# Action Fiche for Republic of Lebanon

## 1. IDENTIFICATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Title/Number</strong></th>
<th>Developing national capability for Security and Stabilisation Programme (SSP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total cost</strong></td>
<td>EU contribution: EUR 12 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aid method / Method of implementation</strong></td>
<td>Project approach: For Component 1: <em>partly decentralised management</em> (through the Project Administration Office-PAO attached to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers-PCM) and joint management with the International Center for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD). For Component 2: <em>partly decentralised management</em> (through PAO). For Component 3: <em>centralised management</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DAC-code</strong></td>
<td>15210</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## 2. RATIONALE

### 2.1. Sector context

Lebanon is emerging from a conflict which fractured the state and divided the society, lacking consensus over what constitutes the “national interest” and on the nature and aims of security. Lebanon has a relatively developed security sector and subordination, albeit flawed, to civilian government. In reality, the security sector has not yet overcome the legacy of the civil war that ended in 1990, or the subsequent fifteen years of Syrian domination. Consequently, the four different services involved in internal security (Internal Security Forces-ISF, General Security-GS, State Security-SS, and the Army-LAF) are subjected to different political loyalties, thus causing a competition that often leads to duplications.

The deficiencies of the Lebanese security system are underlined by the existence of several non-state actors (such as Hezbollah's armed wing, armed Palestinian and Islamic fundamentalist factions and re-emerging militias with sectarian political affiliations). External military support to the different factions and the proliferation of weapons outside the official security forces also fuels a cycle of mutual fear and represents a possible trigger for violence.

Permeability of the borders is another threat to the State’s sovereignty over its territory with the potential of fuelling instability. Management of borders between Lebanon and Syria needs to deal with problems ranging from easy access through Palestinian camps to drug-trafficking, from infiltration of jihadi/takfiri Islamist fighters to the smuggling of goods (including, allegedly, weapons) due to overall poor border control resources. Border control is also an issue of compliance with UNSC resolutions. A national coordinator (at ministerial level) for border issues has just been appointed in order to ensure the definition and implementation of an
Integrated Border Management (IBM) strategy and adequate coordination among the four security agencies involved in border work.

There is a widespread distrust towards security and police services amongst the citizenry in Lebanon. Despite this, and since the end of the Syrian presence in Lebanon, many security experts and civil society organisations (CSOs) have started a reflection over the need for political reform of the security system. Thus, the new government of December 2009 should guarantee the necessary stability for the country to embark on a wider reform process that will also involve discussions on the Lebanese security system.

2.2. Lessons learnt

Regarding border control, a Northern Border Pilot Project (NBPP) (led by a team of German border experts between 2007 and 2008 and supported by a number of other donors, including the EU, UK, US, Denmark and Canada), aiming at applying the concept of IBM at a part of the border, highlighted the need for a comprehensive border strategy with proper political guidance. On rule of law issues and support to criminal investigation capacity, the lack of coordination within ISF and with the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) has represented an obstacle for previous projects supported by the EU (see 2.3), together with the lack of institutionalisation of improved practices; both aspects are already being tackled within the on-going Security and Rule of Law-SAROL project (see below).

Most donors in Lebanon concentrate on strengthening specific security agencies with equipment and training without any overarching approach to security system reform. Material assistance is of limited value if political authorities are not prepared to devise national security policies and key actors regard the security sector as a tool for gaining the upper hand militarily.

2.3. Complementary actions

On border issues, the EU is looking at the possibility of mobilising either the Instrument for Stability or MIEUX (Migration EU Expertise) to support the definition of a national strategy for IBM and therefore assure the transition towards this project. Other donors have expressed an interest in supporting the border management initiative (US, DE, UK, DK, CA, IT, ES, NL and JP).

On rule of law aspects, this project complements other EU actions undertaken since 2008 (“Amélioration de l’investigation criminelle a tous les stades de la chaîne pénale au Liban”, and “Security and Rule of Law - SAROL”), strengthening the criminal investigation process and supporting the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities (MoIM)/ISF and the MoJ/General Prosecutor in developing practical procedures to apply the penal code and a self-sustaining training capacity on such procedures.

Other donors (FR, UK, ES, IT, NL, CA, US) - the first four being directly implicated in EU projects through the signature of a specific MoU - have a significant degree of cooperation with the ISF. In particular, this project takes into account the on-going cooperation of FR (on Public Order Maintenance - POM, and traffic management) and UK (strategic planning, public image and outreach, and accountability) with a view to continue such work.
On the other hand, experiences on introducing the debate on security sector management and reforms in Lebanon are scarce. Such work needs to be further promoted in a neutral and incremental way, the EU being in a privileged position to promote dialogue on Security System Reform (SSR).

2.4. Donor coordination

International donors involved in security issues in Lebanon hold an internal bi-monthly general information meeting and have established three working groups (on borders, internal security and rule of law, and national defence) chaired on a rotation basis. In this co-ordination fora, the EU is seen as a key player in promoting Security System Reform as a key element for Lebanon's stabilization process. Within the border sub-group, UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL) and the EU have promoted a process of donor alignment around a Common Donor Position that has been presented to Prime Minister Hariri in January 2010. Key donors have proposed a joint roadmap for supporting the Government of Lebanon in developing a Lebanese IBM strategy.

3. DESCRIPTION

3.1. Objectives

The overall objective of this project is to contribute to the development of a long-term capability of the Lebanese security system to control risk and guarantee the respect of the rule of law, thus ensuring greater security for citizens and sustainable stabilization processes for the country.

The present project follows an approach focused on: 1) increasing State effectiveness in sectors identified as critical for stability and security; and 2) action on public understanding of risk and insecurity, as crucial elements for promoting a transformation of the security system management by increasing its accountability.

The project will be implemented through three components, corresponding to the three specific objectives of the programme:

(1) **Borders**: Increase Lebanon’s capability to practice Integrated Border Management EU concept.

(2) **Rule of law**: Improve the capability of State institutions and security forces (namely MoIM/ISF and MoJ) to enforce the Rule of Law.

(3) **People-centred security**: Increase security system stakeholders' understanding of threats to people's security and on the options available to address them.

3.2. Expected results and main activities

**Component I**
The project will follow a double approach aimed at strengthening the controls over land borders and at improving the performance of involved agencies at the Border Crossing Points (BCPs). Expected results of this component are:

**Result 1.1. An integrated border management (IBM) framework that reduces and prevents cross and near border crime -while facilitating the legitimate movement of goods and people- is in place for controlling the Northern and Eastern land border.**

Main activities envisaged for this result include Technical Assistance (TA) and equipment for the implementation of a national IBM strategy, including Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) with border communities.

**Result 1.2. Border Crossing Points (BCPs) managed effectively.**

Main activities: implementation of a one stop control system, support to General Security and Customs for more effective border checks.

**Result 1.3. Inter-ministerial and inter-agency cooperation and coordination enhanced.**

Main activities include training on inter-agency operations, the strengthening of the border committees and coordination mechanisms, and assistance in formulating a comprehensive IBM strategy including also air and sea borders.

**Component II**

Expected results for this component are:

**Result 2.1. The ISF increase their operational competences to respond to people's needs in a more professional, timely and accountable manner.**

This will be achieved by strengthening the ISF capacity for strategic planning and self-evaluation, by enhancing the ISF overall training capacity, by improving ISF gender-sensitivity and capacity to attend women victims of crimes, and by equipping the scientific police in police stations to respond more quickly when criminal offences are reported.

**Result 2.2. The capability of MoIM and MoJ to fight serious and organised crime in a coordinated manner is improved.**

Proposed activities include: developing the training capacity of the ISF on criminal investigation; improving the custody chain for evidence found in the course of criminal investigations; increasing MoIM/ISF and MoJ capacity to fight serious and organized crime; and computerization of the ISF.

**Result 2.3. The ISF Mobile Forces (MF) master the techniques for democratic management of public order.**

This will imply the equipping the MF with non-lethal means for public order maintenance (POM), providing them with a mobile communication system covering the whole national territory and training for the adoption of a new doctrine for POM.
Result 2.4: Improved road safety through better traffic management and increased citizens' awareness.

Foreseen activities: support to the GoL for adopting a Traffic Management strategy and establishing an *ad hoc* unit in charge of traffic management nationwide; training to the ISF in traffic management and enforcing traffic rules; awareness in the public - with priority to the youth- on traffic rules and road safety will also be promoted.

**Component III**

In order to address the challenge of how SSR can be made part of a national agenda in the long-term, the project will work on the development of a common understanding among stakeholders about what is actually meant by public security and SSR, and on how to address diverse security and development challenges facing the state and its population. The component's expected results are:

**Result 3.1. An assessment of citizen's perceived sources of insecurity will be carried out.**

Following consultations, the research will capture security perceptions of all confessional groups and their avenues for protection. Relevant ministries and security agencies will also be supported in conducting their own internal surveys. The assessment could be the starting point for dual local and national level consultation processes that might inform reforms toward the improvement of public security service by state agencies.

**Result 3.2. Public awareness, knowledge and engagement on security issues among civil society groups, representatives of security agencies, the administration, and the media, will be increased through training and capacity building activities.**

Activities envisaged: civil society organisations will be trained to articulate their security concerns; security forces will be trained to consult with communities on these issues; a broad coalition of policy-makers and opinion formers, including ISF Strategic Planning Unit and Common Border Forces, will be trained in addressing public security issues and challenges as part of security system governance.

**Result 3.3: Debate generated among key opinion formers (ministries, security agencies, parliamentarians, media, CSOs, academics) on alternative entry points to security system reform compared to what was discussed in the framework of the National Dialogue.**

Political dialogue is needed to build trust between the different actors making up the security system, prior to preparing the ground for reform and the launch of a long-term SSR programme.

**Result 3.4: Communication activities targeted at a broader international audience on local level security issues will assist donors to better plan and coordinate their long-term SSR contributions to Lebanon.**

The EU policy framework itself may benefit from participatory research on security issues.
3.3. **Risks and assumptions**

The project assumes that during the implementing period there is no disruption of the country’s current peace and security and that there is no major breakdown in Lebanon’s internal political situation. With reference more specifically to the first component, the appointment of a border coordinator in the Prime Minister’s office with international technical assistance should partially mitigate the risk of Lebanon's incapability to define a comprehensive border strategy. As for the second component, it is assumed that beneficiaries (ISF and MoJ) will carry out the internal organizational changes they need to fully benefit from the project, as agreed during the formulation phase.

The third component also assumes that all stakeholders (including civil society, relevant institutions and government actors) are willing to engage with the EU and its implementation partners in a process of consultation on public security issues and the role of the security forces. Finally, a risk is represented by political sensitiveness on security issues but the approach chosen, in which security is viewed as involving a wider range of human security and development issues, should legitimise donor engagement and open the door to a constructive dialogue.

3.4. **Crosscutting Issues**

The integration of gender perspectives into the security sector is a very relevant dimension of the programme in all its components. Currently, LAF, ISF and GS have a relative small percentage of women (app. 10%), including at officers’ level, while there are no women in Customs. The programme will aim at re-profiling the key role women officers have in the relevant security agencies to ensure sensitivity in both attending women victims of crimes and controlling women travellers at LCPs.

Good governance and human rights are also integral to the proposed programme. Component two aims to make the ISF more responsive and accountable to the general population and will bolster human rights by, inter alia, ensuring that objective proof is available in criminal cases, assisting the ISF in monitoring the application of the revised Code of Conduct, and promoting the use of solely non-lethal means for public order maintenance.

3.5. **Stakeholders**

The project concerns the broad range of stakeholders composing the security system, such as:

- **Core security actors**: Internal Security Forces (ISF), Lebanese Army Forces (LAF), Customs, General Security (GS) and non-state security forces.

- **Justice and law enforcement institutions**: Ministry of Interior, Minister of Justice.

- **Security management and oversight bodies**: the civil authorities responsible for the oversight and control (e.g. Parliament), civil society (including human rights organizations and research institutes) and the media.
For component I, the stakeholders will be more particularly GS and Customs. The technical counterpart will be the office of the National Border Coordinator. The ISF will be the main beneficiary of Component II. MoJ is also an important counterpart for such component. For Component III, the main stakeholders will be state authorities in charge of security system oversight and management. The project will work with both policy makers and civil society.

Given its key role in ensuring inter-ministerial coordination and promoting reforms, the Presidency of Council of Ministers (PCM) will also be a major stakeholder of the overall programme.

4. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES

4.1. Method of implementation

The programme will be implemented through the signature of a financing agreement with the Government of the Republic of Lebanon represented by the Presidency of Council of Ministers (PCM).

For Components I and II, the programme will be managed under partly decentralised management mode. The PCM will be the Contracting Authority for decentralised contracts for Components I and II. In addition, for Component I, the EU contribution for supporting the implementation of an IBM strategy will be done under joint management mode through the signature of a contribution agreement with International Center for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD). This international organisation which has already worked with EuropeAid on developing European Commission guidelines for cooperation in integrated border management (IBM) has a great experience in leading IBM processes and national strategies. ICMPD has also completed the four pillars assessment. The Commission controls ex ante all the procurement procedures except in cases where programme estimates are applied, under which the Commission applies ex ante control for procurement contracts > 50,000 EUR and may apply ex post for procurement contracts ≤ 50,000 EUR. The Commission controls ex ante the contracting procedures for all grant contracts.

Payments are executed by the Commission except in cases where programmes estimates are applied, under which payments are executed by the beneficiary country for operating costs and contracts up to the ceilings indicated in the table below.

The Authorising Officer ensures that, by using the model of financing agreement for decentralised management, the segregation of duties between the authorising officer and the accounting officer or of the equivalent functions within the delegated entity will be effective, so that the decentralisation of the payments can be carried out for contracts up to the ceilings specified below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Works</th>
<th>Supplies</th>
<th>Services</th>
<th>Grants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt; 300,000 EUR</td>
<td>&lt; 150,000 EUR</td>
<td>&lt; 200,000 EUR</td>
<td>≤ 100,000 EUR</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The Project Administration Office (PAO), located at the PCM, is in charge of contractual management of the activities because of its long-standing experience.
with EU procedures, and its operational capacity will be increased for this new programme.

Contracts under Component III, framework contracts, audit, monitoring and evaluation contracts will be managed by *centralised management* mode and therefore contracted directly by the EU.

In the light of the Aid Effectiveness agenda and in line with the provisions of the Backbone Strategy, the programme will have a *Stakeholder Consultation Committee* incorporating relevant actors to review project objectives and activities in which strategic issues will be discussed and the overall coherence of the programme ensured. The technical assistance provided will assist the Committee by fulfilling a technical secretariat function in coordination with PAO and with the technical and operational counterparts directly involved in the project implementation, and that will be articulated into a sub working group for each programme component.

### 4.2. Procurement and grant award procedures [/programme estimates]

#### (1) Contracts

All contracts implementing the action must be awarded and implemented in accordance with the procedures and standard documents laid down and published by the Commission for the implementation of external operations, in force at the time of the launch of the procedure in question.

Participation in the award of contracts for the present action shall be open to all natural and legal persons covered by ENPI. Further extensions of this participation to other natural or legal persons by the relevant authorising officer shall be subject to the conditions provided for in 21(7) ENPI.

#### (2) Specific rules for grants

The essential selection and award criteria for the award of grants are laid down in the Practical Guide to contract procedures for EU external actions. They are established in accordance with the principles set out in Title VI 'Grants' of the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget. When derogations to these principles are applied, they shall be justified, in particular in the following cases:

- Financing in full (derogation to the principle of co-financing): the maximum possible rate of co-financing for grants is 80%. Full financing may only be applied in the cases provided for in Article 253 of the Commission Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2342/2002 of 23 December 2002 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities.

- Derogation to the principle of non-retroactivity: a grant may be awarded for an action which has already begun only if the applicant can demonstrate the need to start the action before the grant is awarded, in accordance with Article 112 of the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget.

#### (3) Specific rules on programme estimates
All programme estimates must respect the procedures and standard documents laid down by the Commission, in force at the time of the adoption of the programme estimates in question (i.e. the Practical Guide to procedures for programme estimates).

For Component I: joint management:

If specifically foreseen by the Agreement signed with the International Organisation selected all contracts implementing the action will be awarded and implemented in accordance with the procedures and standard documents laid down and published by the International Organisation concerned.

4.3. Budget and calendar

The indicative budget of the programme is 12 000 000 EUR. The Government of Lebanon will provide in-kind contribution through human resources and, where appropriate, refurbished premises (for an amount to be quantified).

The indicative budget distribution is:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Indicative budget EUR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Component I – Borders (mostly supplies, some services, contribution agreement)</td>
<td>3 560 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component II - RoL(Services, supplies, grants)</td>
<td>6 360 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component III – People-centred security (Grants)</td>
<td>840 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingencies¹</td>
<td>500 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication and Visibility</td>
<td>160 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating costs</td>
<td>400 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit and Evaluation²</td>
<td>180 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>12 000 000</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The project will have the duration of 72 months following the signature of the Financing Agreement. The operational implementation phase will be 48 months and the closure phase will be maximum 24 months. All activities will be carried out in Lebanon.

4.4. Performance monitoring

Day-to-day technical and financial monitoring will be a continuous process led by technical, operational and administrative counterparts with the support of the foreseen technical assistance to be contracted. For this purpose, at the start of the programme an appropriate set of performance indicators will be defined for each component to measure progress. Thus, this will allow a permanent monitoring

¹ The use of contingencies needs the prior approval of the Commission.
² The EC will be the contracting authority for audit and evaluation contracts.
system for each Component of the project. The project will be subject to ROM monitoring provided by the Commission.

4.5. Evaluation and audit

The programme will undergo audits in line with the provisions of the Financing Agreement and the Programme Estimate Practical Guide. Mid-term and final evaluations, as well as monitoring missions, will be carried out separately for each component due to their specificities. The EU will communicate all audit and evaluation reports to the Beneficiaries. The EU will also carry out independent audit and monitoring missions, whenever they are deemed necessary.

4.6. Communication and visibility

A Communication and Visibility Strategy and an Action Plan will be defined for each Component of the project, in line with the Communication and Visibility Manual for EU external actions. The third component also incorporates a specific communication objective.