inclusion**

   - Introduction of the Metropolitan Area Social Fare System: *Targeta Rosa metropolitana* (free public transport for the disabled and elderly with limited economic resources); *Carnet Rosa metropolitàn de tarifa reduïda* (50% reduction in public transport for the disabled and elderly with limited economic resources); *Passi Metropolità d’Acompanyant* (free public transport for the person travelling with a dependent citizen); *T-12* (free public transport for children under-12).

C. **Urban Regeneration**

Policies and actions have been implemented to balance the territory, fight urban sprawl and enforce urban cohesion, connecting neighbourhoods and metropolitan areas not previously

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51 In the city of Barcelona
52 In the metropolitan area
53 In the city of Barcelona
54 A brief background of the main strategies and policies followed in the metropolitan region in the field of urban cohesion and regeneration is included in Annex V.
linked or serviced by public transport (including many under-privileged neighbourhoods and mountain zones with difficult topography).55

- In order to promote the social right to an effective mobility with the best available transportation mode, the City of Barcelona guarantees a public transport station within 200m. All Barcelona neighbourhoods have been effectively connected (clearly a loss-making policy, but one aimed at social cohesion).
- Efforts have been made to link the different transportation modes (intermodal transport systems and their interoperability), which lagged behind due to poor investment in infrastructures and the absence of an “intermodal culture.”
- The establishment of a Metropolitan Integrated Fare System has successfully linked all Barcelona districts and all transport modes, except Aerobus (bus to airport) and Telefèric (cable car). It is today the most complete public transport fare integration in Spain, reaching out to 240 municipalities and encompassing an area greater than the metropolitan region, for a total potential population of 5.5 million. This process, which started in the late 1990’s, dramatically increased the demand for public transport.
- The introduction of el Bus del Barri (“the neighbourhood bus”) and the Bus Nocturn (“night bus”) have been favourably adopted by the targeted population. “The neighbourhood bus,” a smaller vehicle covering many stops in only one neighbourhood, is very accessible. Its revenues are under 30% of its cost, its objective being fundamentally a social transport mainly for the elderly, families with children, young students, etc. The “Night Bus” operates 17 lines reaching out to 18 metropolitan municipalities, running every 20 minutes, 365 days per year.

Shift to a More Sustainable Mobility

A. The Promotion of ‘Soft’ Modes of Transport

The Barcelona City Council and other administrations in the metropolitan region have been committed in the last decade to a more sustainable mobility within everyone’s reach, with less energy consumption and less polluting emissions. The implementation of a network of cycling, walking and public transport routes “has increased the value and the quality of public urban space (where social relations can emerge and grow), challenging the traditionally physical conception of the local urban planning,” according to Mr. Francesc Magrinyà, University Professor at the Department of Urban Planning and Transportation (Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya, UPC) and Head of the Urban Services Department at the Human Development and Cooperation Research Group.

Energy consumption and pollution in Barcelona are largely linked to trips leaving and entering the city (since 43% of them are done in private vehicle, whereas only 19% of all internal city trips in Barcelona involve private transport). Therefore, it has proved essential to implement integrated mobility policies at the metropolitan level, and not merely local transportation plans.

55 According to Mr. Àngel López (Barcelona City Council), “when a new metro station connecting a suburban town or a peripheral under-privileged neighbourhood to the centre of Barcelona is inaugurated, the citizen feels he is now really part of the city (‘I’m in Barcelona’). That metro tunnel acts as an umbilical cord with the city centre; through achieving a large capacity it guarantees social equity, as it is the same tunnel used by all other citizens. This ‘feeling of belonging,’ of being an effective part of the city – just as another more privileged or centrally situated citizen- does not occur with private vehicle transport.”
Promoting sustainable development and mobility implies giving priority to pedestrians, next to cyclists, then to public transport and lastly to motorcycle and car users. This pre-established order of best to worse prioritizes the “soft” modes of transport:

1) **Pedestrians:**
   - Regulated access and pedestrianisation of sensitive zones. Examples of pilot interventions are found in the neighbourhoods of Gràcia and Poblenou and in the municipality of El Prat de Llobregat (all three underwent civic participation processes).
   - The predominant mode of transport within the city is walking (46% of all internal trips)

2) **Cyclists:**
   - Construction of 200 km. of bicycle lanes (from 110 km. in the year 2000)
   - The implementation, improvement and consolidation of *Bicing*, the second largest system of public bicycle service in Europe

3) **Public Transport:**
   - Public transport is considered an *inferior economy*. It generates social benefits for everyone (not only its users), but it cannot generate enough revenues to finance itself. In Catalonia, public transport users cover 40% of its total cost whereas financial transfers from Spanish and Catalan governments cover the rest (60%).
   - In 2009, 35% of the recorded stages of internal city trips and 48% of the connecting trips entering or leaving the city were done by public transport.
   - The tram was re-introduced as a means of public transport by the Metropolitan Transport Authority operator *Tramvia Metropolità* with 2 new lines (*Trambaix* and *Trambesòs*).

4) **Private or shared vehicle:**
   a) **Motorcycles:**
      - 30% of the vehicles in the city are motorcycles and mopeds, which helps reduce internal traffic (a total of 290,000 vehicles);
      - The local Strategic Plan for Motorcycles has included social participation and working groups to promote its access. It has promoted, among others, the following good practices:
        - The Motorcycle Overtaking Area system (ZAM), a space reserved for motorcycles at the head of traffic light-controlled crossroads, an innovative initiative started in Barcelona.
        - Implementation of specific roadside motorcycle parking zones (for a total of 64,000 motorcycles in 2009, up from 8,000 in 2000)

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56 In Barcelona, 65% of street surface is devoted to pedestrians and there are a total of 72 hectares of pedestrian zones.

57 The new tram service reached 50 km. of length and had 24 million users in 2009, just 3 years after its construction.

58 This measure improves safety for drivers and pedestrians. Its purpose is to avoid dangerous maneuvers as motorcycles overtake cars at traffic light-controlled crossroads just as the lights turn green. Its implementation has produced satisfactory results in reducing accident rates and has generated widespread approval by both motorcyclists and car drivers.
b) Cars:
- The general assumption among local mobility experts and decision-makers is that cars in urban areas do not guarantee social cohesion equity. They are perceived as a private solution in the absence of a public solution.
- The implementation of Àrea Verda as a reference for other Spanish and European urban mobility strategies. The Barcelona counter model to the ‘urban toll’, Àrea Verda is a traffic management mechanism that regulates the price of private vehicle demand for roadside parking.\(^5^9\)

B. Encouragement of Alternative Transport Fuels and Energy Efficient Vehicles
- The use of alternative fuel with greater energy efficiency on the fleet of buses and underground train units contributed to a 30% reduction in CO\(_2\) local emissions in 2009.
- TMB, the metropolitan transport operator, developed in 2010 the mixed electric-diesel technology for buses. Soon 50% of the total fleet of metropolitan buses will be powered with natural gas, and mixed electric-natural gas buses will start service this year.\(^6^0\)
- The development of electrical vehicles is a strategic urban phenomenon from an environmental, economic and mobility perspective. Barcelona coordinates all the private and public initiatives through the LIVE Office, with the aim of being a point of reference for electrical mobility.\(^6^1\)

The Implementation of Participation Processes

It is impossible to understand the urban transformation of Barcelona without taking into account the role of the associative movements during the 1970s.\(^6^2\) These associations were made up of technicians, some of who succeeded in being elected or in becoming city councilors who brought with them an on-the-field understanding of the city’s problems and a consciousness of the necessity of implementing civic participation processes.

Since then, mechanisms have progressively been put into place for different social needs to emerge in the development of sustainable mobility processes:
- The City Council Mobility Pact (1998) has reinforced the channels of participation and research into new methods and instruments of democratic innovation. It has evolved in accordance with the new challenges generated by the city. Through its institutional

\(^{59}\) Other specific good practices in public and private transport are detailed in Annex VI

\(^{60}\) It would be difficult to implement 100% electric buses in Barcelona, as the city has many steep streets

\(^{61}\) Traffic density in the city, the existence of a municipal network of car parks, a highly integrated management of road space and the desire to promote renewable energies, has made Barcelona a city committed to the implementation of electrical vehicles. The Spanish government chose the Catalán city (along with Madrid and Seville) to work through the MOVELE Plan, designed to create a safe and effective network of recharging points, guaranteeing the infrastructure needed for its implementation. Furthermore, the City Council, the Government of Catalonia and the energy operator company Endesa signed an agreement to promote the development of electric vehicles in the city, forming the LIVE Office (Logistics for the Implementation of Electrical Vehicles). This new office is commissioned with developing the MOVELE Plan to create a minimum of 191 charging points in 2011 for electrical vehicles in the city, as well as with coordinating the general road map with regards to the movement of these vehicles. Finally, fiscal ordinances offer electrical vehicles a 75% discount in vehicle excise duty and exemption of the payment of Àrea Verda rates.

\(^{62}\) “Sustainable Cities in Europe”, article on Premier Plan Feature, nº 15, by Francesc Magrinyà (UPC University Professor).
bodies, plenary sessions and working groups, the Pact has developed its actions and has given voice to the contributions of its members in the following ways:

- Several actions included in the Mobility Pact: plenary and information sessions; working days (for example, the Diagonal Street participation process); 7th cycle of conferences (on electric vehicles); 9th Mobility Pact Awards, etc.
- Other training and dissemination activities: 16th Barcelona Road Safety Forum; Week of Sustainable and Safe Mobility; 14th Awards on Road Safety, etc.

- The Mobility Master Plan (2008), approved by the Metropolitan Transport Authority (ATM), joins stakeholders and social organizations around the table to launch a participatory process with municipalities, other regional institutions and public in general.
  - Several actions included in the Mobility Master Plan: The Council of Mobility; County Councils; technical groups; participative sessions open to citizens; Web forums, chats and Facebook; the MMP electronic magazine, etc.

4. The promotion of bicycle use and the Bicing public bicycle service: an example of a successful and sustainable mobility program rapidly adopted by the targeted population

The Barcelona City Council has shown a determined commitment to promote bicycle use as a sustainable, affordable, efficient and healthier mode of transport. It has heavily invested in infrastructure and services and it has raised public awareness campaigns to change a previously reticent ‘bicycle culture’.\(^\text{63}\)

The existence of a cycle lane network provided a basis for the introduction of a public bicycle system in 2007. This, in turn, triggered the growth of bicycle lane provision: an increase of 100% in the last decade, totaling 200 km.\(^\text{64}\)

Today the Bicing public bicycle system has been consolidated as another form of public transport in the city:

- Inaugurated in March, 2007, with 200 bikes and 14 stations, the service has been progressively enlarged. In 2009, the system expanded to all city districts (with 6,000 available bicycles and 419 stations) and its demand reached 11 million trips. Since then, periodical improvements have been made on stations, bicycles, customer service (helpline, in person and written), website and mobile phone consultations. Whereas the

\(^{63}\) “There has been a change in public perception,” says Mr. Ricard Riol (Association for the Promotion of Public Transport). “First public bicycle lanes were seen as a loss of public space. Now the role of bicycles in Barcelona is not questioned and it is the fastest-growing mode of transport in the city.” Municipal statistics record a revealing 102,824 daily bicycle trips in 2009, compared to just 33,182 daily bicycle trips in 2004. In order to manage this growth, a Municipal Bicycle Office was set up in 2009 to promote and regulate bicycle use in the city.

\(^{64}\) Out of a total of 1,300 km. of street length in Barcelona
network has stabilized its supply figures, demand has continued to increase and Bicing is today the second largest bike sharing scheme in Europe, totaling 50,000 rentals per day.65

- Even though a few smaller public bicycle systems have been previously developed in Europe (such as those in Lyon, Vienna or Stockholm), the inauguration of Bicing in Barcelona and Vélib’ in Paris (two months later) in 2007 resulted in wide-spread international media coverage about bike sharing. The term ‘Velorution’ was used to describe the success of these systems.

- The 2008 Municipal Service Survey gave Bicing a score of 6.84 out of 10 points, the most positive score for one of the many public services provided by the City Council.

- The service has an annual budget of 18€ million and is financed by user subscriptions and public funds coming from Área Verda revenues (the Barcelona road-side parking mechanism). This sends a significant pedagogical message in sustainable urban transport.66

- The system is managed by the municipal company Barcelona Serveis Municipals (BSM), which granted the right to run Bicing to the American company Clear Channel in November 2006 for a 10-year period until 2017. The close collaboration between the two organizations has resulted in a significant improvement of the original model imported from the city of Oslo.

- Recent efforts to fight against acts of vandalism - the system’s main problem during these first years - have been significantly successful through a wide range of actions, such as: improvements on bike security, reinforcement of the stations and new bicycle racks to prevent theft.

- Its 115,000 users pay an annual subscription fee of 35 €. During the first 30 minutes, the service is free of charge. After that, each 30-minute fraction costs 0.60 €, and there is a maximum time allowed of 2 hours. The system is available 365 days a year, from 5:00 am to midnight Sunday to Thursday, and 24 hours on Saturday and Sunday.

5. **Main tools and methods used**

*Key Legal Framework*

  - Obligations for mobility plan designs

- Sustainable Mobility Law (Parliament of Catalonia, 2003)
  - Requires the establishment of five itinerary networks: pedestrian, bicycle, public transport, car and freight
  - Encourages modes of transport favourable to social cohesion

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65 Twice as many as *Barclay’s cycle hire* in London, with 25,000 rentals per day. *Vélib’* in Paris is the largest system in Europe with 120,000 rentals per day. Incidentally, these three largest bicycle sharing schemes in Europe are used for trips equivalent to going around the world ten times each day (assumption: average distance per bike trip, 2 km.).

66 Other new European public bicycle systems, such as the *Barclay’s cycle hire* in London, are financed by commercial sponsorship and advertisements in order to limit or eliminate public financing.
Requires civil participation processes

  - Relates for the first time accessibility and social cohesion elements
  - Accessibility decree obliges the construction of ramps, elevators, etc.
- National Mobility Directives (Parliament of Catalonia, 2006)
  - Guideline framework for the Metropolitan Mobility Master Plan

This increasing body of legislation at the Catalan level has led to a strategic and integrative approach to urban metropolitan planning. According to Ms. Lydie Laigle, Head at the Laboratoire MUST, in this case “the complementarity of the tools and the approaches of public policy has allowed them to process the relationship between ‘urban planning and transport’ at the different levels.”

Legislative measures approved during the last decade by the Government of Catalonia have provided the guidelines for sustainable municipal transport policies in the metropolitan area, such as: the introduction of the energy dimension in public transport; the attractiveness of urban centres in mid-size towns has been improved by their interconnection to the transport network; the promotion of a modal transfer from private vehicles to public transport (through integrated fare systems, local taxes, road tolls, etc.); the mobility generated by any urban planning project is now taken into account.

**Key Regional, Metropolitan and City Mobility Plans**

- Barcelona Mobility Pact (City Council, 1998)
- Strategic Bicycle Plan (City Council, 2006)
- Metropolitan Mobility Master Plan (Metropolitan Transport Authority, 2008)
- Metropolitan Territorial Plan of Barcelona (Government of Catalonia, 2010)

Different mobility management plans promoted by the Government of Catalonia oblige the following organizations to have a mobility plan:

- Companies and other work places of more than 500 employees
- Hospitals, universities and other learning and medical centres with more than 1,000 people

- The Gesmopoli project, a joint initiative led by public administrations, labour unions and non-governmental civic organizations, promoted comprehensive and sustainable mobility management in six main industrial areas. Initial actions focused on establishing the necessary contacts and infrastructure to work in cooperation with all stakeholders on the industrial zones and on drawing up sustainable mobility plans. Later on, based on these plans, mobility pacts were established with the aim of introducing comprehensive improvements. Finally, the following specific actions for mobility management were put into place: introducing and training mobility managers at each industrial area; awareness-raising actions aimed at entrepreneurs and workers; sustainable pilot mobility

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schemes at each industrial zone. The Gesmopoli project was nominated in the 2008 Sustainable Energy Europe Awards and has later had a significant impact on other metropolitan industrial areas.\(^{68}\)

**Financing**

**A. National Financing**

The multiplicity of actors involved and the absence of a Spanish law of public transport financing have proved to be a problem. So is the lack of a metropolitan administration with finance competencies. Financing for different transport activities comes from different administrations (municipalities, the Catalan government and the Spanish government).

**B. European Funds:**

The following investments in metro infrastructure were financed by ERDF funds during the period 2000-2006 (with payments before 31/12/2008):

- Metro line n°2 (extension Pep Ventura-Badalona Centre); metro line n°3 (extension Canyelles-Trinitat Nova); metro line n°5 (extension Horta-Vall d’Hebron)

The following infrastructures, which are included in the 2007-2013 Metropolitan Mobility Plan, count with ERDF financing.\(^{69}\)

- A specific lane for public transport and high-occupation vehicles in highway C-58 (in construction); Volpalleres station (completed); El Prat de Llobregat intermodal station (in tender process); and Gràcia station in Barcelona (in construction).

**External Projection**

Intense promotion abroad has been required to put Barcelona’s urban mobility and safety policies on the European map, and to share experiences with other trend-setting metropolitan regions.\(^{70}\) Barcelona actively participates in the main mobility management organizations throughout Europe:

- POLIS network, which groups over 60 cities and regional members, was chaired by the City of Barcelona until 2010, and it has proved to be the main instrument to voice local transport concerns in the European arena on a wide range of different issues:
  - Road safety; the Urban Transport Action Plan (2007); the Conference on new technologies applied to traffic management (2009), etc.

- Other European organizations where the city and the metropolitan area of Barcelona are actively involved: Impacts Network\(^{71}\) (where Barcelona presented the implementation of

\(^{68}\) “In many cases,” states Mr. Francesc Magrinyà (UPC University Professor), “if you didn’t have a car (and 40% of the population does not have a driver’s license), you couldn’t get to work.”

\(^{69}\) According to Mr. Lluís Alegre (Metropolitan Transport Authority)

\(^{70}\) “We feel distant from the EC,” says Mr. Àngel López (Barcelona City Council). “Cities are not listened enough. An example: in the preparatory sessions for the EC Road Safety Program, the word ‘street’ was not pronounced once. There is a lack of an urban focus. We are also concerned for injured people on urban streets, not only for deaths on roads”

\(^{71}\) [http://www.impacts.org/](http://www.impacts.org/)
the Bicing project); EC Road Safety Program\(^2\) (Barcelona takes part in the preparation of the 2010-2011 programme); OBIS Project\(^3\) (the Optimising Bike Sharing in European Cities project promotes cycling as an attractive and effective mode of sustainable daily transport); E-SUM \(^4\) (which promotes safe driving of motorcycles and mopeds. Barcelona has been the coordinator of the project, presenting its motorcycle overtaking area system, known as ZAM); SUGAR\(^6\) (efficient urban loading and unloading management project, where Barcelona has presented innovative policies, such as its night time loading and unloading plan); EVA\(^7\) (Electric Vehicle for Advanced cities. Barcelona has been a candidate for the EVA European Cities Consortium).\(^8\)

6. **The main lessons learned out of the process**

- Urban mobility raises transversal challenges that require the development of transversal processes and the implementation of transversal policies, which must take into account:
  - Accessibility, social inclusion, urban cohesion, environmental issues and participation processes
  
- All actors and stakeholders must assume transportation and urban cohesion as an integrated issue, relating physical and social instruments.\(^9\)
  - Urban planning, infrastructures, services and mobility management

- Mobility management requires an integrated planning process which must consider:
  - Freight and people transport, all networks, and all transport modes

- Participation processes are essential for the emergence of social demands and necessities,\(^10\) and must include all actors and stakeholders:

\(^2\) [http://www.project-asset.com/data/p_003_ec_road_safety_initiatives.pdf](http://www.project-asset.com/data/p_003_ec_road_safety_initiatives.pdf)

\(^3\) [http://www.obisproject.com/](http://www.obisproject.com/)

\(^4\) The municipality of Barcelona participates in this international network along with Lyon, Berlin, London and other European cities, universities and organizations to identify and exchange projects and good practices. Their goal is to provide recommendations for relevant stakeholders and implement efficient bike sharing schemes all over Europe. The central result of the project— the OBIS manual of best practice— will be presented and shared at the OBIS final conference in Prague, on June 21\(^{st}\), 2011.

\(^5\) [http://www.esum.org/](http://www.esum.org/)

\(^6\) [http://www.sugarlogistics.eu/](http://www.sugarlogistics.eu/)

\(^7\) [http://www.polis-online.org/](http://www.polis-online.org/)

\(^8\) TMB metropolitan transport operator also participates in numerous benchmarking projects with other European and world public transport operators

\(^9\) According to Mr. Lluís Alegre (Metropolitan Transport Authority), “this perception must be shared by all parties, and a consensus on this issue is necessary in the elaboration process of mobility plans (such as the metropolitan Master Mobility Plan). Only then, each stakeholder will consider it as its own plan and joint follow-up mechanisms will be able to be effectively implemented.”

\(^10\) “The participation process is very rewarding. When citizens and civic organizations are informed and consulted, there are great leaps forward,” argues Mr. Àngel López (City Council). He mentions the Barcelona Mobility Pact as an example. “When citizens understand the situation and the associated problems, they understand the solutions. Inversely, sometimes solutions proposed by public administrations which are too technical address a problem that
Public administrations, private actors, non-governmental organizations, civic groups and citizens

- It is essential to underline the benefits of European funds and cooperation in order to undertake innovative mobility infrastructures and management:

- Cooperation is enhanced by active participation in European mobility networks and organizations

Main difficulties met along the process

- The absence of a Spanish mobility law:

  - The current applicable law at the Spanish level is the Motor Vehicle Traffic and Road Safety Law (Parliament of Spain, 1990), which has been recently modified in 2011, but does not reflect sustainable mobility necessities.

- The absence of a Spanish law of public transport financing:

  - There is an urgent need for a law that regulates public transport financing and determines the percentage paid each by the Catalan and the Spanish governments. Upto now, 3-year agreements are periodically negotiated between the two administrations, which results in periodical financial disputes.

- The general fiscal framework in Spain for public transport:

  - The general fiscal framework in Spain for urban public transport is partly collected through a housing unit municipal tax (IBI), which is widely perceived as an unfair system.

  - There is a need to articulate mechanisms for fiscal reduction in vehicle registration which are more suited to urban environmental needs, since the current fiscal framework is based only on CO₂ emissions and not on NO₂ emissions.

What are the main weaknesses and contradictions in local policies and practices in front of the challenge?

- Multiple and contradictory competencies among the different actors:

  - The Metropolitan Transport Authority, for example, does not have competencies over private transport and parking

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81 According to Mr. Àngel López (City Council), “Barcelona is often obliged to go beyond the current Spanish legislation, in order to protect the most vulnerable modes of mobility.”

82 “There have been non-payment situations by the Spanish government in the past, in legislative terms marked by political disputes between the Spanish and the Catalan government,” states Mr. Ricard Riol (Association for the Promotion of Public Transport).

83 According to Mr. Àngel López (City Council), a system like the French versement transport (VT), based on personal income tax, would be more just.
There is not a metropolitan entity with competencies to manage metropolitan finances

The transfer of management competencies over suburban and regional railway lines to the Government of Catalonia has now been resolved. However, the Catalan government cannot decide over railway infrastructures (an exclusive competency of The Ministry of Infrastructures of the Spanish government). Complexity here arises as interaction between infrastructures and service is essential, since the needed railway energy is provided by its infrastructure.

- It is difficult to generate political consensus for local and metropolitan mobility policies. Infrastructures and mobility plans are often the object of local political controversy (widely exposed in the media), which does not necessarily conform to technical criteria and does not facilitate the implementation of mid and long-term programmes that go beyond 4-year terms.

- There are redundancies in the public transport service. Different public administrations own different public transport operators, and service is, in some instances, duplicated. For example, new tram lines have not resulted in the elimination of existing duplicate bus lines.

- The Association for the Promotion of Public Transport (PTP) has a necessarily critical position on several of the good public practices developed in this case study. Nevertheless, PTP views are quite relevant, as it is a highly reputed local civic organization. Some of their critical arguments are highlighted as follows:

The Sustainable Mobility Law does not provide for a council of users and beneficiaries; the Barcelona Mobility Pact lacks transparency by the City Council, and does not offer NGOs and citizens the capacity to reform this process; there has been investment mainly for large transportation infrastructures, but not enough attention has been devoted to light infrastructures; there has not been enough global planning for surface, street-level transport; local public administrations have not historically managed public transport plans in an integrated, gradual and efficient way (too often work has been concentrated in planning infrastructural needs around large international events taking place in

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84 According to Spanish Law, the Government of Spain has exclusive competencies over railway and road transport which travels over more than one Spanish region (Comunidad Autónoma). Article 149 of the Spanish Constitution also grants the Spanish government exclusive competencies over public works of general interest. However, regional governments can have management competencies over suburban and regional railway lines and regional roads that do not extend beyond their internal borders. Under this legal framework, the Catalan Constitution (Estatut d’Autonomia de Catalunya) awards exclusive competencies to the Catalan government for all trains with lines that travel only in Catalonia, regardless of who owns the railway infrastructure (Article 169). Under these provisions, even though railway infrastructure in Catalonia is still owned by the Spanish government, the transfer of management competencies over regional and suburban railway lines to the Government of Catalonia took place in 2010.

85 Some recent examples of this phenomenon are: a mobility plan for Diagonal Street; the new high-speed train tunnel under the city; an 80 Km/h. speed limit in all road accesses to the city of Barcelona; the construction of a metro line to the airport of Barcelona; a reduction of public transport fares to reduce energy consumption, etc.

86 See Chapter 1 of this case study

87 “It is difficult to eliminate bus lines,” argues Mr. Josep Mensión, Director of Central Services and Deputy Director General of the Barcelona Metropolitan Transport operator (TMB). “Users would complain as there is not yet a strong local intermodal culture. It is growing, but it needs time.”
the City, such as the Summer Olympic Games in 1992, or the Forum of Cultures in 2004); the Ministry of Infrastructures has not been effectively concerned by metropolitan transport (the recent inauguration of the Barcelona airport new Terminal 1 without a servicing metro or train line is, according to their view, a demonstration of this failure).

Main perspectives, possible follow-ups of the stakeholders’ actions

- The current financial crisis, which is still severely affecting the Spanish economy, means that some planned transport infrastructures might not be entirely completed in the following years. The next metropolitan Mobility Master Plan in 2012 “will manage demand but will not be able to provide supply tools until 2013-2014, due to the financial crisis,” explains Mr. Lluís Alegre (Metropolitan Transport Authority).

  - For instance, several new stations planned for metro line nº 9 might not be constructed, and a much needed orbital beltway network around the metropolitan region (connecting the following cities: Mataró-Granollers-Sabadell-Terrassa-Abrera-Vilafranca-Vilanova and included in the Suburban Plan for 2016), might not be completed until 2030.

- A new government has been in office in Catalonia since December 2010, and municipal elections will be held in May 2011. These political changes might also affect previously approved mobility policies in the City and in its metropolitan region.

- There is a pressing challenge to consolidate sustainable street-level transport (in a public space with high demand) with priority for pedestrians, bikes, trams and clean buses. “An open and participative reflection process is needed to negotiate how public space and time is distributed,” states Ms. Cristina Jiménez, Head of Mobility and Transportation Studies at Barcelona Regional – Metropolitan Agency of Urban Development and Infrastructures.

- Intermodality is still difficult to achieve. Intermodal transport systems and their interoperability in the metropolitan region need to be improved:

  - “Intermodal connecting stations are still not designed to minimize time,” argues Ms. Cristina Jiménez (Barcelona Regional). “Nineteen new connecting stations will need to be reformed in the near future.”

  - There is no contact public transportation card yet (such as Oyster card in London). It is still being designed and it needs a complete change in the validation and selling system that must be coordinated among the different operators and transport modes. It will be an advanced card, which will contain information beyond public transport (such as information about traffic lights,

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88 According to Mr. Joan Trullén (Institute of Regional and Metropolitan Studies of Barcelona)

89 Along these lines, Mr. Àngel López (City Council) argues that “Àrea Verda (the Barcelona road-side parking mechanism) is very cheap. It is difficult to make pedagogic consciousness campaigns to stress that occupation of public space is an expensive good that everyone wants. The price of public space should be in relation with the mobility policy the City wants to do. That is, if you have 600,000 city vehicles, plus 600,000 vehicles from the metropolitan area coming into the city, they cannot all have roadside parking.” Similarly, Mr. Ricard Riol (Association for the Promotion of Public Transport) defends: “There is not space for everyone to park in the city; therefore, road-side parking is a choice, not a right.”
bicycle parking, etc.) but will not be in place until 2 or 3 years from now.\textsuperscript{90}

- A new concept of resilience is emerging in sustainable mobility policies. According to Mr. Francesc Magrinyà (UPC University Professor), “in 10 years, oil will be very expensive. Therefore we must be more autonomous, more creative. The future oil crisis could enforce social cohesion, as more social actions will be needed. From the technological perspective it is all clear now. We just need to lead in transversal initiatives and experiences regarding future mobility.”\textsuperscript{91} The Metropolitan Transport Authority and the transport operators interviewed for this case study also pledge their commitment to adapt to these energy changes (in sum, to be less dependent on oil and cause less health hazards).

- A new gigantic Mobility Museum (\textit{Museu de la Mobilitat}) designed by the American architect Frank Gehry has been projected in the future Sagrera central railway station. While it is of relative importance to the core objective of this case study, it is a demonstration of the significance the City Council places on the future of sustainable mobility.

7. Transferability of the experience. Are these policies and practices replicable in other places? On which conditions would it be possible?

- Key legal framework with specific legislation (such as the Sustainable Mobility Law (Parliament of Catalonia, 2003) and the Neighborhood Law (Parliament of Catalonia, 2004) is essential in order to have the capacity to develop and implement good practices and policies. The right legislation can anticipate the system’s needs.

- A metropolitan plan of integrated mobility such as the metropolitan Mobility Master Plan (Metropolitan Transport Authority, 2008) is necessary to establish coherent and coordinated policies over the entire region. However, many metropolitan regions in the European Union still only have segregated transport plans. The Barcelona Metropolitan Transport Authority shares its master plan and its good practices in the European Metropolitan Transport Authorities association (EMTA) and in other European forums and sessions.

- Some of the most innovative actions arise when participation processes such as the Barcelona Mobility Pact (City Council, 1998) are implemented. Interested and organized citizens must interact with experts and public representatives from city and metropolitan administrations in reflection and action processes. These local bottom-up methods have been closely followed by cities in new member states, where the legacy of socialist-communist regimes in central and Eastern Europe took citizens away from participative processes.

- Several of the good practices detailed in this case study have been studied by other European Union cities, for example:

\textsuperscript{90} According to Mr. Josep Mensión (Barcelona Metropolitan Transport operator TMB)

\textsuperscript{91} A good example is the RetBus plan, a new bus network for the City designed in terms of efficiency (jointly developed with UPC University). Barcelona will be divided in vertical and horizontal axis, where new bus lines will have a frequency of 3 minutes. This will increase capacity by 30%, with an average speed of 15km/h (today the current bus network has a frequency of 7 to 19 minutes and its average speed is 11km/h). “Its implementation,” admits Mr. Francesc Magrinyà (UPC University Professor) “could initially be politically difficult, as changes and necessary elimination of some current lines could be criticized by users.”
The Bicing public bicycle service engages interest in many European cities. Its system, originally imported from Oslo, has already been ameliorated three times since its implementation in 1997.

In the areas of regulated access, pedestrianization of the city’s sensitive zones and creation of quality public spaces, Barcelona has been a model imitated by several European cities, notably by those sharing its compactness and density.

Traffic management mechanisms: Àrea Verda has received interest from several Italian and Portuguese cities, as an innovative tool applied with existing technologies in a new manner; the Motorcycle Overtaking Area system (ZAM) has had much publicity abroad in European mobility management organizations;\(^\text{92}\) the innovative action of introducing and training mobility managers in key industrial areas of the Barcelona metropolitan region (under the framework of the successful Gesmopoli project) has been considered for replication in similar European zones.

\(^{92}\) According to Mr. Ángel López (City Council)
Annex

1. Map of the Barcelona Metropolitan Region
2. List of Interviewees

- Mr. Àngel López Rodríguez, Director Serveis Mobilitat, Ajuntament de Barcelona
  Director of Mobility Services, Barcelona City Council

- Mr. Xavier Patón, Director de Participació i Comunicació sector Urbanisme, Ajuntament de Barcelona
  Director of Participation and Communication, City Planning sector, Barcelona City Council

- Mr. Lluís Alegre, Cap de Serveis de Mobilitat, Autoritat del Transport Metropolità (ATM)
  Director of Transportation Services, Metropolitan Transport Authority

- Ms. M.a. Teresa Carrillo i Palacín, Directora de Serveis de Transports, Entitat Metropolitana del Transport (EMT)
  Director of Transportation Services, Metropolitan Public Institution of Transportation

- Mr. Josep Mensión, Director Serveis Centrals i Adjunt a Direcció General, Transports Metropolitans de Barcelona (TMB)
  Director of Central Services and Deputy Director General, Barcelona Metropolitan Transportation operator (TMB)

- Mr. Joan Trullén, President, Institut d'Estudis Metropolitans i Regionals de Barcelona (IERMB)
  President of the Institute of Regional and Metropolitan Studies of Barcelona

- Ms. Cristina Jiménez Roig, Cap d'Estudis de Mobilitat i Transport, Barcelona Regional – Agència metropolitana de desenvolupament urbanístic i d'infrastructures
  Head of Mobility and Transportation Studies, Barcelona Regional – Metropolitan Agency of Urban Development and Infrastructures

- Mr. Ricard Riol, President, Associació per a la Promoció del Transport Públic (PTP)
  President of the Association for the Promotion of Public Transport

- Mr. Francesc Magrinyà, Professor, Departament d’Infraestructura del Transport i del Territori (UPC) i Responsable de l’Àrea de Serveis Urbans del Grup de Recerca en Cooperació i Desenvolupament Humà (GRECDH-UPC)
  Professor of the Department of Urban Planning and Transportation at Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya (UPC), and Head of the Urban Services Department at the Human Development and Cooperation Research Group
3. Other Specific Challenges

Mr. Lluís Alegre, Metropolitan Transport Authority:

- Difficulty to elaborate local mobility plans to reach Mobility Master Plan objectives. Coordination among the different local metropolitan autonomous institutions.
- Since the 2008 financial crisis: finding less costly and more efficient solutions in management and services
- Adapting to changes: an initial target of 50% bio-diesel fleet for public transport was reduced to 2-3%. We have to find the missing 47% in other solutions. Finding a less diesel-dependent public vehicle, until electric vehicles are generalized.

Mr. Àngel López, Barcelona City Council:

- Reaching any point of the city within 30 minutes (a reasonable goal for a city 10 km. x 8 km. long, and with traffic at an average in the city of 22 km/h.). Yet still not always possible.
- There is a risk of collapsing the city centre. 27% of the streets take 82% of the traffic. Similarly, metro stations in the city centre risk collapse, as most existing lines have stops there.
- However, the total internal city traffic has not significantly increased since 1994. A total of 102 lanes entering and exiting Barcelona seems to be the city’s capacity, and if you were to increase them you would have to manage more internal traffic and guarantee that internal capacity holds.
- The Barcelona metropolitan area is severely unbalanced: the north (Maresme county) is predominantly residential, whereas the south (Baix Llobregat county) is predominantly industrial. Therefore morning traffic is largely south-bound and afternoon traffic is largely north-bound, creating traffic congestion problems in the insufficient beltways around the city.
- A need to exchange demand for private vehicles in metropolitan trips for public transport supply.

Ms. Ma. Teresa Carrillo, Metropolitan Public Institution of Transportation:

- Maintaining social spending under the current financial cuts: increasing social fares and access improvement
- Providing more public transport to remote areas and zones with difficult access
4. Concepts of Social Cohesion and Sustainable Mobility

**Mr. Francesc Magrinyà, UPC University Professor**

- Local concept and processes of social cohesion, and the integrated approach to urban development are derived, among other sources, from:
  - EC Urban Pilot Projects and URBAN I (1994-99), where the concept of integral planning appears for the first time
  - *Solidarité et Renouvellement Urbain* (SRU) in France
  - ABC Law and theory from the Netherlands, the concept that mobility and urban planning must go together

- The concept of sustainable mobility started approximately in 1995 and was first introduced in an EU publication in 1998. Local concept and processes of sustainable mobility were derived, among others, from:
  - ‘Congestion charge’ and other measures introduced by the former Mayor of London Mr. Ken Livingstone
  - ABC Law and theory from the Netherlands
5. Background of the main strategies and policies followed in the metropolitan region in the field of urban cohesion and regeneration

Shift from road networks to underground and roadside public transport infrastructures
- There has been a change of strategy in the Barcelona metropolitan area. Until 1992 most public infrastructures were centred on improving road networks in the metropolitan area (construction of the road beltway around the city (Rondes), tunnel of Vallvidrera, and highway to Mataró). The private vehicle was at the core of these policies. After 1992, decision-makers realized that the metropolitan region could not keep building roads without also improving the high capacity public transport network. (Ms. Cristina Jiménez, Barcelona Regional)

- Regarding public transport, throughout the end of the 1970’s and during the 1980’s the pattern was to construct primarily underground infrastructures. More recently, there has been a democratization of the public roadside space, where public transportation in Barcelona transports far more people than private vehicles. Public transport lanes, the re-introduction of trams (Trambesòs and TramBaix), and bicycle lanes construction have all been successful and widely accepted by the population. They deserve a public space (Mr. Ricard Riol, Association for the Promotion of Public Transport).

Current investment in railway networks
- Today the key strategic policy of the Barcelona metropolitan region is the commitment to develop all railway infrastructures and networks. The following data confirms this major current undertaking:
  ▶ Barcelona is the leading European Union city in current investment in metro infrastructures, mostly centered in the new metro line n. 9 (6 billion € cost and nearly 50 km. long). (Mr. Joan Trullén, Institute of Regional and Metropolitan Studies of Barcelona)
  ▶ The future Sagrera central railway station will be the largest in Southern Europe.
  ▶ The tunnel from Sants to Sagrera stations will allow for greater traffic in: long-distance railway travel (lines to Madrid, Valencia and eventually Lyon); suburban railway (FGC and RENFE to and from the metropolitan area); and metro lines.
6. Other good practices in public and private transport

Other good practices in public transport:

- De-centralized management of central bus depots. Each one is managed with autonomy and with its own contract programme (known as CON management model). ERTP public transport operator from Paris, France, has visited local facilities and studied this model implemented by Barcelona Metropolitan Transport operator (TMB) in 2000 (Mr. Josep Mensión, Barcelona Metropolitan Transport operator TMB).
- Special prevention and mobility campaigns to manage mass celebrations in the city
- Indirect management operators undergo annual quality controls. Certificate awarded, conforming to European norm UNE EN 13816:2003, and according to 3 quality controls: index of customer satisfaction (ISC); index of services quality (IQO); and index of interior quality (IQI).
- Construction of bus lanes in suburban roads
- Implementation of an extended and flexible public transportation schedule
- Good practices in public transport information and technology:
  - ibus (SMS messages with approximate waiting time for the next bus, etc.); TMB Virtual (software unloaded to take you to the nearest stop, for i-phone and android mobiles);
  - PIUS (displays with visual and audio information for the blind); PSI (pantalles solars d’informació) autonomous stop shelters with solar panels not connected to the electric system.
- New public transportation website with multiple applications (such as proposed itineraries: “how to get there”, getting from A to B in the city, etc.)
- Primavera Cultural a TMB (an annual program of cultural activities organized by the Barcelona Metropolitan Transport operator TMB)

Other good practices in private transport:

- “Zona 80” (80 Km/h. speed limit in all road accesses to the city of Barcelona, which has reportedly decreased traffic accidents, road deaths and pollution)
- “Zona 30” (30 Km/h. speed limit in road access to 14 sensitive neighborhoods, in a total of 215 km. of street length). However, unlike in France, pedestrians can only cross here at traffic lights and crossings, not anywhere (Mr. Francesc Magrinyà, UPC University Professor).
- Construction of off-road parking spaces (parking spaces for a total of 618,000 vehicles)
- Construction of the first “park and ride” zones
- Wide range of road safety good practices in the city resulted in a reduction of both traffic accidents (24% decrease in the 2000-2010 period) and people injured from traffic accidents (23% decrease in the 2000-2010 period).
Upgrading the international position of the city and its region by attracting highly qualified people and activities

The case of Brno, Czech Republic
1. The territory and its main actors

Brno

Fig. 1 The Brno Metropolitan area and its main connexions

The city of Brno has 370,000 inhabitants over an area of 230 km² and a population of 520,000 in the wider Metropolitan zone over an area of 3,170 km². Almost half a million people (commuters, students, tourists etc) are in the city on a daily basis. Brno is a city of universities, with circa 90,000 students, a high number compared to its population. Estimated 30,000 ‘foreigners’ are registered in the city. Unemployment rate is 8,6 per cent. Brno hosts approximately 250,000 jobs out of which 72 per cent in the service sector.

As a traditional industrial city, Brno had already become the industrial centre of the Austro-Hungarian Empire during the 19th century, and was labelled “the Austrian Manchester” in recognition of this. It is mainly known for its textile and engineering industries and its industrial character endured and was reinforced during the socialist period. However, following the 1990 political transition Brno went through a deep transformation. By 2011, the services sector became dominant in the local economy.

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93 Data shown according to the Czech Statistical Office. According to the Ministry of Interior, there are 405,000 inhabitants according to the Ministry of Interior, including foreigners with various status of their stay.

94 On the administrative structure of Brno - see annex

source: Zezulkova, City Strategy Office, Brno
Brno is also an important university centre with a high number of students studying in over ten universities and high schools\footnote{The most important universities: Masaryk University Brno, Brno University of Technology, Mendel University, University of Veterinary and Pharmaceutical Sciences Brno. Other high schools: Brno International Business School, High School of Karel Englis in Brno, Janacek Academy of Performing Arts in Brno, Newton College, a.s., University of Defence, STING Academy... (http://www2.brno.cz/index.php?lan=en&nav01=2222&nav02=2220&nav03=218), Rasin College, Hotel and Commerce Academy and Frank Dyson Institute.}. The city also has strong potential as a regional centre for R&D and international business tourism (trade fairs, congresses etc). The Brno Fair Trade Centre constructed in 1928 receives approximately 1 million visitors per year.

The international potential of the city also derives from its relatively favourable geographical position: the city is located within 200 km from most of the important capitals of Central Europe (Prague, Vienna, Bratislava), and is also relatively close to Budapest and Warsaw. Brno is part of a region called CENTROPE\footnote{(http://www.centrope.com/en/centrope-project/centrope-initiative). CENTROPE is a joint initiative of the Austrian Federal Provinces of Vienna, Lower Austria and Burgenland, of the Czech Region of South Moravia, of the Slovak Regions of Bratislava and Trnava, of the Hungarian Counties of Győr-Moson-Sopron and Vas as well as of the cities of Bratislava, Brno, Eisenstadt, Győr, Sopron, St. Pölten, Szombathely and Trnava}, a Central European cross-border cooperation established with the aim of conducting common development projects in different areas. Brno’s international role, however, strongly depends on the city’s capacity to tackle the concentration of development on Prague and thus to find complementarities with Prague’s international functions.\footnote{Interview with Ondrej Mulicek, geographer, Masaryk University}

Brno’s infrastructure providing international connections are however weak: the Brno Airport has only limited connections and many of them have been cut as a result of the financial crisis; the motorway towards Vienna is still not finished; the new intermodal railway station of Brno is still not completed as a result of the politics surrounding the project.\footnote{These are partly related to the tensions within the former grand coalition that had led the municipality until 2010 and to protesting of civil associations.}

The South Moravian Region

The South Moravian Region is an administrative unit at NUTS III level, so strictly speaking is more akin to a ‘county’ or, in the French terminology, ‘department’. The region is managed by a General Assembly and headed by the Governor, both elected by the population. The region has a population of 1 140 000 inhabitants, spread over 673 municipalities and 49 cities within them. It is divided into seven administrative districts\footnote{Blansko, Brno-mesto, Brno-venkov, Breclav, Hodonin, Vyskov, Znojmo} and at the centre is the city of Brno.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Fig_2_South_Moravian_Region.png}
\caption{The South Moravian Region}
\end{figure}
The actors listed in Table 1 are in close and permanent contact with each other. The City and the region, the two main authorities, share the same vision and goals within their strategies, follow common marketing, and together develop cooperation with other actors, in particular the universities.

**Table 1: the actors and their actions related to the challenge of the study**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Competences, actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brno Municipality – City Strategy Office</td>
<td>Directly affiliated to the Lord Mayor, the office intervenes in four areas (marketing and tourism, strategic planning and regional cooperation, conception of economic development and information activities about the city development). It has prepared the City Strategy of Brno.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Moravian Region</td>
<td>Preparation of regional strategies and management of regional level infrastructure In 2009, the 3rd Regional Innovation Strategy was adopted. The region is a financing partner in innovation projects through the creation of project companies together with other partners (such as the Brno City Municipality, the Universities, etc)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arch. Design</td>
<td>Independent architecture company, working as external contractor with the municipality. Recently preparing the Master Plan of Brno.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. The challenge

All interviewees agreed that the main challenge for Brno is to develop its international attractiveness based on its main potential: higher education and R&D. In that context, the following proposed definition has been widely approved: ‘Upgrading the international position of the city and its region by attracting highly qualified people and activities’

Furthermore, this definition could apply following interviews with different contacts. The challenge of Brno is not only to improve, but also to make sustainable its international position and attractiveness.

- The first part of the challenge (improving the international position) is being implemented now through a series of project elements covering the development of innovative economies in Brno, as determined by the Regional Innovation Strategy of the South Moravian Region.
- The second part of the challenge (sustainability) is less developed at present. Firstly, the challenge requires some important infrastructure investments to improve the accessibility of Brno, such as the construction of the remaining parts of the Brno-Vienna motorway and reconstruction of the Brno-Prague motorway, development of the regional airport, and construction of a new intermodal railway station.

Secondly, sustainability of the upgraded international position of Brno does not depend solely on infrastructure investments. Some of the interviews\textsuperscript{101} confirmed our doubts concerning the way this strategy would be embedded into the local society and the risk of a two-speed development of the city. Avoiding this must be an important challenge for the city development, although this has not yet been explicitly recognised by the political stakeholders of the city.

3. Responding the challenge - improving the international position of Brno

The Strategies

In terms of innovative development, a strong synergy exists between the Brno Municipality and the South Moravian Region, with some actions and priorities shared by the two entities.

\textsuperscript{101} Especially with Ondrej Mulicek, Masaryk University, see end of chapter 4.
The role of innovation in the Brno City Strategy

The first version of the Brno City Strategy was approved in 2002 and its updated version in 2007. The strategy is based on the vision of how the city should be in 2020: a city with a positive image, good economic performance and good quality of life, offering an optimal environment for innovation and knowledge based activities. The vision is supported by three main axes of development called “pillars”: (1) turning local economic development from industry to business; (2) developing a good quality of life by and (3) promoting a new dynamic for the city through the development of research, innovation and education. Research, development, innovation and education also form the five main priorities identified by the strategy and one of its three pillars as shown in Figure 3.

Innovation development is based on several already existing potential foci (the universities, the Campus of Masaryk University, Czech Technology Park, and some international projects and institutes created by regional and municipal authorities and the universities of the South Moravian Region) as well as on the strong engagement of the city in supporting the creation of facilities for international research and of programmes permitting the attraction of international students and researchers. Attracting highly educated people is regarded as a tool for the city to develop a ‘creative class’, in other words an intellectual elite that it is hoped will bring about a spill over effect on the entire development of the city.

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102 ‘Brno aspires to be a city with a positive image, a good economic basis ensuring its competitiveness in Europe, optimal transport accessibility, good conditions for the life of its inhabitants and a healthy environment, as well as a centre for intelligence, education, research and innovation’. Brno City Strategy brochure, Municipality of Brno, City Strategy Office, 2010. page 14.

103 ‘Brno wants to grow in quality and knows that growth is generated by educated people, their demands and requirements and the city will listen to them carefully. Creative people are the elite of the nation. Brno wants to be a good home for these elites.’, Brno City Strategy brochure, Municipality of Brno, City Strategy Office, 2010. page 15.
**Regional Innovation Strategy and Action Plan**

Science, research and innovation have also been determined as the main priorities of economic development in the Regional Development Strategy of the South Moravian region. In 2002, the region was the first in the Visegrád countries to formulate its Regional Innovation Strategy (RIS), which was revised for the third time in 2009 to cover the period 2009-2013. The main objective of the RIS is to achieve the rank of the South Moravian region among the first fifty innovative regions in Europe by 2013.

In the framework of the strategy, an Action Plan has been formulated that also reflects the strong cooperation between the city and the region. The plan identifies actions to be led, in part, by (1) the SM region, (2) the City of Brno and (3) by other actors. All actions are detailed according to the initial problems they respond to, the main activities, the target group, the impact of the project, the estimated budget according to the main resources, and the company or other unit responsible for the project management. Some of the projects are managed by existing institutions or by the local authorities themselves, while for other specific projects companies have been funded by the municipality or the region.

The projects of the third RIS have a total budget of € 82.7 Million of which 65 per cent is financed from European sources and 35 per cent from local contributions. European financing comprises 90 per cent from ERDF and 10 per cent of others – FP7, European Innovation Fund, Interreg, etc.

**Realisation of the actions: project companies and their activities**

In the following section two main project companies and their principal projects will be presented; both were created by the region and other actors for the realisation and management of certain projects identified by the RIS.

**South Moravian Regional Innovation Centre (Jihomoravské Inovacní Centrum - JIC)**

JIC is a public agency founded in 2003 by the South Moravian Region with the cooperation of the City of Brno and four universities, in order to support innovative entrepreneurship in the region. The agency was set up with an initial capital of € 2.5 million and currently employs 35 people and its headquarters is located in Czech Technology Park. Apart from the contributions of the funding partners, the agency also generates its own income as a result of its incubation programme, the main projects of which are as follows:

1. an incubation programme offering premises and services for new innovative companies in the Brno Technology park and the new Masaryk University Campus. The main advantage of

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104 Regional Development Strategy, South Moravian Region, 2007

105 Four central European countries: Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland, having signed an economic, cultural and tourism cooperation, named by the venue of their first meeting in 1991 in Visegrád, Hungary. The Visegrád cooperation is only consultation-based; it consists of regular meetings on various levels (presidential, prime-ministerial, foreign-ministerial, etc.). The only institution of the Group is the Bratislava-based International Visegrád Fund, established by the four respective governments in 1999, which supports civil society in the V4 countries. [http://www.visegradgroup.eu](http://www.visegradgroup.eu)


incubators is subsidized rent (roughly half of open market pricing) and comprehensive services available at one location. Over a period of seven years the centre has helped establish more than 50 companies, of which 28 successfully completed the incubation programme;

- ‘Innovation Academy’ – a training programme for entrepreneurs.
- ‘Innovation Vouchers’ – a tool for promoting cooperation between companies and Brno research institutions. Subsidy worth up to 150,000 CZK (approx. 6 000 EUR) covering 75 per cent of the value of the supported project.
- ‘Patent Licence Funds’ – payment of a loan and consultancy fees to help inventors register their innovation and obtain their patent. The loan covers 80 per cent of the total costs.
- ‘Brokerage’ – organisation of international meetings to enhance cooperation between companies and academics.
- ‘Inovace.cz’ – a platform for people interested in innovations.
- Microsoft Innovation Center Brno – joint project of JIC and the Microsoft Corporation. The main goal of MIC is to improve the knowledge of professionals concerning new Microsoft information technologies and to facilitate cooperation between companies in the region.

### Innovation Vouchers

The project started in 2009 and subsidises cooperation between companies and the research sector for better use of research innovation in business. The main objective of the programme is, therefore, to create pilot projects for cooperation between business and the research sector, thereby allowing companies to have access to research results that would otherwise not be widely available to them but which can contribute to strengthening business competitiveness. The eligible activities are mostly rooted in the field of marketing, project management and assessment of results (such as product development, testing and measurement, feasibility studies, prototyping, product design, creation of business plans for an innovative product, economic impact assessments, etc. In 2009 and 2010, more than 90 vouchers of more than CZK 12 million were distributed among Czech companies.

The main target groups are innovative companies from Europe. The subsidy of one project can go up to a maximum of € 6,000 and may cover up to 75 per cent of the project. The financing of the project is assured by the City of Brno.

*South Moravian Centre for International Mobility (Jihomoravské Centrum pro Mezinárodní Mobilitu - JCMM)*

Founded in 2005 by the South Moravian Region and four Brno universities108, the South Moravian Centre for International Mobility (SMCIM) is a non profit organization supporting talented researchers based in the region, as well as researchers and students from abroad. The City of Brno

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108 Brno University of Technology, Mendel University, Masaryk University, University of Veterinary and Pharmaceutical Sciences Brno
does not contribute to this project at the present time. The main projects funded so far are as follows:

- Supporting talented 15 - 22 year old students in the region with a grant of € 12,000 per year for up to seven years.
- Scholarships for international students coming mainly from Russia, Ukraine, Serbia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The SMICM has three small offices in Russian universities in order to promote their programme and is planning to open a fourth office in Ukraine.
- Grant for PhD students
- Help for secondary schools to work with talented children and funding extracurricular activities for talented children and students (such as e-learning courses, activities for high school students, interdisciplinary competition, etc). The projects are partly financed by the European Social Fund (ESF).
- South Moravian Programme for Distinguished Researchers (SoM oPro) \(^{109}\) - See Box below.

**SoMoPro – South Moravian Programme for Distinguished Researchers**

SoMoPro is a regional grant programme that supports the inflow of foreign scientists and the reintegration of Czech scientists. It offers grants for financing the placement of experienced researchers at research institutions from periods of one to three years. The programme was launched in 2009 for four years, with an overall budget of € 4 million. The South Moravian Region contributes 60 per cent of this sum, while 40 per cent is financed by the Marie Curie programme (COFUND). It is administered by the SMICM, though the distribution of the grants remains the responsibility of the Region in its role as Programme Coordinator. So far two calls for proposals have been launched within the framework of the project.

Up until 2010, 14 researchers have been hosted by the Region and a further 12 will receive grants from 2011 following the second call. The grant is in the range € 3000-6000 per month, which is increased by a contribution to the travel and subsistence costs of the researcher.

**Infrastructure investments**

While scientific and mobility programmes are well coordinated and advanced, the ‘hardware’ part of the strategy, the infrastructure development still has room for improvement.

The hardware aspect itself may be divided in two parts. The improvement of research facilities is quite advanced, judging by some recent developments (such as the new Masaryk University Campus or the new Technology Park) and further investments are on their way or will be realised soon. In the

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framework of the CEITEC project\textsuperscript{110}, new laboratories will be built, and the JIC is creating new incubators for SMEs, etc. Being geographically dispersed across the city, these developments do not form one large scientific cluster, but instead create smaller hubs in different districts of Brno\textsuperscript{111}.

While research infrastructure development needs have mostly been met, the city is still facing some important major infrastructure development needs that are core elements of the transformation of Brno as an internationally acknowledged centre of excellence in Europe. However, the city’s remit only concerns a part of these developments. For instance, nothing can be done at the city level about the construction of the remaining parts of the Brno-Vienna highway. The main development within the remit of the city would be the replacement of the old railway station by a new one that could form an intermodal hub, with the prospect of handling the future High Speed Trains and which can also help create a new neighbourhood on the premises of a former industrial area. The realisation of this project, planned several decades ago, has been hindered over the past few years mainly because of political reasons, but now under the new coalition there is a renewed hope that the vision may be realised\textsuperscript{112}.

\textbf{Financing tools and main difficulties}

As in many cities in East-Central Europe of the same size as Brno, European funding plays a crucial role in local development. International programmes on innovation and research and development (described above) are financed by the different elements of the 7th Framework Programme\textsuperscript{113} (Marie Curie for instance) and to a less extent by the ESF. Other programmes concerned with infrastructure development (such as the incubation programme), are funded by the ERDF.

The Regional Operational Programme NUTS 2 South-East (ROP S-E) formulated by the South East Cohesion Region\textsuperscript{114} identifies three main priorities for the allocation of European Structural Funds, as follows:

\begin{itemize}
  \item Improving the transport accessibility and transport services of the region while respecting environmental protection
  \item Increasing the proportion of sustainable tourism in the economic prosperity of the region;
  \item Improving the living conditions of people in towns and rural areas.
\end{itemize}

Between these priorities, the first one related to transport facilities, receives the largest allocation (49 per cent of the total ERDF allocations), followed by sustainable development (28 per cent) and tourism (19 per cent) as illustrated in figure 4 below:

\begin{figure}
\caption{Repartition of ERDF fund according to priorities}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{110} An international research project launched by four universities and two research centres for improving life and material sciences, see annex for further details.

\textsuperscript{111} Ondrej Mulicek

\textsuperscript{112} see more in annex

\textsuperscript{113} European fund subsidising researches and R&D programs in ten different themes, such as “industry and industrial technology” or “information and communication technology”... see more: http://cordis.europa.eu/themes/home_en.html#cloud

\textsuperscript{114} see more about the NUTS II level region in annex
The total ERDF allocation for the ROP S-E for 2007-2013 is € 704 445 636, of which € 81 511 404 is allocated for urban development in the framework of priority 3.1 for Integrated Urban Development Plans. Under this priority, € 55 152 599 has been allocated to Brno, and €25 019 823 has already been directed to firm projects. Altogether € 69 664 137 worth of funding has been implemented in Brno covering all the priorities (i.e. transport, tourism and urban development).\textsuperscript{115}

Although Brno is an active beneficiary of European funds, in case of infrastructure development the city is permanently facing the problem of co-financing. The annual budget of Brno is too limited to cover its own contribution, and turning to loans as an alternative funding mechanism is too risky under the current uncertain financial conditions. As a result, the City has to focus its attention on the most important investments, those related to its strategy on improving its international attractiveness.

According to the Deputy Mayor, the most urgent necessity is to respond to the infrastructural requirements of investors willing to locate in Brno (such as preparing green field areas, further development of Brno’s international school, etc.) The second priority is to create some strategic investments such as the construction of the new railway station, the renewal of some transport facilities (trams etc), infrastructure development (water pipelines) new sport and cultural facilities (such as an Aquapark, and a Concert Hall).\textsuperscript{116}

Project companies and research programmes are also facing some difficulties concerning EU financing. The majority of the programmes conducted by them are related to innovation and scientific actions and are financed by FP7. Nevertheless in some cases these programmes also comprise investments (for example, in the case of CEITEC or the South Moravian Innovation Centre) that are funded by the ERDF. The difficulty arises because of the management of the two types of funding (ERDF and FP7) since the system of priorities, and especially the types of monitoring indicators, are different. For the CEITEC project the problem was to combine the priorities of the

\textsuperscript{115} Information provided by the Regional Council South-East Authority

\textsuperscript{116} Robert Kotzian
ERDF, which are strongly related to spatial development, with the basic principles and priorities of their programme, mainly regarding technological and scientific development.\textsuperscript{117}

\textit{The results until now – dilemmas around the overall impact of the projects on the city development}

While the concrete results of the programmes are relatively easily measured, the overall impact of the different projects on the overall development of the city is difficult to assess. According to most of the interviewees, the programmes related to innovation and the attraction of a highly qualified people are likely to have very important effects on the city’s economic development, such as the need of new types of services as a result of the arrival of the new population (everyday social services, housing, etc.), creation of new jobs, etc.

Considering these secondary effects of the programmes as being the main effects they would play on the city raises an important dilemma: the risk of a city strategy based on the concentration of an important part of local resources within an objective that does not directly concern directly the majority of the population\textsuperscript{118}.

According to the expert geographer Ondrej Mulicek\textsuperscript{119}, there is no guarantee that innovation policies will result in the expected spill over effects, such as increase of services and employment, without any balancing policies that would help to spread these effects over the different parts, sectors and social groups of the city. The micro scale effects of these programmes and investments are already measurable: the investments related to innovation (the new Masaryk University Campus, the new Technology Park, etc.) are concentrated in clusters and already contributing to the gentrification of their surrounding areas.

Furthermore, even in the case of a strong impact on the service sector, the risk of dual development persists.\textsuperscript{120} The concentration of urban strategies on the attraction of highly qualified people and activities still does not guarantee the sustainability of the results achieved and may enhance a two speed development in the city. This fact raises many questions:

\begin{itemize}
  \item How foreign students and researchers can better integrate into the local life? How to retain them in Brno once their grant is over?
  \item How to spread the effects of these excellence programmes on local students?
  \item How to explain to local inhabitants the necessity of concentrating public investments in projects regarding the attraction of highly qualified people?
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{117} Ondrej Hradil

\textsuperscript{118} The following ideas raised by Ondrej Mulicek, geographer, Masaryk University, confirmed some of our impressions obtained during the interviews.

\textsuperscript{119} Interview with Ondrej Mulicek

\textsuperscript{120} Dual development (a term introduced by Saskia Sassen) is used here as being a main characteristic of global city development: connectivity of cities to global markets and international relations creates a number of high level jobs and functions, and as a spillover effect it generates the development of the service sector as well. However, this phenomenon may lead to a two speed development: high level (and well paid) experts and jobs on the one hand – low level and less paid jobs in the service sector on the other. This polarisation may engender some important social tensions within the cities...
These questions also lead to the dilemma of communication. In spite of the extremely good communications between the city, the region and their partners, there seems to be a lack of dialogue with stakeholders representing different interests or goals – for instance with certain NGOs.

### 4. Lessons to learn and conditions of transferability

Brno has been through a positive and successful transformation over the past decades, changing from an industrial city to one largely based on services, and at the same time managed to avoid many of the negative effects of industrial decline. This positive transition, along with the impetus from European integration, provided the basis for the realisation of a strategy for developing the specific economic performance of Brno and through this, its international position and competitiveness vis-à-vis cities such as Prague, Vienna, and Bratislava.

Thanks to the synergy between the city and its region (South Moravian Region) a rich network of projects, actors and project companies has been created in Brno and its surroundings. This network is at the core of a well coordinated structure of complementary actions that are all financed by complementary resources: the region, the city, and in general some European funds (in particular, FP7 and the ERDF). From this perspective, the case of Brno provides a viable model of synergy between actors working towards the same purpose and following the same principles.

Nevertheless, the successful response to the main challenge may be hindered by some elements that are in a potential conflict with the main actions:

- the problems of infrastructure development
- the lack of strategic communication with the local society and with a large segment of the NGOs.

In East-Central European cities these two points have special significance because:

- the infrastructure system in these cities tends to be in relatively poor condition as a result of the socialist heritage and the withdrawal of the public sector following the political transition,
- the self representation of local societies is still weak. Although the number of NGOs is increasing, the methods and tools of interaction between local authorities and NGOs is not yet well developed and resistance for communication is still strong on both sides.

Confronting these problems is difficult and politically not always seen as beneficial as it often leads to slow and only slight changes. Political and social tensions around the construction of the new railway station of Brno prove how real and how problematic the issue can be.

Another aspect of this difficulty concerns the financing of projects. In East-Central Europe, European funds play a crucial role in the financing of local (urban) development. As a result, European priorities often appear as main priorities in urban or regional development strategies in order to attract the available financing. There is a risk that cities, while adapting their objectives to European priorities, will find their policies deformed. In the case of Brno, the strategy for the attraction of new innovative activities corresponds well to the priorities of European spatial policies. The sustainability and transferability of these projects will therefore depend on two facts. Firstly, on the way the

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121 On the situation of NGOs please see annex

122 Interview with Ondrej Mulicek
balance between the innovation strategy and other (social and infrastructural) priorities can be maintained in a complementary way and, secondly, if the projects on innovation and mobility are accompanied by the necessary infrastructure developments (such as the railway station in Brno) based on a social consensus.
Annex

1. Administrative structure of Brno

Brno is a statutory city meaning it has the status of a city, that is divided into city districts (29) with their own self-governmental bodies, and of a district (which is administrative unit situated between the city and the regional level).

The city is divided into 29 inner city districts that are relatively independent, led by their own elected local councils and spending their own budgets. There is a huge disparity between the central districts and those on the periphery of the city: the latter are often villages that had been incorporated into the City of Brno during the 1960s as part of the socialist urban policies. This system results in a fragmented pattern of city management where the distribution of local and central issues, as well as the diversity of districts, creates tensions between them and also vis-à-vis the Brno Municipality.

Another sign of fragmentation is the lack of administrative management on the agglomeration level (Metropolitan Area). A study is currently under preparation by the South Moravian Region on the possibilities of planning on the agglomeration level.

Since 2010, Brno is led by a coalition comprising the Czech Social Democratic Party and the Civic Democratic Party. Before then the city was led for four years by a large coalition which also included the Green Party. Tensions within the coalition made it impossible to adopt any bigger project or plan, therefore the recent political management refers to this period as being a ‘hole’ in planning and development of Brno.

2. The Structure of the Brno Municipality

source: Brno City Municipality, City Strategy Office
3. Actors

**Municipality of Brno – City Strategy Office**

Brno City council has 11 members and is headed by the Mayor and his deputies. The management of the Brno City Municipality is divided into four sections (culture and social affairs, technical questions, economy, and city development) with one deputy mayor on the head of each of them.

The City Strategy Office is directly related to the Mayor. It is divided into four units: Marketing and Tourism, Strategy and Regional Cooperation, Economic Concept Unit and Urban Development Information Centre. The **Brno City Strategy** was prepared in 2005-2007 and the **Master Plan of Brno** based on it is now in its finalisation phase.

**South Moravian Region**

The South Moravian region manages the strategy making at the regional level, as well as the management of certain infrastructures for the region, mainly roads.

The policies of the region correspond closely with those on the city level. Since 2000, the region works within the **Regional Innovation Strategy**, with the third version appearing in 2009. It is one of the main partners for the creation and financing of project companies for the realisation of the strategy’s elements.

**Arch. Design Studio and the Brno Master Plan**

An independent architecture office working as a sub contractor to the City of Brno for the preparation of its new Master Plan. It replaces (de facto) the chief architect of the city. The preparation of the Master Plan is available in its final phase and public consultations of the proposal were completed in February 2011. Currently the office is finalising the three alternative versions that will be proposed to the City council for adoption.

**CEITEC (Central European Institute of Technology)**

A project for the creation of a European Centre of Excellence in life and material sciences. Its aims are: providing basic infrastructure, promoting international mobility and cooperation between the research and the application sector, and improving the hi-tech sector in Brno. CEITEC was created by a consortium of six partners: four universities and two research centres. The project started in 2011 and will be completed in 2015. Seven research projects, 51 research groups and 557 researchers will be supported during that period; 25,000 m² laboratories are planned to be constructed with a budget of € 208 million. The main sources of funding are: ERDF for the investment part and FP7 for the scientific part. The project is in close cooperation with different

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123 see annex

124 Mr. Dokoupil, www.archdesign.cz/brno-studio/

125 Masaryk University, Brno University of Technology, Mendel University, University of Veterinary and Pharmaceutical Sciences Brno, Institute of Physics of the Academy of Sciences, Veterinary Research Institute
projects of the Regional Innovation Strategy, for instance, SoMoPro, promoting international mobility.\textsuperscript{126}


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>South Moravian Region</th>
<th>Project title</th>
<th>amount (CZK)</th>
<th>sources of financing</th>
<th>time</th>
<th>responsible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ICT Incubator/Scientific &amp; Technical Park</td>
<td>350 M</td>
<td>Enterprise and Innovations Operational Programme (75%) + SM R</td>
<td>Jan 2010-dec 2011</td>
<td>Masaryk University, Univ of Technology, SM R</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Setup of Technology Incubators/STPs in selected SMR towns</td>
<td>300 000</td>
<td>SM R, towns, SF</td>
<td>from 2011</td>
<td>SM IC, economic chambers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of fully competitive specialized developmental services for innovative businesses</td>
<td>3-6 M</td>
<td>SM R, SF</td>
<td>2009-2011</td>
<td>SM IC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innovative business support fund (Seed Fund, Micro-loan Fund)</td>
<td>10-20 M</td>
<td>SM R</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>SM R, SM IC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Forums (cooperation with private investors, financial forums organizing)</td>
<td>200 000 / year</td>
<td>SM R</td>
<td>from 2008</td>
<td>SM R, SM IC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for talented foreign students’ studies at SMR universities</td>
<td>6 M/year</td>
<td>SM R</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>SM CIM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SoMoPro - South Moravian Programme for Distinguished Researchers</td>
<td>3,88 M</td>
<td>SM R + FP7</td>
<td>2009-2012</td>
<td>SM R, SM CIM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brno – EURAXESS Mobility Centre</td>
<td>600 000 / year</td>
<td>Czech Mobility Centre</td>
<td>2008-2011</td>
<td>SM R, SM CIM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brokerage Events</td>
<td>200 000</td>
<td>SM R, European Entreprise Network...</td>
<td>2009-2010</td>
<td>SM R, SM CIM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Secondary School (in English)</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>SM R + School fees</td>
<td>from 2009</td>
<td>City of Brno</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City of Brno</th>
<th>Project title</th>
<th>amount (CZK)</th>
<th>sources of financing</th>
<th>time</th>
<th>responsible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Innovation Vouchers</td>
<td>5,7 M / year</td>
<td>City of Brno</td>
<td>from 2009</td>
<td>SM IC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grants for Talented University Students Involved in Scientific Activities</td>
<td>5 M</td>
<td>City of Brno</td>
<td>2009-</td>
<td>SM CIM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Scholarships for Talented PhD Students</td>
<td>CZK 3.5 million in year 1, 5.5 million in year 2, 8 million in year 3.</td>
<td>City of Brno</td>
<td>2009-2010</td>
<td>SM CIM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flats for (Foreign) Scientists</td>
<td>2 M</td>
<td>City of Brno</td>
<td>2010-</td>
<td>SM IC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialized Industrial Conferences</td>
<td>2 M</td>
<td>City of Brno</td>
<td>2010-13</td>
<td>SM IC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{126} Interview and presentation provided by Mr. Ondrej Hradil.
5. The South-East Cohesion Region

‘The NUTS 2 Southeast Cohesion Region’ consists of two territorial units - the Jihomoravský Region and the Vysočina Region, with the regional cities Brno and Jihlava. Its area of 13 991 km² makes it the second largest cohesion region in the Czech Republic after the Southwest. Measured by population, its 1 641 125 inhabitants (as of 1 January 2006) make it the largest region, accounting for 16 per cent of the population of the Czech Republic. With respect to national GDP, the Southeast region is second with approximately 15 per cent of the total. GDP per capita is at 91.6 per cent of the Czech Republic's average, placing it third after Prague and the Central Bohemia Cohesion Region.’


The South East Cohesion Region

source: www.jihovychod.cz

6. One example for the dilemma on dialogue: the ambiguous relationship between local authorities and NGOs

Brno is a city with a relatively rich network of NGOs. As in most cities, these NGOs represent very different goals, methods and levels of professionalism. Three main types of NGOs can be distinguished in Brno127: (1) NGOs fighting for social integration of certain groups such as the Roma

127 Interview with Ondrej Mulicek
population (2) groups of local citizens acting at the neighbourhood level for improving living conditions and (3) professional NGOs who cover a wide range of activities. Between the three groups, the first and third can be considered as real potential partners of the Municipality, while the aims of the second group are often limited to defending the very interests of a relatively small local area. Nevertheless, the dialogue and interaction between NGOs and local authorities is very limited and in some cases, hostile. A very typical example of this relationship is the case of the railway station. The municipality and the region are willing to substitute the old railway station, located next to the city centre, by a new one that would be developed in a brown field area that would permit the development of an intermodal connection with the future motorways as well as an entire new neighbourhood outside the centre. In spite of these strong arguments related to economic and urban development, some NGOs, as well as the Green Party, protested against the plan, mostly for ecological reasons. According to them, the new railway station would risk increasing car traffic (in the case of the new railway station, approximately 150,000 commuters coming to Brno would need to get into the city centre following their arrival at the station, compared to the current situation where most of the urban hubs are within walking distance of the current station). The lack of dialogue between the two sides created a strong political tension in the city and hindered any solution. Finally, time and political changes brought the solution: the Green Party withdrew from the coalition, and this seems to have allowed the new project to move forward.

There are also positive examples for the relationship between local authorities and NGOs. Vankovka association was created in 2005 to fight against the demolishing of the Old Vankovka factory that is located between the current railway station and the proposed new one and now the building has been saved. One part of it has been sold to investors and is now a shopping centre, while the other part has been transformed partly into a Gallery of Contemporary Arts and partly as a centre for NGOs. The latter became the headquarters of the South Moravian Association of NGOs. It comprises a café and a room for 50–60 people that is the venue for several debates about public development programmes, meetings between NGOs, etc. Vankovka centre is now considered to be an independent place for debate and discussion on public issues.¹²⁸

### 7. Interviews

Marie Zezulkova, Head of the City Strategy Office
Frantisek Kubes, City Strategy Office
Ondrej Hradil, CEITEC
Eva Hamříková, South Moravian Region
Robert Kotzian, Deputy Mayor of Brno
Miloslav Sífalfa, South Moravian Centre for International Mobility
Jaroslav Dokupil, Arch. Design
Ondrej Mulicek, geographer, Masaryk University
Jirí Filip, Brno Airport
Petr Chladek, South Moravian Regional Innovation Centre

¹²⁸ Interview with Eva Stankova
8. Sources, web sites

Regional Innovation Strategy and Action Plan

Brno City Strategy

www.kr-jihomoravsky.cz/
www.jihovychod.cz/en/
www.inovacnivouchery.cz/en/
www.archdesign.cz/brno-studio
www.jic.cz/
www.jcmm.cz
www.ceitec.eu/
REORGANISING CULTURAL INDUSTRIES AND REVITALIZING LOCAL MANUFACTURING TRADITIONS IN ORDER TO REDEFINE THE CITY’S INTERNATIONAL POSITION

THE CASE OF FLORENCE, ITALY
1. Florence and its actors

The city

The population of Florence in 2009 was 368,901 and the population of the Florence metropolitan area 618,990. The latter consists of Florence and ten other settlements around the city. Florence is the eighth biggest city of Italy and is the centre of the Province of Florence (comprising 44 communes, 934,000 inhabitants over an area of 3,514 sq km), as well as being the capital of the Tuscany Region (with 3.7 million inhabitants and ten provinces with an area of 23,000 sq km).

Florence is, of course, one of the most important centres for cultural tourism in Europe. In 2009, five million tourists visited the city, 70 per cent of who came from foreign countries with the remaining 30 per cent from other parts of Italy. In 2009, the average number of tourists present in the city on any one day was 18,254. The 74 museums of the city received 7.5 million visitors in the same year. In spite of these high figures, tourism in Florence shows a distinct decline during the past few years. The number of daily tourists has decreased by 6.7 per cent between 2007 and 2009. Also, visits in Florence are quite limited with the average time spent in the city 2.5 days, just enough time to visit the main attractions of the city (museums, historical area, etc). Apart from cultural tourism, the city also hosts business and event tourism but to a less important extent. Tourism places strong pressure on the urban development of the city, increasing the challenges such as the maintenance of the cultural heritage, inner city revitalisation, or the need to attract the local population back to the city centre.

Although tourism plays a crucial role in Florence’s economy it is not the only critical factor. Florence’s economy is also based on some important traditional industries such as textile and leather production, porcelain, and fashion. For instance, Florence accounts for 45 per cent of Italy’s total leather production, and because of this, many international fashion designers work with Florentine leather manufacturers who continue to support the prestigious label “Made in Italy”. Other important new sectors are: pharmaceuticals, chemical development, mechanical and electronic industries. Furthermore, a wide range of service and manufacturing sectors related to old and new technologies in art restoration play a crucial role in the city’s economic life. Fashion industries and many types of manufacturing industries are in historical families’ ownership (from the world wide known Salvatore Ferragamo mark, to other smaller family manufacturers.) such as the traditional arts and crafts workshops that cover a wide range of activities in the historical centre of the city.

Florence’s society is strongly characterised by traditional hierarchies. Since the 1980s, the city experienced a negative demographic development characterised by the decrease in birth rates and increased ageing. The demographic loss stopped by the beginning of the 2000s, but Florence still

129 Bagno a Ripoli, Calenzano, Campi Bisentio, Fiesole, Impruneta, Lastra i Signa, Pontassieve, Scandicci, Sesto Fiorentino, Signa

130 after Rome, Milan, Naples, Turin, Palermo, Genoa and Bologna (http://en.comuni-italiani.it/citta.html)

131 Piano Strutturali 2010, seconda parte

132 Interview with E. Cianfanelli, Municipality of Florence

133 Interview with F. Caracciolo
occupies a disadvantageous position in Italy. In 2006, the average age was 49 in Florence compared to 42 in the whole Italy. Between 2001 and 2008, the population grew by 3.2 per cent, though birth rates in Florence are still relatively low at 7.66 births per 1,000 inhabitants compared to the Italian average of 9.45 births.\textsuperscript{134} Immigration is a relatively new phenomenon in Florence. According to official statistics\textsuperscript{135}, in 2006 more than 90 per cent of the population were Italians and the remaining part comprised of Chinese, East Europeans (Albanians, and Romanians in particular), and North Africans (Moroccans, Tunisians in particular), the influence of the immigrant population is strongly visible in the some parts of the historical centre ethnic businesses. Nowadays some important transformations of the economic and urban structures of Florence risk diminishing its national and international position as a main centre of culture and manufacturing:

- Decrease of the number manufacturing units (from 6,272 to 5,643 between 2000 and 2008\textsuperscript{136}) especially shows the decline of small size arts and crafts units, a tendency that can be illustrated by the functional changes in many of the local workshops in the historical Oltrarno neighbourhood.

- Urban sprawl as a result of the suburbanisation process that took place until the beginning of the 2000s resulted in the abandon of the historical area by local people resulting in many empty houses in the city, a relatively bad traffic situation, and subordination of the city centre to the needs of tourism.

- Growing city competition for tourism and investment as well as the effects of the financial crisis having a negative effect on the international (and national) position of Florence. The city needs to invent new, innovative solutions for improving this situation.

\textit{The main actors of the case study}

The main stakeholders of the Florence case study represent different sectors of the local economy as described below

\textit{Confindustria Firenze}

Confindustria is a trade union confederation of Italian commercial and industrial enterprises. Created in 1865, Confindustria Firenze is one of the regional units of this network, aiming at the representation and the promotion of commercial and industrial enterprises in Florence and the Tuscany region. The association is financed by the contributions of its members. Cofindustria is the initiator of Florens2010 event, and offers the main experience covered in this case study.\textsuperscript{137}

\textsuperscript{134} http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Florence

\textsuperscript{135} Piano Stutturale, 2010

\textsuperscript{136} Piano stutturale 2010, p. 33.

\textsuperscript{137} see annex
Confederazione Nazionale Artigianato Piccola e Media Impresa - CNA (Association of small and medium sized handicrafts entreprises)\(^{138}\)

CNA is an association representing small and medium sized enterprises and the largest association of its kind in Florence with 1,100 members, acting at the provincial level. The CNA was established in 1945 as a trade union for arts and crafts enterprises, and it developed later on to encompass other (mainly service) sectors. The principal activities of the association are: help in documentation and fiscal matters, information provision for tenders and funds. The CNA has a total of more than 300 employees and 18 offices located throughout the Province of Florence. The CNA became one of the main partners of Confindustria in the realisation of Florens2010.

The Municipality of Florence

The recent change in the political leadership following the election of Matteo Renzi in 2009 as a new left wing mayor of Florence, who introduced a new approach to urban development in Florence with an accent on sustainable development, re-integration of the historical inner city into every-day life, the return of people who left the city to live in the surrounding areas, etc. The mayor launched his ‘One hundred Point Action Plan’ for a sustainable urban development and for improving the quality of life for residents and for visitors. This included the development of the local transportation system, revitalization and reuse of empty buildings and abandoned urban spaces, enhancing compact urban development, and improving the international image of the city and these are the core principles of his programme.\(^{139}\) The new administration launched the evaluation of the existing regulations and plans for Florence’s urban development in order to prepare the new Urban Development Plan (Piano Stutturale) that was adopted at the end of 2010 (see later).

The Municipality was Confindustria’s partner for the realisation of Florens2010 mainly by providing the prestigious venues in the city (Palazzo Vecchio, main squares etc.) which were all under its administration.

2. The challenge

The case study of Florence had been suggested by the Steering Committee and so, contrary to the other case studies, the challenge and the experience had to be identified immediately before and during the study trip. Some interviews preceding the field study\(^{140}\), allowed us to make an initial decision on the main challenge of the case as follows: “Strengthening cultural economies to improve the city’s national and international position and to foster sustainable and cohesive development”. Florens 2010, a large international cultural event and its follow ups, have been chosen as the main experience of the city responding to this challenge.

\(^{138}\) interview with A. Panonini and http://www.firenze.cna.it/default.asp?idtema=1&idtemacat=1&page=informazioni&idcategoria=60824 see more in annex


\(^{140}\) telepohone interviews preceding the study trip with Mr Antonio Calafati
Following interviews with the main actors taking part as initiators or organisers of this event and from the ensuing actions, the above identified challenge has been articulated and made more precise as follows: “Reorganising cultural industries and revitalizing local manufacturing traditions in order to redefine the city’s international position”. As it will be shown in the following pages, the principal aim of Florens 2010 was to create an internationally acknowledged cultural and art forum in Florence with a double objective:

- to bring together a wide range of actors in cultural industries within the city
- to create a new brand for Florence as being a world centre for industries related to cultural heritage and art restoration (a new economic sector that has been named ‘Golden Economy’)

Florens2010 is thus an experience that responds to one of the main challenges of Florence’s development: how to redefine the city's international position. If Florence is to always remain one of the most important centres for international cultural tourism, it is important to consider how to revitalise its image drawing on its lively contemporary art life and creative industries. It is also important to consider how to avoid the disappearance of manufacturing and arts and crafts traditions. For example, in the sector of art restoration, the integration of traditional branches and new technologies may facilitate the creation of a new creative economic cluster in the city. Furthermore, how can local actors and policies help maintaining small arts and crafts activities within the city?

Related to this latter question, a third challenge can be added to the two main objectives behind a new economic image of Florence, as follows

- Promoting the development of local arts and crafts sectors and helping them reintegrating into the city’s economy

Although the term ‘cohesive development’ has been removed from the main challenge of the Florence case study, this objective is still present in objectives such as the revitalising of local arts and crafts traditions or the strengthening the position of small arts and crafts producers in the economic palette of the city.

The main objectives of Florens 2010 are also in concert with some of the main points of the city’s urban strategy that suggests for example bringing closer the historical city centre to local inhabitants or improving of the economic performance of the city.

3. Florens 2010: the concept, the event, its results and the follow-up steps

The concept – Golden economy

The initiative Florens 2010, initiated by the President of Confindustria Firenze, is based on the view: how could the enterprises of Florence tackle the challenges of the financial crisis? What are the city’s main economic potentials? Further, how to reanimate the art and cultural life of Florence that, during the last decades, seemed to have become a “sleeping city” in spite of the flood of tourists visiting its attractions every year? This reflection led to the formalisation of a concept for the potential economic development of Florence.

141 see more about this concept in the following chapter.
According to this concept Florence would be the very city to bring together all businesses and other types of activities (education, technological development, arts and crafts, international seminars and cultural events) related to the restoration of cultural heritage (art objects, buildings, etc). In Florence all these branches are traditionally present, the main issue is therefore to organise them as complementary elements of a complex and sustainable structure of economic production. According to the author of the idea, if environment-friendly activities are designated as elements of the ‘green economy’, then activities related to restoration and revalorisation of cultural heritage could be labelled as components of a ‘golden economy’, the added value of the two being the economic model that Florence could follow in the future. Florens 2010 was originally organised as the first step in the realisation of this concept.

**The Florens 2010 event**

Florens 2010 – International Week on Cultural Heritage and Landscape was a nine-day long international cultural meeting that took place in November 2010. Altogether it hosted 150 different events: exhibitions, performances, public lectures, concerts all related to the themes of space, cultural heritage, and art.

**Some of the main events:**

One of the main events was the installation of replicas of the David statue in different places of the city reflecting the imagined locations from part of a long debate in 1504 between Leonardo da Vinci, Botticelli and Giuliano da Sangallo. This event permitted revitalisation of the cultural and historical image of some public places of the city.

The exhibition ‘Rooms of Wonder’ organised by the CNA was held in the Palazzo Vecchio. It housed the presentation of the products of 70 traditional arts and crafts companies, all seen as being an integral part of the cultural heritage economy of Florence: a step for the reintegration of small manufacturers into the urban economy.

At the core of Florens 2010 was a three-day long conference: the International Forum on Cultural Heritage and Landscape, where some 300 speakers, many of them highly prestigious international experts and politicians, were invited. The Forum was organised around three main subjects: the economic and spatial impacts of cultural heritage, the new technologies and new professions related to restoration and the communication, and promotion of cultural heritage (museums, media, etc.).

**The organisation** phase lasted almost two years from the conceptualisation of the idea to the opening of the event. Beginning 2010, four ‘technical tables’ were designated in order to give professional support to the choice of events. Each table represented a different sector: (1) public and private cultural institutions; (2) universities and international teaching institutions (including Florence University, British and French cultural institutions, nine American Universities, etc.), (3) politicians (on

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142 The crisis has forced us to profoundly rethink entrepreneurial consumption and repositioning of all our productive systems. The role of the environmentally sound ‘green economy’ is gaining increased importance when it comes to changing productive systems in order to consume fewer environmental resources. (…) the economics of cultural heritage can become a new winning productive paradigm (…). The ambition is to develop a district dedicated to cultural and environmental heritage that will become the ‘Gold economy’. G. Gentille, in: Firenze, local media. According to this concept, the cultural heritage business could be organised into three main branches: a) business related to restoration: new technologies, methods and materials, services and productions; b) the business related to the valorisation of the results (museums, web, media and related services and activities), c) fund raising and the managing of cultural heritage.
national, regional and local levels), and (4) Foreign embassies. Approx. 70 persons were present at each meeting. The events were selected by the Board of Organisers including members from Confindustria, CNA, the Bank, and the Tuscany Region.

The direct organisation of the Forum and of its related activities, (i.e. the preparation of an international study on the economic effects of cultural heritage and the distribution and analysis of a questionnaire for the event’s visitors) was subcontracted to the Ambrosetti company.

**Financing**: the financial breakdown of the event was as follows (in euros)\(^{143}\).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source: data provided by Nocolò Manetti (Fondazione Florens)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total budget</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank (Intesa Sanpaolo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confindustria, CNA and Chamber of Commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Environment and the Tuscany region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private contributors (Gucci, Florence milk company, Pharmaceutics companies etc)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No application was made for EU funds or resources, mostly because the organisers did not know how and where to search for appropriate resources, but also because they did not have enough time to engage in a long administrative process of tendering\(^{144}\).

**Results and outcomes (evaluation of the event)**

The evaluation of the event’s results was made on two levels:

- direct effects on the number of participants at the event are shown through some basic data prepared by the organiser boards, based on indicators such as the number of ticket purchases for the events, the number of newspaper articles covering the event, data provided by hotels and restaurants, as well as the results of interviews conducted during the Forum, etc.
- some indirect effects can be identified through the impressions of interviewees.

Around 90,000 visitors attended the event according to the organisers – and 200,000 according to the municipality, but this data also includes tourists who did not come specifically for the event. Some 25,000 people visited the Culinary Market “Culture e Civilita dei sapori”, 20,000 people participated in the ‘David – the power of beauty’ event, and 15,000 people visited the three-day long Forum.

As part of the Forum, 1,500 questionnaires were distributed among the participants asking them to give their opinion on the different sessions of the forum and the main speakers, as well as on the general organisation of the event and on the subjects that would be interesting to cover in a follow-

\(^{143}\) interview with Nicoló Manetti, project manager of Florens 2010 and General manager of Florens Foundation since March 2011.

\(^{144}\) interviews with Nocolò Manetti (Florens Foundation) and Giovanni Gentile, President of Confidustria Firenze.
up forum. Unfortunately, Confindustria could not provide the results of this questionnaire since these had not been communicated yet by the subcontractor Ambrosetti Company.\textsuperscript{145}

When considering the indirect effects, any impacts on the SMEs have to be mentioned. According to the evaluation by the CNA, many new contracts have been realised by SMEs and in that sense, Florens 2010 served as an effective marketing event for this sector.\textsuperscript{146}

More generally, Florens 2010 had an impact on the reinforcing of the relationship between the different stakeholders, the partners of the organisation: Confindustria, CNA, Chamber of Commerce, and the Municipality.

All actors agreed that the Florens 2010 event achieved its aim of bringing together the stakeholders within the local economy and to stimulate the international image of the city.

\textit{Outcomes:}

The report on Florens 2010\textsuperscript{147} was an important outcome of the event and contains the main results of an international research project entitled: ‘The economy of cultural heritage and landscape’ prepared as part of the conception work of the International Forum on Cultural and Environmental Heritage, by the subcontracting company Ambrosetti.

The study first gives a detailed definition of cultural and creative economies (the sectors they comprehend and their role in spatial and economic development). Secondly, it proposes the creation of the “Florens Index”, a summary indicator created out of 20 other indicators, that permits comparisons to be made between the level of development of the cultural and creative sectors in a given geographical area.\textsuperscript{148} Using the Florens index, the role of the Tuscany region in the context of the 20 Italian regions was examined in terms of its cultural performance. Thirdly, the Florens index was also used in an experimental way in an international comparison based on a survey of 600 interviews across six countries (France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Spain, Greece, Japan and the United States).

\textit{The follow up}

On the basis of the success of the Florens 2010 event, the founding partners have decided to continue the event. For this purpose the Board of Directors has been transformed into a Foundation, representing the continuity of the Florens events\textsuperscript{149}. The President of Confindustria and the director of the Foundation are strongly committed in the idea to create a new cultural institution in Florence.

The Florens Foundation will fulfil a number of goals as follows:

\begin{itemize}
  \item conceptualising and organising the Florens event every 2nd year
  \item organising independent cultural events (invitation of conference speakers, etc) in Florence,
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{145} Interview with Nicoló Manetti (Florens Foundation).

\textsuperscript{146} Interview with A. Pantonini, CNA


\textsuperscript{148} The creation of the Foundation is very recent: the official papers just arrived at the moment of our study trip, so no further information is available yet on their activities.
participating in the promotion and the creation of an international High School of Restoration.

The Florens Foundation has already started organising the Florens2012 event, the detailed concept and programme of which will be published in summer 2011. Apart from the Florens events to take place every second year, the Foundation also organises smaller events such as public lectures and workshops\textsuperscript{150}, dealing with the questions of cultural heritage and landscape. Furthermore, it intends to cooperate with other local actors of Florence. These events are also opportunities to enlarge the circle of stakeholders, partners of the Foundation, as for instance, in the inclusion of the University of Florence.

4. Complementarity of Florens 2010 with the main lines of territorial development in Florence and its metropolitan area

According to the director of the Urban Planning Office of Florence Municipality (Pianificazione Urbanistica)\textsuperscript{151}, Florens 2010’s aims and vision are complementary to those determined by the Structural Plan of the City (Piano Stutturale 2010). This is also the case for the Strategic Plan of the Florence metropolitan area prepared in 2009 (Piano Strategico). Before Florens 2010, the contribution of culture to the city’s development had been somewhat limited on the profitability from international tourism. Florens 2010 set out to extend this concept of culture and to see it also as an element of spatial and urban development – for example, by recovering abandoned buildings, by promoting cultural heritage, or by integrating arts and crafts companies into the Florence economy. This would then make a contribution to fighting against the gentrification of certain neighborhoods, or by changing the image and the message of certain urban places and bringing back local inhabitants to the city centre.

The main lines of the new urban development plan of Florence

In 2010 the process of the preparation of a new Master Plan of Florence was launched and evaluation of the former plans and the setting out of the new one entitled ‘Piano Strutturale 2010’, were adopted in December 2010. The elaboration of this new plan was accompanied by a participation process involving professional groups as well as citizens’ groups. As the plan is very recent, it is difficult to evaluate its real impacts on the city yet. Nevertheless, it clearly shows the orientation towards an integrated and sustainable urban development of Florence. The main principles for the future development of the city are as follows: fighting urban sprawl, bringing back the historical centre to the inhabitants, improving the quality of life and urban environment, reinforcing sustainable urban development and improving the position and attractiveness of Florence in Italy and on the international scene, through the development of local economies and tourism.\textsuperscript{152}

\textsuperscript{150} public lecture of Gilles Clémen, landscaper and writer; public workshop entitled “Saveguard of Cultural Heritage”

\textsuperscript{151} Interview with Stefania Fanfani

\textsuperscript{152} See main objectives and tools of the plan in annexe
Projects for the economic development of Florence

Concerning economic development, the city’s policies and objectives interact with the Florens 2010 initiative:

The objective of maintaining local commercial and manufacturing activities facing the growing importance of commercial centres:

A special study was conducted in the historical city centre on the existing network of local businesses (SM Es) and it showed that the traditional workshops are more and more being substituted by minimarkets that are established without any regard to the urban environment. This is a typical problem in the Oltrarno neighbourhood for example. Regulating these economic activities is a quite sensitive question and almost impossible to realise because of the need to respect free market rules on the national as well as on the European level. On the other hand, growing numbers of minimarkets have also generated the rapid increase of commercial real estate prices. In order to limit this increase, the city decided to introduce a regulation: functions of ground floor shops previously used for arts and crafts purposes cannot be changed into any other functions such as services, grocers etc. Until now this regulation was effective in slowing down this transformation.\(^\text{153}\)

The creation of an innovative cluster on cultural heritage:

Strongly in line with the original ideas leading to the creation of Florens2010, the Municipality, in partnership with the Tuscany region, the University of Florence and the National Research Centre and with the contribution of related companies, is elaborating a new project on the creation of a ‘Technological District on Cultural Heritage’ (‘Distretto tecnologico dei beni culturali’).\(^\text{154}\) This District would be a centre of excellence for cultural heritage and restoration, including a high school of restoration, an incubator for high tech enterprises working in the restoration industries, R&D laboratories, cultural institutions and art workshops. The ‘district’ will be hosted by one of the empty palazzos in the city centre. Financing is expected to come from the 7th framework programme\(^\text{155}\) and the financial contribution of companies and the University. Confindustria and the Florens Foundation are strong supporters of the initiative.

The Spatial development Strategy of the Florence Metropolitan area (Piano Strategico)

Prepared in 2009 by the Associazione Firenze Futura, the strategic document was signed by the municipalities of cities constituting the Florence metropolitan area, as well as by other private and public partners\(^\text{156}\). In 2010 Associazione Firenze Futura has been wound up but the document

\(^{153}\) Piano Strutturale and interview with S. Fanfani

\(^{154}\) The modalities of the District have been discussed during one of the round table discussions held in the frame of the International Forum within Florens2010. (http://press.comune.fi.it/hcm/hcm5353-3_4_172-%22Il+distretto+tecnologico+dei+beni+culturali+iin+To.html?cm_id_details=53537&id_padre=4472)

\(^{155}\) European fund subsidising researches and R&D programmes ten different themes, such as “industry and industrial technology” or “information and communication technology”... see more: http://cordis.europa.eu/themes/home_en.html#cloud

\(^{156}\) Provincia de Frenze, Tuscany region, Chamber of Commerce, Confindustria...
remains a strategic blueprint for the development of the whole area. Its main objectives also underline the principles represented by Florens 2010.

In the chapter on cultural production, the plan describes an extended concept of culture, corresponding to the ideas reflected by the concept of the Florens 2010 event: ‘… cultural production, good quality manufacturing activities that are respectful for tourism, but pay also attention to sustainable environment and to social cohesion as main elements of sustainable development.’

5. Main learning and conditions of transferability

Strengths and weaknesses of the case study

The Florence case demonstrates the development of a complex economic strategy in the city, actively supported by the main actors in the local economy and by new urban development policies. One of the main weaknesses of the case is the fact that almost all projects and ideas (as discussed above) are very new or they are close to being realised and so is too early to assess any firm impact on the city. However, the strong interaction between the objectives of the different actors can be seen as a guarantee of the success of the projects and their positive effect on the city.

Another important weakness of the overall case is the risk of unbalanced development: in spite of the representation of local manufacturing industries at all levels, there is a risk of shifting towards the promotion of a pole of excellence, mainly representing the largest companies and cultural institutions. All the interviewed actors seemed to be aware of this risk but no concrete actions were mentioned aimed at preventing them.

The impact of a private initiative on urban development

Florens 2010 is a private economic initiative. Although its objectives go hand in hand with the city’s main policies, it remains an independent initiative of economic stakeholders, with the successes and the limits of this situation. On the one hand, as an initiative based on purely economic and financial resources, its maintenance and goals are not dependent on any political level.

On the other hand, the Florens event itself is not a pure case of integrated urban development, even if various elements of the city development (cultural heritage, environment, etc) are at the core of the whole event. Social and urban cohesion, regeneration of certain areas of the city, etc., are not within its main goals and, of course, this is not their objective. The Florens 2010 event was at the same time a successful initiative of high importance that gave a strong push effect to the city by:

- setting out a creative and original solution for the city to tackle the economic challenges related to the financial crisis and the decreasing international competitiveness of Florence.

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157 the Piano strategico has been presented as the Local Action Plan of Firenze in the Joining Forces URBACT Network. http://urbact.eu/fileadmin/Projects/Joining_Forces/documents_media/LAP_FLORENCE.pdf

158 ‘(…) produzione culturale, della manifattura di qualità nelle attività produttive, rispetto alla vocazione del turismo e con un’attenzione forte alla sostenibilità ambientale e alla coesione sociale come fattori a sostegno dello sviluppo.’ (p.112, Piano Strategico). See the main axis and tools of the plan in annex

159 This question has been raised in all the interviews.
Therefore, Florens 2010 has a strong potential to contribute to the cohesive development of the city. Of course, the new dynamics generated by the event are now to be used for diverse purposes such as: organising the follow-up Florens events every second year, launching programmes for the integration of SMEs, the improvement of the quality of life in the city centre, etc.

Yet the sustainability and overall long term effects of the Florens events on the city will strongly depend on the way the above mentioned dilemma facing this initiative will be resolved: will the Foundation responsible for the Florens events be a new centre of excellence in Florence or will it become a new cultural actor of the city that is also engaged in its social and educational scene? Will the organisers of the further Florens events be able to integrate a larger circle of stakeholders as partners for their activities? Will they be able to transfer their ideas into other actions and policies at the city level? Until now, there are several positive signs emerging, although their overall effect could only be assessed much later on. These include the following:

- the potential role of Confindustria and the Florens Foundation in the realisation of the “Technological District on Cultural Heritage”;
- the growing cooperation of the Foundation with higher education and research institutions – for example, in the frame of the organisation of public lectures and workshops in between two events and during the main Florens events.

**The main conditions of transferability**

Private independent initiatives may be extremely useful for a city’s development as they effectively represent the needs of local economic actors, and as independent actors, they can suggest innovative solutions. Nevertheless, it is important that the economic actors in Florence are all well embedded into the local society: they are representing local firms, enterprises that are in family ownership – and not international firms without any local roots in the city. This strong engagement in local development is the key to their sensitivity in relation to the needs of the city.

Furthermore, Florence is also an ideal model for how a private initiative might become a complementary action with some objectives that are also represented by the strategic plans and actions being followed by the local municipality.
Annex

1. The protagonists of Florens2010

Confindustria

Confindustria Firenze was founded in 1885 as a territorial member of Confindustria in Italy. It represents, promotes and supports its associated companies located in Florence and the Province of Florence, and provides a full range of services to meet companies’ needs in different fields, including the following:

- To promote the development of entrepreneurial activities
- To encourage the co-operation of entrepreneurs
- To represent their interests and needs in front of the local institutions, public administrations, trade unions and social organizations
- To disseminate information, knowledge and managerial culture as means of progress
- To deliver services to support companies in their non core processes

As a representative association, Confindustria Firenze is financed by the annual subscriptions of its members.\(^\text{1}\)

Distribution of associated enterprises according to sectors

![Distribution of associated enterprises according to sectors](image)

*Source: Confindustria, 2011*

CNA (Association of small and medium sized entrepreneurs)\(^\text{2}\)

The CAN is an association representing small and medium sized enterprises and is the largest association of its type in Florence with 1,100 members. It acts on the provincial level. The CNA was established in 1945 as a trade union for arts and crafts enterprises, and it was enlarged later on to encompass other sectors (mainly services). The main activities are: help in documentation and fiscal

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\(^{1}\) presentation of Confindustria

matters, information provision on tenders and funds. The CNA has a total of more than 300 employees and 18 offices in the Province of Florence.

According to the CNA, the main challenges for Florentine arts and crafts SMEs are twofold as follows:

- traditional manufacturing is declining in Florence, and specifically the Oltrarno area, the traditional arts and crafts neighbourhood, where the small shops and workshops are closing or changing functions (for services, restoration, etc). This leads to the general social degradation of the neighbourhood.

- arts and crafts SMEs cannot remain competitive with the emerging countries. As a result of the closures and functional changes, the new generation is often not equipped or willing to take over the small companies. On the other hand, the growing competition from larger companies forces the SMEs to be more engaged in subcontracting that in general leads to the loss of their skilled workers and a decline in the quality of their products.

In order to tackle these challenges, the CNA became one of the main partners of Confindustria in the financing and organisation of Florens 2010. For them this event is an occasion to promote arts and crafts companies and to help their integration into the city’s economic networks.

The CNA contributed to the financing of Florens 2010 with 100,000 euros and it provided its expertise to contribute to the services needed during the event. The CNA delegated two of its members onto the Board of Organisers.

The CNA engaged with several events in the frame of Florens 2010, as follows:

- Rooms of Wonders (see above)
- The event of the Craftsman confederation, where companies from all over the world were invited to participate.

The main inputs of Florens 2010 for them were as follows:

- new contracts for SMEs (Florens 2010 was a marketing window for SMEs)
- strengthening the relationship between the CNA and the other partners in the organisation (namely with the Chamber of Commerce and the Municipality).
### 2. Piano Strutturale: main objectives and tools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Tools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Integrating and strengthening public transport system</td>
<td>improving the tramway system, developing the “tram-train” (similar to the RER in Paris), improving the railway system and the airport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecting transport systems</td>
<td>creation of an underground line crossing the city with intermodal connection to the railway; a ring road around Florence to facilitate the connections between the city-centre and the main highways; a new road system entering into the city and the improvement of the existing road system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rationalising the parking system</td>
<td>Creation of park and ride facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulating the infrastructures related to the transport system</td>
<td>city logistics creation of an urban zone with limited traffic and with bicycle paths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainable development</td>
<td>improving public parks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preserving natural resources</td>
<td>determining the protected areas and the measures for preservation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limiting consuming of space</td>
<td>building regulations creation of new living spaces / social housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consolidating economic activities</td>
<td>legal control of the changing functions of workshops in inner city; improving the quality of production Development of a Technological district for restoration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Piano Stutturale, 2010
3. **Piano Stratégico: main axis and tools**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main axis</th>
<th>Tools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Favouring a pluricentral urban structure to monocentral one</td>
<td>Reinforcing the new functional areas;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reforming the metropolitan mobility system</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Managing the complex financial system of the area</td>
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<tr>
<td>Territorial cooperation</td>
<td>working out the project for the “Union of Municipalities”</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>working out an integrated spatial development programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innovation and development</td>
<td>Cultural production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Good quality industrial and manufacturing production</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tourism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sustainability of the environment</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Social cohesion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sustainable development projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metropolitan governance</td>
<td>Monitoring system for the realisation of the Strategic Plan and Assessment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Piano Strategico

4. **Interviews**

Antonio Calafati, economist, Università Politecnica delle Marche, IT
Giovanni Gentile, President of Confindustria Firenze
Francesco Caracciolo, Director of Confindustria Firenze
Niccolo Manetti, General Director of Fondazione Florens
Leonardo Ferragamo, Holding of Ferragamo Family
Elisabetta Cianfanelli, Councillor for Tourism, Erueopa, Fashion and Egality of rights
Patrizia Antonini, Marketing and Economic Development, CNA
Stefania Fanfani, Director of Urban Planning Department, Municipality of Florence
Raffaello Napoleone, Managing Director of Pitti Imagine

5. **Documents, web sites**

http://www.florens2010.com/
http://www.nileguide.com/destination/florence/things-to-do
http://www.firenze.cna.it/
http://www.blogfromitaly.com/matteo-renzi-takes-florence/
http://www.comune.fi.it/home.htm


Piano Strutturale 2010
Piano Strategico, 2009
Improving and integrating local SMEs in order to sustain the economic revitalisation of the city based on knowledge society

The case of Gliwice, Poland
1. The special path of Gliwice’s development

Gliwice is at first sight a typical industrial and mining city, which started growing during the 19th century, a trend that continued right up to the Socialist period. With 192,000 inhabitants it is the second largest city after Katowice in the Upper Silesian industrial region, one of the main industrial zones of Poland. Nevertheless, detailed analysis shows that Gliwice does not conform to the classical characteristics of an industrial city that fell into long term economic and social crisis after the radical transformations of the 1990s. On the contrary, after the first difficult years of political and institutional restructuring, the city was able to turn to the interaction of two key positive features. Firstly, its special economic and social status, based on its historical development, that makes it somehow different from the other cities of the industrial region and, secondly, the fact that Gliwice became part of the Katowice Special Economic Zone formed in 1996. In spite of the expectations and predictions concerning its economic collapse, today, thanks to its favourable economic indicators (i.e. relatively low unemployment rate, permanent growth of the service sector, high number of registered companies) Gliwice occupies a strong position not only in the region but at the national level as well.

Fig. 1. Gliwice in the Upper Silesian industrial region

Source: wikipedia

Gliwice, an industrial city with particular characteristics

During its history, Gliwice never remained a completely mono functional mining city. Apart from industrial and mining activities, services always formed an important part of the city’s functioning. The city became the main headquarter of industrial companies before World War 2, and, as a result, it attracted an important middle and upper class, with some related services in education, culture or health care. Under socialism the city became a centre for high level R&D activities. Since 1945, Gliwice has hosted the second most important technological university in Poland. Before 1990, located within the city were seven industrial research institutes, two Warsaw based R&D branches,

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162 About the Upper Silesian Industrial Region and the Silesian NUTS II Voivodship, please see annex.
163 Domanski, 2000, see table 1 in annex
164 see more on Gliwice’s historical development in annex
three departments of the Polish Academy of Sciences, and 19 large engineering companies specialised in industrial design.\textsuperscript{165}

As a result, since the political transition Gliwice has maintained some important social and economic advantages in the region such as:

- a relatively high proportion of graduates in the population and the most comprehensive facilities for secondary and higher education in the region contributing to a high quality of human capital in the city;
- a relatively good urban environment, partly due to the fact that Gliwice is the only city in the region to have a medieval city centre, and partly to the fact that the presence of middle and upper classes had attracted the development of some better quality residential facilities;
- the relatively good living standards of the city have also resulted in the presence of several cultural and urban services (e.g. musical theatre, cafés, and a lively urban life in the medieval centre, etc);
- the disappearing of industrial and mining activities from the city increased the green spaces and improved the quality of air in the urban area.

These social and environmental characteristics of Gliwice complemented some more obvious attractions of the city related to its geographical position or infrastructure, such as:

- Gliwice is located in the westernmost part of the Silesian industrial region on the intersection of two major highways, the A4 (Dresden/Berlin - Wroclaw - Krakow) and A1 (Gdansk-Vienna). Motorways play a basic role in the accessibility of Gliwice (Krakow is one hour by care from Gliwicer.)
- Being located on the periphery of the industrial region, Gliwice has some important green field areas that can easily be converted into new industrial sites
- The high number of R&D institutions, companies and other services hosted by the city offer a rich basis for new development following privatisation
- Gliwice Municipality follows an active policy of economic development and responded promptly to the infrastructural requirements of firms planning to settle in its industrial areas.

In line with these proactive policies, in 2004 the City, in cooperation with the Silesian University of Technology and the Katowice Special Economic Zone Co., created a company for the setting up of the first Technology Park in the city (Technopark Gliwice, which opened in 2008).\textsuperscript{166} Gliwice is taking part of the World Technopolis Association as the only city from Europe.

The above listed positive outcomes are accompanied by some negative socio-economic features, mostly reflecting some typical problems of post-socialist cities as follows:

- A negative demographic development: between 1990 and 2005, as a result of outward migration, relatively high death rates and relatively low birth rates, Gliwice lost 7 per cent of its population. This was a significant loss, although it is still not comparable to that

\textsuperscript{165} Domanski, 2000

\textsuperscript{166} Interview with Karolina Warchalowska, Technopark Gliwice. see also annex
experienced by Katowice (16 per cent)\(^{167}\). Since the middle of the last decade this tendency is improving and since 2005 a constant increase in the birth rate was observed (1.669 in 2006 and 1.758 in 2007) although net migration rate still remained negative (-624 in 2007)\(^{168}\).

Gliwice suffers from a relatively poor public transport system. In spite of its excellent accessibility by road, accessing the city by train is rather difficult: for example Krakow is more than three hours from Gliwice by train. In addition the public transport system within the city boundaries has been weakened, especially as a result of the closure of the tram lines in 2009.\(^{169}\)

**Gliwice as part of the Katowice Special Economic Zone**\(^{170}\)

Another main advantage for the economic development of Gliwice was the creation of the Katowice Special Economic Zone in 1996. The Special Economic Zones (SEZ) were created in Poland from 1994, with the aim to sustain the economic reconversion of the country’s former industrial areas. The SEZ is a form of state subsidy towards for these areas to facilitate the attraction of large firms and new industrial production by offering a total exemption from corporation tax for ten years and then a possibility of maintaining a partial exemption of up to half of the company’s income.\(^{171}\)

The Katowice SEZ covers an area of 1,544 ha located across 35 different sites in 19 cities, and extending into three different **voivodeships** (regions)\(^{172}\). The zone is divided into four sub-zones, one of them located in Gliwice. The Gliwice subzone covers an area of around 600 ha and hosts some leading investors such as GM Opel, NGK Ceramics, Mecalux and Roca.\(^{173}\) Gliwice became part of the zone as a result of lobbying by General Motors, with the company making the integration of Gliwice in the Katowice SEZ one of the conditions for its investment in the area\(^{174}\). This investment contributed to the strengthening of the car industry cluster in the Silesian-Krakow region that started in the 1980s with the setting up of the production of the Fiat Cinquecento in Tychy.\(^{175}\)

\(^{167}\) Grossmann et al (2009): Urban shrinkage in East-Central Europe?

\(^{168}\) Key structural and economic characteristics, City of Gliwice. in: Baseline study in the frame of the Fin Urb Act project application (URBACT II)

\(^{169}\) http://www.energy-cities.eu/IMG/pdf/Gliwice_tramway_history_en.pdf (“President’s decision was supported by KZK and the Council, and since 1st September 2009, tramways are no longer present on Gliwice’s streets”)

\(^{170}\) About the Special Economic Zones (SEZ) see more in annex

\(^{171}\) Gwosdz et al, 2008.

\(^{172}\) SEZ do not constitute continuous geographical regions but consist of separate industrial sites spread over the given area.


\(^{174}\) Gwosdz et al. 2008., 831.

\(^{175}\) Gwosdz-Micek, 2010, 165.
The Gliwice sub zone has been developed on a green field area on the outskirts of the city, where facilities had been built by the Municipality of Gliwice.\textsuperscript{176} Until 2004, approximately 4,200 new jobs were created in this area out of the total of 17,374 jobs created in the Katowice SEZ.\textsuperscript{177} Nevertheless, even though the SEZ has exerted a strong influence on the economic development of Gliwice, it is not the only factor. Gliwice is also the location for a renewal of R&D activities and consequently the development of knowledge based industries. All these factors explain the relatively high attractiveness of Gliwice for international investments. In 2010 Gliwice was ranked as a Class A city in terms of investment attractiveness in the Silesian region.\textsuperscript{178}

2. The main challenge and how the actors perceive it

Gliwice and its main challenge – a city of SMEs and a knowledge economy

Engineering and R&D companies which were active before the political transition in Gliwice have been partly privatised by international companies and partly abandoned. In the latter case, the companies are renting their laboratories and offices to new small businesses or R&D companies as summarised in: ‘R&D units, engineering firms and the Technical University have produced significant spin offs in the form of mushrooming new firms established by former employees of these institutions. The creation and expansion of new local businesses is a vital component of local economic growth and includes, among other things, enterprises offering engineering design, modernisation of industrial processes, computer services and firms manufacturing custom made electronic and electric devices, e.g. measuring and medical instruments.’\textsuperscript{179}

If the new focus for specialisation in Gliwice is the knowledge economy, then this is strongly related to SMEs which are playing a crucial role in the entire economy of the city. In 2007, 99 per cent of the total 20,000 registered companies were SMEs.\textsuperscript{180} As a result, improving the conditions of entrepreneurship, promoting the creation of SMEs and providing them a wide spread of services (such as financial support, material conditions, consultancy, training, accounting, etc) became essential policy at the level of the local government for stabilising local development.

This is the reason why we considered that the original challenge proposed, ‘Development of knowledge society in the service of the reconversion of a former mine city’, only covered one part of the actual situation in Gliwice. As a result, the challenge has been slightly modified to: ‘Improving and integrating local SMEs in order to sustain the economic revitalization of the city based on knowledge society.’

The main actors and their objectives

This revised challenge was confirmed in our discussions with key actors in Gliwice. For instance, the municipality regards the fostering of SMEs not only as a tool for economic development, but also as a

\textsuperscript{176} Interview with Mr Naumann Deputy Mayor of the Gliwice Municipality

\textsuperscript{177} Gwosdz et al. 2008, 835.

\textsuperscript{178} Investment attractiveness of regions 2010. Institute of Enterprise, Collegium of Business Administration Warsaw School of Economics.

\textsuperscript{179} Domanski, 2000, 11.

\textsuperscript{180} City of Gliwice – Key structural and economic characteristics, Baseline study of Fin-Urb-Act project, call for proposals URBACT II.
tool for decreasing unemployment. The Local Development Agency, as an independent project company of the municipality, affirms this policy by promoting and sustaining the creation of new SMEs in the knowledge based sector through the creation of infrastructure and education facilities (such as the Technology Park, Incubator units, and the Academy of Entrepreneurship). The Silesian Foundation of Support for Enterprises, as an NGO working in this field, promotes entrepreneurship to help unemployed persons and people with a risk of becoming unemployed. Furthermore, the NGO Centre (which is also maintained by the municipality) promotes local NGOs to act as independent bodies living within their own budgets (see table 2 below:)

Table 2: The main actors related to the challenge

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTOR</th>
<th>ACTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Managing several programs for SMEs:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- training and advising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- creation of special infrastructure for new SMEs: (New Gliwice project; Technology Park)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- information and intermediate role for SMEs (participation in FinUrbAct project)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Creation of project companies (Local Development Agency, NGO Centre)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Development Agency</td>
<td>Municipal project company created in 1999 and financed by the Municipality. Management of incubators and own training programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academy of Entrepreneurship</td>
<td>Studies in the fields of entrepreneurship, economy, fund raising for social companies, etc. Complementary fields with the Technical University.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silesian Foundation of Support for Enterprises</td>
<td>Created in 1994 with financing from the State and the World Bank, regional level institution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Training, advising and working group programmes for unemployed or people at risk of losing their jobs (outplacement programmes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO Centre</td>
<td>Created in 2001 by the Municipality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Incubators, training and advising for NGOs and people who intend to operate an NGO (such as the unemployed or other interested parties)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology Park</td>
<td>Offer of offices and services, training, advice for people looking to create SMEs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These actors, the main activities of which are presented below, are acting independently from each other, even though their objectives, methods and tools are similar. Their programmes are based on two types of activities as follows:

- training and consultancy services
- infrastructure services for new SMEs.

Almost all of these projects are financed from the different priorities of the Regional Operational Program co-financed by the Silesian Region.

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181 Interview with Mr. Naumann, Deputy Mayor of the city
In spite of these similar goals and resources, cooperation between these actors is limited and coordination of their actions is rare. Although some of them are created and financed by the municipality (the NGO Centre, the Local Development Agency), they are intervening as independent actors in the city, following their own objectives. These objectives and the target groups they aim at are not defined in any complementary way, with the result that it may lead to the creation of similar types of projects for similar target groups.

3. The strategic background

**SME development as part of the economic development strategy of Gliwice**

The palpable similarity of the methods and tools of local actors denotes also the strong influence of national and regional strategies on local development, in particular of the Regional Operational Programme as the main financing instrument for local projects.

In reality, the relatively strong influence of policies of central government on the Silesian region has been clearly observed by geographic research. It shows that this influence has been extant since the 1990s through the creation of the SEZ, or the construction of the new A4 highway as one of the main national infrastructure investments. In the first years of their functioning, SEZs were seen as instruments of national regional policies, and prioritised the attraction of medium or large sized enterprises. Soon the SEZs were considered as unique tools for subsidising the attraction of enterprises to the target areas. Following the European adhesion strategy for Poland, the priorities for regional development were redefined according to EU priorities and, as a result, the position of SMEs became more advantageous.

In this context, the Development Strategy of the Silesian Voivodeship highlights that: “Creating the conditions for the development of small and medium sized enterprises’ is one of the priorities of an innovative and competitive economy”. The Regional Strategy of Innovation for the Silesian Voivodeship 2003-2013 identified the development of SMEs as one of the main goals of regional innovation development. The following related priorities have been identified:

- Creation of Regional System of Information for SMEs
- Creation of a Regional Financial System for SME development
- Support of SMEs for a more effective use of marketing possibilities on the Single European Market
- Development of innovative traditions
- Formation of a regional economy based on strong economic clusters
- Development of the regional economy based on networks
- Support for the creation of innovative companies

In line with the regional strategy, the City of Gliwice developed its ‘Strategy of Integrated and Sustainable development of Gliwice to 2022’, where the priority ‘Formation of Modern Economic Structures’ covers the attraction of innovative investments, the creation of advantageous conditions

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182 Domanski, 2003, 16.

for cooperation between business and science, or the improving of entrepreneurship behaviour among local citizens. The city has also issued its ‘Strategy on Social problems 2006-2015’ identifying as strategic goal the increase of employment through the training of those starting their enterprise, promoting entrepreneurship and programmes for the creation of jobs[184].

The main strategies and actions of urban development in Gliwice and the role of European financing

To sustain economic development, the City introduced several policies and interventions for improving the living conditions in Gliwice, in line with the main priorities of the Strategy up to 2022 and these are as follows:

- Building the economic structure
- Improving living conditions
- Developing metropolitan functions
- Strengthening the spatial attractiveness
- Building civic society

The main developments in Gliwice during the last decade concerned:

- **Infrastructural developments**, such as the modernisation of the water and sewage systems, road-construction, modernisation of sidewalks and traffic lights, etc.
- **Urban revitalisation**, concerning the run-down inner districts as well as the extended brown-field and military zones of the city, in the frame of two programmes adopted by the Municipality. First, the Local Programme of Revitalisation of Urban Areas in Gliwice (2005) and its five territorial programmes concerning the revitalisation of the most neglected urban areas of Gliwice[185] and, secondly, the Revitalisation Programme of Post-industrial and Post-military areas (2006).
- **Cultural investment**: revitalisation of some specific historical buildings – for example, the creation of a Cultural Information and Regional Education Centre in the Piast dynasty’s castle; revitalisation of a radio station and its area; modernisation of the Gliwice Musical Theatre; construction of a modern entertainment and sports hall (PODIUM).

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[184] City of Gliwice – Key structural and economic characteristics, Baseline study of Fin-Urb-Act project, call for proposals URBACT II.

[185] Ligota Zabrska, Sobierać, Sobór, Kopernik, Śródmieście
Table 3 shows the programmes managed by the Municipality of Gliwice that benefitted from EU financing since the pre-accession period until the 2007-2013 period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financing period</th>
<th>Project title</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-accession</td>
<td>Modernisation of the sewage system in Gliwice</td>
<td>ISPA and Cohesion Fund</td>
<td>Total: € 47 M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EU: € 21M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Renovation of the post industrial zone of New Gliwice”</td>
<td>PHARE</td>
<td>total: € 21 M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EU: € 9,5M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-2006</td>
<td>Reconstruction of a section of the national road</td>
<td>Sectoral Operational Programme for Transport (SPOT)</td>
<td>Total: PLN 71,686,442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EU: PLN 39,730,314.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Revitalisation of the Piast dynasty’s castle. Establishment of the Cultural Information and Regional Education Centre”</td>
<td>ERDF</td>
<td>Total: PLN 3,670,202.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EU: PLN 940,337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-2013</td>
<td>Construction of the modern entertainment and sports hall PODIUM</td>
<td>ERDF</td>
<td>total: PLN 365,017,037</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EU: PLN 141,574,456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Modernisation of a water and sewage system in Gliwice – Stage 2”</td>
<td>ERDF</td>
<td>total: PLN 35,391,247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EU: is PLN 94,584,720.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Integrated urban actions to support and fund innovative economies and SMEs (FIN-URB-ACT)</td>
<td>ERDF</td>
<td>total: PLN 133,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EU: PLN 90,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regional cooperation along the 3rd Pan-European Transport Corridor</td>
<td>ERDF</td>
<td>PLN 520,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PLN 442,000.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Construction of information society in the central subregion of the Łódź Voivodship: City of Gliwice</td>
<td>ERDF</td>
<td>total: PLN 8,705,711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EU: PLN 7,399,939.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In spite of this extensive list, European funds only cover a small part of the total municipal income as shown in Fig. 2:

Fig. 2: City’s income by source in the period 2006 –2010

source: Budget and Analysis Division of the Gliwice City Office

4. The main actions in Gliwice answering the challenge

Development of ‘New Gliwice project’ as part of municipal policies

Gliwice Municipality launched its ‘incubator policy’ by the end of the 1990s to help local SMEs start up. A Local Development Agency (LDA) was created in 1999 for managing the related programmes and the LDA opened in the same year that the first incubator opened in the city.

In 2000, one of the last remaining coal mines of the city was closed and so the site needed revitalisation, mainly because two building on the site were classified as important elements of the Gliwice industrial heritage. The project for a new zone for economic development called the ‘New Gliwice Project’ began to take shape as the site seemed to be well suited to the two main objectives of this project, which were:

- creating favourable conditions for new SMEs (incubator) and
- creating good conditions for students to learn economic management (education)
The site was cleaned up and the two main buildings were restored and transformed to host an incubator and a new high school of entrepreneurship (the Academy of Entrepreneurship). The infrastructure development accomplished in 2003 was financed by the Phare Programme. The task of filling the two buildings with projects was the next part of the project that took place following the EU membership.

**The incubator**

Run by the Local Development Agency (LDA), 40 per cent of the building is rented to subsidised enterprises (i.e. a subsidy based on the difference between the market price and the lower price paid by SMEs was allocated by the Municipality to the LDA), and 60 per cent is rented based on market prices. Since the start of 2011, the incubator no longer receives subsidies from the municipality and so the LDA has to finance the difference between the lower rents and the market prices from the sale of designated plots of land next to the incubator.

At the beginning of the New Gliwice project, the Municipality also supported the LDA through an Interreg C project called ‘New Technology Incubator’, an international collaboration between Gliwice, Lille and Aachen. The aim of this exchange programme was to provide the LDA with basic information on methods and tools of managing an incubator of this kind. Apart from this, the city funded four training programmes for SMEs in the new Incubator.

In the framework of the Human Capital priority of the Regional Operational Program 2007-2013 financed by ESF, the LDA achieved the financing of an important programme for training and the creation of SMEs. This programme was targeted at people wanting to create a new enterprise with a priority for those entrepreneurs aged under 25 or above 45 years old, the long term unemployed or disabled. This priority was determined by the Managing Authority according to the EU priorities. All the 42 participants of this training prepared a business plan out of which 22 were selected for funding for the creation of their businesses. €10,000 was allocated to each person with the condition that they maintained their enterprise for at least 12 months (otherwise they were obliged to pay back the loan). To date, none of the loans have had to be paid back.  

**The Academy of Entrepreneurship**

The High School of Entrepreneurship began to function one year before the actual opening of its building in New Gliwice. The remit of the school is to teach business management and other subjects that cannot be found at the Technical University. The Academy has four main faculties: economy, design, faculty of ‘social workers’ and English. The third faculty needs a little more explanation. Its aim is to train people who in the future can help NGOs to create and run their own structure.

The Academy is attended by 1,000 students who mainly come from Gliwice and its surroundings. In the relevant faculties, strong relationships exist with the incubator companies. The academy is self-financing with the student fees (of € 400 / semester) covering the running costs of the building. Apart

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186 Interview with T. Szulc, director of LDA
from this, the Academy is applying to additional funding sources for certain projects, for instance for the PhD courses. The LDA is the owner of the school.187

Creating new financial and information tools for SMEs

Between 2008 and 2011, Gliwice was part of the Fin-Urb-Act network within the URBACT II programme, created for supporting local SMEs and innovative economies.188 The original objective of Gliwice in this framework was to create a new financial instrument to help the formation of SMEs. In collaboration with the Regional Guarantee Fund, the city intended to increase this guarantee up to 80 per cent (compared to the actual 50 per cent) in order to help small entrepreneurs to get a bank loan. As a result of the financial crisis, this objective became ineffective since now even the 80 per cent guarantee has proved insufficient guarantee for a bank. As a result, the project had to be changed. According to the questionnaire launched by the municipality at the beginning of the project, one of the main problems for local SMEs is the lack of information. Although an Info Point already existed in the LDA building, many entrepreneurs instead used the building of the municipality to obtain information.

As a result the main outcomes of the URBACT Programme are as follows:

- the city has to be more active in information giving and has to work out a new strategy for a real intermediary position
- SMEs need more information on EU funding
- Some future projects are determined and will be realised during the following months: firstly, an official web site is under construction for providing information to SMEs, and secondly meetings with the managing authorities for the EU funds for SMEs are planned. 189

Promoting entrepreneurship for unemployed persons and people in a marginal situation

The Silesian Foundation of Support for Enterprises is a non profit organisation created in 1994. It was one of the 13 foundations created all over Poland in the framework of a programme realised in cooperation with the World Bank and the Ministry of Labour for the “Development of Small Entrepreneurship”. The founding partners include several municipalities from the region, as well as the Technical University. The objective of the foundation is to promote entrepreneurship between local inhabitants, and in particular:

- for the unemployed or people benefiting from outplacement services 190
- other groups that are in a difficult situation on the jobs market - for instance, women from rural areas, those currently inactive but not registered as unemployed.

The Foundation’s main activities include training, individual advice, the creation of small working groups for helping people with common interests in order to stimulate their motivation from working

187 Interview with M. Madej, director of the Academy of Entrepreneurship
189 Interview with Katarzyna Kobierska, City Development Office of the Gliwice Municipality
190 Advice and training service for the employees of a company that is being wound up, paid for by the company.
together, etc. The main resource for these activities mainly comes from European projects, with regional co-financing. Since the country joined the EU in 2004, the foundation has managed 12 EU projects, most of them financed by ESF.

**Entrepreneurship in the non profit sector**

In Gliwice entrepreneurship is understood in its broadest sense. In the case of the Academy of Entrepreneurship, one of the faculties is devoted to the promotion of entrepreneurship in the NGO sector. Furthermore, in 2001 the Municipality founded an NGO Centre for supporting NGOs in Gliwice. This Centre comprises 20 workers and its main activities are quite similar to those of the Silesian Foundation or the LDA, only their target groups are different. Here training, personal advice, and consulting are organised for local NGOs as well as for local groups or individuals willing to create an NGO. Their main goal is to help NGOs create their own financial structure by improving their fund raising capacities in order to become financially independent. Therefore, new NGOs or persons willing to create one, can obtain a form of ‘business training’ from the NGO centre. The majority of NGOs in Gliwice deal with cultural and sports issues, and the NGO centre does not work with organisations created for defending special interests, fighting against some public policy decisions, etc. Among the 400 registered NGOs in Gliwice, approximately 150 are receiving support from the NGO centre.

The Gliwice NGO Centre is a municipal agency, partly financed by the municipality and partly from EU funded projects.

One important programme is a running network project financed by the EU OP Human Resources Priority (for the sum of € 1 million) with the aim of creating ‘incubators for social enterprises’ in Gliwice and a further five cities in the region. These incubators operate following the traditional model in that they offer spaces to NGOs as well as some other services such as information, training, workshops etc.

The NGO centre also works in partnership with the Academy of Entrepreneurship by providing training for them on ‘social enterprises’. Apart from these specific programmes, they regularly organise meetings and small working groups for NGOs.

**Results of the projects - Evaluation**

As it was the case in the City of Brno, the actual results of the projects launched and managed by the different actors in Gliwice are well evaluated following the requirements of the programme. Nevertheless, no assessment has been made on the overall effects of the outcomes on the urban development of the city, for example how these programmes contribute – or may contribute in the future - to the overall economic development of the city? We can only estimate the likely impact of these programmes through some general data. For example, the relatively high number of people employed by SMEs in Gliwice is 39 per cent compared to 28,7 per cent at the national level (see table 1 in annex).

In the case of each project, the concrete numbers of persons participating in training and on advisory programmes are available, and in addition there is some basic information on the percentage of people managing to find a job during the few months up to one year following completion of their programme.

Some examples of project outcomes are given below:
In 2010 the Silesian Foundation for Support of Enterprises had 355 trainees and consulted 34 persons and approximately 50 per cent found a job.

According to the NGO centre, 27 new NGOs are founded every year in Gliwice – partly as the result of their activities.

The recent training project organised in the frame of the ROP by the Local Development Agency led to the creation of 22 new enterprises.

Nevertheless, further tracking of the participants is not done and so no further information is available on the following:

- the development of the long run career of those who succeeded to get a job or create their own SMEs as a result of the training (as the projects are quite recent, this indicator would give better results after a number of years have elapsed).
- the main reasons for the failure of those who could not get a job or could not create their own company and the subsequent plans and option for these people in the future.

In addition, the connectivity of the projects with the other similar projects is not assessed and whether there is any overlap between the persons benefitting from the training programmes offered by the different actors.

5. Lessons learned and conditions of transferability

How strong is the potential of Gliwice?

As has been shown in the first part of this report, Gliwice does not conform to the archetypical former industrial city, suffering from a long lasting and deep decline, social and economic crisis as a result of closure of industrial production and mining. On the contrary, Gliwice is firmly located between those cities in the Silesian region that could profit from economic transformation. Unemployment in Gliwice is half of the national average (see table 1 in annex).

On the other hand, almost all interviewees underlined the necessity of a structural economic development in Gliwice, and some of them – and including virtually all those representing the social and NGO sector – underlined the serious problem of unemployment and of low educational levels found in the majority of the population. 191

However, this contradiction may be assumed as ‘natural’, since the specific field of action of each actor and the main objectives of their projects are, in reality, moving towards a structural improvement of local economy (for example through the creation of SMEs, a decrease in unemployment, etc). Nevertheless, this contradiction may also raise doubts about the existence of a real diagnosis on the city’s potential that would have gone on and so been acknowledged by local stakeholders and the population as a whole. On the contrary: the programmes and strategies presented during the interviews for this case study gave the impression that although they are all perfectly prepared and presented, their originality or ‘vivacity’ is missing. This reflects the lack of some real long term global objectives that should have been determined by the different actors. Furthermore, no complementarities are defined between the different actors, risking the setting up of similar projects with similar results and target groups and so leading to wasted resources through duplication.

191 Interviews with T. Pawlowski, NGO Centre and Bozena Gabryel, Silesian Foundation of Support for Entreprises
Standardisation of projects?

The very similar methods, tools and objectives presented by the different actors give the impression of strongly standardised policies and programmes. In Gliwice, most of the actions and programmes intervening for the development of SMEs and promoting entrepreneurship are financed from the Regional Operational Programmes and, as a result, they respond to the main priorities and objectives defined by the region, the latter being based on the focus of the EU. In that context, Gliwice is a good example to show both the negative and positive effects of European cohesion fund policies.

The main advantage is, of course, that the Regional Operational Programmes bring a high added value to urban policies and to the activities of the different actors. At the same time, EU funding represents a strong factor in the standardisation of projects. The general aim of the city to correspond to those priorities and demands defined by the EU, may hinder the implementation of original projects and the definition of objectives that are locally important and based on a well established local diagnosis. Consequently, this may be an important obstacle for the sustainability of these projects. Nevertheless, the role of EU financing in the implementation of local strategies is quite difficult to assess, as EU financing accounts for a relatively small part of the total income of the Municipality (see fig. 2 above).

The above presented contradiction can, of course, be found in many European cities, albeit in different degrees. However, the case of Gliwice is an interesting example since the city’s history shows that its main potential and functions have always been changing according to the political and economic influences (see in annex). Therefore Gliwice may be a good example of a city that has strong development potential within its region, but the development path has always been influenced by external conditions. At present, these external political and economic conditions concern the integration of Poland into the EU and the establishment of the Regional Operations Programme. This path is perhaps more typical of East-Central Europe than in other parts of the continent, particularly in this large region where the rapid succession of very different political and economic structures failed to allow enough time for the formulation of local strategies and objectives.
### Annex

#### Table 1.: Main data on Gliwice and other cities in the region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>town/city</th>
<th>area in sq km [as of 31 Dec 2009]</th>
<th>inhabitants in thousands [as of 31 Dec 2009]</th>
<th>population density (persons per sq km)</th>
<th>employed persons* [31 XII 2008] in thousands</th>
<th>employed persons per 100 inhabitants</th>
<th>employed in mining, manufacturing and construction (Nace C-F, rev. 1.1.) in thousands*</th>
<th>share of employed in Nace C-F (rev. 1.1.)* [%]</th>
<th>unemployment rate (as of 31 Dec 2010) [%]</th>
<th>registered companies per 10,000 inhabitants (As of 31 Dec. 2009)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Katowice</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>308.5</td>
<td>1 870</td>
<td>192.1</td>
<td>62.3</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sosnowiec</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>219.3</td>
<td>2 410</td>
<td>74.1</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>1071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gliwice</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>196.2</td>
<td>1 464</td>
<td>89.9</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>1138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zabrze</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>187.7</td>
<td>2 346</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bytom</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>182.7</td>
<td>2 649</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruda Śląska</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>143.4</td>
<td>1 838</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dąbrowa Górnicza</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>127.7</td>
<td>676</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chorzów</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>113.0</td>
<td>3 424</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mysłowice</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>74.9</td>
<td>1 135</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siemianowice Śląskie</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>70.7</td>
<td>2 828</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Będzin</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>1 587</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>1122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wiślońcowice</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>4 161</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czeladź</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>2 097</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tychy</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>129.4</td>
<td>1 579</td>
<td>59.4</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>1003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaworzno</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>95.0</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>787</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piekary Śląskie</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>1 463</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Poland</strong></td>
<td><strong>312 679</strong></td>
<td><strong>38 167.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>122.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>13 711.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>35.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>3 930.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>28.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>12.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>981</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

source: K. Gwosdz own calculations based on non-published data of Polish Statistical Office (col no 5,6,7,8,) and Bank Danych Lokalnych of Polish Statistical Office (columns no. 2,3,4,9,10)

*NACE S-F = industrial companies between 50 and 100 employees together with microfirms (employment of less than 10 persons), own calculation by Krzysztof Gwosdz*
1. Brief history of Gliwice

Gliwice is a medieval town where industrial development began in the 17th century from a technological innovation, namely the creation of the first coke-fuelled blast furnace the Continent. The coming of the railways made Gliwice a new industrial and mining town: with two mines, and iron and steel making activities. From this perspective, Gliwice followed the same development path of other cities in the region (for example, Bytom, Katowice, etc). However, at the same time, Gliwice was given a privileged position by becoming the headquarters of industrial companies, a situation that attracted several complementary changes, such as the establishment of a middle and upper class in the city and with them, several secondary and high level services (such as education with a good secondary school, healthcare services, a new hospital, cultural facilities, the musical theatre, several parks, etc.).

Following World War I, a part of Silesia that included Gliwice, was attached to Germany. In this new situation, Gliwice became the centre of the German part of the Silesian industrial region, while Katowice grew as the centre of the Polish part. After World War II, Gliwice was again attached to Poland, and suffered from deep restructuring with the deportation of the middle and upper classes, nationalisation of the industrial companies, and the resultant disappearance of services. Nevertheless, under socialism Gliwice once again became a specific centre of the region and on the site of the former services, new, mainly R&D functions, were introduced. The secondary school building hosted the Technical University of Gliwice (established in 1945), which was the first university of its kind in the region and only the second in Poland after Warsaw. Gliwice hosted seven industrial research institutes, two Warsaw based R&D branches, three departments of the Polish Academy of Sciences, and 19 large engineering companies specialised in industrial design. Research and development was a new function of Gliwice and attracted highly educated people.

2. The Upper Silesian Industrial region and the Silesian Voivodship

Gliwice is the second largest city after Katowice of the Upper Silesian industrial region, one of the main industrial zones of Poland. This area consists of 27 powiats (cities and settlements) in an area of 6,073 km², with a population of 3.6 million inhabitants. The centre of the region is Katowice with 340,000 inhabitants, followed by nine towns with more than 100,000 people, the biggest of them being Gliwice itself with almost 200,000 inhabitants.

Within the region, the Upper Silesian Metropolitan Union was founded in 2007 and currently 14 adjacent cities are participating in it. Its population was 2,039,454 in 2008. The Union is a local initiative and participation is voluntary and because of this is not a strong organisational unit in the region.

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192 1846: connection to Wroclaw
193 mainly composed by Jews and by Germans: the latter population was deported after the war.
194 Domanski, 2000
Upper Silesia is part of the Silesian Voivodeship, a NUTSII region centred in Katowice (4,676,983 inhabitants, and an area of 12,334 km²).\footnote{Silesian Voivodship comprises two other units: Czechostowa a mainly agricultural region and Bielsko-Biała, where tourism and industries are the main sectors.}

![Fig 2: The Silesian Voivodeship](http://www.silesia-europa.pl)

Source: http://www.silesia-europa.pl

### 3. The Special Economic Zones in Poland

The Special Economic Zones (SEZ) were introduced in Poland in 1994 as instruments of regional development. Similar SEZ were created in other post-socialist countries of East Central Europe as well as in other parts of the world such as China, for example). The aim of the SEZ is to support the industrial and peripheral regions in crisis and to stimulate their economic growth by improving their potential for attracting external investment and reinforcing their local economies. In Poland the SEZs were created for the following reasons:

- accelerating the economic development of regions
- managing post-industrial property and infrastructure
- creating new jobs
- attracting foreign investors to Poland

As a result, they were mainly created in old industrial regions, with a specific challenge to promote the use of existing industrial assets. Following the creation of the first SEZ in 1994 in Mielec, several new zones were created and there are now 14 across the country, one of them being the Katowice SEZ.

The main benefit of investing in a special economic zone is the possibility of obtaining a tax allowance consisting in exemption from corporate tax for the first ten years of operation of an

\footnote{Gwosdz et al.}

\footnote{A Guide to Special Economic Zones, KPNG in Poland, 2009}
enterprise. The tax allowance is provided by the local municipality and the difference is repaid to it by the state. The SEZs are managed by the Managing Authorities which are limited companies, their stakeholders being the local municipalities. The fields for investment are provided and prepared by the municipalities.

**Fig 3: Special Economic Zones in Poland**


4. Technopark Gliwice

The Limited company managing the Technopark was jointly created in 2004 by the City, the Silesian University of Technology and the Katowice Special Economic Zone Co. The construction of the building was completed in 2008 and was partly financed by a contribution from the ERDF. The park has three main objectives as follows:

1. Incubation of newly created SMEs
2. Transfer of technology
3. Promotion of entrepreneurship

1. The provision of office space for newly established SMEs for up to 2-3 years and a common conference room for special events. The building is already full, so now there has been a decision to create a new building. The Technopark company tendered an ERDF financing bid in the frame of the Regional Operational Program but this failed to receive approval.

2. Technology transfer has been realised mainly through partnerships within the region between the 12 R&D Institutes, 3 Academic Institutes, scientists and students. In addition, the Technopark also purchased four new technology machines which they rent to companies for their own use.

3. A special programme - Academic Entrepreneurship. In order to reinforce the contact between the business sector and the university, a programme of the Technopark focuses on stimulating university employees (scientists, professors, etc) to create their own enterprises. For this purpose, professional training services are offered in the frame of the EU OP.
5. Interviews
Katarzyna Kobierska, Director of the City Development Office, Gliwice Municipality
Mr. Naumann, Deputy Mayor of Gliwice
Tomasz Szulc, Director of LDA
Marek Madej, Director of Academy of Entrepreneurship
Tomasz Pawłowksi, NGO Centre
Bozena Gabryel, Directrice of the Slilesian Foundation of Support for Enterprises
Prof Kosmol, Director, and Karolina Warchalowska, Assistant, Technology Park of Gliwice
Krysztof Gwodsz, PhD, geographer researcher Jagellonian Uliversity, Institute of Geography and Spatial Management, Krakow

6. Sources, web sites
A guide to Special Economic Zones in Poland, KPNG Poland, 2009
Gwodsz et al, 2010: Spatial agglomerations in the Polish automotive industry, in: PRZEGŁ•D GEOGRAFICZNY 2010, 82, 2, s. 143–173
Domanski, B (2003): Economic trajectory, path dependency and strategic intervention in an old industrial region: the case of Upper Silesia. in: Domanski (ed) Recent advances in urban and regional studies, Polish Academy of Sciences, Committee for Space Economy and Regional Planning, Warsaw, 133-153
City of Gliwice – Key structural and economic characteristics, Baseline study of Fin-Urb-Act project, call for proposals URBACT II
http://www.gliwice.eu/
http://www.slaskie.pl/
THE CONSOLIDATION OF A POST SOCIALIST URBAN REGENERATION WITH DECREASING SUBSIDIES

THE CASE OF LEIPZIG, GERMANY
1. Introduction and main data

Urban regeneration in cities of former socialist countries cannot be dealt with in exactly the same way as in western European countries. Although de-industrialisation affected them all, the main difference lies in the fact that in many cases industrial cities in Eastern and Central Europe completely lost their industrial infrastructures in a very short space of time and hundreds of thousands of workers were suddenly out of jobs.\(^{198}\) Another crucial fact is that towns were in an advanced stage of decline, not only evident in the poorly built prefabricated housing estates of the GDR period, but also in the old housing stock in the inner cities that had been totally neglected by the socialist regime. Furthermore, as a consequence of these two factors, there was a serious demographic crisis that was particularly strong in East Germany, though was not happening in all former socialist countries. This imbalance resulted from a combination of outward migration and low birth rates.\(^{199}\)

As evidenced by statistical data, Leipzig has had to face a critical situation but perhaps better than other cities, it managed to tackle some of the main issues at an early stage, largely thanks to the mobilisation of local actors and to European, federal and state funds.

Leipzig is the largest city of the State of Saxony in Germany. Dresden, the State capital city is smaller. Like all cities in East Germany (the former GDR) there was a significant loss of population after

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\(^{198}\) Decrease in the number of employments subject to social insurance contribution from 1993 to 1997 by 6.2% and by another 12.3 per cent between 1997 and 2003, BBR 2005: 43

\(^{199}\) Population decreased by approximately 11 per cent from 14.9 million in 1990 to 13.3 million in 2005, Statistisches Bundesamt, Statistische Ämter der Länder.
reunification, and Leipzig went through a steep demographic decline throughout the 1990s. The decline stopped at the end of the decade and was followed by a slow but constant increase that has continued ever since. The 2010 population was almost 520,000, and this number is close to what it was at the beginning of the decline, but still not quite up to the 1989 figure (530,000). Interestingly, there is an important flow of residential mobility within the city, with a significant population growth in the regenerated areas, particularly in the western neighbourhoods close to the town centre, in areas which benefited from large investments in urban and economic regeneration.

Table 1: Leipzig population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inhabitants total</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>male</td>
<td>243,125</td>
<td>245,017</td>
<td>247,282</td>
<td>250,018</td>
<td>251,748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>female</td>
<td>259,526</td>
<td>261,561</td>
<td>263,230</td>
<td>265,451</td>
<td>267,114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German inhabitants</td>
<td>470,903</td>
<td>474,597</td>
<td>477,724</td>
<td>481,941</td>
<td>486,564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>male</td>
<td>224,174</td>
<td>226,368</td>
<td>228,329</td>
<td>230,729</td>
<td>233,397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>female</td>
<td>246,729</td>
<td>248,229</td>
<td>249,395</td>
<td>251,212</td>
<td>253,167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign inhabitants</td>
<td>31,748</td>
<td>31,981</td>
<td>32,788</td>
<td>33,528</td>
<td>32,298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>male</td>
<td>18,951</td>
<td>18,649</td>
<td>18,953</td>
<td>19,289</td>
<td>18,351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>female</td>
<td>12,797</td>
<td>13,332</td>
<td>13,835</td>
<td>14,239</td>
<td>13,947</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistical Office of the Free State of Saxony

Table 2: Enterprises in Leipzig

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of enterprises</td>
<td>34,058</td>
<td>35,011</td>
<td>36,702</td>
<td>38,431</td>
<td>40,179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of trade and handicrafts</td>
<td>3,808</td>
<td>3,882</td>
<td>3,934</td>
<td>3,994</td>
<td>4,078</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Chamber of Commerce of Leipzig
Source: Chamber of Handicrafts of Leipzig

Table 3: Vocational schools total

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pupils</td>
<td>26,611</td>
<td>26,708</td>
<td>26,022</td>
<td>24,910</td>
<td>24,033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching staff</td>
<td>1,622</td>
<td>1,754</td>
<td>1,762</td>
<td>1,715</td>
<td>1,683</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistical Office of the Free State of Saxony

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200 A table of colleges and universities is in Appendix
2. The challenge of an overall recovery

Previous research focusing on Leipzig and in three other eastern or central European cities (ACT Consultants, 2007), underlined the quantity and quality of the comprehensive urban regeneration implemented in the western district of Plagwitz-Lindenau.

On the basis of this relatively successful regeneration process, our suggestion for the current challenge for the city was first as follows: “how to extend the methods experimented in Plagwitz in the 2000-2006 on the whole city?” However, the civil servants in charge of urban regeneration and urban planning interviewed for the present study tend to view things slightly differently. They do not take for granted that the way of working in the western part of the city is transferable to other neighbourhoods, and a principal reason for this is the shortage of subsidies, as well as the differences in context between districts.

The main tool which allowed a global and in depth approach covering all aspects of the situation in Plagwitz was URBAN II (2000-2006). This European programme brought not only related subsidies, but also guidelines to combine actions on housing, public and green spaces, former industrial buildings and brown fields, and employment, and all of this with the real participation of citizens. It created a framework within which local actors could create and experiment actions such as the “House guardians” launched by the HausHalten association or the implementation of the concept of the “perforated city”, maintaining empty plots as part of environment and urban planning. However, there was much to do and at the end of URBAN (2006), local actors were hoping for a follow up system likely to provide funds to achieve regeneration of the area. In reality, what emerged was the OP ERDF programme, with much smaller subsidies. (URBAN: €20 million, OP ERDF 2007-2013: €5 million for the same territory up until 2012).

Consequently, the people interviewed for this case study in charge of urban planning consider the challenge is both to consolidate the URBAN benefits in the west, and to invent methods to continue to develop Leipzig, particularly in areas still in relatively bad shape.

Following on from this we can specify a more accurate challenge for Leipzig as follows: Grounding new actions on the lessons learned from the URBAN experience and finding innovative ways to develop the west and to start regenerating the east.

The strategy launched at the beginning of this century will be reviewed first, and then we analyse how the challenge has developed in recent times and how the strategy has been adapted accordingly.

3. The basic Leipzig strategy launched in the early 21st century

Facing a strong degradation of the housing stock and a haemorrhaging of enterprises, jobs and workers, Leipzig decided to be both realistic and voluntary in its approach to these challenges.

Being realistic meant accepting such factors as a shrinking city with some devastated sectors. To be voluntary meant to have confidence in the possibility of re creating activities and social life by bringing together the suggestions of inhabitants and the proposals of experts.

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201 Budapest in Hungary, Krakow in Poland, and Riga in Latvia

202 More information is given later in the report under "Flagship actions"
Overall, the city standpoint was "Keeping as much of the urban fabric as possible and restructuring as much as necessary".

**Main components of the strategy**

With the Urban development plan on housing and urban regeneration passed by the town council in 2000 and updated in 2003 and 2006, the municipality officially declared that urban shrinking would be considered as the main condition for the future urban development of Leipzig. Since then, its development strategy has been focusing on the methods to deal with this situation at the urban level. The thus far predominant model of a growing compact city was partly abandoned and instead the idea of the 'perforated city' was put forward, including new urban qualities that are mainly defined as 'more green, less density'. Based on a detailed analysis of the different sub-districts, neighbourhoods were ranked according to their potential in order to set out any further treatment within the process of urban regeneration.

According to this categorisation, three main areas for future urban regeneration policies were identified: Leipziger Osten (east Leipzig), Leipziger Westen (west Leipzig) and the large housing estates, especially Grünau. The target to be achieved by 2010 was the demolition of about 30,000 dwelling units, mainly in the large housing estates but also partly among the old housing stock. Between 2000 and 2006, about 6,400 dwelling units had already been demolished and so taken out of the market.

For each of the three main areas for urban policies, special target-plans were set up to define more precisely the development targets. The contents of each regeneration process were defined in a "Functional Plan".

**The main actors in the strategy**

In the table below we indicate who the prominent actors of the urban, economic and social recovery are.

Table 3: main actors in the strategy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Leipzig municipality</td>
<td>Decision-making and moderating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing companies</td>
<td>Signed an engagement on housing policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private investors</td>
<td>Buy land and build office spaces and housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associations</td>
<td>Cooperate with municipality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saxony State University</td>
<td>Provide statistics and monitoring when asked by the municipality</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 only mentions those actors who can be considered most active in the strategy of urban, economic and social recovery. However, the following parts of this report show that many more actors are involved in actions launched within this strategy.

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203 "Mehr Grün weniger Dichte" (Stadt Leipzig 2000: 7)
4. The current strategy of integrated urban development

Recent developments in the strategy

Until 2007, urban planning in Leipzig was already taking account of what is now considered to be at the forefront of a strategy for global recovery and attractiveness. Various kinds of actions were implemented at the time on identified areas, for example in the western part of the city. Ideas, proposals and financial contributions from various sources were welcomed and coordinated by the municipality. However, priority was given to housing and urban development.

Now the ambition of the municipality is to give more attention to other aspects such as school planning, culture, education, and quality of social life, and to interconnect them all. In the mid 2000s, it seemed that these objectives were already present. However, they may have been there as objectives, but less so in terms of implementation on the ground. In any case, the view of city planners now is that they are attempting to achieve a second stage of the integrated strategy, by emphasizing complementarities.

What seems particularly stimulating in all this is the way the strategy has been conceived in the long run. It started shortly after reunification but did not immediately have all the means it acquired later on. As a result, it progressively increased in complexity and ultimately became more sophisticated. The urban planning office drew a kind of circle, starting with regeneration in the northwestern part of the city centre, then going to the inner south, then the west (the current focus) and next will be the east.

The focus and lead actions are still on deprived areas but an emphasis is also put on main roads and the city centre. The attractiveness of the town and well being of its inhabitants are key concepts in this strategy. Consequently, it has an even a broader scope than the city itself. As an example of this, one idea is to try to create a route by boat through the city water ways to the surrounding lakes.\footnote{These lakes are former mineshaufrts turned into leisure places in the early 1990s.}

The role of the European structural funds

Financing is the critical issue. Currently subsidies are much smaller than in the previous period either from the State of Saxony, the Federal government (the Bund)\footnote{The 2010 cut in the Soziale Stadt programme is equal to 25 per cent of the 2009 budget.} or the EU. The municipal budget itself has been reduced. Consequently, new efforts are being made to implement projects by mixing the various funding sources. This method has been successful over the period 2000-2006 in the regeneration of the western part of the city.

However, the issue is not only to be able to continue with less money, regulations for the European programmes have changed in a way that places more constraints for urban integrated development, according to the Municipal Office for Urban Renewal and Housing Promotion\footnote{Interview of Mr Gerkens}. By comparison, URBAN allowed a more complex and integrated approach. The three dimensions (economic-employment, social, housing and urban) were each given approximately the same amount, whereas the ERDF operational programme is split into 50 per cent of the subsidies on building and environment, and 50 per cent on social and economic actions. In addition, total amounts are very different. URBAN II (2000-2006) brought about €20 million (URBAN and city contributions included) for an action plan focused on an area located in the Lindenau and Plagwitz neighbourhoods. The
ERDF OP (Operational Programme 2007-2013) is bringing € 5 million for the same territory\(^{207}\). The amount per capita was €500 for URBAN and €200 for the OP ERDF.

This financial reduction can be interpreted as a way of maintaining a smaller amount of assistance from structural funds to an area which has been highly subsidised in the previous period, so that projects that may have not been completed may be seen through to their conclusion. However, Leipzig was hoping to be able to go further in urban regeneration with more significant funding but on the contrary, all sources of public finance have been reduced. It took some time to adapt the strategy to this new situation and City services are studying ways of continuing with less public money. The participative method promoted by URBAN is a particularly valuable tool in such a situation. Another significant asset is private investment, as is explained below.

5. Methods

Participation

The role of the inhabitants and of grassroots organisations has been crucial in urban regeneration from the beginning. Contrary to what has been observed in other central European cities, citizens are willing to be partners of local government and technical bodies in the process of urban development.

As early as 1990, a “people’s conference for reconstruction” was held in Leipzig with the objective of rescuing the Plagwitz neighbourhood from falling into total degradation, following the loss of 80 per cent of its industrial infrastructure and the consequent loss of population.

Forums in different parts of Leipzig are the main structures for citizens' participation. They gather all volunteer inhabitants and other stakeholders such as shopkeepers, and all kinds of people interested in the development of their environment. These Forums meet three to four times a year and in the meantime they function through thematic working groups that have their equivalent in the city services, in order to be able to work together on projects.

In the domain of people’s participation, Leipzig west provides a model. The municipal office for urban regeneration in Plagwitz is a centre of information and contact, managed by a small team run by a private office under contract with the Municipality. The staff are in charge of organising the whole process of common working between technicians, inhabitants and other stakeholders. The work is principally the role of an urban planner who has been involved from the start in the urban regeneration of this area and he insists on the high quality of what is done with the neighbourhood, explaining that it is not only participation but rather cooperation\(^{208}\). For instance, an information meeting is first organised to prepare the next planning workshop to be held with inhabitants and planning officers. The meeting consists of walking and talking in the area and examining plans. After this, those of the group who wish to proceed further will be given more information and should be prepared to take part in the formal meeting dedicated to the planning process.

Inhabitants also participate directly in improving the environment or buildings. This process has resulted in three kindergartens being opened in the west. In the same way, groups of people and children undertook the repair and improvement of school yards.

\(^{207}\) More details in appendix
\(^{208}\) Interview of Mr Fritjof Mothes
Private initiative and investment

Private investors have always been welcome within the Leipzig urban strategy for recovery. However, in the early 2000s they were not so numerous though some large international companies such as BMW or DHL came and settled in Leipzig. An association of economic actors was engaged in seeking new investors in order to help revitalizing the neighbourhood streets through retail stores and other activities.

Recently a street where houses were until recently in a very bad state of repair and most of them empty (Joseph Street), underwent complete transformation after the municipality had renovated a space into a public garden. This started to make the area more physically attractive and, as a result of this strategy, families, benefiting from the low real estate prices, bought houses and restored them. They were encouraged to do so by recognising that the City was paying attention to this area. Through combined public and private investment, the place has become vivid. A kindergarten has been opened. Projects are launched in close cooperation between the municipality, owners and tenants. This process illustrates what the municipality has been looking for in its strategy, that public investment may be multiplied by the injection of private investment.

The Municipal Office for Urban Renewal and Housing Promotion is confident in this strategy, especially at a time when public money is getting scarce. It is said that now the private sector is financing most projects. Also, it should be recalled that to the almost €20 million brought by URBAN and the city into the URBAN II program, were added €127 million from the federal government and private sources.

Municipal coordination

The municipality plays a twofold role. On the one hand its respective offices and departments fix the strategy and decide on major projects as well as on priorities for action. On the other hand, it manages the process of regeneration and acts as moderator. This latter role attempts especially to involve different actors and the local community in the process – an approach that can already be observed from the 1990s onwards. The intention is to more and more act as a moderator.

The twofold role the public administration played in the process of urban regeneration is also reflected in the administrative structure. Two comparably large municipal offices are in charge of the urban regeneration tasks. The office for urban planning basically deals with strategy making, while the office for urban development and house building is designated to put into action the strategies and to coordinate all the urban subsidy programmes.

Local offices in neighbourhoods support the central services policies through an intense and multifold activity that includes writing leaflets and reports, putting up posters, organizing meetings, going from one place to the other, and launching exhibitions.

Participation in European networks

URBAN has been a critical tool for the development of the western part of Leipzig and for the building of a framework for further actions. A network is still functioning among actors of the Austrian and German\textsuperscript{209} former URBAN sites. They stay in contact and exchange experiences in the follow up of the URBAN achievements.

\textsuperscript{209} In Germany, 9 cities in URBAN I, 3 cities in URBAN I and II, and 9 in URBAN II. In Austria, 2 cities in URBAN I and II.
Leipzig is also taking part in URBACT, as lead city in the LC-FACIL project and as partner in FIN-URBACT. LC-FACIL has been devoted to the implementation of the reference framework for a sustainable city, after the Leipzig and Marseilles informal ministers meetings (2007 and 2008) and the Montpellier international urban Forum (December 2008). Given that process started with the Leipzig Charter, Leipzig was in the best situation to be lead city of this working group and in fact is concluding with a seminar in Leipzig in May 2011.

FIN-URB-ACT, of which Gliwice (another case study city of this study) is also member but is mainly focused on developing the efficiency of local support to SMEs and to innovative economic structures. Joining this group was meaningful for Leipzig with respect to the economic fabric of the local urban regeneration. The URBAN II evaluation noted as a result the support provided to 245 local companies, most of them SMEs and at the time, participation in the FIN-URB-ACT working group coincided with this characteristic. It has also been relevant regarding the creative industry which is part of the new economic development in Leipzig.

In the EUROCITIES network, Leipzig has a leading role in the “cohesion policy” working group devoted to the promotion of the urban dimension in the European cohesion policy. Leipzig representatives are particularly charged with the task of sharing with the 55 other participating cities the objectives and actions on an urban integrated approach within the cohesion policy. The cooperation with all kinds of stakeholders is one of the main inputs of Leipzig in this group\(^{210}\). Leipzig is also a member of other Eurocities working groups, with a distinct added value to local policies. For instance, the cultural part of the urban development strategy is deemed enhanced through the participation in all working groups related to culture.\(^{211}\)

### 6. Flagship actions

Aside from the above described actions, some others can be mentioned for their strong impact on urban recovery and possibly on social cohesion.

**An action on the housing stock**

Among various actions aiming at improving buildings and living conditions in Leipzig, the “Guardian Buildings” device is typically representative of the spirit of urban regeneration in Leipzig. It aims to maintain an important architectural heritage and contributes to attract artists and cultural activities in deprived areas. It also participates in boosting the cultural and economic life of these neighbourhoods.

**The Guardian Buildings (Wächterhauser)** is an initiative dating back in 2004 by an association called HausHalten. It provides for an owner, who cannot afford the maintenance of a property, to have “free” tenants such as artists or students, or new businesses who settle in without paying a rent but who have to “pay the building’s operating costs, provide repair and maintenance for their own rooms and control the remaining building”\(^{212}\). HausHalten acts as an intermediary between owners and guardians. Approximately one thousand demands for space are currently registered by HausHalten.

\(^{210}\) Interview of Ms Heiderose Heßke

\(^{211}\) « Cultural access and entitlement”, “Culture and young people”, “Resources for culture” and “Creative industries”.

\(^{212}\) From the brochure: Guardian Buildings in Leipzig, an initiative by HausHalten E.V. published with support from the Federal State.
The Guardian Houses project is at the core of the contradiction between the noticeable architectural heritage of the Wilhelminian buildings, of which 80 per cent have been redeveloped, and the vacancies in the housing stock.

**Actions in education and culture**

The Urban Planning Department launched an action funded by the Federal government called “Learning in the neighbourhood”. It aims at developing the idea and practice of lifelong education through networking of different cultural and educational structures. Actors of these structures meet twice a year to define and implement projects. Public libraries are very active in this action and the Municipality considers that supporting and strengthening such networks is a good way to reinforce the attractiveness of developing neighbourhoods not just through the retail sector.

### 7. Lessons learned

The urban regeneration process in the western part of Leipzig is a very rich experience. It principally shows the importance of combining foresight and day to day adaptation in a progressive urban development. Looking back at what has been achieved in twenty years, it is possible to highlight significant results and outcomes as well as some weaknesses.

**Results and outcomes**

*The municipal strategy resulted in attracting activities and inhabitants*

According to its strategy, the municipality first had to work to prepare the ground to attract economic and cultural activities. Priority was given to infrastructure and public spaces in the western part of the city and this was done through a number of distinct stages.

In the 1990s, some factory buildings were reconverted into business centres, with the large abandoned brown field area in the centre of Plagwitz developed as part of the EXPO 2000 events. However, at the end of the 1990s the results were not at all convincing, the number of new jobs created remained low and the commercial functions declined. As a result of the increasing loss of the area’s attractiveness, this shrinkage continued and the vacancy rate within its housing stock increased.

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213 Interview of Mr Fritz Hof Mothes, founder of Wächterhauser.
The first half of the 2000s, thanks to URBAN II, have been good for deepening the restructuring of infrastructure, decontaminating a channel and cleaning its waterfront, and creating new designs in plots left empty after demolition of abandoned factories or houses. The west became attractive for artists, start ups, services industry and creative industry. But on the whole, the number of businesses moving in remained small, and between 2000 and 2007, unemployment increased by 21 per cent in the URBAN II area, mainly in the districts of Lindenau and Altlindenau where much less works had been done than in Plagwitz\textsuperscript{214}.

By the end of the decade, progress was being made and in 2011 a real change is perceptible in the west, with more office buildings, more inhabitants and private initiatives and the Baumwolle Spinnerei may be the most impressive. It is a former spinning mill turned into a cultural complex conceived to provide one hundred studios at low rents to artists, and run on a non-profit basis. Other structures have been progressively added such as twelve exhibition rooms, private galleries\textsuperscript{215} (some of which moved in from the town centre) an art house cinema, a public library, and free gardens for the people working in and for former factory workers still there. In order to have enough money to maintain the non-profit system, a part of the complex is rented out on a commercial basis to businesses, with a special permit from the municipality\textsuperscript{216}.

\textbf{The municipal know-how in dealing with private investment}

The municipality started very early to favour private investment in the regeneration process. The focus was twofold, on economic activities on the one hand and on real estate on the other.

In the economic field, aside from trying, and managing, to have international companies settling down in the Leipzig area (DHL and BMW are good examples), the objective in regeneration zones was more on SME development. The municipality supported a private group willing to play a significant role in attracting new retail shops, craftsmen and start-ups. This group, an association of economic actors, offered to participate in the economic and cultural revitalization of Plagwitz by looking for free spaces for activities and being an intermediary between the municipality and enterprises.

In the real estate field, several devices were experimented with to attract investment in renovation and house building. The impact was weak for some time, but it became stronger over the past few years. An indicator of this success is the slight increase in real estate prices in the west.

In both fields, the Head of the Municipal Office for Urban Renewal and Housing Promotion recalls that the municipality has long been “activating investors in a black hole of urban renewal” and that today valuable investments are made by people in building or renovating homes. The fact that most projects are now being launched by the private sector appears a result of the city strategy and in this context, the municipality is interested in matchmaking its action with other projects\textsuperscript{217}.

\textbf{The importance of understanding why some actions did not work}

One quite successful action called “Selbstnutzer” has been built up to assist people in becoming owners of houses to renovate or in building a new one in areas under regeneration. The Municipality

\textsuperscript{214} Source: URBAN II Evaluation, Case Study Leipzig.

\textsuperscript{215} Rents for studios are around 2.50 €/sqm and 5€/sqm for galleries.

\textsuperscript{216} The city rules of the urban development strategy prohibit the mixing of non-profit and profit oriented activities.

\textsuperscript{217} Interview Mr Gerkens
supports two experts (architects) to assist potential new owners. It started slowly in mid 2000s and then grew substantially with up to 700 households currently involved. This mechanism is considered to have been helpful when people were reluctant to settle down in areas like Plagwitz and other derelict urban sectors. It helped clarify difficulties in access to credit for non wealthy families and it also helped show the banks that there was a potential demand among these social categories.

What is underlined here is that this action was well thought and managed, thanks to lessons learned from a previous experience, a forty houses project. The objective there was to find forty people ready to renovate houses belonging to the municipality and to live in them. The houses, located on main streets, were in very bad condition and it was decided to achieve the project in four weeks but it failed. The lessons from this experience were as follows: (1) it is necessary to have pilot projects before launching them wider, (2) such a project should not start with the worse buildings, (3) more time is needed, and (4) people need help to find places to live in neighbourhoods they may not know well and they also need help to build their own project\textsuperscript{218}. The conclusion from this experience led to the launch of Selbstnutzer with great care.

**Ongoing debates as a sign of vitality and open-minded actors**

The urban integrated approach needs to be regularly assessed and this leads to debates among technicians and between technicians and even on occasion politicians. The latter tend to think that the policies implemented for more than ten years do not result in enough significant outputs, relying on the still high unemployment rate and the bad education system performances, with many young people emerging without a degree. Technicians are more optimistic, considering Leipzig as a success story since people who moved to the outskirts are coming back in town, boosting the real estate sector, limiting urban sprawl, and helping the demographic increase which they foresee until 2020.

**Limits**

There is a clear view among the Leipzig officials that the urban regeneration needs to cover the whole city territory and the integrated development approach is sought at the city level. But so far, only the north-western and western parts have been affected and now the dilemma is expressed in the budget discussion over the reduction of available amounts for urban planning. One option would be to focus on the most dynamic sectors where one euro of public money can generate several euros of private investment. But the city Council would not like to neglect the most difficult areas after all the efforts made there.

The eastern part of the city has far fewer assets than the west. For instance, the great Whilelminian heritage of the west has no equivalent in the east. Other attractive items in the west like the canal, now decontaminated, and the intertwining of housing and work places are lacking on the other side of the city. Nevertheless, a seminar was held in Leipzig in March 2011 on perspectives for the east and the subject of lifelong learning education was raised. However, the integrated urban development of the east will have to be launched on a different basis and with different projects that what has been done in Plagwitz and Lindenau.

A problem is that even the west could suffer from being isolated as the only regenerated area, local actors agree on the need to deal with the whole city.

\textsuperscript{218} Interview Mr Heinig
8. Transferability

The Leipzig city actors have a message as follows: “you can transfer ideas but every place has its specificity”. This is important because ideas mean thinking and this is much needed in urban planning, even more so in times of financial shortage when cities are facing crucial challenges.

Some conditions of successful urban regeneration strategies can be drawn from the Leipzig experience:

− Building a strategy in the long run, knowing that its implementation needs to go step by step and that not all the projects can be launched at the same time. This may appear basic, but it implies the need to have a clear idea of what can be done at different stages, which actions can drive other actions, and which ones should be avoided if there is a risk that they may hinder future most needed actions.

− Leaning on a solid institutional structure. Leipzig benefits from well organised and stable technical services within the municipality. This has been of the utmost importance regarding the implementation and monitoring of the urban regeneration and integrated development strategy. Building up such institutional structures where they are lacking should be a priority.

− Mixing several types of financial sources. This is not always easy since each financing support comes from an institution which is pursuing a specific goal and may have specific rules and regulations. So it is only possible if the municipality or city region has a clear vision of what has to be done in order to use the money to meet both with its own strategy and with the conditionality of the investors and subsidisers.

− Combining three components: the financial part, the urban development issue and the technical and thematic component. Particularly important is the need to maintain contacts between all stakeholders and technicians, since the latter do not always see the influence of technical decisions on the life of people.

− Implementing and making sustainable the participation of all categories of stakeholders in urban regeneration. This needs an open administration and somebody acting as a go-between to maintain an active relationship between the administration and the people. This is meant to cope with differences of thinking and knowledge.
Annex

1. The Leipzig Charter

Press release of the Informal meeting of Ministers of urban matters, Leipzig, May 2007 (extract)

“Living in cities is becoming increasingly popular. This is a positive development, and one that we have to boost. Families are returning from the urban fringe and rural hinterland to the inner cities. Urbanity is becoming a hallmark of quality. Industrial sites are being put to new uses. Living and working on what used to be derelict industrial sites is becoming attractive. In short: Europe’s cities are currently experiencing a renaissance, and policymakers have to shape this renaissance. It will usher in a new phase of urban development. The cities of Europe face major challenges.” (the German EU Council President, Wolfgang Tiefensee in the informal ministerial meeting, Leipzig)

The Minister said that one of the challenges faced by European cities was youth unemployment. "With an unemployment rate among young people under 25 years of age of 18.6 %, cities have to compensate for enormous fluctuations. Here, urban development policy also has to offer solutions." The Minister said that it was imperative to tackle social exclusion and isolation in individual neighbourhoods. "Long term and stable economic growth will not be possible unless whole cities remain socially balanced and stable", said Mr Tiefensee. Policymakers must not tolerate downward spirals and the stigmatization of individual neighbourhoods. "In particular, we have to devote even more attention to the educational requirements of children and young people in these urban areas. If over one half of young people in these deprived neighbourhoods leave school without any qualifications, there are bound to be problems in the future. Europe has to involve everyone", said the Council President.


The municipality played a twofold role. On the one hand its respective offices and departments fixed the strategy and decided on major projects as well as on priorities for action. On the other hand, it managed the process of regeneration and acted as moderator. This latter role especially meant to involve different actors and the local community in the process – an approach that could already be observed from the 1990s onwards.

Apart from the municipality, other actors established different forms of cooperation and participation. The major housing companies for instance signed a ‘Pakt der Vernunft’ or Treaty of Reason, whereby they declared their willingness to contribute to the reduction of dwelling vacancy and to actively participate in the demolition of dwelling units. Also, under the moderation of the municipality, different actors in the housing market such as housing companies, tenants’ associations, owners’ associations etc. regularly used to meet and discuss on relevant issues. In Leipziger Osten and Leipziger Westen, the target areas of urban regeneration, so-called “Foren” were installed, functioning as a kind of platform where different actors of the respective neighbourhoods meet and inhabitants are involved. This is especially important as the citizens experience enormous changes in their lives that are not always favourable. In addition, neighbourhood offices in the sub-districts improve the communication between the municipality and the local people. Besides the already mentioned monitoring reports, exhibitions on issues of urban regeneration, as well as
detailed brochures published by the municipality, constitute other key-elements of an approach to communication and transparency.

3. Strategic Priorities and Development Targets

In 1990, the City of Leipzig was faced with a difficult inheritance: the quality and quantity of apartments offered on the housing market were unacceptable – 25,000 apartments were uninhabitable. While the region witnessed large-scale housing development, the renovation of old properties was impeded by the complicated legal situation regarding property ownership and restitution claims in the wake of German reunification.

From the very start, Leipzig’s urban development strategy aimed at the conservation of the many buildings and quarters dating from the "Gründerzeit" (a period of rapid industrial expansion after 1871), because they are a major part of the overall appearance of the city. More than 85,000 apartments from that era have been fully or partially refurbished and renovated since 1991. Consequently, only about one fifth of the 19th-century architectural fabric is in need of refurbishment or partially at risk today. Meanwhile, an "overlap" of developmental and social issues is promoting the development of less favoured districts, while refurbished "Gründerzeit" quarters are enjoying increasing popularity as attractive residential areas.

http://www.leipzig.de/int/en/stadt_leipzig/stadtentw/wohnen/

4. The OP ERDF Budget for the western part of Leipzig

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Themes</th>
<th>Projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2,8 million €</td>
<td>Infrastructures and urban development</td>
<td>Green spaces, construction of a few buildings, improvement of the former Spinnerei factory turned into a galleries and artists' studios, new green lines for pedestrians and bicycles, new sports places</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0,95 million €</td>
<td>Civic society</td>
<td>Social projects such as tackling the drinking of alcohol in the street using two street workers</td>
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<tr>
<td>0,67 million €</td>
<td>Development of small and medium size enterprises</td>
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<tr>
<td>0,33 million €</td>
<td>Kids in the neighbourhoods</td>
<td>Help and accompaniment of children of poor families to cultural life (going to the theatre for example)</td>
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<tr>
<td>0,25 million €</td>
<td>Civic participation</td>
<td>Monthly thematic working groups and general Forums</td>
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5. Colleges and universities in Leipzig

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<th>Colleges and universities total</th>
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Source: Statistical Office of the Free State of Saxony

6. Interviews in Leipzig

Mr Karsten Gerkens  Head of the Municipal Office for Urban Renewal and Housing Promotion
Mr Norbert Raschke  In charge of EU programs (URBAN and now ERDF) in the Office for Urban Renewal and Housing Promotion
Mr Fritjof Mothes  Stadtlabor, Counselor in the municipal ERDF Office in Plagwitz-Lindenau, founding member of HausHalten e.V
Mr Jens-Uwe Boldt  Urban Planning Department, Old West Division
Mr Heinrich Neu  Urban Planning Department, Old West Division, Grünau and Plagwitz South Section manager
Ms Grossmann  Urban Planning Department, Old West Division
Mr Stefan Heinig  Head of the Urban Planning Department
Ms Heiderose Heßke, by phone  Municipal Office for International Affairs, Eurocities representative in Leipzig, Chair of the Eurocities working group on Structural funds and the cohesion policy
Mr Bertram Schulze  Baumwollspinnerei Manager
Ms Juliette Kaiser and Mr Michael Ludwig  Baumwollspinnerei

7. Documents


ECOTEC: Ex post evaluation of programmes of the Cohesion policy 2000-2006, URBAN II, Summary, July 2010

ECOTEC: URBAN II Evaluation, Case study: Leipzig

Guardian Buildings in Leipzig, an initiative by HausHalten E.V., 2008

Spinnerei, from Cotton to Culture, Report 2009

Stadt Leipzig: URBAN II Leipziger Westen, Bilanz

Stadt Leipzig: Konzeptioneller Stadtteilplan für den Leipziger Westen, KSP West

Stadt Leipzig: KSP West 2009

Stadt Leipzig: Leipzig 2020, Integriertes Stadtentwicklungskonzept (SEKo)

Stadt Leipzig: Monitoringbericht Wohnen 2010

Stadtplannungsamt Leipzig, Abteilung West: Die “Kreative Szene” im Leipziger Westen
RESPONSE OF A CITY TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS

THE CASE OF NEWCASTLE-UPON-TYNE, UNITED KINGDOM
1. Introduction

The city of Newcastle is the administrative capital of the North East region of England which has a total population of around 2.5 million. Standing on the north bank of the River Tyne, Newcastle itself has a population of approximately 278,000 and on the opposite bank is the separate municipality of Gateshead with a population of around 200,000. Another three local authorities – North Tyneside, South Tyneside and Sunderland – make up what is commonly seen as the ‘Newcastle City Region’ and with a combined population of around 1.65 million, which accounts for around two-thirds of the region’s total population. After a downward trajectory, the population of Newcastle and Gateshead has stabilised under the dual effects of an increasing student population and inward migration – mostly from Central and Eastern Europe.

Figure 1: Map of North East England

Source: One North East
The economy of Newcastle and its surrounding area has undergone much change over the past 30 years, moving away from a dependence on heavy industries such as shipbuilding, coal mining and heavy engineering, to a more diversified industrial base. This includes manufacturing with firms such as Nissan and Findus being major employers, alongside service sector employers such as financial institutions (for example Northern Rock and Newcastle Building Society) and Sage (software). The city is also host to a large further and higher education sector which has provided a springboard for some of the current knowledge-based developments, but is also indicative of a strong public sector dependency accounting for around 38 per cent of all jobs. The city's traditional dependence on big employers (public and private sectors) has contributed to a comparatively low number of small and medium sized (SME) businesses and this low level of business formation prevails.

The rate of claimant unemployment in Newcastle was 4.4 per cent in January 2011 and in Gateshead 4.8 per cent which are close to the national figure of 4.6 per cent. However, male unemployment was much higher at 6.3 and 6.9 per cent respectively, compared to 2.5 and 2.7 per cent for women. Long-term unemployment remains a persistent problem and the growth in youth inactivity is prevalent here and represents a growing problem throughout the UK. The city has areas of affluence alongside areas of significant deprivation.

The effects of the austerity package introduced by the government to tackle the budget deficit acquired during the financial crisis will be significant on Newcastle. It will lose around £50-60 million from its budget and around 2,000 jobs will go over the next four years.

2. Case Study Rationale

The criterion for Newcastle as a case study is summarised as ‘the response of a city to the financial crisis’ and this was broadly accepted as a major catalyst for change. In a sense, the nascent financial crisis in the UK had its first visible sign of the coming extent of the problem in Newcastle with the run on Northern Rock Bank (formerly a building society) in 2008 which was headquartered in the city and employed around 1,500 people. Therefore, the reality of the situation was recognised early on and while the city has a comparatively small financial services sector (and not all jobs in Northern Rock were lost), the knock-on effects to other industry and the economy in general were starting to become apparent.

However, in a sense the city has been in a process of change and adjustment for many years and the financial crisis and ensuing recession were simply more external shocks they had to deal with – albeit significant ones. Therefore the response from the key stakeholders was both short-term to ease the situation for those affected, but also strategic over the next 20 years, with the view that the city needs a long term plan that would hopefully transcend these short-term disturbances. Furthermore, a city with a solid strategy should be better placed to withstand these shocks in the future.

219 The figures are based on those claiming unemployment benefits which are more accurate at a local area level but represent only a part of the total unemployed. The preferred measure is based on the Labour Force Survey (LFS) and over the period July 2009-July 2010 the average unemployment rate was 10.7 per cent in Newcastle and 9.3 per cent in Gateshead, compared to the UK national figure of 7.7 per cent.

220 Interestingly, the Northern Rock Tower – the office block vacated by the bank – has recently been taken over by the city council providing office space for its own services as well as others on a commercial basis.
3. Local Perceptions of the Main Challenge

Even before the financial crisis struck the city was well versed in the effects of economic change. The whole area had seen a steady period of de-industrialisation since the 1980s that had decimated employment in the traditional industries of coal, steel, shipbuilding and heavy engineering and much had been done to diversify the local economy – particularly into the growing service sectors.

The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) carried out a detailed Territorial Review of Newcastle in 2006 and this has greatly influenced development policy ever since. The review focused on the city region which was defined as encompassing the municipalities of Newcastle, Gateshead, North Tyneside, South Tyneside and Sunderland. The report found significant strengths in the area such as:

- A rich heritage of natural and cultural amenities that provide a sound basis for a range of tourism and retail activities;
- Good transport connections (air, rail, road and sea) and a developed telecommunications network that underpins any growth potential;
- Good range of higher education institutions with leading edge research going on in fields such as life sciences, energy and the environment.

Box 1: Local Growth White Paper

One of the early pronouncements of the new coalition government in 2010 was to issue its White Paper on local growth. This identified the following key needs:

- To shift power to local communities and business, enabling places to tailor their approach to local circumstances;
- To promote efficient and dynamic markets, in particular in the supply of land, and provide real and significant incentives for places that go for growth;
- To support investment in places and people to tackle the barriers to growth.

It went on to set out ten functions that local authorities should perform, summarised as follows:

1. Leadership and coordination;
2. Overcome coordination failures and manage externalities and competing interests;
3. Ensuring a responsive supply of land;
4. Creative use of land assets;
5. Statutory powers and planning;
6. Supporting local infrastructure;
7. Support for local people and businesses;
8. Providing high quality services;
9. Maintaining trading standards;
10. Promoting independence and rehabilitation, maximising individual’s opportunities for employment.

The subsequent bill is expected to be passed by Parliament in March 2011 and ‘localism’ is now an underlying theme of government policy. More information is available at:

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmbills/126/11126.i-v.html
However, on the debit side the report acknowledged that there had been a good deal of local activity to try and realise development potential but these strategies often lacked coherence and were sometimes burdened with optimistic growth assumptions, leading to the statement that: ‘There is a lack of strong regional development entities, leadership and plans to combat the region’s decline’. This may be surprising given the presence of the long established Regional Development Agency (RDA) ‘One North East’, but it is more symptomatic of how centralised planning is in England generally – though this is likely to change under the weight of the new coalition government’s localism agenda (see Box 1 for further information).

In its update on its response to the economic downturn (Newcastle City Council (2010) the challenges posed by the anticipated public sector spending cuts stated that it was ‘important not to overstate the city’s vulnerability’ to them even though around 38 per cent of jobs are directly dependent on the public sector.

4. The Process

It is too simplistic to suggest that a complex city such as Newcastle faces one main challenge – the financial crisis and subsequent economic recession certainly encapsulated the principal challenge of the time, but its manifested itself in many different problems that required appropriate (and often customised) approaches.

It was in June 2009 that the city council set out its formal response to the recession caused by the financial crisis in the form of the following ten points:

1. Maintaining confidence in the economy and planning for future growth;
2. Large and increased capital expenditure programme;
3. Help to small businesses, including rapid payment of invoices;
4. Improved access to procurement contracts;
5. Targeted support to those made redundant and minimising the social consequences of the downturn;
6. Increased access to employment opportunities at Newcastle City Council;
7. Increased provision of debt and housing advice;
8. Benefits awareness campaigns for both individuals and companies;
9. Maintaining low council tax;
10. Keeping momentum in regeneration schemes.

It is clear from these that this was an effort to help all parts of the local economy suffering the effects of the downturn – individuals losing their jobs and companies struggling to survive. Furthermore, implementation of these measures was not consistent with reducing expenditure and so involved increased borrowing. In this sense it was a bold move for local politicians when the pressure was on to cut costs. It was also bold in that some of the action points were unlikely to deliver short term gains – for example increasing the capital expenditure programme and keeping the momentum going in regeneration schemes.
The city’s response to the downturn was subject to a review in July 2010 and it concluded that the prevailing economic conditions and the prospect for further difficulties caused, for example, by the review of public expenditure by the then new coalition government, merited continuation of the measures until the end of March 2011 (the end of the financial year).

A more detailed analysis of the measures taken and the key players under each of the ten headings is summarised in Annex A. It clearly shows that the City Council (staff and elected members) are driving the response to the downturn but bringing in appropriate key players where possible. Many of the actions taken are concerned with achieving ‘quick wins’ such as helping individuals to access their full benefit entitlements or improving access to procurement contracts in the City Council, while other take a longer terms perspective, such as the measures to maintain confidence in the local economy and keeping the momentum going in regeneration schemes.

In its mid 2010 review of the measures (essentially a self evaluation), the City Council was able to show some tangible results from the various measures. For example, in its help to businesses it pointed to the following outcomes:

- New business start-ups – 120;
- Existing businesses supported – 100;
- Community and voluntary sector organisations supported to be enterprising – 90;
- Social enterprises set up by community and voluntary sector organisations – 20;
- Local residents engaged in enterprise – 720;
- Young people (aged 14-19 years) engaged in enterprise – 500.

These are impressive results over the short period of the downturn response and in many cases offer the prospect of longer term solutions if some of these businesses continue to grow and employ people.

In its activities to help individuals affected by the downturn, the City Council introduced a number of initiatives. In one case, the increased provision of debt and housing advice, the council’s Welfare Rights Service has handled increased numbers of clients and importantly had seen a 48 per cent decrease in the issuing of mortgage possession claims in the last quarter of 2009. Similarly the Service has identified an additional 2,100 children who appeared to be eligible for free school meals but were not taking up their entitlement.

Some of the other measures introduced may take longer to deliver such tangible benefits. However, the council’s commitment to a large capital expenditure programme and keeping the momentum in regeneration schemes serves both short and longer term goals and demonstrates that in this city there is a strong strategic ethos and it is the longer term perspectives that went on to find form in the major initiative to take the area forward over the next 20 years in the shape of the ‘1NG Plan’ – an economic master plan for the Newcastle-Gateshead area.

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221 The work done by the city council was recognised by the Audit Commission as one of only two areas in the country to be awarded a ‘green flag’ for its work to combat the recession.
5. The Instruments Used

The economic master plan for Newcastle-Gateshead was formally launched in June 2010 but has its foundations well before this date. The two areas started forming an alliance in their preparation for a joint bid for European City of Culture 2008 – they lost out to Liverpool but the successful collaboration then provided a basis for a more extensive working together resulting in a formal partnership.

The Gateshead Newcastle Partnership was set up in 2007 following agreement between the two councils to set up an umbrella body for joint activities. The overall objective of the partnership was as follows:

- To provide political steering of joint work between Newcastle and Gateshead;
- To develop shared thinking on new and emerging issues;
- To sustain the spirit of the partnership approach.

The partnership established protocols for working together and set up the representation – six members from each council with a rotating chair.

This collaboration went a stage further in the setting up of ‘1NG’ (1 Newcastle Gateshead) the strategic development company to push forward the 20 year vision for the area. Interestingly the two municipalities have moved forward bilaterally and not on the basis of the wider city region comprising three other local authorities. However, it appears that the other three (North Tyneside, South Tyneside and Sunderland) had little appetite for developing a wider strategy and so the focus fell on Newcastle and Gateshead.

The Gateshead Newcastle Partnership oversees 1NG, which is a separate independent private sector-led company funded by the three partners of Newcastle City Council, Gateshead Council and One North East – the RDA. It employs 14 staff with a Chief Executive at the head, reporting to a board of nine (including the Chief Executive) which comprises:

- Chair – Lord Falconer (a Labour Peer);
- Newcastle City Council (2) – Chief Executive and Leader;
- Gateshead Council (2) – Chief Executive and Leader;
- One North East (2);
- Homes and Communities Agency – North East Region (1).

The vision of the agency is set out in the 2010 ‘1PLAN’ which is summarised in Figure 2. This 20 year economic and spatial strategy is explored in detail in the relevant publications (see references below). By taking the long term view, the expectation is that the vision will transcend short term set backs, though clearly circumstances will have some effect on the vision as it unfolds. For example the current difficulties largely stemming from the government’s measures to tackle the national budget deficit (largely caused by the financial crisis) have slowed the rate of progress.

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223 More information on the company is available at: http://www.1ng.org.uk/
The ‘Placemaking Strategy’ is a particular feature of the plan and is geared to making Newcastle Gateshead a more compact, accessible and sustainable place with less dependency on the motor car. The idea is to make the centre more attractive as a place to live in addition to its current role of a place for shopping, leisure and work. Like many cities in the UK, there has been a long term trend of ‘suburbanisation’ where people and jobs move out to the fringes of the city. There are still plenty of jobs in the city centre but the plan envisages a number of key developments to take this further and encourage working and living in the core of the area.

Figure 2: The 1PLAN

4 Big Moves – which establish the key themes of the approach:

1. Knowledge Economy;
2. Skills and Talent;
3. Urban Core;
4. Sustainable Urbanism

10 Key Steps – the practical actions to be taken in the next three to five years and the priorities for action:

1. World Class Skills;
2. Tackling Worklessness;
3. Development Regeneration;
4. Places and Spaces;
5. Complete Mobility;
6. City of Science;
7. Top 200;
8. Business and Cultural Tourism;
9. Low Carbon Economy;

Placemaking Strategy – how sustainable urbanism will be promoted and transform the urban core.

In addition a network of ‘Knowledge Hubs’ is being developed that will bring together the industries of the future with research, teaching and service providers on one site (See Box 2). The local economy already has demonstrable strengths in some key areas and these will be built on - for example, sustainable industries, digital and design, ageing and health, and stem cells and regenerative medicine. These are industries with a future and with the right sort of encouragement
can develop in the location – though of their very nature the competition comes globally and the requirement to be leading edge will remain.

However, the knowledge economy is just one part of the plan alongside emphasis on encouraging the following activities:

- Low carbon – the area has an established track record in advanced manufacturing, marine and sub sea engineering that provides a basis for developing low carbon technologies such as wind turbines;
- Science and technology – the local universities are already involved in leading edge research in such subjects as stem cells and the science of ageing and this will be more closely associated with business development;
- Culture and creativity – here the area already has the key elements such as cultural venues, creative and media businesses, etc, to attract those with the skills and expertise to set up businesses;
- Business services – the area is already a business and professional services centre of note and the intention is to build on this to encourage growth as a regional centre and to bring back firms that may have moved outside the area;
- Tourism – the area has much to offer and the aim is to become one of the UK’s top business tourism destinations, a key part of which will be the construction of a major conference and exhibition centre.

**Box 2: Knowledge Hubs – Newcastle Science City**

The Newcastle Science City initiative aims to develop the city’s image and reputation as a city of science and builds on the leading edge work already underway in fields such as ageing and health, stem cell and regenerative medicine and sustainability. The initiative has already achieved the following outcomes:

- Supported over 150 businesses to commercialise new ideas;
- Sign up ten city centre schools to the Science Education Innovation Partnership (SEIP) reaching over 6,000 school children;
- Set up a fund that enables people to use science to drive change in their community;
- Developed a series of networking events attracting over 100 attendees each month;
- Introduced the Newcastle Innovation Machine, which creates an average of one new high-growth business per month;

Alongside this approach there are other developments establishing a physical presence for the facilitation of science based business – such as the Science Central development on the site of the old brewery in the city centre.

For more information see the Science City Mission Statement at: [http://www.online-brochures.net/files/8603/](http://www.online-brochures.net/files/8603/)

These sectors combined are expected to generate demand for employment at all levels, though it is acknowledged that there is a long way to go to bring some of these ambitions to fruition.
It is accepted that the next few years of the plan will be challenging, not least because of the period of austerity now being entered. Of more immediate concern is the funding for the 1NG agency itself because from April 2012 it will lose one of its partners, the RDA, and with it one third of its operational funding. The agency is exploring alternative sources of funding though it is unlikely that the new Local Enterprise Partnerships (see Box 3) being formed will have any resources to help fill the gap. The overall plan is subject to regular review and updates will be applied as necessary – including any restructuring of the priorities.

Box 3: Local Enterprise Partnerships

The long established Regional Development Agencies (RDA) (One North East is the relevant one for Newcastle) are being closed in 2012 and while there will be no direct replacement for them, the government has encouraged the establishment of Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEP) to help fill the vacuum. They are expected to reflect the ‘natural economic areas of England’ and so are likely to cover smaller geographical areas than the RDAs – the one covering Newcastle will be spatially large from Northumbria down to Durham (in effect two LEPs will cover the region formerly covered by the RDA). The LEPs are expected to ‘provide a clear vision and strategic leadership to drive sustainable private sector-led growth and job creation in their area’ but without much funding to make it happen. There will be a Regional Growth Fund which will accept bids mostly coordinated by the LEP, but the level of funding will fall far short of what was previously available.

European Structural Funds have been central to the development of Newcastle and its surrounding area. The ERDF in particular has contributed towards major infrastructure projects including roads and bridges, but also key developments such as the emerging Science Centre in Newcastle city centre. However, the situation now is that finding sources of matched funding is problematic as traditional sources such as the local authority and the RDA dry up under the reductions in public expenditure. For capital projects the gap is expected to be filled through borrowing and recourse to the ‘JESSICA’ programme. This EU initiative allows Member States to use some of their grant funding under ERDF or ESF to make repayable investments in projects that form part of a plan for sustainable urban development. However, this option is not available for revenue funding in such activities as support for enterprises, services, etc, where the matched funding element will be hard to find and things will get worse from 2012 when the RDA sources of funding end. The government is setting up a Regional Growth Fund but this subject to application from a wider constituency (likely to include companies) and at £1.4bn over three years for the whole of England is comparatively small.

224 The JESSICA programme is the Joint European Support for Sustainable Investment in City Areas and is an initiative by the European Commission and the European Investment Bank, in collaboration with the Council of Europe Development Bank.
The local control over the ERDF allocation and its increased flexibility is welcomed by the city council whereas the ESF is seen as a national programme that they have no control over. In England the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) controls the ESF allocation, effectively topping up its own funding for operational and active labour market measures and with little or no local delivery determination.

The city has not been proactive in accessing transnational funds itself, though within the city the universities, for example, are likely to be involved with various programmes and there is likely to be greater coordination of European activities between the various players in the city in the future. It also helps that the city's key priorities are coincident with those to the EU.

6. The main learning and conditions of transferability

Lessons learned

The long experience in Newcastle in dealing with change has led to a plethora of initiatives over the past few years. Some of these have been centred on the city itself while others have encompassed the wider Tyne and Wear city region or occasionally incorporating other parts of the region (such as Northumbria). However, it was recognised in the OECD study that often the initiatives lacked coherence and coordination leading to duplication of administration and activities. As a result, the past few years have seen distinct efforts at more effective collaboration from the work done for the application for the European City of Culture 2008 (which brought Newcastle and Gateshead closer together), through the setting up of the Gateshead and Newcastle Partnership, and culminating in the 1NG initiative that affirms the focus for development on the two municipalities.

The need for policy responses on regular and ad hoc bases is evident in the approach by the city council. It has been particularly active (and received an accolade for it) in responding to the financial crisis and ensuing recession by developing short term responses and is having to review them in the light of the budget cuts imposed by central government. Its response recognised that the downturn presented not just one but a range of challenges affecting individuals, businesses and other local players and so required a range of responses – which it has done. However, the city has not allowed short term concerns to crowd out taking a much more strategic, long term view for the city in the expectation that pushing ahead with visionary developments is essential and may eventually place the city in a much stronger position to weather the inevitable future external shocks, as typified by the financial crisis.

Transferability

The approach to dealing with the economic shocks in Newcastle have relevance to other cities experiencing similar effects, though like any examination of transferability it is certain elements of the approach that are likely to be relevant rather than a transplantation of the whole policy. Nevertheless, there is much to learn from Newcastle and some of the key learning points are set out below:

- Responding to the crisis involves addressing both the needs of individuals displaced from work and businesses struggling for survival and councils should invest resources even when budgets are under pressure;
Developing a short-term response should not prevent the development of longer term strategies for when the economy improves; Collaboration with like-minded municipalities who share space, aims and objectives is an appropriate way forward. In the case of Newcastle and Gateshead, while the areas are different in terms of their infrastructure and comparative wealth, they are similar in population size and this helps establish a partnership on an equal basis – the same degree of collaboration may be more difficult to obtain with smaller areas (in population terms); While support needs to be given to existing industries, focusing on those sectors likely to offer the most sustainable growth potential in the future makes sense, with resources geared to encouraging their development. Collaboration with other partners such as universities is crucial, as is promoting recognition of the skills required across the community (especially schools) so that all have the opportunity to participate; Attention to what is called ‘placemaking’ in the 1NG Plan recognises the importance of a sustainable and attractive urban environment for people to live and work as a foundation for strategic development.

The above points illustrate in a general way how the rich experience of Newcastle can be applied elsewhere, with the detailed actions geared to local circumstances.
Annex

1. List of Interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jonathan Walker</td>
<td>North East Chamber of Commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interim Head of Member Relations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rob Hamilton</td>
<td>Newcastle City Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>Senior Economic Policy Specialist</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Claire Prospert</td>
<td>Newcastle City Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>Programme Manager (European Funding)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nick Powell</td>
<td>Newcastle Science City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Engagement Officer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jim McIntyre</td>
<td>1NG (1 Newcastle Gateshead)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Executive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vicky Cuthbertson</td>
<td>1NG (1 Newcastle Gateshead)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning and Strategy Manager</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. References

1NG (2010) Newcastle Gateshead Plan:
Summary
http://www.newcastle.gov.uk/wwwfileroot/nccslides/1NG1PlanIntroSummary.pdf
Context
http://www.newcastle.gov.uk/wwwfileroot/nccslides/1NG1PlanPt1Context.pdf
Performance and Prospects
http://www.newcastle.gov.uk/wwwfileroot/nccslides/1NG1PlanPt2Performance.pdf
Vision
http://www.newcastle.gov.uk/wwwfileroot/nccslides/1NG1PlanPt3Vision.pdf
Making it happen
http://www.newcastle.gov.uk/wwwfileroot/nccslides/1NG1PlanPt4Implementing.pdf
Inspirations
http://www.newcastle.gov.uk/wwwfilerooot/nccslides/1NG1PlanPt5Inspiration.pdf

Newcastle City Council (2003) Tyne and Wear City Region Development Programme
http://www.newcastle.gov.uk/wwwfilerooot/regen/ldf/05.03.03_TandWcityregiondevprog.pdf

Newcastle City Council (2006) Building the Prosperity of the Tyne and Wear City Region: A Business Case

Main Report
Summary
### 3. Update on the responses to the economic downturn

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Action Points</th>
<th>Examples of Actions Taken</th>
<th>Key Players</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Large and increased capital expenditure programme</td>
<td>Council to continue capital investment programme (£268m in 2009/10).</td>
<td>City council. Private Finance Initiative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Help to small businesses, including rapid payment of invoices</td>
<td>Enterprise Package for business start-ups (£3.6m in 2009/10).</td>
<td>City Council. Business Link' Business and Enterprise North East.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Targeted support to those made redundant and minimising the social consequences of the downturn</td>
<td>Set up three resources centres offering help with job search, skills assessment, debt advice, etc. Delivery of the ‘Future Jobs Fund’ programme in the City Council.</td>
<td>City Council. Newcastle Futures. Jobcentre Plus.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Increased provision of debt and housing advice</td>
<td>Increased capacity to provide debt and housing advice. Work closely with local lenders to reduce repossessions.</td>
<td>City Council Welfare Rights Service. Financial services providers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Benefits awareness campaigns for both individuals and companies</td>
<td>Increase the take up of benefits to those eligible such as free school meals, Working Tax Credit, etc. Help small businesses maximise their tax relief.</td>
<td>City Council Welfare Rights Service and Children’s Services. Citizens Advice Bureau (and other voluntary and community support). North East Chamber of Commerce.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Maintaining low council tax</td>
<td>Implement major corporate transformation programme in the City Council to save money and so reduce pressure to increase Council Tax.</td>
<td>City Council.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Keeping momentum in regeneration schemes</td>
<td>Examine individual projects with the aim of keeping regeneration schemes on track. Helping secure alternative funding to enable projects to</td>
<td>City Council. Housing associations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>progress.</td>
<td>Construction companies. 1NG. Department of Communities and Local Government.</td>
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</table>

CITY OF A GROUP OF CITIES TO ATTRACT DIVERSE ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES, AMONG WHICH MANY SERVICE INDUSTRIES, IN THE VIEW OF PROVIDING EMPLOYMENT TO LOCAL DWELLERS OF A DEPRIVED AREA IN TRANSITION

THE CASE OF PLAIN COMMUNE, FRANCE
1. Presentation

Plaine Commune is the name of an Agglomerated Community (Communauté d’agglomération) of 8 communes, adjacent to the northern edge of Paris. It has 346,209 inhabitants (2007 data) and an area of 42.7 km², comprising:

- 100,800 in St Denis,
- 73,699 in Aubervilliers,
- 37,228 in La Courneuve,
- 34,663 in Stains,
- 28,338 in Pierrefitte,
- 11,376 in Villetaneuse,
- 52,020 in Epinay-sur-Seine
- 7,083 in L’Ile-Saint-Denis.

For the first time since 1975, the intercensus period 1999-2006 shows a demographic increase. Between 1975 and 1999, the decrease was an effect of de-industrialization. Over 25 years employment decreased, but an increase of 18% has been registered from 1999 to 2006, with a total of 136,000 jobs that year, among which 21,500 jobs are linked to the re-location of enterprises in Plaine Commune. In 2009: 115,000 people worked in 13,000 enterprises in this territory. The unemployment rate is estimated at 13 to 14%. Around 43,000 students are studying in two universities: Paris 8 in St Denis and Paris 13 in Villetaneuse.

**Participation in international cities networks**

CUF, Cités Unies France
CGLU, Cités et Gouvernements Locaux Unis
FALP, Forum des Autorités Locales de Périphéries
Cooperation with suburban cities in Brasil and southern Europe
Cooperation with Tuzla in Bosnia and with Palestine

PLAINE COMMUNE WITH ITS EIGHT MUNICIPALITIES AND NEIGHBOURING AGGLOMERATIONS
2. Introduction

The group of eight municipalities acting together under the status of an Agglomerated Community called Plaine Commune, has been selected as one of the two pilot case studies.

Located in the northern edge of Paris in the Seine-Saint-Denis district (département), Plaine Commune is undergoing major urban, economic and social change, for example large pieces of land that have been left as brownfield sites since the industrial decline of the 1980s have started to be reallocated to economic and housing purposes in the 1990s. The “Stade de France”, built there in 1998 on the occasion of the Football World Cup, has made this area well known and more attractive. Consequently, and through efforts of public and private actors, the area is host to many new companies and housing projects, although the pace of development has remained slow until recently.

3. The main challenge Plaine Commune is facing

We suggested Plaine Commune as a pilot case study, after observing that Plaine Commune is demonstrating intercommunal solidarity in looking for innovative activities to help overcome unemployment and poverty. In our view the main challenge was unemployment and the low qualifications of the workforce in an area which is steadily modernizing. In fact, Plaine Commune leaders are mainly concerned with driving the economic growth of the area to lead to social and territorial integration.

By social integration is meant employment, housing, care, facilities and infrastructure, education and training, whereas the issue of territorial integration is mainly one of a balance between the north and the south of the area, the latter being the location of most developments to date.

Thus, we reformulated the main challenge Plaine Commune is facing as the capacity to attract diverse economic activities, including many service industries, with the aim of providing employment to local residents across the whole area.

However, this represents a challenge because since the 19th century, the area has been historically populated by French and foreign workers, mainly unskilled, and without sufficient attention to their training, especially when industrial decline has forced them out of work. Data show that in this former industrial core of the Paris agglomeration, three quarters of the active population are registered as workers and clerks. Despite some progress in basic training and some improvement in the number of qualifications achieved, unemployment is one of the major social problems of the area, although Plaine Commune is the third service industries pole in the region. The main factor preventing local inhabitants obtaining jobs in the newly settled firms is the low level of education: 30% of the population over 15 does not have any formal qualification and only 6% of the population has an academic degree. Many former workers now unemployed are of foreign origin and have a low proficiency in the French language.

Another problem is the weak link between the economic development of the zone and its research potential, even though it has two large universities and several research institutes enrolling around 11% of all students in Ile-de-France.

As evidence of the poor state of the area, 24 neighborhoods of the eight cities are engaged in a “territorial contract of urban regeneration” signed with the National Agency for Urban Regeneration (ANRU, Agence Nationale pour la Rénovation Urbaine). The level of personal
resources in these cities ranks Plaine Commune at next to last of all Agglomerated Communities (Communautés d’agglomérations) in France.

The next section attempts to explain how the intermunicipal network is in a position to tackle such a challenge. Then we will analyse the strategy formulated to tackle it and finally what the main tools of that strategy are and how far they have succeeded.

4. Intermunicipal solidarity within the French administrative system

France has been structuring intermunicipal solidarity to cope with the great number of municipalities\textsuperscript{225} and to help find economic and social solutions at a more suitable territorial level.

Several types of intercity structures have been created by French Laws. The most recent ones appeared in the 1990s, as District Planning Authorities (Communautés de communes -1992) and Agglomerated Communities (1999). The latter must have more than 50 000 inhabitants; and they cover a number of contiguous municipalities, each of them being supposed to have at least 15 000 inhabitants. They have compulsory responsibilities and optional ones. The optional responsibilities are decided by all the municipalities involved, following what is considered to be “community interest”. They have the status of public intermunicipal cooperation institutes (Etablissements Publics de Coopération Intercommunale).

Plaine Commune is one of the most prominent intermunicipal structures in the capital region, particularly because of its situation in a deprived area with a relatively important proportion of its population classified as poor and simultaneously a strong trend of economic relocation. The history of Plaine Commune goes back to the 1980s when the mayors of Saint-Denis and of Aubervilliers decided that something had to be done in La Plaine-Saint-Denis, a large territory shared by these two cities which had been one of the biggest industrial zones in Europe since the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, and which was at that time suffering deindustrialization. Several common initiatives were launched in the 1980s and 1990s in the economic, urban and local finance fields. In 2000, the Agglomerated Community (AC) was created. One of its main features is the adoption of a unique professional tax system, which expresses solidarity among the eight cities. After long and difficult years, the Plaine-Saint-Denis appears as one major site attracting economic investment. In the Paris metropolitan area, it comes right after La Défense.

It started with 5 cities, and was progressively joined by three others. The most populated ones in the role of leaders, are Saint-Denis (100 800) and Aubervilliers (73 699). But Plaine Commune authority is making efforts not to left behind smaller cities and, on the contrary, to pull them closer to act together so they may also benefit from the grouping.

In 2004, all eight cities decided to transfer the responsibility of town planning, housing and economic integration to the AC. Then other responsibilities were transferred as shown in the table below.

\textsuperscript{225} The number of communes is approximately equivalent to the sum of the communes in all the other country members of the European Union (Thoenig, 2007)
Areas of competences of Plaine Commune

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town Planning</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Urban renewal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
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<td>Economic development</td>
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<td>Trade implementation coherencen</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transports and mobility</td>
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<tr>
<td>Academic education and research</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tourism and local development</td>
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<tr>
<td>Employment and access to jobs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public and green spaces</td>
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<tr>
<td>Waste systems, water</td>
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<tr>
<td>Urban waste management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Books and readership</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sports and community cultural events</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aubervilliers Olympic swimming pool</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

In all around, 1809 employees work in Plaine Commune offices.

The eight municipalities have a common Charter giving the organization principles they all respect. The AC is ruled by a Council which meets every month. Meetings are open to the public and minutes are on line. It also has a "Development Council" (Conseil de développement), a group of eighty women and men from the civil society associated to projects and decisions.

The Plaine Commune annual budget (2010) amounts to 426.76 million €, 277 million € of operating budget and 150 milion € of capital budget.

5. A strategy of merging economic development and access to employment

In reality, economic development does not provide jobs to the whole population and this is the experience since the Plaine-Saint-Denis has gone through a period of strong economic development. Large firms in the service industries are attracted by comparatively low land prices, but they tend to locate with their own labour force and so do not recruit much local labour.

Plaine Commune formulated a strategy to attract such firms, but being conscious that the companies objectives do not meet social objectives such as access to jobs, the board of the Agglomerated Community launched specific policies and actions to correct this weakness.

The strategy consists of managing under the same authorities several actions aiming at deriving access to jobs from new economic activities coming from outside the area. This objective is considered relevant in the long run, but not in the short term. The main actors of this strategy are the head of Plaine Commune (the chairman) and the directors of Economic development, and the Employment and Communication departments. They work together in a transversal way to cross-fertilize each other’s contribution, although the institution is still organized along hierarchical lines, as is the case in all French administration. The idea is that this principle cannot be totally replaced at once, but that it is important to change methods by sharing objectives and managing actions with various inputs from different departments.
Within the framework of the AC, they have been trying to develop and coordinate actions in all eight cities in order to give a sense of community in dealing with poverty and unemployment. Such a strategy is also a way of giving more strength to actions than the ones isolated cities can launch themselves.

Some of these actions are described below to show how they can tackle the challenge, what their tools are, who the main actors and beneficiaries are, and what results can be observed. We will deal with actions of integration into the job market and partnerships with economic actors.

6. Policies and actions for integration into the job market

A device called “Houses for Employment” (« Maisons de l’emploi », MDE) exists in France. It may take various forms according to the cities they lie in, but generally speaking they follow the pattern created by the Ministry in charge of professional integration of unemployed, especially unskilled workers and young people newly arriving on the job market.

In 2005, Plaine Commune submitted a bid to a call for tenders from the Ministry of social cohesion and housing. Since then, a partnership has been set up, including Plaine Commune, the State, the Ile-de-France region, the district (département de Seine-Saint-Denis), the Chamber of Commerce, the Chamber of Crafts (Chambre des métiers) and Plaine Commune Promotion, a group of 250 companies located in the area. They all agreed to participate in a project aiming to help unemployed people to have better access to jobs.

The MDE project consists of establishing a network of eight such Houses, one in each city of Plaine Commune, coordinated at the community level. The objective is to reinforce tools for access to jobs. It starts with providing extensive information open to all visitors and goes on with a strategic program of training in the French language and basic knowledge, job forums and a monitoring system to follow up the hiring of local unemployed people on demolition and construction works launched in the framework of urban regeneration. MDE also launched a program where job seekers alternately attend training courses and work in partner enterprises. Various firms in construction work, trade, restaurants and hotels, transport and logistics, Medicare, banks and insurance signed conventions for this.

This project is eligible for ERDF within the In’Europe program set up among 10 cities and agglomerations in Ile-de-France. The total budget is 3 547 400 €, and the ERDF part is 950 000 €, mainly devoted to construction of the jobcentres. Plaine Commune itself is contributing 1 185 230 € and the French government was supposed to give 1 075 000 €, but the State budget reduction has had some impact on this project by reducing the State contribution (extending to a loss of 1 million € partly compensated by other sources up to 750 000 €, leaving a net loss of 250 000 €) which resulted in a delay in the opening of the centres. This program is meant to give a series of job opportunities to people having no information on jobs, especially young people and the long-term unemployed.

Looking at those indicators useful to evaluate the results of the MDE program, there appears to be only quantitative ones (such as the number of alternate contracts, number of participants in Forums and other meetings), and so lacking a more qualitative approach dealing with how people are really accommodated and prepared for the job market. However, this is certain to be improved, particularly with the help of the Communication Department which is acting in close relation with the Employment Department. For example, they distribute questionnaires to all
participants in information meetings on jobs, asking them how they have come to know about such meetings, then they keep track of how many and what kind of people attended. This helps to refine information to the public about such initiatives and helps attract people who really need to be accompanied in their search for work.

**Helping unemployed to create economic activities**

Plaine Commune supports associations devoted to help people create their own activity. More than 20 projects receive such help every year including:

- Artis Multimedia is an association doing teaching in literacy for the unemployed who need it to find a job.
- Taf et Mafé is an African cooking unit training people to find jobs in cooking.

This seems to be a valuable action, given that many people have skills they cannot demonstrate in the existing economic system.

7. **Actions towards businessmen**

Plaine Commune has promoted a Charter called “**Enterprises - Territory Charter for Plaine Commune economic actors**”, the objective of which is expressed in the introduction of the Charter quoted below. It underlines a phenomenon of discrimination towards young job seekers, preventing them having access to jobs in the newly settled companies whose boards may be prejudiced against the local population. Discrimination towards inhabitants of deprived areas, mainly when they are of a foreign origin, is a major problem in access to jobs. It is aggravating unemployment partly due to low levels of skills among this group.

“This territory has gone through the strongest economic development since 2000/01/01, with 1 400 new enterprises on more than 1.5 millions square metres, with 21 000 more jobs. But the territory inhabitants do not benefit enough from these new economic settlements. The unemployment rate, although it fell to under 14%, is still largely over the national average. Access to jobs for the territory inhabitants is still hindered by a real discrimination phenomenon. Too many young people, despite their level of qualification, do not obtain an interview or hiring because of their names, their features or their address.”

On that ground, Plaine Commune with its partner Plaine Commune Développement (an association of 230 local firms at the time of the launching of the Charter but now 250 strong), initiated this Charter in 2005. The launch of the Charter implied many contacts with various companies, following a strategy aiming at creating a spirit of citizenship among them.

With this Charter, Plaine Commune is asking companies to agree to their responsibility in social cohesion along with economic growth and to demonstrate this agreement in concrete actions. Some 24 types of actions are suggested in the Charter, each company being free to choose from them. Companies are supposed to launch between five and seven actions within three years. Examples of suggested actions are as follows:

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226 See Charter in annex
− In the employment field: paying specific attention to candidates from the area in the job offer, supporting the "Second chance School" (Ecole de la deuxième chance) where school dropouts can resume training, sponsoring of young people to help them find jobs...
− In the field of training: integrating young apprentices in alternate training, welcoming trainees, developing links with universities located in the area and with research labs.

In return, Plaine Commune is engaged in several actions, such as:
− Associating enterprises in decisions on town planning and urban projects.
− Developing shops and local utilities to improve the companies’ environment.
− Contributing to adaptation of the transport system for better access to the area.

The main results, after four years of existence were noted in 2009, as:
− 93 companies signed the Charter
− 1 300 recruitments were made during the first two years
− Local recruitment seemed to be in progress, since 19% of the 2009 employees live in the area, whereas they only were 16% to begin with.

Some partners have objected that the Charter was not convincing and that 21 companies out of the 93 which had signed, quit after three years. They also noticed that fewer and fewer companies were signing: only 12 in 2009 for example. But the Plaine Commune 2009 Annual Report mentions that although 11 companies withdrew because of lack of motivation, 45 signed for a second period.

A cooperation Charter in the opening of a new shopping centre

An example of particular joint efforts between the institution and economic actors is visible in the recent settlement of a large shopping centre, the Millennium shopping centre located at Porte d’Aubervilliers, which is on the limit between Paris and the city of Aubervilliers. It is a meaningful case of structuring together a territory, a population and employment objectives.

This shopping centre, opening April 2011, is built on a large brownfield site along the peripheral boulevard going all around Paris. It has a 4 100 square metres supermarket, and 130 other shops, restaurants, and 12 000 square metres of green space along the Saint-Denis canal. A total of 700 full time jobs are expected to be created.

Going back to January 2006, a Charter was signed by Plaine Commune, the City of Paris, the cities of Pantin and Saint-Ouen and the two companies responsible for the construction work. In addition, 104 other firms signed it. The Charter planned:

− 75% of jobs reserved for people living in what was called the solidarity zone comprising all eight cities of Plaine Commune, two other close cities and the northern Paris districts (arrondissements) close to the shopping centre. Among these jobs, 20% should be offered to people having specific difficulties regarding access to employment.
− 35% of all subcontracted work for local enterprises.
− 5% of contracts reserved for integration enterprises (entreprises d’insertion)

In order to fulfill these objectives, the MDE (Maison de l’Emploi) has been associated to this project, with the task of developing specific training for local unemployed people likely to obtain
jobs in this centre. Specific work is done to inform inhabitants of the area and to identify those whose qualifications enable them to be candidates and those who need training. MDE has been very active in the last few months in the view of the April opening of the Millennium Shopping Centre. An Action Plan was set up in August 2010 with a website where anybody can apply for the jobs. Five types of jobs are selected in which training actions are launched to increase the level of competence of possible candidates.

Around 2 500 people participated in the January session of the “Job Meeting” regularly organized by Plaine Commune a meeting devoted to bring together people looking for jobs and recruiting companies.

Some 70 out of 111 companies are in close contact with MDE. On March 3, 2011 a Job meeting ended up selecting 18 candidates for jobs as departmental heads or assistants, among who 11 live in the cities of Plaine Commune. A seminar on alternate work is due to take place on March 22, 2011, aiming to setup contacts between companies and institutions in charge of training (Lycées, Universities) and of job integration (Mission Locale pour l’Emploi). They will make an inventory of all the possibilities of alternate jobs in order to facilitate access to jobs for people in need of training. Various types of jobs are concerned, skilled and low skilled.

8. An integrated community policy to tackle the main challenge Plaine Commune is facing

To tackle the main challenge of fighting unemployment in an area undergoing massive economic investments, Plaine Commune relies on:

− a strong intermunicipal solidarity,
− an active participation of all cities of the agglomeration in economic and social initiatives,
− a dialogue with economic actors,
− the use of all possible regional, national and European devices,
− assessment of launched action

Intermunicipal solidarity as a way of governance

The way Plaine Commune has elaborated its strategy follows a top-down model. However, the institution manages to act in close association with all stakeholders. A way of guaranteeing that the strategy is deeply rooted in the territory is to communicate largely on the Community Council agenda and on the decisions it takes. This Council, whose 58 counselors, including all mayors, represent the eight cities, meets once a month and the meeting agenda is transparent and available on line as are the minutes (albeit with some delay, the latest available being those from May 2009).

Another tool is the Development Council (see above and appendix) which enlarges the number and type of people associated with the decision-making process.

Intermunicipal solidarity also takes other forms. For instance, some cities have initiatives that are complementary to actions launched by the CA such as:

− Aubervilliers has set up an « Employment Month » where all employment actions initiated by Plaine Commune are developed and explained to Aubervilliers citizens, on a smaller scale but in the same spirit.
– Epinay sur Seine created a Forum especially dedicated to the audiovisual and cinema industry. This action originated in memory of the former Éclair Film Studios of the 1930s and at the same time aimed at helping people to find jobs in the cinema industry. This is closely related to the Culture Cluster extended to the whole agglomeration territory.

**A dialogue with newly settled enterprises**

Plaine Commune authority considers it very important to establish direct links with both the managers and staff of the newly settled companies. Even before their installation, a reception is organized in the Council room in the Plaine Commune building in front of the Stade de France. The Chairman welcomes the newcomers and shows them the model of the territory which is exposed in the Council room. He also talks about Plaine Commune projects and invites employees to use all the facilities of the area (such as gyms) during their lunch break. Other than that, Plaine Commune takes the staff of new companies on tours, giving them information on transport, trade, cultural activities, etc. The objective of such a reception and visits is to create links with the newcomers, to make them more familiar with places they do not know and above all, to counter the poor image of the territory held by some of those outside it.

**Community planning and the use of regional, national and European support**

In order to maintain tight links between economic development, social improvement, employment and training, Plaine Commune is taking part in all possible methods created and co-financed by institutions from the regional through the national and to the European levels. Mentioning one example, the "Pact for employment, training and economic development": the CA, the district and the region cooperate to develop this threefold pact aiming at:

– Territorial marketing to attract economic investments
– Development of specific economic fields, including social economy
– Access of the local population to jobs through training and help to create economic activities in deprived areas.

Plaine Commune often uses Structural European funds in the type of actions that have both social and economic features. Structural funds have an important role in policies and actions aiming at filling the gap between low levels of training among unemployed and the high level of technology of the newly settled firms.

Plaine Commune is one of ten places in Ile-de-France participating in a program called In’Europe concerning integrated urban projects within the Axis 1 of the ERDF 2007-2013 operational program which is employment oriented. The total ERDF endowment is 11 450 000 € and the total cost of actions is 39 057 300 €. The actions relevant to the challenge being dealt with belong to the third objective devoted to reducing intra urban disparities, promoting social inclusion and equality of opportunity. Included is the MDE (see above).

In the frame of the EQUAL program, Plaine Commune had started an action which was first co-financed by ESF and will now receive ERDF (see appendix) It consists of helping people to create economic activities which enhance the value of cultural heritage or of traditional handicrafts.

One difficulty in managing this In’Europe program is to articulate ESF and ERDF funds. This is due to several factors. For example, one has to do with the specific features of each fund: ERDF is mainly oriented towards investments in territorial development and is financing projects for the whole period 2007-2013, whereas ESF is more associated with sectoral policies and has annual
calls. Another reason is that in France the two funds have distinct managing authorities that do not apply the same methods, the regional level of the state for ERDF and the regional administration of labour for ESF (DIRECCTE, Direction Régionale des Entreprises, de la Concurrence, de la Consommation, du Travail et de l’Emploi)

Evaluation tools

Despite the will to follow up and to be able to assess the results of actions launched to tackle the challenge of unemployment of a large part of local population in relation to important economic investments in the area, evaluation tools are not sufficiently developed. Three of them have been mentioned by Plaine Commune Communication Department:

– Questionnaires passed out to participants in Job meetings
– Statistics gathered via website consultation
– Statistics on the number of apprenticeship contracts signed after Job meetings in the field of construction work.

Obviously qualitative indicators are missing which could help, along with quantitative ones, to improve the efficiency of access to jobs and economic integration.

9. Some lessons learned

Strengths and weaknesses

The Plaine Commune strategy does articulate the various dimensions of economic and social development. Social cohesion is at the core of social, economic and urban development in several parts of this fast evolving territory.

Plaine Commune capacity to make its strategy concrete through actions needing participation from several institutions and actors is a key element in view of a deep territorial, social and economic transformation. The elected representatives of the Agglomerated Community take the view that such a transformation should not develop to the detriment of local inhabitants and that on the contrary it might help in the process if their upward recovery. However, this perspective is somehow risky since it relies on achieving agreement with the economic actors on the issue of hiring local people. The other risk lies in the need for public financing which is subject to hazards in economic and social public policies (for example, the loss of state money in the MDE project as referred to above).

On the other side, the AC strength is grounded in several strengths:

† They have the capacity to think how a kind of synergy can stem from organizing internal work with a double principle: on one side each Department has to assume its own responsibilities and on the other side, it has to exchange and share with fellow Departments.
† They try to follow up the making of actions and to observe their results (within the above underlined limits)
† They are transparent on difficulties encountered in the course of action and they try to analyze them in order to solve problems.

On the whole, Plaine Commune leaders are highly conscious of the challenge and they also know how difficult it will be to overcome inequalities among people looking for jobs and a lack of balance between deprived and better off parts of the territory.
Main conditions to tackle the challenge

Plaine commune, or perhaps other cities or groups of cities in similar situations, can rely on the following assets:

− A real will from all member cities and from the supra-local level to work together rather than in competition with each other. This type of will has to be nourished by significant efforts to define common goals and to fix the range of each member's responsibility.

− This cooperative system is always in progress but remembering that the first significant changes are only now appearing despite projects starting more than 10 years ago. The current orientations were formulated some time after the creation of the Agglomerated Community, around 2004-2005.

− A stable political orientation is a real asset. This territory is fortunate to enjoy a stable management. Changes in the personalities can be acceptable as long as the same goals are pursued. Eventually, frequent changes in strategies and actions may be harmful, as being responsible of a loss of points of reference for many actors, with consequences on the final beneficiaries.

− Experts are welcome, as long as their mission is clearly explained. In other places, elected bodies are suspicious towards too much research and expertise, fearing that it may lead to wasted resources. On the contrary, Plaine Commune political and technical leaders frequently call for experts with precise remits and a close watch on the methods and production they deploy. Doing this, they benefit from the consultancy without losing sight of their own objectives.
Annex

1. Interviews

Patrick Braouezec  Chairman, Communauté d'agglomération Plaine Commune, Seine-Saint-Denis Deputy in the French Parliament
Richard Gendron  Manager, Employment and Integration Department
Philippe Pion  Manager, Economic Development Department
Danièle Vigier  Responsible for spatial planning and in the Development Department
Céline Daviet  Responsible for International Relations and Housing in the Chairman staff
Martine Pérot  Manager, Communication cultural partnerships Department
Luc Bouvet  Deputy Manager of Plaine Commune Departments, responsible for town planning and urban projects
Frédéric Coste  Responsible for the Millenium Center recruitment

2. Documents

Plaine Commune : Rapport d’activités 2009
Plaine Commune : Document préparatoire au comité de suivi technique du CTRU de novembre 2010
Plaine Commune : Actualisation du PCAE, 18 mai 2010
Charte Entreprises-Territoire
Grille d’indicateurs des Missions locales pour l’emploi
Pacte pour l’emploi, la formation et le développement économique entre la Communauté d’Agglomération Plaine Commune, le Département de la Seine-Saint-Denis et la Région Ile-de-France
Plaine Commune : Pass’Port pour l’emploi 2010
Plaine Commune : Mission Alternance de la MDE
Plaine Commune : Plan d’action BTP
Plaine Commune : Le PLIE, programmation 2010
Plaine Commune : Schéma de Cohérence territoriale
ACT Consultants : monographie In’Europe Plaine Commune
Urban foresight based on public participation as a tool for integrating local residents’ requirements on their own neighbourhood into the master plan of the city

The case of Molinay 2017, Seraing, Belgium
1. The territory and its actors

The Molinay 2017 experience concerns three territorial levels, all of them representing different, although strongly interrelated challenges as explained below.

Table 1: The territories concerned by the Molinay 2017 experience

Source: author’s design

The City of Seraing

A former industrial city in the agglomeration zone of Liège with 61,000 inhabitants in an area of 36 km². The high unemployment rate (17% in 2007)\(^227\) is primarily due to the permanent withdrawal of its steel industries (annexe, 1). The city has a strong multicultural character: Belgians (85%), Italians (10%), French, Spanish, Turkish, Moroccans, and other minority groups are represented. The decrease in employment and economic activity and an increase in brownfield areas are at the heart of the main urban challenges of the city. Another challenge for Seraing is the lack of a city centre related to the late formulation of the actual territory of the city.\(^228\) These questions are at the core of the new Master Plan, adopted in 2006 as a result of a planning process that was launched by the end of the 1990s.

Since 2001, Seraing is one of the 15 beneficiary cities of the “Federal Plan for Big Cities”\(^229\), a state-level programme providing financial support for cities suffering from social restructuring and deprived neighbourhoods. This programme helped Seraing to launch the process of its urban reconversion and to prepare its Master Plan.

\(^227\) Allyson MAREK, Anne-Marie VEITHEN & Yves DEMEUSE – 31/10/2007

\(^228\) The actual boundaries of Seraing had been defined in 1977 with the unification of several cities Seraing, Ougrée, Jemeppe-sur-Meuse and Boncelles. Now, the city has no city centre, therefore very few cultural and other amenities have been settled down in the city. For instance, Seraing has no movies at all!

\(^229\) Federal Urban Policy of Belgium launched in 1999 (see annexe 2)
The main challenges of the reconversion and therefore the large urban projects designed in the Master Plan are concentrated on a smaller territory of the city, namely the Seresian Basin which has an area of 8 km² and a population of 15,500, with a large number of abandoned industrial plants and an unemployment rate well above the average: 31%. Furthermore, around 46% of the population lives on the minimal level of income.

**The Molinay neighbourhood**

With an area of 1.5 km² and 1,700 inhabitants, this is a small neighbourhood in the heart of the Seresian basin. The Molinay had been a prosperous commercial area within the industrial city until about 20 years ago. The industrial decline brought the disappearance of its traditional commercial activities and the changing of its local society. Today, the Molinay is a multicultural area, with a majority of young population suffering from uncertain living conditions and lacking future prospects. The local society having been dispersed, the area is now suffering from strong individualism and the lack of vivid relationships between its inhabitants. Nevertheless, a great number of associations and NGOs are present on the territory promising a hope for social recovering. The lack of social and cultural facilities and the bad connectivity to the other parts of the city form the major spatial challenges of the neighbourhood (annexe 8).

Although the Molinay neighbourhood is an integral part of the Seresian basin, in the first draft of the Master Plan this area has been almost entirely left out of any concrete intervention. According to the plan, the developments of the other neighbourhoods were supposed to play a pull effect on the Molinay during the 20 years following the realisations of the Master Plan.

**The main actors and their objectives**

The Local Government of Seraing is headed (from 2006 till 2012) by Mayor Mr. Alain Mathot (Socialist party). The main objectives of the municipality are now to tackle the main challenges related to the drastic withdrawal of the steel industries, especially through the realisation of some large urban projects that would be able to generate new economic attractiveness of the city as well as the amelioration of local services for a better quality of life for its citizens. The main instrument of this realisation of these objectives is the Master Plan, an ambitious document designing a deep spatial reconstruction of the city. The preparation of the Master Plan began at the end of the 1990s, well before the mandate of the present mayor, and the first version of the Plan was adopted in 2006. Public participation is declared as being an important objective and tool, while elaborating the plan. However, the concept of participation was changed to encompass workshops with small groups of specialists and larger meetings informing the population about the main lines of the plan (annexe 3).

In 2006, ERIGES, Seraing’s Autonomous Municipal Agency was created with its mission to manage the main procedures of the Seresian urban transformation as follows:

- intervening in preparation of the Master Plan (feasibility studies, information on projects, creating partnerships between individuals and enterprises, etc.)
- managing the municipality’s real estate transactions for urban regeneration (buying and renovating buildings and selling them to individuals)
The Local Actions Services unit of the CAL in Seraing (CAL of Seraing) has been settled in the Molinay neighbourhood since 1997 as a subdivision of the Centre d’Action Laïque (Centre of actions for secularism) of Liège (annexe 4).

As a local NGO working with 9 employees, the CAL of Seraing has been working on local actions aiming at enhancing social cohesion in the neighbourhood and it has also developed a strong articulation of the modalities and aims of participatory projects at the local level. Between 1997 and 2007, the CAL of Seraing had been strongly embedded into the local society of the Molinay and is now considered as one of the main actors of the neighbourhood. Its actions are always based on a direct relationship with local inhabitants and on a strong commitment for the socially cohesive development of the Molinay area (annexe 5).

As a response to the Master Plan of the City, it’s the first version had planned to leave the Molinay almost completely untouched but the CAL of Seraing has launched a participative foresight process called Molinay 2017. It is an exemplary action with the main objective to reveal the urgency of the integration of this area into the Master Plan.

The Seraing Cultural Centre is a cultural facility of the Municipality with a very special position: created in 1975, it is located in the heart of the Molinay neighbourhood while its main mission is to offer programs and events for the entire city. As a city level institution, it had very few relations with the local population. Furthermore, this building was the only one in the whole neighbourhood to be integrated into the first version of the Master Plan which initiated demolishing a large number of residential buildings in front of the Centre in order to ensure its better visibility from the future main axis of the city. As a response to this plan, the Cultural Centre joined in the initiative of the CAL and took an active part in the participatory foresight process. As a result, the Centre became more embedded into the local society, with a certain number of spectacles and events especially organised for the attention of the local society.

2. The main challenge of the case study - why Seraing has been chosen as a good experience?

The case of Seraing has been chosen as a good example for a city tackling the challenge of "countering social and spatial segregation" through public participation. The original challenge identified at the beginning of our study was as follows: “Urban foresight based on public participation in an urban neighbourhood suffering from industrial decline”. As a result of our interviews and field work in the city, this challenge has been slightly altered to: “Urban foresight based on public participation as a tool for integrating local residents’ requirements on their own neighbourhood into the Master Plan of the city”.

The changes in focus relate to the fact that Seraing-Molinay 2017 should not just be considered as an interesting project on participative urban planning. This is actually one important aspect of the case, but not the only one and the not the most important one. The originality of the case should be found in how the results of the participative planning process have been adopted by the municipality, and how some of its main elements have been rapidly integrated into the Master Plan - in spite of the initial objective to leave the Molinay area untouched and to wait for

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230 The centre works with 22 permanent employees. The building contains a large theatre room with 550 seats. Its running costs are partly financed by the French Community, partly by the municipality of Seraing.
the development of the other parts of the city to bring their secondary effect to bear on this neighbourhood. Thanks to the professional character of the participatory urban foresight organised by the CAL in partnership with the Destrée Institute\textsuperscript{231}, the results of the planning process were considered by the mayor and the city council as reflecting the real needs of the city and therefore giving some important arguments for further thinking. The Molinay case reflects an exemplary collaboration between several urban actors (the CAL, the municipality, the Cultural Centre etc) representing different objectives and interests with, at the core, their common commitment for dialogue and consensus.

3. The main elements and results of the Molinay 2017 experience

The Master Plan (MP)

The first version of the MP was adopted in 2006 and updated in 2008, incorporating some new elements taken over from the results of the Molinay 2017 process. The main objective of the MP is to enhance economic and spatial features of the city of Seraing, strongly affected by industrial decline. All together more than 300 projects have been identified. The MP is a classical urban plan, based on the consideration that spatial intervention in certain core urban areas would enhance, in the long run, the economic attractiveness of the entire city. Thus it does not also contain any elements of an integrated urban development strategy dealing with social, cultural, environmental, institutional, etc. approaches.

The main projects of the MP (annexe 7)

\textsuperscript{231} The Destree Institute is an independent non-profit association created in Wallonia in 1938. Acknowledged as a general service for lifelong learning and research centre with an interuniversity calling, the Destree Institute works as a permanent think-tank, while publishing studies and implementing activities related to regional development issues.(...) The aims of the Destree Institute are threefold: 1- the participation of the women and men of Wallonia in a collective project that encourages social justice, promotes democracy, sustainable development and economic expansion, 2- the development of Wallonia as a region based on the sharing, with its population, of a wide, active and receptive knowledge, 3- a critical understanding, by the citizens, of the challenges and goals of society, from the local to the global, and a support in defining the strategic strands leading to these ends. (http://www.institut-destree.eu/Pilotage/Statutes_Destree-Institute.htm)
Molinary 2017 – the participatory foresight process

Origins and originalities of the project

Following the adoption of the MP in 2006, the CAL of Seraing has been contacted by the municipality to help them inform the local population of the Molinary about the main features of the MP. Instead of informing the inhabitants about a plan that did not propose any concrete improvements in their neighbourhood, the CAL decided to draw the attention of the municipality to the importance of integrating the Molinary into the MP. Based on its 10 years of experience and strong local relationships in the neighbourhood, the CAL decided to define the main needs of the area together with its inhabitants. They launched a participatory planning process in partnership with the Destrée Institute. The latter provided them with a double aspect support: professional on the one hand, and financial on the other. In fact, the Destrée Institute managed to integrate the Molinary 2017 process into its running Interreg project: Futurreg (Futures For Regional Development)\(^{232}\).

The aim of this project financed in the frame of „Interreg C” was to create a toolkit for regional foresights, bringing together the different approaches represented by the project’s partners and helping regional authorities facing some important challenges of regional development. The project lasted from September 2005 until the end of 2007. Molinary 2017 was integrated into the project in 2007 as one of the case studies that contributed to the formulation and testing of the regional futures toolkit. Through the Futurreg project, the Destrée Institute contributed to the financing of the Molinary 2017 project with 40,000 euros. (http://www.urenio.org/futurreg/)

\(^{232}\) The aim of this project financed in the frame of „Interreg C” was to create a toolkit for regional foresights, bringing together the different approaches represented by the project’s partners and helping regional authorities facing some important challenges of regional development. The project lasted from September 2005 till end 2007. Molinary 2017 had been integrated into the project in 2007 as one of the case studies that contributed to the formulation and testing of the regional futures toolkit. Through the Futurreg project, the Destrée Institute contributed to the financing of the Molinary 2017 project with 40,000 euros. (http://www.urenio.org/futurreg/)
This support strongly increased the credibility of the Molinay 2017 project from the point of view of the local authorities and other actors.

The CAL of Seraing and the Destrée Institute have been working in a well balanced collaboration, where:

- Destrée Institute provided the expertise in foresight methodology and contributed to the project through its “fresh” point of view coming from the exterior;
- the CAL provided the expertise on local participation methodology, and contributed through its knowledge on the neighbourhood and strong local relationships.

Regional foresight, as defined by the Destrée Institute, is a method built on the logical follow up of different steps: from the preparing and diagnostic, through the formulation of challenges, the construction of a common vision and the definition of the main strategic axes of intervention until the definition of concrete actions, the forms of project management and the tools of monitoring.

Second, the intention of the CAL, that was quite clear: in line with their principle concerning the clear distinction of roles and competences between the different actors of participatory programs (annexe 5), they intended to limit the participative foresight process at the formulation of a common vision, and to give the task of the formulation of the strategic axis and concrete actions to the municipality of Seraing. Following this strategy, the main outcome of the Molinay 2017 process is a study presenting the diagnostic and the main challenges of the territory, as they had been defined with the local population during the Molinay 2017 process and during previous interviews and common events.

The main challenges and needs of the neighbourhood have been determined over a perspective of 10 years that represents a relatively short term foresight.

**Main elements of the project**

→ Nine debate workshops organised in spring 2007, in order to establish a common vision on the neighbourhood – diagnostic, through form of SWOT analysis. All together 200 participants – local inhabitants and actors - took place at the workshops. These were organised following the method of “world cafés” (see box below).
The World Café is a creative process for facilitating collaborative dialogue and the sharing of knowledge and ideas to create a living network of conversation and action. In this process, a café ambiance is created, in which participants discuss a question or issue in small groups around tables. At regular intervals the participants move to a new table. One table manager stays and summarises the previous conversation to the new table guests. Thus the proceeding conversations are cross-fertilised with the ideas generated in former conversations with other participants. At the end of the process the main ideas are summarised in a plenary session and follow-up possibilities are discussed.


→ **Design of the main challenges by the Steering Committee**, formed by the main partners of the project: the CAL and the Destré Institute. 21 main questions and 16 challenges have been identified. Because of time constraints, the result of this brainstorming could not be monitored through a new meeting with the population. As compensation, the results of all interviews and meetings held during the previous 10 years by the CAL in the neighbourhood have been taken into consideration alongside the concrete outcomes of the nine above mentioned workshops.

→ **A lunch workshop** organised at the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the CAL in Seraing in October 2007 allowed a great number of local inhabitants to come together and to work with them on the elaboration of a common vision concerning the previously determined challenges. During the same month, the results of Molinay 2017 have been presented at an international conference held in the frame of the Futurreg project in Dublin.

→ **As a last step, a panel of experts** was organised in order to obtain a professional feedback on the challenges identified. Four further transversal challenges have also been defined by the same panel.

→ **Following the results of these meetings, the hierarchy of challenges** has been worked out by the Steering Committee. The project ended in December 2007.

**Main results, outcomes and capitalisation**

The main outcome of the project is a report containing:

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233 also see annexes 8 and 9
a methodology of participatory foresight

the diagnostic of the area based on statistical documents and on inhabitants’ descriptions

a list of challenges and statements with regard to the Molinay area, based on the diagnostics and the expression of local population and stakeholders.

The report was presented at the Municipal Council by the CAL in January 2008.\textsuperscript{234} As a main result of the project, the Mayor and the municipal council of Seraing did not only acknowledge the high importance of the Molinay 2017 project, but also adopted some elements of it and accepted the integration of them into its Master Plan. In the new version of the Master Plan, four new elements were identified regarding the territory of the Molinay neighbourhood:

1. Renewal and enlarging the pathway under the rails relying the Molinay to the other parts of the city
2. Enlarging the Molinay kindergarten
3. Transforming Smeets street (the main street of Molinay) into a pedestrian way
4. Lightening the Cultural Centre in order to make it visible from the other parts of the city. In the meantime, the idea of demolishing the neighbouring buildings has been rejected.

4. Lessons of the case study

A collaboration and its limits

Molinay 2017 is an excellent example of how a bottom up initiative may be adopted by mainstream local policies. Nevertheless it also shows where the limits of this successful collaboration between local actors and the municipality may be.

The presence of the municipality at the Molinay 2017 process was limited to the participation of technical experts invited by the CAL. Neither the mayor nor any elected politicians were present at any of the Molinay 2017 programmes. However, once the results of Molinay 2017 had been presented to them, the mayor and the City Council immediately adopted its methodology and results and certain elements have been rapidly integrated into the Master Plan. Further, the Mayor now considers that the Molinay 2017 project is an integral part of municipal policies regarding public participation, undertaken since the beginning of the planning process.\textsuperscript{235} During the interview he even expressed his wish to launch the same process in other neighbourhoods suffering from similar problems related to exclusion and deprivation, through the local neighbourhood councils, or by inviting the CAL to move into another area of the city and to

\textsuperscript{234} The Destrée Institute did not take place at this presentation, as the CAL intended to highlight the fact that the foresight is the outcome of a common work of local partners (inhabitants and NGOs) and therefore the challenges described there reflect the results of a real bottom up process

\textsuperscript{235} Interview with Alain Mathot, Bourgmestre of Seraing, decembre 2010. On the different types of participation in the frame of the elaboration of the Master Plan, please see in annexe.
repeat the same process. But this is not necessarily an objective for the CAL which actually does not consider its duties as being accomplished in the Molinay neighbourhood.

The adoptive approach of the municipality and its Mayor regarding the Molinay 2017 project may be explained by several conditions, but especially by their need for maintaining a general social consensus on the level of the entire city in order to be able to realise the main urban projects identified by the Master Plan. At this point the limits of the cooperation between the CAL and the municipality may be pointed out.

Although the Molinay neighbourhood has been finally integrated into the Master Plan, the weight of the four projects (their budget and their importance within the other projects) lags behind the volume of the other project elements. Further, these four projects only correspond to a small part of the challenges and objectives identified by the Molinay 2017 foresight process. The operational strategic actions related to objectives such as education, mobility or security are still to be developed by the CAL and adopted by the municipality later on.

The reasons for these limits on the cooperation between the CAL and the municipality would need further analysis. They can only partly be explained by the lack of an integrated urban policy on the level of the Seraing municipality. In addition they could also be related to some general – national or even global - features that may hinder or at least make difficult the realisation of such integrated policies. For instance, in the cases of housing (see box) and education, the lack of relevant competences on the federal level may also jeopardise the adoption of the CAL’s objectives and the launching of an active municipal policy in their direction.

Housing is for instance a regional competence in Belgium, although cities can lobby for increasing their social housing stock. In Seraing the amount of social housing is already very high – more than 50% of the total housing stock, therefore neither the city nor the region are willing to increase this amount. The municipality of Seraing has engaged in a mostly market oriented housing policy: buying the housing via its Autonomous Agency and selling them after renewal at an increased price. Within these circumstances it is very complicated in Seraing to elaborate any local, bottom up housing strategy, and this is why the CAL decided to put aside this question.

Transferability of the Molinay 2017 experience

Several elements and learning from the experience can be considered as being transferable in the case of other cities:

The human condition is of basic importance for the success of participatory foresight processes: the strong and long term presence in the area of the leader(s) of the project is inevitable. It is not enough to be aware of local problems, it is also necessary to be sure of the confidence of local people in the leadership and for the leadership to be confident in local people. To achieve this, several years of local presence and regular contact with the population is absolutely necessary.

The clear distinction of roles and competences between the different actors is a basic principle. Inhabitants must be aware that their contribution is only one (although very important) element of local foresight processes and that they will need to make compromises according to the possibilities revealed by the technicians. In this sense the whole process is a permanent negotiation between the three main actors: inhabitants (citizens), technicians (urban planners, urban planners, 236 Please see in annexe
experts etc) and politicians (the elected persons who will bring the responsible decisions). The role of experts is essential; it assures the credibility and feasibility of the projects imagined by the citizens.

The political context must be positive. It is important that the results or at least part of the results of the participatory planning meet the main lines of current political orientations regarding the given territory. The more the results of the participatory planning can be translated into concrete actions that fit into a programme or strategy already engaged by the municipality and, even, co-financed by the state, the EU and private actors, the bigger will be the chances to succeed. The openness of the politicians towards the results of the participatory planning is of basic importance.

The stable financing structure is a guarantee for the independence of participatory planning process. In the case of Molinay, financing was a strong element of the experience:

- the process was initiated by the CAL whose work is based on 9 persons obtaining permanent salaries and as a result being absolutely available.
- the Destrée Institute managed to deliberate some EU financing for the participative planning through the Futurreg program. Here the constraint was that the foresight process had to be finalised at a relatively early stage because of the expiration of the programme.

Annex

1. Steel industries in Seraing

Seraing is a traditional industrial city, with steel industries being the main sector of production. During the 18th century a large part of the historical buildings of Seraing had been transformed for industrial purposes: steel factory in The Castle, crystal production in the Val Saint Lambert Cistercian Abbey. In the 1980s, steel production became the main sector in Seraing, as part of the steel cluster in the Liège area, owned by Cockerill Sambre. Since 2003, its successor named Arcelor decided to withdraw its activities from the Province of Liège. In the case of Seraing this decision concerns the hot phase of production, and led to significant job losses in the city.

2. Federal Urban Policy Programme

Federal Urban Policy has set up a financial support programme based on a system of contractualisation with local authorities of large cities in order to reverse the negative dynamic which affects their disadvantaged neighbourhoods. It is in fact the municipalities themselves who define the projects that they intend to implement, as part of the directives issued by the State.

Until 2008, two types of contracts were agreed with a certain number of cities: “city contracts”, launched in 2000, which aimed to improve the situation in neighbourhoods in difficulty and “housing contracts” launched in 2005. In 2005, these two types of contracts adopted a multiyear format, covering a period of three years, from 2005 to 2007. These contracts were extended by one year in 2008, by an amendment.

Unlike many financial aid programmes, the Urban Policy Programme does not require any financial contribution from local authorities, taking into account the particularly difficult situation
of the municipalities in question. The projects are financed 100% by the Programme. It aims to support innovative projects, projects that could not otherwise be developed.

2009 marks a turning point for the programme: the distinction between city contracts and housing contract disappeared to give way to integrated contracts now called “Sustainable City” contracts.

In the case of Seraing, the different sustaining programs are integrated as follows in the municipal policies:

- there has been no participation in city contracts
- Housing contracts between 2005 and 2007 were used for urban regeneration purposes in the frame of the Master Plan: i.e. housing constructions to be realised in public-private cooperation in Cockerill street (Neocittà I and II)
- Sustainable contract since 2009: different elements of the Master Plan related to sustainable development are highlighted such as:
  o social participation - the creation of three local committees;
  o eco-renovation projects in the frame of the MP
  o waste management awareness programmes, motor-free mobility

3. Public participation in the different phases of the preparation of the Seraing Master Plan

‡ 2001-2002: preparation of the general diagnostic of Seraing. As part of the process, a participatory diagnostic had been realised with small groups composed by elected persons, representatives of main NGOs, entrepreneurs, and some inhabitants.

‡ 2003: The municipality initiates several meetings with the population in order to inform them about the reasons for the withdrawal of Arcelor and the possible solutions for the future. These were the “TUPPI evenings”: informative meetings led by people who previously had passed a rapid training on the processes of steel production, the environmental constraints, the schedule of closing of the production units etc. The meetings were organised in special small groups: in clubs, NGOs, schools, enterprises... More than 5000 inhabitants of Seraing participated at these meetings between 2003 and 2010.

‡ 2004: A tender was launched by the municipality for the elaboration of the Master Plan of Seraing. The winner is a consortium that proposes to integrate the participatory approach in the planning process..

2005-2006: participatory workshops in two phases:

Phase 1: Study of the Master Plan
February 2005, a two day long workshop with 30 participants chosen by the consortium (form the city administration, cultural and economic institutions, etc). Objective: small working groups on the challenges of the MP

- June 2005: second meeting of the same group

Phase 2: Identifying 3 priority areas for the MP

- April 2006 : two day long workshop with 20 participants chosen by the consortium (from the same institutions + economic actors from Arcelor, comerciants etc.)

4. The CAL – Centre D’Action Laïque – Centre of actions for secularism

CAL has been created in 1969 as an NGO for the defence and promotion of secularism in Belgium. Cal is a network of different NGOs and is constituted in 7 regional centres – the CAL of the Province of Liège (CAL/Lg) created in 1977 being one of them. Its vocation may be summarised as follows: "Secularism is fighting for all individuals and against discrimination, exclusion and injustice. For the Centre of actions for secularism this fight means actions sustaining equality, solidarity, democracy and active citizenship." CAL/Lg is composed by a grouping of 80 local NGOs with diverse activities for social purposes. CAL/Lg also initiates the creation of local NGOs, for instance “Territories of Memory”, an NGO working on the memorial of the Holocaust in Belgium. Running costs of the CAL (with salaries) are covered by the subvention of the Federal state; the CAL works actually with 50 permanent employees.

5. Actions of the CAL of Seraing before Molinay 2017 (since 1997)

- In the beginning, a series of interviews and meetings with inhabitants were held in order to list their needs concerning the neighbourhood and trying to convince them to take an active role in an area for improving their quality of life. As these meetings did not lead to any important results, the CAL decided to pass to concrete actions.

- Development of Marchamps Park: creation of a slide planned by an artist and realised by young citizens. The problem was that neither the municipality, nor the inhabitants took in charge the maintenance of the slide afterwards. Finally referring to the new norms in the European Union, the slide had to be demolished. Conclusion of this experience was: it is very important to distinguish the roles and duties of all local stakeholders. Local inhabitants and users of park should not be supposed to get the role of the municipality in terms of maintenance of public spaces and goods.

- Help for local citizens to create their own NGOs: assistance in the organisation of meetings, preparation of official documents. Problem encountered: the newly created NGOs do not always share the democratic values represented by the CAL.

- Lobbying at the municipality for the creation of a Neighbourhood committee. Problems encountered: the realisation of a representative committee will be hindered by the twofold

237 « Etre laïque, c’est militier pour la dignité de chaque individu, en combattant les pratiques discriminatoires, les exclusions et les injustices. Pour le Centre d’Action Laïque de la Province de Liège, cela se traduit par des initiatives en faveur de l’égalité au sens le plus large, d’une solidarité, d’une démocratie et d’une citoyenneté renforcées. » (http://www.calliege.be/index.php?page=presentation)
discourse of the municipality. On the one hand, it highlighted its strong commitment to create this committee as its direct local partner in the neighbourhood. But on the other hand, the financial background for the establishment of a real representative committee has not been assured. The created committee is therefore not legitimate.

On the base of these and other experiences, the CAL had been working on improving certain principles of public participation that could have been used during the Molinay 2017 project.

‡ To avoid all misleading misunderstandings, the roles of participants should be determined at the beginning of the participatory process. Therefore the CAL proposed to its partners to sign a participation contract.

‡ *Forms of expressions offered at the participatory process should be convenient to all.* People, especially inhabitants with no experience in participation, should have time for thinking, reacting, even to pass the “catharsis” of being asked. They need to be self confident. Therefore, several alternative forms of participation should be worked out. The CAL preferred the world café method. ²³⁸

‡ Common respect of the roles and competences of the different types of actors within the participatory project is a key condition of democratic local decision making. According to the CAL, three main types of actors may be distinguished:

*The triangle: citizens – politicians - technicians*

All actors of the participation process should find their place in this triangle and to be aware of the limits of their capacities and competencies. In order to establish a consensual solution, the three points of the triangle should remain in interaction.

²³⁸ The World Café is a creative process for facilitating collaborative dialogue and the sharing of knowledge and ideas to create a living network of conversation and action. In this process a café ambiance is created, in which participants discuss a question or issue in small groups around tables. At regular intervals the participants move to a new table. One table manager stays and summarises the previous conversation to the new table guests. Thus the proceeding conversations are cross-fertilised with the ideas generated in former conversations with other participants. At the end of the process the main ideas are summarised in a plenary session and follow-up possibilities are discussed.

6. The elements of the Master Plan

Development of the administrative city centre

The former building of CMI enterprise is planned to be converted into a centre of public administration creating approximately 200 jobs. The building should become the new gate of the city. Construction works began in January 2011 and will be finished by 2014. Budget: €18 million, out of which €10 million of private investment. An extension is previewed in the building of the Castle that could host offices for further 500 employees.

Requalification of Cockerill street

Enlarging of the street with reserved lane for public transportation is planned to be realised through ERDF financing in the period of 2007-13.

New constructions

Neocittà I: a new building in Cockerill street with housing, commercial activities, offices and public spaces on 1200 m². To be finished in 2013, budget: €1 million.

The gate of Neocittà I: two residential buildings to be finished in 2015, budget: €11 million.

Neocittà II: reconversion of an industrial site in offices, housing, shops and parking in front of Neocittà I.

These are partly financed by the Federal state (Federal Urban Policy, Housing contracts)

Boulevard Urbain

The core element of the Master Plan, the future main axis crossing the Seresian Basin from the East to the West. 25km long boulevard, with cycling path, pedestrian zones and green installations. To be finalised in 2012-13. Budget: €12 million.

LD Park

Activity park next to the Boulevard urbain on 0.17 km². To be finalised in 2012-2014.

Ateliers centraux (central workshops)

Located in some industrial halls soon to be vacated by Arcelor Mittal.

Cristal Park

Europe’s biggest commercial and leisure centre on 65 000 m², with 28 000 m² for leisure activities (ski, aqua park, restaurants), 2 residential sites (56 000 m²) a business park with 12 buildings, a
hotel with 120 rooms and a new crystal factory on 4800 m². Budget: €170 million private investment.
### The main projects of the Master Plan and the main contributors to their budgets and the main projects in the Molinay neighbourhood

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Projects</th>
<th>total budget</th>
<th>City of Seraing</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Federal state</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Wallonnia region</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>ERDF</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Private</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>State of art of the investment and remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boulevard Urbain</td>
<td>10.773.983 €</td>
<td>1.937.525 €</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>0 €</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>5.237.665 €</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>3.598.793 €</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>0 €</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Acquisitions réalisées-chantier début 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>administrative centre</td>
<td>14.360.216 €</td>
<td>6.469.036 €</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>0 €</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>7.891.180 €</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>0 €</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0 €</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Chantier en cours-fin: début 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cockerill street</td>
<td>8.176.108 €</td>
<td>1.952.000 €</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>0 €</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3.734.465 €</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>2.489.643 €</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>0 €</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Début du chantier - 2ème semestre 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neocitta 1</td>
<td>12.104.712 €</td>
<td>8.596.200 €</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>0 €</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3.508.512 €</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>0 €</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0 €</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Début du chantier - juin 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neocitta 2</td>
<td>35.000.000 €</td>
<td></td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0 €</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>5.000.000 €</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>0 €</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0 €</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>En attente de partenaires privés</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cristal Park</td>
<td>170.000.000 €</td>
<td></td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0 €</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0 €</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0 €</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>170.000.000 €</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>Etudes en cours / Intercommunale de développement SPI+ prendra en charge les travaux dans une seconde phase (montant à déterminer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parc LD</td>
<td>97.427 €</td>
<td>56.743 €</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>0 €</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>20.513 €</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>20.171 €</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>0 €</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Chantier en cours à 45%. Fin prévue courant 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paway under the rails</td>
<td>2.977.397 €</td>
<td>297.740 €</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>0 €</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1.488.699 €</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>1.190.959 €</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>0 €</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Chantier en cours-fin prévue janvier 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural centre</td>
<td>2.395.200 €</td>
<td>1.589.520 €</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>0 €</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>387.600 €</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>418.080 €</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>0 €</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Etudes en cours.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morchamps creche</td>
<td>2.461.741 €</td>
<td>1.329.341 €</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>0 €</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1.132.400 €</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>0 €</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0 €</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Chantier en cours-fin prévue janvier 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smeets street</td>
<td>1.481.300 €</td>
<td></td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0 €</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0 €</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0 €</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Aucun financement acquis-non planifié avant 2012</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>sous-total</strong></td>
<td><strong>259.828.084 €</strong></td>
<td><strong>22.228.104 €</strong></td>
<td><strong>9%</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.508.512 €</strong></td>
<td><strong>1%</strong></td>
<td><strong>24.892.522 €</strong></td>
<td><strong>10%</strong></td>
<td><strong>7.717.646 €</strong></td>
<td><strong>3%</strong></td>
<td><strong>170.000.000 €</strong></td>
<td><strong>65%</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Municipality of Seraing, December 2010
### 8. Statements and challenges for Molinay – the results of Molinay 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes</th>
<th>Statements</th>
<th>Challenges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Urban development</strong></td>
<td>Molinay has a marginal position in the Master Plan, despite of its densely built and run down urban fabric and the difficulties of its sustainability. Regeneration of the neighbourhood would be needed but only if it permits to keep original inhabitants and social mix.</td>
<td><strong>Definition of an urban regeneration project:</strong> requalification of existing urban poles, of the street system and creation of new public spaces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Housing</strong></td>
<td>Large proportion of individual housing (3/4), and of old housing stock (34,7%), only few social housing (7,2%) compared to the high proportion of social housing in Seraing (50,6%). Molinay is a transitory neighbourhood with a high number of tenants, while owners in general do not live the area. In case of urban regeneration speculation should be avoided.</td>
<td><strong>Strengthening the attractiveness and the comfort level of housing for all</strong> in order to maintain the number of inhabitants, the social diversity, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mobility</strong></td>
<td>Segregated area, bad accessibility by car, few parking possibilities... The narrow streets are not ideal for cycling paths only for pedestrian streets.</td>
<td><strong>Improving the neighbourhood’s accessibility</strong> requalification of the poles and entrance points of the area (for instance, the cultural centre etc) <strong>To find a balance between the space for cars and for pedestrians</strong> Mixing of different types of transportation (car, public transportation, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Environment</strong></td>
<td>Air- and sound pollution related to industrial activities is seen as a major obstacle of local development</td>
<td><strong>Collective engagement for the cleaning of the area</strong> in order to re-establish the clean neighbourhood. <strong>Respecting environmental and health standards in the neighborhood</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security</strong></td>
<td>Indicators on criminality are less negative as they are in Seraing or in the Province of Liège. Nevertheless the majority of inhabitants feel insecure.</td>
<td><strong>New organisation of public spaces in order to avoid crimes</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economy, trade</strong></td>
<td>Contrary to the industrial character of the city, Molinay is a traditional commercial neighbourhood. As its commercial activities are strongly related to the</td>
<td><strong>Maintaining commercial activities in the neighbourhood and definition of new quality criteria</strong> Improving the quality and attractiveness of</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Social and educational services | The lack in infrastructures is compensated by the presence of a large scale of social services and NGOs. | Relying and adopting services available within and outside the neighbourhood.  
Valorisation of the NGOs’ and other associations’ work within and outside the neighbourhood. |
|---------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Training and employment         | Lack of accessible information on training and employment especially for foreigners and difficulties for young people to break out from the local educational system. | Improving the quality of local education  
Improving psychological and physical mobility capacities of the local population to get new competences and training possibilities. |
| Diversity and social networks of the local population | Strong diversity of the local population with growing individualism. Tensions between generations. | Improving social integration and increasing the interest of middle classes to developing the neighbourhood.  
Identification of challenges and themes that may concern all generations, all social classes and cultural groups.  
Paying special attention to disadvantaged groups (listening, preventing, treating) |
| Culture                         | Strong cultural assets in the neighbourhood (Cultural Centre with regional effect, CAL, etc.) but local population is not easy to be attracted. | Meeting the cultural potentials of the neighbourhood.  
Strengthening cultural attractiveness of the neighbourhood, discovering internal resources |
| Transversal challenges          | Seraing, a city a diverse neighbourhoods | Molinay, neighbourhood suffering from demographic and urban decline  
What place for Molinay in post-industrial Seraing? |
9. Main outcomes and capitalization of the Molinay 2017 project

The report on Molinay 2017 prepared by the Destrée Institute and the CAL has been integrated into the booklet describing the CAL’s activities and results in Molinay since 1997.

Capitalisation of the project contains several activities on behalf of the CAL:

- Creation of a film on the Molinay and on the participatory foresight process designed by a well known architect and narrated by a popular media character.\(^{239}\)
- The results have been sent to all local stakeholders and several meetings were organised for their discussion
- Presentation of the results to the local population by the occasion of friendly meetings
- Participation and presentation of papers at international meetings and conferences

10. Main activities of the CAL of Seraing since Molinay 2017

Two different groups were created within the CAL of Seraing dealing with two of the challenges identified in the Molina 2017 process.

1. Strengthening the auto-image of the neighbourhood

Actions:

- edition of a photo book “Les mercredis of Molinay” (The Wednesdays of Molinay) to present the positive image of the everyday life in the neighbourhood
- edition of postcards on the “good faces” of Molinay. 200 of them have been sent to inhabitants with an invitation to an evening event organised by the CAL. Postcards are available in different places (CAL, Cultural centre, restaurants, etc.)
- organisation of alternative walks in the neighbourhood in specific subjects as “the architecture of Molinay”, “the history of Molinay”, “the legends of Molinay”, “the artists of Molinay” etc.

\(^{239}\) Luc Schuiten and Jacques Bredael
sharing common experiences: organisation of travel tours for local inhabitants outside Seraing (cultural visits, leisure time, visits of the region)

street animations: organisation of local actions and happening on a chosen street (every year another street is highlighted).

2-Educational programs
A complex program in order to fight against school failure, to facilitate the transition towards higher education and to help teachers in their work.

- Extra courses for small groups of students (1 to 4 persons) in the office of the CAL to help them to catch up with the school lessons
- Workshops in collaboration with the local school to help students to practice oral expression, reading and informatics.

11. List of interviews

Cecile Parthoens, manager of CAL in Seraing
Michaël van Cutsem, Destrée Institut
Alain Mathot, Bourgmestre of Seraing
Valérie Depaye, director of ERIGES
Caroline Coco, Cultural Centre of Seraing
Colette Mertens, coordinator, CAL in Seraing
Renaud Erpicum, coordinator, CAL in Seraing
SUSTAINABLE ENERGY POLICIES AS PART OF A MODEL FOR MANAGING COMPLEX URBAN CHANGE

THE CASE OF VÄXJÖ, SWEDEN
1. The territory and its actors

Växjö has three territorial levels of action all of which have their own roles in the response to challenges. The levels are: The Municipality of Växjö, the Kronoberg County whose capital is Växjö, and the region of Småland, one county of which is Kronoberg (Appendix 3).

The Municipality of Växjö

The surface of Växjö is about 1240 km². 83,000 residents (2010) live in the municipality of whom some 60,000 live in the densely built urban area. The municipality has the power to collect taxes (20%) of the income. Växjö has a long historical experience of big changes and deep going transitional periods (Appendix 1). The wooden town has burnt down ten times during its history, most recently in 1843. In the great municipal reform of Sweden, in 1960s, seven rural municipalities were attached to Växjö. In the latter half of the 1800s scores of people emigrated from Småland to the USA. Today, the direction of migration is the other way round. The percentage of immigrants in Växjö is currently high, about 18%. The capability to master change seems to have become embedded in Växjö in the form of an applicable action culture.

The County of Kronoberg and the Region of Småland

The County of Kronoberg (185,000 residents, 8,5000 km²) is a Swedish governance level. It has the power of taxation (about 20% in 2010). The county governor is Kristina Alpers. The region surrounding Växjö is Småland (710,000 residents in 2010; 30,000 km²), which used to be a duchy, but now only a cultural and identity forming concept. Småland is a region of forests (75% of the surface), lakes and barren land in which farming has not been easy. Växjö is the centre of the region.
The industrial crisis has also shaken Småland. The mass-production of glass has been terminated and chipboard factories as well as other wood processing industry have been put down. During the centuries, the people of Småland have been compelled to learn to master huge changes, to comprehend that collaboration enhances problem solving and they have had to learn to cope with meagerness by relying on their own strength.

**The main actors and their roles**

The **County of Kronoberg** is the state authority for regional governance and planning. It is responsible for regional zoning, environmental governance, protection of culture, special health care and for networks of infrastructure. The County delivers the state subsidies for regional support and thus it is the partner of Växjö in several development projects. The County employs 4000 persons.

The **Municipality of Växjö** is the main actor of its territory and also the biggest employer (7,400 persons). The municipality acts both directly as an action organisation and indirectly through the companies it owns and through partnership companies.

The majority of the 8000 **enterprises** in Växjö are small, as only 20 of them have over 100 employees. Due to the great number and small size of the enterprises, Växjö has had to create an unusually effective network of communication and collaboration with the enterprises.

The decision-makers of Växjö regard the significance of its own **University** to the city as of great importance. The physical location of the university in the locality is an advantage, although it is possible to have collaboration with academic partners from other universities as well.

Part of the Växjö action culture is the involvement of **citizen organisations and NGOs** in all significant development projects. The municipality canvases the public opinion about current issues, four times a year, through the so called Växjö citizen panel. A citizen forum is organized once a year in all neighbourhoods and in every rural community in which the political leaders and high level administrators answer questions from the residents.

### 2. The challenge: Sustainable energy policy

Växjö has been chosen to this assessment, because it is a remarkable example of a city that has been able to respond to the challenge of sustainable energy policy. The interviews of the actors have demonstrated that Växjö has responded to the challenge through a long term environmental strategy that has brought forth results on many levels, on many sectors with multiple actors and partners, thus also enhancing the social cohesion of the municipality (Figure 1). The strategy has been and still is being implemented through a specific Växjö mode of action. The latter comprises the construction of strategic documents in collaboration with quadruple partners (public, private, people and academia), based on several interrelated policies that are implemented by targeted measures which are monitored with pertinent indicators.
3. The main sectors, measures and results of the Växjö mode of action

The Växjö mode of action implies that during the term of the council, every fourth year, a special environmental programme is devised. It is a long term strategic document that covers the whole municipality and all its activities. It is implemented through the sectorial policies, and specific operations as well as projects.

**Environmental programme**

The city has developed a special environment programme, as a strategic tool for its environmental policy. The last one dates from 2006, and it has been checked after the municipal elections in 2011 (Appendix 7).

The programme consists of three main themes (Figure 2):

- Living Life

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ACT Consultants – Good policies and practices to tackle urban challenges
- Our Nature and
- Fossil Free Fuel Växjö.
(http://www.vaxjo.se/upload/3882/Environmental%20programme_2010.pdf
http://www.vaxjo.se/upload/3880/Environmental%20programme_2010.pdf
http://www.vaxjo.se/upload/3880/CO2%20engelska%202007.pdf)

Figure 2. Implementation of the environmental strategy through the environmental programme.

Each theme has been dealt with a tripartite methodology: the municipal objectives, indicators to be monitored, and named responsible sectors and persons in the municipality. Some of the indicators deal with budget resources, some with the state of the environment, as well as with the parameters of life style (Appendix 8).

Thus, the municipality is able to make each year an environmental account, as part of usual economic planning. The account contains figures which demonstrate to the politicians, administrators and citizens in an easily comprehensible way the progress or potential decline in terms of the different objectives. (http://www.vaxjo.se/upload/3882/PDCAecoBUDGETcycle.pdf)

A follow-up table 1969...2010 illustrates the exceptional volume and scope of the environmental measures. The over 40 year period contains 232 significant environmental projects and measures by the municipality. In addition, Växjö is well-connected in environmental issues with the networks of several shared EU-projects, programmes and knowledge transfer (Appendix 6).

(http://www.vaxjo.se/VaxjoTemplates/Public/Pages/Page.aspx?id=38748)
In this assessment we will only deal with the following sector-transcending measures, as these intertwined measures are, according to the interviews, the most important ones:

1. **Our nature**
   - Cleaning of the water
   - Protection of air
   - Nurturing biodiversity

2. **Living Life**
   - Environmental consciousness
   - Eco-account
   - Cohesive urban structure
     - A lively city centre
     - Rural communities
   - Traffic policy
     - Public transportation network
     - Enhancement of biking

3. **Fossil Free Fuel Växjö**
   - District heating using biofuel
     - In the city centre
     - In rural communities
   - Improvement of energy efficiency in buildings
   - Distant cooling system using bioenergy
   - Building of wood
     - Energy saving
     - Carbon binding

A set of consequent and simultaneous measures with results

The Växjö mode of action in response to the challenge of sustainable energy policy means that a great variety of actions are taken simultaneously or consequentially. Here are some of them:

**Cleaning the lake Trummen**

The environmental discourse was opened in Växjö at the beginning of the 1970s with a pragmatic question: "What should be done to the extremely polluted lake Trummen at the centre of the city?"

The municipality started to restore the lake by using the best knowledge of the time in collaboration with bio-scientists and enterprises. The lake was saved and today it is a shared resort of leisure for the citizens. The care of nature became part of the municipal identity.

**Fossil-free fuel district heating**

The successful endeavour created a political foundation for the next steps. Already in the 1980s, the municipal district heating was transformed to function by local renewable energy out of wood. In the 1990s the municipality made a decision to strive to get rid of fossil fuel sources. The first step was the goal to halve the CO2 emissions during 1993-2010. Now the goal has nearly been reached, a 40% reduction, although the volume of business life in the municipality has increased by 70% (appendix 5). The reduction has also been achieved due to the sustainable construction and environmentally-
Building of wood and energy efficiently

The reduction of the carbon footprint has also been enhanced by the use of wood in all public construction. One specialty consist of the high-rise housing buildings made of wood, which are a major achievement of the development work. They are also being implemented in other Nordic countries, according to the Växjö model.

The new wooden multistorey houses are built as “zero energy houses”, i.e. without a separate heating system. An extended energy saving programme of the building stock in Växjö has been carried out which still goes on. The mode of construction used in the new building of public housing and buildings is significantly more energy efficient than is required by the national norms in Sweden.

Cohesive urban structure and traffic planning

The structure of the main urban district of Växjö municipality, the Växjö city, has been kept with determined politics in such a form that measures which decrease car dependence have been possible (Appendix 4). Soon after the main highway crossing Växjö was transferred from the main street of the city, Storgatan, to the bypass road outside the city, began the debate over the calming down of Storgatan. The first plans were made in 1974, but not until the year 1986 the first two blocks, a 200 m long part of the street that was reserved only for light traffic, was taken into use. The pedestrian street was soon expanded to cover four blocks. Currently, the centre has four car-free streets, and also other parts of the centre have restricted car use. Simultaneously, ten centralised parking establishments, (communal and private) in sum over 1500 spaces for cars, have been built and the accessibility to the centre by bus and bike has been enhanced.

The first plans and even the implementation were met with great resistance especially from the real estate owners and business men. However, when the business-world noticed the positive consequences of the pedestrian streets for their businesses, since 1985 the financial responsibility has been shared between the different beneficiaries. This has meant that it was possible to move from the mere municipal investments over to shared ones with the real estate owners, as well as to long term strategic plans. In the later phases of the implementation, beginning from the 1990s, a shift was taken towards collaborative and communicative planning with positive results.

Currently, the core of the pedestrian centre lies close to the bus and railway terminal, within a walking distance from them, in an area that has been the centre of the city for hundreds of years (Appendix 4). In fact, the expansion of the bicycling network and the enhancement of bicycling in other ways in the city, are among the current measures of the municipality to decrease the carbon footprint.

Most of the public services have remained or have been built inside of or very close to the expanded pedestrian centre. The incremental improvements of the centre have been continued by projects that deal with the lightning and planting of flowers, by organising shared service traffic to the shops, by linking the centre to the bicycling and walking networks, and by starting to build covered streets through the blocks. A couple of years ago an energy renovation project of the business properties in the centre was started which now continues block by block.
In the last decade a joint company for execution (Appendix 9) was founded. The result of the long transformation process of urban structures is that Växjö does not have a car-dependent “shopping paradise” outside the city centre, at the intersection of main highways which is typical of European cities of the same size. Thus, the city has preserved its original structure and the centre has all the functions of a cohesive town centre; business life, culture, administration and historical monuments. The positive effects are significant for the daily life of the citizens, but the environmental impacts of the reduced car use are not less important. Even the real estate owners and entrepreneurs are currently almost unanimous about the consequences.

The latest project under development is a dense group of housing by the railway station and the pedestrian centre, on a lot that became available from the railway yard. The buildings will be dwellings which in turn support the centre and the environmental goals of the city. The interviewees found it important that the pedestrian centre is the target of on-going development and that some positive reform takes place every year, preferably in a user-driven way.

**Summa summarum**

The environmental interventions make an impressive list: the reduction of the carbon footprint and CO2–emissions, the reorganizing the city centre as a pedestrian zone, improving the public transport and bicycle networks, creating a joint University with Kalmar, a neighbouring town, transferring the former military barracs into a centre for SMEs, keeping alive the village centres and supporting with many measures the 18% immigrant population of the municipality.

### 4. Lessons of the case-study

**Success based on consensus**

The assessments by the interviewees concerning the so called Växjö mode of action were surprisingly similar. The cognitive resemblance of the administrators in different sectors and the politicians of various parties reflect the fact that Växjö enjoys a large consensus over some fundamental issues. The interviewees stressed the tradition in Växjö to transform the hardships and problems into victory through self-reliance and partnerships, without requesting help from outside.

Due to the many honours that Växjö has received (Appendix 2), the reputation of Växjö as an environmentally-friendly city has led to the phenomenon that the number of expert groups from Europe and around the world has grown into several scores each year. This in turn has strengthened the popularity of the adopted environmental policy among the politicians and the citizens.

**Co-production and shared projects as a solution**

Collaboration and independent initiative taking are typical modes of action in Småland. This can be seen in many projects in Växjö. The municipality has been involved with them in many roles and with a variety of shares of financing. The implementation and management of the Växjö airport has taken place by a municipal shareholder company. The airport of Småland is owned 55% by the Kronoberg County, 42% by the municipality of Växjö, and 3% by the municipality of Alvesta. The goal of the owners is to maintain a good regional aviation infrastructure, at low cost. The stunning complex of concert hall-art museum-congress centre in Växjö, in the neighbourhood of the Town hall, was realized in cooperation with a bank and a construction firm in which the role of the municipality was to provide the lot and the contract to rent the concert hall 70 days a year.
The Regiment of Småland was axed in 2000, as part of the renewal of the Swedish defense doctrine and the shift from an army, based on compulsory military service towards one that functions on purely professional basis. Some 200 jobs were lost and the huge territory of barracks, a couple of km from the city centre, was left empty.

The town set quickly in motion a development project with a real estate development company in order to fight off the menacing economic damage. The project was successful. Now the former area of barracks is recycled and it is the haven of 100 small enterprises the number of which is twice the size of the former regiment.

The rapid implementation, saving of costs by sharing, and the significance of many committed stakeholders who are ready to take potential additional measures that the projects often require are regarded as an advantage of this kind of joint projects

_The controlled follow-through of long projects_

A few shared characteristics emerged from the interviews of the key persons, in addition to the aforementioned “spirit of Småland” and the Växjö mode of action. The interviewees stressed the significance of collaboration, i.e. the municipality has seldom acted alone during the past decades, but partners have been sought and found from many sectors and fields; from enterprises, regional administration, neighbouring municipalities, universities and also from the free groups of citizens.

It was also underlined that Växjö has been for a long time a so called balancing municipality in which the majority position of the right wing-left wing coalitions has often changed in the municipal elections, and with a small margin. This has led to the fact that renewal projects always require cooperation with the political opposition and an obligation to make such compromises which endure the political change of power without jeopardizing the projects. The Växjö mode of action also implies a certain caution which means that reforms are undertaken only after positive experiences of them with examples from elsewhere have been acquired. But once the decision has been taken, the reform or projects will be systematically implemented, and if needed in a stepwise way and sometimes with a slow timetable. Successful implementation at the beginning of the project and the emerging goodwill were regarded as very important.

Complex projects and long term political alignments have often had some visionary person whose vigour has been in a decisive role in all the major decision-making situations. One of the best examples is the aforementioned environmental politics.

In addition, the municipality of Växjö has a strong tradition of political steering. This is reflected in the fact that the municipality has some 35 whole or part-time political officials among the decision-makers. This makes it possible to avoid conflicts between the preparation of the administrators and the decision-making. On the other hand, it was mentioned that administrators are also given great freedom of action within the limits that the political decision-makers have drawn.

Encouraged by its experience, Växjö trusts in the making of strategic political programmes. The latter are not made as a declaration, but they always include a plan of implementation with practical measures that extend to all municipal sectors. The programmes also comprise on-going monitoring and interim evaluations. The programmes are generally made for the whole period of elections, i.e. four years, and they are checked during 1-2 years. All programmes are transparent and they have been created publicly in interaction with the citizens. This way of acting has guaranteed the political passing through and the engagement of people outside the municipal organisations.
The big role of EU-programmes

At the end of 2010 the share of Växjö of the on-going EU-funded projects was in total 23,330,000 euro. This is about 6% of the Växjö yearly budget.

The main part of the funding came in 2010 from the programmes Concerto, Interreg-Baltic, Intelligent Energy Europe, Lifelong learning and Saving the European Environment. Irrespective of the additional administrative work caused by the EU-rules, the representatives of Växjö were happy about the opportunity to implement projects through both ERDF- and ESF-funding. EU-funding has become part of the routines of financial planning in the renewal of the municipality. The positive experiences of EU-projects have been both economic, as well as based on the exchange of new knowledge and wide interaction with different stakeholders both in Sweden and in other EU-countries (Appendix 6).

Växjö seems to be simultaneously “the smallest big town and the biggest small town in Sweden”, if this caricature is allowed. The urban area and its characteristics support the notion of a small big town, but the practical mode of action and the humane contents come from the tradition of small towns.

Transferability of the Växjö mode of action to sustainable energy policy

The Växjö mode of action can be transferred to the contexts of same size or smaller towns. The speed of transfer is constrained by the long time frame of some of the measures in Växjö, as well as the deep-rooted democratic culture of Sweden that is embedded in the tradition of citizen discourse together with the specific characteristics of the Småland spirit.
Annex

1. A short history of Växjö

Växjö has been inhabited since the prehistoric times. Several old roads have crossed Växjö, as well as an ancient water path to the Baltic Sea. The old crossing place on the board of a lake has been the stage for a church for more than a thousand years and even the Bishop’s seat, since the beginning of the 1200s. The town itself was founded in 1342. The surrounding region, Småland, in Southern Sweden (1 hour by plane from Stockholm, one hour by car from Copenhagen) is rugged, hilly and full of lakes, which has not made farming easy. Växjö is the centre of both the Kronoberg County (182.000 inhabitants) and the Region of Småland (Appendix 3).

Växjö has a long experience of great changes and times of deep going ruptures. During its history, the wooden town has been burnt down ten times, lately in 1843. The geopolitical location of the town at the historical border between Denmark and Sweden has been the cause for many destructive wars and changes of rulers. Currently, south of Småland lies in the rich and fertile Swedish region ´Skåne´, where Danishlike language is spoken, meaning that the cultural border is still there.

During the centuries, the Smålanders have been obliged to learn to master alone fierce changes, to collaborate in order to solve problems and to learn resilience in the face of scarcity. These skills seem to have been rooted in Växjö and they have become part of the lasting action culture.

In the latter half of the 1800s scores of people emigrated from Småland to the USA, mainly to the Northern states, and especially to Minnesota. The migration improved the opportunities of survival in the rest of the farms, but it shook up Småland. Today, the direction of migration is the other way round. People from many areas of global crisis, such as Chile, Somalia and Near-Orient have migrated to Växjö during the past decades. The 8 percentage of immigrants in Växjö is currently high, about 18%.

Even later on, huge changes have struck Småland and Växjö. In the great Swedish municipal reform, in the 1960s, seven small rural municipalities were incorporated to Växjö. As a consequence, the surface of Växjö is now a quarter of the whole county of Kronoberg whose capital it is. The industrial revolution also struck Småland. The centennial cluster of glass industry, called ”Glasriket” (Glass Kingdom), was an easter neighbourhood of Växjö. It lost from the 1980s onwards a big part of its mass-production, but it has been able to transform itself into an arena of action for micro producers of studio glass, thanks to vigorous measures.

Winds of change have shaken the wood processing industry, when chipboard factories and other big industry of the branch were closed down in Småland. A Glass domain-like phenomenon, emerging from the tradition of wood industry, is the area of furniture producers, south-west of Växjö, called the Möbelriket (the Kingdom of Furniture).

As the militaryvise strong Sweden has recently switched to a professional army, garrisons have been spaced out. Also Växjö lost its garrison a decade ago which was a cataclysm in terms of the local scale.
2. Honours

The municipality of Växjö and its politics have received during the 21st Century many honours and rewards. The list is impressive:

"The Swedish town centre of the year", 2010
The rural municipality of the year, 2010
The Millenium - municipality, 2009
The municipality of Fair trade, 2008
Union of Baltic Cities Environment Award 2007
"Sustainable Energy Europe" Award of EU 2007
and the name "The greenest town in Europe" that the TV-programme with millions of spectators, by the BBC, gave in 2007.

The last name has been adopted by Växjö as a motto in the communication strategy and in the public image. The number of honours, the vast scope of actions with different partners and the integrative strategic programmes with targeted measures indicate that the Växjö approach has been in many respects successful.

3. The maps

The maps beneath show:

on the left, the region of Småland in Sweden
in the middle, the location of the Kronoberg County
on the right, the municipalities in the Kronoberg County and the location of Växjö
The map below shows the cohesive urban structure of Växjö: the University lies in South and the main highways pass the densely built areas.
The whole municipality of Växjö in which the urban centre is in the middle:
4. The Växjö bus-system at the centre of town
5. The development of CO2 emissions and the GDP in Växjö during 1993...2009

![Graph showing CO2 emissions per capita and GDP per capita vs. years 1993 to 2009 with a peak in 2000 for CO2 and a peak in 2005 for GDP.]

6. EU-projects in Växjö

1. SESAC

Currently the biggest project is “Sustainable Energy Systems in Advanced Cities”. It is funded from the EU sixth Framework, Concerto Initiative. The project period was 2005-2010, with a budget of app. 24 M€. Växjö is the coordinator and the other partners are Grenoble, France and Delft, The Netherlands, as well as associate partners Miskolc, Hungary, Vastseliina, Estonia and Kaunas, Lithuania. Partners are all together 19 from the before mentioned towns. (Partners in Sweden are: Växjö Kommunföretag AB, Vexjö Energi AB, Energiakontor Sydost AB and the Royal University of Technology, KTH).

The aim of SESAC is to build sustainable energy systems in the participant towns. The special aims of Växjö are:

- The 75% reduction of consumption produced by fossil energy sources in the new buildings of the participating towns, compared with heating by traditional oil.
- A 37% lower consumption of energy in the project towns than required by the Swedish norms.
- An increase in the renewable energy production by 15,000 MWh a year.

The project is carried out holistically and targets several sectors, starting from information dissemination, administration and planning, ending with the building of energy efficient houses and the construction of production entities that use renewable energy sources.
During the project period some 400 energy efficient dwellings and one school will be built in Växjö. 134 of the dwellings will be located in four low-energy wooden houses (Limnologen) which are 7-stories high, and 64 dwellings in two zero energy-houses (Portvakten Norr) with 8 stories. They have no extra heating system.

A light-electricity system will be constructed in a new school (yearly production 58 MWh) in such a way that it can be used as a teaching device.

The project will also implement the first phase of a district cooling system using wood energy and a production system of bio-gas from bio-waste and sewage treatment sludge. Due to the latter, the Växjö municipality will become self-sufficient in relation to its needs of energy and it will found a gas station even to car drivers.

The project will model the extensive visitor stream to Växjö (appr. 150 yearly visitor groups from Sweden and abroad). An information and distant learning package will be produced together with the Växjö University.

In addition, Växjö will improve the energy efficiency of an old industrial area, make the municipal management of the environment more effective, raise the awareness of energy consciousness among the citizens, build a network of residents dealing with the exchange of experiences on energy saving, as well as build models of action how to interact between real estate owners, investors, construction SMEs and land owners.

2. ECOREGION

This is a currently running Interreg –project in the Baltic Sea area. The participants come from different regions of Baltic states but Växjö takes part as a municipality. Its share is 75,000 euro. The actors come from different sectors (forestry, industry, agriculture etc). The purpose is to enhance sustainable development within the Baltic sea area. Besides exchange of experience, the project comprises local actions. In Växjö, the shops around the city centre will be transformed with the real estate owners into ones that are conscious of the climate change. For example, the transport of material and products will be organized together. Also a special Green label will be given to those restaurants, cafes and shops that have an ecological profile.

3. ANSWER

ANSWER is an Interreg –project around the North Sea that is still going on. The share of Växjö is 286,000 euro. The municipal actors are the trades division, information office and planning department. The aim is to encourage residents, schools and enterprises to get involved with climate projects by, for example, challenging one another to decrease energy consumption and other negative climate consequences. One sub-project is called “climate idols”. It consists of a group of local celebrities who have been trained in recycling. Their implemented actions are then models for other residents. This model of action has been borrowed from the USA and Canada.
7. Measures in Växjö to enhance sustainable development and to fight climate change


Coherent urban structure

Växjö has systematically worked during the past twenty years for the reduction of car dependence, for the increase of light traffic and for the strengthening of public transport in the context of keeping the city centre alive by:

- blocking out supermarkets that are outside the city
- transforming part of the city-centre into a pedestrian district
- arranging car parking in the centre in parking buildings
- providing the most important public services in the city centre
- organising good public transport from the densely built areas to the city centre and fairly good connections from other parts of the municipality

The reduction of carbon dioxide, at first by 50% and then giving up totally fossil fuel energy sources

The foundation for the Växjö climate objectives has taken place by making the use of energy more effective in the whole municipality, during 1994-2010. The distant heating system of the densely built urban area has been carried out, by using new energy sources, since 1980. Currently, the distant cooling system using wood has been connected to it. The network is being further expanded (a.o. to the neighbouring municipality Alvesta) and new solar and wind components have been added to the production of heat. Small local distant heating systems have been built in small rural communities, during 1997-99. The programme for locally produced food has reduced the climate consequences of food production.

The production of bio-diesel from wooden raw material has begun in 1997. Bio-gas for vehicles and heating is being produced from waste and purification slam. Both bio-gas and bio-ethanol can also be filled in private cars in Växjö.

Construction that binds carbon has been strongly increased by producing multistorey buildings of wooden structures. The newest ones will be so called passive houses which function without any separate heating system (see Appendix 6). The current challenge is to have the entire chain of transport use renewable energy sources.

Increasing the awareness of climate and environmental knowledge and influencing citizens’ own solutions.

The pedagogical programmes of schools have a strong content in terms of climate awareness. The newest schools use the heating system of the school buildings as pedagogical tools. The municipality conducts a separate climate account in connection with the yearly budget. The citizens have a climate map which illustrates the locations and modes of the climate measures in the municipality. [http://www.vaxjo.se/VaxjoTemplates/Public/Pages/Page.aspx?id=33711]
8. Eco-budget & indicators in Växjö Environmental Program

Budget indicators: B1...B10  
Follow-up indicators: U1...U22

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B1</td>
<td>Proportion of locally produced and/or ecologically foodstuffs purchased (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B2</td>
<td>Proportion of individual waste water outlets with satisfactory purification capacity (%) and number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B3</td>
<td>Reduced fossil fuel carbon dioxide emissions per inhabitant (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B4</td>
<td>Reduced consumption of electricity per inhabitant (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B5</td>
<td>Increased number of passing cycles per measuring point (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B6</td>
<td>Increased single journeys with city public transport per city inhabitant (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B7</td>
<td>Increased single journeys with country public transport per country inhabitant (%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>B8</td>
<td>Reduced amount of energy consumed per inhabitant (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B9</td>
<td>Reduced fossil fuel carbon dioxide emissions from municipal transport and service operations (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B10</td>
<td>Reduced amount of energy consumed per square metre in Växjö Kommunförvaltning AB's properties (%)</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U1</td>
<td>Environmental awareness index (0-100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U2</td>
<td>Proportion of purchases of ethically produced foodstuffs within municipal companies (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U3</td>
<td>Total amount of household waste for material recycling, energy extraction and dumping per inhabitant excluding producer-responsible materials (kg per inhabitant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U4</td>
<td>The apportionment of dealing with household waste between material recycling, energy extraction and dumping per inhabitant excluding producer-responsible materials (kg per inhabitant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U5</td>
<td>The proportion of dangerous waste in household waste according to random selection analyses (kg of total weight)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U6</td>
<td>Area of ecological agriculture in relation to the total agricultural area (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U7</td>
<td>Proportion of protected land area by means of nature reserves and hillside protection (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U8</td>
<td>Municipal park and nature land per inhabitant (m² per inhabitant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U9</td>
<td>Municipal park and nature land as a proportion of built up land area (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U10</td>
<td>Proportion of the City of Växjö where the daily average value of particles (PM10) exceeds 35 micrograms/m³ more than 57 days during one year (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U11</td>
<td>The number of vehicles per weekday at vehicular traffic's average measuring points for city centre streets (number)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U12</td>
<td>The number of vehicles per weekday at vehicular traffic's average measuring points for approaches to the town (number)</td>
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<tr>
<td>U13</td>
<td>The number of lakes over 100 hectare with good water status according to the County Council's Water Authority's inventory (number)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U14</td>
<td>Three-year average value of phosphor in lakes close to the town (micromg/litre)</td>
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<tr>
<td>U15</td>
<td>Three-year average value of nitrogen in lakes close to the town (micromg/litre)</td>
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<tr>
<td>U16</td>
<td>Proportion of renewable energy (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U17</td>
<td>Proportion of renewable energy in the transport sector (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U18</td>
<td>Total amount of energy consumed per inhabitant (GWh/inhabitant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U19</td>
<td>Motor traffic operations per inhabitant, pace of change per year (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U20</td>
<td>Cycle paths and cycle tracks (km)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U21</td>
<td>Reduced use of electricity per square metre in premises owned by Växjö Kommunförvaltning AB, where the municipality runs operations (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U22</td>
<td>Reduced use of electricity per square metre in homes owned by Växjö Kommunförvaltning AB (%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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9. *Development company of the Växjö City Centre*

VÄXJÖ MUNICIPALITY

21 COMMUNITIES OF REAL ESTATE OWNERS

150 ENTREPRENEURS

DEVELOPMENT COMPANY OF THE CITY CENTRE

WORKING GROUPS AND COMMITTEES

PARTNERS
10. The key interviewees in Växjö

Ulf Agermark  Head of traffic planning
Gunnar Elm    Vice President of the City board
Bo Frank      Mayor
Ulf Hedin     Chair of the technical board, Mayor
Rose-Marie Lindström President of the Development company of the city centre
Sarah Nilsson Environmental strategist
Hans Olsson   Ombudsman for the rural areas

In addition to the key interviewees a few pedestrians in Växjö were interviewed (taxi-driver, male appr. 40 y., waitress, female, appr.30 y., receptionist at the hotel, immigrant female, appr.20 y., airport official, female appr. 40 y. pedestrian, male appr.70 y. and a couple in a restaurant, appr.25 y.) by asking what does “the greenest city in Europe” mean to them? They all knew that it was their home town Växjö, most of them regarded it as a fine characteristic of their town and only one person thought that it was personally indifferent but otherwise worthy of support.
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