Standard Project Fiche

Basic Information

1.1 CRIS Number: TR2011/0124.10

1.2 Title: Socioeconomic Development through Demining and Increasing the Border Surveillance Capacity at the Eastern Borders of Turkey

1.3 Sector: 24-Justice, freedom and security

1.4 Location: Turkey (Provinces of Van, Ağrı, Iğdır, Kars)

Implementing arrangements:

1.5 Implementing Agency:

The Central Finance and Contracting Unit (CFCU) will be Implementing Agency and will be responsible for overall coordination and monitoring of project implementation, all procedural aspects of the tendering process, contracting matters and financial management, including payment of project activities.

The Director of the CFCU will act as Programme Authorizing Officer of the project.

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1.6 Main Beneficiary:

1) Ministry of Interior - Development and Implementation Bureau on Border Management Legislation and Administrative Capacity

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2) General Staff (Land Forces Command)
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1.7 Overall cost: EUR 52.450.000
1.8 EU contribution: EUR 39.450.000
1.9 Final date for contracting: 2 years after the signature of the Financing Agreement
1.10 Final date for execution of contracts: 2 years following the end date for contracting
1.11 Final date for disbursements: 1 year after the end date for the execution of contracts

2. Overall Objective and Project Purpose

2.1 Overall Objective(s):
Social and economic development through demining and more secure borders in Eastern Turkey.

2.2 Project purpose:
To contribute to the prevention of illegal migration and all types of cross-border crimes at Turkey’s Eastern borders in line with EU’s IBM policies and strategies via de-mining the area and providing effective and humanitarian border surveillance tools for a technologically supported modern border surveillance system.

2.3 Link with Accession Partnership (AP)/ NPAA / Progress Report

2008 Accession Partnership

Short-term priorities:
• Continue efforts to implement the National Action Plan on Integrated Border Management including through the definition of a precise road map. Steps should be taken to establish the new border law enforcement authority,
• Continue efforts to implement the National Action Plan on Asylum and Migration (including through the adoption of a roadmap), increase capacity to combat illegal migration in line with international standards,
• Implement the national strategy on organized crime. Strengthen the fight against organized crime, drugs, trafficking in persons, fraud, corruption and money-laundering.

Medium-term priorities:
• Accelerate efforts to set up an integrated border management system in line with the acquis, based on close interagency coordination and professionalism of staff, covering inter alia, a pre-screening mechanism to identify persons in need of international protection at borders.

2005 Accession Partnership

Justice, freedom and security:
• Adopt and begin implementation of the National Action Plan on Border Management, in particular through taking steps to establish a professional non-military border guard and through de-mining of the border.

2008 National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis

Chapter 24 Justice, freedom and security

• Priority 24.1 continuing to strengthen and enhance the judicial and administrative capacity of all law enforcement institutions and align their status and functioning with European standards, including through developing inter-agency cooperation.

National Action Plan towards the implementation of Turkey’s Integrated Border Management Strategy

Under the section concerning the objectives of the Action Plan among the priorities for field organization there is reference to the removal of mines from the western borders as indicated in the 2005 Accession Partnership.

In the Annex on Financing Plan, reference has been made to the acquisition of vehicles and equipment used for land border surveillance including land surveillance radar, electronic surveillance and control system which includes sensors.

Regular report priority

2010 Progress Report

POLITICAL CRITERIA

Human rights and the protection of minorities

Situation in the east and south-east

Landmines remain a security concern for military personnel and civilians, after causing several casualties. The government reported continuing use of anti-personnel mines by the PKK. Under the ‘Ottawa Convention’ on the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines and on their destruction, Turkey has undertaken to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas as soon as possible, but no later than 1 March 2014.

Landmine clearing at the border areas continues to be a priority. Following the adoption of the law on "mine clearing and tender procedures to be conducted at the land borders between Turkey and Syria", a "project management group" has been established in under the Ministry of Defense, working in particular on the re-demarcation of the Turkish-Syrian border. Further actions are needed to de-mine border areas in the country, in particular the ones adjacent to Iraqi and Iranian borders.

ABILITY TO ASSUME THE OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBERSHIP

Chapter 24: Justice, freedom and security

Measures are required to deploy more trained staff and additional border check equipment at border crossing points to prepare for professionalized border management. Further efforts are
needed to transfer border control tasks to a new border security agency; the current agencies need to be strengthened at the same time as this new agency is established.

2.4 Link with MIPD

Besides the positive socioeconomic development benefits which will be achieved through demining, this project falls mainly under the sector Justice, Home Affairs and Fundamental Rights in the Turkey MIPD for 2011-2013. One of the objectives of the IPA support to this sector is “effective law enforcement, successful fight against crime and corruption and improved integrated border management and prevention of illegal migration”.

As such the implementation of this project will contribute to the achievement of the following indicator:

- Effective integrated border management and prevention of illegal migration through effective systems to manage asylum, illegal migration and borders; establishment and effective functioning of the integrated border management system and reduction of cross-border crimes, in particular focusing on trafficking and smuggling in human beings.

2.5 Link with National Development Plan (Contribution to National Development Plan (and/or Structural Funds Development Plan/SDP)

According to point 726 of the 9th National Development Plan, in accordance with the National Action Plan towards the implementation of Turkey’s IBM Strategy; the legal and institutional framework action will continue towards establishing a professional border enforcement unit.

2.6 Link with national/sectoral investment plans

The difficulties Turkey is facing in providing border security and controls have been mentioned in the chapters 2.2.2 of the National Action Plan on Integrated Border Management.

Turkey must provide the borders with technological equipment and implement certain projects with the EU funds to establish surveillance and controls meeting the EU standards in line with the institutional and legislative efforts for integrated border management in parallel to the improvements in equipment, Turkey should also advance the procedures applied for border management to achieve a more efficient functioning of the system.

A financing source from the EU funds and from the Turkish government needed to be created for the investments. The “Financing Plan” annexed to the national action plan should be taken into consideration in implementing the investments.

3. Description of project

3.1 Background and justification
a) Relevant country background

The Turkish Government in the course of progress towards accession to the European Union and in response to the obligations of the EU and its Member States is actively following a National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis. However the objective of the process of law approximation is not only to implement the relevant amendments to existing legislation but as importantly, to strengthen those institutions responsible for the enforcement or
implementation of the new procedures. This process of ‘Institution building and Reform’ in order to enhance administrative capacity, is seen as crucial in ensuring that Turkey is successful in the transition to the standards, norms, expectations and obligations of similar EU Member State administrations.

Within the process of ‘Institution Building and Reform’, border management which is evaluated under the chapter of Freedom, Justice and Security is regarded as being one of the most priority areas of this process. After the membership to the EU, as Turkey’s eastern borders will be the external borders of the Union, management of a comprehensive border security and its implementation constitutes an important subject.

Management of the eastern borders is not an easy task due to geographical and climate conditions of Turkey in that region. Moreover, this region constitutes a big problem in terms of being the illegal crossing route and in order to provide the border security in this region, landmines had been used mostly to prevent illegal border crossings, smugglings and due to security reasons. For the time being these land mines constitute a very serious threat for border management in that region.

The global landmine crisis is also one of the most pervasive problems facing the world today.

In 1996, a comprehensive international initiative that is known as the Ottawa Process was started by a great number of countries led by Canada, Austria and Germany and with the initiatives of Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs). The aim of the process was to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines with the total ban of anti-personnel mines. On 26 January 1998, the Chief of the Turkish General Staff issued a directive banning the use of antipersonnel mines by the Turkish armed forces. There have been no confirmed instances of use of antipersonnel mines by Turkish forces since that time.

The Republic of Turkey acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 25 September 2003, becoming a state party on 1 March 2004. Turkey has not enacted domestic implementation legislation, but has indicated that its constitution and criminal code, and directives from Turkey’s Armed Forces General Staff, give legal effect to the treaty’s provisions. Turkey has to implement its obligations under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty and is currently trying to meet its 2014 deadline for clearance of all antipersonnel mines from mined areas under its jurisdiction or control.

Currently, the size of the mined area in Turkey is 313.274.400 m².

Turkey evaluates the Ottawa Convention as a success regarding the ban on the use of antipersonnel mines. Moreover, being a country attaching great importance to ongoing humanitarian mine clearance activities on different parts of the world, Turkey is trying to clear the mines in her own lands in the south and south east region. With reference to the said convention, Turkey should clear the landmines in her own lands. Within this respect, works are ongoing for clearance activities in the borderline with Syria. A law on the “The Tender and Mine Clearance Activities along the land borders between the Republic of Turkey and Syria Arab Republic”, Law No. 5903 had entered into force on 17 June 2009. According to this Law, the Ministry of Defense is tasked to carry out the duty of demining activities in Syrian border to be financed from national funds. This accelerates the coordination between Ministries. As mentioned above, the mine clearance activities along these borders will be financed by Turkish Republic and the other landmines in eastern and south east of Turkey are also planned to be cleared in the scope of the commitment of Turkey under Ottowa Convention and due to other international agreements. Turkey plans to clear the minefield along 42km of the border with Iraq, the minefield along 109 km of the border with Iran,
and the minefield along 17km of the border with Armenia. As per the assessments made by the government and Land Forces Command concerning the resources for clearance activities, it has been evaluated that it would be appropriate to use external assistance especially for the clearance activities that will take place in the eastern border regions.

The necessary procedures for the works that will take place in military forbidden zones are arranged in the Military Forbidden Zone and Safety Regions Law, Military Forbidden Regions and Safety Regions Regulations. As per this law and regulation, it is necessary to get permission from General Staff for all the activities that will take place in these regions.

There is not yet a national mine action authority or mine action centre in Turkey. However as concerns the Syrian border, based on the Law No. 5903 (see Annex.4 for details), works are ongoing to prepare a directive for setting up a Top Project Board (TPB) to oversee mine action. A Project Implementation Board (PIB) has already been established to pursue the tendering process for clearing of the landmines, to monitor the implementation and to act as a contact point for relevant activities. The experiences gained from the works of these boards will be beneficial for the future clearance activities in the other regions of Turkey.

The landmines are generally located in border areas; however there are no land mines at Turkey’s western borders, all the mines laid on the Turkish side of Turkey’s borders with Greece, Bulgaria, and Georgia have been cleared. The landmines are only located in Armenian, Nakhchivan, Iranian, Iraq and Syrian Borders. This constitutes a very important problem in terms of providing an efficient border management system. The main reasons of laying these land mines in these regions differ from the countries of South East Europe. In South East Europe mines were basically laid due to war conditions or to conflicts between the states and these mines are generally laid nearby or inside the settlements in South East Europe. However, in Turkey the situation is different: these land mines are generally laid along the borders to prevent illegal migration or smuggling activities or for security reasons against PKK. In today’s conditions, in addition to the humanitarian concerns, these landmines limit the operational capacity of Turkey in the border areas. They prevent the establishment of good functioning border surveillance systems and as a result lead to a decrease in the efficiency in the fight against illegal migration, cross-border crimes and smuggling. For these reasons, demining is evaluated as an indispensable part of the border management reforms. Turkey targets to have these landmines cleared to provide a more secure way of protecting the borders by means of technologically supported border surveillance systems and achieve the targets set out by European Union for a good functioning border management system.

Turkey has difficulties in providing border security as she is a country which has long mountainously steep land borders on the east and south west. She has also long costs which constitutes sea borders on her South, North and West. She poses a crossroads among Middle East, Asia and Europe. Due to this geographical location, a strong border controlling and safeguarding organization is needed.

In the recent years, illegal border crossings, mostly in the form of multinational organized crime (smuggling, trafficking and terrorism etc.) nature have created serious ramifications not only for Turkey but also for European border management system. Illegal immigrants are smuggled into Turkey and also Europe either across unregulated land, sea or air borders or through regulated security check points using counterfeit/stolen passports or concealed in cargoes. Turkey is influenced by these illegal activities due to the fact that it sets a bridge between east and the west, holds the straits which are the only exits of the Black Sea to the open seas and has natural and cultural charms as well as democratic and universal principles of law embedded in the social structure.
Current state of affairs in the relevant sector

State of play in border surveillance at Eastern Borders:

Illegal border crossings constitute a very serious threat to national security and made a pressure on European border management system. Whereas the numbers of illegal migrants crossing the borders, between 2006 and 2009 were 15,270, this number increased to 39,274 in 2009-2010. More than the half of these illegal crossings had taken place in the east and southeast of Turkey (Iran, Iraq and Syria). In the border of Turkey-Iran approximately 8,000 illegal crossings are taking place annually. Nearly half of these illegal crossing have taken place in Van-Ağrı-Kars-İğdır provinces. To state more clearly, 30% of these annual illegal crossings are taking place in this region. For this reason, increasing the technological measures to prevent these illegal border crossings in this region should be a priority in terms of border management. It is very crucial to further increase the border security measures through additional technological systems in the fight against illegal border crossings and organized crime in this region. In order to use this technology, it is necessary to clear the mines in these border areas. It is not possible to establish a technologically supported border security system without demining these border areas.

The Land Forces, in charge of border surveillance in the border region concerned is currently utilizing the following types of equipment however since the border region is mined for the time being these equipments are placed in close areas to the mine fields and this effects the efficiency of the border security in these regions.
- 4x4
- Observation towers, border stations
- Thermal cameras
- Barbed wires

As mentioned above, it is necessary to strengthen the security measures in the areas that will be cleared from mines in order to have a complete border surveillance system. Through the surveillance vehicles that are planned to be purchased in this project, most of the border patrolling in the cleared areas will be carried out.

Ongoing efforts and plans to improve the border surveillance at Eastern Borders:

Turkey is already in the process of upgrading the conditions for border surveillance. The efforts could be defined as threefold:
- Renovation, reconstruction of the border stations via Housing Development Administration of Turkey (TOKİ)
- Constructing zero line roads at the borders
- Construction of telephone lines, lightening the newly constructed roads and building new fences/wires

One of the results of this project is to strengthen the border surveillance capacity by means of technological equipment. Demining of the area will be the first step to achieve this result and then the priority will be given to the construction of a humanitarian physical border security system along these border regions through the efforts mentioned above in addition to border
surveillance equipment that will be purchased within this project. The same process will take place along the Syrian border once the clearance activity has completed.

**Preparation** stage for this project:

“Land release” is the process of applying all reasonable effort to identify or better define Confirmed Hazardous Areas (CHA) and remove suspicion of mines through non technical survey, technical survey and/or clearance using an evidence-based and documented approach. Effective management of this project aims to return land in a safe and efficient manner for providing the technical infrastructure for the procurement of border surveillance equipments.

This stage of land release had already been carried out in the specified eastern borders of Turkey by Land Forces Command for the regions mentioned below. All the related data for this stage is available in Land Forces and the preparation activities for the region between Yassıtepe and Sibraltepe are presented as an example to these studies in the annex of this project fiche.

- the border of Turkey - Armenia
- the region between Dilucu - Gürbulak BCPs
- the region between Gürbulak - Yassıtepe
- the region between Yassıtepe - Sibraltepe
- Özalp region
- Albayrak-Gelenler village region

The feasibility studies as the pre-study of this project carried out by the Land Forces comprise detailed measurements including the photographing of these mined areas. The surrounding of these mined areas had been marked in a way to leave a safety margin.

The first stage of the “land release” as being the identification and defining the mined areas which is called as technical survey (preparation) had already been carried out by Land Forces Command in 2009. Two different teams had been established by the Land Forces to examine the minefields along the borders with Armenia and Iran at site and detected the location of mines with an error margin of ±%10-%15. After that, these mined areas had been marked and surrounded by wire fences. Warning signs had been placed on these fences at each 50m. in such a way to be seen from the neighboring country.

**Identification of the needs at Eastern Borders:**

Given the hard topographic and harsh weather conditions, it is necessary to establish technologically supported physical border security systems and to construct zero line roads to control the borders more effectively.

In general, mines are located with the depth of 500-700 meters into the inland of borders in border regions and at the back of this area track fields, patrol roads, border lightning and watchtowers are built. To have the physical border security systems at the back of the border makes the border surveillance harder especially in hard weather conditions and mountainous areas. Due to the reason of having line roads at the back of border, it is impossible to reach the border as motorized. However, the neighboring countries have zero line roads to our borders. The maintenance and controlling of border stones are made through the borders of neighboring countries according to the protocols made by these countries for this purpose. Therefore, the borders should be demined in order to establish a technological system and to construct zero line roads along borders.
Once the clearance activities had been completed, the borders should be supported by physical security systems, wire fences, command control centers, patrolling roads and etc. However, in eastern borders it is difficult to establish these physical security systems due to having these mined areas separately from each other (the minefields are not uninterrupted long lines as at the Syrian borders but rather consisting of a patchwork of separate areas). Some feasibility studies are going on for lightning, construction of roads, optical and physical security systems for this region and also Housing Development Administration of Turkey (TOKİ) is planning to modernize some stations in this region but modernizing these stations is not an enough solution by itself but it should also be supported by mobile technological equipments to have a sound border protection around this region.

Within the framework of increasing the current measures that will prevent illegal migration and human smuggling, it has been evaluated as appropriate to have these technological systems in the region of Van-Ağrı-Iğdır-Kars within the scope of the integrated border management project. The difficulties Turkey is facing in providing border security and controls have been mentioned in the chapters 2.2.2 of the National Action Plan. The region of Van-Ağrı-Iğdır-Kars is very mountainous and hence it is necessary to have additional technological systems in order to control the illegal crossing route. Landmines are barrier systems laid along the borders as a part of the physical border security system within the context of security measures. Turkey has always been seen as a step to reach Europe through illegal migration and it maintains her attractiveness on this issue. **The landmines had been used along the borders as a deterrent factor to prevent illegal migration** within the context of providing border security. Even though the mines were laid to prevent illegal border crossings, and around security installations at first, due to the new concept of security perception and humanitarian reasons, it is inefficient, cruel and insufficient to fight against illegal border crossing, smuggling and cross-border crimes in this way. Besides, contaminated areas make it difficult to patrol along the border for surveillance. So, in nowadays conditions, this barrier system should be replaced by technology and the landmines previously laid in this region prevent the establishment of technological systems. If these lands are demined, then this will give the opportunity to establish these systems in that region and to provide the maintenance and continuation without giving any harm to the personnel working in the field.

Hence;

- Due to the changes in the perception of security (disarmament, controlling of weapons and works on disarmament), the landmines used as a deterrent factor to prevent illegal migration should be cleared in the border region of Van-Ağrı-Iğdır-Kars.

- By this way the field will be suitable for the strengthening of the border surveillance through technological capacity to combat illegal migration, smuggling and cross-border crime by respecting human life,

- The lives of the people affected from the landmines will be saved through demining by giving the way to the establishment of more effective and humanitarian border management methods.

**Mine Casualties in Turkey:**

In most cases, the places of the mines are known by the people trying the cross the border illegally. However the exact locations of mines are changing due to weather conditions or to the movements of soil so even if people think that they may be able to cross these mined areas along the borders. Since it is not always the case, the dislocation of mines causes lots of people to die or severely wounded. The way to prevent these casualties is to demine these areas and to
provide a more secure way of protecting the borders within the context of border management. Once these minefields are cleared, the casualties caused by these landmines will disappear.

There is no comprehensive statistics about the casualties however according to Landmine Monitor analysis of 2008 media reports collected by the Initiative for a Mine-Free Turkey (IMFT) identified at least 100 new casualties due to mines, ERW, and victim-activated IEDs, including 29 people killed and 71 injured. Of these, 72 were members of security forces and 28 were civilians.

The number of casualties in 2008 was very similar to that collected by the IMFT in 2007 (101 casualties; 28 people killed and 73 injured). Turkey reported 158 antipersonnel mine casualties in 2008 (37 killed and 121 injured). It was not specified how many of the casualties were civilian, or if any civilians were “village guards” or members of other security forces. This total represented a significant decrease from 257 casualties (53 killed and 204 injured) reported for 2007. It was a return to similar casualty numbers reported in 2006 (155 casualties; 24 killed and 131 injured).

Casualties continued to occur in 2009 with at least 48 new casualties of victim-activated devices (27 killed and 21 injured), as of 29 June 2009. All but one of the casualties were male (the gender of one casualty was unknown). The 47 male casualties included 42 men, one boy, and four casualties of unknown age.

The total number of mine casualties in Turkey is unknown. Landmine Monitor has reported 831 victim-activated mine/ERW casualties in Turkey between 1999 and 2008, including 250 killed and 581 injured.

Turkey has reported that between 1993 and 2003 landmines caused 2,905 casualties, including 588 people killed and 2,317 injured. It was reported that more than 3,000 people (mostly civilians) have been killed and another 7,000 injured by mines along the Turkish-Syrian border since the 1950s.

According to Turkey’s latest Article 7 report covering calendar year 2008, 37 military personnel and civilians were killed and 121 were injured in 2008 by landmines used by the PKK/KADEK/Kongra Gel. The report does not differentiate between casualties caused by antipersonnel mines, anti-vehicle mines or improvised explosive devices (IEDs), nor between victim-activated and command-detonated mines/IEDs. In its Article 7 report covering calendar year 2007, Turkey reported that 53 military personnel and civilians were killed and 204 injured by landmines used by the PKK/KADEK/Kongra Gel.

**Quantity of Mines in Turkey:**

According to the Annual Article 7 Report, for the reporting period of 01 January 2009 to 31 December 2009, the quantity of stockpiled anti-personnel mines is 730.458 in total and the total quantity of mines in mined areas is 979.417. For the reporting period of 01 January 2008 to 31 December 2008, the quantity of stockpiled anti-personnel mines is 1.702.982 in total and the total quantity of mines in mined areas is 981.778. For the reporting period of 01 January 2007 to 31 December 2007, the quantity of stockpiled anti-personnel mines is 2.616.770 in total and the total quantity of mines in mined areas is 982.777.

Turkey is contaminated with antipersonnel and anti-vehicle mines, and ERW, primarily UXO, as well as IEDs. Mines were laid from 1956–1959 along 510km of the border with Syria, and on some sections of the borders with Armenia, Iran, and Iraq to prevent illegal border
crossings, and around security installations. All the mines laid on the Turkish side of Turkey’s borders with Greece, Bulgaria, and Georgia have been cleared. Landmines were also emplaced by government forces during the 1984–1999 conflict with the PKK in the southeast of the country. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, these mines have been progressively cleared since 1998. New contamination may result from use of mines and IEDs by the PKK from 2007–2008.

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<tr>
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<th>2004</th>
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<th>2008</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stockpiled Anti-Personnel Mines</strong></td>
<td>2,973,481</td>
<td>2,979,165</td>
<td>2,866,818</td>
<td>2,616,770</td>
<td>1,702,982</td>
<td>730,458</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Mines On The Areas</strong></td>
<td>920,552</td>
<td>984,313</td>
<td>983,166</td>
<td>982,777</td>
<td>981,778</td>
<td>979,417</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Retained for Training</strong></td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>15,150</td>
<td>15,150</td>
<td>15,125</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Deaths Occurred</strong></td>
<td>25</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wounded</strong></td>
<td>123</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rehabilitation Provided</strong></td>
<td>123</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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According to a report prepared by an NGO called ‘Initiative for a demined Turkey’, the number of mines in some borders is as follows;

- In the minefield of 42 km. along the border of Iraq, there are 75,115 mines,
- In the minefield of 109 km. along the border of Iran, there are 191,428 mines,
- In the minefield of 17 km. along the border of Armenia, there are 21,984 mines.

**Civil society aspect:**

Within the scope of this project design, the above mentioned NGO called ‘Initiative for a demine Turkey’ was consulted to obtain their views in relation to the impact on civil society. According to the feedback given, due to nature of these minefields being far away from the settlements, the project does not have a direct impact on the local community. Therefore, no activities are planned in this respect in this project.

There are some activities in the region which can be regarded as awareness raising activities such as the informing of the village headmen by the law enforcement authorities about minefields who in turn inform the local people on this issue.

From time to time the importance of the issue is emphasized in sermons taking place in mosques. Apart from these informing activities, no special activity is planned within the framework of this project about awareness raising activities on minefields.
For the clearance activities in the Syrian border, Ministry of Education and Land Forces have reached an agreement about informing the students in schools and putting some lectures on how to be protected from the landmines and about the clearance activities taking place in that region.

**Related programs and other donor activities:**

- TR 02 JH 02 Support for the Development of an Action Plan to implement Turkey’s Integrated Border Management Strategy
  Output: An action plan to determine the legal and institutional reforms, training activities, and infrastructure and equipment investments expected to be realized for an integrated border management system in alignment with the EU requirements.

- TR 04 JH 04 Development of a Training System for Border Police
  Output: A training strategy, program and curriculum in EU standards for the new border police to be established and a practical “Common Manual of Checks at the External Borders” developed for personnel currently working at borders

- TR 02 JH 03 Support for the Development of an Action Plan to Implement Turkey’s Asylum-Migration Strategy
  Output: An action plan on asylum and migration strategy in line with EU legislation. It also improved the operational and administrative (coordination, human resources, equipment) capacity of the agencies responsible for management and implementation of Turkish asylum and migration policy.

- TR 07 IB JH 04 Action Plan on Integrated Border Management-Phase 1. (Ongoing)
  Purpose: To support the Turkish Government in transforming the current border management to an integrated one by detailing the Action Plan in the form of a Roadmap defined in the Action Plan and ensure further development of high level border management and border surveillance architecture and standards in line with EU’s IBM policies and strategies.

- TR 07 IB JH 04 Action Plan on Integrated Border Management-Phase 2. (Ongoing)
  Purpose: To support the Turkish Government in transforming the current border management to an integrated one by detailing the Action Plan in the form of a Roadmap defined in the Action Plan and ensure further development of high level border management and border surveillance architecture and standards in line with EU’s IBM policies and strategies.

- TR 08 IB JH 02 Training of Border Police (Ongoing)
  Purpose: Improving the in-service training capacity of the Turkish National Police working at border gates and further development of integrated border management best practices in line with EU’s IBM policies and strategies.

**b) Current level of Progress**

Within the scope of the studies to determine a comprehensive harmonization strategy on the protection of the external borders as a part of the efforts of alignment with the EU legislation and practice, Turkey set up a **Task Force**, bringing together different agencies responsible for border management, asylum and migration namely General Staff, Ministry of the Interior (General Directorate for Public Security, Gendarmerie General Command and the Coast
Guard Command), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Under-secretariat of Customs to develop
an overall strategy in these areas in 2002, under the coordination of the Ministry of Interior
and three separate working groups connected to this task force were established in the fields
of “asylum”, “migration” and “external borders.”

As a result of the studies which continued for one year, “the Strategy Paper for the
Protection of External Borders” was issued in April 14, 2003, with the contributions of the
representatives from institutions and agencies such as the General Staff, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Ministry of the Interior (General Command of Gendarmerie, General Directorate for
Security and the European Union Coordination Department).

Based on the aforementioned strategy paper, “National Action Plan towards to
Implementation of Turkey’s Integrated Border Management Strategy” was drawn up as a
result of the twinning project carried out in cooperation with France and UK Consortium and
was approved by Prime Minister of Turkey on 27 March 2006.

The working group in the field of “external borders” continues to regular monthly meetings in
which to convey information about the latest progress and deficiency about the projects that
take place in the section of the infrastructural needs towards the border surveillance and
control and to give information about the necessary requirements and the Roadmap to pursue.

A training strategy, program and curriculum in EU standards for the new border police to
be established and a practical “Common Manual of Checks at the External Borders” was
developed for personnel currently working at borders as a result of the twinning project
“Development of a Training System for Border Police” carried out in cooperation with Spain
and Hungary Consortium in the end of 2007.

Within the context of TAIX, several study visits for development of research relevant for the
control and surveillance of external borders, of obtaining first hand info about developing a risk
analysis model at strategic, operational and technical level in line with best practices, standards
and procedures for border police units, of SIS, Sirene and of Interagency cooperation in the
field of IBM.

Within the context of MATRA, a project proposal for training of law enforcement units in order
to prevent use of forged travel documents by people was accepted as a result of 2008
programme applications. The project has been implemented and study visits had taken place to
Netherlands.

As the transition to integrated border management is to be started at the border gates and as the
completion of the legislative, administrative and infrastructural efforts to strengthen the existing
capacity in accordance with the EU Acquis and standards will take a long time, it is decided to
be done step by step. As a conclusion the project “Action Plan on Integrated Border
Management- Phase I” was developed, accepted in the context of the first component of IPA
in 2007 and started in second quarter of 2010 and still under implementation.

The Development and Implementation Bureau for Border Management Legislation and
Administrative Capacity was established in the Ministry of Interior on 15 of October 2008.
This unit is under the Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior. The unit is responsible for
carrying out studies for legislative and administrative structure of IBM, preparing of
assessment and needs analysis on IBM, carrying out IBM projects, working on the
establishment of a new border security unit, organizing External Borders Task Force with the
participation of institutions responsible for border surveillance and control on a monthly
bases.

The Integrated Border Management Coordination Board under the presidency of
undersecretary of Ministry of Interior, with participation of high level representatives from General Staff, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Transportation, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, Gendarmerie General Command, Undersecretaries of Customs, Undersecretariat of Maritime Affairs, Ministry of EU Affairs, Security General Directorate, Coast Guard Command and General Directorate, National Police was established in May 2010. The main goal's of the “Integrated Border Management Coordination Board” is to develop strategy and policy, to set priorities and oversee implementation of core documents in IBM. According provided information, the Turkish authorities is in process of establishing implementing bodies which will co-ordinate implementation of IBM documents.

In Justice and Home Affairs Council Meeting which was held in Brussels at the dates of 25th and 26th of February 2010, it was concluded on 29 measures for reinforcing the protection of the external borders and combating illegal immigration, it has been mentioned in article 26 that ‘The Commission is also invited, in the context of the existing Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) financial framework, to explore possibilities to provide adequate financial means to improve Turkish capacity to tackle illegal migration, including support to the implementation of the Turkish integrated border management system.

c) The corresponding Turkish legislation

Law No: 3497 on Protection and Security of Green Borders

According to the aforementioned law;

- Land Forces Command is tasked to protect and secure the green borders and this task shall be fulfilled by border units

The Land Forces Command is the authorized body for the security of the land borders of Turkey under the provisions of Act No. 3497 on the Protection and Security of Land Borders. However, pending the transfer of responsibility for border control to the Land Forces Command, a part of the Iraq border is currently under the control of the Gendarmerie General Command. As mentioned in the National Action Plan towards the Implementation of Turkey’s Integrated Border Management Strategy; until the completion of the transfer of the duties the Land Forces Command and the Gendarmerie General Command will continue to perform their duties under the Law no.3497.

- Law No. 5903 on the Tender and Mine Clearance Activities along the land borders between the Republic of Turkey and Syria Arab Republic had been accepted in the Turkish Grand National Assembly on 4th June 2009 and entered into force on 17th June 2009.

d) Current institutional changes

In compliance with the provisions of Act No. 3497 on the Protection and Security of Land Borders, work is underway to transfer border surveillance currently under the responsibility of the Gendarmerie General Command to the Land Forces Command.

As foreseen in the Action Plan, the new border management detachment will be a well trained, professional, centrally organized, non-military unit under the Ministry of Interior.

3.2. Assessment of project impact, catalytic effect, sustainability and cross border impact

The people living close to these areas have been risking their lives for economical reasons. They are using the borders for smuggling in order to make their living. They are killed or wounded severely while trying to cross these mined areas for smuggling purposes or for illegal migration.
At the start of the project, the beneficiary of the border surveillance equipment will be the Land Forces Command and in the future the ownership of this equipment will be transferred to the Border Agency.

After delivery, the supplied equipment will be used exclusively for border surveillance. Any other use or modification of the equipment requires the written authorisation by the Commission.

**Cross border impact**

The demining of the eastern borders will have a cross border impact with the neighboring countries in terms of having a more secure and technologically supported border management systems leading to a better border management system and contribute to the fight against all kinds of smuggling and related cross-border crimes.

**3.3. Results and measurable indicators:**

Results expected from this project are as follows:

**Component 1: Clearance of landmines in the eastern border regions of Turkey (Service Contract)**

**R.1.1.** Demining the border regions of Van- Ağrı- Iğdır-Kars

Measurable indicators of R.1;

By project end;

- Disappearance of accidents through mine clearance
- Selected border regions become suitable for the establishment of humanitarian border surveillance systems.
- Maps of mine hazardous areas before and after project realization, decreased by 13.538.462 m²

**Component 2: Supply of Technological Border Surveillance Equipment for the Cleared regions (Supply Contract)**

**R.2.1** Strengthened border surveillance capacity in the borders of Van- Ağrı-Iğdır-Kars region by means of technological equipment.

Measurable indicators of R.2;

- supply of 15 pieces of 4*4 vehicles equipped with sensors and radars
- year after the project end;
- Between %20 and %30 of decrease in cross-border crimes and illegal entries (these percentages are only an assumption, there are lots of factors effecting the cross-border crimes and illegal entries and it is very difficult to make a precise prediction only by taking into account the supply of border surveillance equipment. The economic and social situation of the neighboring and other countries in the region, political regime shifts, natural disasters etc. can be suggested as the examples of the factors effecting this situation.
- 48 number of staff trained on the use of the modern vehicles
• Improved border patrol plan in place for the use of the vehicles

3.4. Activities (including inputs = precise list of contracts)

The activities of this project will address the following stages of the process which includes the clearance and post-clearance activities via a service contract. The equipment that will be used in clearance activities shall be provided by the service contractor.

Component 1: Clearance of landmines in the eastern border regions of Turkey (Service Contract)

1.1 Clearance

This stage includes the clearance activities for the selected regions.

The operational procedures for clearance activities in the said regions should be effective and safe and should be based on international norms and ‘best-practice’, such as the destruction of mines in-situ, safety distances and the handling of explosives on the local mine and ground conditions.

1.1.1. Clearance activity along the border of Turkey-Armenia

1.1.2. Clearance activity between Dilucu-Gürbulak

1.1.3. Clearance activity between the region of Gürbulak and Yassitepe (Border Stone No.125)

1.1.4. Clearance activity between the region of Yassitepe (Border Stone No.125) and Sibraltepe (Border Stone No.228)

1.1.5. Clearance activity between the region of Sibraltepe (Border Stone No.228) and the Border Stone No. 306 (Özalp region)

1.1.6. Clearance activity between Border Stone No.306 and the Border Stone No. 357 (Albayrak - Gelenler Village region)

1.2 Post-clearance

The service provider is required to conduct a formal post project review (PPR) to identify lessons-learned which are relevant to the planning, preparation and clearance phases of the operation. The PPR should include a report on the suitability of the equipment, procedures, training and support and should have all accident/incident reports appended. Issues of concern should be identified and prioritized, and solutions proposed.

This activity is not a certification process; just a post review of the contractor on how they carried out the demining work, what kind of difficulties they have faced during the clearance activities. This is a self-evaluation that will be made by the service provider (Contractor).
Component 2: Supply of Technological Border Surveillance Equipment for the Cleared regions (Supply Contract)

2.1 Supply

Supply of technological border surveillance equipments in order to prevent or detect illegal border crossings and smuggling.

The beneficiary of this equipment will be those in charge of the surveillance of the "green border", and possibly also of the territory immediately adjacent to the latter.

Land Forces and Gendarmerie are currently respectively responsible for these two tasks, but this attribution may also change in the nearest future as a result of a Border Organization reform which is being planned. In any case, after the Border Organization has been reformed, the ownership of these vehicles will be transferred to the new organizations to be identified as relevant for the tasks.

Reconnaissance/Surveillance Vehicle (RSV), 15 pcs.

Reconnaissance/Surveillance Vehicle is used for detection of targets and transmission of collected data to the operation management centre. It has ground surveillance radar and electro-optic sensor suite as the main sensors of the system for surveillance, target detection, recognition and identification. Radar and electro-optic sensor suite operates independently and complements each other. It has computer controlled system architecture and video recording capability.

The diverse nature of eastern border defense is challenged by an equally diverse array of threats ranging from terrorists to drug smugglers and illegal border crossings. There are basically three types of threats; human and good smuggling and terrorists. All of these crimes are in the hands of armed organized crime organizations and in most cases these organizations use remote controlled explosive ordinances that endanger the lives of the personnel. Past difficulties in securing the borders against these armed organized crime organizations in conjunction with fears that terrorists could use this region for crossing the borders has prompted the use of armored surveillance vehicles to provide the security in the region as well as the security of the personnel working in that region.

Main Equipment to be purchased

- 4x4 Vehicle
- Electro-Optic Sensor Suite
- Ground Surveillance Radar

The equipment will be located around the stations in the cleared regions. There are 24 stations in the region that will be cleared from mines and one surveillance vehicle will be located per two stations and they will be under the authority of the regimental commands in the mentioned regions. These equipments can function both as stationary and mobile and its
mobile feature makes it possible to patrol large areas and it will be supported by observation towers and thermal cameras in order to have a complete surveillance system in the region.

**Estimated Unit Price:** 1,736 Million Euro

### 3.5 Conditionality and sequencing

At the start of the project, the beneficiary of the border surveillance equipment will be the Land Forces Command. Should there be institutional changes, e.g. the establishment of a civilian Border Agency, a transition plan with target date will be developed, specifying when ownership of the equipment will be transferred to the relevant institution.

After delivery, the supplied equipment will be used exclusively for border surveillance. Any other use or modification of the equipment requires the written authorisation by the Commission.

Duly taking account of the specificities of the project and the security situation in the geographical area of implementation, on-the-spot monitoring by the EU Delegation will be organised together and with the support of the beneficiary.

### 3.6 Linked activities

Studies are going on for the clearance activities in the borderline with Syria and a law on the Tender and Mine Clearance Activities along the land borders between the Republic of Turkey and Syria Arab Republic had entered into force on 17th June 2009. According to this Law, the Ministry of Defense is carrying out the duty of demining activities in Syrian border.

In Turkey, some studies concerning mine clearance had been first realized by the Specialized Mine Clearance Unit of the Turkish Military Forces in Akçakale in the province of Şanlıurfa. In 2008, a commercial company was awarded a demining contract by tender. A Turkish company, Tusun Corporation, together with its German partner Tauber, initiated demining operations in June 2008. A land of 200 square meters had been demined for a new border crossing point that was opened between the district of Kamışlı in Syria and the province of Mardin in Turkey. Demining of that area lasted for 26 days and it has been declared by the de-mining company that the area has been cleared from 310 antipersonnel, 35 antitank and from 1 hand grenade.

### 3.7 Lessons learned

IBM projects require a good cooperation among the institutions. As the projects includes different institutions as beneficiaries, the coordination and cooperation between these institutions play a crucial role for the smooth implementation of the project.

It is also important to allocate the necessary personnel from the related institutions to carry out the works in the implementation and tendering process full-time throughout the project implementation.

The working methods of project management should also be determined to provide a good coordination in the tendering and implementation process.

In Albania, under the Multi-Annual Strategy and Programming, the EC supported mine clearance and technical survey of the mined areas of Albania, especially in the north-east. The Country Strategy Paper (CSP) and the Community Assistance for Reconstruction,
Development and Stabilization (CARDS) indicated that these mined areas hindered the development of the country. It was expected that the EC funding would help Albania meet its anti-personnel mine ban convention obligation within ten years.

The policy and procedures used in Albania have been developed by the Albanian Mine Action Executive (AMAE) almost entirely without external assistance.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, professional military units mapped the minefields that have been laid. However, the numerous militias laid mines with few or no records.

In its 2009-2019 strategy, the BiH Mine Action Centre (BHMAC) stated that it assumes that 1,573 km² of land will remain contaminated by mines and UXO at the beginning of 2009.

Anti-personnel mines (and other mines) were emplaced in Croatia’s territory during the conflict that took place between 1991 and 1995. Mines were also laid in areas of strategic importance, including railway lines, power stations, pipelines and military installations.

During the period between March 1996 and June 1998 the United Nations Mine Action Centre (UNMAC) office in Croatia played a leading role in collecting data on contaminated areas. UNMAC assessments resulted in an estimate that approximately 13,000 km² of Croatian territory was suspected to contain mines. Following the creation of the Croatian Mine Action Centre (CROMAC) in late 1999 it was able to reduce the original UNMAC estimate to 5,980 km².

The Republic of Croatia confirmed its resoluteness in solving the mine problem by passing the Law on Demining in 1996, by the establishment of the Croatian Mine Action Centre in 1998, by fulfilling the commitments undertaken by joining the Ottawa Convention as well as providing for permanent and stable sources of financing in the State budget, in the World Bank loan and from public companies in the Republic of Croatia.

Humanitarian Demining Plan for the period 2009 to 2011 was made in 2008 and approved by Croatian Government in July 2009. It defined the basic tasks and their implementation for the next three-year period.

National Mine Action Strategy in the Republic of Croatia was made in 2008 and passed on by Croatian Parliament in September 2009. It consists all relevant information on mine action since 1991, current status of mine suspected area, a description of available capacities for mine action execution and their performance and basic goals to be achieved in the period 2009 to 2019 with an established method and preconditions for their realization.

The European Union assistance programs have been contributing to Croatian mine actions since 1998. Assistance was in the beginning focused on UNMAC programme and Western European Union Demining Assistance Mission (WEUDAM) that helped the establishment of Croatian mine action as well as a scientific research project in mine action.

In year 2000, the European Union launched the CARDS Assistance Program as part of the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP). The demining program served as a support component of the EU CARDS program for Croatia and the program’s wider objective was to contribute, with the removal of obstacles that landmines present, to the creation of an environment that will enable the improvement of the overall conditions for sustainable return of refugees and displaced persons by contributing to the improvement of economic, social and political conditions in the country and thus consequently to its stabilization.
The Croatian Mine Action Centre has so far successfully implemented 5 EU funded Grant Contracts and 3 World Bank loans.

The experience from CARDS and CROSS BORDER demining program in the Republic of Croatia shows that the removal of mine danger is an important cross-cutting issue when it comes to the return of refugees and internally displaced persons, and suitable development in return areas, and that it can be linked with reconstruction, return and socio-economic development.

Since 2002 the EC appears to have supported mine action in countries of South East Europe with BiH and Croatia receiving the most support.

Mine clearance in South East Europe is a mixture of national military, police and civil defense organizations, national and international NGOs, and commercial companies.

In Turkey some clearance activities had taken place by military itself and by some private companies and works are still going on in Syrian border to demine the area along the Syrian borders. However, there is no Mine Action Authority or Mine Action Centre established so far. For the planning and organization of these activities some boards are established particularly for Syrian border to ease the works going on. It could be better if an organization responsible for all the clearance activities like National Mine Action Authority is formed such as in South East Europe countries.
4. Indicative Budget

Current institutional framework is described briefly in Annex III. Below table is only for the institutional framework within this project.

**Approximately estimated budget:**

Unused funds are subject to transfer among different components before the contracting deadline expires.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTIVITIES</th>
<th>TOTAL EXP.RE</th>
<th>TOTAL PUBLIC EXP.RE</th>
<th>IPA CONTRIBUTION</th>
<th>NATIONAL PUBLIC CONTRIBUTION</th>
<th>PRIVATE CONTRIBUTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Component 1 (Service)</td>
<td>x -</td>
<td>26.400.000</td>
<td>26.400.000</td>
<td>19.800.000</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>contract 1.1 (Service contract)</td>
<td>x -</td>
<td>26.400.000</td>
<td>26.400.000</td>
<td>19.800.000</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component 2 (Supply)</td>
<td>x -</td>
<td>26.050.000</td>
<td>26.050.000</td>
<td>19.650.000</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contract 2.1 (Supply Contract)</td>
<td>x -</td>
<td>26.050.000</td>
<td>26.050.000</td>
<td>19.650.000</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL IB</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL INV</td>
<td>52.450.000</td>
<td>52.450.000</td>
<td>39.450.000</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>13.000.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL PROJECT</td>
<td>52.450.000</td>
<td>52.450.000</td>
<td>39.450.000</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>13.000.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NOTE: DO NOT MIX IB AND INV IN THE SAME ACTIVITY ROW. USE SEPARATE ROWS

Amounts net of VAT

(1) In the Activity row use “X” to identify whether IB or INV

(2) Expressed in % of the Public Expenditure (column (b))
   Expressed in % of the Total Expenditure (column (a))

"The Turkish authorities commit themselves to provide national co-financing according to the above provisions. The NAO will verify that co-financing has been provided in line with the above provisions before submitting requests for funds and final declarations adjusting payment requests to the above ratio as necessary."

"In the context of beneficiary staff participating in missions outside of Turkey paid for under a contract, the maximum amounts eligible for accommodation costs and daily allowances ("per diems") are the official rates provided for by Europe Aid for the destination country (see website for the latest rate). Provided the total cost of daily allowance and accommodation charged to the contract remains below these maximum rates, the applicable Turkish rules and regulations for per diems shall be applied when reimbursing these costs for public servants from the beneficiary institutions. Where a contract foresees the reimbursement of such expenses for Turkish public servants and other beneficiaries of IPA projects during missions inside of Turkey, the maximum costs reimbursed under the contract will be those provided for domestic missions under the applicable Turkish legislation provided that they are subject to the same ceiling for maximum rates. This provision cannot be construed and applied in contradiction with the IPA Framework Agreement and in particular the IPA Implementing Regulation."
5. Indicative Implementation Schedule (periods broken down per quarter)

**Duration of the contracts**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Start of Tendering</th>
<th>Signature of Contract</th>
<th>Contract Completion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Component 1: Clearance of landmines in the eastern border regions of Turkey (Service Contract)</td>
<td>3Q/12</td>
<td>1Q/13</td>
<td>1Q/16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component 2: Supply of Technological Border Surveillance Equipment for the Cleared regions (Supply Contract)</td>
<td>3Q/12</td>
<td>1Q/13</td>
<td>2Q/14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"All projects should in principle be ready for tendering in the first quarter following the signature of FA."

Tender dossiers will be prepared by beneficiary.
6. Cross cutting issues

6.1 Equal Opportunity

Based on the fundamental principles of promoting equality and combating discrimination, participation in the project will be guaranteed on the basis equal access regardless of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.

6.2 Environment

The de-mining process will not have any negative effect on the environment.

6.3 Minority and vulnerable groups

According to the Turkish Constitutional System, the word minority encompasses only groups of persons defined and recognized as such on the basis of multilateral or bilateral instruments to which Turkey is a party. This project has no negative impact on minority and vulnerable groups.

6.4 Civil Society/Stakeholder involvement

It will be provided that the relevant civil society organizations such as the one mentioned in the project fiche is aware of the aim and results of the project.

ANNEXES TO PROJECT FICHE

1. Logical framework matrix in standard format
2. Contracting and disbursement schedule by quarter for full duration of program
3. Institutional Framework
4. Reference to laws, regulations and strategic documents
5. Details per EU funded contract
6. An example of the feasibility study
## ANNEX 1: Logical framework matrix in standard format

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Socioeconomic development through demining and increasing the Border Surveillance Capacity at the Eastern Borders of Turkey</th>
<th>Program name and number IPA 2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overall objective</strong></td>
<td><strong>Objectively verifiable indicators</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Social and economic development through demining and more secure borders in Eastern Turkey. | Turkish institutions can carry out IBM policy consistent with EU practices and procedures  
Turkey is more efficient in providing border security in eastern borders  
Turkey is able to reach the targets set for demining in international documents  
Social and economic development of the region is enhanced through demining. | • Monitoring by Delegation  
• Progress Reports  
• Turkstat |
| **Contracting period expires:** | **Disbursement period expires:** | **Total budget:** EUR 52.450.000,00  
**IPA budget:** EUR 39.450.000,00 |
<p>| 2 years following the date of conclusion of the Financing Agreement | 3 years following the end date for contracting |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Project purpose</strong></th>
<th><strong>Objectively verifiable indicators</strong></th>
<th><strong>Sources of Verification</strong></th>
<th><strong>Assumptions</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To contribute to the prevention of illegal migration and all types of cross-border crimes at Turkey’s Eastern borders in line with EU’s IBM policies and strategies via de-mining the area and providing effective and humanitarian border surveillance tools for a technologically supported modern border surveillance system.</td>
<td>Reduced illegal border crossings by the end of the project. - 20% increase in detected cases of illegal border crossings 2 years after the completion of the project. - Disappeared casualties caused by land mines in the region - Border area with Armenia (Dilucu, Gürbulak) and Iran (Gürbulak, Yasıstepe, Sibraltepe, Özalp) is under active surveillance by modern equipments by the end of the project. - The infrastructure becoming suitable for the establishment of technologically supported, humanitarian and more efficient border surveillance systems</td>
<td>• Monitoring by Delegation • Project implementation reports • Demined areas Additional suggested sources of verification: • Initiative for a Mine-Free Turkey (IMFT) reports (indicated in the background) • Official Article 7 Reports • FRONTEX Reports • IOM quick statistics • UNHCR</td>
<td>Government supports the construction of physical border security systems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results</td>
<td>Objectively verifiable indicators</td>
<td>Sources of Verification</td>
<td>Assumptions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tbody>
</table>
| **R.1:** Demining the borders at Van- Ağrı-Kars-Iğdır region | • Cleared mined areas in the selected border regions, 13,538,462 m²  
• Disappearance of accidents through mine clearance  
• Selected border regions suitable for the establishment of humanitarian border surveillance systems.  
• Maps of mine hazardous areas before and after project realization, decreased by 13,538,462 m² at the end of the project.  
• Total mined areas in the eastern borders is 100,574,400 m² | - Interim and Final Reports of the project  
- Official Article 7 Reports  
- Reports of International NGOs | |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Means</th>
<th>Costs</th>
<th>Assumptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Component 1 (Service): Clearance of landmines in the eastern border regions of Turkey</strong></td>
<td>Service Agreement</td>
<td>EUR 26,400,000</td>
<td>Favorable weather conditions which will not limit the demining operations despite the design of the ToR for the service contract</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1.1 Clearance  
1.2 Post-Clearance | | | |
| **Component 2 (Supply): Supply of Technological Border Surveillance Equipment for the Cleared Regions** | Supply Agreement | EUR 26,050,000 | |
| 2.1 Supply | | | |
ANNEX II: amounts (in €) Contracted and disbursed by quarter for the project (EU contribution only)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C1: Service</td>
<td>19,800,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>C2: Supply</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cumulated</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disbursed</td>
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<tr>
<td>C1. Service</td>
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<td>4,620,000</td>
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<td>4,620,000</td>
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<td></td>
<td>4,620,000</td>
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<td>1,980,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>C2. Supply</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cumulated</td>
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<td>4,620,000</td>
<td>7,860,000</td>
<td>4,620,000</td>
<td>4,620,000</td>
<td>4,620,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,980,000</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX 3

INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

Beneficiary

Ministry of Interior Undersecretary Development and Implementation Bureau for Border Management and Legislation through cooperation with General Staff (Land Forces Command) is responsible from the execution of the project.

The Development and Implementation Bureau for Border Management Legislation and Administrative Capacity was established in the Ministry of Interior on 15 of October 2008. This unit is under the Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior. The unit is responsible for carrying out studies for legislative and administrative structure of IBM, preparing of assessment and needs analysis on IBM, carrying out IBM projects, working on the establishment of a new border security unit, organizing External Borders Task Force with the participation of institutions responsible for border surveillance and control on a monthly bases.

Cooperation between Ministry of Interior and General Staff (Land Forces) is ensured through official correspondences. Besides, Land Forces Command had very important contributions during the planning phase.

Project Steering Committee

The Project Steering Committee will meet in principle twice a year, or more frequently where relevant as per request of the members, to monitor the implementation of the project, achievement of results against indicators in the project fiche, and to agree on corrective actions as appropriate. The operational conclusions of the Steering Committee meetings will be agreed by all participants in the minutes of the meetings.

Project Steering Committees will be composed of the representatives of project beneficiaries, Ministry for EU Affairs, Undersecretariat of Treasury, Central Finance & Contracts Unit and EU Delegation to Turkey. Participation of other stakeholders will be ensured when deemed necessary.

Project Steering Committee will operate under the following set of rules/tasks which will be adopted by the SPOs.

• To assess the progress of the project components in terms of the procurement preparation and implementation of contracts
• To verify the achievement of the outputs and results specified in the PFs or as amended.
• To discuss actions to be undertaken in following quarters in terms of achievement of indicators in the PF.
• To design and monitor the outreach and communications activities among relevant partner/beneficiary institutions at programme level.
• To coordinate involvement of the partner/beneficiary organizations for effective follow up of progress made and ensure the timely flow of project level information between these institutional partners.
• To monitor the progress made towards project indicators in line with the log frame or propose project fiches changes where appropriate.
• To monitor and facilitate linkage among different project components/contracts and the project with linked activities with other projects, donors or through national fund.
• To coordinate among different project components/contracts ensuring effective sequencing between interrelated components.
• Issues which can’t be solved at SC level to be brought to the attention of the next JMC (SMSC)”

The Ministry for EU Affairs (MEU) will ensure that Steering Committees are formally established and will have a first meeting at the latest within 3 months after the date of the signature of the Financing Agreement.

**Project Implementation Group**

This group will be responsible from the implementation of the project on site to ensure the coordination between the institutions. Necessary staff from each beneficiary institution will be allocated for this purpose to work full-time throughout the project implementation.

**Contracting Authority**

The Central Financing Contracting Unit (CFCU) will be the Implementing Agency and will be responsible for all procedural aspects of the contracting matters and financial management (including payments) of the project activities, in accordance with the Decentralized Implementation System (DIS) Manual. CFCU will involve in the Steering Committee meeting as an observer.

**EUD**

The European Union Delegation in Turkey and the funding agency will be involved in the monitoring of the project. EUD will be observer in Steering Committee.

The Delegation is the politically independent institution that represents and upholds the interests of the EU as a whole. It is the driving force within the EU’s institutional system: It proposes legislation, policies and programs of action, and it is responsible for implementing the decisions of the Parliament and the Council. Like the Parliament and the Council, the European Commission was set up in the 1950s under the EU’s founding treaties.