COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING DECISION

of 19.10.2017

modifying the Commission implementing Decision C(2016)6767 final on the 2016 Special measure for Syrian population to be financed from the general budget of the European Union
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THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) No 236/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 laying down common rules and procedures for the implementation of the Union's instruments for financing external action\(^1\), and in particular Article 2(1) thereof,


Whereas:


(2) The purpose of the present modifying Decision is to allow for a change in the implementing partners of the Action Fiche "Programme to strengthen resilience and prepare for recovery in Syria" - Annex 1 to the original Decision.

(3) The action provided for in this Decision does not fall within the categories of measures for which the prior opinion of the Committee is required. The European Parliament and the European Neighbourhood Instrument Committee established under Article 15 of the financing instrument referred to in recital 1 should be informed of this Decision within one month following its adoption.

(4) The envisaged assistance is deemed to strictly comply with the conditions and procedures set out by the EU restrictive measures concerning the said country.

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\(^1\) OJ L 77, 15.3.2014, p. 95.

HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:

Article

Annex 1 of Commission implementing Decision C(2016)6767 final is replaced by the annex of this Decision.

Done at Brussels,

For the Commission

Johannes HAHN
Member of the Commission
This action is funded by the European Union

**ANNEX**

of the Commission Implementing Decision modifying the Commission implementing Decision C(2016)6767 final on the 2016 Special measure for the Syrian population

**Action Document for a "Programme to strengthen resilience and prepare for recovery in Syria"**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>INFO</strong></th>
<th><strong>RATION</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>INFORMATION FOR POTENTIAL GRANT APPLICANTS</strong></td>
<td><strong>WORK PROGRAMME FOR GRANTS</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This document constitutes the work programme for grants in the sense of Article 128(1) of the Financial Regulation (Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012) in the following section concerning calls for proposals: 5.3.1 and grants awarded directly without a call for proposals: 5.3.2.

| **1. Title/basic act/CRIS number** | Programme to strengthen resilience and prepare for recovery in Syria CRIS ref: ENI/2016/039-594 financed under the European Neighbourhood Instrument |
| **2. Zone benefiting from the action/location** | Syria |
| **3. Programming document** | N/A |
| **4. Sector of concentration/thematic area** | N/A |
| **5. Amounts concerned** | Total estimated costs: EUR 117.25 million Total amount of European Union (EU) Budget contribution: EUR 80 million. This action is co-financed by potential grant beneficiaries and other implementing partners for an indicative amount of EUR 37.25 million. |
| **7a) DAC code(s)** | 110, 120, 150, 220, 311, 430, 730. |
| **b) Main Delivery Channel** | 10000 – Public sector institutions (Member States agencies). 21000 – International Non-Governmental Organisations. 42000 – European Institution (JRC). |
| **8. Markers (from CRIS DAC form)** | General policy objective Not targeted Significant objective Main objective |
Summary

After 5 years of conflict in the devastated Syria, the present action aims at contributing to the resilience of the Syrian population and paving the way for the recovery and reconstruction of the country in case a credible political process towards the resolution of the conflict gains traction. The action has six components defined taking into consideration the following:

- It ensures the possibility of a timely reaction should the political process allow it, through easily re-locatable and re-sizeable interventions.
- It responds as well and as comprehensively as possible to the needs identified with the Syrian population and communities and it contributes to avoiding further fragmentation and to reconnecting the country back together.
- It switches to a more structural/strategic type of support considering the protracted nature of the conflict in order to ensure, as much sustainability of the actions as possible in the context of the conflict.
- It foresees interventions that contribute to safeguard technical public institutions at state and local levels while ensuring through vigorous monitoring that such support is not abused for political or military ends by parties to the conflict. Similarly, it will in no way indirectly support policies aimed at demographic engineering.
- It takes account of the EU ongoing portfolio of projects and respects the “Whole of Syria” approach. Given the highly political context it will follow the political directions given by the Council and managed by the European External Action Service (EEAS). It co-ordinates closely with and complements the actions of other EU instruments (Instrument for Humanitarian aid, Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)) as well as with other donors, so that complementarities and synergies are ensured and a “do no harm” approach is respected.
- It supports the political process and the implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions 2254 & 2268.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Components of the action</th>
<th>Implementing Partners</th>
<th>Modality</th>
<th>Indicative amount in Mio €</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education and youth</td>
<td>International non-governmental organisation (INGOs)</td>
<td>Direct management – Grants</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>EF, Danish Red Cross (DRC)</td>
<td>Indirect management + Grants</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSOs incl. Media</td>
<td>INGOs + Syrian Civil Society Organisations (CSOs)</td>
<td>Direct management - Grants</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Governance</td>
<td>GiZ and DFID</td>
<td>Indirect management</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resilience-oriented interventions complemented by urban profiling and neighbourhood level analyses.</td>
<td>GiZ, JRC, iMMAP, COSV and another NGO</td>
<td>Indirect management, Direct management – Grants Administrative arrangement with JRC</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL 80</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 CONTEXT

1.1 Sector/Country/Regional context/Thematic area

1.1.1 Situational Analysis

1.1.1.1 Overall situation

Five years of conflict have had a devastating impact on Syria’s economy, infrastructure, public services and social fabric. According to the World Bank, the crisis has claimed between 132,000 and 470,000 lives and has displaced almost half of Syria’s 22 million population. A preliminary and partial assessment by the World Bank estimates the damages caused to the capital stock by the conflict at USD 70-80 billion as of mid-2014\(^1\). During the decades leading up to the conflict, Syria had achieved - or had made significant progress towards - many of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); by the end of 2015, however, most of these economic and social gains have been reversed.

1.1.1.2 Economic situation

Syria’s economy has lost an estimated USD 259.6 billion in five years of conflict\(^2\). The manufacturing, agriculture and service sectors have almost all been decimated\(^3\). The Syrian pound has lost more than nine tenths of its value in the same time period. A parallel “war economy” has emerged across the country, in which "new sources of revenue are directly linked to violence, the management of internal and external borders, the extraction of local resources, and the absence of any regulation”\(^4\). The ongoing conflict has already undone social gains. According to UNDP Syria has already lost 12 places in the Human

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\(^1\) "Reconstruction for Peace" MENA Economic Monitor, World Bank, April 2016, p 15.
\(^2\) "Syria at war. Five years on" UN ESCWA, 2016.
\(^4\) Turkmani et al, “Countering the logic of the war economy in Syria; evidence from three local areas,” p. 6.
Development index falling back from 106 in 2005 to 118 in 2014 and lost the 35 years of human development progress.\(^5\)

The resulting economic contraction has left much of the population destitute. While extreme poverty had fallen between 1997 and 2009 from 12.4% to 8.7%, since the onset of the crisis, given the rising prices of goods and services, the decrease in real wages and the loss of jobs and material assets, many more people have fallen into poverty. By the end of 2015, around 85% of the population is estimated to live below the poverty line (and 69% are living in extreme poverty)\(^6\), and over 50% of the labour force is unemployed.\(^7\) Likewise, food insecurity has reached worrying levels whereby 30% of the population can no longer meet their basic food needs, and a further half of the population are at great risk of becoming food insecure. Local food production has been adversely affected by the crisis and the country now relies on commercial imports and food aid.\(^8\) Prior to the crisis, agriculture was an essential pillar of Syria economy and contributed about 20–25 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) and was the main source of employment and income for 47 percent of the population. The sector generated about 16–20 percent of non-oil exports and was a major source of raw materials for the processing industries. The annual revenue loss as a result of the virtual extinction of agricultural exports due to the current crisis was estimated by the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform (MAAR) at SYP 72 billion (about USD 0.5 billion) in 2013. The reduction in agricultural production has led to a dire food security situation across the country.

1.1.1.3 Public services and governance

The education sector continues to deteriorate, depriving increasing numbers of children and adolescents of their right to education and skill-building. In addition, the negative impact of the conflict has placed children at increased risk of being killed, maimed, exploited and abused – including recruitment into armed groups, abduction, sexual and gender-based violence and child labour.

At the onset of the conflict, Syria had a functioning health system and high childhood vaccination rates. The country was on track to achieve Millennium Development Goal 4 (reducing child mortality rates from preventable diseases by two-thirds). The trend reversed in 2012 and maternal mortality raised from 52 to 62.7 deaths per 100,000 live births between 2009 and 2013. As of the March 2016, 55% of all public hospitals in Syria had been damaged or destroyed and the domestic production of medicines had fallen by 70%. Just over one third of health structures are still functioning.\(^9\) Deliberate attacks and ensuing damages to health care facilities have resulted in a shortage of beds and medicines to treat patients. The situation has further deteriorated due to increased isolation of the vulnerable groups, especially children, elderly people, people with disability, women, female headed households and youth as well as to poor service delivery. The deliberate targeting of health staff, leading to their death or departure is further aggravating the availability and quality of health care. As such, the UN estimates that 42 percent of the population lack access to basic health services. The Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) plays an essential role in the logistics of humanitarian support to the Syrian population but also and first and foremost in the health

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\(^8\) Food Security Assessment, WFP 2015.

\(^9\) Survey of nine governorates in Syria recently conducted by WHO and the health cluster in Turkey.
system. This latter role is crucial especially for what concern hard to reach areas. But SARC has been stretched to its limits by the destruction of many of its primary health care facilities, the decrease in the available medical personnel and the increasing importance of humanitarian aid distribution in SARC's portfolio without sufficient resources. If humanitarian support can bring immediate relief for life saving care, complementary needs for secondary and tertiary health care but also reproductive health are immense and are not met. Considering the state of destruction of public health infrastructures, SARC is expected to keep playing an important role in addressing health services delivery gaps in the coming years, whatever the political scenario.

After five years of conflict, and due to mismanagement and high level of corruption already before the conflict, Syrian state governance structures are severely degraded and weakened. Power is and will remain contested as long as the conflict lasts and probably even longer through a number of rounds of elections at local and national levels. Control of territory is still being fought over between moderate opposition groups, the regime, and extremists' groups. In these conditions governance is very weak, especially in opposition held areas. This adds risks to the potential for recovery as well as the sustainability of any development/early recovery action. In 2011, law 107 adopted by the regime gave provision for a more decentralised model of administration with empowered local and provincial councils. This law presents a model that could apply to the whole country. Despite the law, local governance in regime held areas remains highly centralised. Even though the law is issued by the regime, it has been used in some opposition held areas to frame relations between Provincial Councils (PCs) and Local Councils (LCs) although the scattered control of the areas between several groups and the lack of a central authority (e.g. the Syrian Interim Government) recognised by a critical mass of opposition groups make it difficult to put in place reliable and recognised LCs, PCs and technical directorates. That being said, some are in place and are playing an important stabilisation role. A 2015 study by the Local Administrative Councils Unit (LACU) of the Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC) found 405 LCs in the areas it surveyed.

The situation in Syria has reduced the ability of people, communities, and cities to respond to on-going shocks and their ability to move beyond simply coping to recovery and development. Multiple displacements have exhausted savings and undermine livelihood activities. Within host communities, large movements of internally displaced persons (IDPs) place incredible strain on already stretched infrastructure, services, and social services. Social tension is increasing in hosting areas as well as other locations across Syria.

1.1.1.4 The situation of CSOs in Syria and the role of media

In the course of the conflict moderate voices have become rare in Syria. Syrian advocacy groups operate mainly from outside of Syria and CSOs remaining in Syria often primarily focus on the delivery of basic services, operating alongside the fault lines of the conflict. However and despite the adversity, many Syrians still remain committed to working at grass-roots' level in their communities to reduce tensions, provide local solutions to everyday problems and to strengthen the feeling that civic action in a joint effort across communities' divides can bring results and improve people's lives. Such initiatives exist all across Syria and across the lines of the conflict. While such Syrian efforts at community-level are tireless and on a voluntary basis, the support to them so far has mainly focused on capacity-building and on strengthening fragile networks that bind them together.

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10 Needs for the Local Councils of Syria, Public Policy Report, 2015 LACU and NPA.
11 Estimated at 6.6 million persons in March 2016. Source: UN OCHA.
In the conflict political context and the reporting about it (national, opposition and international media) the stories and voices of those Syrians do not come through even though they are the closest to the everyday life and needs of the average Syrian. Given their lack of access to political or media platforms the potential to use their experiences, lessons-learnt and human stories to re-connect Syrians through the sharing of such practical, resilience-oriented information across divides remains largely unused.

While access to media across Syria remains strong with pro-opposition media being accessible in Government held areas and vice versa Syrians, like most populations living violent conflict, are strongly polarised and rely on "their respective" media for information. State media (primarily a number of terrestrial and satellite TV stations) is still followed by a substantial number of Syrians inside and outside Syria. Likewise a number of recent opposition affiliated satellite television channels such as Orient TV and Aleppo Today are also accessible via satellite across Syria and beyond. Other media consumed by Syrians includes pan-Arab channels (notably opposition leaning Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya and regime leaning Al Mayadeen) Arabic versions of international news networks (e.g. BBC Arabic, France 24 Arabic, RT Arabic) and internet based media (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, YouTube).

A number of new radio stations as well as print media have developed some of which with internet portals that help diffuse their content beyond their physical reach (e.g. Enab Baladi). According to the EU supported Syrian Prints platform12 294 newspapers were launched since March 2011 of which 54 are still active.

Islamic State has since its beginning had a particular focus on media with dedicated programming and daily journals distributed in its territory and beyond via a highly developed use of the Internet in particular social media.

While the Syrian media landscape displays high levels of polarisation and politicisation, it still lacks ability to provide relevant localised information to Syrians in Syria but also to the Syrian refugee communities outside Syria. Syrian community-based civil society groups and other civilian actors' views and needs are not reflected in Syrian mainstream media. Most Syrian media, be it opposition or regime sided, appears detached from Syrians' everyday lives and needs. It also does not serve as an interface to connect with the diverse range of Syrian civil society organisations and their needs for advocacy.

Despite initiatives to create a media middle ground by bringing together views from various outlets (e.g. Syria direct) it has not yet been possible to successfully create middle ground media platforms at a larger scale that are attractive to all Syrians. Such middle ground media could play a role in providing practical, resilience-oriented information, from Syrians to Syrians. Over time it could also play a constructive role in a possible transition phase and support peace-building and post-conflict national reconciliation. Syrian civil society, which needs to play a crucial role in any political discussions about transitional government and post-conflict Syria does not have sufficient Syrian media exposure to animate, influence and enrich national debates about such political solutions to the conflict13.

1.1.2 EU policy framework

This action is framed by the following EU and international strategies and principles:

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a) EU regional strategy for Syria and Iraq as well as the ISIL/Da'esh threat and notably its objectives of strengthening the moderate opposition and civil society actors, providing basic services and contributing to rebuilding an administration in areas of reduced violence, and preparing for "the day after".

b) Most recent European Council and Foreign Affairs Council conclusions on Syria that provides the political frame of the foreseen actions.


d) EU Communication on conflict prevention and the Communication on Empowering Local Authorities in partner countries for enhanced governance and more effective development outcomes, (that feeds in the local governance component of the action).

e) Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)/DAC Principles of Good International Engagement in Fragile States and the related 2007 EU Communication towards an EU response to situations of fragility as well as the "Do Not Harm approach" (that provides a relevant tool for Syria to assess how our assistance affects the conflict dynamics).

f) EU Communication "Lives in dignity: from aid-dependency to self-reliance" and notably its promotion of the early engagement of development support in protracted displacement situations.

g) The action also addresses several of the objectives laid out in the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy (2015-2019), in particular under chapter III on ensuring a comprehensive human rights approach to conflicts and crises.

The action also addresses several of the objectives laid out in the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy (2015-2019), in particular under chapter III on ensuring a comprehensive human rights approach to conflicts and crises.

Syria’s national development objectives have normally been laid out in a series of 5 year plans. The 10th five year plan covered the period 2006-2010 and while the 11th five year plan for 2011-2015 was drafted, it was not officially adopted. Due to the violence and unacceptable human rights situation, EU bilateral co-operation with the Government of Syria was suspended in May 2011. Since then, EU’s economic and development assistance to address the Syrian crisis under the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument/European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENPI/ENI) has continued through annual special measures and has been channelled mainly through UN organisations, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Member States' agencies. The EU has always kept a “Whole-of-Syria approach”. It supports UN organisations, as well as a number of NGOs working from Damascus mainly serving Government-held areas (but also partly opposition-held through cross-line operations). The EU also supports more and more other NGOs and Member states agencies working essentially from southern Turkey but also Jordan or Lebanon and which serve predominately opposition-held areas (through cross-border operations).

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The actions foreseen are following-up or complementary to the ongoing portfolio of projects funded under ENI since 2011 in the Education, livelihoods, CSOs, Media and Health sectors. Compared to previous years 2011-2015, the EU contribution for this 2016 special measure for inside Syria is almost doubled. This reflects the dramatically increasing needs identified but also the need to be ready to support a credible political process that would make progress towards transition and stabilisation possible. Should the latter not happen, the EU could revise its contribution for 2017 accordingly.

### 1.1.3 Stakeholder analysis

Identified actors that could have a stake on the action:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stakeholders</th>
<th>Level of engagement with the action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Residents and IDPs in targeted areas including the most vulnerable such as women, disabled, youth and children. | • Primary target groups and beneficiaries of the proposed action and its outputs: public services (education, health, WASH, etc.), income generation.  
  • Involvement in planning, implementation and monitoring. |
| Local authorities notably local councils, provincial councils, technical directories but also municipalities. | • Primary target groups and beneficiaries of the proposed action and its outputs: empowerment, capacity building, accountability.  
  • Partners in implementation:  
    o Service delivery to the population.  
    o Technical support to some parts of the action.  
    o Coordination and administrative support to some parts of the action.  
  • Involvement in planning, implementation and monitoring. |
| Service providers: schools, health care centres, including Syria Arab Red Crescent (SARC). | • Primary target groups and beneficiaries of the proposed action and its outputs: rehabilitation of infrastructures, capacity building, etc.  
  • Involvement in planning, implementation and monitoring. |
| Community based and civil society organisations. | • Primary target group and beneficiaries of the proposed action and outputs: empowerment, capacity building, service delivery, advocacy capacity, etc.  
  • Partners for the implementation – service delivery to the population.  
  • Involvement in planning, implementation, and monitoring.  
  • Community representation and accountability. |
| Private sector – businesses, farmers and service providers. | • Primary target group of the proposed action.  
  • Partners for implementation – service delivery to the population (markets, goods).  
  • Involvement in planning, implementation and monitoring. |
| Line Ministries both in regime and opposition held areas. | • Engagement at the technical level. |
| Armed groups | • Enable access.  
  • Dialogue |
| International Community. | • Direct and indirect coordination.  
  • Facilitate access to hard to reach areas. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implementers</th>
<th>Engagement with the action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Member states agencies (Expertise-France, GiZ, DFID).</td>
<td>• Coordination of health activities and local governance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International and Syrian NGOs.</td>
<td>• Coordination and implementation of activities in the domains of education, health, civil society and media.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.1.4  **Priority areas for support/problem analysis**

The following priority areas of intervention have been identified:

1.1.4.1  **Needs in terms of education and youth**

The education system is severely affected by the crisis, with limited children’s access to education and undermined educational achievement. The school system has seen a drop-out of about 2.4 million children since 2011, and over 2 million children and adolescents are out of school. In 2015, there were in total 3.1 million students in Syria, of which 2.7 million in basic education. Enrolment rates vary greatly according to the areas (from − 75% in Aleppo to + 12% in Lattakia) with difficult challenges due to population displacements. There is an acute paucity of functioning learning spaces: out of 22,000 schools, more than 6,000 are destroyed, partially destroyed or used as shelters. Secondary education has also experienced massive drops of enrolments since the beginning of the conflict, with Dara'a, Aleppo and Deir ez Zour being mostly affected and no increase of enrolment anywhere.

In opposition-held areas, the situation is particularly dire. On a sample of 3,228 schools, 95% of schools have been damaged and 41% are non-functional for security, logistical, financial reasons or lack of human resources. Only 46% of school staff receives regular salaries and only 20% of the schools receive equipment support. Lack of heating and electricity hampers the functioning of at least half of the schools. The use of different types of curriculum and the delivery of certificates that are not recognised in the whole country contribute to complicate the picture. Moreover, governance structures in education directorates and local councils as well as the interference of armed groups in the education process contribute to the inability to provide the necessary support to schools and to ensure supervision and quality education.\(^23\)

Children and adolescents have been subject to a range of physical, psychological and grave violations of their rights, including imprisonment and recruitment into armed groups. The psychosocial impact of the crisis on both individuals and Syrian society as a whole has been severe.

Besides service provision and psychological distress, security has become a major concern for the children and their families, and is often indicated as the main barrier to school attendance.

Moreover, there are now 1.5 million disabled in Syria, partly as a consequence of the conflict. This issue should be adequately addressed: access and outreach of disabled beneficiaries should be integrated into assistance programmes and service provision.

This situation requires an articulated response, providing different types of assistance to the children and youth in need, with a specific attention to protection and to provision of safe learning spaces, especially in opposition held areas where the EU is currently hardly present.

\(^23\) Thematic report from the Assistance Coordination Unit dated 02/2016.
1.1.4.2 Needs in the health domain

Beside food aid and relief assistance, healthcare is one of the primary elements of the humanitarian response in the Syrian crisis. With the complex and protracted crisis in Syria however, it is necessary to complement the ongoing emergency response with a resilience-based development approach. That is why the present action has been developed in close links and with clear complementarities with the European Commission's Humanitarian aid and Civil Protection department (ECHO). It addresses general health needs of the vulnerable population, strengthens coping mechanisms and Gender Based Violence (GBV), supports physical and mental recovery of affected people and enhances the capacity and infrastructures to address community needs for non-emergency health services, through rehabilitation of health facilities, equipment and reinforcement of capacities of health staff. It also addresses the question of medical staff shortages, governance of the sector and the need for a referral system between health facilities.

Needs in the health domain are immense. The intervention of the EU in this domain presents a clear added value when considering that longer-term development in this area was not addressed and no support was pledged at the London conference of 4 February 2016 on the Syrian crisis although all recognise it is crucial for the resilience of Syria’s human capital but also in a perspective of a potential transition and the return of Syrian refugees.

1.1.4.3 Needs for supporting civil society organisations notably through media

Many Syrian civil society and grass-roots organisations have no access to mass media consumed by Syrians. While their voices would be relevant to respond to the needs of the broader Syrian populations with their rich experiences in solving every day, community-level problems and how to strengthen people's resilience in the adversity of war, their voices, stories and resilience-oriented information often remains unheard by the Syrians outside of their immediate community of action. The absence of Syrian middle ground media that is able to attract broad audiences from all parts of Syrian society makes it harder for non-politicised CSOs to make their views heard. The current Syrian media landscape displays high levels of polarised and politicised information and contents and many media consumers appear to look for information confirming their respective narratives rather than a middle-ground narrative. Syrian media still lacks the ability to provide relevant localised information to citizens in Syria. Such information mainly circulates informally within networks through social media and word-of-mouth. The situation is worsened by an absence of journalistic values and a lack of equal access (asymmetric information). The Syrian refugee community outside of Syria as a specific stakeholder group is also outside the radar of most media providers. This also leads to a fragmentation of knowledge, solidarity, empathy thus reinforcing identity shifts along the fault lines of the conflict and jeopardising future Syrian unity. In addition, according to the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Syria has become the world’s most dangerous country for journalists. Journalists are systematically targeted and those reporting inside Syria operate under constant threat and fear for their lives.

In the very volatile situation of Syria, access to relevant localised and objective information for Syrians is crucial. Enhanced EU support to allow Syrian CSOs across Syria which work at local/community level to provide such information and give them access to broader, national media coverage would not only fill the information gap, but could also play a strong role in supporting EU sectorial projects such as support to resilience, education (in particular non-formal vocational training), health, psycho-social support and civil society development by amplifying their sectorial expertise through broad dissemination using middle ground media. It would work towards countering violent extremism and radicalisation and
contribute to reinforcing and structuring the Syrian Civil Society Organisations offering them a platform for expression and that way contributing to the reconciliation efforts.\textsuperscript{24}

The CSO participation in the Civil Society Support Rooms on the margin of the Geneva Talks is a clear sign in the right direction. The "Comprehensive Syria Peace Support Initiative" (IcSP funded project), will support such civil society engagement in close collaboration with UN Special Envoy's Office and other stakeholders. It is relevant to ensure coherence between the IcSP project and the activities implemented within this component of the Action fiche.

\textbf{1.1.4.4 Needs for local governance in opposition held areas}

The EU will continue to provide support for local civilian governance structures in opposition held areas, in line with the EU Strategy for Syria and Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions of 23 May 2016 and 4 April 2017. The EU will expand the support it has been providing to local civilian governance.

Support to building governance is an essential step to improve their transparency, participation and accountability in the provision of services and to prevent the control of civilian structures by military actors, enlarge space for civil administration and society. This will ensure the sustainability of any resilience and early recovery actions.

The present action intends to tackle several important weak aspects of governance at local level in Syria. Being issued by the central government in 2011, law 107 on decentralisation does not shed light on vertical linkages and relations between the provincial and local governance levels that have developed in opposition-held areas. The respective roles of the Provincial and Local councils (PCs and LCs) are not clear. In government-controlled areas, the law has not yet been implemented and in opposition held areas its legal value is not always recognised although the law can offer a useful template for local governance structures that remain embryonic and in need of support.

In the prospect of a political settlement and transition, there is scope for integrating strengthened moderate local governance structures into higher level structures. This should help improving the capability, legitimacy and representativeness of a new set of governance structures in opposition-held areas which could help increasing their chances to become effective policy contributors and power stakeholders in a future political transition and therefore ensure stability in the longer term.

To date there has been little concerted effort to attempt building governance and resilience and capacities for peace with a bottom-up approach and within a multi-stakeholder architecture in Syria. This is an essential step for enabling the enhancement of space for civil administration and society, respected by armed groups and the cascading of information and decisions through different levels of governance and therefore paving the way for empowering the councils in their mission. Such bottom-up process will provide the basis for more effective representation, transparency and accountability in the present exceptionally complex and fluid conflict context. More importantly, it will empower civilian structures to gain legitimacy and withstand the pressure that is exerted by armed groups, thereby paving the way for a reintegration with state structures when there is a political solution. Forging a

\textsuperscript{24} FAC Conclusions 23 May 2016: "Therefore, the EU will strengthen its collective work to [...] enhance its support to Syrian civil society starting in regions held by moderate opposition in areas such as local resilience, delivery of public services and local governance, human rights and accountability, peace building, gender and minority issues, in order to enhance its capacity to participate in the transition and stabilisation of the country".
policy based on an inclusive dialogue among all conflict parties in the present but also in future dialogues for peace and reconstruction is the only way to get to something meaningful and sustainable.

Functioning local governance structures that are representative of and accountable to the local populations are also key to ensure the sustainable implementation of any resilience action that donors support through development instruments.

1.1.4.5 Needs for flexible and locally-based multi-sector approach in perspective of transition

Syria has experienced a massive conflict-induced urbanisation. While in 2011, Syria’s population was 53% urban, today 75% Syrians live in cities.25

Among host communities and IDPs, around 2.5 million youth are among one of the key vulnerable groups as a result of limited social participation and inclusion and as a result are missing out on education and employment opportunities. Female and youth headed households that are in need for social services, empowerment and opportunities for revenues are increasing due to the additional burden placed on them as a result of outward migration of male cohorts and deaths.

The availability of public services such as health and education are often scarce and are struggling to cope with increasing demands. Solid-waste collection has significantly declined in many cities and informal dumping sites are multiplying creating significant public health risks. Overall ± 50% of the urban population is in need of humanitarian assistance.26

Urban infrastructures are often severely damaged. ± 30% of the total housing stock has been damaged. Direct damage to the electricity sector is immense. Remaining power plants are struggling to cope with the increased demand. Water supply has decreased to 1/3 of pre-crisis levels. Sewerage treatment has decreased from 70% to 25%.27

These macro-level impacts manifest themselves differently across the country and have spill-over effects one onto the other. For example, Tartous has been largely free of conflict but is dealing with strained infrastructure and services and increased social tension between IDPs and the host community. Lattakia has seen more conflict and greater IDP influx and as a result more social tension. The city of Homs was a major conflict centre and has been significantly damaged but has been relatively stable for over a year and is shifting into recovery planning. Certain neighbourhoods in Hasakeh were recently recaptured from Daesh (ISIS) and are in a stabilisation and recovery context. In Rural Damascus the entire population of Palestine refugees and Syrians in the informal settlement of Al Hussaniyah fled during the destruction of part of the settlement and have begun returning in greater numbers while the nearby small town of Gezlanieh has experienced a large influx of IDPs that has resulting in faling infrastructure and increased social tensions.

These broad analyses plead for a well-tailored response adapted to each local situation. Thorough conflict analyses and bottom-up needs assessment allowing for well-designed multi-pronged interventions may respond more efficiently to needs expressed by local communities thus better contributing to their resilience and avoiding further migration and setting first steps for reconciliation and de-conflicting. In addition, this kind of approach allows preparing for an early engagement in recovery and rehabilitation in Syria with a possibility for the EU to enhance its capacity to rapidly provide support for the

26 Syria Humanitarian Needs Overview, p.12.
27 Syria Strategic Framework, p.4.
28 Syria Strategic Framework, p.4.
reconstruction and the return of refugees when a political solution is reached and a political transition is well under way.

The still volatile situation in some parts of Syria, including opposition-held areas, but also the recent military interventions in and around Raqqa also mean that the security situation in some parts of Syria will remain volatile and access to public services, but also to good governance and other relief mechanisms is likely to be interrupted or differ in quality. Over the past two years the EU has been supporting a European joint rapid response mechanism that has been able to support a broad range of service provision related activities in addition to humanitarian interventions. Experience has shown that the need persists to, on the one hand, retain such a flexible instrument that can quickly react to unforeseen needs in particularly volatile areas and, on the other hand, to consolidate activities that have been undertaken under this instrument and to ensure that some of the activities become more sustainable in nature and complementary to other EU activities in the areas of education as well as resilience and recovery. There is therefore a need to continue providing services to the population in such areas, in order to reduce the pressures on displacement and migration and to strengthen, where possible, also cross-line community linkages if it can improve service delivery to the population.

Projects aiming at a longer-term impact for the beneficiary communities do benefit from a longer timeframe, and predictability of funding is essential for the development and the management of such projects. Continuing and scaling up the currently running project with GIZ and Expertise France would allow the agencies to already create under the ongoing interventions longer-lasting structures, to foster better relationship with local partners, as well as hire, train and retain qualified staff in Gaziantep and better prepare for a possible Raqqa response.
## Risks and Assumptions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risks</th>
<th>Risk level (H/M/L)</th>
<th>Mitigating measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deterioration of the security situation precluding resilience efforts and access to areas of implementation. Increased control space and resources by parties to the conflict / Parties to the conflict act as spoilers to the action. Large displacements and/or population movements in the vicinity of the area of implementation. Significant changes in geographical areas controlled by warring parties.</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>Regular monitoring by Implementing Partners (IP) of conflict dynamics in areas of interventions. Mainstreaming of conflict sensitive approaches. IP’s engagement and dialogue with key neighbourhood and local security actors / armed groups. Demonstrating success and identifying shared incentives for supporting stabilisation efforts. Partners chosen have experience implementing actions in the same or similar security and conflict affected contexts. Detailed conflict, stakeholder, and local governance analyses to identify interests, needs, incentives, and potential shared benefits. Flexibility to adjust interventions to respond to changing security situation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in restrictions on the activities or operations of implementing partners by parties to the conflict.</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>Continuous advocacy and negotiations with parties to the conflict for partners to have access to targeted areas. The projects will undertake periodic assessments of the operational contexts in order to respond to changes. They will maintain some fluidity in planning and budgeting processes to allow for mid-stream modifications in close consultation with the EU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remote management and oversight of implementation of activities. Monitoring and evaluation cannot be addressed properly since it is impossible for the staff of the EU delegation to Syria to ensure a proper presence in the field.</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>IPs have robust compliance and monitoring systems with established internal monitoring and management structures, partnership with local actors and triangulation of sources. Proper description of measures is ensured at contract level with precise methodologies including surveys and regular reporting. Third party monitoring and evaluation will be undertaken.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Further fragmentation of the political situation and rapid evolution of local situations.</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>The flexibility in the design of the projects to be developed under the present action needs to be combined with close steering of the EU delegation to Syria in their implementation, in order to re-orientate if need be.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue</td>
<td>Level</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deterioration of relations between IDPs and host communities in areas of implementation.</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>Balanced assistance which is not directed only to one specific group. Identification of beneficiaries is done in partnership with local communities including IDPs and host communities. Selecting implementing partners that are accepted by local communities and aware of conflict sensitivity. Flexibility to adjust interventions to respond to changing security situation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communities and local governance structures lack capacity to implement stabilisation efforts</td>
<td>H/M</td>
<td>Strong emphasis is put on local level analysis and understanding and on participatory planning processes to ensure best possible adherence to the responses proposed. Capacity analysis of local governance and communities during the inception phase to identify and address any gaps in capacity. During the inception phases of projects, considerable emphasis will be placed on sensitizing local stakeholders, setting-up / strengthening local planning and consultation bodies, and strengthening relationships. Implementers are well experienced and have existing local and sectorial partnerships to increase local buy-in. Involvement of local authorities in neighbourhood consultative bodies during project selection, implementation, and monitoring.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural disasters (summer droughts, harsh winters).</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>Climate conditions' monitoring and preparedness to shift activities where necessary.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Assumptions**

- Targeted areas for the interventions are selected on the basis of security, access, and relatively stabilised local context. Security considerations allow for the movement of implementers' staff and mitigation measures are in place to protect them.
- Equipment and supplies necessary to the implementation of the projects are available in the local or regional markets.
- Local institutions and community accept external project interventions.
- Effective and reliable local Syrian partners can be identified.
- Access is provided by relevant security actors / armed groups.
Lessons learnt

3.1.1 On the need for complementarities between EU funding instruments notably humanitarian and development support

Humanitarian assistance is still and will remain needed for a long time in Syria even in more stable areas. However, there is a need to start setting the foundations for a longer term support in sectors such as livelihoods, education, health and WASH, as well as to define a more coordinated development framework for local governance and peace building. Experience shows that the transition from humanitarian interventions towards resilience based interventions must begin as soon as enabling conditions are present and within a coordinated framework for three main reasons: the needs largely overcome the humanitarian means, humanitarian support is not sustainable in the long run and it can rapidly lead to aid dependency.

Coordinating humanitarian, resilience and also stabilisation support at EU level but also more widely is crucial and formalisation of this coordination appeared necessary. Concerning the EU level, the first aspect being essentially ECHO responsibility and the second and the third being respectively mostly in the hands of the Directorate General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR) and of the Foreign Policy Instrument this coordination is ensured within the exercise of "Joint Humanitarian and Development Framework" currently being developed between the EU Delegation to Syria, ECHO, NEAR and FPI.

3.1.2 On governance

Governance structures, local communities and CSOs need to be engaged at technical level to ensure the sustainability of resilience activities. For example, coordination with health, education of agricultural technical services at local, provincial and national levels is necessary to ensure timely technical support to all targeted beneficiary groups and a wide application of international standards and without political or other bias. Furthermore, managing relations with institutions safeguard the sustainability of projects and allow for more inclusive planning and implementation. In addition it allows safeguarding the functioning of institutions which will be crucial for the reconstruction of Syria when the political conditions allow for it.

Although not yet implemented in government held areas and not having legal value in areas outside government control, keeping an approach based on Law 107 on decentralisation of 2011 should help avoiding further fragmentation of the territory.

Strengthening local participation in planning, implementation, and monitoring is also essential. More inclusive local planning processes increase the demand for strong civil leaders and improved local governance in targeted Syrian areas because they involve a wider cross-section of society and facilitate the emergence of technical leadership that is more accountable to the local population.

3.1.3 On whole of Syria approach

Since 2011, beyond humanitarian aid, the EU has funded development/resilience projects in Syria through a "whole-of-Syria" approach. Operations are conducted cross-border as well as from Damascus. Keeping as much as possible a needs-based "service delivery" approach that is not politically polarised favours a politically balanced image of the EU and its assistance which helps it playing an active part in the international efforts to resolve the crises as well as an active role in overall donors' coordination and coherence of interventions wherever it applies.
The experience in cross-border operations from Turkey into Syria, which matured over the past three years, has shown that despite the increasing challenges, access constraints and a shrinking space, such operations are possible and vital to support local structures and populations in need in areas that would not be reached by other means.

3.1.4 Monitoring and reporting

The war situation in Syria prevents most donors from directly monitoring and evaluating projects on the ground, as most of the operational teams cannot enter the country. Monitoring and evaluation is essentially done remotely with a triangulation of information coming from different sources. It is essentially based on information gathered from implementing partners (insertion of precise indicators, surveys and regular reporting in contracts) and cross-information from other partners and Syrians participating in meetings/conferences. The situation has evolved rather positively lately: with the protraction of the crisis and all donors facing the same situation of a need for third party monitoring and evaluation of the projects they fund, some firms and NGOs have recently created capacities in this domain. The EU delegation to Syria will profit from this improvement of the situation to launch third party monitoring and evaluation of its activities thus providing a better insight on their results and impact. The use of technology in partner's actions should be promoted to increase quality of needs assessments, information gathering and remote monitoring.

3.2 Complementarity, synergy and donor coordination

The EU has responded to the Syrian conflict and its regional implications by progressively making available increasing amounts of funding in order to match escalating needs. To date, the EU has contributed more than EUR 6.4 billion with EUR 3 billion coming from EU Member States and more than EUR 3.4 billion from the EU budget – predominantly for actions in countries neighbouring Syria. While humanitarian assistance is generally focused on immediate lifesaving activities, economic, stabilisation and development assistance is working on the "other side of the humanitarian line" to support measures that seek to minimise the medium to long term impacts of the crisis (civil society organisations' capacity building, education, support to livelihoods, access to basic services, etc.).

The EU continues to ensure a clear division and complementarity between humanitarian, stabilisation and development/resilience assistance and its various funding instruments. The projects to be developed under the present action are complementary to those funded by ECHO and the Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace in Syria. For example, interventions in the areas of:

- health are designed in full co-operation with ECHO Syria field staff, and in complementarity with ECHO life-saving health assistance;
- Local governance actions were in a first stage supported by IcSP and considering their importance in a longer run, ENI funding will allow widening coverage and scope.

The EU Delegation to Syria (operational section) ensures complementarity and synergies among EU funded development/resilience projects. For example, full complementarities will be ensured between the education programmes already conducted with UNICEF and UNRWA and the present action in terms of geographical coverage of the actions. The present action will also be carefully designed so as to complement and work in synergy with the project "Strengthening Civil Society in Syria as a Pillar for a Democratic Transition", implemented from Turkey by the NGO People in Need which has a component on provision of Technical Vocational Education and Training of secondary level for 400 students. The current programmes on livelihoods to be signed with consortia of INGOs (ENI Special Measure for the Syrian Population 2015) will benefit from the work to be carried out on local governance foreseen in the present special measure. Full synergy will be ensured.
between the part of the present measure supporting the health sector in opposition held areas and the one on local governance.

While bilateral aid with the Syrian Government of Syria remains suspended, a number of development/resilience projects implemented mainly through the UN, Member State agencies and/or NGOs are still going on to the benefit of Syrians and further projects are expected to be implemented in the future. Through its Whole of Syria approach, the EU is one of the only donors which have regular access to both Damascus and Gaziantep. This facilitates communication between implementing entities in Damascus and those that operate cross-border.

Due to the regional scope of the crisis and the fact that assistance is using different delivery mechanisms ("Damascus-based", "cross-line" and "cross-border"), donor coordination is taking place in a number of different fora at different levels. These include:

- The informal "core group" on donor coordination for recovery, resilience, and development response to the Syria crisis which is chaired by the EU and includes key bilateral and multilateral donors. This group aims to improve the effectiveness of development assistance. However it does not include humanitarian activities which are coordinated by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).
- The sector clusters: for education, there are three clusters (in Gaziantep, in Damascus and in Amman), regularly meeting and exchanging information.
- Coordination with Member States activities but also other donors through other coordination fora: regular sectoral and general EU – donors meetings in Gaziantep for the cross-border activities but also Beirut for activities developed from Damascus, Lebanon and Jordan.

Given the sensitive political environment, the EU Delegation to Syria (operational and political sections) will ensure in close coordination, the identification of implementing partners and activities for the component relating to civil society empowerment including by enhancing its influence on media content. Given the significant funds already allocated to the domains of CSO and media support by other major donors close donor coordination will be pursued, notably with relevant Member States as well as the US and others.

### 3.3 Cross-cutting issues

The following main cross-cutting issues will be touched upon the present action: Resilience, human rights, gender equality, respect of vulnerable groups and capacity development.

**Resilience:** The action aims at supporting efforts to integrate resilience across the various sectors so as to address the changing needs of the affected population in Syria, empowering persons and communities, and promoting the dignity of affected peoples. All the projects to be developed under the present action will prioritise activities with anticipated multiplier effects on the conflict-affected communities and the broader emergency and resilience-building activities.

**Human Rights:** This action explicitly takes account of human rights and directly supports rights holders throughout the foreseen projects with an aim of achieving greater respect, protection, promotion and fulfilment of human rights. The action will be designed and implemented following a rights-based approach, e.g. by focusing on social inclusion and empowerment of the marginalised, including direct war-injured people and other persons with disability throughout all projects foreseen.

**Gender equality:** Achieving gender equality and eliminating all forms of discrimination based on sex are mainstreamed throughout all the action. More specifically, gender-specific interventions are included in activities such as education, employment, health and fight
against gender-based violence. Gender-specific interventions will be central to the approach of the action to addressing poverty and vulnerability.

**Capacity development:** A central premise of the action is that it can best contribute to achieve defined outcomes through the development of the capacities of individuals, communities and civic groups as well as local and national institutions. This is foreseen through direct empowerment around essential services, livelihoods and social protection and through strengthening the capacities of duty bearers (institutions and communities) to identify needs and respect, protect, and fulfil those rights.

### 4 Description of the action

Taking into account the recent developments on the political side with the active participation of the EU in the International Syria Support Group (ISSG) and the adoption of UN Council resolutions 2254 & 2268 setting a path to peace, it is necessary that in order to respond efficiently to the crisis and in the frame of the EU policy line, the present action is founded on the following principles:

- Should a credible political process gain traction in a near future, considering the administrative delays between funding decision and signature of contracts, it is essential to maintain the necessary level of flexibility in the projects falling under the present action to make it possible to rapidly re-locate and re-size activities in order to support such a process with timely peace dividends at local community level.

- The action switches to a more structural/strategic type of support considering the protracted nature of the crisis in order to ensure as much sustainability as possible in a war context of our supported projects through rooting them in local governance structures.

- The action foresees interventions that contribute to maintaining technical public institutions at state and local level that should maintain the "skeleton" of the country throughout whatever transition is agreed on in a political process.

- The action takes account of the EU’s ongoing portfolio of actions with an analysis of potential gaps and the maintenance of an EU balanced position in the context of the “Whole-of-Syria” approach (working from both Damascus and Gaziantep).

- The action is closely co-ordinated with actions funded under other EU instruments (notably ECHO, IcSP) and other like-minded donors so that complementarities and synergies are ensured and a “do no harm” approach is respected. The action needs to demonstrate the added value of EU funding before committing funding.

The projects to be developed under each component of the present action will enforce a results-based management. The resources will contribute to clear and logical chains of results from outputs through to outcomes for all projects to be implemented, those contributing in turn to the general and specific objectives as well as the results identified under the specific objectives of the present action.

There is a limited number of tangible and specific outputs and outcomes for each component of the action. Care will be taken that these make a significant difference in respect of the key challenges identified and can be achieved.

#### 4.1 Objectives/results

Although composed of several identifiable components, the rationale of merging them into one single action comes from the fact that they all contribute to the same general objective and that this allows the necessary flexibility to reallocate funds among the different components during the contracting process in order to adapt to the extremely volatile situation on the ground.
4.1.1 General Objective

In the specific war context of Syria, the general objective of the Action is to contribute to the resilience of the Syrian populations and the preparation for a political transition as well as the recovery and reconstruction of the country in case a political process for the resolution of the conflict gains traction.

The action will have a specific focus on social inclusion, community and local authorities' involvement, bottom-up and do-no-harm approaches with systematic conflict analyses in order to allow for reconciliation processes to occur.

The action also contributes to supporting the political process and the implementation of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and in a more secondary manner to reaching the Sustainable Development Goals, notably 1 "No poverty", 2 "Zero hunger", 3 "Good health and well-being", 4 "Education", 5 "Gender equality", 8 "Decent work and economic growth" and 16 "Peace and justice and strong institutions".

4.1.2 Specific objectives (SO)

Specific objectives are defined for each of the components of the action:

4.1.2.1 Education and youth

To contribute to the "no lost generation"29 initiative through increased basic and secondary education enrolment and quality and improved psycho-social well-being of children and youth most affected by the conflict in Syria.

4.1.2.2 Health

To enhance the availability and utilisation of non-emergency health care services at local level.

To contribute to improving governance in the health system.

4.1.2.3 CSO/Media

To enhance the capacities of CSOs and CSO platforms, including by amplifying their outreach notably through their contribution to credible, non-partisan, professional, human rights and gender sensitive, resilience-focused media.

4.1.2.4 Governance

To lay the ground for improved governance structures at provincial and local level in opposition-held areas in a medium / long term perspective.

4.1.2.5 Resilience-oriented interventions and swift support to the continuation of service delivery

To stabilise and improve the resilience of Syrian communities and cities' populations allowing for local economic recovery and strengthening local cohesion.

4.1.3 Expected results

SO 1:

Result 1.1: Increased enrolment in basic education, improved quality education and psycho-social support is provided.

Result 1.2: Increased enrolment in secondary education and vocational training and job opportunities are provided for adolescent boys and girls willing to enrol.

29 http://nolostgeneration.org/about.
SO 2:

Result 2.1: Health facilities are rehabilitated and equipped, medical staff is present, specific health services such as in reproductive health and Gender Based Violence related services are increased and psycho-social support is provided to those in need especially the most vulnerable.

Result 2.2: Administrative health staff from local governance structures is trained and referral systems from communities to hospitals are set-up.

SO 3:

Result 3.1: Syrian CSOs and grass-roots organisations and their networks are supported and structured to make themselves heard at country-wide level.

Result 3.2: Media content responding to the needs of, Syrians (inside Syria but also refugees) is shaped by civil society and communities' actors and disseminated.

SO 4:

Result 4.1: More local governance structures are empowered and accountable.

Result 4.2: Staff at local governance at administrative and technical levels (including health, education and agriculture) is trained and delivers services to communities and dispose of tools to develop, implement and monitor evidence-based policies, strategies, plans and resilience programmes.

SO 5:

Result 5.1: City and neighbourhood profiles and plans for resilience packages are produced for the targeted cities.

Result 5.2: The EU’s ability to swiftly support the continuation of service delivery in volatile areas is maintained, and on-going (humanitarian and non-humanitarian) activities in opposition-held areas are complemented by medium-term activities strengthening sustainability and local ownership.

Result 5.3: The development of skills and the provision of livelihoods opportunities foster cross-line dialogue and social cohesion.

4.2 Main activities in regards of the expected results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expected results</th>
<th>Indicative list of activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Increased enrolment in basic education, improved quality education and psycho-social support is provided.</td>
<td>Rehabilitation of schools and safe spaces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trainings and stipends for teachers and head-teachers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Remedial education.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Psycho-social support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recreational, cultural and sport activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support to contribute to lifting barriers to attendance at household and community levels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support to contribute to lifting barriers to attendance at household and community levels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Increased enrolment in secondary education and vocational training and job opportunities are provided for adolescent</td>
<td>Provision of already available teaching and learning materials where necessary to achieve the objective.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provision of upper secondary education and TVET.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Links or integration with basic education programmes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Links with labour markets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected results</td>
<td>Indicative list of activities:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>boys and girls willing to enrol.</td>
<td>Rehabilitation of schools, training centres and safe spaces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trainings and stipends for teachers and head-teachers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Remedial education.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Psycho-social support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recreational cultural and sport activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support to students for sitting to final school exams (fees, transport, etc.).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support to contribute to lifting barriers to attendance at household and community levels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peace-building initiatives in/among communities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provision of already available teaching and learning materials where necessary to achieve the objective.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Health facilities are rehabilitated and equipped, medical staff is present, specific health services such as in reproductive health and Gender Based Violence related services are increased and psycho-social support is provided to those in need.</td>
<td>Rehabilitation of health facilities and community well-being centres.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Procurement of equipment and spare parts for the targeted healthcare facilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Restoration of specific health care activities such as in reproductive health GBV or psycho-social support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trainings for health staff in health care centres are deployed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Administrative health staff from local governance structures is trained and referral systems from communities to hospitals are set-up.</td>
<td>Developing referral systems for patients.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reinforcement of the capacities of local health governance bodies notably through trainings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Setting-up of an information system (epidemiology).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 Syrian CSOs and grass-roots organisations and their networks are structured to make themselves heard at country-wide level.</td>
<td>Capacity-building and networking activities for CSOs and their platforms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Setting-up of a pool of civil society actors and organisations, community representatives, etc. to propose, evaluate and produce content for media.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Media content responding to the needs of Syrians (inside Syria but also refugees) is shaped by civil society and communities' actors and disseminated.</td>
<td>Supporting Syrian media content producers conveying non-partisan, neutral, human-rights and gender-sensitive, resilience-focused messages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Creation of a Syrian owned online platform and/or satellite TV channel for dissemination of content.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inventory of media producers and monitoring of content for assessing ethics and neutrality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1 More local governance structures are empowered and accountable.</td>
<td>Organising dialogue and consensus building between all stakeholders around local to sub-national levels of governance in Syria around common interests and concerns on security, representation, and accountability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Capacity reinforcement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 Staff at local governance at administrative and technical levels (including health, education and agriculture) is trained and delivers services to communities and dispose of tools to develop, implement and monitor evidence-based policies.</td>
<td>Capacity building for coordination of local governance structures and for the oversight of the work of the technical directorates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ensuring women, vulnerable and marginalised groups' (e.g. religious minorities) participation in the decision making processes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Expected results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicative list of activities:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>strategies, plans and resilience programmes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to revenue generation and cost recovery schemes as part of a medium-term scaling down of donors' support in opposition held areas.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.1 City and neighbourhood profiles and plans for resilience packages are produced for the targeted cities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicative list of activities:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Profiling of cities and neighbourhoods.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refining methodologies with the support of satellite imagery (JRC).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on the state of cities and neighbourhoods.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.2 The EU's ability to swiftly support to the continuation of service delivery in volatile areas is maintained, and on-going (humanitarian and non-humanitarian) activities in opposition-held areas are complemented by medium-term activities strengthening sustainability and local ownership.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicative list of activities:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rapid responses in the areas of education, health, food security/livelihoods, WASH, electricity provision, solid waste management, civil protection and related fields to support local actors (local administrations, CSOs, etc.) in their capacity to deliver services, in coordination with SIG and related opposition actors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linking to similar interventions across the line; promotion of processes aimed at ensuring local ownership and a possibility for sustainability even if political control changes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restoration and improvement of basic infrastructure to enhance community resilience (incl. cash for work activities); rubble removal.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.3 Development of skills and the provision of livelihoods opportunities to foster cross-line dialogue and social cohesion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicative list of activities:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Selection of the beneficiaries with the specific objective of scouting capacities to foster dialogue and social integration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of specific (soft and technical) skills through vocational training; support the development of businesses through coaching/mentoring; analysis of the local economics to determine business opportunities; provision of seed funding for business opportunities that have potential social impact on local communities (between adjacent areas; in localities with tensions etc.).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural activities are developed to create livelihoods and increase household incomes, food production and enhance local markets.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4.3 Intervention logic

The present action is meant to improve the resilience and well-being of the Syrian population through six key components contributing to this resilience and well-being that are fully complementary to EU already funded activities. These components will be implemented through projects to be contracted through various implementation modalities as stated below. See indicative logical frame in annex.

### 5 IMPLEMENTATION

5.1 Financing agreement

In order to implement this action, it is not foreseen to conclude a financing agreement with the partner country, referred to in Article 184(2)(b) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012.

5.2 Indicative implementation period

The indicative operational implementation period of this action, during which the activities described in section 4.1 will be carried out and the corresponding contracts and agreements
implemented, is 48 months from the date of adoption by the Commission of this Action Document.

Extensions of the implementation period may be agreed by the Commission’s authorising officer responsible by amending this decision and the relevant contracts and agreements; such amendments to this decision constitute technical amendments in the sense of point (i) of Article 2(3)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 236/2014.

5.3 Implementation modalities

In the below implementation modalities, the Commission will ensure that the entities receiving funds in direct and indirect management and providing financing to third parties in the context of this action will ensure compliance with EU restrictive measures affecting the respective countries of operation.

5.3.1 Grants: call for proposals (direct management)

(a) Objectives of the grant, fields of intervention, priorities of the year and expected results

1. Education and youth in opposition held areas: To contribute to the "no lost generation"\(^\text{30}\) initiative through increased basic and secondary education enrolment and quality and improved psycho-social well-being of children and youth most affected by the conflict in opposition held areas in Syria.

2. Support to CSOs through Media: To support civil society and community actors in developing grassroots initiatives and media contents aiming at communicating from Syrians to Syrians and their dissemination through non-partisan, neutral, practical, professional resilience-focused media.

For the 2 above mentioned objectives, see expected results and indicative activities in § 4.1.

(b) Eligibility conditions

Be a legal person, non-profit-making specific type of organisation such as: Civil society organisations (CSOs)\(^\text{31}\), be directly responsible for the preparation and management of the action with the co-applicant(s) and affiliated entity(ies), not acting as an intermediary and be established\(^\text{32}\) in; i) a Member State of the European Union\(^\text{33}\) or; ii) a country that is a

\(^{30}\) http://nolostgeneration.org/about.

\(^{31}\) CSOs are defined as: "All non-State, not-for-profit structures, non-partisan and non-violent, through which people organise to pursue shared objectives and ideals, whether political, cultural, social or economic. Operating from the local to the national, regional and international levels, they comprise urban and rural, formal and informal organisations. The EU values CSOs' diversity and specificities; it engages with accountable and transparent CSOs which share its commitment to social progress and to the fundamental values of peace, freedom, equal rights and human dignity." They include membership-based, cause-based and service-oriented CSOs. Among them, community-based organisations, non-governmental organisations, faith-based organisations, foundations, research institutions, Gender and LGBT organisations, cooperatives, professional and business associations, and the not-for-profit media. Trade unions and employers' organisations, the so-called social partners, constitute a specific category of CSOs.

\(^{32}\) To be determined on the basis of the organisation’s statutes, which should demonstrate that it has been established by an instrument governed by the national law of the country concerned and that its head office is located in an eligible country. In this respect, any legal entity whose statutes have been established in another country cannot be considered an eligible local organisation, even if the statutes are registered locally or a ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ has been concluded.

\(^{33}\) Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.
beneficiary of the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance II\textsuperscript{34} set up by the Council Regulation (EU) No 231/2014 of 11 March 2014 or; iii) a Member State of the European Economic Area\textsuperscript{35} or; iii) a developing country and territory which are not members of the G-20 group\textsuperscript{36} or a partner country or territory covered by the European Neighbourhood Instrument Regulation No 232/2014\textsuperscript{37}.

The indicative minimum amount of the EU contribution per grant is EUR 2 Mio and the grants may be awarded to sole beneficiaries and to consortia of beneficiaries (coordinator and co-beneficiaries).

(c) Essential selection and award criteria

The essential selection criteria are financial and operational capacity of the applicant.

The essential award criteria are relevance of the proposed project to the objectives, design, effectiveness, feasibility, sustainability and cost-effectiveness of the action.

(d) Maximum rate of co-financing

The maximum possible rate of co-financing for these grants is 80% of the eligible costs of the action.

In accordance with Articles 192 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 if full funding is essential for the action to be carried out, the maximum possible rate of co-financing may be increased up to 100%. The essentiality of full funding will be justified by the Commission’s authorising officer responsible in the award decision, in respect of the principles of equal treatment and sound financial management.

(e) Indicative trimester to conclude the grant agreements

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\textsuperscript{34} Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iceland, Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia, Turkey, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

\textsuperscript{35} Non-EU Members include: Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway.

\textsuperscript{36} Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, Laos, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Tanzania, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, Vanuatu, Yemen, Zambia. Armenia, Belize, Bolivia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Iraq, Kosovo, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Syria, Tokelau, Tonga, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, West Bank and Gaza Strip. Kenya, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Kyrgyz Republic, South Sudan, Tajikistan, Zimbabwe, Albania, Algeria, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Chile, Colombia, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Gabon, Grenada, Iran, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Montenegro, Montserrat, Namibia, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Panama, Peru, Serbia, Seychelles, Saint Helena, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent & the Grenadines, Suriname, Thailand, Tunisia, Uruguay, Venezuela, Wallis and Futuna, Greenland, New Caledonia and Dependencies, French Polynesia, French Southern and Antarctic Territories, Wallis and Futuna Islands, Mayotte, Saint Pierre and Miquelon, Aruba, Netherlands Antilles: Bonaire, Curaçao, Saba, Sint Eustatius, Sint Maarten, Anguilla, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, Montserrat, Pitcairn, Saint Helena and Dependencies, British Antarctic Territory, British Indian Ocean Territory, Turks and Caicos Islands, British Virgin Islands, Bermuda.

\textsuperscript{37} Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Republic of Moldova, Morocco, occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), Syria, Tunisia, Ukraine.
It is intended to launch the call for proposals in July 2016, before the adoption of the Financing Decision, by means of a suspensive clause.

5.3.2 Grant: direct award (direct management)

(a) Objectives of the grant, fields of intervention, priorities of the year and expected results

1. Improve access for communities and vulnerable groups to non-emergency health services: The objective is to enhance the availability and utilisation of non-emergency health care services and psychosocial well-being of the persons and especially the most vulnerable, at local level, under the supervision of the Syrian Arab Red Crescent.

2. Resilience-oriented interventions aimed at stabilising and improving the resilience of Syrian communities and cities' populations allowing for local economic recovery and strengthening local cohesion

For the above mentioned objectives, see expected results and indicative activities in § 4.1.

(b) Justification of a direct grant

1. The grant for health services may be awarded without a call for proposals to the Danish Red Cross, under the responsibility of the Commission’s authorising officer responsible.

2. Three grants for interventions in the area of resilience may be directly awarded to iMMAP, Coordinamento delle Organizzazioni per il Servizio Volontario (COSV) and to one of the NGOs in the reserve list of the Pro-Resilient Action inside Syria - ProAct 2016 Call for Proposals\(^{38}\), under the responsibility of the Commission’s authorising officer responsible.

Under the responsibility of the Commission’s authorising officer responsible, the recourse to the award of grants without calls for proposals is justified because the country is declared in crisis situation referred to in Article 190(2) RAP and since:

- There are limited numbers of possible beneficiaries for implementing projects under the concerned objectives and they can therefore directly be reached. The final choice will be fully documented.
- There is a factual monopoly of the Red Cross Red Crescent family and in particular the Danish Red Cross in its relationships to Syrian Arab Red Crescent.

(c) Essential selection and award criteria

The essential selection criteria are financial and operational capacity of the applicant.

The essential award criteria are relevance of the proposed project to the objectives, design, effectiveness, feasibility, sustainability and cost-effectiveness of the action.

(d) Maximum rate of co-financing

The maximum possible rate of co-financing for these grants is 80% of the eligible costs of the action.

In accordance with Articles 192 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 if full funding is essential for the action to be carried out, the maximum possible rate of co-financing may be increased up to 100%. The essentiality of full funding will be justified by the Commission’s authorising officer responsible in the award decision, in respect of the principles of equal treatment and sound financial management.

\(^{38}\) EuropeAid/155660/DD/ACT/SY
(e) **Indicative trimester to conclude the grant agreement**

Fourth trimester 2017.

### 5.3.3 Indirect management with Member States agencies (Expertise France, GiZ and DFID)

This action may be implemented in indirect management with 3 Member States agencies (3 delegation agreements with respectively EF, GiZ and DFID) in accordance with Article 58(1)(c) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012. This implementation entails interventions on:

- Health (EF);
- Local Governance (GiZ, DFID);
- Rapid response resilience-oriented (GiZ);

This implementation is justified because the entities referred to are having a significant presence and project experience concerning the actions foreseen inside Syria.

The entrusted entities would be responsible for the award and management of contracts (grants and procurement) and for making payments. The entrusted entities intend to sub-delegate part of the execution of these tasks to NGOs or other international organisations in the framework of a consortium, according to their respective capacities and previous experiences in specific sectors and areas of intervention. Appropriate provisions will be included in the delegation agreements.

### 5.3.4 Direct management - Administrative arrangement with Joint Research Centre

According to the Council conclusions of 26.04.1994\(^{39}\) on the role of the JRC and to the offer supplied by JRC to the European Commission Directorate General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR) on its request for a project entitled "An Urban Information and Analysis to help plan and target humanitarian and recovery interventions in Syria", DG NEAR entrusts the JRC with the execution of the above mentioned project through an administrative arrangement.

### 5.4 Scope of geographical eligibility for procurement and grants

The geographical eligibility in terms of place of establishment for participating in procurement and grant award procedures and in terms of origin of supplies purchased as established in the basic act and set out in the relevant contractual documents shall apply, subject to following provisions.

In accordance with Article 9(2)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 236/2014, the Commission decides that natural and legal persons from the following countries having traditional economic, trade or geographical links with neighbouring partner countries shall be eligible for participating in procurement and grant award procedures: Turkey, Iraq. The supplies originating there shall also be eligible.

The Commission’s authorising officer responsible may extend the geographical eligibility in accordance with Article 9(2) (b) of Regulation (EU) No 236/2014 on the basis of urgency or of unavailability of products and services in the markets of the countries concerned, or in other duly substantiated cases where the eligibility rules would make the realisation of this action impossible or exceedingly difficult.

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\(^{39}\) J.O.C 126 of 07.05.1994 p.1.
5.5 Indicative budget

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Indicative EU contribution (million EUR)*</th>
<th>Indicative third party contribution (million EUR)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education and youth</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSOs/Media</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Governance</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>± 25 (GBP 20 million)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resilience-oriented interventions</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>80</td>
<td>± 37.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The budget for each component includes communication and visibility

5.6 Performance monitoring and reporting

The day-to-day technical and financial monitoring of the implementation of this action will be a continuous process and part of the implementing partners’ responsibilities. To this aim, every implementing partner shall establish a permanent internal, technical and financial monitoring system for its project and elaborate regular progress reports (not less than annual) and final reports. The use of most up-to-date technologies and methods for better needs assessment, info gathering, sharing in remote management context will be promoted in all contracts to be signed.

Every report shall provide an accurate account of implementation of the projects, difficulties encountered, changes introduced, as well as the degree of achievement of its results (outputs and direct outcomes) as measured by corresponding indicators, using as reference the logical frame matrix.

The report shall be laid out in such a way as to allow monitoring of the means envisaged and employed and of the budget details for the action. The final report, narrative and financial, will cover the entire period of the action implementation.

Considering the political sensitivity of the situation inside Syria as well as the current complicated set-up of the EU delegation to Syria, the operational section in charge of the implementation of the action will establish a light clearance coordination mechanism with the political section to ensure political assessment for each intervention. This will allow overseeing the consistency of the activities with the political priorities and to swiftly react if necessary.

The Commission may undertake additional project monitoring visits both through its own staff and through independent consultants recruited directly by the Commission for independent monitoring reviews (or recruited by the responsible agent contracted by the Commission for implementing such reviews).

5.7 Evaluation

Having regard to the nature of the action, a final evaluation will be carried out for this action or its components via independent consultants.

It will be carried out for accountability and learning purposes at various levels (including for policy revision), taking into account in particular the fact that the context is rapidly evolving and that the approach is innovative and merits further analysis for learning lessons.

The Commission may, during implementation, decide to undertake an evaluation on its own decision or on the initiative of the implementing partner(s).
The Commission shall inform the implementing partner(s) at least one month in advance of the dates foreseen for the evaluation missions. The implementing partner(s) shall collaborate efficiently and effectively with the evaluation experts, and inter alia provide them with all necessary information and documentation, as well as access to the project premises and activities.

The financing of the evaluation shall be covered by another measure constituting a financing decision.

5.8 Audit

Without prejudice to the obligations applicable to contracts concluded for the implementation of this action, the Commission may, on the basis of a risk assessment, contract independent audits or expenditure verification assignments for one or several contracts or agreements.

The financing of the audit shall be covered by another measure constituting a financing decision.

5.9 Communication and visibility

Communication and visibility of the EU is a legal obligation for all external actions funded by the EU.

This action shall contain communication and visibility measures which shall be based on specific Communication and Visibility Plans to be elaborated for each contract contributing the present action, this, at the start of implementation and supported with the budget indicated in section 5.5 above.

In terms of legal obligations on communication and visibility, the measures shall be implemented by the Commission, contractors, grant beneficiaries and/or entrusted entities. Appropriate contractual obligations shall be included in grant contracts and delegation agreements and be adapted to the security situation and consequent risks in the area of interventions.

The Communication and Visibility Manual for European Union External Action shall be used to establish the Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action and the appropriate contractual obligations. More particularly, for the projects implemented in government held areas the political section of the Delegation will be involved to ensure that legitimate visibility and communication requirements do not offer opportunities for the Syrian regime to misuse them.

APPENDIX - INDICATIVE LOGFRAME MATRIX

The activities, the expected outputs and all the indicators, targets and baselines included in the logframe matrix are indicative and may be updated during the implementation of the action, no amendment being required to the financing decision. When it is not possible to determine the outputs of an action at formulation stage, intermediary outcomes should be presented and the outputs defined during inception of the overall programme and its components. The indicative logframe matrix will evolve during the lifetime of the action: new lines will be added for including the activities as well as new columns for intermediary targets (milestones) for the output and outcome indicators whenever it is relevant for monitoring and reporting purposes. Note also that indicators should be disaggregated by sex whenever relevant.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Results chain</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Baselines (incl. reference year)</th>
<th>Targets (incl. reference year)</th>
<th>Sources and means of verification</th>
<th>Assumptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall objective</td>
<td>To contribute to the resilience of the Syrian populations and the preparation for a political transition, as well as the recovery and reconstruction of the country in case a political process for the resolution of the conflict gains traction.</td>
<td>% population having access to public services: electricity, sanitation, education and health. % population having improved revenues.</td>
<td>TBD-2015</td>
<td>Not consistent in war situation – improvement is the target.</td>
<td>UN reports. City profiles. Economic studies from SCRP. The already dire and volatile situation does not degrade to a point where interventions become impossible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific objective 1</td>
<td>Education and youth To contribute to the &quot;no lost generation&quot;[40] initiative through increased basic and secondary education enrolment and quality and improved psycho-social well-being of children and youth most affected by the conflict in Syria.</td>
<td>% of children attending schools. % of youth attending secondary education.</td>
<td>TBD-2015</td>
<td>Not consistent in war situation – improvement is the target.</td>
<td>UN reports. Reports from cluster on education. Safety and security don't prevent children going to school.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[40] http://nolostgeneration.org/about.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specific objective 2</th>
<th>Health</th>
<th>To enhance the availability and utilisation of non-emergency health care services at local level. To contribute improving governance in the health system.</th>
<th># of beneficiaries served by healthcare facilities. # of functional health facilities (rehabilitated, equipped and staffed). # of supervision visits to health facilities by PHC regulatory officers. % of recommendations issued by regulatory officers are enforced in health facilities.</th>
<th>TBD-2015 TBD-2015 TBD-2015</th>
<th>Not consistent in war situation – improvement is the target. WHO reports. Monitoring field visits.</th>
<th>Safety and security. Premises are accessible. Premises are not bombarded.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Specific objective 3</td>
<td>CSO/Media</td>
<td>To enhance the capacities of CSOs and CSOs platforms including through amplifying their outreach notably through their contribution to credible, non-partisan, professional human rights and gender sensitive, resilience-focused media.</td>
<td># of CSO platforms' claims are taken into consideration in Geneva talks.</td>
<td>TBD-2015</td>
<td>Not consistent in war situation – improvement is the target. Regular content monitoring. Project's reports.</td>
<td>Conditions allow for Geneva III talks to progress.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific objective 4</td>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>To lay the ground for improved governance structures at provincial and local level in a medium / long term perspective.</td>
<td># of functional LCs and RCs.</td>
<td>TBD-2015</td>
<td>Not consistent in war situation – improvement is the target. Tamkeen reports and evaluation. Projects reports.</td>
<td>Opposition held areas don't shrink further.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Specific objective 5** | Resilience-oriented interventions and support to service delivery  
To stabilise and improve the conditions of Syrian communities and cities' populations allowing for local economic recovery and strengthening local cohesion. | # of sites where multi-sector resilience packages based on a neighbourhoods analysis and planning are implemented. | TBD-2015 | At least 5. | Project inception report and project reports. | The situation remains sufficiently stable for a sufficient time to enable the implementation of the concept. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Output 1.1** | Increased enrolment in basic education, improved quality education and psycho-social support is provided. | % increase in enrolment in basic education.  
# of ≠ curricula taught in opposition held areas. | Not consistent in war situation – improvement is the target. | UNICEF reports.  
ACU reports.  
Project's reports. | Safety and security don't prevent children going to school. |
| **Output 1.2** | Increased enrolment in secondary education and vocational training and job opportunities are provided for adolescent boys and girls willing to enrol. | % increase in enrolment in secondary education.  
# of adolescents trained (sex and disabled disaggregated).  
# of adolescents getting a job following training (sex and disabled disaggregated). | Not consistent in war situation – improvement is the target. | UNICEF reports.  
UNESCO reports.  
ACU reports.  
Project's reports. | Safety and security don't prevent adolescents participating to trainings and to work. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output 2.1</th>
<th>Health facilities are rehabilitated and equipped, medical staff is present, specific health services such as in reproductive health and Gender Based Violence are increased and psycho-social support is provided to those in need especially the most vulnerable.</th>
<th># of rehabilitated healthcare facilities. Average # of health staff per facility.</th>
<th>TBD-2015</th>
<th>Not consistent in war situation – improvement is the target.</th>
<th>Implementing partner reports. Monitoring field visits reports.</th>
<th>Bombings of health care facilities stop.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Output 2.2</td>
<td>Administrative health staff from local governance structures is trained and referral systems from communities to hospitals are set-up.</td>
<td># of primary health care centres with referral systems.</td>
<td>TBD-2015</td>
<td>Not consistent in war situation – improvement is the target.</td>
<td>Project reports</td>
<td>Opposition held areas don't shrink further.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 3.1</td>
<td>Syrian CSOs and grass-roots organisations and their networks are structured to make themselves heard at country-wide level.</td>
<td># of CSO platforms created and trained.</td>
<td>TBD-2015</td>
<td>Not consistent in war situation – improvement is the target.</td>
<td>Project reports</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 3.2</td>
<td>Media content responding to the needs of, Syrians (inside Syria but also refugees) is shaped by civil society and communities' actors and disseminated.</td>
<td>% of population consuming the middle-ground media products. Decrease of the balance between war reporting and peace reporting/human stories in mainstream media # of hints on created social media. # of CSOs involved in media content shaping.</td>
<td>0 TBD-2015 0 0</td>
<td>Not consistent in war situation – improvement is the target.</td>
<td>Regular comprehensive audience surveys. Internet survey Project's reports Regular content monitoring (internal and external to project).</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 4.1</td>
<td>More local governance structures are empowered and accountable.</td>
<td># of basic common rules adopted at local and regional governance structures' levels.</td>
<td>TBD-2014 (Tamkeen reports)</td>
<td>Not consistent in war situation – improvement is the target</td>
<td>Project reports</td>
<td>Opposition held areas don't shrink further.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># of decisions taken at local and regional (governorate) levels relating to well-being of the population.</td>
<td># of coordination meetings held between local councils and regional councils.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># of decisions taken at local and regional (governorate) levels relating to well-being of the population.</td>
<td># of coordination meetings held between local councils and regional councils.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output 4.2</th>
<th>Staff at local governance at administrative and technical levels (including health, education and agriculture) is trained and delivers services to communities and dispose of tools to develop, implement and monitor evidence-based policies, strategies, plans and resilience programmes.</th>
<th># of trainings at local, regional and technical directorates' levels with level of participation.</th>
<th>TBD-2014 (Tamkeen reports)</th>
<th>Not consistent in war situation – improvement is the target</th>
<th>Population surveys. Projects reports.</th>
<th>Opposition held areas don't shrink further.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improved feedback from civil society on quality of services provided by local governance structures.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output 5.1</th>
<th>City and neighbourhood profiles and plans for resilience packages are produced for the targeted cities.</th>
<th># of city and neighbourhood profiles completed with their regular update.</th>
<th>20 in 2015</th>
<th>75</th>
<th>Profiles. Project reports.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># of city and neighbourhood profiles completed with their regular update.</td>
<td># of plans for resilience packages of intervention.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>At least 5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># of city and neighbourhood profiles completed with their regular update.</td>
<td># of plans for resilience packages of intervention.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>At least 5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 5.2</td>
<td>The EU's ability to swiftly support to the continuation of service delivery in volatile areas is maintained, and on-going (humanitarian and non-humanitarian) activities in opposition-held areas are complemented by medium-term activities strengthening sustainability and local ownership. Wells, boreholes, water supply system created or restored / supply of water sanitation equipment. # of water functioning networks. Supply of various equipment for e.g. rubble removal, fire extinction &amp; rescue, generators etc. # of tons of rubble removed. Electricity coverage.</td>
<td>TBD-2014</td>
<td>Not consistent in war situation – improvement is the target.</td>
<td>Project reports. City and neighbourhoods profiles. Economic reports from SCRP. The situation remains sufficiently stable for a sufficient time to enable the implementation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 5.3</td>
<td>Development of skills and the provision of livelihoods opportunities to foster cross-line dialogue and social cohesion. # of jobs created with sector and sex disaggregation. Mills and other productive infrastructure restored. Supply of productive inputs (flour/wheat, seeds or vegetables, agricultural and farming equipment). Livelihood opportunities created (e.g. bakeries, etc.). # of local partners supported through micro-grants inside Syria.</td>
<td>TBD-2014</td>
<td>Not consistent in war situation – improvement is the target.</td>
<td>Project reports. City and neighbourhoods profiles. Economic reports from SCRP. The situation remains sufficiently stable for a sufficient time to enable the implementation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>