1. **IDENTIFICATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title/Number</th>
<th>Building National Stability (BNS)</th>
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<tr>
<td>CRIS number:</td>
<td>ENI/2014/025-057</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total cost</strong></td>
<td>Total estimated cost: EUR 12,000,000</td>
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<td>Total amount of EU budget contribution: EUR 12,000,000</td>
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<td><strong>Aid method / Management mode and type of financing</strong></td>
<td>Project Approach</td>
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<td>Direct management – procurement of services and supplies</td>
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<td>Indirect management with the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) and with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)</td>
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<td>Sector</td>
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2. **RATIONALE AND CONTEXT**

2.1. **Summary of the action and its objectives**

Amid a complex domestic and regional scenario, the challenge for the Lebanese security system is one of resilience: to withstand internal and external pressures and shocks, and to deliver public services in a way that strengthens rather than destabilises Lebanon's delicate internal equilibrium. This is of particular importance in the context of the Syria crisis, and the massive pressures it places on Lebanon’s social and political fabric. For this reason, the action will build on and consolidate European Union(UE) Security sector reform (SSR) work in Lebanon to date, continuing to lay the foundation for longer-term institutional reform and the accountable delivery of security services whilst focusing its support in areas of immediate relevance in the current context (such as Integrated Border Management (IBM), emergency preparedness and crisis management/response).

The programme is designed to leverage, wherever possible, greater co-ordination and inter-operability between security sector agencies, adopting a thematic approach rather than an agency-specific one. It explicitly seeks to support the agencies to deliver effect at the point of greatest need rather than exclusively at central institutional level, with a focus on borders, communities more affected by the current...
crisis and areas more prone to the occurrence of natural calamities. The support will therefore target measurable improvements to government response and service delivery to citizens and communities on the issues which most threaten their security and safety.

Aiming at the same overarching goal of strengthening the Lebanese security sector for conflict prevention purposes and as a vector of national cohesion and unity, the programme "Support to the Lebanese Security Sector for Stability and National Cohesion" (S4NC) approved under the Annual action programme (AAP) 2013, together with this BNS programme also constitute a first EU response to the priorities highlighted in the Political and Security Committee (PSC) recommendations from 30 January 2014 on enhanced EU support to the Lebanese Armed Forces, covering, among others, civil-military co-operation, border security, military education and training system, institutional capacity building, Integrated Border Management, Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN).

2.2. Context

2.2.1. Country context

Lebanon is a fragile state characterised by weak institutions that are prey to entrenched confessional divisions. This makes the adoption and implementation of key government policies, including in the security sector, difficult. Furthermore, the political system is designed to cement multi-confessional co-existence through checks and balances that provide for short-term stability but restrict the scope for reform.

Since the 1990 armistice, Lebanon has been continuously subject to enormous internal and external pressures and shocks, including the ongoing presence of Palestinian refugee camps, outbreaks of conflict with Israel, politically-sponsored internal violence and terrorist attacks. The current regional political dynamics have added significantly to those pressures and shocks, with a refugee influx which has swollen the country’s population by 20% in three years (generating serious social and economic pressures in border areas and host communities), and the increasing displacement of the Syrian conflict – and its wider regional and global underpinnings – to Lebanese territory. These dynamics cannot be readily categorised as ‘internal’ and ‘external’, but together threaten to stress Lebanon’s fragile politico-social equilibrium to breaking point.

The most pervasive risks relate to the spill-over from the conflict in Syria, with mounting concern for its potentially destabilising effect on Lebanon. The Syrian crisis has led to further polarization and weakening of governance, the postponement of elections originally scheduled for June 2013 and the extension of the present Parliament until November 2014 severely limiting the scope for legislative process or policy formulation and implementation.

Although major political and economic reforms remain stalled by the lack of political consensus, the security and stability of the country remain at the centre of the discourse of the national authorities, as reflected in the priorities agreed under the new Action Plan for EU-Lebanon Partnership and Co-operation (2013-2015) and
Single Support Framework (SSF) for the period 2014-2016. Lebanon is upholding its international obligations with respect to United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1701 and co-operation with United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), and with the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), as well as upholding international humanitarian principles on protection and assistance to people fleeing violence.

2.2.2. Sector context: policies and challenges

Lebanon has a relatively developed security sector in terms of formal legal framework and institutions, established chains of command, and, at least on paper, subordination to civilian government. Nonetheless, a deep domestic disagreement over what constitutes the “national interest” and on the nature and aims of security as well as the increasing tensions provoked by the crisis in neighbouring Syria risk eroding organisational effectiveness, highlighting the challenges faced by the Lebanese security system in responding to the citizens' security needs, while respecting the standards of a democratic State.

The composition and balance of powers within the security sector reflect Lebanon's multi-confessional character: Lebanon's state security institutions are not only 'guarantors' of security and public order, but influencers of and agents in the wider politics of equilibrium and control, and the security services are perceived as (and to differing degrees are) subject to political and confessional influence, as well as agents of those influences on society. Due to the diffusion of political power and allegiance through the security sector (as well as to more practical issues of management and capability), their relations are often characterised by poor co-operation, competition and duplication of tasks.

Amid these challenges, the agencies are critical not only to ‘providing security and enforcing the law’, but to national stability. The agencies have the potential to both strengthen or weaken the social cohesion of Lebanon, through their direct actions, their roles (and citizens' perceptions of those roles), and their ability, or the absence of it, to bridge confessional and sectarian divides. Supporting the Lebanese security system’s effectiveness and legitimacy therefore remains a fundamental requirement for preventing the escalation of violent conflict, managing current and future crises, and fostering national unity in a country fragmented by years of civil war, a political settlement which preserves the underlying dynamics of that conflict, and repeated outbreaks of violence.

This is particularly the case in the current crisis context. Since May 2012, the security situation has deteriorated due to the growing involvement of opposing Lebanese factions in the fighting in Syria, exacerbated by the widespread availability of weapons. Incidents include clashes between the traditionally hostile neighbourhoods in Tripoli, cross-border incursions from regular Syrian forces, the shelling of Lebanese cities by Syrian opposition fighters, and eruption of violence in Sidon, Baalbek and Beirut. The borders with Syria are porous and border management remains weak. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) are overstretched by the requirement to protect the borders and provide support for both internal security and crisis response / emergency relief tasks; the General Directorate of General Security (GS) still lacks the capacity and systems to administrate border immigration.
at the same time as fulfilling its mandate to manage the swelling population of immigrants and refugees within Lebanese territory; and the Internal Security Forces (ISF) are still in the process of regaining public trust and becoming an institution that is more responsive to citizens’ needs and expectations.

This means that, in addition to consolidating the work started under previous support cycles (AAP 2010 and AAP 2013), the impact of the Syrian crisis and the pressure it places the security sector increases the requirement for enhanced support for the security agencies in domains that are of direct relevance in the current context. Continued EU engagement will therefore help address the immediate need to respond to the crisis, as well as the structural deficiencies which undermine the country’s governance, the legitimacy of the State security agencies, and the confidence of citizens.

2.3. Lessons learnt

The key lessons learned by the EU and the wider international community in Lebanese security sector engagement over recent years are:

✓ ‘Capacity building’ rather than ‘capability building’. There is a tendency amongst bilateral donors to concentrate their efforts on strengthening the security forces with equipment and training to cater for their short-term needs, often confusing ‘stability’ with ‘security’ and lacking a more holistic approach to SSR which aims to generate long-term, sustainable change.

✓ Lack of donor coherence. Although efforts have been made to co-ordinate, genuinely synergistic interventions which drive at common effect are lacking. The Lebanese security agencies receive a wide array of international support in the same areas, without consistent agreement on an overall set of goals and a common approach. Incoherent programmes may build individual or functional capacity, but are unlikely to foster systemic change.

✓ Over-ambition. Donor interventions that sought to change entire institutional capabilities have proved less effective than discrete pilots in ‘addressable’ areas that could then be scaled up based on lessons learned from initial implementation.

✓ Weak local ownership. There has in many cases been a lack of thorough and proper consultation, joint problem analysis and co-management with Lebanese partners. This has reduced genuine local ownership, and damaged the potential for sustainable reform institutionalised through recipient agencies.

✓ Many SSR interventions in Lebanon have been overly focused on a single security sector agency, limiting the impact on cross-agency co-ordination and inter-operation. A comprehensive approach which includes all actors relevant to a particular security function (e.g. border management), with a focus on joint

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1 More in depth analysis and inputs for the work to be developed will be recollected through the EU-funded project with International Alert "Promoting people-centred SSR" (that will be finalised in the second semester of 2014) on people security needs and expectations on the provision of security services, as well as from the work carried out under the grants foreseen under the S4NC on accountability issues.
activities between and among agencies is needed to drive better cross-sectoral working and generate better security outcomes.

- **Inadequate agility/flexibility in project management.** Lebanon is a fluid environment, and not one in which inputs, outputs and work plans can be defined for an entire project. Iterative amendment and revision to plans and resource allocation is required, with tight project evaluation and revision cycles, particularly at the early stages of engagement, and flexibility for transfer of funding between budget lines.

More positively, by using uncontentious technical entry points for its security-related co-operation, the EU has built relationships of mutual trust with different security sector stakeholders and demonstrated EU capacity to assist the sector, gradually enabling an approach in line with international SSR principles.

2.4. **Complementary actions**

This action is complementary to the support already provided by the European Commission, EU Member States and other bilateral donors. Close co-ordination is ongoing and will be maintained with all relevant donors.

The European Commission has allocated EUR 34.5 million since 2007 for its support to the development of the Lebanese security sector and the enforcement of the rule of law, through the following interventions that are of particular relevance to this action:

Support to the German-led "**Northern Border Pilot Project (NBPP)**" (2007-8, EUR 2 million), which represented a first attempt to responds to Lebanon's border management responsibilities;

"**Amélioration de l'Investigation Criminelle à tous les stades de la Chaîne Pénale**" (2007-2009, EUR 2.4 million) and "**Security and Rule of Law (SAROL)**" (2009-present, EUR 8 million), covering both the Internal Security Forces (ISF) and the Judiciary and aimed at improving the quality of criminal investigations. The SAROL programme has also supported the development of ISF internal training structures and resources for the Judiciary Police, ISF computerisation efforts, and police capacity to better respond to vulnerable sectors of society;

Building on the above, the programme "**Developing National Capability for Security and Stabilisation (SSP)**" (2012-2015, EUR 12 million) covers the following components:

i. **Integrated Border Management (IBM),** working on the development of a national IBM strategy jointly developed by the four agencies involved (LAF, General Security (GS), Customs and ISF) and on the improvement of GS and Customs' operations at the legal crossing points with Syria.

ii. **Rule of Law and Fight against Crime,** further promoting the organisational development of the ISF (strategic planning, training structures, automation efforts, etc.), its capacity to fight serious organised crime in co-operation with the Judiciary, and its traffic management capacity;
iii. People-centred security sector reform, promoting the establishment of a dialogue with civil society on the needed improvements of the Lebanese security sector towards a more citizens' oriented provision of security services on the basis of a better understanding of people's security needs and concerns.

"Support to the Lebanese security sector for stability and national cohesion (S4NC)" (2014-16, EUR 8 million), which represents the expansion of EU SSR efforts in a more articulated manner, by working on the following:

a. Organisational development of GS and LAF, in order to increase their capacity to perform their functions in line with SSR principles. This includes work on: administration and management issues (human resources, procedures, budgeting processes, maintenance of the equipment and/or infrastructure, etc.); support to internal quality control mechanisms; office automation and development of appropriate ICT systems; and revision and development of GS training systems;

b. Support to security agencies’ role in preserving national and local stability, through institutional strengthening of the LAF Unit for civilian co-operation (CIMIC), and promotion of stabilisation initiatives aimed at increasing LAF inter-action with local communities in areas of current or potential instability;

c. Enhancement of agency-civil society relations with the security sector through sponsored co-learning, dialogue and research.

d. Development of agencies’ strategic communication and public outreach capacity, with the aim of generating a more robust two-way dialogue between the agencies and citizens on security and public safety issues;

The EU has been active in the CBRN domain (Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear hazards), supporting the development of a National Response Plan for CBRN-related events (2008-12, EUR 2.1 million), including strengthening a LAF CBRN Response Team, and with a regional project (the CBRN Centres of Excellence initiative) funded by the EU Instrument for Stability (IfS).

Finally, the EU-funded regional programme for Prevention, Preparedness and Response to Natural and Man-made Disasters (PPRD South) is providing limited support to Lebanese disaster management capability, largely in the form of joint activities with regional disaster management authorities, but no direct intervention in Lebanon is envisaged.

In parallel to these activities, the EU supports the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms through continuous political dialogue with Lebanese authorities and human rights defenders. This dialogue is underpinned by financial assistance both bilaterally through the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNOHCHR) and through civil society initiatives funded under the EIDHR.

Over the last decade the United States (US) has been the major donor to both the ISF (approx. USD 8M per year) and to the LAF (with a budget of around USD 80M per year). The US programme predominantly covers equipment for LAF through Foreign Military Financing (FMF); but extends also to civil-military co-ordination (CIMIC).
including sponsoring LAF community projects; to LAF public communications; and, recently, to LAF planning, logistics and acquisitions management systems.

Other relevant donors in the security sector are the United Kingdom, which works with the ISF on a community policing pilot project, and provides substantial assistance to the LAF (USD 18M) for operational border control tasks; France, with a regular programme of support to both the ISF and the LAF; Germany and Belgium (equipment donations to LAF).

Parallel to this, EU Member States (MS) are heavily involved in the UNIFIL peace-keeping mission\(^2\). Apart for carrying out their peace-keeping mission, the role of these contingents is important also in terms of building LAF capacity, including for CIMIC projects, which are carried out in close co-operation with UNSCOL, UNDP and UNOHCHR.

In January 2014, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia announced a USD 3 billion package of support to the LAF. The support, the large majority of which will be used to supply defence equipment sourced from France, amounts to nearly twice Lebanon’s USD 1.7 billion annual defence budget. Initial discussions with LAF suggest that other donor support programmes will continue unaffected; but the absorption of such a donation, the integration of the new capabilities it will provide and the political implications of the assistance are an important consideration for EU and other international support to the LAF.

UNDP has provided support over the past four years to the establishment of a Disaster Management Committee in the Office of the Prime Minister, and has developed a draft National Response Plan, submitted to the Council of Ministers but yet to be approved. UNDP has developed a project plan for building disaster management systems and capability at central, sectoral and local level, and is seeking donor funding for implementation. Several activities have been organised by the DRM Unit through the EU TAIEX Instrument. Although limited funding has been committed, UNDP remains at the forefront of the development of Government of Lebanon central policy mechanisms for disaster management. UNDP’s engagement at agency level, however, is limited.

UNHCR is a key donor agency in the current crisis context, and has deployed staff in a number of key locations in Lebanon relevant to refugee influx and accommodation. UNHCR’s primary security sector interest is around refugee eligibility and protection, and UNHCR is in discussions with GS regarding possible support to its Border Modernisation Strategy in areas which support these objectives, and with LAF in the context of its border security role, which often includes the interdiction of refugees entering Lebanon through non-legal crossing points. As such, in the current context UNHCR is an important programme stakeholder and potential partner. Although UNHCR does not have an SSR mandate or approach, but one which is shaped by refugee issues, there may be synergies available, particularly in the context of the IBM component.

\(^2\) Thirteen (13) EU Member States provide 3,674 troops representing 35.7% of the total force (the largest contingents being Italy with 1,080 and France with 860 troops).
2.5. Donor co-ordination

Co-ordination between different EU and other donors is undertaken through regular donor co-ordination meetings organised in Beirut (usually at the EU Delegation), where exchange of information takes places and concrete steps to improve co-ordination on internal security assistance are taken. Co-ordination on defence issues, particularly with the US, remains often a challenge; and overall donor co-ordination on project activities is weak – and areas which the next programme should consider as a priority for improvement.

In general, the security agencies lack the capability and systems to act as effective co-ordinators of the wide range of donor support they receive. At a policy level they interact closely with donor organisations; but the programming, project management and activity/resource de-confliction capabilities which would allow meaningful local ownership and management of reform are embryonic.

3. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

3.1. Objectives

The **overall objective** of the programme is to strengthen the resilience of Lebanon's security institutions to withstand internal and external pressures and shocks, and to reinforce the role they can play as drivers of stability and national cohesion.

The **specific objective** is to improve the institutional capabilities of security agencies to fulfil certain functions in a co-ordinated and accountable manner, thus increasing their effectiveness in line with democratic norms and social equity, and the credibility of their actions in the eyes of citizens, particularly in domains of immediate relevance in the current context and in the areas most affected by it.

In line with the priorities highlighted in the PSC recommendations from 30 January 2014 on EU support to the Lebanese Armed Forces, and with the on-going dialogue with other security agencies (e.g. GS), this will translate into work in the areas detailed below.

3.2. Expected results and main activities

**Result 1: Enhanced capability for Integrated Border Management (IBM)**

*Activity Area 1: IBM action planning*

1. Support to IBM co-ordinating body at strategic and operational levels to drive implementation of IBM strategy developed under the IBM component of the programme "Developing National Capability for Security and Stabilisation (SSP)" (2012-15);

2. Development of GS and Customs systems and capacity to generate IBM action and implementation plans, programmes and projects, in line with the IBM strategy developed with EU assistance in the previous phase;
3. Assistance to development of rapid response and contingency plans to handle border management implications of evolving Syria crisis; response and contingency planning to be conducted in close co-ordination with UNHCR to ensure full integration of refugee protection imperatives;

*Activity Area 2: Strengthening of operational systems and processes for IBM implementation*

4. Support border management co-ordination capabilities by advising on creation of National IBM Co-ordination Centre and supporting the establishment of multi-agency operation rooms for co-ordination of border management agencies;

5. Support development of risk analysis, early warning and pre-arrival, intelligence analysis systems;

6. Facilitation of development of international linkages, including through membership of multinational forums and border management organisations and partnerships with bilateral foreign agencies.

*Activity Area 3: Development of agency systems for continuous enhancement of operational and delivery capacity*

7. Support to development of Lebanese agency-owned training systems, mechanisms and capacity, through: a) development of GS training department, including training management systems and expansion, upgrading and equipping of training facilities; b) establishment of Customs central training facility, with supporting training management systems and capacity; and c) expansion of GS and Customs field training facilities, synchronised with field training of ISF and LAF where appropriate;

8. Delivery of specialist training in technical IBM functions, ensuring where possible the transition of training capability to Lebanese ownership, e.g. through co-teaching with Lebanese trainers, adaptation of curricula for forward use in agency training centres, and specialised train-the-trainer programmes;

9. Facilitation of border management scenario-based exercises (with specific scenarios designed with close reference to current Syria crisis context); with transition of exercise management to Lebanese authorities and incorporation of exercises into GS and Customs core curricula;

10. Development of regional and international training and lessons exchange partnerships and networks.

11. Continued development of IBM infrastructure and equipment, in line with IBM strategy, including through: support to development of agencies’ dedicated logistics and facilities management units (responsible for needs assessment, development of logistics and procurement programmes and plans, investment policy, capital and operational budget plans, and procurement procedures); development of inventory database with all IBM agencies; provision of equipment in line with IBM strategy, with a focus on joint-use equipment to foster inter-agency co-operation, e.g. CCTV, automatic number plate recognition (ANPR).
12. Support to implementation of GS Border Modernisation Strategy (BMS), including: a) development of GS programme planning and management capability (definition of scope, prioritisation, programming and budgeting, project management); and b) provision of IT equipment and advisory to support implementation of BMS immediate priority programmes as defined in GS programme planning.

Activity Area 4: Systems for establishment and maintenance of professional standards in IBM

13. Support to development, dissemination and training of codes of conduct with border management agencies;
14. Development of reporting ‘hotline’ for members of the public to report allegations of corruption or abuse of authority at the borders; and
15. Support to GS and Customs in development of systems and capacity to investigate allegations of misconduct.

The implementation of this component will follow on from what achieved under the IBM component of the programme "Developing National Capability for Security and Stabilisation (SSP)" (2012-15), including in terms of further implementation of action plans agreed with beneficiaries, training strategies defined and delivery of equipment identified. Complementarity and co-ordination will be ensured with other on-going support, particularly that already provided by EU MS to increase the LAF border security capabilities.

Result 2: Lebanese police services deliver more effective, better-managed and more accountable police services to citizens

Activity Area 1: Police Professionalisation

16. Continued development of ISF training systems and capacity, including in the areas of training strategy, training management, training evaluation, curriculum and course design, trainer career and skills development, and through continued (limited) donation of training equipment;
17. Development, dissemination and implementation of policy and procedure in core police service delivery areas, with a focus on skill areas relevant in the current context, e.g. community safety and public order response;
18. Promotion of joint ISF training with other agencies with key responsibilities in priority service delivery areas of relevance in the current context, in particular the Municipal Police (community safety) and Civil Defence/LAF (crisis risk management and disaster response).

The implementation of this component will follow on from what achieved under the SAROL project and the Rule of Law and Fight against Crime component of the programme "Developing National Capability for Security and Stabilisation (SSP)"

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3 At the time of writing, the on-going IBM project is providing ITC expertise to GS in order to define the ITC needs for the implementation of the BMS strategy as part of a broader planning for its implementation.
(2012-15), including in terms of training systems and the consolidation of the ISF Academy and Judiciary Police Practical Training Centre, automation issues, and of specific work on gender issues as part of the ISF organisational development, attention to vulnerable public including women victims of domestic violence or other crimes and the need for improved follow up investigations. Activities will be further fine-tuned on the basis of the work carried out by the EU-funded "Promoting people-centred SSR" as well as under the grants on accountability issues foreseen under the S4NC.

Result 3: Improved Government of Lebanon capacity for emergency preparedness and crisis response (for both man-made crises and natural disasters), in particular CBRN incidents.

Activity Area 1: Development of functional central crisis risk management and disaster response mechanisms, with a focus on CBRN

19. Support to development of National Operations Room (NOR) for natural and man-made disasters management under the Prime Minister’s Office, in line with National Response Plan, (NRP) including though: a) the development of Terms of Reference (TORs) and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for NOR operation and management; and b) provision of office equipment, and technical / telecommunications / audio-visual (non-ICT) equipment;

20. Capacity building of NOR staff, including in use of equipment, risk planning, response and early recovery, in line with staff of Terms TORs/SOPs, including through simulation exercises and exposure to international best practice;

21. Finalization and integration of the CBRN Response Plan in the National response framework;

Activity Area 2: Development of LAF and Civil Defense CBRN/crisis operational management and response capability

22. Support development of LAF crisis management operations room, with a focus on management systems and procedures for handling CBRN incidents;

23. Equipping of LAF crisis management operations room with technical/IT/communications systems required to assist in co-ordination of incidents on the ground;

24. Support to LAF planning for development of tactical CBRN response capabilities, including through development of risk management framework, policies and procedures; development of equipment, sustainment and maintenance procurement plan; and support to establishment of IT architecture for CBRN incident management (e.g. Real-Time Online Decision Support System for Nuclear Emergency Management - RODOS);

25. Capacity building for CBRN Regiment at LAF HQ in CBRN incident planning and response, including through training, exercises, exposure to international best practice and lessons sharing;

26. Provision of field equipment for CBRN response, with training in equipment use and maintenance.
27. Training on CBRN response, including through support to simulation exercises and exposure to international best practice.

28. Support to the reorganisation and institutional development of the Lebanese Civil Defense, with particular reference to the modifications introduced in April 2014 to Decree No. 50/67 from 05/08/1967 establishing and organising the entity.

29. Support to Civil Defense CBRN response capabilities, in co-ordination with the support provided to LAF.

30. If relevant and appropriate, depending on the work developed in the foreseen activities as well as on the lessons learned and results achieved under the support to CIMIC and stabilisation activities under the programme S4NC, this Activity Area could also include an additional support to civil-military cooperation activities, particularly aimed at building community preparedness and resilience to man-made disasters and natural calamities.

Finally: the BNS program may foresee where relevant institutional capacity building and training measures beyond those mentioned above.

3.3. Risks and assumptions

The major risks for the interventions relate to possible deterioration of security in Lebanon. This could affect both delivery of Technical Assistance, through restricted access and movement within the country, and the willingness of security system stakeholders to engage on and implement the institutional changes required for improved sector performance. Mitigating measures in this area are: consistent security risk management; delivery with and through local partners, ensuring continuity of action if international access and movement is restricted; and political engagement to ensure commitment to reform and development imperatives are not subsumed by immediate operational requirements.

Another risk is represented by the political sensitivity of security issues. Mitigating measures in this area are: EU engagement with the Lebanese security sector across the spectrum of security agencies; consistent support to institutional capacity in tandem with a focus on accountability and responsiveness, to illustrate the EU’s commitment to building state capabilities; and a sensitive, incremental and locally-owned approach to accountability and state-citizen engagement issues.

Government of Lebanon stakeholders’ ownership of the process is an important assumption. The commitment shown by the main state stakeholders through programme delivery to date and in recent consultations provides a strong indication that beneficiaries are fully engaged in the process, and will remain so. The proposed programme interventions are based firmly on agencies’ own published and

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5 In particular, the programme "Support to the Lebanese security sector for stability and national cohesion (S4NC)" (2014-16) will have a dedicated component on participation, accountability and transparency in SSR. On the basis of this work, it will be in a position to provide the elements for the revision of the LogFrame ahead of the programme's start, to better capture this dimension in terms of indicators.
authorised strategic plans, fall fully within required improvements articulated by the agencies themselves, and support firm intentions by all stakeholders to complement donor interventions through the application of internal resources.

A particular ownership risk is around the senior leadership of the agencies. Whilst current leaders are demonstrably committed to reform, accession to senior office of leaders who are less so, or more sceptical of the value of international engagement, has the potential to decelerate the pace of change, particularly in the context of weak co-ordinating ministries. Mitigating strategies in this area are: engagement with a range of officers, avoiding investing too much ‘ownership’ in any one commander and focusing in addition on mid-level officers, who are also potential future leaders; institutionalisation of change through institutional policy, procedure and the internal training regimes of the agencies; ensuring that all change explicitly and measurably drives improved organisational performance; maintaining an appropriate balance between reform objectives and the practical support required by security agencies to properly carry out their duties; continued EU Delegation engagement in policy/sector dialogue with the Lebanese authorities, including the MoIM, MoD and Prime Minister’s Office, and with senior agency counterparts, beyond the activities addressed by the project.

3.4. Cross-cutting issues

Good governance and human rights are an integral part of the proposed programme. The Government of Lebanon remains committed to its obligations under the Human Rights instruments to which the Government is a signatory, and to addressing several priority recommendations, including in the field of Security Sector Reform, highlighted by the last Universal Periodic Review (UPR); and UNOCHR is helping Lebanon work towards this objective, including the compliance of Lebanese security agencies with International Human Rights standards. The programme will work with other EU activities to support implementation of activities which support the delivery of these obligations in the security sector.

In addition to fostering co-ordination between agencies, the programme will take into account the need for co-ordination and inter-operability between the security sector and civilian authorities, including those with responsibilities in the context of crisis risk management and disaster response (e.g. utilities, health, transportation) and the municipalities. This will generate cross-cutting opportunities with other programme, as well as leveraging synergies and offering the opportunity for greater impact between security sector projects.

The integration of gender perspective into the security sector programme is also an important cross-cutter. Currently, LAF, ISF and GS have a relative small percentage of women (approximately 10%), including at officer level. Support to human resource management systems will take into account the key role women (both uniformed and civilian staff) have in the respective security agencies, and in maintaining security, delivering access to justice for all, and fostering the rule of law. A gender-sensitive approach, both within the agencies and in addressing female citizens’ priority security needs, will feature across the programme.
3.5. Stakeholders

The largest security institution is the **Lebanese Armed Forces** (approx. 59,000). The LAF operates in the absence of a government/military defence strategy promoting capabilities necessary for the Armed Forces to respond to security threats. It is currently designed as a conventional military force, though it also has a significant role in internal security and humanitarian/social relief in the case of civilian crisis or natural disasters, for which it is not appropriately configured. In 2013 the LAF finalised a *Capability and Development Plan (CDP)* for the period 2013-2017. In a context in which the spill-over effects of the conflict in neighbouring Syria are impacting Lebanon very hard, LAF are central to the cohesion and stability of the country. Although the LAF continues to enjoy broad national legitimacy due to their cross-confessional composition and generally perceived neutrality, it faces serious difficulties in fulfilling its multiple mandates. This over-stretch is compounded by limited equipment, insufficient infrastructure and structural and co-ordination challenges.

At a time of massive pressure due to the external and internal shocks exerted by the Syrian conflict, **General Security** (GS) also plays a critical role in national security and stability, including in border/migration management, for which it is a already a major beneficiary of EU support in IBM. Its relatively small size (5,000), and sophistication in terms of strategic management and leadership indicates a potential absorptive capacity for support.

The **General Customs** are part of the Ministry of Finance, but act as an independent body. The Customs Brigade (uniformed personnel) is responsible for the control of land, sea and air borders. They operate in an extremely complex environment and the IBM *Gap and Needs Analysis* developed by the on-going EU-funded IBM project have identified Customs as the agency most in need of EU support at this stage.

With a force of 26,000 personnel under (like GS) the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities (MoIM), the **Internal Security Forces** (ISF) are the core of what should be the internal security system and a civilian police force. The EU has provided substantial support to ISF since 20076. The programme will continue this support, consolidating results achieved whilst focusing on institutionalising enhanced service delivery through the training academy, strengthening administrative function, and promoting co-operation with other security actors.

In the current context, the role of the **Municipal Police** is an important consideration. The Municipal Police are not part of the ISF, but are recruited and managed locally by municipalities. They do not undertake criminal investigations, but are tasked to counter and deal with petty crime, and are deployed in communities to manage public safety matters. They receive little if any training (training is only given if the municipality decides it should be, and there is no meaningful training capacity at this level) and operate in the absence of standardised procedures. Nevertheless, in the current crisis situation they are often the first point of contact between the citizen and the State at local level, and have a potentially critical role to play in helping to

6 More detailed information on the EU assistance to the ISF up to date is available upon request.
resolve inter-communal disputes, including between Lebanese host communities and Syrian refugees.

In the field of **Crisis Risk Management and Disaster Response** two committees have been established under the Office of the Prime Minister: the Disaster Management Committee and the CBRN National Committee. These committees, whose memberships overlap, are important national-level stakeholders for the development of both CBRN response capability and the wider systems for management of crisis and man-made and national disaster. In this framework, the recent approval of the modifications to the law regarding the organisation of the Lebanese Civil Defense also provides an opportunity to provide timely and much needed support for an institution that is key in the response to disasters.

Beyond the security sector agencies themselves, the **civilian authorities of the Government of Lebanon** represent a key stakeholder group. The co-ordinating ministries which, at least in theory, oversee and hold to account the security agencies will be important interlocutors, with the MoIM in particular a potential convening point for inter-agency co-operation on key cross-sectoral issues such as crisis management and disaster response. Both MoIM and MoD house inspectorate generals, which will be engaged in the context of promoting formal and administrative accountability. It is important to note, however, that in the absence of a consensus on the Lebanese “national purpose” the potential for agreement on security and defence strategy is very limited, and all security agencies will continue to operate in a ‘strategic vacuum’. The ministries are therefore partners to be included in consultations; but the centre of gravity for the programme and the projects under it will continue to be the agencies themselves.

A further key stakeholder is Lebanese **civil society**. Civil society is vibrant in Lebanon and exerts a commendable degree of well-informed and professional analysis and advocacy for the rights of citizens. In the security sector, however, this is limited: many non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have attempted to engage in dialogue with the security agencies, with varying and generally limited success. This is likely to be caused partly by a relative lack of capacity in the agencies to engage intelligently with well-informed, highly educated and highly organised NGOs; but largely because the agencies do not have a strong culture or tradition of external engagement. There is, however, an appetite and desire among civil society for a more engaged relationship, and indications that this would be welcome, to a point, in the agencies. This will be handled incrementally, building on what achieved under previous EU-funded SSR programmes.

The ultimate beneficiaries of the action are **Lebanese citizens**. As in any country, this is a complex and diverse spectrum of stakeholder with numerous interests, agendas and priorities. In the context of the Lebanese confessional system, citizens in general identify closely with discrete components of the politico-social fabric, represented by political parties and power blocs. It is therefore very important that the programme seeks to reduce the reality or perception of sectoral politicisation by focusing on work which encourages **equitable service provision to all citizens**, regardless of confession, and on engagement by all security agencies with citizens across the political and confessional spectrum.
4. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES

4.1. Financing agreement

In order to implement this action, it is foreseen to conclude a financing agreement with the partner country, referred to in Article 184(2)(b) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012.

4.2. Indicative operational implementation period

The indicative operational implementation period of this action, during which the activities described in sections 3.2. and 4.3. will be carried out, is 48 months from the date of entry into force of the financing agreement, subject to modifications to be agreed by the responsible authorising officer in the relevant agreements. The European Parliament and the relevant Committee shall be informed of the extension of the operational implementation period within one month of that extension being granted.

4.3. Implementation components and modules

4.3.1. Procurement (direct management)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type (works, supplies, services)</th>
<th>Indicative number of contracts</th>
<th>Indicative trimester of launch of the procedure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Result 2 – Activity Area 1: Police professionalization</td>
<td>Services, supplies</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result 3 – Activity Area 2: Development of LAF and Civil Defense CBRN/crisis operational management and response capability</td>
<td>Services, supplies</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation and Audit</td>
<td>Services</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.3.2. Indirect management with an international organisation.

4.3.2.1. Indirect management with ICMPD

A part of this action with the objective of enhancing capabilities for Integrated Border Management in Lebanon (Result 1) may be implemented in indirect management with the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) in accordance with Article 58(1)(c) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012. This implementation is justified based on the following:
the action requires a specific technical competence and specialisation. ICMPD is the primary international agency by which the EU approach to Integrated Border Management, as described in the Guidelines for Integrated Border Management in EC External Co-operation (developed by ICMPD) are propagated in EU neighbourhood countries. ICMPD brings the full range of border management, customs, border policing and border security competencies necessary to fulfil the requirement of this action;

the action is the continuation already provided by the EU on IBM issues in Lebanon. The current support is provided by ICMPFD for the full satisfaction of all stakeholders. This has allowed ICMPD to build a strong basis of trust and partnership with Lebanese partner authorities (notably, GS, Customs, ISF). In the current crisis context, the disruption to the current action which would result from the transfer of this action to another beneficiary would severely restrict effective implementation and damage the delivery of the required results.

The entrusted entity would be in charge of the full implementation of the IBM component both in terms of expertise provided and procurement of equipment.

The entrusted entity might sub-delegate certain activities to other organisations specialised on certain aspects of the intervention (e.g. UNHCR for activity 3). Appropriate provisions will be included in the delegation agreement.

The entrusted entity is currently undergoing the ex ante assessment in accordance with Article 61(1) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012. In anticipation of the results of this review, the responsible authorising officer deems that, based on a preliminary evaluation and on the long-standing and problem-free co-operation with this entity, it can be entrusted with budget-implementation tasks under indirect management.

4.3.2.2. Indirect management with UNDP.

A part of this action with the objective of improving government of Lebanon capacity for emergency preparedness and crisis response (for both man-made crises and natural disasters, with particular emphasis on CBRN) may be implemented in indirect management with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in accordance with Article 58(1)(c) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012. This implementation is justified based on the following:

- UNDP has partnered with the Government of Lebanon for the last four years in developing strategy and structures for central-level disaster management co-ordination, namely in the form of the Disaster Management Committee under the Office of the Prime Minister and the development of the National Response Plan (NRP). Other donors will provide support to development of the capacity required to implement the NRP. For purposes of effective donor co-ordination it is not advisable that the EU, or other donors, seek to develop parallel, and potentially competing, interventions the area of policy-level response to disaster;
- UNDP has built a strong partnership with the elements of the Office of the Prime Minister responsible for co-ordinating crisis risk management and disaster response. More broadly, the UN, through UNSCOL and UNIFIL, has a unique
position as a convenor of donor interaction at policy level on issues of crisis management and results. In the current crisis context, the disruption to the current action which would result from the transfer of this action to another beneficiary would severely restrict effective implementation and damage the delivery of the required results.

- The DRM Unit established with UNDP support under the Office of the Prime Minister has already received a piecemeal support from the EU in the form of study visits and conferences funded under the TAIEX instrument, and it would seem adequate to provide a more solid framework to this incipient co-operation.

The entrusted entity would be in charge of procurement of expertise for the execution of all activities foreseen under Result 3 - Activity Area 1 (*Development of functional central crisis risk management and disaster response mechanisms, with a focus on CBRN*), as detailed above.

The entrusted entity is currently undergoing the ex ante assessment in accordance with Article 61(1) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012. In anticipation of the results of this review, the responsible authorising officer deems that, based on a preliminary evaluation and on the long-standing and problem-free co-operation with this entity, it can be entrusted with budget-implementation tasks under indirect management.

### 4.4. Scope of geographical eligibility for procurement and grants

The geographical eligibility in terms of place of establishment for participating in procurement and grant award procedures and in terms of origin of supplies purchased as established in the basic act shall apply.

The responsible authorising officer may extend the geographical eligibility in accordance with Article 9(2, b) of Regulation (EU) No 236/2014 on the basis of urgency or of unavailability of products and services in the markets of the countries concerned, or other duly substantiated cases where the eligibility rules would make the realisation of this action impossible or exceedingly difficult.

### 4.5. Indicative budget

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component / Activity</th>
<th>Amount in EUR thousands</th>
<th>Third party contribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Component I – Enhanced capability for IBM</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3.2. – Activity Areas 1 to 4 composed of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3.2.1. – Indirect management with ICMPD</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component II – Improved delivery of Police services</td>
<td>1,860</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3.1. – Activity Area 1 composed of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3.1.1. – Procurement (direct management)</td>
<td>1,860</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Component III – Improved capacity for emergency preparedness and crisis response with emphasis on CBRN

4.3.2 - Activity Area 1 composed of
4.3.2.2. – Indirect management with UNDP 240

4.3.1. – Activity Area 2 composed of
4.3.1.2. – Procurement (direct management) 3,500

4.7. – Evaluation and audit
160

4.8. – Communication and visibility
n/a

Contingencies
240

Totals
12,000

4.6. Performance monitoring

Performance will be assessed through annual external reviews, based on agreed performance indicators and implementation milestones. Such indicators will be updated and refined (to better capture cross-cutting dimensions such as human rights or gender) in the LogFrame by the Technical Assistance at the beginning of the programme's implementation, building on the inputs received by the other EU-funded SSR projects (recently closed or on-going). Means of verification will include primary documentation from the Lebanese agencies, project documentation, and qualitative interviews with key Lebanese agency stakeholders.

In order to foster coherence of approach across the portfolio, it is recommended that, to the greatest extent possible, common programme level indicators and means of verification be used across projects in the action, drawing on survey data for measures of national and local stability, the resilience of Lebanon’s response to the current or future crises, and the development of institutional capabilities.

4.7. Evaluation and audit

External Evaluations and audits of the service contracts and the grant contracts will be carried out by independent consultants recruited by the EUD in accordance with EU rules and procedures based on the specific ToR.

To make sure the programme maintains the adequate agility/flexibility in project management, tight revision cycles (based on programme monitoring) and a mid-term

7 Based on the experience acquired in previous SSR programming with reference to the implementation of communication and visibility budgets, the communication and visibility budgets will be allocated directly to the operational procurement budgets.
evaluation at the early stages of engagement will be needed. A final evaluation and audit are also foreseen.

4.8. **Communication and visibility**

Communication and visibility of the EU is a legal obligation for all external actions funded by the EU.

This action shall contain communication and visibility measures which shall be based on a specific Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action, to be elaborated before the start of implementation and supported with the budget indicated in section 4.5 above.

The measures shall be implemented either (a) by the Commission, and/or (b) by the partner country, contractors, grant beneficiaries and entrusted entities. Appropriate contractual obligations shall be included in, respectively, financing agreements, procurement and grant contracts, and delegation agreements.

The Communication and Visibility Manual for European Union External Action shall be used to establish the Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action and the appropriate contractual obligations.

Communication will represent an important tool for the programme to deliver achieve its objectives. Specific *Communication and Visibility Strategies* will therefore be defined with each implementing partner as part of the operational procurement budgets entrusted to these entities for the implementation of the activities described above. These strategies will detail how specific communication and visibility actions will help the project achieve its objectives and disseminate its results and lessons learnt. The production of reference materials for distribution and visibility activities will be part of this work and will be geared at reinforcing the messages that each project will deliver through its own activities. The amount dedicated for Communication and Visibility will be at least of EUR 240,000 throughout the three programme's components.