SUMMARY PROJECT FICHE

1. **Basic Information**

1.1 Désirée Number: BG 0005.02
1.2 Title: MODERNISING BORDER POLICE EQUIPMENT AT THE TURKISH BORDER
1.3 Sector: Justice and Home Affairs
1.4 Location: Ministry of the Interior: Border Police Service

2. **Objectives**

2.1 **Wider objective**

The wider objective of this project is to strengthen border management in Bulgaria, through the introduction of operational standards and practices for the Bulgarian Border Police – which is the prime agency for border management -, based upon the best practices of border control in the EU and also the modernisation of equipment.

2.2 **Immediate objective**

The immediate objective of this project is to develop an integrated operational strategy in the Lyubimetz border region (adjacent to Turkey) which is one of the most critical areas of Bulgaria in terms of cross-border criminality and a major transit route and conduit for illegal immigration.

2.3 **Accession Partnership and NPAA priority**

**Short-term AP priority**

Implement effective border management control systems and coordination of services to prevent illegal immigration and to enable full participation in Schengen Information System.

**Medium term AP priority**

Further intensify international coordination and cooperation in the field of combating trans-border crime, especially in the field of transiting, producing and selling drugs as well as money-laundering; implement anti-corruption strategy; continue fight against trafficking in women and children;
NPAA

- Limitation of the illegal immigration to and from Bulgaria.
- Limitation of the illegal stay of foreigners in Bulgaria.
- Establishment of a border regime corresponding to the regime adopted by EU Member States for external border of the community.
- Supply of materials and technical equipment to the departments and the units of the Ministry of the Interior that execute border control and the control on residence of foreigners in the country.
- To stop the trend for seizure of the illegal migration and the illegal human traffic by structures of organised crime or by international terrorist or extremist organisations.
- Not to allow the illegal migration and the illegal traffic of foreigners to become source of threat to the public order and national security.
- To overcome the unfavourable opinion on our country as a transit point for illegal migration.
- execution of effective coordination and interaction between the competent state authorities to combat illegal migration.

3. Description

3.1 Background and justification

Bulgaria is faced with an ever growing threat from cross-border crime, in particular illegal immigration, smuggling, drug trafficking and the proliferation of weapons and hazardous materials. It is a major transit route for organised crime syndicates as they seek to penetrate the European Union. The Bulgarian Turkish border, particularly in the 46 km strip in the Lyubimetz region on which this project focuses, is proving to be a particular hot-spot for illegal cross-border crime. In response, the Bulgarian Authorities, in particular the Border Police are making every effort to counter this threat. Bulgaria has developed a national strategy to combat organised crime and the Border Police play a critical role. A process of institutional reform is already under way, including new management structures and new methodologies and practices associated with professional law enforcement are replacing the old systems of border control.

However, much of the equipment possessed by the Border Police is outdated and therefore a barrier to the adoption of new operational strategies. This deficiency was noted in the EU-sponsored Bulgarian Border Police Equipment Feasibility Study completed in the Autumn of 1999 and which recommended in detail the nature of the equipment required to enhance operational effectiveness. In addition to this, the process of “demilitarisation” or better: “professionalisation” will lead to an important decrease in the number of operational staff. Therefore it will be necessary to compensate by the introduction of modern equipment.

This project seeks to meet the above described considerations by the introduction of modern communication and surveillance systems in the Lyubimetz border region. These assets, plus the introduction of modern off-road patrol vehicles, will offer the Border Police the opportunity to deploy a multi-faceted and integrated operational counter-measure to cross-border violations in a critical region. Yet the project does not only reflect investment in equipment but also supports a significant training
component which will ensure not only the optimum use and maintenance of the equipment but the continued institution building which is an important feature of the Bulgarian Border Police’s own development strategy.

This project is the first phase of a Multi-annual Border Management Modernisation Strategy (see annex 5), which has been produced by the Bulgarian Border Police as a precondition for receiving Phare support on a multi-annual basis. The strategy will see similar developments take place on the Black Sea Coast, the Yugoslav and Macedonian borders and eventually all Bulgaria’s borders. Finally, this project fits into the drive for an integrated approach to border management which generally has three phases: integrated technical solutions at operational level in the border region, greater inter-agency co-operation on the border and finally co-ordinated approaches at national and international levels.

3.2 Linked activities

This project is linked to the Phare 99 Programme, (3M Euro) which is a balanced programme of institution building and investment in equipment. However, it should be noted that the funding under the 1999 Programme for equipment was exceedingly small and reflected only a fraction of total investment required. Furthermore, the Bulgarian Authorities themselves have invested heavily (approximately 500,000 EUR in 1999) in procuring new equipment and supporting the training bill associated with greater professionalisation and institutional reform. Additionally, it should be noted that bilateral support, primarily from Germany, will further support the re-equipment modernisation programme and new patrol vehicles supplied by Germany are now being deployed along the Bulgarian-Turkish border in the Lyubimetz Region. The value of the total assistance from Germany was DM 2m.

3.3 Results

The concrete results of this project will be:

Sub-project 1
- Deployment of approximately 8 - 10 surveillance units and associated equipment.
- All foot and mobile patrols of Border police in Lyubimetz area equipped with 80 – 100 night vision goggles.

Sub-project 2
- The development of equipment facilitating the creation of a modern, regional control and communication centre which will focus on the integrated use of intelligence surveillance, communication and mobility.
- Sub-units controlled by the command centre fully equipped with modern communication and positioning equipment, allowing access to all relevant operational data and the appropriate means of operational response to situations indicated by the command centre.
- Lyubimetz border police equipped with:
  - tactical communication systems, including duplex repeaters
  - GPS systems
  - mono-zonal paging systems
  - main frame servers, workstations and associated software
Sub-project 3
• Lubimetz border police equipped with approximately 26 vehicles:
  • to mount surveillance units
  • to transport special mobile detachments

Sub-project 4
• 400 officers trained in new operational techniques associated with the tactical deployment of the new equipment
• IT training for operators trained in the handling of new information systems.
• Selected officers trained in new techniques of criminal intelligence analysis.
• Staff trained to man a 24 hour regional operations command, control and communication centre

Sub-project 5
• TA to support the continued operational development of the Bulgarian Border Police strategy for operational development for all future external borders of the EU in Bulgaria
• Second phase of BP five year development plan finalised/developed
• Inter-agency co-operation strengthened and operational

The sub-projects relating to equipment will be standard investment activities whilst the other two are considered to be traditional TA. The technical specifications of the equipment are in a process of being defined and will be ready before the signature of the Financing Memorandum of Phare 2000.

3.4 Activities

Sub-project 1
• The procurement and deployment of approximately 8 - 10 surveillance units and associated equipment
• The procurement of 80 - 100 night vision goggles

Sub-project 2
• The development of an operational command centre
• The procurement of tactical communication systems, including duplex repeaters
• The procurement of GPS systems
• The procurement of mono-zonal paging systems
• The procurement of main frame servers, workstations and associated software

Sub-project 3
• The procurement of vehicles to mount surveillance units
• The procurement of vehicles to transport special mobile detachments

Sub-project 4
• The training of 400 officers in new operational techniques associated with the tactical deployment of the new equipment
• IT training for operators of new information systems
• Training of select officers in new techniques of criminal intelligence analysis
• Training of staff to man a 24 hour regional operations command, control and communication centre
Sub-project 5
- TA to support the continued operational development of the Bulgarian Border Police
- TA to develop second phase of BP five year development plan
- TA to provide assistance on the development of inter-agency cooperation

4. Institutional Framework

It should be noted that the 1999 Programme envisages the appointment of two PAAs in the field of Border Police.

The project beneficiary will be the Bulgarian Ministry of the Interior and in particular the Bulgarian Border Police. The Border Police comprise approximately 9500 staff and work throughout the country in 13 regions. They will take ownership of the project and provide the requisite staff to project manage the activities. The Border Police have appointed project officers and are in the process of appointing a Strategic Advisor for the Implementation of Technical Assistance Projects. Additionally, the CFCU Sofia will work closely with the Border Police in order to ensure that all tenders are prepared in accordance to stated requirements and conform with Phare tendering procedure.

5. Detailed Budget

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPONENTS</th>
<th>Phare support in MEURO</th>
<th>Total Phare (=I+IB)</th>
<th>National Co-financing</th>
<th>IFI</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<td>Investment Support*</td>
<td>Institution Building*</td>
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<td>Component 1 : Equipment</td>
<td>8,5</td>
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<td>Subproject 1 - Surveillance</td>
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<td>Subproject 2 - Communication</td>
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<td>Subproject 3 - Mobility</td>
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<tr>
<td>Component 2 : TA/ Training</td>
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<td>Subproject 4 – TA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subproject 5 - Training</td>
<td>0,5</td>
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<td>25%</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>8,5</td>
<td>0,5</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

* The national co-financing represents approximately 25% of the total budget as in-kind contribution according to Annex 6.
6. Implementation Arrangements

6.1 Implementing agency

The CFCU in Sofia will be responsible for the implementation of this project, although it will work in close association with the beneficiary: Ministry of the Interior and the Border Police, particularly the new Border Police Implementation Management Unit. The Border Police will elaborate the technical specifications and ToRs for all the sub-projects as required for tenders but it is anticipated that TA will be required for the elaboration of the more sophisticated technical specifications. This TA should be provided through traditional channels. Finally, the Border Police will provide experts in the respective areas to participate in the tender evaluation boards and oversee the deployment, installation, field testing and trials of all items procured.

6.2 Twinning (NA):

6.3 Non Standard aspects

This project will be managed under DIS rules.

6.4 Contracts

It is envisaged that there will be contracts for:

* Supplies under subprojects 1, 2 and 3  8,500,000 EUR
* TA/Training under subprojects 4 and 5  500,000 EUR

7. Implementation Schedule

Start of Tendering  2Q/01
Start of Project Activity  4Q/01
Completion  4Q/03

8. Equal Opportunities

The Bulgarian Border Police is an equal opportunities employer.

9. Environment

The training and investment activities relate to IB activities.

10. Rates of Return

The benefit of the investment was supported by the Equipment Feasibility Study (annex 4)
11. Investment Criteria

11.1 Catalytic effect
The investment provided by Phare will significantly speed up the operational enhancement of the Border Police and in turn this will lead to a more effective border management regime for Bulgaria. This is a key element of the Accession Partnership. Without this investment, it would take far longer for border management to meet Schengen standards and for the rate of cross-border criminality to decrease.

11.2 Co-Financing
The Bulgarian Authorities will offer approximately 25% co-financing from the national budget and will be represented as an in-kind contribution (see Annex 6).

11.3 Additionality
The Phare assistance will not replace other bilateral support in this area. Bilateral support, primarily from Germany, will further support the re-equipment modernisation programme and new patrol vehicles supplied by Germany are now being deployed along the Bulgarian-Turkish border in the Lyubimetz Region. The value of the total assistance from Germany was DM 2m. Within the context of the twinning, the German PAAs will assure compatibility between the bilateral German assistance and the EU Phare assistance.

11.4 Project readiness and size
This project will, once the appropriate technical specifications have been elaborated, be ready for contracting through public tender.

11.5 Sustainability
The Bulgarian Authorities are fully aware of their responsibilities for the due care and attention for all equipment provided under the project. This project is in line with both the “Multi-annual Border Management Modernisation Strategy” produced by the Bulgarian Border Police (annex 5) and with the main conclusions of the 1999 Feasibility study (annex 4).

11.6 Compliance with state aid provisions (NA)
11.7 Contribution to National Investment Plan (NA)

12. Conditionality and sequencing

It is expected that the Border Police will continue to refine their own operational strategy and that this should be completed prior to any subsequent applications for funding under the multi-annual programme. In terms of the immediate project, all equipment will be deployed into the Lyubimetz region and in particular on the green border with Turkey.

The in-kind contribution should be provided prior to the delivery of the Phare financed supplies.

The Commission will review the progress of this project through its regular Phare Review meetings. The effect on the reduction of illegal cross-border activity will be assessed in the yearly Progress Reports on Bulgaria. Therefore the Border Police must provide full operational statistics for the period in question. With regard to the institutional building activities foreseen under this project, particularly the training component, these will also be monitored under traditional Phare procedures. Finally,
given the importance of the project on inter-agency co-operation, the Home Affairs Attaché in the Sofia EC Delegation will follow up this issue very closely.
# LOGFRAME PLANNING MATRIX FOR STRENGTHENING CONTROL OF THE BULGARIAN-TURKISH BORDER: Phase 1 of a Multi-Annual Strategy to Enhance the Future External Borders of Bulgaria

## Project Number

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wider Objective(s)</th>
<th>Indicators of Achievement*</th>
<th>How, When and By Whom Indicators Will Be Measured</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Strengthen border management through Improvements in operational standards And practices and modernisation of Equipment | • Compliance with national strategy and NPAA  
• Moving towards Schengen standards  
• Reduction in levels of cross-border Crime | • Regular reports, operational analysis  
• Bulgarian Authorities and EU  
• Phare annual reports |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Immediate Objective (Purpose)</th>
<th>Indicators of Achievement*</th>
<th>How, When and By Whom Indicators Will Be Measured</th>
<th>Assumptions and Risks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| To develop an integrated operational strategy in the Lyubimetz border region         | • Reduction in cross border crime along Bulgarian-Turkish border  
• Enhancement of operational practice through training and new equipment in Lyubimetz BP administrative region  
• Increased levels of inter-agency co-operation on border management through regular exchange of operational data and experiences | • Regular reports, operational analysis  
• 6 month report, annual report  
• Bulgarian BP and nominated EU experts | • BP have developed operational plan for Lubimetz  
• BP fulfil obligations of co-financing  
• BP can absorb investment component  
• Levels of cross-border crime increase faster than institutional response  
• Full co-operation of all relevant border management agencies |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Results</th>
<th>Indicators of Achievement*</th>
<th>How, When and By Whom Indicators Will Be Measured</th>
<th>Assumptions and Risks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sub-project 1</td>
<td>Sub-project 2</td>
<td>Sub-project 3</td>
<td>Sub-project 4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deployment of approximately six surveillance units and associated equipment.</td>
<td>The development of equipment facilitating the creation of a modern, regional control and communication centre which will focus on the integrated use of intelligence surveillance, communication and mobility.</td>
<td>Lyubimetz border police equipped with: Tactical communication systems, including duplex repeaters, GPS systems, Mono-zonal paging systems, main frame servers, workstations and associated software</td>
<td>400 officers trained in new operational techniques associated with the tactical deployment of the new equipment, IT training for operators trained in the handling of new information systems, Selected officers trained in new techniques of criminal intelligence analysis, Staff trained to man a 24 hour regional operations command, control and communication centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Foot and mobile patrols of Border police in Lyubimetz area equipped with of night vision goggles.</td>
<td>Sub-units controlled by the command centre fully equipped with modern communication and positioning equipment, allowing access to all relevant operational data and the appropriate means of operational response to situations indicated by the command centre.</td>
<td>Lyubimetz border police equipped with in total 25: Vehicles to mount surveillance units, Vehicles to transport special mobile detachments</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-project 5</strong></td>
<td><strong>Enhanced border control</strong></td>
<td><strong>Mission Reports, Technical Reports, Statistical Analysis</strong></td>
<td><strong>The BP have developed an operational plan for Lyubimetz</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TA to support the continued operational development of the Bulgarian Border Police strategy for operational development for all future external borders of the EU in Bulgaria</td>
<td><strong>Improvement of BP structures, systems and practices</strong></td>
<td>Inception period, quarterly reviews, end of project</td>
<td>The BP are sufficiently trained to use the new equipment and the equipment fully meets requirements of BP operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second phase of BP five year development plan finalised/developed</td>
<td><strong>Modern equipment</strong></td>
<td>Bulgarian BP, EC Delegation Sofia, nominated EU experts</td>
<td>The levels of crime rise faster than institutional response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-agency co-operation strengthened and operational</td>
<td><strong>Functioning Inter-agency border management working group</strong></td>
<td><strong>Mission Reports, Technical Reports, Statistical Analysis</strong></td>
<td>Full co-operation of other relevant border management agencies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Enhanced border control
- Improvement of BP structures, systems and practices
- Modern equipment
- Functioning Inter-agency border management working group
- Mission Reports, Technical Reports, Statistical Analysis
- Inception period, quarterly reviews, end of project
- Bulgarian BP, EC Delegation Sofia, nominated EU experts
- The BP have developed an operational plan for Lyubimetz
- The BP are sufficiently trained to use the new equipment and the equipment fully meets requirements of BP operations
- The levels of crime rise faster than institutional response
- Full co-operation of other relevant border management agencies
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Assumptions and Risks</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-project 1</strong></td>
<td>• Deployment of new tactical/operational communications systems</td>
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<td>• The procurement and deployment of approximately six surveillance units</td>
<td>• Deployment of active and passive surveillance devices which facilitate 24-hour</td>
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<td>and associated equipment</td>
<td>surveillance</td>
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<td>• The procurement of night vision goggles</td>
<td>• Deployment of new tactical support vehicles including those mounting surveillance</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-project 2</strong></td>
<td>systems</td>
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<tr>
<td>• The development of an operational command centre</td>
<td>• Completion of operational training modules</td>
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<tr>
<td>• The procurement of tactical communication systems, including duplex</td>
<td>• Creation and running of an inter-agency border management working group</td>
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<tr>
<td>repeaters</td>
<td>• It is assumed that this project will be implemented under Phare procedures.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• The procurement of GPS systems</td>
<td>• Full and neutral technical specifications are vital for this project</td>
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<td>• The procurement of mono-zonal paging systems</td>
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<td>• The procurement of main frame servers, workstations and associated</td>
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<td>software</td>
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<td><strong>Sub-project 3</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• The procurement of vehicles to mount surveillance units</td>
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<td>• The procurement of vehicles to transport special mobile detachments</td>
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<td><strong>Sub-project 4</strong></td>
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<td>• The training of 400 officers in new operational techniques associated</td>
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<td>with the tactical deployment of the new equipment</td>
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<td>• IT training for operators of new information systems</td>
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<td>• Training of select officers in new techniques of criminal intelligence</td>
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<td>analysis</td>
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<td>• Training of staff to man a 24 hour regional operations command, control</td>
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<td>and communication centre</td>
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<td><strong>Sub-project 5</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• TA to support the continued operational development of the Bulgarian</td>
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<td>Border Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Develop of second phase of BP five year development plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Provide assistance on the development of inter-agency cooperation</td>
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ANNEX 2

DETAILED TIME IMPLEMENTATION CHART FOR THE PROJECT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPONENTS</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Component 1 – Equipment</td>
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<td>T</td>
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<tr>
<td>Component 2 – TA/Training</td>
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<td>T</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

D = Design,
T = Tendering,
I = Implementation,
X = Closure
## ANNEX 3: CUMULATIVE CONTRACTING AND DISBURSEMENT SCHEDULE

All figures in million Euro

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<tr>
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### NB:
1. All contracting should normally be completed within 6-12 months and **must** be completed within 24 months of signature of the FM.
2. All disbursements **must** be completed within 36 months of signature of the FM.

**Note 1:**
- Component 1: Supplies
- Component 2: TA/training

**Note 2:** It is essential for effective operational enhancements to be made as soon as possible and therefore all equipment must be delivered and field tested within a three month period. Therefore disbursement can be staggered within the financial quarter as suits the Beneficiary/CFCU.
ANNEX 4

FEASIBILITY STUDY ON THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE EQUIPMENT OF THE BULGARIAN BORDER POLICE AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EQUIPMENT MODERNISATION

A study prepared for the European Commission by: ANDREW DOLAN and STEVE FEHER in OCTOBER 1999

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ANNEX 1:
COMMUNICATIONS AND IT:
REQUIREMENTS AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
INTRODUCTION

The objective of this study was to assess the current state of the equipment holdings of the Bulgarian Border Police and to offer detailed recommendations to the European Commission with regard to what investment in equipment may be required in the future, particularly through the Phare Programme.

The study was undertaken primarily by two experts; the first a specialist in border management and the second, specialising in communications and information technology. However, it is fair to say that without the full and transparent co-operation of the Bulgarian Border Police, the task would have been more difficult to achieve.

Over a series of missions to Bulgaria and coupled with answers to a questionnaire provided by the experts, it was possible to acquire an accurate assessment of Bulgarian Border Police’s equipment holdings. Emphasis was not placed so much on numbers, although this is important. It was considered of greater relevance to consider operational factors such as utility, serviceability, age and modernisation schedules.

Although the experts saw considerable types of equipment, emphasis was given to four main categories, namely personal equipment, surveillance, mobility and communications and IT support. Indeed, given the complicated nature of the communications field, it was decided to provide a separate report on this subject, with a particular reference to the development of a Schengen-compatible information system.

However, it was also decided to include a section on infrastructure, as without adequate static facilities, full operational capacity is rarely achieved. For the same reason, the report will briefly touch on the question of training equipment, particularly the material required in the Border Police training establishments.

Finally, the experts offer a full set of recommendations as to what equipment is needed in Bulgaria in order to enhance the current levels of border management. These recommendations do take into consideration the Bulgarian Border Police’s own modernisation programmes and respect their method of border management. However, what they do not do is provide an equipment modernisation programme and indicate the phased introduction of such equipment. This must be the task of the Bulgarian Border Police and they alone to conceptualise, implement and manage any future investment support from the Phare Programme.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Border management is taken seriously by the Authorities in Sofia. It is seen not only as a key component of the Accession Partnership between Bulgaria and the European Commission but also a national and regional responsibility.

The main agent of border management is the Border Police, itself undergoing a major institutional reform process as it moves away from a Soviet-style military structure to a law enforcement organisation based on the Schengen-model of border management. The threats it faces in terms of border security are immense and worryingly, the trends suggest the problems are becoming more acute. However, the capacity of the Border Police to adequately respond is hampered by serious shortcomings, including a decrease in manpower, the general obsolescence of its key equipment and a shortage of funds.
In all the main areas of equipment holdings, the Border Police are badly served. Most of the equipment is ex-Soviet and military in purpose and design and more to the point completely obsolescent. For much of the equipment, the ability to find spare parts has long since passed. The fact that the Border Police are still functioning under such conditions, is a testament to the dedication, skill and imagination of the management and staff.

The senior management of the Border Police acknowledge that the most important asset is their officers, non-commissioned officers and men and therefore providing improved personal equipment is a priority. Basic items such as foul-weather clothing, life vests for naval staff and improved body armour would do much to enhance the physical safety and security of the men and contribute towards a general improvement in morale.

Nevertheless serious levels of investment are required to maintain current levels of activity and even more investment is required to enhance border management. The Bulgarian Border Police need properly-equipped cross-country vehicles in order to patrol its extensive and topographically-challenging border. On the blue border, it requires modern patrol boats capable of going to sea in all conditions and with an ability to observe maritime traffic at all times and in all conditions.

The concept of twenty-four hour activity is fully acknowledged by the Border Police but impossible without the procurement of surveillance systems. Active and passive sensor systems, thermal imaging devices and basic night optical devices are all required to sustain such a level of operation. Given that so many of the organised crime groups who operate in this region are well-equipped, then the Border Police must be furnished with the means to meet their operational objectives.

A similar argument exists in relation to the need for vastly improved means of communication. No border management agency in this day and age should be compelled to operate a communication system built in 1944. No amount of mobility or surveillance can compensate for a basic lack of horizontal and vertical communications systems and therefore this sector requires urgent attention. Thankfully, the Border Police do have sound systems and procedures and recognise the value of the dissemination of information from the centre to the regions and below. Investment in modern means of information collection, storage and retrieval however, would significantly enhance the current system.

The use of equipment serves three main purposes. It can be used to replace manpower, enhance the efficiency of the manpower and lastly, enhance the safety and security of the manpower. It is not an exaggeration to state that significant investment in equipment for the Bulgarian Border Police would act as a force multiplier, enhance their operational efficiency and protect the lives of those who serve on the border-line.

It is recommended, therefore, that the option to finance such an investment through the Phare Programme be given due consideration. It is certainly in the interests of the Union to enhance Bulgarian border management.

**BORDER MANAGEMENT : AN OPERATIONAL OVERVIEW**

Bulgaria’s borders are difficult to manage. Topographically disparate, they would challenge the most modern of the EU’s border management agencies and therefore one must bear this in mind when assessing the capabilities of the Bulgarian Border Police.

To the north of the country lies the Danube River, one of the most important economical and political features of the Balkan Region. Despite numerous economic embargoes and more recently, destruction to bridges in Yugoslavia as a result of the war in Kosovo, river traffic
continues and therefore the safe passage of shipping and the interdiction of illegal traffic along the river will remain a prime concern. Indeed, whilst the international community continues to isolate Yugoslavia, there is every reason to believe that efforts to circumvent these restrictions will continue and the Bulgarian Border Police will have to maintain a highly visible presence in the region.

To the east of the country, the blue border continues, stretching down the down the Black Sea coast from Romania to Turkey. Apart from the size of area to patrol, approximately 12,000 km, the weather is often severe and even in summer, extensive patrolling can be difficult. Furthermore, the region surrounding the sea, particularly to the north and east is volatile, with military or terrorist activities in southern Russia, Abkhazia and Georgia. The struggle against arms smuggling is a key Border Police activity in this area. However, one must also not forget the critical economic role the Black Sea plays, especially in the transit of oil from Russia, Georgia and Azerbaijan and increasingly therefore, Border Police attention is focusing on maritime environmental protection.

Moving inland, Bulgaria has a southern border with Turkey and Greece. With high mountains and very steep ravines, border control is far from simple. Thick foliage often obscures one’s view, making surveillance a far from straightforward task. The region also has limited infrastructure and as such the Border Police must be as self-contained as possible in order to operate, particularly in extreme winter conditions. Life for the Border Police staff in very isolated posts will undoubtedly be harsh in winter.

Bulgaria’s western border with Macedonia and Yugoslavia shares many of the same characteristics as the southern border with Greece and Turkey with one major exception, the residual threat of armed conflict. The Bulgarian Border Police have, since the beginning of the conflict in Kosovo, drafted in over 2000 extra soldiers to the border with Yugoslavia which has been a phenomenal drain on the state’s and the Border Police’s limited financial resources. Additionally, the Border Police have had to control the passage of KFOR assets entering Macedonia and Kosovo, post-hostilities. Travelling this border provides ample evidence of the tension in the region and the Bulgarian Border Police continue to operate under the watchful eye of the Yugoslav Army.

As has been previously stated, border management in Bulgaria is far from simple. Geography has not favoured easy solutions and the authorities in Sofia must continually manage scarce resources in order to maintain acceptable levels of border management on all borders and not merely on the future external borders of the Union.

THREATS TO BORDER SECURITY

The threats facing Bulgaria’s borders today would be familiar to most border management agencies in Candidate Countries, namely illegal immigration, the smuggling of drugs, weapons and hazardous materials, stolen vehicles and of course traditional cross border illegal trading which in recent years has become larger, more organised and more violent.

Statistics do not always offer a true reflection of the scale of the problem but in 1998, with over 14 million legal crossings of the border, over 9758 persons were taken into custody for attempting to illegally cross into Bulgarian territory, with the Bulgarian-Greek and Bulgarian-Turkish borders being the most problematic areas for the Bulgarian Authorities. Most of this activity related to human trafficking from countries such as the Former Soviet Union, Turkey, Afghanistan, Sri-Lanka, Pakistan and Bangladesh.

The smuggling of people is a profitable business for organised criminal networks and the Bulgarian Border Police spend a great deal of time and effort to interdict and defeat such activity. The two most popular channels for illegal immigration which cross Bulgaria are
from Turkey to Albania, Italy, Germany and France and the other from CIS countries to Bulgaria, Greece and beyond. One must also not forget the desire of Bulgarians themselves to seek entry to Greece for economic reasons.

However, to suppose that eventually this traffic will decrease is simply an illusion. The potential for even greater numbers to seek passage through Bulgaria is all too obvious and as long as traffickers can make sizeable profits and employ more modern and sophisticated equipment with which to assist them, the Bulgarian Border Police will always be in a responsive mode.

As for the other forms of illegal cross-border activity, the most worrying trend is the rise in drug and weapon smuggling. Given the volatile nature of the region, the illegal transfer of weapons must give cause for concern. To date, the majority of seized weapons have been small-arms but the suspicion exists that heavier calibre and more sophisticated weapon systems have been moved undetected. With a paucity of detection means at their disposal, particularly scanners for sea containers at ports and gates for trucks passing border check points, the Border Police will have to continue to rely on good intelligence and diligent detective work in order to succeed in the interdiction and seizure of weapons, drugs and hazardous materials.

Whilst the above should not be considered an exhaustive assessment of the nature of the threats facing Bulgaria’s borders, it does, nevertheless, adequately demonstrate the scale and diversity of the problems facing the Bulgarian Border Police.

INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES

There is no set method of border management but the Bulgarian Border Police are fully committed to bringing their methods and practices into line with those adopted by EU MS agencies and with an eventual aim of fully integrating into a Schengen border management system.

This is an important commitment for the Bulgarians and reflects a significant shift away from the old Soviet-style methods to a more modern law-enforcement based posture. However, achieving this will take time and much more resources than presently available in Bulgaria. Indeed, in the short-to-medium term, the implications of a successful demilitarisation programme will be a significant reduction in Border Police manpower as conscripts are eventually replaced by professional officers. At the moment, the Border Police has a massive training bill in so far as it must provide existing staff with new skills whilst seeking to absorb new recruits, many from civilian life or transfer from other service.

However, from the clear management decisions taken over the last 18 months and in line with stated Bulgarian Government policy, investment in people is a priority. Equipment levels may, on paper, seem adequate for the task but in reality the bulk of the holdings are obsolescent and therefore only committed and dedicated staff can ensure that some semblance of border management can be attained.

There is no doubt that the Bulgarian Border Police do have a system for border management. It may not be the most modern or effective but in relation to the scale of the problem and the level of resources available it has much to commend it. Indeed, given the limitations, it could be argued that the Bulgarian Border Police provide at least a thoughtful border management strategy, with an emphasis on considered responses to the varying levels of threats.

At the basic level, the Border Police try to maintain a visible presence on all its borders, in part to ensure the natural protection of sovereignty and facilitate safe and reliable transit but also to provide a visible deterrence to those who may seek to illegally enter the country.
is of acute concern on the green and blue borders and the Border Police make every effort to maintain an effective 24-hour operational patrol schedule. However, given the inadequacy of the equipment at their disposal and the challenging nature of the terrain and sea, which must be covered, full and effective coverage is currently impossible. A stark example is on the Black Sea coast where only approximately 10% of naval traffic can be effectively monitored by the Border Police.

In recognition of this dilemma but also as a principle of strategy, the Border Police seeks to use statistical analysis and intelligence to form the second layer of border protection: analysis of cross-border incidents shows a picture of the critical areas of operation and it is henceforth covert surveillance operations in these sectors which seek to channel and direct mobile interdiction groups to their target. This is sound operational practice and the Border Police have demonstrated, at times visually, how successful and cost-effective this type of policy can be. Yet to be fully effective requires good communications, reliable day and night surveillance devices and mobility. Sadly, the Bulgarian Border Police have none of the above and at best can only try to be as efficient as possible. On the blue border, the situation is no better.

At the moment, the use of conscripts does allow for greater patrolling, albeit on foot. However, given the geography of the southern and western borders, such activity has real value and well-concealed covert patrols, furnished with good intelligence can make significant inroads into illegal cross-border activity.

Nevertheless such optimism should not conceal the true picture which shows an increase in threats to the border at a time when Border Police resources are stretched to breaking point. Demilitarisation reduces manpower and replacement professionals costs far more. Replacing equipment is both costly and takes time and although the Bulgarian Authorities have increased support, including the purchase of new equipment, the scale of support is not in direct proportion to the problem.

Equipment by itself is no answer to Bulgaria’s problems. However, equipment aligned to a sound strategy and efficient procedure can make a difference. The introduction of new equipment will undoubtedly enhance efficiency but it will also act as a force multiplier at a time when manpower constraints may have a detrimental impact on the force and on border management.

This point has been noted by the Authorities in Sofia and their commitment to demilitarisation and an eventual convergence with Schengen practice and procedure is to be applauded. The efforts of the Border Police management and staff must also be recognised, as they carry out a thankless task, often at personal risk, in order to maintain Bulgaria’s integrity and reduce the flow of illegal activity, the impact of which is often felt within the borders of the EU.

**EQUIPMENT REVIEW**

**INFRASTRUCTURE**

Technically, one could argue that the issue of infrastructure should not feature in a study on equipment. However, given that manpower is the most important asset in border management and that modern equipment is there to enhance the efficiency of manpower, there is justification for including a brief statement on its relevance.

Whilst most of the border crossing points are reasonably constructed and maintained, the accommodation used by the staff on the green border is exceedingly basic. Most if not all of
the facilities are over thirty years old and badly in need of refurbishment. The comfort and safety of the staff is of paramount importance when living in such far flung areas of the country and therefore basic improvements in accommodation and operational rooms is essential. It will be difficult to sell the concept of professional service in the Border Police if basic conditions are not improved in the near to medium term future.

Additionally, if new equipment is to be introduced, particularly vehicles or surveillance devices, it is essential that proper storage and garage facilities be made available in order to avoid unnecessary wear and tear. Few of the Border Police establishments are adequately provided with such facilities and therefore proper consideration should be given to improving this situation.

PERSONAL EQUIPMENT

The average Bulgarian Border Police officer and conscript is reasonably well-equipped in terms of personal equipment. He or she is issued with standard dress and field uniforms and heavy greatcoats for the winter. Additional operational protective gear such as body armour and protective helmets are also available in central facilities. However, for some personnel, the above is simply inadequate to the task.

Those officers who protect the green and blue borders, particularly in winter-time would benefit from special foul-weather clothing and footwear. Furthermore, the body armour and protective helmets are ex-Soviet style military issue and obsolescent. There is a clear need for the Border Police to possess and centrally locate adequate numbers of modern kevlar-type body armour and helmets, certainly for the mobile groups but also for those officers who conduct snap vehicle check-points at night and in remote areas.

Given the need for checking persons and vehicles, the Border Police would benefit from improved flash-lights, anti-personnel sprays and for the detention of vehicles, modern caltrop devices. Current holdings of all the items discussed is very limited or again very obsolete.

SURVEILLANCE

For the purpose of this study it was decided to include under surveillance all traditional technical means but also to enlarge the parameters by including scanning devices, CO2 probes, dogs and the electronic barriers, generally known as the systema.

The Bulgarian Border Police have an alarming deficiency in terms of surveillance equipment and those stocks which do exist are ex-Soviet military, unsuited to the current purpose and on average between 15 and thirty years old. Only the stock of approximately 2700 binoculars with a range of 8x30 remain in good technical condition.

The first and most prominent surveillance device in use is the old Soviet electronic fencing or systema., C-100 and Skala. Although much of this system has been dismantled, parts remain and in operational use, in particular the 700km of southern border. Whilst at one time this system may have served a purpose, it is obvious now that its utility is limited and frequently breached. Built in the period 1960-72, the system has degraded so much that its efficiency rating is about 25%. Although on the Turkish border its operational use is as much associated with animal control as for the detection of people, the limited nature of the system, its antiquated command and control function and the inability to service the existing equipment brings one to the conclusion that this system no longer serves a useful purpose and in terms of Schengen, is totally unacceptable.
No sensor system, active or passive is available to the Border Police at this time, although studies are being conducted on the use of sensors for perimeter signalling and guarding, including microwave barriers, seismic detection and through radio channel. The requirement for such equipment is obvious and would act as a clear force multiplier. At a time of reduced manpower and the increasing sophistication of criminal groups, the use of such sensors is recommended as soon as possible.

The Border Police do, however, have a fair number of radio locating stations, covering land and coastal systems. Most are over 10 years old and amonization ranges from 10% to 100% in some cases and subsequently all have very low operational capacity, with an average distance of 6km. However, used I conjunction with other surveillance and communication systems, these types of stations can play an important role, most strikingly in tracking maritime traffic. The Border Police have recently invested in 6 such coastal radar stations but the total required is 36 stations.

Investment has also taken place in relation to the purchase of mobile facilities for 24-hour surveillance. The Border Police have recently deployed 6 UAZ-452s with SSD cameras, providing a monitoring option of up to 3.5km by day and at night, with low illumination or infrared, up to 1km. This is an important development for the Border Police and offers a virtual quantum leap in operational surveillance. This will be supplemented next year with the first consignment of thermal imaging equipment provided through the Phare Programme.

Unfortunately, progress in the field of portable night vision devices is less encouraging. At the moment the Border police rely on a number of devices including hand-held optical devices, goggles mounted on a protective hat and line of sight night vision telescopes mounted on assault rifles. Although the latter are not so bad, their weight, when mounted on the rifle, make them too heavy and cumbersome to use effectively and for the other devices, they are simply too old and limited in range, with an average distance in good conditions of 350m. There are currently no thermal image devices.

The same picture emerges in relation to the devices used on the blue border. The naval patrol craft are not furnished with anything other than very low level devices and again even this is converted from its former purpose, usually military related. Obviously coastal radar can contribute greatly to the maritime surveillance pattern but for stop and search operations some distance from the coast, the patrol craft must be furnished with the means to observe properly, even if only to avoid accidents at sea.

Operationally, working with such poor surveillance devices greatly reduces effectiveness and merely adds to the frustration already felt by the Border Police.

In respect to other forms of surveillance (or more accurately detection) devices, there is generally a mixed picture. The Border Police do have stocks of CO2 probes, on average 1 per check point. However, these are relatively inexpensive and efficient devices and greater stocks of them should be held. The use of dogs is also to be commended and again greater use should be made. However, in order to do so, the Bulgarian Border Police would first need to develop a dog breeding programme and include a modern dog-handling course within its training establishment.

Finally, some comment on the use of static and mobile scanning devices for lorries and shipborne containers. At present, the Bulgarian Border Police possess no such devices. Yet investment in such devices would provide a critical ability to scan the inside of suspicious containers at the Black Sea ports of Burgas or items transported on the Danube. Without adequate means of scanning, there is a reluctance on the part of the Border Police to break the seal and opens these containers, given that this then makes the Border Police legally responsible for any subsequent reported damage or theft. The same principle applies to the
green border where there is also a particular requirement to scan for nuclear and other
dangerous materials. The benefit of mobile gate scanners is that the device can be moved
around whenever there is a need to survey a suspicious vehicle.

Before leaving the question of surveillance, one additional point is worthy of consideration.
At present, the Bulgarian Border Police possess no airborne surveillance platforms such as
spotter aircraft or small helicopters. On the green borders, such items would be a luxury,
even if it were possible to finance their operation. However, in relation to the blue border,
some wider considerations are relevant, as the maritime Border Police have additional
responsibilities including environmental protection and sea rescue. With such limited
surveillance means, it is questionable whether such tasks can be fulfilled adequately. Perhaps
future consideration could be given to the Border Police operating a small helicopter which
may serve various purposes and funded by all the relevant agencies.

MOBILITY

For green border patrolling, the Bulgarian Border Police use old Soviet vehicles, primarily the
UAZ-469 and the VAZ-21213 which vary in age between 13 and 18 years old. These are
reinforced four-wheel drive vehicles, technically capable of operating in difficult
environmental conditions but now so dilapidated, that their real efficiency is negligible and
they are only capable of an operational range of 20-40km. Other vehicles exist in the fleet but
they are designated for other purposes such as the transport of mobile groups or
administrative purposes.

These cars, which are exceedingly uncomfortable to drive due to their heavy transmission and
gear configuration are notorious for consuming inordinate amounts of fuel and are most
definitely uneconomical to drive. Additionally, spare parts are now unavailable and it is only
a regular maintenance schedule at rear support stations which virtually keeps them on the road
and even then many others cannot be returned to service. It is little wonder that such vehicles
are incapable of apprehending or detaining modern cars.

The only conclusion that can be drawn from this review is the fact that the Bulgarian Border
Police are patrolling the southern and western borders at much less than maximum
operational limit and as such contributes to a window of opportunity for illegal activities to
pass undetected. To overcome such deficiencies requires a complete modernisation
programme of the patrol car fleet of the Border Police, with the phased introduction of both
short-wheel and long-wheel based cross-country patrol vehicles.

The introduction of modern cross-country vehicles will ensure that virtually no areas of the
border is immune from serious patrolling. Furthermore, the mixed fleet of cars will allow
more varied types of patrol, with smaller two-man patrols being the norm and the larger
vehicles supporting search and interdiction operations, including the use of dogs, which can
also be carried.

Another important factor concerning vehicles is the need to be able to house communication
systems on board. In many of the mountain areas, these vehicles may also be required to
transport booster or relay equipment to various locations in order to improve communications
and today’s modern cross-country vehicles, able as they are to operate even in the harshest
climates, are urgently required by the Border Police.

Before leaving the question of mobility, one must also consider the question of maintenance
for the vehicle fleet. Any fleet of vehicles must be backed up by a reliable team of mechanics
with the necessary spare parts. The Bulgarian Border Police have the skilled mechanics but
they work in dilapidated workshops and with few modern tools. Spare parts are non-existent.
Given that the Commission will soon invest in the supply of modern cross-country patrol vehicles through the Phare Programme, it should not be left too long before the whole issue of rear support and logistic services are examined and upgraded accordingly.

Yet however poorly equipped the Border Police is as regards land mobility, the situation on the blue border, particularly on the Black Sea is near to critical. The fleet assigned to the coastal protection of Bulgaria consists of 9 patrol boats, each approximately with a displacement of 40 tons. They were constructed in the 1970s and are completely inadequate for the tasks they must perform. Their long service and lack of spares (there have been no spares for over 10 years) ensures that only 2 ships can be on patrol at any one time, therefore denying the Border Police the means to effectively police the coast line. The most surprising thing is how the Border Police manage to keep their vessels afloat, particularly when over 50% of the basic mechanical parts, main and auxiliary engines and diesel generators are obsolete.

The fact that these ships were not constructed for Border Police work is obvious from their construction. Whilst mounting twin 12.7mm heavy machine guns fore and aft, there is no place on board for Border Police to effect a boarding at sea. There is virtually no space on which to stand at the side of the ship. The implication of this situation means that boarding at sea has become very problematic and actually discourages the crew from carrying out this essential function for fear of causing accidents. There is a larger vessel at the disposal of the Border Police, a forty-year old Soviet made vessel of 170 ton, which is technically more suitable for such work. However, given its excessive consumption of fuel and its even more obsolescent features, this vessel must remain a virtual museum piece.

With a coast of 411km and approximately 14,000 km of sea to patrol, the lack of modern purpose built patrol vessels renders the Black Sea coast of Bulgaria practically unguarded. This of course is perhaps an overstatement, as the Border Police make every effort to maintain the basis of a patrol pattern, working closely as they do with the coastal radio location stations. Every time the sailors put to sea, they actually risk their life in vessels, which should have been decommissioned long ago. If the officers and men of the Border Police were afforded new vessels, their very recognisable skill, determination and professionalism would be put to better and more productive use.

Fortunately, the situation is less critical on the Danube blue border. The Border Police possess 14 small patrol vessels with the largest about 10 tons. Most of them are Soviet but at least they were built in the mid-1980s and are still serviceable. Obviously more modern craft would be a logical development for the Danube patrols but at this time, their need is far less than their colleagues on the Black Sea coast.

**COMMUNICATIONS**

Although the aspect of communications will be covered in a separate annex, it is nevertheless useful to have some insight into the current communications systems used by the Border Police.

The Border Police possess an independent telecommunications system providing for information exchange at all levels. The system comprises three main subsystems; telex, radio short-waves and FM communication.

The telephone sub system provides for information exchange between the Headquarters in Sofia and the regional border sectors, Border Police Departments, border sub-sections and the cross-border points. The information is sent via channels leased from the Bulgarian national telecommunications provider and also via channels owned by the Border Police. Unfortunately, the automated telephone exchange units and multiplex facilities are of the old
analogue variety, which frequently leads to interruptions and poor quality and obviously fewer options for servicing the subscribers. In some areas, local exchange facilities date as far back as 1944 and this is unacceptable in this day and age. The system should be replaced with a fully modern digital exchange and with multiplex packing systems.

The telex system was constructed to provide communications between the Border Police and all regional border sectors and cross border points. The centre in Sofia and those at regional level are equipped with devices designed in the 1980s, an electrical type, which is rather slow at exchanging information. These should also be replaced with more modern telex systems or other computer-based systems.

As regards local radio systems, the Border Police use short wave systems for the headquarters to border sectors and FM radiophone system in the border sectors, using two or three automated relay-stations per border sector. The main communication between border sector and the border sub-sections and cross-border points is a duplex FM radio connection of the analogue variety.

The main connection devices used within the network are quartz channel radiophones FM-10164 SD, FM-301 and FM 305. All of these are of Hungarian origin and were manufactured in 1968. These devices have 12 channels, with a maximum output of up to 10W.

Although the Bulgarian Border Police do operate successfully using these current systems, that should not hide the fact that the phone system does not comply with the technical requirements and tasks which are assigned to them. They are not capable of providing the necessary communication links to those units protecting the border and those passport control officers are cross-border points.

As for the short-wave and FM facilities, they are totally obsolete and should be replaced immediately.

The only reasonable conclusion that can be drawn from this is that the available communication systems for the Border Police are so inefficient that it is seriously degrading the flow of vital information. The systems available most certainly do not meet European standards and certainly not the Schengen standards applicable to the Schengen Information System. The gradual and phased restructuring of the Border Police’s communication systems, transferring from analogue to digital, is a vital and necessary pre-condition for the effective management of the border, particularly for passport and visa control. To do this will involve the likely introduction of a Trunk system with a dispatcher-programmable arithmetic logic processor, which will provide a far more effective service for those subscribers at local and sub-local level.

The description above is merely an indicative overview of the current systems and much more detailed information, particularly relating to the information technology will be contained in the Annex on Communications and Information Technology. However, it is essential for any border management agency to have efficient and task-related systems and unfortunately, Bulgaria is suffering in this department. It is of no use to provide sophisticated surveillance devices or cross-country patrol vehicles if there is an inability to inform officers of the circumstances on the border. As has been mentioned already, it is not acceptable to be using second world war field telephone exchanges in the age of Schengen.

**TRAINING EQUIPMENT**

The issue of equipment for training is often overlooked but in its own right it is an integral part of operations. Officers must be trained to operate their equipment in order to get the best
from it. Admittedly, much of this can be done in basic training but with any service undergoing structural changes and equipment modernisation, the issue of providing adequate equipment for training should not be overlooked.

To date, the main Border Police training establishments lack sufficient stocks of basic training tools. There are no proper language laboratories, management and communication skills suites, document cabinets or the basics for training material production, including copiers, printers, scanners and overhead and slide projectors. Certainly there are very few surveillance devices or communication training devices.

If the Border Police aspire to train professional officers to EU standards, then the level of teaching support equipment must increase dramatically.

**CONCLUSIONS**

The picture that emerges from this study is of a border police force in transition but one which, nevertheless, has introduced a workable system which is being adhered to. Indeed, it is only due to the remarkable skills of the many officers and men on the borders that ensure that any of the current equipment still functions.

In terms of equipment, it would be fair to argue that the Bulgarian Border Police are woefully equipped for modern border management. Obsolete machines and systems, most of it designated and designed for completely different tasks from the ones they carry out today cannot be maintained much longer and therefore there is a real danger that the existing border management system in such a key area may collapse from equipment depletion.

In every key sector from mobility to communications to surveillance to tactical support the picture is the same, valiant and often futile efforts to keep obsolescent equipment in service. The question must be asked as to how in the future, when the Border Police will be a totally professional force, they will be able to attract and more importantly, retain staff if they are professionally frustrated due to a lack of basic equipment never mind state of the art devices.

The answer lies in the complete modernisation of the equipment holdings of the Border Police within an integrated approach to border management. This will not be cheap and will take many years to accomplish. Investment solely from the EC will not in itself be sufficient.

The Bulgarian Border Police must therefore prioritise their requirements in such a way that they can target the phased introduction of equipment into the regions and areas, which are most critical in terms of illegal cross-border activity. Generally, this would have meant the southern and eastern borders but after the Kosovo conflict, the Bulgarian Border Police must now place an additional emphasis on the Yugoslav border.

The following recommendation will make clear what is required. However, it is for the Bulgarians to conceptualise how such a modernisation programme should evolve and at what pace. Their circumstances, particularly economic, must be taken into consideration. However, given the political and professional commitment of the Government and the Border Police and the undoubted willingness to engage in reforming border management, the European Commission should offer the Bulgarians every encouragement, both morally and financially.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

The following recommendations are based on the author’s assessment of the nature of the threat to Bulgaria’s borders, the institutional capacity of the Border Police to meet these
challenges and very importantly the current equipment inventory, which is exploited in order to enhance the capacity of the Border Police. The recommendations will also include a brief statement of justification, as to recommend serious investment in equipment without a clear explanation as to why the material is required and what it is meant to do would be illogical.

INFRASTRUCTURE

As was mentioned already in the main text, the question of infrastructure was technically excluded from this study. However, in the opinion of the author, any professional border management agency which, adheres to the principle that, personnel are its most vital asset must, first and foremost, promote the interests of the officers and men. Improved living and working conditions are a priority therefore and will help improve the quality of service, morale and staff motivation.

It is also important that proper infrastructure be available in order to suitably protect new equipment. Proper care and maintenance is essential but so too is adequate storage and garaging.

It is recommended therefore that the Bulgarian Authorities consider an infrastructure modernisation programme for the Border Police. Emphasis should be placed on the refurbishment or new build of adequate working and living accommodation, properly equipped and with adequate storage of vehicles and equipment.

A priority should be those areas of the green border, which are generally exposed to harsh conditions. The average building should include sleeping areas, common messing rooms, kitchen and proper washing and toilet facilities. The working area should include an operations room, including communications centre, a briefing room which, should double as a training room and a holding area with interview room.

For the protection of equipment, there should be an armoury for the storage of all weapons, ammunition and other pyrotechnics, surveillance devices and radios. Externally, there must be adequate garage space for vehicles, thereby ensuring that when not in use or being locally maintained, they are protected from the elements, particularly in winter.

PERSONAL EQUIPMENT

The main problem in this field is the obsolete nature of some equipment and the complete lack of other items of equipment. The equipping of the officer or soldier on the border should be based on the operational requirements of his duty. The current uniforms of the Bulgarian Border Police are adequate, although the lack of special foul weather clothing will reduce the efficiency of the officer. However, when it comes to safety, then every effort should be made to ensure the physical safety of the officer and soldier whilst on duty and here there is a marked deficiency.

It is recommended that the Bulgarian Border Police invest in a variety of personal equipment items.

Firstly, it is recommended that the officers and ratings of the naval contingent of the Border Police be provided with modern life vests. These vests should be lightweight and capable of being discretely stored. Additionally, they should be brightly coloured and have a facility for topping-up the air inside and include any other safety devices currently on offer. Each ship should have one vest per member of the crew and a small
number of spares, which can be used for emergencies or when issued kit requires replacement. A sufficient number should be held centrally in reserve.

Secondly, it is recommended that each border post and naval vessel be issued with a number of modern, lightweight body armour, perhaps of the kevlar variety. A maximum of ten per unit should be sufficient and perhaps three per patrol craft or depending on the average size of boarding party. Their use should be at the discretion of local commanders but it is recommended that they be compulsory for night patrolling on the green border. There is also a requirement to hold a supply of such body armour and additional light-weight kevlar helmets at regional level for the use of mobile groups. Again, there use should be at the discretion of local commanders but is suggested they be issued whenever mobile groups are deployed or when it is known through intelligence sources that there may be a risk of the use of firearms by criminal groups.

Thirdly, it is recommended that all officers and men who patrol the green and blue borders be issued with modern foul weather clothing of the gortex variety and coloured to reflect local circumstances. This clothing should include over-jackets and over-trousers, gloves and waterproof boots. In winter, thermal underwear is also recommended. The main factor to be considered is that the garments themselves do not hinder the conduct of operations.

Fourthly and related to the issue of clothing, it is recommended that a small number of specially-designed thermal suits be purchased and used by those personnel on covert surveillance operations. In conjunction with improved tactical training methods, these suits allow covert patrols to spend longer period under cover without having to be rotated or withdrawn.

Fifthly and finally, it is recommended that each officer and soldier on the green and blue border be issued with a modern rubber-coated battery-operated flashlight and a canister of mace or any similar protective spray.

Although the Border Police have an adequate store of binoculars, consideration should be given to their eventual replacement. There is little evidence to suggest that Border Police patrols use caltrops whilst conducting vehicle checks but they are a cheap and non-violent method of stopping vehicles that either fail to stop or try to drive away from a check-point. The use of these devices should also be considered.

SURVEILLANCE

Surveillance of the border is the core of border management and to be effective, a border management agency must have a capability for night and day observation and in all weathers. An additional factor as far as the Bulgarian Border Police is concerned is the reduction in manpower which will effect its capacity to operate at anything like peak capacity. Therefore given that the replacement of conscripts by professionals will still mean a reduction in numbers, the Bulgarian Border Police must consider the introduction of a new and integrated strategy for border management.

This new integrated strategy must reflect a series of concentric circles. At the outer edge must be a selectively-placed screen of active or passive sensor devices. The next should be the use of mobile image equipment, including thermal vision and finally the last layer of observation, which is mobile patrols, equipped with powerful binoculars and night vision devices.
On the blue border, particularly the Black Sea, a similar strategy must be developed, utilising a combination of coastal radio-location systems and observation platforms mounted on naval patrol boats.

*It is recommended that Border Police deploy a screen of perimeter protection and signalling equipment, based on active and passive sensors. The precise type of equipment will depend largely on the terrain but a typical solution may be the use of microwave beams. Such systems may be either static or mobile but their positioning must be based on maximum efficiency and related to the areas where there are the highest incidence of illegal cross-border activity or where regular patrolling is hindered by lack of manpower or difficult terrain. However, given the familiarity in Bulgaria with static systems such as ‘Skala’, then the preference may be for static systems. However, if the system is to be static, then every effort should be made to conceal them and regularly maintain them.*

Additionally, it is recommended that the Bulgarian Border Police invest in the purchase of thermal image devices, both static and mobile. Reasonable vision would be up to 3.5km. These units should be linked to a central command function which can assess the images being transmitted, the location of patrols in the area and can vector in search and interdiction units. The typical unit should perhaps consist of a thermal camera with appropriate magnification and if necessary a coolant pack, a number of remote camera units or even a combination of both. An adequate information unit must be included to assess the images and if necessary send them on for further study or merely for the use of other parties. Finally, a reliable communications system must be associated with such a unit.

Recommended also is the replacement of existing night-vision devices with more modern systems. The favoured option should be night-vision goggles with a range of between 500m and 600m. These goggles should be robust enough for regular patrolling purposes and require little maintenance save regular battery changes. However, it is also recommended that a small number of modern weapon-mounted night vision sights be held centrally in each border post station in order to allow at least two men to carry such devices in case there is a need to use weapons at night.

For the surveillance of the blue border, a combination of static and ship-borne platforms is required. The Border Police need to invest further in the number of land-based radio-location stations in order to adequately cover the inland coastal waters. Given the shortage of patrol boats, these stations need to be able to track multiple maritime targets and exchange information with the available patrol craft or the port authorities. As for the ship-borne systems, these will largely mirror the mobile requirements on the green border, with improved thermal vision devices built on to the upper structures of the patrol craft and night-vision goggles for those men who conduct off-ship searches.

**MOBILITY**

The Bulgarian Border Police are required to constantly patrol the green and blue borders. This implies the possession of a modern fleet of land and maritime patrol vehicles and vessels. The ability to travel provides improved deterrence and presence on the border and of course the ability to react to border incidents or violations. Such activity must also be carried out 24 hours a day and in all weather conditions. This operation, like surveillance, is at the heart of border management.

*It is recommended that the Border Police invest in the upgrading of its land patrol vehicles and coastal blue water fleet of patrol craft.*
The main requirement in vehicles is for two types of cross-country patrol vehicles and a limited number of medium-size transport vehicles. The Border Police require a robust short-wheel based cross-country vehicle for the daily routine of patrolling. Such a vehicle should be able to operate in rugged off-road terrain and in hilly or mountainous areas. Ideally, they should have the facility to operate in poor climactic conditions, have power steering and be powered by diesel engines. A normal compliment would be either 3 or 4 persons, depending on the discretion of the local commander. However, there is also a requirement for a similar vehicle but this time long-wheel based, used for the movement of larger patrol groups, possibly with a patrol dog. A typical configuration would be for 9 persons and a dog and such vehicles could also be used to transport people arrested on the border.

Finally it is recommended that the Border Police acquire a number of medium-size transport vehicles, equivalent to larger mini-buses with an average capacity for thirty passengers. Such vehicles should be used to transport reserve manpower or mobile groups in times of crisis. Ideally they should incorporate features such as air conditioning or heating units. Each border station requires one such vehicle.

All of the vehicles however must be able to incorporate communications systems.

For the blue border, particularly the coastal border, the Border Police need to scrap all of their existing craft and replace them with modern patrol boats with a similar displacement to the existing craft. These boats, which have to be able to operate in all conditions, must incorporate the latest GPS systems and sufficient communications for ship to ship and ship to shore purposes. Some light armament may be necessary but if so it should be forward mounted. The rear of the boat must contain sufficient space for the stowage of a modern small rubber boat with outboard motor, which will be used for boarding parties. This small craft must have the capacity to transport an average of 4 to 6 persons.

Given the size of the blue border and the requirement for constant operations, the Border Police may need as many as 12 such patrol boats, with a minimum of 6 at sea at any one time. However, there is an argument for the Border Police to operate at least 3 larger coastal patrol craft, particularly to support not only tasks at an extended range from the shore but also to support environmental protection activities. These vessels could range from 100 to 200 ton and may be expensive to run, although modern vessels are more economic than those in service at the moment. Alternatively, the running cost of the vessels could be shared by the Bulgarian environmental agencies as well as the Border Police and this may be an affordable way to operate a mixed fleet.

COMMUNICATIONS

The separate study on communications and information technology, contained in Annex A to this study will make detailed recommendations as to the requirements in this field. However, it should be noted, that the question of upgrading or replacing communications systems is closely related to internal Bulgarian telecommunications and also the standards in information systems associated with Schengen. For example, the need for more channels can only be done after discussions with the Government and the national telecommunications provider.

Yet without a root and branch modernisation of all the communications means of the Border Police, it will be impossible to operate at anything like maximum operational efficiency.
It is recommended that the Border Police develop a new vertical and horizontal communications structure, based heavily on digital telecommunications systems at the upper level and GSM systems at the lower level. It is essential that border patrols have immediate access to necessary information such as visa control, stolen vehicles or suspicious persons without having to go through a chain including base, station, sector and region. Information of the border police must also be available to other agencies such as the national police and security agencies.

TRAINING

The training of personnel is an important function, which requires serious investment in its own right. However, in terms of equipment, there are two major requirements; firstly for the training on specific items of equipment which will be used in the field and secondly, secondary equipment which is used to facilitate the training.

It is recommended that the Border Police ensure that appropriate stocks of equipment currently being used operationally be held at training establishments in order to be sure that staff will be familiar with all equipment that they will be expected to operate.

It is further recommended that all training establishments have the basic tools of modern instruction, including furnished classrooms with overhead projectors and slide projectors, TV and video recorders, work-stations, (notebooks in border posts for distance learning) a library of essential reading material, language laboratories, management suites, copiers, printers and telephone/fax connections.
ANNEX 5: MULTI-ANNUAL STRATEGY FOR THE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE BORDER POLICE

Conception of National Border Police Service

Summary

According to the E.C. stand-point upon the Application of Republic Bulgaria for membership in European Union and the signed Bulgaria Agreement for Accession Partnership of R.B. with the European Community and implementing the Program „Bulgaria 2001“, the Bulgarian Government Adopted the National Strategy for integration of R. Bulgaria with the European Union. The Strategy is a common program document, specifying the basic activities and Government directions in short-term, mid-term and long-term plan for implementing the strategic objective – Republic Bulgaria Association with European Union.

The purpose is to emphasise the integration efforts within the framework of consistent policy and to define the priorities and the principles of the separate spheres and to identify the relevant tasks and devices for their achievement.

The strategy deals with the problems of the resources and the organisation for the final objective achievement.

The time terms for implementing the strategy are defined by the process, which take place in Bulgaria and the European Union.

Executive Art. 69 from the European Agreement for R. B. Association with the European Community, we adopted a NPAA.

The main objective is achieving a state, in which Bulgaria will join the E. Union with a National Legislation, accorded with the current acts of E.C. and with the institutions able to enforce it.


The program is a working plan for co-ordination between R. Bulgaria and E. Union in every concrete moment and is a substantiation for the needs of financial assistance.

The principles and the acts of the Bulgarian Government in this direction are basic points also for the Ministry of Inferior Program for Euro integration 1998-2000. The main objects of this program is assistance to the governmental strategy for the economic growth (1998-2000), adoption of the law and extended regulations according to the E.C. justice, which is under the authorisation of the Ministry of Inferior, development and consolidation of the administrative capacity of the Department and achievement of the European norms and standards.
an institutional building of the system) as well as the realisation of the concrete requirements, concerning the collaboration and the implementation of the international commitments in the sphere of the third pillar (Justice and Home Affairs) of the Agreement for R. Bulgaria Association with the European Union. (Accession Partnership).

By the adoption of the Ministry of Inferior Law, 09.12.1997, the real restructuring of the Ministry or Inferior, was established in accordance to the European standards.

The functions and the tasks of the Department are obeying the National Strategy for R. Bulgaria Association with the European Union and the NPAA. Among the priority activities of the Ministry of Inferior also is the implementation of the National Strategy for combating the organised crimes and the corruption, including also combating the illegal migration, which have negative influences over the ability to be within the criteria for E. Union membership – during II 1998.

The program for counteracting to the illegal migration and the illegal stay of aliens in the country, was adopted. The measures, provided by the program, which Ministry of Inferior exercises are aiming at:

- harmonisation of the national legalisation for counteracting to the illegal migration according to the proposals of the Budapest’s process and unification of the visa policy in accordance with Schengen standards;
- exercising restrictive visa policy over citizens from the risk countries according to the Schengen criteria;
- implementing the projects for building and functioning of the border crossing check points and guarding the state border of the country, according to the criteria for external border of the European Union;
- measures for limiting the abilities of aliens from the risk countries to use the country as a device for illegal migration;
- execution of a restrictive regime for Bulgarian citizens, leaving the country, which have done offences on the territory of foreign countries, as well as for aliens, entering the country that have broke the Bulgarian laws or are under the visa limitations of the Schengen standards.

Basic indicator for this are the undertaken activities for harmonisation of the national legislation system for counteracting to the illegal migration and unification of the visa policy with the same one of the E.U. states.

Without detailed analysis of the legislation initiatives in this direction, we will stress on some priority regulations as:

- Bulgarian ID documents act, regulating the limitation regime for Bulgarian citizens, leaving the country, that have broken the law
on the territory of other countries, as well as for aliens entering in the
country, that have broken the laws of Bulgaria or are under the visa
limitations according to the Schengen standards;

- Aliens residence in Republic of Bulgaria act providing the
  regime for entering, residence, movement, localisation, work and
  business activity, the right and duties of aliens, leaving the country,
  refugee law, which defines the status and the right of the refugees.

The implementing of the tasks is under the authorisation of the new
established structure – National Service „Border Police“ (NSBP).

It is a specialised security and operative – investigation service at
Ministry of Inferior guarding the state border and controlling the border
regime, which provides it’s functions at the border zone, at the zones of
border-crossing checkpoints, the international airports and seaports, inner
sea-waters, the territorial sea, the adjoin zone and continental coast line,
Bulgarian Danube, the other boundary rivers and natural water reservoirs.

The tasks and responsibilities of the National Border Police Service
bodies are shown, in details, in the Ministry of Inferior law and include a
number of specific activities for guarding the national border, preventing,
exposing and investigating crimes at the border zones and sites, caring
out border passport control exclusively designated to allow passage
through the state border of persons, goods and transportation vehicles,
checking-up the transportation vehicle, goods and delivering, checking-up
the Bulgarian and foreign ships and aircraft and the additional activities,
concerning the combating the trans-border criminality, corruption, goods
smuggling and illegal migration.

Implementing the proposals of the European Commission, the
Government documents and the tasks from the Ministry of Inferior Law,
the management of the National Border Police Service carried out the
basic priorities for the development of National Border Police Service till
2005.

The main objective of the National Border Police Service is work
as the European border police – opened to Europe and helpful bar against
the illegal migration and the organised trans-border criminality.

The sufficient priorities for restructuring of the National Border
Police Service are an open system, which is able to be actualised and
concretised within the process of its executing in accordance to the
changing conditions and requirements in the fields of the legislation and
the practice of guarding and control over the state border and closer
incorporation with the Schengen criteria.

The tasks are positioned through the time as for the first
implemented task to be a base for the implementation of the contingent.
In this plan, the remote in time tasks are step by step transformed in
short-term priorities or are changed relevant to the concrete needs and probably changed conditions.

They are also defined by the critical situation of the Border Police, which is expressed by the critical status of the ships-, automobile-, communications-, and electronic techniques, and the material base the infrastructure, and work organisation of the crossing-checkpoints are not in accordance to the European standards.

The objective is the transforming from a military organisation into a border police structure, which is personal provided, communicational, technical, and training provided, according to the European standards; increasing the effectiveness of the operative-investigation activity and referring the passport-visa control, as well as counteracting and combating the corruption.

Exercising the strategic activities, the Directory of NSB Police stressed their efforts on exposing, organising and total using the internal provisions. Results are achieved in implementing the short-term period tasks and we are working for creating new conditions for active realisation of the points of the following period.

Gradually using direct and real practical activities and results from them, we create the new image of the National Border Police Service as a structure of the Ministry of Inferior which has the required potential to realise it’s basic functions. It is necessary to emphasise, that the realisation of these priorities is concerning an investment of huge financial resources, which comes to 160 millions XEU and over. The problem increases by the circumstance that till this moment, financial resources are not granted for technical providing and requirement of the service, according to the new police functions provided by the Ministry of Inferior Act. The achieved within the frameworks of this short period let us to response occasional, to the high requirements on behalf of the Government and the European Community in combating, the illegal smuggling, the drug smuggling, stolen cars smuggling and illegal migration.

For example, due to the made efforts the main border crossing checkpoints firmly improved their traffic capacity and at the same time improved the passport-visa control, the control over the transportation vehicles, goods, materials and persons.

Despite of that, it is still not achieved an unification concerning the technical equipment of the working places, and personal training according to the European standards and practices.

Independent form the achieved, a number of unsolved problems still exist. They are obstacles for implementing the tasks layed in front of National Border Police Service. We will not be able to solve entirely the problems with the increased cross passing trough the border crossing
checkpoints by passengers and goods at the same time with increased passport-visa control, until we provide the means for the modern techniques, relevant to the European standards and requirements.

We would be not be able to solve entirely the problem with the illegal migration, the drug smuggling, the trans-border criminality, within real time, if we don’t have modern mobile and telecommunication devices.

Requirements are set up and possibilities arise for granting the positive effect due to the investments in the sphere of human resources, as a part of the priority activities of the National Border Police Service. It is necessary for National Border Police Service to begin working as an European police with high-levelled effectiveness, when exercising the specific specialised security and operative investigation activities for guarding the state border and for control over the border regime for counteracting to the illegal migration and the trans-border criminality.

The co-operation with the state members of the European Union and executing the Centre for Training at National Border Police Service will lead to an unification of our co-operative efforts for improvement the qualification of the police officials and as a whole will contribute to the Bulgarian joining the future United European area.

At present, National Border Police Service does not have the necessary well-trained officials and experts in the sphere of the border control and guarding the state border, because of the lack of a built specialised centre for methodical management of the problems, concerning the specific police activity of National Border Police Service.

The creating of a structure, building and technical equipment of a specialised training centre at NBPS will contribute to an improvement of the skills and images of the police officials and the representatives of National Border Police Service as a main part of the Ministry of Inferior Structure. The bilateral and multilateral co-operation of professional knowledge’s and skills with the member-states of E.U., will unificate the activity of NBPS in the training sphere with the developed European democracies.

An entirely transforming into a police-method in guarding the border is not possible, without the technical devices for movement and communication. We would be not able to stop entirely the illegal smuggling of drugs, persons, arms good and financial means along our Black Sea and Danube Border, if we don’t have modern patrol ships and cutters, which are able to act the whole time through the day-and-night and under complicated meteorological situation. The lack of modern devices for movements (vehicles with increased possibility, specialised moto-bicycles, transport and low-weight helicopters) to accomplish in
short-terms what we have started – to transform into an external Schengen border of European Community.

What NBPS, and in respect MI and the Government, have done till that stage, is achieved by an utmost pressure of our human potential, the available financial and technical devices. The achieved expresses our striving for association with United Europe and for implementing it’s requirements. But in the terms of Monetary Board the resolute counteracting to the organised international criminality, concerning the opposition and the fear of the corrupted state officials, the further restructuring of NBPS is possible only if an E.U. international help is provided.

Every delay of the needed financial and material assistance will lead to unforeseeable consequences to the disability to accomplish in terms what we have started, to disability to provide an effective border control, at the entrance of Europe, to abolishing the already built bar against the trans-border criminality, the corruption, the illegal migration the drug smuggling, persons and goods smuggling.

An obligatory requirement for the realisation of the NBPS priorities and executing the tasks and the objectives, is their facilitation with the needed financial and technical devices.
ANNEX 6: LIST OF IN-KIND CONTRIBUTION ITEMS TO BE PROVIDED AS BULGARIAN CO-FINANCING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Estimated value, EUR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Existing building in Svilengrad</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Land</td>
<td>1,163 m²</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Existing building, 5 floors, 10% amortisation</td>
<td>2,200 m²</td>
<td>1,100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Repair, including utilities</td>
<td>2,200 m²</td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Demolishing of store</td>
<td>144 m²</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Repair of boiler room</td>
<td>77 m²</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Diesel generator</td>
<td></td>
<td>20,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Vertical planning</td>
<td>400 m²</td>
<td>50,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Contingencies 10%</td>
<td></td>
<td>185,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal I</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>2,025,000</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>II. Premises for the base stations of the TETRA system</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>4 new and 3 existing buildings, 36 – 40 m²</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Land</td>
<td>7x100 = 700 m²</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Vertical planning</td>
<td>7x20 = 140 m²</td>
<td>50,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Repair for 3, utilities, communications</td>
<td></td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Contingencies 10%</td>
<td></td>
<td>35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal II</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>385,000</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>III. Digital maps</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Computer equipment</td>
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<td>90,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Geodetic survey equipment</td>
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<td>100,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Licenses, software and GIS</td>
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<td>160,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Preparation of maps</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal III</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>500,000</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>2,910,000</strong></td>
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