Ex-Post Evaluation of the INTERREG III Community Initiative funded by the ERDF

TASK 5: IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF A REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLE OF PROGRAMMES

PROGRAMME: INTERREG IIIA ØRESUND (DENMARK – SWEDEN)

EVALUATION REPORT elaborated by

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Foreword

The ex-post evaluation of Interreg III comprises a number of tasks interactively and iteratively linked. One of the tasks is the in-depth evaluation of a sample of sixteen Interreg III programmes from all three strands. The expected outcome of these in-depth assessments is demanding (e.g. the evidence-based extrapolation of results from project and programme level to the Community Initiative).

INTERREG III A Oresund programme has been in-depth evaluated as a part of the Strand A Category 3 of programmes: Programmes with less-favourable cross-border framework conditions, a very high or medium concentration of ERDF-support on INTERREG III “priority topics” and a high or medium level of depth & intensity of co-operation.
Executive Summary

The vision of an integrated Öresund region between Denmark and Sweden dates long back and cross-border cooperation projects started more than 36 years ago. However, living the vision took a huge leap forward when the fixed link between Denmark and Sweden was inaugurated in year 2000. Before opening the Öresund Bridge a number of projects had been displayed as part of the INTERREG IIa program paving the way for quickly picking low hanging fruits as soon as the fixed link was in place. Low hanging fruits included first of all the Medicon Valley and the Øresund University.

When the Öresund Bridge opened two different and contradicting events happened. First of all the Medicon Valley and the Øresund University took off as institutions and indicated the success of the regional integration. Second, not much else happened. Cross-border passing and regional integration developed much slower than expected. Only now, ten years later, the actual cross border interaction has reached the level of activity that was expected to display shortly after the inauguration of the fixed link.

The Interreg IIIa programme was born out of this stop-and-go process. High hopes were associated with the integration in the region but the hopes fulfilled were initiated before the fixed link was established. Hopes born by the construction of the Øresund Bridge were only fulfilled at a far later point in time than expected.

The success of the Interreg IIIa programme on the measure level is quite unquestionable. On the overall level all three priorities were overachieved and on the detailed level of sub-measures only one in 14 submeasures were not achieved or overachieved. Also with respect to the financial allocation over time it is fair to say that the Interreg IIIa program was a success in terms of adapting to changed priorities and realities of the region without loosing the original goals a sight.

To which extent the Interreg IIIa program then actually had an impact that matches the resources spend is more difficult to assess. The methodological set-up for monitoring the implementation of the program was not strong on impact measures. Neither was the first level financial control implicating that by the conclusion of the program the Commission suspended its final payment to the Interreg IIIa program. Also the administrative set-up vis-à-vis the political steering of the program was critically debated.

After the termination of the Interreg IIIa program efforts have been made correct the defaults of the first level financial control and to accommodate criticism with respect to the administrative set-up. What stands is the slow down of speed in reducing barriers to trade and commerce and the imbalance in political focus on integration between the Swedish and the Danish side of the region. Also the Interreg program is consider en “elite program” for public administration bodies limiting the involvement of private partners.

The institutional and regulatory set-up in Denmark and Sweden is still so different that cross-border cooperation is hampered. Diverging national legal frameworks and lack of transperancy and coordination in fields such as cross-border taxation, social security, pension and unemployment benefits as well as civic rights limits the potential for a new lifestyle in the Region where companies can expand their
markets, job-seekers can take up working in the neighbouring country, families can start new lives on the other side and students can follow courses on more than one university.

The short- and medium term policy recommendations based on the evaluation highlights:

- Involvement of remote regions facilitated by specific marketing efforts, by favouring proposals involving remote parts of the region (on the prerequisite that all other requirements are met satisfactory) and by proactive efforts in raising awareness of specific project opportunities,

- Involvement of the National Governments in e.g. analysis of the benefits of removing or reducing one or more of the barriers in question.

- Priority to cross-border projects in the area of Health, Social Care, Police, Custom etc.

In a long-term policy perspective the overall recommendation is to continuously analyze the development of the region and balance the integration of new topics with sustaining attention to old topics until the intended effects has been achieved. This sailing between Scylla and Carybdis takes political leadership and the first long term policy recommendation is to ensure as much political leadership as possible in the overall governance of future INTERREG programmes.

From a long term policy perspective the INTERREG IIIa programme has been fairly well integrated with other regional programmes and activities. Securing national government support, however, has been and are still, lacking hampering the cross-border integration in areas such as diverging national legal frameworks and lack of transparency and coordination in fields such as cross-border taxation, social security, pension and unemployment benefits as well as civic rights. Political leadership in the governance of the INTERREG programmes is essential both to balance existing and new priorities and to secure national government support and cooperation in aligning national legal frameworks and improve coordination on fields such as cross-border taxation etc.

In a long term policy perspective it is also important to consider ways to alter the involvement of more stakeholders in the INTERREG Programmes and in their governance. The second long-term recommendation is, therefore, to consider ways to broaden the stakeholder base – both in geographical terms and in terms of allowing partnerships not only cross-borders but also cross sectors, e.g. public authorities, universities, business, voluntary organisations, cultural institutions, Health services etc. The first phases of cross border integration required, and still requires, strong involvement by public authorities both at local, regional and national level. As the proceeding phases unfold other sectors needs to be involved as well and new cross sector partnerships to evolve.

Involving a broader stakeholder base in both governance and implementation of INTERREG programmes also serves another purpose. INTERREG programmes will not continue forever and projects or initiatives should continue also when INTERREG programmes terminate. Therefore the third an final long term policy recommendation is to increase focus on economic sustainability of projects and initiatives. Broadening the stakeholder base to include among others business might serve the purpose of increasing economic sustainability as well.
1 Introduction

In the Øresund region, cross-border cooperation between regional and local authorities has taken place since the 1960's. With the prospect of a fixed link across the Øresund in the 1990’s, the local and regional authorities in the Greater Copenhagen region and the Scania region in Southern Sweden decided to formalise the cross-border collaboration politically in the Øresund committee. Since 1999, the regions of Sealand, Lolland, Falster and Bornholm in Denmark, and Scania in Sweden, have also become full members of the Øresund committee.¹

The Interreg IIA programme (1996-1999) covered the greater Copenhagen area on the Danish side and 20 municipalities on the Swedish side of the Øresund. Roskilde in Denmark and 13 Swedish municipalities were associated as 20% areas.

The Øresund IIA programme had the following objectives:
- to promote integration between Scania and Greater Copenhagen so as to make a more integrated region,
- to intensify current collaborations and to explore new modes of coordination in as many fields as possible of deemed to be of significance for territorial integration,
- to promote business development in the Øresund region by strengthening collaboration between enterprises, public authorities and civic organisations, and
- to promote a continuing integration of South-Eastern Scania and Bornholm by focussing on infrastructure and business development, improved transportation and communications.

The Øresund IIA programme had a total budget of € 29,02 million, of which the ERDF contribution came to a total of € 13,51 million. All the Interreg IIA projects (124 in total) applied the partnership principle of having a Swedish and a Danish partner. The projects had a common budget, and a total of some 160 different local, regional and national organisations participated in the Interreg IIA Øresund programme.²

The Interreg IIA programme was particularly successful in fostering the growth of common educational, scientific and entrepreneurial projects (Øresund Committee, 2003).

The Interreg IIIA Øresund programme picked up where the IIA Øresund programme left off, trying to respond to some of the perceived shortcomings of the previous programme. The mid-term evaluators of the Øresund IIA programme noted in particular that private co-funding remained a major obstacle in developing the programme, and that focus in future project portfolios should be changed from focussing on networking and contact-generating activities towards sponsoring projects which could have a more long-term, dynamic structural impact. Horizontal themes should also be brought more to the forefront.

The Interreg IIIA Øresund programme has had a similar level of ERDF funding available as the Øresund IIA programme. Funding was almost equally distributed across three different priorities, organised in five measures:

¹ See section 3.5 for a more detailed presentation.
² The Øresund IIIA programme had 266 different local, regional and national institutions/ organisations participating.
### Table 1.1 Programme priorities and measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priorities and measures</th>
<th>Budget ERDF (in €)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Development and improvement of administrative and physical structures</td>
<td>8,620,433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Development of an economically and socially functional region</td>
<td>11,533,289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Cross-border functionality and regional development</td>
<td>6,322,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Cross-border education and competence development</td>
<td>5,211,088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Development of cohesion and attractiveness</td>
<td>8,468,665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 Cohesion and regional information</td>
<td>4,032,439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Marketing and attractiveness</td>
<td>4,436,226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Administration, information and monitoring</td>
<td>2,642,651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1 Technical assistance</td>
<td>1,563,252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 Programme management</td>
<td>1,079,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>31,265,038</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Annual report 2007
2 Research interest and methodology

The case study combines document studies with qualitative research methods. Documentation assembled in the previous work packages of the ex-post evaluation of the Interreg 2000-2006 Community Initiatives has provided us with rich material in terms of financial data and categorical data that may be used to compare various Interreg programmes across and within different strands.

In addition, we have benefited from interviewing key respondents in the MA and JTS of the Interreg IIIA Øresund programme organisation. These programme organisation interviews were performed following a semi-structure questionnaire template and the qualitative data collection took place in August, 2009. The programme management interview lasted for about two hours, and the Head of the Secretariat and the Communication Expert of the Interreg IIA Øresund programme kindly volunteered to contribute with their insights.

In addition project leaders from five projects funded by the Interreg IIIA Øresund programme were interviewed about various aspects of their project’s activities.
3 In-depth analysis of the results and impacts in terms of effectiveness & the socio-economic effects

3.1 The financial implementation of the programme

3.1.1 Financial analysis across the intervention codes

The OP of the Interreg IIIA Øresund sounded an overarching vision for cross-border collaboration between Sweden and Denmark (OP, p. 45), maintaining that the Øresund area should strive at becoming one of the most integrated and functional border regions in Europe (“Øresundsområdet skal udvikles til en af Europas mest integrerede og funktionelle grænseregioner”).

From this vision emerged the three programme objectives of the Interreg IIIA Øresund programme, which specified that

1. The (national) border must be reduced as a complicating factor for interactions in the Øresund area and opportunities for completing transnational integrative solutions must be sought out,
2. The Øresund region must function as a commonly shared region for all inhabitants, enterprises, HEIs and R&D institutions, and
3. Those living in the Øresund region should be able to experience social and economic cohesion and a shared identity. The shared identity should also be perceived of by the surrounding [world] and constitute a force of attraction.

The latter part of the last of these three objectives was rapidly translated into a call for more concentrated efforts aimed at place branding and global marketing of the Øresund region as a global term, thus creating increased awareness of the Øresund region as a distinct, territorial concept. Consequently, tourism (code 170) became a prioritised field of intervention together with attempts at improving social cohesion and conditions for interaction between civic societies at both sides of the Øresund (code 360). Together, these two fields of intervention have consumed almost 1/3 of the total programme expenditures, making Interreg IIIA Øresund a cross-border programme where the interventions are chosen from a very limited palette:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fields of intervention</th>
<th>Øresund: Code expenditure/Programme expenditure (%)</th>
<th>Interreg: Code expenditure/CI expenditure (%)</th>
<th>Strand A: Code expenditure/Strand expenditure (%)</th>
<th>Cluster: Code expenditure/Cluster expenditure (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>170. Tourism</td>
<td>18,68</td>
<td>2,22</td>
<td>2,50</td>
<td>3,49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>360. Social infrastructure and public health</td>
<td>14,15</td>
<td>1,75</td>
<td>2,08</td>
<td>3,49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>160. Assisting SMEs and the craft sector</td>
<td>10,39</td>
<td>1,45</td>
<td>0,81</td>
<td>4,27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>180. Research, technological development and innovation</td>
<td>8,11</td>
<td>1,11</td>
<td>1,29</td>
<td>1,40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>240. Workforce flexibility, entrepreneurial activity, ...</td>
<td>7,35</td>
<td>1,88</td>
<td>2,21</td>
<td>2,28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>410. Technical assistance and innovation</td>
<td>6,57</td>
<td>1,12</td>
<td>1,04</td>
<td>1,42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>220. Social inclusion</td>
<td>6,06</td>
<td>1,63</td>
<td>2,11</td>
<td>3,31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>210. Labour market policy</td>
<td>5,90</td>
<td>0,96</td>
<td>1,25</td>
<td>1,48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>320. Telecommunications infrastructure and IS</td>
<td>4,76</td>
<td>1,42</td>
<td>1,55</td>
<td>1,33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the table above, we have opted for a very Øresund-oriented approach and presented expenditures of all fields of intervention used in the Interreg IIIA Øresund programme. The Øresund programme is evidently specialised, as the total expenditures of the programme spans only 15 different 3-digit fields of interventions. These 15 fields of intervention aggregate to a mere one third (33,71%) of the total expenditures of the programme cluster to which the Interreg IIIA SE-DK Øresund programme belongs (summarising the percentages displayed in the far right column - Code expenditure/Cluster expenditure).

With such a high concentration, all fields of intervention with the exception of positive labour market actions – the only intervention receiving less than 1% of the Øresund ex-ante budget – have a higher ratio of total expenditures than the comparable fields across the set of CI or strand A programmes.

Comparing the Øresund programme expenditure data with the similar fields of intervention within the cluster of Interreg IIIA programmes to which it belongs, we note that in three fields of intervention (in codes 350, 180 and 170), the concentration of funding of the Øresund programme exceeds the concentration of the programme cluster by a factor of five to one.

In planning and rehabilitation (code 350), 16 major projects were performed by the programme. In research, technological development and innovation (code 180), 12 projects were performed. The prominent role of tourism (code 170), with 13 projects (several of them flagship projects) has already been discussed.

Table 3.2 Weight of fields of intervention

<table>
<thead>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>360. Social infrastructure and public health</td>
<td>4 977 392</td>
<td>3 401 031</td>
<td>68,33%</td>
<td>14,15%</td>
<td>0,88</td>
<td>6,82</td>
<td>8.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>170. Tourism</td>
<td>4 853 011</td>
<td>4 488 204</td>
<td>92,48%</td>
<td>18,68%</td>
<td>1,12</td>
<td>7,49</td>
<td>8.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>160. Assisting SMEs and the craft sector</td>
<td>2 968 715</td>
<td>2 497 418</td>
<td>84,12%</td>
<td>10,39%</td>
<td>0,97</td>
<td>12,86</td>
<td>7.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>410. Technical assistance and innovative actions (ERDF, ESF, EAGGF, FIFG)</td>
<td>2 642 652</td>
<td>1 578 822</td>
<td>59,74%</td>
<td>6,57%</td>
<td>0,82</td>
<td>6,31</td>
<td>5.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>180. Research, technological development and innovation (RTDI)</td>
<td>2 417 769</td>
<td>1 947 815</td>
<td>80,56%</td>
<td>8,11%</td>
<td>0,90</td>
<td>6,27</td>
<td>7.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>240. Workforce flexibility, entrepreneurial activity, innovation, information and communication technologies (persons, firms)</td>
<td>2 251 102</td>
<td>1 765 501</td>
<td>78,43%</td>
<td>7,35%</td>
<td>0,97</td>
<td>3,32</td>
<td>3.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>220. Social inclusion</td>
<td>1 925 285</td>
<td>1 455 814</td>
<td>75,62%</td>
<td>6,06%</td>
<td>0,92</td>
<td>2,87</td>
<td>3.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>210. Labour market policy</td>
<td>1 904 261</td>
<td>1 417 243</td>
<td>74,42%</td>
<td>5,90%</td>
<td>0,98</td>
<td>4,71</td>
<td>6.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>320. Telecommunications infrastructure and information society</td>
<td>1 494 263</td>
<td>1 142 989</td>
<td>76,49%</td>
<td>4,76%</td>
<td>1,00</td>
<td>3,08</td>
<td>3.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>350. Planning and rehabilitation</td>
<td>1 466 909</td>
<td>1 002 355</td>
<td>68,33%</td>
<td>4,17%</td>
<td>0,92</td>
<td>7,23</td>
<td>1.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230. Developing educational and vocational training (persons, firms)</td>
<td>1 302 772</td>
<td>989 491</td>
<td>75,95%</td>
<td>4,12%</td>
<td>1,03</td>
<td>2,25</td>
<td>2.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>340. Environmental infrastructure (including water)</td>
<td>1 293 065</td>
<td>938 474</td>
<td>72,58%</td>
<td>3,91%</td>
<td>0,84</td>
<td>7,52</td>
<td>8.89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled and calculated based on budget and expenditure data provided by the EU commission
310. Transport infrastructure  ..... 862,043
130. Promoting the adaptation and the development of rural areas 645,245
250. Positive labour market actions for women 260,554

In terms of the relative weight of codes, in the Øresund programme virtually all codes of intervention are very pronounced. Except for code 130 (promotion of rural areas) all other interventions show a relative weight (IM) of > 1. In regards to code 130, the Øresund IIIA programme area included the island of Bornholm, which was not included in the Øresund IIA programme but instead served in a minor Interreg IIA programme of its own, Interreg IIA Bornholm. Programme interventions promoting the adaptation of rural areas to an integrated Øresund region in the IIIA Øresund programme were not always optimal. An evaluation of the project “Helhedsorienteret udvikling og delregionale roller i Øresundsregionen” [A unified development and sub-regional roles in the Øresund region], in which the Bornholm regional authority was the lead partner, aimed at exploring the potentials of Bornholm and other peripheral parts of the Øresund region. However, the project group did not include Copenhagen and this shortcoming for the project’s ability to deliver focussed dynamic integrative analyses (Pettersson, 2006). Some of the thematic objectives of the initial project were also covered in other Interreg IIIA Øresund projects.

Worth mentioning is code 160 (Assisting SMEs and the craft sector), an intervention with a larger expenditure share in the programme and with an IM value of around the 13-fold of the strand A and still the 7-fold if related to the INTERREG average.

The relative absorption rates of codes (GM strand A) do not display any higher deviations from the norm of the Strand A programmes. All values are in the range of 0,82 – 1,12. Controlling for the gap measure at the level of the Community Initiative (all Interreg programmes), the GM (CI) ranges from 0,79 – 1,11, still without major deviations. The largest deviations can be observed for programme administration (code 410 Technical assistance), where the GM (strand A) is at 0,82 and the GM (related to the INTERREG-CI) is at 0,79.

3.1.2 Dynamic financial analysis

The dynamics of the financial implementation of the Øresund programme displays some differences between the five measures within the three different priorities of the programme. Activities under priority 1 had quite a slow start but enhanced in 2004 and had a rapid linear implementation throughout the programme period. Activities under measure 2.1 and 3.2 display a relative rapid implementation, which decreased somewhat in 2005. Measure 2.2 (cross-border education and competence development) and 3.1 (cohesion and regional information) came up to a comparably slower start and implementation. However, in 2005, measure 2.2 improved its implementation. In a programme dominated by well-established network organisations, this measure incorporated activities that typically would engage/benefit actor groups that were difficult to integrate in the Øresund programme (the voluntary sector, civic society, some primary and secondary education institutions). In addition, the projects within this measure involved relatively small projects with limited ERDF funding.

The dynamics of the financial implementation reflects the recommendations of the mid-term evaluation and of the update of the mid-term evaluation pointing out the need for adjustments in funding across measures in order to achieve the original goals of the Programme.
The dynamic differences in the financial uptake of the various intervention areas (measures) do not add up to a programme implementation process that has put strains on the programme organisation towards the end of the programming period. Due to the late start of the programme, the financial implementation of the programme commenced in 2003.

The total financial uptake was almost linear during the 2003-2007 period (see figure below) and the share of funding was almost 50/50 between ERDF funding and national co-funds. However, the national funding share was somewhat larger. One explanation to this pattern, is that ERDF grants maximum 50% of the funding while national co-funding contributes with at least 50%. The difference between the two funds is that the national funding grants some pre-financing to kick-start activities and do not follow-up the results, while ERDF funding is granted after the approved application.
The n+2 rule did not favour any specific selection of projects to ensure financial implementation of the programme according to the JTS. There were no such measures undertaken to analyse how 'complex' a project was. Each project application was evaluated according to standard procedure, i.e. if the project seemed relevant and if the project could reach tangible goals and results. In addition, there was no top-down ruling pointing out which level of experimentation the projects should have.

It is difficult to quantify if the JTS favoured more 'easy' projects instead of more complex ones. However, at the programme level, Interreg IIIA Øresund put the main emphasis on tangible results rather than on learning and qualitative experimentation. In addition, the updated MTE showed that the budget spending within priority 1 was 73%, 78% within priority 2 and 96% within priority 3. This gives an indication of rather fast financial implementation which is supported by the figure on the five measures above, but do not give any indication of the correlation between financial implementation and the complexity of the projects.

The Interreg IIIA Øresund programme identified a total of 10 (8+2) programme indicators, three of which could be combined to a composite indicator of cross-border interactions. Out of these 10 programme indicators, three indicators had a high level of experimentation, three medium level and three low level (3.1 was measured with qualitative indicator). Thus, the level of experimentation has remained modest, particularly with respect to assessing the qualitative impact of project activities on horizontal issues such as environmental sustainability and economic and social equality.

It is very important that the funds allocated to the programme are paid out. Through the N+2 rule in the Structural Fund regulation it is determined that funds for decisions in 2003 must be paid out by the end of 2005 and so forth. The N+2 rule continues until the end of the programme.

The N+2 rule is by many technical secretariats and managing authorities considered to be difficult to administer. It is the basis of the N+2 rule that there is an even division of decisions and consequent payments from year to year. Especially for Interreg programmes, that involve different partners from two or more countries the N+2 rule can lead to problems, i.e. different national rules for auditing or that it takes time for a cross-border coordination of financial flows.
Furthermore, N+2 leads to much more focus on the financial side of projects instead of the actual quality of projects. At a secretariat level, this leads to less available time for idea and project development. It is therefore important, especially for Interreg programmes, in the future, to discuss more flexible rules, i.e. N+3 or to decide on a new budget after the mid-term evaluation.

Based on previous evaluations the following proposals for administrative simplification is observed:
- One single Interreg regulation, without possibilities for a stricter national interpretation, must be worked out. The Steering Committee must be able to define if a project is a good cross border project.
- The Interreg programmes should thematically be as broad as possible so that the cross border regions can choose the themes that are relevant for the programmes in each region.
- Private co-financing from non-profit organisations must be allowed in all Interreg programmes.
- The management of the Interreg programmes must be decentralised as far as possible, local and regional politicians in each cross-border region shall be a part of the decision-making process and the Joint Technical Secretariats must be rooted in the region.
- More flexible rules for payment should be established, replacing the current N+2 rule, like for example N+3

By and large the budget was spend as originally allocated with deviations less than 1% as revealed from the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme Measure</th>
<th>Total allocation of funds as of Dec 31(^{st}) 2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Development and improvement of administrative and physical structures</td>
<td>100,73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Cross-border functionality and regional development</td>
<td>100,19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Cross-border education and competence development</td>
<td>99,07%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 Cohesion and regional information</td>
<td>99,45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Marketing and attractiveness</td>
<td>99,04%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Programme Annual Report 2007

In both instances of budget overruns it was due to expected reimbursements of funds from projects not yet completed.

Only public or semi-public institutions and organisations could be lead beneficiaries of the Interreg IIIA programme. On the occasions where public or semi-public organisations were acting in competitive markets, the JTS and FM controlled the market conditions. Thus the Danish broadcaster TV2 Lorry benefitted from funding because it had public service obligations, whilst there were other private broadcasters in the region.

Private enterprises or organisations were, however, permitted to hold administrative responsibility for operating programme tasks within particular Øresund IIIA projects. Private enterprises contributed with only 0,02% of the national co-funding of the programme. The remaining national co-funding was
contributed by national authorities or agencies (17%), regional authorities or agencies (29%), local authorities/municipalities (32%) and other public or semi-public network organisations specialising in cross-border cooperation (21%).

In general it seems as the Interreg IIIA in the Öresund Region stroke a good balance between aligning towards later developments and sticking to original goals and indicators. There was no major re-programming conducted. However, in the updated MTE it was highlighted that the target for the indicator ‘cross-border education and competence development’ ought to be redefined since it was not connected to the purpose of related projects with this indicator. In addition, some funding was moved from measure 2.2 to 1.1 since one indicator was fulfilled by projects under 1.1. There was also funding transferred from 3.1 to 3.2 regarding one tourism project according to the JTS.

3.1.3 Conclusions

The INTERREG IIIA Øresund programme was concentrated on reducing barriers for cross-border interaction, enhancing a commonly shared region for all and promoting a shared identity. The latter rapidly turned into a concentrated effort on place branding and global marketing. Accordingly, the financially most important codes became tourism (code 170), social infrastructure and public health (coe 360) and assisting SMEs and the craft sector (code 160). Together these three codes constituted more than 43% of the total programme making the INTERREG IIIA Øresund programme one of the most focussed INTERREG programmes in its category (Strand A – Interreg programmes in regions with less favourable cross-border framework conditions, high- or medium concentration of ERDF-support and high- or medium level of depth and intensity of co-operation).

In general the relative absorption rate of codes does not display major deviations from the other programmes in the same category of programmes. Minor deviations were noted for programme administration (code 410 Technical Assistance). The smallest deviations were observed in transport infrastructure (code 310) and positive labour market actions (code 250).

In general the INTERREG IIIA programme Øresund stroke a good balance between sticking to the original goals and budget, at the one hand, and adapting to recommendations from the mid-term evaluation and the updated mid-term evaluation. The focus in a region may shift over time and programme administration should apply a certain flexibility to reflect that, however, at the same time being faithful to the goals, budgets and intentions agreed upon from the out set of the programme. Accordingly, in the case of the INTERREG IIIA Øresund programme, there were no major reprogramming and the budgets were spent in a more or less linear way. Following the opening of the fixed link bridging the two parts of the region, attention was mostly on cross-border functionality (measure 2.1) and marketing and attractiveness (measure 3.2) that display rapid implementation. In a second wave of attention cross-border education and competence (measure 3.2) replaced the focus on functionality, marketing and attractiveness. The most convex trend was observed for priority 1, development and improvement of administrative and physical infrastructures. This was due to a major regional administrative reform that was implemented in Denmark in 2007. Before 2007 the expectations for the reform caused quite some uncertainty with respect to projects relating to administrative infrastructures.
Summing up, budget shifts were minor in the programme period and changes seemed well routed in experience gained from evaluations rather than from financial monitoring and concerns about relative absorption of funds.

3.2 The effectiveness of the programme

In total, the Interreg IIIA Øresund programme accepted 116 projects out of 229 project applications. According to facts and figures from the JTS, the acceptance rate was 54 %. Two of the 116 successful project applications were later withdrawn after having received ERDF funding clearance. In addition to the number of fully fledged project applications received, the JTS also rejected 23 project applications on formal grounds 2000-2006 and saw 10 formally complete project applications be withdrawn.

A total of 26 innovation projects (which incorporate pilot projects) were performed, with only 7 innovation project applications received being rejected by the programme secretariat. According to JTS, the acceptance rate was 82% for innovation project applications. A positive outcome of innovation projects would typically result in a regular project application.

The ratio of regular projects supported with ERDF funding to regular project applications received is a simple measure of the effectiveness of the programme organisation.
3.2.1 Planned results, achievement rates at measure level and trend patterns

Table 3.3 Achievement rate at measure level 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Achieved</th>
<th>Achievement rate %</th>
<th>Mean %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Development and improvement of administrative and physical structures</td>
<td>No. of working groups/ cross-border collaboration structures/ networks</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. identified initiatives, obstacles and barriers</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Barriers and obstacles removed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. of plans/ programmes/ initiatives</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Development of an economically and socially functional region</td>
<td>No. of working groups/ cross-border collaboration structures/ networks</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. of participants in common competence development schemes</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>2500</td>
<td>761</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. of documents and/or training systems and info. Material</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. of collaboration agreements or participating institutions; no. of networks</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. of enterprises</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Development of cohesion and attractiveness</td>
<td>No. of working groups/ cross-border collaboration structures/ networks</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. of plans/ programmes/ initiatives</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. of participants in common competence development schemes</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>2500</td>
<td>761</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. of documents and/or training systems and info. Material</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Extent to which there is awareness and (international) knowledge of the Ø. Region</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Improving</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At measure level the planned results were, by 2007, surpassed for all three priorities. Most successful has been the development and improvement of administrative and physical structures with an achievement rate of 204%. Only one of the variables has not been fulfilled according to the planned results in 2007. The targeted number of individuals participating in vocational training and competence development schemes, set to 2500 participants, was very ambitious and the relevance of the indicator was questioned even during programme implementation.
In addition to the results on measurement level displayed in the table above, there were a range of other complementary indicators related to horizontal issues in addition to the two indicators presented here. These indicators have not been included here, since both baseline values and results were set to nil.³

³ No. of environmentally sustainable neutral projects; no. of projects that risk being detrimental to environmental sustainability; no. of neutral projects in terms of social and economic equality; no. of projects that risk being detrimental to social and economic equality. These auxiliary quantitative indicators were imposed as a result of the call for a more conscious approach to horizontal issues made in the MTE of the Øresund IIA programme (see the introduction).
Looking at the programme performance from a programme level point of view it can also be said that most targets were reached. Since all of the indicators at measure level correlated with the programme indicators the JTS decided to use the same indicators for the measure and programme levels.

At the programme level, most of the anticipated results were quantified. Only one indicator, the one related to improving cross-border knowledge and cohesion, was set to be assessed qualitatively.

Figure 3.3 Achievement rates 2009

A static analysis of the programme achievements displays that the main achievements were made early in the programme period. Compared to the expected results reported from completed and ongoing projects in the 2007 Annual Report, the actual achievements reported by 2009 have been reduced for six of the seven programme level indicators displayed above. The current (May 2009) mean achievement rate of 139% can be compared with the expected mean achievement rate reported in the 2007 Annual Report, which at that point in time could be calculated to 185%.

The JTS/MA is quite comfortable with the actual achievement rates, pointing out that the only programme level indicator in which the programme under-achieved results – the number of individuals participating in vocational training and competence development schemes actually is an indicator that is closer to the old Objective 3 (ESF) programmes, and as such not a programme level indicator that reflects the core concerns of the Interreg IIIA Øresund programme. This indicator which falls short of expectations is only one of the three indicators that produce a composite measure of the degree of cross-border interactions produced by the programme.

The evaluators of the MTE update (performed in 2005) noted that the target set for this particular programme indicator (Cross border interaction - competence development) should be redefined since it appeared not to be associated with the purpose of the project activities taking place.
INTERREG III ex-post evaluation. In-depth evaluation of the PROGRAMME: INTERREG IIIA ØRESUND (DENMARK – SWEDEN)

Interreg IIIA Øresund put the main emphasis on tangible results rather than on learning and qualitative experimentation. An additional, qualitative programme indicator not displayed in the previous figure rates the qualitative change in “cross-border cohesion and ‘awareness’”. The programme base value did put this indicator at ‘low’, whereas the achievement of the programme was set to improve this value. The qualitative assessment does not only include improvements internal to the cross-border Øresund region, but also the global awareness and image of the Øresund region as such.

The JTS means that experimentation and innovation in the projects are hard to reward since the programme has no influence over projects that apply for funding. Also it has, according to the JTS, been hard to reward experimental projects just because tangible goals have been set up for the projects and they have to be able to overview what will come out of the project beforehand.

3.2.2 Reviewing the programming quality and the programme relevance on the basis of the results achieved

The MTE noted that the SWOT analysis that has served as a starting point for shaping the overriding objectives and strategies of the programme was still relevant in the view of the evaluators. Hence these objectives and strategies still compose useful tools for increasing integration in the Øresund region. The measure-specific objectives were also deemed to be in harmony with the goals at programme level, in the sense that the measure-level objectives were instrumental in the achievement of programme objectives. There was however, a tendency, that the different objectives at measure level were not all on the same hierarchical level. A mixture of overall objectives and more measure-specific descriptions could be found and this reduced the analytical quality of the initial programming.

The evaluators of the MTE also pointed out that the priorities and measures of the Interreg IIIA Øresund programme well reflected the socio-economic analysis and its conclusions about cross-border barriers and obstacles to cooperation. The main deficiency pointed out in the MTE relates to the programme monitoring system, where the majority of programme indicators are activity-related (programme process oriented) rather than related to programme results and long-term effects. The evaluators argued that this might limit the possibilities of a full ex-post evaluation of whether the Øresund programme would be able to achieve its original objectives.

The programme challenges were identified through a pre-existing and comprehensive joint development plan covering the entire programme area as well as by a joint SWOT analysis that involved a broad range of public and semi-public stakeholders.

The SWOT identified 20 different issues to be addressed in the upcoming IIIA Øresund programme. Each of the main issues (in terms of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats) were set to be addressed by at least one of the programme’s measures. Half of the 20 issues were specifically to be addressed by two of the measures, whereas no issues could be addressed by three measures at the same time. The determination of the programme was sufficient to ensure a relevant programming process.

If we consider the most important challenges of the programme area to be those addressed simultaneously in two of the measures, then both functionally based and identity based initiatives were
INTERREG III ex-post evaluation. In-depth evaluation of the PROGRAMME: INTERREG IIIA ØRESUND (DENMARK – SWEDEN)

set to be prominent, with a priority given to social and economic functional integration of the programme.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion / scoring</th>
<th>Excellent</th>
<th>Sufficient</th>
<th>Poor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Data use and analysis</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistency of the programme strategy</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality and logic of the SWOT analysis</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The initial programming was, from the most recent results, well formulated and no major need for reprogramming has been needed. The only reprogramming that was made was the move of an indicator from measure 2.2 cross-border education and competence development to measure 1.1 development and improvement of administrative and physical structures. This was made because the indicator was more suitable according to the JTS.

In general the central indicators of the programme have not provided good indicators of whether the effectiveness of the programme has been a success or not according to the JTS. In order to get a more complete picture of the effectiveness the JTS proposes a combination of project indicators and programme indicators. With aggregation of the results comes further complexity which makes it hard to establish if it has been a success or not.

One might also question central indicators on the background basis that they only present an account of failure or not. The JTS points out that accounts from project management that project indicators have not been reached can sometimes be of more use to the programme. They can help to explain what barriers there are for reaching programme targets and uncover problems that might occur at project level. Therefore, the programme-specific indicators do not provide a complete picture of the effectiveness of the programme according to the JTS.

The baseline used for quantifying the targets was in part the Interreg II Öresund which gave some clues to what could be expected of the Interreg IIIA programme. The JTS states that when formulating the targets it was to some help but mostly it was a rough estimation of what the targets should be. The variation in results, with some exceeding greatly and a few falling short are a sign of this.

It is difficult to conclude to which extent the monitoring indicators sufficiently capture the achieved outputs, results and impacts. To quantify how many projects that were achieved within each indicator does not say anything about the projects being a success or not. The quantitative approach in the indicators is a blunt tool to measure results and impacts. This could to be supplemented with indicators at project level to be able to show not only concrete results, but also to monitor the processes and methods (best practice) behind the achieved goals. In addition, the monitoring indicators do not specify if and how long a project continues after the programme period. Is the programme only a financial resource and how many projects really have their own viability?

What the monitoring indicators did not capture were the changes of mindset amongst project stakeholders and citizens in the region. It is difficult to measure how many people each project effected, directly or indirectly, to see and grasp the advantage of an integrated Öresund region with increased
trust, mobility, access, networking etc. between stakeholders and citizens in the region. Growth and integration goes hand in hand and cannot be explained separately.

To set up standard indicators on a project level together with qualitative reporting, the unobservable effects could be captured and identified and thereby serve as good and best practice for other and future projects. Common project indicators could lead to better monitoring and benchmarking between different Interreg programmes and projects.

3.2.3 The level of complexity and experimentation achieved by co-operation

The Interreg IIIA Øresund programme identified a total of 10 programme indicators, three of which could be combined to a composite indicator of cross-border interactions. The ex-post achievement has surpassed 100% (as of May 2009), although the level of experimentation has remained modest, particularly with respect to assessing the qualitative impact of project activities on horizontal issues such as environmental sustainability and economic/social equality. However, even though the quantitative measures demonstrate an overachievement we have to be aware that there is no qualitative measures to monitor the real effects of the projects within the programme. In addition, the correlation between overachievement and the sustainability (life time) of the projects is impossible to measure.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme indicators</th>
<th>Ex post achievement %</th>
<th>Level of experimentation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Degree of cooperation</td>
<td>87,7</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-border obstacles and barriers</td>
<td>172,5</td>
<td>medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-border plans/programmes/strategies</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-border interaction: competence</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>development and educ.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-border interaction: information and</td>
<td>113,3</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-border interaction: business community,</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business development</td>
<td>157,5</td>
<td>medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-border knowledge and cohesion</td>
<td>Qualitative indicator</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Projects that directly or indirectly improve</td>
<td>107,7</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>environment sustainability</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Projects that directly or indirectly improve</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>social and economic equality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The achievement rates are particularly successful with respect to the degree of cooperation accomplished, the identification and removal of cross-border obstacles and barriers, and with respect to the development of cross-border plans/programmes and strategies. The achievements are provided in the three top rows in the figure above.

The cooperation endeavours resulted in a range of different outcomes. 26 different institutional collaborations were formalised, and 19 new triple-helix networks were established.

In terms of planning and programming for increased cross-border cooperation, 77 cross-border plans and strategies were developed within the Øresund projects. The extent of actually implementing these plans and programmes is not significant enough to occasion more than a medium level of experimentation. A stronger degree of implementation could be asked for. Many of the plans could be characterised as a compilation of information from both sides of the border in order to improve knowledge, rather than on formalising collaboration in an explicitly strategic manner.
The expectations of the INTERREG III was in some respect to ambitious, e.g. the expectations for participants in vocational training schemes. From other points of view. The Interreg III programme was in general not ambitious according to the final achievement rate. On the contrary, it has achieved more than expected. At project level there might be some ambitious goals not reached, however, the majority of the project seem to be realistic. It is also important to put the Interreg III in its context. Several external factors influence the co-operation and the effectiveness of the programme. Strength, weaknesses, opportunities and threats of a Region changes over time, but often quit slowly. The basic structure of a region’s industry, innovation capabilities and social coherence is to a large extent path-dependent and development is in general evolutionary by nature. The policy focus, however, might change more frequently over time, due to new insights, changes of the political agenda (e.g. the Danish regional administrative and political reform of regions and municipalities during the programme period (effective from 2007)) etc. We can perceive the following phases and developments during the programme period:

Phase 1: In the Öresund region issues related to mobility was in focus when the Öresund Bridge was planned and constructed.

Phase 2: When the bridge was opened issues related to research and education came into focus and a number of initiatives were taken to improve cooperation in research and education.

Phase 3: Slowly, during the years after the opening of the bridge, issues related to commercialisation, industry and business were added to the political agenda.

Phase 4: Today, the new issues relates to openness, diversity and accessibility. It is increasingly acknowledged that the key drivers in the region has to do with the tight social relations and the sustainable balances between industry and the environment, between work life and family life, between productivity and care. From the tight social relations steams the specialisation in certain fields of research and higher education as well as cooperation between university and industry and the high level of mobility in the Region.

The Interreg IIIA programme was planned when mobility, research and higher education were the most important issues on the agenda of the region. Goals and indicators were phrased accordingly. During the implementation of the programme the agenda of the region partly shifted to include commercialisation, industry and business to a higher degree, and the programme implementation partly aligned itself with the new agenda, partly stayed faithful to the original goals and indicators.

3.2.4 Conclusions

The INTERREG IIIA Óresund programme over-achieved all measures on the composite level. In one single measure though, the number of participants in common competence development schemes, the programme under-achieved. The single measure where the programme fell short was in fact an indicator closer related to the old Objective 3 (ESF) programmes and as such not a programme level indicator that reflects the core of the INTERREG IIIA Óresund programme. Accordingly, it is fair to say that the patterns of effectiveness and performance have been in accordance with the hypotheses. However, the quantitative measures can not say anything of the qualitative effects and sustainability of the individual projects, since qualitative indicators are missing.
Whether the results achieved were also relevant according to the intervention logic is partly a different matter. The indicators applied emphasis on tangible results while less tangible results such as learning effects and qualitative experimentation are equally important but less captured by the measures defined. The results achieved are relevant but there are other results that are equally important but not captured by indicators. Accordingly, it is very difficult to say which intangible results have been achieved and whether these results are relevant and sufficiently achieved. If less tangible results should be assessed as well, however, one would need to apply survey indicators as well and to do so in a baseline study from the outset of the programme.

The implementation of the measures varied over time according to the change of focus in the region. In the beginning of the programme period the fixed link bridging the region was inaugurated and focus quite naturally, was on identifying and removing obstacles and barriers to cross-border integration. Accordingly measures related to obstacles and barriers were achieved early in the programme. Later, when focus shifted towards cooperation in research and education, measures related to developing an economically and socially functional region as well as developing cohesion and attractiveness, were achieved. At the same time, however, an administrative reform in Denmark hampered projects focussing on administrative integration.

In conclusion, the INTERREG IIIA Øresund programme met and overachieved the measures defined at the outset. Targets, not defined as measures, might or might not have been met in a sufficient manner such as the level of experimentation and complexity of projects. Most likely the project portfolio represented a reasonable mix of experimentation and complexity, but it remains a qualitative assessment not based on hard facts. The same conclusion applies for the effectiveness and sustainability of co-operation. In quantitative terms a number of projects continue after programme termination indicating sustainability of the activities. The programme, however, most likely also facilitated effectiveness and sustainability in other ways such as by its learning effects. These intangible results, though, are not measured in the evaluation.

3.3. Project-level co-operation under the programme

In the Interreg IIIA Øresund programme, institutions of higher education (HEIs) were very pronounced as project partners. Almost one in four projects could boast participation of an institution of higher education. Municipalities and regional authorities was another major group participating at the project level. In total, 62 different municipalities participated in Interreg IIIA Øresund project partnerships, and most of them in several projects. This strong embeddedness of an Interreg IIIA programme with local authorities is exceptional in the context of Nordic Interreg IIIA programmes. In total, 266 different local, regional and national authorities and organisations participated and co-funded 143 projects.

The development of the project portfolio was continuous and robust. During 2002-2006, the programme operated with four annual application deadlines – two in the spring and two in the autumn. Between 2 and 10 new projects were accepted at each call. 2002-2004 the number of project applicants succeeded the number of funded projects, whereas in 2005-2006 almost all project applications received funding.

The project application procedure was followed by three administrative bodies. An overall responsibility of the Øresund programme was held by the Monitoring Committee. In addition, the programme operated
a regional decision-making body (regional beslutningsgruppe) consisting of local and regional politicians, as well as an Interreg-group (Interreg-udvalg) consisting of administrators coming from the organisations represented in the regional decision-making body. The administrative Interreg-group prioritised and decided on smaller project applications which required less than SEK 600.000 (€ 67.000) of ERDF funding. Larger project applications were assessed and confirmed/rejected in the regional decision-making body.

In addition, the Øresund programme operated a special facility for smaller pilot studies, or 'innovation projects'. These projects had an upper funding limit of SEK 75.000, with ERDF co-funding at most covering 50% of the expenses of the project (50% of SEK 150.000 (€ 17.000)). The prioritisation between and acceptance of innovation project applications were made administratively by the JTS.

Some of the main participants at the project level were:

| Skåne regional authority (SE)     | 41 |
| University of Lund (SE)           | 32 |
| City of Malmö (SE)                | 31 |
| City of Helsingborg (SE)          | 25 |
| Fredriksborg regional authority (DK) | 14 |
| Trelleborg municipality (SE)      | 6  |
| Bornholm regional municipality (DK)| 6  |
| Storstrøm regional authority (DK) | 4  |
| Skåne Sports Association (SE)     | 4  |

### 3.4.1 Selection of the project sample

The Øresund programme encompassed a total of 116 main projects and 26 pilot projects (more appropriately termed ‘innovation projects’). In pre-selecting projects, the evaluators chose to include only main projects. The evaluators scanned the project presentation reports (produced by the JTS annually 2002-2006), which presented all new projects initiated each year. In addition, the mid-term evaluation and the update of the mid-term evaluation was assessed in order to identify projects that would act as examples of good practice, or were expected to be of strategic importance for the outcome of the programme while still in operation.

This produced a shortlist of projects for case studies focussing on projects from the early and middle phase of the programme. The JTS was asked to complement the initial shortlist with projects from the final phase of the Øresund programme, while maintaining a broad range of priority topics. This interactive pre-selection resulted in the following shortlist, which included 12 projects:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTERREG IIIA Priority Topics</th>
<th>Pre-selected projects (Øresund no)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Promotion of urban, rural and coastal development</td>
<td>Unified regional development and sub-regional roles (2003-117); Kunskapsupplybyggnad och spridning av resursnåla vattenvårdshållande för att minska effekter av övergödningen (2003-70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of business spirit and SMEs, tourism and local development and employment initiatives</td>
<td>Miljövis i Øresundsregionen (2003-95); VisitOresund.info (2002-13)/One destination - two countries (2006-199)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration of the labour market and promotion of social inclusion</td>
<td>Språket forbinder (2002-5); Sygehus-beredskab Øresund (2003-122); Vidensdeling</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The final selection of projects for in-depth case studies was performed in dialogue with the JTS. The selection was accomplished based on the terms of reference, the availability of written, documented project assessments, as well as the availability of key project management respondents. The final selection was (names in Swedish or Danish):

(1) Ørestat II (2002-69)
(2) Sygehusberedskab Øresund (2003-122)
(3) Fringo / Förening Öresund (2002-9/2004-152)
(4) Øresundsportalen (2006-193)
(5) Kunskapsuppbyggnad och spridning av resurssnåla vattenvårdsåtgärder för att minska effekter av övergödningen (2003-70)

A full description of these projects (in English) are provided below. Project analyses were based on documentary evidence, project report, programme syntheses ('Når grænser brydes') and pre-announced and co-ordinated phone interviews with key respondents representing the project networks. There have been some difficulties in measuring the effects, since there have been no common qualitative measures or external evaluations of the project outcomes. This is an important lesson learned for the future Interreg programmes and programme evaluations.

3.4.2 Description of projects realised under the priority topics of the Community Initiative

Project study 1: Kunskapsuppbyggnad och spridning av resurssnåla vattenvårdsåtgärder för att minska effekter av övergödningen [Knowledge development and diffusion of practices for reducing sewage water waste so as to minimise the effects of eutrophication]

I. General project information


Intended results: creation of a network, a handbook and an action plan.

Total costs: €824,300 of which ERDF-funding € 393,300

Lead partner: Municipality of Helsingborg (SE)
INTERREG IIIA ØRESUND

Other partners: University of Copenhagen, University of Lund, Kristianstad municipality (SE), Landskrona municipality (SE), Lund municipality (SE), Skåne regional authorities, Hillerød municipality (DK), Fredriksborg regional authority (DK), Helsingør municipality (DK), Helsingborg-Helsingør municipal alliance (HH-samarbejdet), Råån waterway association

II. Selection process
Scania in Sweden and Sealand in Denmark share the same physical geography and as well as problems with eutrophication in waterways, lakes and along the coastline. The differences in administrative systems between the two countries constitutes an obstacle for joint efforts to combat this environmental problem. In Denmark, the central government is in the lead in the physical planning process, whereas planning is decentralised to the municipal level in Sweden. Sweden even lacks a corollary to Denmark's *vandmiljøplane* (Action Plans for the Aquatic Environment) as well as certain funding instruments. A common regional approach to the EU Water Directive is a necessary condition for improving the aquatic environment in the Øresund.

When the project started, a state of the art knowledge base that could display how actions to prevent eutrophication vary in Sweden and Denmark was still not available. Therefore, actors both in Sweden and Denmark decided to embark upon the mission to initiate a project dubbed "Kunskapsuppbyggnad och spridning av resurssnåla vattenvårdsåtgärder för att minska effekter av overgödning".

Examples of resource’snåla’ actions might be the restoration of marshlands, controlled drainage and managed constructed coastal zone areas. The objective of the project thus became to put the light on initiatives that could prevent eutrophication and put focus on concrete initiatives on how to combat it.

III. Partnership and sustainability
The project was organised in six distinct working groups (from all project partners) as well as a reference group that included both representatives from public agencies as well as private interest groups.

In late 2003 the project established a web portal, www.rent-vatten.com, from which the project output can be downloaded. As of September 2009, the web page have received >3100 hits.

In total, the project brought together 14 different authorities and institutions, the majority that normally does not collaborate, as for instance HEIs and local environmental authorities. This cross-sectoral collaboration represents a specific value added.

The project participants themselves underline that the mapping exercise in Denmark and Sweden has revealed that the minute differences in environmental policies in the two countries have allowed niche companies to prosper in the field, and has also allowed for increased trade in various fields of environmental technology between the two countries.

By participating in two major fairs, the project expanded its outreach to the farming community as well. This expanded contact network has allowed for a complementary Interreg IIIA Øresund project activity in *aquatic modelling*. At the end of the project period, the project partnerships were certain that the activities carried out would lead to an improved functional integration of the authorities responsible for aquatic environmental issues, while at the same time incorporating private and voluntary interests in the Øresund region in a better way, as well.
IV. Learning and indirect effects

The project outputs included a handbook and an action plan that each were issued in some 5000 copies. The handbook was aimed at individuals, while the action plan was primarily aimed at public authorities at local and national levels.

As a background a mapping exercise was performed which combined existing initiatives, interviews, surveys as well as study visits. The inspirational handbook "RENT VANN – helt enkelt!" (Simply PURE WATER!) was produced to provide examples of direct applications of how the action plan could be implemented. It displayed methods, solutions and technical descriptions of how initiatives to combat eutrophication could be carried through, without requiring the reader to have a deep theoretical background.

The action plan complemented the handbook in that it described the structural changes and initiatives that would be required to ensure that technologies that could reduce eutrophication would actually be put in place. The action plan containing descriptions of the present situation(s), and identified challenges in five general areas: with respect to planning issues, legal issues, economic, sociological and technological issues.

The action plan proposed actions at two levels. At one level were proposals that would aim at increasing the implementation of low-energy solutions. At quite another level were actions that could contribute to a reduced leakage of nutrients to aquatic environments in the Øresund region. Actions addressing agriculture were particularly relevant. A total of 49 possible actions were identified.

The project created a shared platform for the various aquatic environmental actors so as to be able to address both those bodies responsible for carrying out preventive measures as well as legislative bodies. Under the auspices of the project conferences, courses, and study trips were arranged so that the authorities responsible for aquatic management had arena’s in which to meet and discuss. The action plan developed was forwarded to central agencies and authorities in order to obtain their comments and assessments.

V. Impacts

One of the long-term objectives of the project was to maintain the thematic collaboration networks established in the project partnership. The main impact has come in the area of R&D:

The project revealed a lack of knowledge in ecological modelling amongst some of the project network participants. This was a significant motivation for a complementary Øresund IIIA project, Akvatisk Økomogisk Modellering (Aquatic Ecological Modelling), which was carried out in 2004-2007. In this project, R&D institutions in the Øresund region collaborated in developing and offering joint university courses at the bachelor, master and PhD level. This academic collaboration, which deepened relations between HEIs on both sides of the Øresund through exchanges of students, educators and researchers, has to some extent widened the functional labour market and increased labour market mobility for individuals possessing formal competencies in ecological modelling.
Project study 2: Sygehusberedskab Øresund (Health and civil protection in the Øresund region)

I. General project information


Intended results: A formal political agreement and an operational plan for cross-border collaboration on the provision of pre-hospital (and possibly in-hospital) rescue services. Implementation of joint plan of operation.

Total costs: €350,000, of which ERDF funding € 77,500.

Lead partner: KAMBER, the emergency services section of Skåne regional authority

Other partners: Copenhagen region, Hospital association of Greater Copenhagen (Hovedstadens Sygehusfællesskab)

II. Selection process

The construction of the Øresund bridge 1995-1999 required the local Danish and Swedish hospitals to come up with plans on how to provide emergency services should work-place accidents occur in the course of the bridge’s construction.

The Øresund bridge enabled the rapid cross-border deployment of emergency resources should a major event or emergency arise somewhere in the Øresund region. With the bridge completed, the regional authorities on both sides of the bridge therefore wanted to explore the opportunities for pooling and integrating such rescue services in a more systematic manner, at the same time covering an uptake area larger than the area in the immediate vicinity of the Øresund bridge.

The aim of the project was thus to establish the formal basis for, and to provide for the implementation of, mutual and effective health emergency assistance during exceptional events or major emergencies within the Øresund region. Another aim of the project was set to ensure a rapid supplementation of public health resources, in-hospital as well as pre-hospital, enabled by a common planning regarding dispatch centres and communication centres.

The selection of project partners was thus determined by the aim and tasks, and constitutes a self-selection process joining a limited set of regional authorities with similar public health responsibilities on both sides of the Øresund.

In 2003, the public health authorities of Scania (SE) and Copenhagen (DK), together with the Fire Services of Copenhagen, the dispatch centre of Greater Copenhagen and the private company Falck rescue services produced a proposal for a cross-border project which would enable a rapid and efficient rescue service and pre-hospital assistance at major emergencies on both sides of the Øresund. The collaboration should be based on the available rescue services and resources, based on the established practices used in Scania and Greater Copenhagen. The proposal was based on the daily practices and would not replace national or regional plans but was rather set to supplement these with a cross-border, regional contingency plan.
From early on, such a cross-border cooperation plan aimed at broadening the existing cooperation between hospitals in Denmark and Sweden, with the provision that the cooperation in emergency and pre-hospital rescue services should be expanded to cover the whole Øresund region in a not too distant future.

The project group applied for funding from the Interreg IIIA Øresund programme in late 2003, and was informed of ERDF funding following the meeting of the regional decision-making group in March 2004.

### III. Partnership and sustainability

The project received a rapid political approval. During the summer of 2004 the project partners entered into a formal, political agreement on the mutual provision of close cross-border emergency services between the hospitals on the Swedish and Danish side of the Øresund (i.e. in the Greater Copenhagen, Greater Malmö areas).

The agreement constituted the formal foundation for increased cooperation, and a steering group was established to implement it. The Interreg IIIA project developed an operational plan that detailed the instructions to be followed in particular fields as well as putting in place the administrative requirements for the operational plan to be put into practice.

By this, all the formal and operational collaboration agreements were in place. To embed the operational plan with the various agents that would be required to act upon it, a range of information seminars were put in place. In the same way, a range of information seminars with key personnel and key decision-makers were held to ensure that the operational plan would be properly anchored.

In the autumn of 2006, a common contingency plan regarding dispatch centres and communication centers was agreed upon. In order to improve communication between Danish and Swedish partners, the plan even included a dictionary displaying the most common and relevant technical terms both in Danish and Swedish.

As a result of the Danish regional structural reform in 2007, Bornholm became included in the formal uptake area of the implementation agreement. Following the structural regional reform, a new organisation had to be set up to continue the collaboration established in the Interreg IIIA project. In June 2007 a steering group, a coordination group and a small secretariat was established. This extended collaboration has started planning for improved coordination in areas where shortcoming in the day-to-day operations of hospitals might occur in emergency rescue situations, such as in the number of available beds. Preparatory planning is also taking place to prepare for possible emergencies in connection with major regional events, such as the upcoming Copenhagen meeting on climate change in December 2009.

### IV. Learning and indirect effects

The project has demonstrated a significant and necessary improvement by integrating emergency services resources in the event of major disasters or in extraordinary situations, when a common pooling of hospital resources in the Øresund region will be beneficial.
Such eventualities have already been put to the test several times, such as at the evacuation of Swedish, Danish and Norwegian citizens after the Tsunami of Southeast Asia in 2004/2005 and by the use of pressure tank capacities in Copenhagen when this capacity malfunctioned in Helsingborg, Sweden. On various occasions there has been contact between the emergency coordination units on both sides of the Øresund, such as during the America’s Cup match race in Malmö, at bus accidents in Southern Sweden and the evacuation of Scandinavian nationals from Lebanon in the summer of 2006.

The project group has emphasised both formal and informal dissemination activities, as well as providing information of project experiences both internally and externally.

The potential for broadening the range of collaboration to new areas is continuously being explored, such as common helicopter transportation services, sea rescue, the transport of medicine in ambulances crossing national borders, and in hospital overload situations.

V. Impacts

The collaboration has been gradually improved to cover new areas. In 2008, the two regions (Region Skåne in Sweden and Region Hovedstaden in Denmark) enacted a declaration of intent, which has opened up and formalised cross-border collaboration in specific in-hospital areas in emergency or low-capacity situations. Such collaboration could include intensive care, pre-natal care, plastic surgery or trauma treatment. Collaborations will be focussing on countering situations when bottlenecks in treatment capacities may emerge in the Øresund region – one part of the region may have low treatment capacities while another part might have surplus capacities.

Such collaboration initiatives may help to reduce medical treatment waiting lists. One such collaboration agreement, focussing on non-emergency medical treatment such as orthopaedic surgery, was formalised in late October 2009.

This gradual pooling of medical resources also improves the availability of specialised medical treatment in the Øresund region.

Project study 3: Fringo and Förening Öresund (Fringo and Öresund Association – back-to-back projects on improving cross-border cooperation in the voluntary sectors of Denmark and Sweden)

I. General project information

Duration: 2002-2004 (FRIngo), 2005-2007 (Förening Öresund)

Intended results: To improve collaboration in the voluntary sector in DK and SE. To produce a survey on the interest of cross-border collaboration among municipalities, local associations and umbrella organisations in the Øresund region. To create a web portal on the Internet to provide information on these issues.

Total project funding (ERDF): € 408.000 (Fringo), € 443.000 (Förening Öresund)

Lead Partner: Adult educational association (Folkeuniversitetet), an extra-mural department attached to University of Lund
Other partners:
FrIngo – Malmö municipality, Skåne regional authorities (Region Skåne) and the Danish secretariat for adult education (Folkeoplysningssekretariatet).

Förening Öresund: Skåne association of municipalities, Malmö municipality, Skåne regional authorities, Öresund Network, Öresundskomiteen, Copenhagen municipality.

II. Selection process
The voluntary /non-governmental sector on the Danish and Swedish side of the Öresund is thriving. Estimates indicate that the tertiary sector of the region in 1999 hosted some 58,500 different associations with a combined membership of almost 11.7 million (multiple memberships included).

In 1999 Danish and Swedish organisations established a Öresund IIA project (also named FRIngo), which performed two parallel activities: an NGO education activity and an NGO network-building activity. Based on the initial experiences made in the Interreg IIA project, an application for an Öresund IIIA project was submitted, as the project partnership wanted to broaden their stance. One argument was that the participation organisations by an extension “wanted to reach out more broadly, and involve individual members in a more active way”. The IIA project was focused on Copenhagen and Malmö participants, and in a IIIA project the partnership wanted to expand their uptake area to include the whole of the Scania and Sealand regions.

III. Partnership and sustainability
In describing the partnership and sustainability of the collaboration, we present these issues as they relate to the two complementary projects separately.

FRIngo (2002-2004)
The objective of the FRIngo (2002-2004) project were stated as

- Contributing to knowledge diffusion and display good practices in the area of collaboration between non-governmental associations,
- Creating networks and co-operation projects knowledge and experience transfer
- To provide platforms that could stimulate new democratisation processes,
- To create networks that could inform about NGO activities in the Öresund region at the EU level, and
- To display equalities and differences between DK and SE, challenges and barriers to cross-border cooperation.

The main target group were the individual members of the voluntary associations. The project was perhaps most successful in providing a new platform that could stimulate democratisation processes, as in the end it involved 200 organisations in a cross-border knowledge exchange and experience transfer network.

The project also performed a mapping exercise, to learn how local municipalities support NGO’s financially in Demark and Sweden. The purpose of this mapping was to be able to analyse how such public support can be provided most efficiently. A web portal, www.oresund.com, was established to provide information for NGO’s and individuals on voluntary sector activities in the Öresund region.
A 2004 evaluation of the outcomes of the FrIngo project concluded that it had had a positive impact on the social and identity-creating dimensions of integration efforts in the Øresund region. It contributed to strengthening regional social networks and processes that could emerge while structural integration was being established. Although the initial objectives of the FrIngo initiative was deemed perhaps a bit too ambitious, in stressing the need for voluntary sector organisations daring to make ‘regional choices rather than local ones’, the Fringo project enabled a re-writing of the ‘mental maps’ of the participants.

A shortcoming of the FrIngo project was that it still involved partners from the most central part of the Øresund region, that is the greater Copenhagen and Malmo areas. In extending the FrIngo project, the evaluators proposed to expand the project partnership geographically.

The FrIngo project had a positive impact in that it promoted the social integration and public awareness of integration processes in the Öresund region. On the one hand, the Öresund region was being perceived of as a more manifest object in the perceptions of the tertiary sector agents, and in addition the Fringo project enabled voluntary sector organisations to be a more legitimate participant in the public debate on the development of the Öresund region.

In this sense, the FrIngo project was both innovative and experimental in making voluntary sector organisations a more legitimate partner in the public debate on the Öresund integration process – a public debate that hitherto has been dominated by public sector actors and –networks.

Förening Öresund (2005-2007)
This extension of the FrIngo project had two main tasks:
1. To map the realism of producing an action plan for regional cooperation between NGO’s, and
2. To develop new arenas and meeting points for voluntary associations in the Öresund region through a new web portal, www.frivillige.dk / www.frivillig.se.

An initial survey displayed that by 2005, cross-border collaboration was already well on its way between Danish and Swedish NGO’s. 45% of Danish associations and 54% of Swedish associations had previous experience from participating in cross-border cooperation. 42% of the NGO’s reported that they believed that the CBC had advantages that could not be obtained if they only operated locally, and 34% of the associations had local activities that could easily be up-scaled to a cross-border regional level.

The findings of the mapping exercise were published in a booklet, Tolv tips [Twelve tips for better cross-border cooperation] in 2006. The booklet was printed in 4000 copies, 2000 in each language (Swedish, Danish).

On the Danish side, a structural reform of the municipal and regional administrative structure was implemented in 2007. This changed the field as municipalities merged and the voluntary associations had to renew their relations with the new local administration. The fluidity of the 2006-2007 actually provided for new, constructive contact-making initiatives to be made, and some unexpected NGO’s, such as the local tourism associations (Turistforeninger) proved to be very able participants in improving and anchoring CBC in this new setting.

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The experiences made in FrIngo and Förening Öresund displayed that municipalities and voluntary organisations both in Denmark and Sweden do not take full advantage of their potential to contribute to local development in an efficient manner. The ambition after 2007 has therefore been to perform yet another Öresund collaboration project, but due to the difficulties of raising awareness on the Danish side the current following-up is taking place only in Sweden. A project financed by the Obj. 2 Scania-Blekinge programme (2007-2013), *Public Entrepreneurship Skåne*, support NGO entrepreneurial initiatives.

The Obj. 2 project partnership involves Folkeuniversitetet, The Skåne network for the social economy, Region Skåne, the municipalities of Malmö, Lund and Landskrona as well as Malmö University College. A 2008-2009 pilot study will be followed up by a main project 2009-2012.

**IV. Learning and indirect effects**

Although the ambitions of the project(s) were not reached completely, the long-term collaboration which spanned 8 years (1999-2007) has made the Öresund integration process an integral part of the perceptive landscape of the participating NGO’s. The voluntary sector has also become a more legitimate participant in the public debate on regional integration processes, and in particular the dialogue between NGO’s and individual municipalities has become more constructive. The main frustration connected to this being performed in the context of Interreg IIIA projects is that the formal reporting requirements of the programme tend to exclude smaller associations, which possess limited administrative resources.

The FrIngo/Förening Öresund projects have also had interactions with other Öresund IIIA projects, in particular those lead by other NGO’s such as the projects “Idrott over sundet” [Sports across the Öresund] and “Pedagogik och Fritid” [Learning and pastimes].

**V. Impacts**

The main impact of the two projects has been in making voluntary sector organisations a more legitimate partner in the public debate on the Öresund integration process. On a more operational level, the difficulties of maintaining the long-term organisational collaborations into the Interreg IVA programming period (and the evolution of the project partnership into a Obj. 2 Scania-Blekinge project that mainly addresses end beneficiaries in the greater Malmö urban area) has revealed that the main positive benefits rest with the larger, centrally located voluntary associations and some of the HEI’s that engage in interactions with organisations in the tertiary sector.

**Project study 4: Øresundsportalen (UPØ; Gateway Øresund – a shared web portal for tertiary / professional education facilities in the Øresund region)**

**I. General project information**

Duration: Apr 2006 – Nov 2007

Intended results: 1 information system implemented

Total costs: €224,600 of which ERDF funding is € 112,300

Lead partner: ØresundDirekt
II. Selection process

The objective of the project is to establish a web portal that will enable visitors to acquire information on the supply of tertiary (polytechnic) education in the Øresund region, and to create and maintain cross-border contact networks within this field of education.

The idea of a UPØ portal was conceived of following cross-border conferences that took place in Helsingborg (SE) in April 2004 and Copenhagen (DK) in March 2005. Among the ideas presented at the conferences that raised most praise was the call for a virtual meeting place or forum where individuals about to enter the labour market could learn about the supply of professional or certified education in the Øresund region.

Following the March 2005 conference, the Øresund Committee made a call for three roundtable discussions in June, September and November 2005. The roundtable discussions were made with a set of 10 different municipalities, regional authorities and HEI’s from both sides of the Øresund. The discussions confirmed that a web portal would be the most efficient way to address this issue. The interest group thus initiated a project application for the Interreg IIIA Øresund programme.

At the central level, the Swedish National Agency for Education provided support in developing the general project idea, whereas the Danish Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs funded the preparation of the project application. Labour market organisations, both from employers and employees also co-funded, contributed at this stage.

III. Partnership and sustainability

ØresundDirekt, an information service promoting the activities of public sector authorities and agencies in the Øresund region took on the role as a lead partner. The UPØ web portal was attached to www.oresunddirekt.com, a web portal that had been in operation since 2000.

This initiative was supported by the Nordic Council of Ministers. Based on the conferences and the roundtable discussions, several actors initiated the creation of a web portal that displayed the providers of tertiary education and professional skills training aiming at youths entering the labour market. The project was aptly named Education Gateway Øresund (Uddannelsesportalen Øresund). The project was a complement to the Interreg IIIA Øresund pilot project Öresundsnycckelen (Key to Øresund), in which tertiary education initiatives and requirements were translated from Danish to Swedish and vice versa. The pilot project concluded that there was a need for a more systematic approach for exchanging information on (non-academic) tertiary education and vocational training opportunities for youths in the Øresund region.

The 2004-2005 pilot project Öresundsnycckelen only involved some of the partners in the UPØ project, but was mainly initiated by the Federation of municipal employees in Skåne as well as the local Youth Education Advisory Office UU-center South in Ishøj (DK).
INTERREG III ex-post evaluation. In-depth evaluation of the PROGRAMME: INTERREG IIIA ØRESUND (DENMARK – SWEDEN)

The project networks are still functioning, although with a somewhat looser foundation. ØresundDirekt is no longer the initiator or driver of the network, but rather an ordinary participant as the others. The web portal has become an integrated component of the ØresundDirekt’s field of activities, and is updated regularly. By the beginning of each calendar year, editors validate and update all available information that is currently available on the web portal. ØresundDirekt is also engaged in marketing the various education and training opportunities available to the youths (16-24 year olds) of the Øresund region.

IV. Learning and indirect effects

One of the main lessons learned in the project is that it is essential to identify the beneficiaries as quickly as possible. Although the UPØ project description was very specific in spelling out its target audience – youths that would potentially be interested in taking up or entering professional training schemes/education on any side of the Øresund, that did not really prove to be the whole story. Due to differences in the education systems in Denmark and Sweden, the average beneficiary on the Swedish side tended to be somewhat older than the target group on the Danish side. Therefore, the factual content on the two web portals (the Danish entrance www.uporesund.dk and the Swedish entrance www.uporesund.se), which explains the Danish system of education for a Swedish audience and vice versa, had to be made qualitatively different, since Swedish and Danish clients would have different expectations with respect to the layout and design of the web pages addressing them.

The network is still in operation, but with a somewhat looser foundation. Øresund Direct is no longer the main network initiator, but rather a network contributor as all others. The web portal has become an integrated part of the operations of ØresundDirekt, and is frequently updated, although mainly at the beginning of each academic term/ school year. ØresundDirekt continues to market various forms of tertiary and professional education to 16-24 year olds in the Øresund region, and the web portal remains an efficient source of information. The Nordic Council of Ministers has also extended their involvement and has drawn some conclusions from the UPØ project that is currently being explored in the cross-border integration of educational services in other border regions between other Nordic countries.

V. Impacts

The promotion of labour market integration in the Øresund region is one of the main concerns of the cross-border organisations in the region. Surveys of the industrial activity of cross-border commuters display that since 2000, the strongest increase in such commuting has been for Swedes working in Denmark in professions that require tertiary educational skills (public administration, finance/real estate, commercial services) – or in more menial jobs in wholesale and retail trade (Ørestat, 2008). These are occupations that have not been directly addressed or covered by the project Øresundsnyckeln and its follow-ups.

However, in the longer term an increased awareness about differences in professional or certified skills requirements in similar occupations in Denmark and Sweden will be of benefit to all individuals that might want to work for employers on the other side of the border or who want to be enabled to take up part-time or temporary occupations across the border. Such information will be particularly relevant in the future, where the Greater Copenhagen area in the medium term is projected to face manpower shortages in many occupations, and will therefore attract labour from Scania, which will continue to have labour surpluses.
3.4.3 Good practice project with particularly strong territorial cooperation demonstrating the Community added value of INTERREG programmes: Ørestat II (Øresund Statistics II)

I. General information


Intended results: the production of a public data base presenting basic Øresund statistical data in selected thematic fields (fields to be determined in the project based on pilot studies). Pilot and main studies to expand the data base (named Øresund Data Bank).

Funding: € 818,000 of which ERDF funding € 409,000.

Lead partner (incl. co-funding): Skåne regional authority (€ 136,000)

Other partners (incl. co-funding): Malmö municipality (€ 22,000), Regional Administrative Board of Skåne (€ 16,000), Labour market Board of Skåne (€ 57,000), Copenhagen municipality (€ 68,000), Development Council of Greater Copenhagen (€ 38,000), Øresund Bridge Consortium (€ 42,000) and Greater Copenhagen Employment Board (€ 28,000).

II. Project aim

The objective of the Ørestat project is to increase knowledge about the factual conditions in the greater Øresund region and its sub-parts. Public statistics is an important part of democratic society and as an Øresund region it is in the making, spanning both Sweden and Denmark. A simple requirement should be to ensure that information about the region is made available and produced with the same quality standards, and in the same format, as national, regional and local data registers.

To enable the Øresund region to evolve into one of the most functionally integrated cross border regions in Europe, there must be a comparative and coherent statistical data base describing the social and economic conditions of the region. Public authorities will need such data to be able to improve integration efforts in a productive way as well as to reduce barriers to trade and movement. In addition enterprises both at home and abroad will require information to be able to reach new markets as well as to be able to explore new business opportunities. And for some, it will always be of great interest to survey changing opportunities concerning settlements, studies and work.

III. Political and strategic context

The functional integration of the Øresund region requires access to high quality, comparative information of social and economic conditions on both sides of the Øresund. Private enterprises as well as local, regional and national authorities and households will demand comparative and easily accessible statistics that might describe the national sub-regions as well as the whole Øresund region itself. Such statistics are also a prerequisite for an efficient marketing of the Øresund region as such abroad.

In 1998-2001 Ørestat was managed as an Interreg IIA Øresund project. The lead partners were Statistics Sweden (SCB) and Statistics Denmark (DS). Together with other interest groups and co-funders the two National Statistical Offices started the tedious task of transforming the Øresund region into a single statistical area. Information obtained from the national statistics of both countries was
In-depth evaluation of the PROGRAMME: INTERREG IIIA ØRESUND (DENMARK – SWEDEN)

probed, compared and linked. A collection of basic statistical tables on the population, education levels, household income, labour market and economic structure of the Øresund region was produced. A separate database that could be accessed through the Internet was produced and named the Øresund Databank. As statistical tables were updated, they were added to the databank. A final report on the project was submitted in May 2001.

After Øresund I had come to an end, SCB and DS continued to update all the tables that were developed within the Ørestat I project. The table updates and the operation of the database was funded by specific allocations to Statistics Denmark and as a specific task required from Statistics Sweden.

The descriptive statistics available in the Data Bank had found many uses, but at the same time it became more and more evident that the Øresund Data Bank had some serious flaws. The time series produced were severely limited and the data in general were very limited in informational content. Several professional users of regional data in the Greater Øresund region therefore joined forces so as to be able to both widen and deepen the Øresund Data Bank. A strong coordination between the re-emphasised formulation of an Øresund II project, as well as the formalisation an Øresund II project itself became a prerequisite both so as to ensure funding as well as a coordinated management of a Ørestat II project.

The 1998-2001 Ørestat project became well known, and had become synonymous with all statistics that describe the Øresund region at large. Although an Ørestat II project would be far from being an extension of the Ørestat I project, it seemed most efficient to continue with such a project for all involved. However, it became necessary to separate the role of tenderer and tenderee that DS and SCB had practiced in the Ørestat I project. Consequently, the Ørestat II project partnership was expanded to include regional and local authorities and –agencies as well.

IV. Implementation

The budget of the Ørestat II project was devoted to purchasing professional services to support the practical work in expanding the data base. The activities within the project itself included secretariat services including the collating of statistical material (28 of total funding), pilot studies (22% of total funding), main thematic studies (44% of total funding), and information and marketing activities (5% of total funding).

The joint technical secretariat was organised by SCB and DS, the main project partners of the previous Ørestat I project (1999-2001). The secretariat cooperated with the project’s steering group and coordinated activities within and between the two national statistical authorities.

A total of 10 different pilot studies were performed. Most of the pilot studies were followed by a specific reference group. The pilot studies laid out the purpose of the specific thematic field, displayed the differences between Denmark and Sweden on how statistical data within the field were organised and whether Swedish and Danish regional/municipal data were directly comparable.

Based on the priorities of the project’s steering group, and the findings of the pilot studies, calls were made for a range of main studies. The main studies produced comparative thematic register data at the municipal/regional level, data that were subsequently added to the Ørestat Data Bank. 13 main studies were produced.
V. Effectiveness

The pilot studies that were performed, displayed that in some statistical fields cross-border statistics could be produced, whereas in other thematic fields, regional data could not be compared and a thematic Ørestat database could not be produced.

At the end of the project regional statistics in 7 thematic fields remained to be produced (barriers not solved in the display below):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Barriers to construction of regional DB solved</th>
<th>Barriers to construction of regional DB not solved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barrier identified prior to project</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barrier identified in the course of project work</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ørestat II final report

Anticipated barriers to the construction of a comparative, regional Ørestat database was solved in the following thematic fields:
- Migration statistics
- Commuting
- Household compositions
- Dwellings
- Professions/socioeconomic status
- Unemployment (municipal level)
- Labour market conditions
- Economic structure/entrepreneurship
- Wages/wage costs
- A transregional register on individuals (to enable longitudinal studies on migration/commuting)
- Statistical data on individual (for GIS analyses)
- Cooperation between local and regional users of the statistics and national statistics producers

Barriers to the construction of a comparative, regional Ørestat database were identified and solved in the course of the Ørestat II project in the following fields:
- Individuals’ employment status
- Unemployment (monthly data)
- Commuting (combined with wage income)
- Wage income from one country (no commuting)
- Commuting indicators
- Declarations of comparability of data DK-SE

Some anticipated barriers to the production of comparative regional Øresund data remained unsolved at the end of the project. The following themes remain unaccounted for at the cross-border regional level:
- The commuting /migration of students
- Prices
- A transregional data register of enterprises (to compare offshoring/outplacement of commercial activities across the Øresund)
- Developing a multilingual database (beyond Danish, Swedish)
- Travels and transportations across the Øresund
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- The organisation and dissemination of database updates

In addition, some new barriers to the production of comparative regional statistics emerged during the course of the project and still remain unresolved. These relate to individual income statistics/household income statistics and consumption patterns. A comparative statistics between DK and SE remains unattainable. A pilot study performed in the project displayed that it would be far too expensive to attempt to produce comparative regional data in this thematic field, and it was not possible to determine how such basic regional data could be updated. A complete presentation of the data matrices available in the Ørestat database (www.dst.dk/extranet/oresund1) is made in the annex 2.

VI. Sustainability

The issue of funding has been a continuous concern on the Swedish side. Ad hoc funding from local and regional groups had to be provided in 2002-2004, as the central government was unwilling to provide such funding over the national budget. This endangered the sustainability of the project’s activities.

During the summer/autumn of 2004, the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs called a range of meetings to try to find a solution to the funding issue in Sweden. In addition to the Malmö municipality, Skåne regional authority, SCB, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Industry and Communication, several government agencies attended as well. The discussions provided full Swedish state funding of Ørestat II in 2005, but proved to be a one shot provision. Only since 2009 has SCB been instructed to maintain cross-border statistics as a part of their regular task – and is thus receiving funding over the national budget for it. One of the main impacts of the Ørestat project(s) has been to demonstrate the feasibility of maintaining cross-border statistical databases with the national statistical offices.

In addition to the funding issue, the regional structural reforms implemented in 2007 reconstructed the institutional landscape in Denmark and the project partnership had to be revised to include new regional partners. This constituted yet another obstacle in the effort to sustain the activities of the Ørestat project beyond the project period itself.

A major shortcoming of the Ørestat Data Bank is that it only displays data in a simple, tabular format. The main user groups have been, and still remain, with local and regional authorities, those who use the Data Bank as an information source for strategic planning purposes.

To expand public interest, the sustained project partnership issued a statistical leaflet in the late summer of 2008 that presents much of the information in the Øresund Data Bank in a graphical format of tables and figures. The publication, TendensØresund (Øresund Tendencies) has raised renewed awareness concerning the outputs of the Ørestat II project. The statistical brochure can be downloaded from www.tendensoresund.org. The fact that the TendensØresund publication was in fact produced without ERDF co-funding is further evidence of the added value of the Ørestat II project.

VII. Conclusions

The Ørestat II project closed making three main conclusions:

- Firstly, the project partnership proposed that a nationally guaranteed and co-funded basis should be created for cross-border statistics of the Øresund region. For the project participants it became evident that it should be a national responsibility to ensure that cross border regional statistics are available for cross-border regions in the same way as other (national) functional regions. On the
Danish side this has since 2006 been assured by basic funding from the Ministry of Research, while the sustainability of updates on the Swedish side has been assured by various ad hoc solutions, mainly with regional or local funding. Consequently, the project partnership proposed that the National Statistics both of Sweden as well as Denmark should be instructed to provide, produce and distribute basic cross-border regional statistics as a part of their general mandate, and that this activity should be funded over the national budget.

- Secondly, the project partnership proposed that a user council for cross-border statistics should be established, so as to ensure that there would be interactions between the users and the producers of cross-border regional statistics beyond 2005. The user council should include public as well as private interests.
- And finally, the Ørestat II project partnership proposed that a regional forum for the coordination of regional statistics. The forum should include regional as well as local authorities. The coordination responsibility of this forum should change on a rotational basis.

While the idea of a regional forum has not been implemented, the user council has been operational since 2005, and continues to meet bi-annually. As a result of the Danish regional administrative reform 2007, Copenhagen municipality has left the user council as the Greater Copenhagen area remains represented by the new regional authority of the Danish capital region (which also incorporates the peripheral island of Bornholm).

The value added to the Community from the Ørestat II exercise can be identified as the following: the project has enabled local and regional actors in the cross-border region to map and overcome the first, main obstacles in the production of a cross border data base providing comparative regional statistics. Many of the obstacles encountered in the project, and the solutions developed to overcome these, are of a general nature, and could be applied in other cross-border regional contexts. The exercise has been copied, although in a much more low-scale format, in projects in the Interreg IIIA Sweden Norway programme.

It is important to make a distinction between the compilation of national regional data, as those produced for instance by EUROSTAT. These are produced to enable comparisons between different regions. A proper cross-border regional statistical database provides for comparisons at sub-regional levels, when (functional) sub-regions even incorporate parts of two different nations. For the Øresund region, the focus has been put on developing tools that enable analyses of regional development processes, so that the continuing functional integration of the different sub-regions can be better understood.

3.4.4 Conclusions

Based on the survey of five projects (including one in-depth), we can conclude that most involved 3-10 partners. The project partnerships were the result of previous joint/common actions among a core group of project partners in previous projects (Øresund IIA programme, IIIA pilot studies). The geographical impact of the projects still remains somewhat concentrated to the core axis of Greater Copenhagen-Greater Malmö, although continuous efforts are made to expand the geographical scope of the project partnerships. The definition of the project activities was in all cases based on a shared diagnosis that in some instances also involved agents that did not take part in the final project partnership themselves. The level of experimentation and complexity varied with the nature of the
project partnerships. Those that involved national agencies/regional authorities were more inclined to include experimentation, whereas those that involved local actors or actors in the voluntary sector would focus more on basic mapping and information gathering activities.

All but one of the supported project structures have been sustained (although in somewhat modified forms) beyond the project periods. These activities are then co-funded by the participants themselves. In some cases, the projects have produced new activities or spin-off projects that maintain or even expand the cross-border project partnerships.

The structure of the Øresund programme and the concentration of activities to a limited set of fields of intervention has not prohibited the project partners from setting up robust project partnerships. Interreg funding tends to speed up CBC initiatives that in most instances would have taken place at a later point in time. (The ability to mobilize municipalities as project partners is particularly strong in the Øresund programme compared to other Nordic Interreg IIA programmes.)

Learning at individual, organisational and institutional levels has been confirmed in the projects. Public sector officials stated a strong belief in the value-added of interacting with colleagues working in other administrative systems and cultures, whereas informants from the voluntary and local levels have learned mostly from cross-sectoral interactions. Typically, the involvement of local authorities in projects are determined by the interest and involvement of individual key drivers within the public organizations, and it remains a challenge to distribute learning effects across the organizations/institutions at large.

At the level of civic society there has been less evidence of cross-border learning, although the (slightly) increasing involvement of voluntary sector agents in the IIIA Øresund programme might be a signal that this state of affairs is about to change.

However, it is hard to draw too many conclusions by quantitative measures only, which are rather blunt tools. To give a more complete picture, the programme would benefit from some qualitative indicators as well. Since these are missing we cannot tell exactly how effective the projects have been and what results were reached. In addition, the quantitative measure cannot tell us the sustainability and future existence of the project within the programme.

3.5 Analysis of factors that determine the character of the programme

The present ex-post evaluation has developed (1) a synthetic indicator for measuring the depth & intensity of territorial co-operation achieved under INTERREG III and for exploring the influence of previous co-operation tradition on this co-operation performance as well as (2) a wider INTERREG III taxonomy which allocates programmes - within Stand-specific typologies – to different sub-types (or Categories). Both concepts also include a number of indicators which determine the age and maturity of co-operation existing prior to the start of INTERREG III (i.e. & “historical variables” of the synthetic indicator) and assess important geographical / socio-economic context factors characterising a programme area at the outset of INTERREG III (i.e. Strand-A & Strand-B typologies).
The following sections will now identify which of these historical and context-related factors had been the most important ones in case of the programme concerned, analyse more in-depth some of the most important programme-specific features and conclude on the relevance of these factors.

3.5.1 Historic factors determining the character of cross-border co-operation before the start of INTERREG III

A brief look at the raw results achieved by the Øresund programme under the three variables\(^5\) making up the “Historical Criterion” of the synthetic indicator points on one specific aspect which is of a particular importance: The very long overall duration of cross-border co-operation in the Øresund area prior to the start of INTERREG III (36 years), which is in fact the second longest cross-border co-operation tradition among all Strand-A programmes (after Germany-Netherlands) and the third longest co-operation tradition among all INTERREG III programmes (i.e. third-highest score achieved under SI 1). Due to this, the Øresund programme is also in a leading position within the group of 12 programmes grouped under Category 3 of the Strand-A typology.

Within the group of 10 Strand-A programmes characterised by the most long-standing co-operation before the start of INTERREG III (i.e. 28 years and more achieved under SI 1)\(^5\), the Øresund programme belongs however to the sub-group of programmes which is characterised by only a medium level of maturity of this previous co-operation tradition (i.e. quality and scope of existing legal instruments\(^7\) & nature and capacity of existing cross-border structures\(^8\)).

- The Øresund co-operation area is covered by a comparatively weak inter-state agreement which promotes decentralised co-operation among territorial authorities, but provides them with only very limited legal solutions to further structuring their co-operation. Only private law-based solutions based upon the existing national legislation as well as the EU-law based instrument of a "European Economic Interest Grouping – EEIG"\(^9\) can be used (programme scores at a level of 50 under SI 2).
- A permanent cross-border structure without an own legal personality has been established which promotes strategic co-operation on many themes as well as project level co-operation on specific topics (programme scores at a level of 50 under SI 3).

This less developed maturity of the Øresund programme is also a general feature which characterises most of the programmes grouped under Category 3 of the Strand-A typology. With the exception of some programmes (Ireland-Northern Ireland under SI 2 & Ireland-Northern Ireland Kvarken-Mittskandia

\(^{5}\) SI 1: Number of years the structured and visible cross-border / transnational / interregional co-operation exists within parts or all of the programme area. SI 2: Nature & quality of the directly applicable legal instrument that can be used for cross-border / transnational / interregional co-operation within parts or all of the programme area. SI 3: Nature & quality of existing permanent cross-border / transnational / interregional co-operation structures established between territorial authorities that operate in parts or all of the programme area.

\(^{6}\) I.e. Germany-Netherlands; Øresund; Ireland-Northern Ireland; D-F Saarland-Moselle-Westpfalz; B-F-Lux – WLL; Germany-Luxembourg-Belgium; FIN-S-N Kvarken-Mittskandia; Italy-Switzerland; Italy-Austria; D-A-CH-LI - Alpen-Bodensee.

\(^{7}\) Under SI 2, the programme Alpen-Bodensee scores “30” and the programmes Kvarken-Mittskandia, Øresund, Italy-Switzerland and Italy-Austria all score “50”, while the five other programmes all score at a maximum level of “90”.

\(^{8}\) Under SI 3 the programmes Øresund, Italy-Switzerland, Italy-Austria and Alpen-Bodensee all score “50”, while the six other programmes all score at a levels of “70” or “90”.

\(^{9}\) The EC-Regulation 2137/85 on “European Economic Interest Grouping” (EEIG) provides a uniform legal framework that has precedence over national law and establishes a set of directly applicable standard rules on EEIGs. Despite this common framework, EEIGs are still governed by various national legal provisions in the different EU-Member States. In principle, EEIGs may also be used as a legal structure for co-operation among bodies governed by public law (e.g. regional and local authorities, public research centres, universities, etc.), provided that their activities or one of these activities can be considered “to be of an economic nature, even if minimal or indirect”. The suitability of EEIGs for transnational co-operation among territorial authorities has however been questioned at various occasions (i.e. EEIGs are not entitled to realise purely administrative activities; EEIGs cannot not take over the management responsibility for a joint co-operation programme / project without the establishment of another structure).
In Scandinavia, two multilateral inter-state agreements have laid the foundations for promoting decentralised cross-border co-operation (Treaty of Helsinki of 1962; Nordic Convention of 1977). Especially since the agreement between Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden concerning co-operation over Nordic national frontiers between local authorities (Nordic Convention), local authorities are entitled to establish border crossing contacts without involvement of central state authorities and to launch co-operation initiatives in a wide range of fields of common interest. Cross-border co-operation can take place in the same manner as co-operation of local authorities within one specific country, but only on the grounds of private law. The actual legal framework conditions for cross-border co-operation in the Øresund region can be illustrated by opposing the main elements of the domestic legislation on territorial authority programmes in Denmark and Sweden:

- **In Denmark**, the Constitution defines that only the central government is responsible for foreign policy (§ 19), which also covers cross-border co-operation. Local authorities (municipalities, counties) can therefore not conclude binding agreements with authorities in neighbouring countries and are furthermore restricted by the principle of territoriality, which defines that their activities need to be related to their territory. Although these provisions formally tend to hinder decentralised cross-border co-operation, practice shows that local authorities have a certain range of de facto possibilities to engage in decentralised cross-border co-operation unless this does not lead to a transfer of domestic competencies towards foreign territorial authorities.

- **In Sweden**, the “Local Government Act” of 1991 defines that local authorities (municipalities, counties) are allocated competencies which allow them to carry out tasks of public interest on their own territory. Within Sweden, municipalities and counties can establish co-operation amongst each other, which was during the 1970’s-1990’s mostly based on private law and more recently also on public law. Swedish local authorities have also an explicit right to conclude private law-based conventions / agreements with municipalities and counties of neighbouring countries (Chapter 3 §20 of the “Local Government Act”). These conventions/agreements can also include that the management of cross-border activities is delegated to another local authority. Mandatory tasks can only be transferred to a local authority of another state on ground of an approving law. In addition, a recent law on “export of local services and cross-border emergency services” (2001) has also introduced further flexibility regarding the narrow definition of the localisation principle for a realisation of local public tasks.

In the 1960’s, the positive effect of political cross-border co-operation was first realised by both sides in Sweden and Denmark, although the region still had to fight off political obstacles which stood in the way of support for the Øresund Region. Due to the above-mentioned multilateral inter-state agreements, an initiative for setting up structured cross-border co-operation in the Øresund region started quite early in 1964 with the founding of the Øresund Council (Øresundsrådet). The Øresund

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10 CEC Commission of the European Communities, DG Regional Policy (2004)
11 Kommuner, Amtskommuner.
12 Localisation principle: Local authorities can formally not operate beyond their own administrative limits and also not beyond the borders of the Kingdom.
13 Simple agreements, shareholder companies, co-operatives and foundations.
14 The “Swedish Local Authority Grouping” has a legal personality and is free to act independently from its members. In its structure and organization, the grouping has resemblance with a local authority. Local authorities can transfer to the Grouping all of their tasks, including tasks linked to sovereignty rights.
Council was a body of 30 members which were elected municipal officers around the Öresund. In addition to the Council, also the **Øresund Contact (Øresundskontakt)** was established as a body in which regional civil servants were represented. These first attempts however did not succeed (as wished) in bringing co-operation forward. One of the main reasons for this failure was the different system structures in the neighbouring countries (i.e. Sweden had a strong tradition of centralization that did not encourage the delegation of national decision-making power and Denmark was going through a decentralization process).\(^\text{15}\)

At the beginning of the 1990’s, the perspectives of the forthcoming Northern and Eastern enlargement of the EU changed regional policy on both the European and the Nordic level and paved the way for the decision to build a bridge across Øresund (decision taken in 1991). These crucial factors have stimulated tighter cross-border co-operation in the area and have led - as a consequence – in 1993 to the replacement of the two existing cross-border structures by the **Øresund Committee**.\(^\text{16}\) The Committee was established by local/regional authorities\(^\text{\text{17}}\) together with national authorities as the regional policy forum for cross-border co-operation between Greater Copenhagen in Denmark and Scania in Sweden. The overall goal of the committee is to strengthen and make the role of the Øresund region visible on national levels as well as internationally in order to create a foundation for increased economic, cultural and social growth. To that effect, the Øresund Committee should - on a day-to-day basis - evaluate and put forward proposals for an appropriate development and also prepare a joint strategy which aims to promoting a common development of the cross-border region. As a cross-border structure without an own legal personality the Committee did not have any contractual power, but it had its own financial resources\(^\text{18}\) for covering the necessary working expenses. According to the initial statues of 1993, the basic institutional structure of the Committee consisted of the following three elements: (1) the Øresund Committee, (2) the Øresund Commission and (3) the Øresund Secretariat.

- **The Øresund Committee** is the decision-taking body and meets at least twice a year. It included an equal number of political representatives from the respective parts of the cross-border region (32 politicians & 32 deputies) and one observer from the respective national governments. The election period for the regional and municipal representatives corresponded to the functional period for the nominating political authorities. The Committee elected amongst its members a chairman and a vice-chairman.

- **The Øresund Commission** prepared a working programme and a budget proposal for the Øresund Committee and was responsible for carrying out the Committee’s decisions. It consisted of at least one civil servant per regional or municipal member organisation and of two observer from the Swedish and Danish governments.

- **The Øresund Secretariat** was established to handle activities decided on by the Committee and the Commission, to deliver information and contact activities as well as to accomplish the day-to-day administrative tasks. The Copenhagen-based secretariat employs both Danish and Swedish staff.


\(^\text{16}\) See: Website of the Øresund Committee; Schönweitz (2008); Brune (2006).

\(^\text{17}\) Members of the Øresund Committee are: Copenhagen County, Frederiksberg County, Roskilde County, Copenhagen Municipality, Frederiksborg Municipality, Storstrom County, West Zealand County, Bornholm County, Malmö Municipality, Helsingborg Municipality, Landskrona Municipality, Lund Municipality.

\(^\text{18}\) The resources were provided for by (1) subscription by counties/county councils and municipalities based on the amount of inhabitants and (2) by additional grants or contributions coming from the Nordic Council of Ministers for particular fields of action or initiatives.
Since its establishment in 1993, the activities of the Øresund Committee quickly expanded and were based upon four main pillars during the period between 1995 and 2000. Despite gradual changes in the first decade of existence (statute modifications of 1997 & 1998), the three main elements of the Committee’s institutional structure as well as the focus of main activities realised have remained stable over time up to January 2007.

Although cross-border co-operation has existed for awhile at this former external EU-border of Denmark, the Øresund area was not included in the set of programmes having received Community funding under the INTERREG pilot programme phase (1989-90) and under the new Community Initiative INTERREG I (1991-1993).

Only under the INTERREG IIA Community Initiative (1994-1999), an external border programme Øresund was initially approved in 1994 which was subsequently transformed in 1996 into an internal border programme after Sweden’s accession to the EU in 1995. A total of 119 projects were approved under the programme for the Øresund Region and received a total of ERDF/ESF funding of ECU 13.5 million. This first generation of EU-funded co-operation projects was very successful in the Øresund and had also a visible or even significant impact on improving the economic fabric and on furthering socio-cultural understanding. The 41 projects supporting cross-border business activities have allowed establishing business clusters in future industries such as biotechnology (e.g. Medicon Valley Academy) and SME-networks (e.g. Øresund Food Network) or enhanced cross-border tourism, which also created around 300 jobs in the cross-border area. Cross-border co-operation between institutes of higher education led to the establishment of the "Øresund University" and co-operation in the field of R&D could also mobilise private companies and directly contribute to create jobs. Some activities such as the "Medicon Valley Academy” continued after INTERREG IIA, as it was established as an institution under private law in order to support the development of biomedical research and production in this border region. Also the "Øresund University” continued to operate and has become a network of universities and institutions of higher education in the cross-border region, where researchers and students can participate from the existing facilities on both sides of the border.

The Øresund programme could – in close co-operation with the EURES-T network - launch a further co-operation and integration of labour market institutions and reach 2,700 people that participated in education and / or competence development activities. Beyond this, the INTERREG IIA programme Øresund has also supported extensive horizontal and policy-specific planning activities. This has led to the elaboration of a cross-thematic “Joint Cross-border Regional Development Plan” for the Øresund-Region with planning recommendations for local authorities. Also the elaboration of a “Joint Environmental Programme for the Øresund-Region” and a cross-border transport-development plan for the time after the completion of the fixed link between Sweden and Denmark had been realised. Finally,

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19 In 1995: (1) project management/implementation, networking and representation, (2) administration of the INTERREG II programme, (3) implementation of the environment program, and (4) discussion of political questions of regional relevance. In 2000: (1) the implementation of the INTERREG II programme, (2) projects for folkelig forankring, (3) strategic lobbying and (4) general information about the region and the activities of the Øresund Committee.
20 Schönweitz (2008): In 2007, an institutional reform of the Øresund Committee was decided mainly as a consequence of the reform of local government in Denmark which changed the structure on the Danish side significantly (i.e. new regional bodies & municipalities had to be incorporated into the Committee; as a consequence the number of representatives in the Committee went up from 16 to 18 on each side, the total number of ordinary members from 32 to 36). This institutional reform represented a turning away from an essential aspect of the Committee’s activities (i.e. the participation in regional INTERREG projects as a lead partner) and - instead - focussed the organisation’s operations primarily on political lobbying. In structural terms, the basic changes were the introduction of an Executive Board of six members per national side (meeting at least four times a year) and the altering of the former Øresund Commission, which was of high importance as it had preparatory function, into an advisory group of civil servants for the secretariat and the new Executive Board. The task to prepare the meetings of the Committee was transferred from the Øresund Commission to the secretariat.
21 CEC Commission of the European Communities, DG Regional Policy (2003)
at a more strategic level, also the importance of the Øresund Committee was also furthered during the INTERREG IIA programming period. The Committee formulated the INTERREG IIA programme and was de facto entrusted with most of the day-to-day management and implementation competencies. The permanent secretariat of the Øresund Committee was acting as the joint programme secretariat, carried out the operational programme management and also played a crucial and positive role in the highly integrated project selection procedure. This helped to ensure that all projects approved under the INTERREG IIA programme adopted the lead partner principle and were genuinely joint cross-border projects.

The above-reviewed historical factors were all highly relevant for providing a sound overview on the main characteristics of cross-border co-operation before the start of INTERREG III. Their in-depth assessment has shown that - despite a long lasting co-operation tradition in the Øresund region - the intensity of previous co-operation only increased in the early 1990’s and especially since the launching of the INTERREG IIA programme in 1994, while its overall maturity remained at a rather moderate level.

3.5.2 Important contextual factors characterising the cross-border programme area

The area covered by the INTERREG IIIA programme Øresund has a population of about 3.5 million (3.68 million in 2008) and extends over some 21,000 km². Compared to the previous Interreg IIA programme, the eligible area has been widened by a further three Danish counties and includes some of the most advanced parts of Denmark and Sweden (i.e. Copenhagen in Denmark & the city of Malmö in Sweden).

In the typology of Strand-A programmes, the INTERREG IIIA programme Øresund forms part of a group of 12 programmes (Category 3) which is – among other aspects – characterised by the existence of generally less-favourable framework conditions for cross-border territorial integration. Among all context factors considered, three factors were important in statistical terms for allocating the programmes to this category:

- A mostly high degree of political-administrative openness of the border (exceptions are: FIN-RUS South-East Finland, Slovakia-Czech Republic, Italy-Malta), but a generally limited degree of physical/communicative permeability of the border.
- No significant levels of cross-border economic disparities.
- Existence of common historic ties / a shared culture, but only in a few cases also of a common language.

Seen as such, the programme Øresund is a typical representative of Category 3 as it well represents all of the abovementioned main characteristics.

The Øresund cross-border region is located in southern Scandinavia at the gateway to the Baltic Sea (i.e. the Øresund strait). The programme covers a maritime border, which is however crossed by a fixed link between Copenhagen and Malmö (i.e. the Øresund Bridge, opened in July 2000) and by ferry services between Helsingborg and Elsinore. One consequence of this particular physical feature of the

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22 In the current programming period (2007-2013), the JTS is no longer an integrated part of the Øresund Committee; the Committee has more of a hosting role. The Committee has also in this programming period lost its possibility to be involved in projects.
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border is the Øresund programme area’s very limited degree of communicative permeability, which can be illustrated by the extremely below-average density of border crossing possibilities per 100 km of borderline (3.65, with the Strand-A average located at 52.1). If compared to the eleven other programmes forming part of Category 3, one can observe that the Øresund programme has the fifth lowest density of border crossing possibilities which is also significantly below the average density of all Category 3 programmes (i.e. 16.71). This limitation is however only an apparent one if confronted with the important role played by the Øresund Bridge. Every day, the fixed link carries about 70,000 people between Denmark and Sweden by train or car. In 2007, the bridge has been used by 9.7 millions of train passengers and by 9.2 millions of vehicles, resulting in a total of 35.5 million passengers having crossed the Øresund bridge. The Øresund Bridge therefore effectively eliminates the maritime barrier and has become the catalyst for a new lifestyle in the Øresund region (i.e. companies can expand their markets, job-seekers can take up working the neighbouring country, families can start new lives on the other side, students can follow courses at more than one university and a day excursion with the family can just as easily go to "the other side.")

The Danish-Swedish border covered by the Øresund programme is an internal EU-border where the dismantling of border control formalities with the Internal Market legislation and the Schengen-regime has resulted in a free flow of goods and persons. A good example illustrating the effects of this openness is the steadily increasing day-to-day cross-border commuting and permanent migration in the Øresund region. Shortly before the EU-accession of Sweden in 1995, only around 2,000 people were commuting on a daily basis between both countries by using ferry services (of which 75% were Swedes working in Denmark & 25% Danes working in Sweden). Since the opening of the fixed link in 2000, however, the number of commuters rapidly increased from 3,000 (in 2000) to nearly 8,000 (in 2004). Statistics compiled in January 2007 show that 14,000 people were commuting each day over the Øresund Bridge, which also led to a drastic increase of commuter traffic (between 2005 and 2006, by 43%). In parallel to this development, one can also observe a steady increase of permanent cross-border migration within the Øresund area, from with a little more than 2,000 persons/year (in 2001) up to nearby 6,000 persons/year (in 2006). Since July 2000, a total of 22,500 Danes have moved to Scania region in Sweden.

This generally open border was however not free from obstacles, as it is the meeting point of two different political and administrative systems. Diverging domestic legislations still have negative effects on the daily life of citizens in the co-operation area and hamper also cross-border commuting as well as the border-crossing activities especially of smaller enterprises. A first example is the lack of transparency and co-ordination of the rules for taxes, social security, pension and unemployment benefits. People commuting to work over the border had a problem receiving information of rules affecting them and risked paying double taxes. They also risked losing the right to unemployment benefits because foreign employment did not contribute to entitlements in their home state, losing the right to kindergarten for their small children for the same reason etc. Some of these problems have been solved after the recent years of political co-ordination between the countries, but the local tax authorities have difficulties implementing the complex rules for cross-border taxation. A second example is the growing imbalance in

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23 FIN-S Skargarden (0.1); FIN-S-N Kvarken-Mittskandia (0.86); Sweden-Norway (25.53); I-FR Alpes (23.01); Ireland-Northern Ireland (17.36); Ireland-Wales (3.49); Storstrom-Schleswig-Holstein (0.1); Italy-Switzerland (38.03); FIN-RUS South-East Finland (4.1); Slovakia-Czech Republic (68.65); Italy-Malta (15.63).

24 Lyck / Boye (2009).


26 The growing number of Swedes commuting in order to take advantage of the need for labour on the job market in Copenhagen and the higher salaries offered in Denmark, as well as an increased immigration of Danes to the south of Sweden, were essential factors in the traffic increase.
the municipal budgets since the flow of commuters is moving mostly in one direction (from the residential side in Sweden to the labour market side in Denmark). Rules of taxation have left municipalities in the Scania region with increased costs not covered by increased tax revenues from the growing commuter population mainly taxed in the country of employment. Although an agreement has been reached (compensation payments to Sweden) it does not solve the initial problem. A third example is the voting privilege, as Danes living on the Swedish side of the Øresund Region lose their right to vote in general elections in Denmark. Finally, also the lack of a single currency is somehow hampering a closer economic integration as both Sweden and Denmark maintain their own currencies (although both of them are accepted in some areas of the other country).27

The Øresund region displays the second largest population concentration in Europe north of Germany after St. Petersburg and is one of the most dynamic regions in Europe (and one that is developing rapidly). As an important location of economic activities in Scandinavia,28 the Øresund Region is home to many high-tech multi-national companies (Sony Ericsson, Tetra Pak, Novo Nordisk, Astra Zeneca etc.) and a large number of innovative SME’s. With the largest concentration of highly educated people in Northern Europe, it is literally sprinkled with world-class innovative environments29 and characterised by a well-developed working relationship between industry, higher education establishments and public authorities. Due to this, the INTERREG IIIA programme area Øresund does not show a significant level of cross-border economic disparities (i.e. the overall level of income disparities existing within the cross-border area).

Strong common historic ties and a shared culture exist in the Øresund programme area, but no common language is spoken on either side of the border. For a majority of the period from 800 to 1658, the Oresund Region was united under Denmark’s flag. With the Treaty of Roskilde signed in 1658, Scania became a part of Sweden. Since that time, the cross-border region has been divided up among two nations while sharing a common history and culture with initially only minor differences. These differences grew during the last three centuries, giving the Øresund two different profiles. Due to this, the Øresund strait constituted a mental barrier between the two countries up to the 20th century and only by the 1960’s, when Swedish-Danish co-operation increased, the positive effect of political co-operation was increasingly realised by both sides.30 After the opening of the fixed link in summer 2000, the two profiles were linked together again and the vision of a common future is growing. In recent years, an "Øresund identity" has been promoted in the cross-border region in order to counter-act various barriers to co-operation caused by nationalistic sentiments on both sides. Although Danish and Swedish are the two official languages in the Øresund Region, both of them are so similar that Swedes and Danes can understand one another when speaking their own language. Due to this, communication is far easier here than in other cross-border regions in Europe where two different languages meet. A closer linguistic integration of the non-Nordic immigrants living in Sweden and Denmark within the Øresund Region represents however still a challenge, especially if one wants to ensure that these permanent residents enjoy the same freedom of mobility in the cross-border area as Danes and Swedes.

The above-reviewed contextual factors were all generally relevant for highlighting the main characteristics of the INTERREG IIIA programme area. Yet, our analysis has however shown that

27 See: “Øresund Region”, from Wikipedia the free encyclopedia.
28 The Øresund Region generates a quarter of the combined GDP of Sweden and Denmark.
29 The Øresund Region encloses twelve universities, some of which are both large and internationally highly ranked (they are all linked together within the umbrella organization Øresund University), a number of science parks (one of them being the largest in Europe) and a number of other research and technology-transfer institutions.
30 Brune (2006)
INTERREG III ex-post evaluation. In-depth evaluation of the PROGRAMME: INTERREG IIIA ØRESUND (DENMARK – SWEDEN)

the level of importance of some factors such as the very limited degree of communicative permeability and the existence of two different languages needs to be biased in the light of the particular conditions prevailing in the cross-border area (i.e. existence of the Øresund Bridge & relative closeness the Danish & Swedish languages).

3.6 Re-considering the “depth & intensity of territorial co-operation”

Based upon the synthetic indicator concept developed in the Inception Report of this ex-post evaluation, the 1st Interim Report has determined a level of depth & intensity of territorial co-operation for each of the INTERREG III programmes considered (i.e. the “Real Rate”, measuring the programme-related co-operation performance) and realised an overall scale-placement of these programmes according to their Real Rate values achieved. Related to this, a regression analysis has been carried for exploring to what extent the INTERREG III-related co-operation performance would have been different if the influence of previous co-operation tradition and the maturity of this co-operation were taken into account (i.e. the “Expected Rate”). The actual “Real Rate” achieved by programmes was finally used as one indicator among others in the context of the ex-post evaluation’s wider taxonomy, which allocated INTERREG III programmes to one of the various categories under each Strand-specific typology.

By taking as point of departure the position of the INTERREG IIIA Øresund programme within the wider Stand-A typology, the following section will now re-consider its actual co-operation performance achieved and assess the influence of specific historical variables on this performance from a more programme-centred and comparative perspective.

The INTERREG III co-operation performance achieved

The programme Øresund forms part of a group of 12 programmes (3rd category of the Strand-A typology) which have achieved a level of depth & intensity of co-operation that is either high (6 programmes) or medium (5 programmes) and only in one case at low (South-East Finland: RR = 66.7). The Øresund programme is however only to some extent a “typical” representative of Category 3, as it shows the third highest Real Rate among all other programmes just after the programmes Ireland-Northern Ireland and Kvarken-Mittskandia (see overview table below).

A quick look at the component-results achieved at the level of the synthetic indicator points to three important factors which have most contributed to the high degree of co-operation performance achieved by the Øresund-programme (see overview table below):

- A very intense diagnosis of the shared needs / problem realised at the outset and a full reflection of this diagnosis in the initial Øresund programme strategy (Component 2): Within this context, the Øresund programme has together with the programme France-Italy (Alpes) a clearly leading position among the Category 3 programmes of the typology. The initial needs & problem diagnosis was elaborated on on the grounds of pre-existing and comprehensive cross-border spatial development concepts covering the entire programme area (i.e. results of previous INTERREG IIA projects, see above) and of a joint SWOT-analysis realised during the programme preparation.

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31 These factors are those where the Øresund programme has reached a component-level positioning equal or better than its RR positioning (3rd highest score or better). Results at a lower position but still above the component average are considered less important, while a score below the component average is seen as a weakness.
INTERREG III ex-post evaluation. In-depth evaluation of the PROGRAMME: INTERREG IIIA ØRESUND (DENMARK – SWEDEN)

phase. This SWOT-analysis involved a wide range of administrative and socio-economic stakeholders from the co-operation area and has served as a starting point for shaping the overriding objectives and strategy for increasing cross-border integration in the Øresund region. Due to this, a clear and logic link existed between the SWOT-analysis and the INTERREG IIIA programme strategy which addressed all (or most) of the important needs and problems identified. In the view of the mid-term evaluators, both the SWOT analysis and the programme strategy were still considered generally relevant in 2003. Yet, a number of weaknesses were also observed. The different measure-level objectives were not all on the same hierarchical level and a mixture of overall objectives and more measure-specific descriptions could be found. In addition, the financial allocations within the programme strategy did not fully reflect the priorities set which has – at the mid-term – resulted in the need to generate more interesting projects within Priority 1 (Administrative & physical structures) and Measure 2.2 (cross-border education & skills development).

- **The very high significance of joint projects** implemented under the Øresund programme (Component 5). This is also a distinct feature of the large majority of other Category 3 programmes and - in case the Øresund - a clear continuation of the trend which could already be observed under the INTERREG IIA programme. Due to the fact that all projects approved under the Øresund programme were truly joint projects, they also covered the entire total project cost / ERDF-contribution mobilised under the operational priorities & measures (excluding technical assistance). Although the mid-term evaluation observed that by 2002/2003 a relatively large part of the approved projects seemed to be pursued by only one partner, the evaluators also pointed out that in these cases this tends to be a cross-border organisation like the Øresund University or similar existing cross-border institutions.

- **A clearly above-average depth & intensity of co-operation achieved across all projects approved under the programme** (Component 4): The Øresund programme scores in fact in the first place among all Category 3 programmes, as an encoding error in the synthetic indicator database has lowered the actual result achieved.33 The actual ERDF-demand of projects approved under the Øresund programme matched only to 77% the initial ERDF-funding supply at the level of the various programme priorities and is therefore slightly below the indicator average of all Strand-A programmes (78%). On the opposite, however, one can observe a complete coverage of NUTS 3 programme areas by project partners (100%) as well as a very high level of complexity / sophistication and of experimentation / ambition of the co-operation actions implemented by all approved projects (i.e. 80%, if compared to the indicator average of 37% for all Strand-A programmes).

Although apparently less decisive in overall terms, **the Øresund programme has established an inclusive partnership deciding on the programme and set up a joint and fully decentralised programme management system** (Component 3, see also chapter 4.2.1 below): Compared to several other Category 3 programmes, the Øresund programme has only achieved a relatively modest component-level score (63, with component average at 61). While looking at the actual set up of the overall Øresund programme governance system, one can however be of the opinion that the programme

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32 Joint projects / operations are considered to be those projects / operations fully meeting at least three of the following four conditions: (1) A joint development of the project from the outset, (2) a joint staffing of the project, (3) a joint financing of the entire project and (4) a joint implementation of the envisaged project activities.

33 i.e. under SI 10 (share of programme NUTS 3 areas hosting one or more of the Lead Partners / Main Partners involved in all approved projects), the programme has actually achieved a score of 100% (see “Øresund fact sheet” elaborated under Task 2) instead of 44% which was the value transmitted by Task 2 for the database for the synthetic indicator.
was slightly "underscored" and could have reached an overall score of at least "70" or even "77" (thus ranging it at the 3rd or 2nd highest level of scoring). The Monitoring Committee (Overvågningskomité) included representatives from national, regional and local authorities as well as from the permanent cross-border structure in the Øresund which all had voting rights. Beyond that, also national/regional labour market authorities and representatives from equal opportunity and environmental organisations as well as the European Commission (as an observer) were represented on the MC. In addition, also a joint Steering Committee and an “INTERREG IIIA Working Group” had been set up for the Øresund programme. If compared to INTERREG IIA, the overall management & implementation system of the INTERREG IIIA programme had been further simplified and decentralised.

The Greater Copenhagen Authority in Denmark (Hovedstadsen Udviklingsråd, HUR) was acting as Managing Authority for the Interreg IIIA programme and had the overall responsibility for an effective and correct management and implementation of the programme. The role of the Paying Authority was ensured by the Swedish Business Development Agency (Verket för Näringslivsutveckling, NUTEK), which was responsible for receiving funds from the EU and for paying the funds to the project lead partners. Similar to INTERREG IIA, the Øresund Committee was again acting as the Joint Technical Secretariat being responsible - among other things - for contacts with potential applicants, programme guidance, handling applications as well as for providing recommendations to the Interreg IIIA Working Group and the Steering Committee. In addition, it carried out almost all tasks of the Managing Authority due to the fact that the Greater Copenhagen Authority has delegated them to the JTS. To provide the overall management & implementation with sufficient legal and procedural backing, a larger number of agreements34 were concluded between the involved member states and the wider programme partner authorities as well as between the programme management bodies (MA, PA, JTS) which facilitated the joint management process.

The below component-average score achieved by the Øresund programme under the final factor of the synthetic indicator assessing the impact of all projects at the level of the entire programme area (C 6) suggests that this aspect had been a certain weakness of the programme. This was to some extent already pin-pointed by the update of the mid-term evaluation in 2005, although the results achieved at this date were relatively good. The evaluators indicated that in some fields of action the targets will not be met without further efforts and that a continuous follow-up of critical projects was required to enhance possibilities in reaching the initial targets. In addition, it was also difficult to measure the effects of the programme at a regional level since there were no direct connections to regional indicators. Finally, also the target for the indicator cross-border interaction & development/upgrading of competencies ("gränsregional interaction – kompetensutveckling/utbildning") should be redefined since it was not connected to the purpose of projects related to this indicator. In the view of the programme "owners",35 the most important impact of the programme was the strengthening of the co-operation culture between relevant stakeholders in the programme area (through building up cross-border platforms & organisations) and a stronger integration of the co-operation topics / themes as defined in the programme strategy. On the opposite, however, the programme impact on social and economic cohesion of the programme area was only marginal as the Øresund programme did not have sufficient (financial) capacity to act as an instrument for creating jobs.

34 Agreement between the Kingdom of Denmark and that of Sweden concerning the implementation of the INTERREG programme. Agreement between the MA and all the partners concerning the implementation of the programme. Agreement between the HUR (MA) and the NUTEK (PA) concerning the financial management of the programme. Agreement of delegation of missions between the HUR (MA) and the Øresund Committee (JTS) concerning the management of the payment requests and their control.

35 See: web-survey among programme mangers, realised in the context of this ex-post evaluation.
**Degrees of depth & intensity of co-operation achieved by Category 3-programmes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme</th>
<th>RR value</th>
<th>Position in the wider RR-scale placement of all programmes</th>
<th>Components of the synthetic indicator determining the RR-result (****)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A19 IRE-UK Ireland-N. Ireland</td>
<td>84.07</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>C2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A2 FIN-S-N Kvarken-Mittskandia</td>
<td>83.42</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A32 DK-S – Oresund (*)</td>
<td>82.59</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A26 D-DK Storstrom-Schleswig-Holstein</td>
<td>81.30</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A16 I-FR Alpes</td>
<td>80.56</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A8 S-N Sweden-Norway</td>
<td>80.24</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A1 FIN-S Skargarden</td>
<td>78.18</td>
<td>medium</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A31 I-CH - Italy-Switzerland</td>
<td>77.22</td>
<td>medium</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A20 IRE-UK Ireland-Wales</td>
<td>74.52</td>
<td>medium</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A62 Italy-Malta (**)</td>
<td>73.23</td>
<td>medium</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A56 Slovakia-Czech Republic (****)</td>
<td>71.39</td>
<td>medium</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A44 FIN-EST – Finland-Estonia</td>
<td>52.69</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) A data encoding error occurred in the context of Component 4 (SI 10), wherefore the actual C4 result achieved is higher (86) and also the overall Real Rate of the programme (RR = 86).

(**) Data consistency check: The programme has probably achieved a much lower RR than the one calculated.

(***) The use of average values for filling data gaps (esp. values of SI 12-17) tends to increase the RR achieved.

(****) Weighted component-level result, with the following component-level averages calculated for all INTERREG III programmes considered: C2=71; C3=61; C4=62; C5=89; C6=68

Our above-realised in-depth assessment shows that the various topics addressed under the components of the synthetic indicator were all relevant for adequately assessing the “depth & intensity of territorial co-operation” of the Øresund programme. **Yet, one has to admit that our analysis especially of the project-level co-operation and of the programme governance system has allowed revealing a few shortcomings which allow concluding that the entire programme was slightly “underscored” and has actually achieved a Real Rate of at least 87.35.**

**The influence of previous co-operation tradition**

The result of the regression analysis shows that the Øresund programme belongs to the large group of 42 Strand-A programmes which achieved a depth & intensity of co-operation under INTERREG III (i.e. Real Rate) being more or less close to what could have been expected if historical variables had been taken into account (Expected Rate). This feature does not distinguish the Øresund programme from the other programmes belonging to Category 2 of the Strand-A typology, as – with the exception of the programme Finland-Estonia - they all form part of this larger group of Strand-A programmes (see overview table below).

Bearing in mind that the long-lasting co-operation tradition in the Øresund region has gained in intensity only during the INTERREG IIA programming period (1994-1999) while remaining at a rather moderate level of maturity also during the 2000-2006 period

[36] No new inter-state agreements adopted & no legal capacity up-grading of the existing co-operation structure realised.
Influence of historical variables under the Category 3-programmes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme</th>
<th>Residuals (RR – ER)</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I-FR (Alpes)</td>
<td>-8,08</td>
<td>RR is slightly above what could have been expected (ER)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIN-S-N Kvarken-Mittskandia</td>
<td>-7,64</td>
<td>RR is slightly above what could have been expected (ER)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-DK - Storstrom-Schleswig-Holstein</td>
<td>-6,55</td>
<td>RR is slightly above what could have been expected (ER)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-N Sweden-Norway</td>
<td>-2,80</td>
<td>RR is slightly above what could have been expected (ER)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRE-UK Ireland-Wales</td>
<td>-1,09</td>
<td>RR is slightly above what could have been expected (ER)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRE-UK Ireland-N. Ireland</td>
<td>-0,23</td>
<td>RR is slightly above what could have been expected (ER)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIN-S Skargarden</td>
<td>-0,08</td>
<td>RR is slightly above what could have been expected (ER)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK-S – Øresund</td>
<td>0,13</td>
<td>RR is slightly below what could have been expected (ER)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy-Malta</td>
<td>2,52</td>
<td>RR is slightly below what could have been expected (ER)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-CH - Italy-Switzerland</td>
<td>2,86</td>
<td>RR is slightly below what could have been expected (ER)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIN-RUS South-East Finland</td>
<td>9,78</td>
<td>RR is slightly below what could have been expected (ER)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIN-EST - Finland-Estonia</td>
<td>11,80</td>
<td>RR is clearly below what could have been expected (ER)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.7 Main factors fostering or hampering cross-border co-operation under INTERREG III

Based upon the previous analytical results (see: 3.4 & 3.5), we will now briefly summarise in an aggregated way which factors were most decisive in fostering or hampering cross-border co-operation in the Øresund area during the 2000-2006 funding period.

The apparently less-favourable framework conditions for cross-border territorial integration prevailing in the Øresund area have not at all hampered cross-border co-operation under the INTERREG IIIA programme. On the contrary, the context factors can even be considered the most important drivers which have fostered co-operation under INTERREG III. The opening of the fixed link across the politically open EU-internal maritime border in 2000 directly connects Copenhagen with Malmö and has generated new socio-economic development trends which were – in an anticipatory way – already explored through comprehensive cross-border spatial development concepts (i.e. previous INTERREG IIA projects) and pro-actively addressed through a thematic widening of INTERREG IIIA programme strategy. This has – at project-level – led to a further deepening of already existing topical co-operation initiatives (e.g. high-tech co-operation; cross-border education & skills development, joint strategic planning) and the launching of new co-operation projects (e.g. cross-border labour market, increasing migration & needs for social integration). The strong common historic ties and the shared culture existing in the Øresund area as well as the high similarity between the Danish and Swedish languages were also important factors fostering cross-border co-operation. They motivated the programme partners to integrate specific priorities/measures stimulating a stronger socio-cultural integration of the Øresund area, which allowed supporting topical cross-border projects and the establishment of permanent networks furthering the emergence of an “Øresund identity”.

Important factors fostering co-operation under the INTERREG IIIA programme have also been the very successful first generation of co-operation projects supported under INTERREG IIA and – on ground of this - the further deepening and widening of project-level co-operation during the 2000-2006 programming period. All projects approved under the INTERREG IIIA programme Øresund were truly joint projects completely covering the eligible NUTS 3 areas of the programme, which were also characterised by a very high level of complexity, sophistication, experimentation and ambition. A further supportive element was the establishment of an inclusive partnership deciding on the INTERREG IIIA programme and the set up of a joint / fully decentralised programme management system which continued to involve in a prominent role an already existing permanent cross-border structure (i.e. the Øresund Committee acting as JTS and de facto also as MA). This overall management system was
provided with sufficient legal and procedural backing through the conclusion of a larger number of agreements between the strategic programme partners, which have facilitated the joint day-to-day programme management process. Seen as a whole, the wider INTERREG IIIA co-operation performance achieved under the Øresund programme can be characterised by “stagnating continuity at a high level of depth & intensity of co-operation”.

Persisting differences between the institutional and regulatory systems in Denmark and Sweden meeting at the common border do however still create obstacles for deeper cross-border integration and partly also for a more intense cross-border co-operation. Diverging national legal frameworks and a lack of transparency and co-ordination in fields such as cross-border taxation, social security, pension and unemployment benefits or civic rights often hamper a more intense cross-border living and working of the population in the Øresund area. Also the lack of a single currency is somehow hampering a closer economic integration, although both currencies existing in Sweden and Denmark are accepted in some areas of the other country. These differences are however not automatically an obstacle for cross-border co-operation, as they have motivated stakeholders in the Øresund area to implement solutions which help overcoming or at least “bridging” these differences. More important in this respect is however the persistence of relatively weak general legal framework conditions for decentralised cross-border co-operation between Sweden and Denmark, as they did not allow to substantially up-grade the maturity (legal capacity) of general cross-border co-operation as well as of the INTERREG IIIA programme-related co-operation beyond what has been existed since the establishment of the Øresund Committee in 1993.

In the following overview table below, we have finally identified for each context-related factor and for each historical factor the concrete effects they had on strategic and project level co-operation under the INTERREG III programme.
### Determining Factor: Topographic / Geographical Nature of the Common Border

- **Operations and Prior Existence of Instruments**: The status as maritime border which is however crossed by a fixed link (opened in 2000) has significantly increased the overall permeability of the border and strongly facilitated the thematic widening of programme-level co-operation in the Øresund area.

- **Historic Factors Determining Cross-Border Co-operation**: The specific features of the border (maritime border & opening of a fixed link between Copenhagen & Malmö) generated new socio-economic trends which were addressed by new topical co-operation projects under the programme (e.g. cross-border labour market, increasing migration & needs for social integration).

### Determining Factor: Political / Administrative Nature of the Common Border

- **Operations and Prior Existence of Instruments**: EU-internal border status generally facilitates programme-level co-operation, but persisting administrative / regulatory differences between Denmark & Sweden sometimes hindered strategic co-operation and/or required a pro-active tackling through the programme.

- **Historic Factors Determining Cross-Border Co-operation**: EU-internal border status generally facilitates project-level co-operation, but persisting administrative / regulatory differences between Denmark & Sweden have led to the implementation of projects further strengthening the degree of socio-economic integration (i.e. co-operation among businesses & growth sectors or knowledge / scientific potentials; making the common cross-border labour market a functional reality) and fostering the overall degree of cross-border socio-cultural integration.

### Determining Factor: Density of Border Crossing Possibilities

- **Operations and Prior Existence of Instruments**: The apparently limited degree of communicative permeability of the border has been changed with the opening of the Øresund Bridge, which has become a major facilitator for exchanges among both sides of the border. This has strongly facilitated the thematic widening of programme-level co-operation in the Øresund area.

- **Historic Factors Determining Cross-Border Co-operation**: The specific features of the border (maritime border & opening of a fixed link between Copenhagen & Malmö) generated new socio-economic trends which were addressed by new topical co-operation projects under the programme (e.g. cross-border labour market, increasing migration & needs for social integration).

### Determining Factor: Cross-Border Income-Level Disparities

- **Operations and Prior Existence of Instruments**: No significant cross-border income-level disparities did exist in the Øresund area, wherefore this factor did neither enhance nor hamper programme-level co-operation.

- **Historic Factors Determining Cross-Border Co-operation**: No significant cross-border income-level disparities did exist in the Øresund area, wherefore this factor did neither enhance nor hamper project-level co-operation.

### Determining Factor: Existence of Historic Ties & Converging Cultural / Linguistic Circumstances

- **Operations and Prior Existence of Instruments**: Existence of historic/cultural ties & strong similarity of Nordic languages facilitated programme-level co-operation and motivated the partners to integrate specific priorities/measures for addressing issues related to the socio-cultural integration of the Øresund area.

- **Historic Factors Determining Cross-Border Co-operation**: Existence of historic/cultural ties & strong similarity of Nordic languages facilitated project-level co-operation and motivated regional/local stakeholders to launch topical ad-hoc co-operation and/or to establish permanent networks furthering the socio-cultural integration of the Øresund area.

### Historic Factors Determining Cross-Border Co-operation

- **Previous Co-operation Tradition**: The co-operation tradition in the Øresund area is very long, but co-operation has become more intense only during the previous INTERREG programme (1994-1999). The joint management of the previous programme has created a substantial stock of mutual experiences and trust among the strategic programme partners, which has facilitated a further decentralisation and truly cross-border management of the INTERREG III programme.

- **Prior Existence of Specific Legal Instruments**: The co-operation tradition in the Øresund area is very long, but project-level co-operation has become more intense only during the previous INTERREG programme (1994-1999). Topic-focussed cross-border co-operation initiatives which were already durable continued to initiate projects under INTERREG IIIA and a further deepening & widening of thematic project-level co-operation started under INTERREG IIIA has taken place due to the changed overall framework conditions (high-tech; cross-border labour market; education & skills development, strategic planning).

- **Prior Existence of Permanent Co-operation Structures**: Existence of historic/cultural ties & strong similarity of Nordic languages facilitated project-level co-operation and motivated regional/local stakeholders to launch topical ad-hoc co-operation and/or to establish permanent networks furthering the socio-cultural integration of the Øresund area.

- **Prior Existence of Permanent Co-operation Structures**: The Øresund Committee established in 1993 has played a major role in the elaboration of previous INTERREG programmes and ensured also the respective JTS-function. The positive experiences made with this have laid the foundations for its continuous involvement in the INTERREG IIIA programme management during the 2000-2006 period, however without further up-grading its legal capacity.

- **Historic Factors Determining Cross-Border Co-operation**: Existence of historic/cultural ties & strong similarity of Nordic languages facilitated project-level co-operation and motivated regional/local stakeholders to launch topical ad-hoc co-operation and/or to establish permanent networks furthering the socio-cultural integration of the Øresund area.
4 In-depth analysis of results and impacts in terms of utility and efficiency – Interreg IIIA Øresund

4.1 The external coherence of the programme

Regulatory compliance and interaction / co-ordination with other Structural Funds programmes

The Øresund programme and the supra-national as well as the trans-national policy context

The Øresund programme belongs to Strand A of the Interreg programmes. The programming documents make extensive references to the original regulatory and policy documents. In chapter 14 of the central programme document the management of the programme is explicitly linked to the general Structural Funds regulations 1260/1999, 1783/1999, 1784/1999 and 1257/1999 as well as national rules and regulations both in Denmark and Sweden.

The Programme Complement makes extensive referrals to the SF regulation 1260/1999 (article 46) and 1159/2000 in describing the information activities of the programme, and confirms that the provisions of EU regulations 438/2001, 448/2001 and 1681/94 are to be followed in the project management process.

The programme’s interaction with the Commission did not display any problems with the content of the programme. There was, however some discussions with the Commission concerning the Danish audit system. Differences in Danish and Swedish national laws did eventually cause some deviations in the operation of the Interreg IIIA Øresund programme in 2003. Diverging Swedish and Danish interpretations on how the Commission’s regulations should be interpreted briefly delayed the programme’s operations for parts of that year:

A system audit of the MA and the JTS was carried out for the Interreg IIIA Øresund programme in February 2003. The interpretation of the Danish auditor differed from the interpretation of the Swedish auditor on how the regulation (1685) concerning eligible costs should be addressed. The different interpretations concerned additionality, the lead partner principle and payments. As a result of this audit, the programme was effectively closed for four months, as the two member states were unable to resolve these differences. Only after the intervention of the Commission did it become possible to re-open the programme.

At the time of terminating the programme the so-called Article 13 report concluded, that the first level financial control had not been satisfactory. From the beginning of the programme and to the end of 2006 the failure rate had been 22,1 pct. For 2007 two projects had been submitted to financial control at level two and both projects had severe faults. Following the very critical financial auditing report a major revision of project approvals was undertaken and just for one project INTERREG-support was reduced by approximately 450.000 EUR. Extra financial control has been implemented and a follow-up report has been submitted to the Commission who has so far suspended the final payment to the programme.
Coherence with other Interreg programmes (including ESPON and InterACT)
The Øresund programme has benefited from extensive interactions both with other Nordic Interreg IIIA programmes (Norway Sweden, Kvarken-Mittskandia, Skärgården, North), as well as with Interreg programmes covering DK-DE cross-border areas, in particular with the Interreg IIIA Fyn-K.E.R.N programme. The interactions between other Danish and Swedish Interreg partners has been structured and well coordinated, and has been deepened into the Interreg IVA programming period. There has been extensive interactions with the JTS in other Danish and Swedish Interreg programmes in order to improve on administrative routines.

Interactions and coordination of activities with InterACT has been beneficial for the performance of the Øresund programme as well, whereas the Øresund programme has collaborated with ESPON only to a very limited extent.

Coherence with other EU policy interventions
The Øresund programme only had limited institutional and conceptual interactions with other CI’s (URBAN, LEADER, EQUAL). More extensive contacts were established with Objective 2 programmes covering the same programme areas as those covered in the IIIA Øresund programme (Obj. 2 Södra in Sweden and several subprogrammes of the Danish Obj. 2 programme). The Obj. 2 programme areas were also represented in the Øresund Committee, a representation which ensure inter-institutional relations between the SF and Interreg programmes mentioned:

Inter-institutional relations and contacts with external organizations and networks
In the Øresund region, there is a plausible association between the age of the existing co-operation and the maturity, depth and intensity of the cross-border cooperation currently being achieved:

The Swedish part of the Øresund IIIA programme, the Scania (Skåne) landscape, was historically a part of the Danish kingdom. Except for a brief stint as Swedish in 1332-1360, Scania (Skåne) became Swedish as relatively recently as 1658. There has been a somewhat negative conception of Swedes in Denmark ever since (Knowles and Mathiessen 2009).

The vision of Øresund as a cross-border regionalization project took on a concrete form with the establishment of the Øresund council (Øresundsrådet) in 1964. The objective of the council was to promote increased integration between Sweden and Denmark. In 1981 the Nordic Council of Ministers initiated ØresundsKontakt, a network aiming at deepening relations between media and commercial interests across the Danish-Swedish border in the Øresund region. Trade and commerce was increasingly taking the lead in developing cross-border contacts (Erlingsson 2001). In 1993 the Øresund Committee was established, replacing the prior organizations Øresundsrådet and ØresundsKontakt.

The Øresund Committee is comprised of regional authority administrators as well as politicians. The committee represents 33 Swedish municipalities, county councils and the Swedish province of Skåne as well as 30 Danish municipalities and the county authorities from the Greater Copenhagen region on the Danish side. As a consequence of Swedish regional experimentation initiatives, the new regional association of Skåne took the place of the Swedish county councils in the Øresund Committee in 1998.
The Swedish and Danish governments participate with observer status only. The Øresund Committee is taking on an increasing role in relation to research, culture, education, the environment and labour market integration issues. Currently, the Øresund committee is manned with a secretariat employing >20 persons. The Interreg IIIA Øresund programme JTS was an integrated part of the Øresund Committee, as is the JTS of the Interreg IVA Øresund sub-programme.

The Øresund Committee is typically analysed as a network organization with strong regional ties to political spheres both locally, regionally as well as nationally (Maskell and Törnqvist 1999). There are a number of formal cross-border networks and associations operating in the Øresund region:

- Øresund Science region (an umbrella organisation for Medicon Valley Academy, Øresund Food Network, Øresund IT Academy and Øresund Environment)
  - Medicon Valley Academy (a network organisation joining both HEIs and private companies)
  - Øresund IT Academy
  - Øresund Food Network
  - Øresund Environment
- Øresund Labour Market Council (established in 1997 to coordinate labour market integration issues)
- Øresund Chamber of Commerce (a joint venture between the Danish and Swedish sister organizations)
- Øresund University (an institutional network/federation of 12 Øresund higher education institutions)

These cross-border networks and associations have been – and remain till this day – central project level agents in the Interreg II, III and IVA programmes.

However, lately we have seen the publication of several academic studies of how trans-regional identities are being constructed in Øresund cross-border co-operation initiatives (Ek 2003, Falkheimer 2004, Hall 2008). A common observation made in these studies has been that so far, Øresund cross-border co-operation initiatives still remain to be thoroughly embedded amongst the general public. In general, cross-border partnerships are characterized "by neither wide-spread public inclusion, nor private or NGO participation, but by public sector institutions networking with each other" (Hall 2008: 432). This is an observation echoed by the Øresund JTS in describing the project partnerships, and particularly who were the leads of these partnerships, in the Øresund IIIA programme. Here, the established cross-border networks and associations described above continue to figure prominently.

This might be interpreted as the Interreg IIIA Øresund having been somewhat of a top-down programme. However, the JTS maintained that this has not been their impression. Rather, the programme should be perceived of as a maturing project by itself – although adhering to a somewhat peculiar funding scheme.

**Conclusion**

The INTERREG IIIA Øresund Programme has been thoroughly embedded in the general Structural Funds regulations as well as national rules and regulations both in Denmark and Sweden. At the implementation of the programme, however, auditors from Denmark and Sweden displayed different interpretations of addiationality, the lead partner principle and payments. The dispute delayed the implementation of the programme for some time but was eventually resolved after intervention by the Commission. After the initial disputes, however, the programme was implemented according to the letter
of regulation and in the spirit of the political debate in 1999/2000. Only minor deviations occurred during the programme cycle as reflections of the mid-term evaluation and the update of the mid-term evaluation. However, at the end of the programme it has been revealed that financial control at the first level has not been adequate and the final payment from the Commission has accordingly been suspended so far.

Between the Nordic INTERREG IIIA programmes interactions has been intensive as well as with INTERREG programmes covering the Danish-German cross border areas. Interactions have improved administrative routines and cooperation has deepened into the INTEREG IVA programme. Interactions and coordination of activities with InterACT has been beneficial for the performance of the Øresund programme as well, while cooperation with ESPON has been limited.

The Øresund programme only had limited institutional and conceptual interactions with other CI’s (URBAN, LEADER, EQUAL). More extensive contacts were established with Objective 2 programmes covering the same programme areas as those covered in the IIIA Øresund programme (Obj. 2 Södra in Sweden and several subprogrammes of the Danish Obj. 2 programme). The Obj. 2 programme areas were also represented in the Øresund Committee, a representation which ensures inter-institutional relations between the SF and Interreg programmes previously mentioned.

With the JTS being a part of the Øresund Committee, a general CBC organisation, it has been somewhat difficult for the general public to separate the INTERREG activities from the general activities of the Øresund Committee. Differences in national legislation and responsible national authorities have continued to create inter-institutional operational uncertainties.

Øresund cross-border cooperation initiatives are locally and regionally still perceived of as something of an elite regional branding project. This is mainly due to the fact that the main promoters of these initiatives are local and regional public authorities. The local interest in CBC is also somewhat stronger on the Swedish than on the Danish side. Public co-financing rules, which prohibit private co-funding from being matched with ERDF funding, prevented private partners from any systematic presence in the programme. Some observers, however, state that a trans-regional identity is slowly emerging thanks to the cross-border co-operation programmes. In time the perception of the INTERREG programmes might slowly evolve from a somewhat top-down programme into a bottom-up programme facilitating the maturing of cross-border cooperation into mainstream development of the region.

4.2 The intrinsic performance of the programme

The overall governance and management system of the programme

The overall governance system and management modes of the programme

The Programme Monitoring Committee consisted of 17 members representing different Danish and Swedish interests. The leadership of the MC rotated on an annual basis between Denmark and Sweden.

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<th>Swedish representatives</th>
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INTERREG III ex-post evaluation. In-depth evaluation of the PROGRAMME: INTERREG IIIA ØRESUND (DENMARK – SWEDEN)

The Monitoring Committee constituted a well-developed partnership, although only those representing public sector agents, and those representing cross-border structures did have voting rights. Economic and social partners did not.

The main tasks of the MC were to make decisions with regard to the Programme Complement, including the physical and financial indicators of the programme. The MC was thus instrumental in setting up the monitoring system of the programme. In addition, the MC had to confirm revisions to the programme complement. The MC also monitored and evaluated the progress of the programme, and assessed the annual reports of the programme before they were forwarded to the Commission.

In addition to a Monitoring Committee, the Interreg IIIA Øresund programme also operated with an interregional decision-making body (interregional beslutningsgruppe) whose main task was to assess project applications and decide upon whether applications should receive ERDF funding or not. These decisions were based on the consensus principle.

The Interreg secretariat of the Øresund Committee acted as the JTS of the Interreg IIIA Øresund programme. The JTS acted as a node between project partners and actors engaged in the programme. Located in Copenhagen, the JTS included both Danish and Swedish administrative staff. From the start of the programme, the Development Council of Greater Copenhagen (Hovedstadsregionens Udviklingsråd – HUR), established in 2000 and thus with no prior relational or institutional link to Øresund CBC organisations, acted as the MA. Danish national legislation had to be altered to enable HUR to take on the MA task.

Following the 2006 Danish regional structural reform, HUR was dissolved on January 1st, 2007. The formal role of the MA was then transferred to a Danish government agency, the Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority (EBST). The EBST formally outsourced a considerable amount of the MA tasks to the Øresund Committee.

The MTE evaluators of the Interreg III A Øresund programme noted that the fact that the programme secretariat is based in the Øresund Committee awarded the Interreg programme a strong link to many other integration efforts in the region. In this way, a rapid uptake of Interreg initiatives was initially assured. The MA and JTS programme management structure have for all practical purposes become gradually more integrated over the course of the programme, so as to comply with the EC requirement that the Interreg programme governance and management system be located with a regional authority or regional authority.

The PA was less integrated, as the PA of the programme was originally with NUTEK (Swedish Agency for Economic and Regional Growth). Following the overhaul of the Swedish regional development state agencies on April 1st, 2009, NUTEK was dissolved and the PA was transferred to a new state agency, Tillväxtverket (which maintains the English name Swedish Agency for Economic and Regional Growth). The reorganisation and relocation of NUTEK started in 2007/08. As a consequence, the programme was somewhat delayed and PA was also relocated from Stockholm to Östersund, in Northern Sweden.
The overall costs of the programme management system was budgeted at €2,64 million\textsuperscript{37}. The actual management costs of the programme amounted to €1,73 million, which equals to 6.04% of total programme costs.

**The joint financial management system**

The financial management system of the Øresund programme conformed with the requirement that ERDF funding should be transferred to a single bank account – in this case the account of the Swedish Riksbank in Deutsche Bank. National co-financing was up to each project. Neither Denmark nor Sweden had national co-funding earmarked for the programme. Instead, all the local, regional and national project partners were required to document co-financing. This requirement was put in place to ensure a strong local and regional embeddedness of the Øresund programme.

The MA (HUR) and the PA (NUTEK) had a signed agreement which regulated the functional relations between the Managing Authority and the Paying Authority of the Øresund programme. The agreement was formalised in 2001.

A formal requirement in the financial management of the projects was that at least 20% of co-funding should be contributed by partners in each country. The efficiency of the financial management of the programme has been somewhat reduced by the n+2 provisions. Significant administrative resources were devoted to assure continuous financial progress of projects (in terms of ERDF payments), whereas less resources could be devoted by the JTS to assure that the qualitative outcome and results of the projects progressed satisfactorily. As a matter of principle, the n+2 provisions were monitored continuously by the JTS.

**The project selection process**

The project appraisal and selection procedure was to a large extent an assessment process based on a list of clear and weighed selection criteria, formalised in an assessment manual. To some extent, the project applicants were provided with information on the rules and scoring scale, and on the weight given to the various criteria.

The JTS applied a set of formal of legal and technical selection criteria. In addition, a set of general qualitative were also applied on all project applications. Separate selection criteria addressed large projects (with a total ERDF co-funding requirement surpassing €1,1 million). Specific selection criteria were used to assess project applications that could be considered complementary to or extensions of previous (IIA) projects.

Thus, the project selection process was formalised and highly predictable. The assessments undertaken by the JTS were robust, so that the final decisions made by the regional decision-making body were subject to little debate. Due to the formal limitations to private participation in the programme, the partnership principle was only to a very limited extent an aspect of the decision-making process.

\textsuperscript{37} All financial information provided in this study is based on a €=9 SEK exchange rate.
The JTS acted proactively during the programme to improve the project selection and appraisal procedure and to inform prospective applicants systematically about formal project requirements during the programming period. In 2004 the JTS arranged a ‘half-way’ conference in order to provide for knowledge transfer and learning across projects, and to stimulate new project ideas. There were 130 participants at this event.

A particular practice of the Interreg IIIA Øresund programme was instead the launching of a set of ‘Innovation projects’, projects that helped project partners start regular projects. This opportunity made it possible for less experience project partners to seek out and test new ways of cooperating. This phasing-in of projects into the main project portfolio provided for a gradual widening of the scope of projects which started as pilot projects. Innovation projects followed a simpler application procedure, and were small-scale activities. Innovation project applications were assessed and decided upon by the JTS. Innovation projects were applied in particular to mobilise and create interest in cross-border cooperation amongst agents in the educational system.

During 2002-2006 the programme had an average of four annual calls each year, two in the spring and two in the autumn. The deadline of the first call was set to February 1st, 2002, while the deadline of the last call was December 15th, 2006. In total the programme received 229 project applications, of which 116 regular project applications were funded and 26 innovation project applications received ERDF funding. In average, 54% of all (regular) project applications were funded, while 82% of all innovation project applications were funded.

The projects funded were distributed across nine major themes: regional analyses and physical planning (16 projects), environment, energy and maritime issues (14 projects), public health, security and emergencies (7 projects), business development and entrepreneurship (7 projects), innovation and RTD (12 projects), information and education (19 projects), competence development and labour market issues (16 projects), culture, media and civic society (12 projects) and tourism/regional marketing (13 projects).
The programme monitoring system

The InterAct study of the Øresund programme\textsuperscript{38} pointed out that some legal aspects of the programme organisation made project monitoring somewhat inefficient: “Danish national law is technically more cumbersome than Swedish law. In addition, the diverging legal traditions in the two countries affect the controlling efforts since these are performed ‘nationally’, in other words, they are done in the national tradition, and Swedish and Danish projects are therefore monitored differently”. (p.9)

Recommendations from the interim evaluators concerning improvements to the indicator/monitoring systems were not put into practice, but rather applied in the preparation of the IVA Øresund programme.

The programme evaluation system

The use of innovation projects in order to allow project partnerships to find new ways of cooperating was a speciality of the Øresund programme identified in the Interact 2005 study. The MTE of the Interreg IIIA programme did not address this issue in particular, neither did the MTE Update.

Ad-hoc studies were not commissioned in order to ensure the quality of the programme and its implementation, but the Øresund Committee produced a 2003 position paper with proposals for programme improvements in the IV programme period, pointing out observed shortcomings of and challenges to the management and administration of the Interreg IIIA Øresund programme.\textsuperscript{39}

Conclusion

Formal cooperation across the Danish-Swedish border dates back to 1964 and has been gradually deepened ever since. The INTERREG programmes have been a continuation of a long historical process and have contributed to even deeper formal cooperation. The monitoring and decision-making bodies have been well-structured and well-functioning while the challenges mainly occurred on a management level due to differences in national laws and administrative cultures.

The instruments of cooperation were partly formal contractual instruments assuring the mutual communication between the MA and PA. Partly, a significant presence of network / umbrella organisations in the various project partnerships of the programme ensured informal vertical and horizontal communication across administrative levels (and to a somewhat lesser extent across different sectors). Members of the monitoring committee were well represented in other, well-established cross-border cooperation structures, although reforms in the Danish regional administrative structure 2007 have later made it necessary to reconstruct many of the cross-border co-operation structures.

The monitoring and evaluation systems adhered to the formal requirements of the Structural Funds and recommendations from the mid-term evaluation as well as from the update of the mid-term evaluation were seriously taken into consideration and applied. The monitoring system, however, tended to overemphasis qualitative indicators at the activity level rather than result indicators.

With the exception of a 4-month period in 2003, in which no new projects were approved, the joint financial management of the programme was effective. Neither the MTE nor the MTE update reported

\textsuperscript{38} Interact (2005); Programme summary of the Øresund region – Interreg IIIA programme.

\textsuperscript{39} Øresund Committee (2003) Interreg A after 2006 – examples and proposals from the Øresund Committee (October). Mimeo, 11 pages.
shortcomings in the decision-making procedures, although following up on ERDF financial rules is perceived of as something of a complicating factor in the JTS.

With four calls for proposals practiced annually, a continuous selection of projects was assured. There was a steady inflow of new applications through the whole programme period. Towards the end of the programming period, the selection process became stricter (more project applications were rejected) due to the increasingly limited availability of ERDF funds.

In a region already with extensive cross-border collaboration activities and well-established cooperation networks, Interreg has become a complement which contributes to a more rapid deployment of planned CB cooperation endeavours.

The programme monitoring system does not allow for a quantitative assessment of long-term effects and impacts, a significant number of the project partnerships have proved sustainable beyond the project period itself.

The programme did not undergo any financial reallocations of funding during the programme period. There was no need to change the strategic orientation of the programme, as it was organised in three general cross-cutting themes from the outset. A significant part of the projects in the overall sample were extensions or complements to previous projects. In this sense, the projects were sustainable as the involved project partnerships with a well-established core of organisational or institutional participants. A major output of the project activities was formalised collaborations or the establishment of task-specific cross-border collaborations (such as triple helix networks).

Pending the financial closure of the Interreg IIIA Øresund programme, the least financially successful cooperation projects appear to be some of the financially large tourism/regional branding flagship projects. The most durable co-operation endeavours appear to be those that have cross-border network organisations as lead partners or as prominent members of the project partnerships. They are engaged in multiple projects and are able to reap synergies from project activities even without SF support.
5 Overall final conclusions and policy recommendations

5.1 Overall final conclusions on the impact of the INTERREG III programme

The cross-border cooperation in the Øresund area has a very long track record. With 36 years of cross-border cooperation it is the third longest cooperation tradition among all INTEREG III programmes. At the same time it is a cross-border cooperation characterized by a maritime division of Denmark and Sweden. Before the Øresund bridge was constructed travelling time between the two countries took between more than an hour in the centre of the region, including check-in time for ferries, and half an hour in the North of the region. Further, the cross-border cooperation was supported by relatively weak interstate agreements and support. Accordingly, the overall depth and intensity of the Interreg III programme is ranked as being medium mature only. However, this less developed maturity of the Øresund programme is shared with most other INTERREG programmes under Category 3 of the Strand-A typology.

During the previous programme period (INTERREG IIA – 1994 – 1999) a number of significant initiatives were launched, first of all the Medicon Valley Academy and the Øresund University. In some respect these initiatives were “low hanging fruits” and as expected they proved successful and sustainable beyond the programme period. It also means that there were less “low hanging fruits” to be picked in the following programme period.

The period 2000 – 2006 and the INTEREG IIIa programme were first of all characterized by the opening of the Øresund Bridge in year 2000. High expectations were associated with the increased border crossing possibilities but in reality commuting only increased slowly. Today, however, the Bridge carries 70,000 people by car or train on a daily basis. In 2007 the bridge was used by 9.7 million train passengers and 9.2 million vehicles.

Copenhagen Economics, which has been trailing integration efforts in the Øresund cross-border region by publishing an Øresund Integration Index annually since 2001, note that the cross-border integration in the Øresund area has been deepening continuously between 2001-2008, albeit with a slower pace or even a momentary decline in some years:

| Øresund integration index 2001-2008 (100=full integration, no cross-border barriers) |
|-----------------------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Labour market                                | 2001     | 2002     | 2003     | 2004     | 2005     | 2006     | 2007     | 2008     |
| Traffic                                      | 32       | 45       | 48       | 56       | 72       |          |          |          |
| Trade and commerce                           |          |          | 52       | 66       | 71       | 76       | 81       |          |
| Service costs                                |          |          |          | 55       | 53       | 56       | 49       |          |
| Øresund total                                |          |          |          | 86       | 81       | 83       | 83       | 85       |
| Danish Øresund                               | 53       | 57       | 56       | 59       | 62       | 64       | 68       | 72       |
| Swedish Øresund                              | 50       | 55       | 55       | 58       | 60       | 62       | 68       | 73       |

Source: Copenhagen Economics (June 2008)
In particular, it appears that the effort to reduce cross-border barriers to trade and commerce has lost some steam in recent years, whereas effort to create a more functionally integrated region (labor market and transportation integration) remains very much in focus. Whereas integration efforts were greater on the Swedish side of the Øresund, the boost to reduce cross-border integration barriers have been more manifest in Danish Øresund in the last few years.

The Interreg IIIA Øresund programme is generally regarded as an ‘elite programme’ for public administration bodies. In the Interreg programme, public co-financing rules (where private co-funding does not qualify for matching ERDF funding) eliminate the direct involvement of private partners in the Øresund cross-border Interreg programme for all practical purposes. A relatively large part of the projects were pursued by only a single partner organization or –institution, which would indicate that the selection criteria for new projects did not fully correspond to the somewhat trans-national aspirations of the programme (NUTEK 2004b). The situation was not completely unilateral, in that in cases with only one main partner these tended to be cross-border network organizations such as the Øresund University or similar groupings.

At present differences between the institutional and regulatory systems in Denmark and Sweden still hampers cross-border cooperation. Diverging national legal frameworks and lack of transparency and coordination in fields such as cross-border taxation, social security, pension and unemployment benefits as well as civic rights limits the potential for a new lifestyle in the Region where companies can expand their markets, job-seekers can take up working in the neighbouring country, families can start new lives on the other side and students can follow courses at more than one university.

The INTEREG IIIa programme in the Øresund region over-achieved all of its priority topics. First of all, the development and improvement of administrative and physical structures over achieved by a factor two measured according to the performance indicators. Due to the opening of the Øresund Bridge and the increasing mobility the topic attracted natural attention. One of the actual projects with respect to cooperation in the legal and administrative fields regarded the establishment of a public database presenting basic Øresund statistical data. The perspective was to enable the Øresund Region to evolve into a functionally integrated cross-border region and comparative and coherent data describing the social and economic development was identified as one of the important prerequisites.

Developing the database was started during the INTERREG II programme and the two national Statistical offices continued their cooperation as a project under INTERREG III. Some of the achievements of the project were comparable and coherent statistics in the field of migration statistics, commuting, Household compositions, dwellings, professions/socioeconomic status, unemployment, labour market conditions, economic structures/entrepreneurship and wages/wage costs. Some of the fields were achievements did not succeed included the commuting/migration of students and prices.

Cooperation between the two national statistical offices continues after the programme period and comparable and coherent data are continuously published facilitating public authorities to improve integration and to reduce barriers to trade and movement of labour. Still, however, one of the important factors hampering integration in the region is actual differences in national legal frameworks and lack of transparency and coordination in fields such as cross-border taxation, social security, pension and unemployment benefits as well as civic rights. The national governments only support harmonization
efforts to a certain degree, but the implications of the lack of support has become more transparent due to the ongoing production of comparable statistics in the different fields.

With respect to development of cohesion and attractiveness, all indicators except one were overachieved. Second to the natural focus on mobility when opening the bridge in year 2000, attention centred on “low hanging fruits” such as cooperation of research, technological development, education, culture, communication, health and civic protection. One of the projects contributing to the development of cohesion was the Gateway Øresund – a shared portal for tertiary/professional education facilities in the Øresund region. The objective was to establish a web portal enabling visitors to acquire information on the supply of polytechnic education and to create and maintain cross-border contacts within the specific field of education.

The initiative was lead by ØresundDirekt and though the portal is still in place and is being updated on a regular basis ØresundDirekt plays a minor direct role today. Instead, ØresundDirekt now focuses on marketing the various education and training opportunities available to the youth in the region. One of the main lessons learned, now taken further into other projects in the region, is the importance of identifying and involving the beneficiaries of an initiative much earlier in the process.

With respect to development of an economically and socially functional region all indicators except one were overachieved. It seems, however, the projects in this area were less of the “low hanging fruits” compared to the other priority areas. A project, part of priority topic “Cooperation between citizens and institutions”, was FRIngo that should improve collaboration in the voluntary sector in Denmark and Sweden. The objectives of the project were to execute a survey on the interest of cross-border collaboration among municipalities, local associations and umbrella organisations in the Øresund region. The further objective was to create a web portal providing information on issues related to voluntary work in the region.

On its own ground the initiative was successful but a structural reform in Denmark in 2007 changed the landscape of municipalities so that many relations between NGO’s and municipalities had to be renewed. Also it seems that the type of organisations involved from the voluntary sector were less experienced with the formal set-up of the INTERREG programme including the reporting requirements.

In conclusion the Øresund region evolved from the original definition of the INTERREG III programme to the execution and later termination of the programme. The opening of the Øresund Bridge in year 2000 marked an important step in the development of the region and focus naturally centred on mobility related issues. Second in focus came “low hanging fruits”, such as increased cooperation in the field of research and education. Projects within these areas naturally achieved important results and impacts were notably and important. In other areas, not yet in focus, results were achieved and projects reached their measurable goals. Impact, however, was seemingly less than in the areas of focus. In contrast the financial management of the programme has been less successful. The first level of financial control displayed severe faults and at present the final payment from the Commission to the Interreg IIIA programme has been suspended.
5.2 Short- and medium-term policy recommendations

The INTERREG IV A programme is first characterized by an enlarged geographical scope compared to INTERREG III A. Even with the more narrow geographical scope in INTERREG III A it turned out to be difficult to involve the more remote parts of the region and it is fair to anticipate that the challenges of involving the whole region increases by the geographical scope. Accordingly, it is recommended to pay extra attention to the involvement of the remote parts of the region in the cross-border cooperation projects. Involvement of remote regions might be facilitated by specific marketing efforts, by favouring proposals involving remote parts of the region (on the prerequisite that all other requirements are met satisfactory) and by proactive efforts in raising awareness of specific project opportunities.

In the case of the Øresund region there is a natural centre including Copenhagen and Malmö. Strength, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) in the centre are most likely different from those in the remote parts of the region. A SWOT analysis has been executed for the region as a whole and another recommendation is to perform a SWOT analysis specifically for the remote parts of the region. A SWOT analysis, that could identify areas for specific cross-border projects between remote parts of the region and raise awareness among the relevant municipalities and institutions.

Another lesson learned from the INTERREG IIIa programme is the importance of support from the National Governments. The National Government support has not been strong during the INTERREG IIIa programme period leaving still a number of barriers for cross-border cooperation to hamper actual integration. Barriers such as diverging national legal frameworks and lack of transparency and coordination in fields such as cross-border taxation, social security, pension and unemployment benefits as well as civic rights can not be reduced without active involvement of the respective National Governments. Accordingly, a third recommendation in the short- and medium-term is to involve the National Governments in e.g. analysis of the benefits of removing or reducing one or more of the barriers in question. Another approach is to favour pilot-projects that on an experimental basis define liberal conditions for a limited time-period for specific segments of the region or for specific target groups of the inhabitants in order to gain experience of the effects of a more general removal of barriers.

Turning to the priority topics of INTERREG IVC lessons from the INTERREG IIIA has clearly been carried further and implemented in the phrasing of the new topics. The overall objectives of the INTERREG IVC programme are increased economic growth, integration of the Region and increased integration of everyday activities.

The priority topics align with the development of the policy focus in the region from mobility and cooperation in the fields of research and higher education to the integration of commercialisation, industry and business and further to issues related to openness, diversity and accessibility. In the region it is increasingly acknowledged that the key drivers in the region have to do with the tight social relations, the sustainable balance between industry and the environment, between work life and family life, between productivity and care. At the same time, progress still needs to be made in the previous areas of mobility and cooperation in the fields of research and education.

In terms of priority topics the old and the new topics are well balanced. The objectives of increasing economic growth encompass priority topics such as cross-border cooperation between Science Parks,
Innovation Incubators and other parts of the regional Innovation System. It also encompass topics such as cross-border cooperation for increasing entrepreneurship as well as business specific topics such as joint profiling of the region vis-à-vis visitors, customers, investors etc. The INTERREG IVC programme also includes cross-border projects on joint industry strategies for tourism and events in the region.

The objective of increased integration specifically addresses the topic of physical infrastructure and increased access ability in all parts of the region. It also addresses cross-border cooperation on the institutional level, and in service areas such as Health, Social Care, Police, Customs and Emergency. Last, but not least, the objective includes an increased effort to recognize and expand diversity in the region economically, culturally and socially.

One of the very promising projects implemented as part of INTERREG IIIA was the Integrated Health and Civic Protection Project. The construction of the Øresund Bridge required the local Danish and Swedish hospitals to come up with joint plans on how to provide emergency services should work-place accidents occur in the course of the bridge’s construction. When the Bridge was constructed it enabled the rapid cross-border deployment of emergency resources should a major event or emergency arise anywhere in the Øresund region. A formal political agreement and an operational plan for cross-border collaboration of pre-hospital (and possibly in-hospital) rescue services were signed, and joint plans of operation were implemented for the evacuation of Swedish, Danish and Norwegian citizens after the Tsunami disaster, during the America’s Cup Race, at bus accidents and at the evacuation of Scandinavian nationals from Lebanon in the summer of 2006.

It is recommended in the short- and medium term to encourage similar cross-border projects in the area’s of Health, Social Care, Police, Custom etc.

5.3 Long-term policy recommendations

In a long-term policy perspective the overall recommendation is to continuously analyze the development of the region and balance the integration of new topics with sustaining attention to old topics until the intended effects have been achieved. This sailing between Scylla and Carybdis takes political leadership and the first long term policy recommendation is to ensure as much political leadership as possible in the overall governance of future INTERREG programmes.

From a long term policy perspective the INTERREG IIIa programme has been fairly well integrated with other regional programmes and activities. Securing national government support, however, has been and still is lacking, hampering the cross-border integration in areas such as diverging national legal frameworks and lack of transparency and coordination in fields such as cross-border taxation, social security, pension and unemployment benefits as well as civic rights. Political leadership in the governance of the INTERREG programmes is essential both to balance existing and new priorities and to secure national government support and cooperation in aligning national legal frameworks and improve coordination on fields such as cross-border taxation etc.

In a long-term policy perspective it is also important to consider ways to alter the involvement of more stakeholders in the INTERREG Programmes and in their governance. The second long-term recommendation is, therefore, to consider ways to broaden the stakeholder base – both in geographical
terms and in terms of allowing partnerships in not only cross-borders but also in cross sectors, e.g. public authorities, universities, business, voluntary organisations, cultural institutions, Health services etc. The first phases of cross border integration required, and still requires, strong involvement by public authorities at local, regional and national levels. As the proceeding phases unfold other sectors need to be involved as well and new cross-sector partnerships need to evolve.

Involving a broader stakeholder base in both governance and implementation of INTERREG programmes also serves another purpose. INTERREG programmes will not continue forever and projects or initiatives should continue also when INTERREG programmes terminate. Therefore, the third an final long-term policy recommendation is to increase focus on economic sustainability of projects and initiatives. Broadening the stakeholder base to include amongst others, business, might serve the purpose of increasing economic sustainability as well.
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Websites relating to the Øresund:
- Öresund Committee (www.oresund.com/oresund/creation/committee.htm) & http://oeresundregion.org
- Oresund Region (Wikipedia the free encyclopedia)
- Øresund Trends 2008 (www.tendensoresund.org)

Mid-term evaluation of 2003 & up-dated mid-term evaluation of 2005


Annex 2 Updated data matrices available in the Øresund Database by subject

- Change of Municipality
- Dwellings and households in Øresund
- Economic accounts - Øresund
- Education in Øresund
- Enterprises in Øresund
- Income in Øresund
- Labour costs in Øresund
- Labour force survey Øresund
- Labour market in Øresund
- Population in Øresund
- Services and tourism in Øresund
- Transfrontier commuting in Øresund
- Unemployment in Øresund