ANNEX 3

to the COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING DECISION on the ENI East Regional Action Programme for 2019, Part 2, including some actions to be carried out in 2020, to be financed from the general budget of the European Union

**Action Document for “EU4Dialogue”**

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**MULTIANNUAL PROGRAMME**

This document constitutes the multiannual work programme in the sense of Article 110(2) of the Financial Regulation and action programme/measure in the sense of Articles 2 and 3 of Regulation N° 236/2014.

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| 1. Title/basic act/CRIS number | EU4Dialogue  
| CRIS numbers: ENI/2019/041-750 and ENI/2020/041-969  
| financed under the European Neighbourhood Instrument | |
| 2. Zone benefiting from the action/location | Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the Republic of Moldova  
| The action shall be carried out at the following location: Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries. | |
| 4. Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) | SDG 5 – gender equality  
| SDG 10 – reduced inequalities  
| SDG 16 – peace, justice and strong institutions | |
| 5. Sector of intervention/thematic area | Security  
| Strengthening Institutions and Good Governance | DEV. Assistance: YES |
| 6. Amounts concerned | Total estimated cost: EUR 15,157,895  
| Total amount of European Union (EU) contribution EUR 15,000,000  
| The contribution is for an amount of EUR 10,000,000 from the general budget of the European Union for 2019 and for an amount of EUR 5,000,000 from the general budget of the European Union for 2020, subject to the availability of appropriations for the respective financial years following the adoption of the relevant annual budget or as |
provided for in the system of provisional twelfths.

7. Aid modality(ies) and implementation modality(ies)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Modality</th>
<th>Direct management through:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Grant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Procurement</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**Indirect management** with the entrusted entity(ies) to be selected in accordance with the criteria set out in section 5.3.2

8 a) DAC code(s) 15220 - Civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution

b) Main Delivery Channel

9. Markers (from CRIS DAC form)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General policy objective</th>
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<th>Significant objective</th>
<th>Principal objective</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participation development/good governance</td>
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<td>☐</td>
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<td>Aid to environment</td>
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<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
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<td>Gender equality and Women’s and Girl’s Empowerment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trade Development</td>
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<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reproductive, Maternal, New born and child health</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**RIO Convention markers**

<table>
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<th>Biological diversity</th>
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<tr>
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<td>☐</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat desertification</td>
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<tr>
<td>Climate change mitigation</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate change adaptation</td>
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10. Global Public Goods and Challenges (GPGC) thematic flagships

N/A

**SUMMARY (max. ½ page)**

In the Eastern Partnership region, five of six countries are affected by conflicts: Armenia and Azerbaijan (over Nagorno-Karabakh), Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), the Republic of Moldova\(^1\) (Transnistria) and Ukraine (Crimea and Donbass). This Action Document covers all the unresolved conflicts except the one affecting Ukraine. All these conflicts remain unresolved and, in some cases, continue to produce casualties.

Further efforts are therefore needed to move from the current *status quo* towards conflict resolution, and it is crucial that CSOs, NGOs, and opinion shapers across the conflict divides are engaged. Such engagement, in areas of common interest, can help create trust, change

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\(^1\) Hereafter Moldova
perceptions, improve conditions and help conflict transformation and diplomatic efforts towards conflict resolution.

The overall objective of this action is to contribute to the transformation of the unresolved conflicts in the EaP region. It will focus on i) establishing an environment that can help defuse tension and foster better understanding across the conflict divides; ii) improving targeted sectors, including human security, for communities; and iii) improving exchanges across the divide through education and culture.

1 CONTEXT ANALYSIS

1.1 Context Description

In the Eastern Partnership region, five of six countries are affected by conflicts, namely Armenia and Azerbaijan (over Nagorno Karabakh), Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), Moldova (Transnistria) and Ukraine (Crimea and Donbass). This Action Document covers all the unresolved conflicts except that affecting Ukraine. The region’s conflicts remain unresolved and, in some cases, involve casualties. Diplomatic efforts manage the conflicts but conflict resolution remains elusive.2

Each conflict is unique, but they all spring from the collapse of the former Soviet Union, and subsequent actions by the Russian Federation. The resolution of these conflicts therefore also depends on broader geopolitical developments particularly the relations between the West and the Russian Federation. As these relations likely will remain difficult for the foreseeable future, lasting solutions to the unresolved conflicts are to be considered as long-term rather than short-term objectives.

The unresolved conflicts (i) continue to impose hardships on the conflict-affected people, including those displaced, (ii) continue to be an impediment to development, and (iii) are a potential threat to broader regional security.

The EU, complementing other actors, supports the existing mechanisms mandated to address these unresolved conflicts. The EU (i) is an observer in the 5+2 negotiations on the Transnistrian settlement process, (ii) co-chairs the Geneva International Discussions addressing the consequences of the August 2008 conflict in Georgia and deploys a large civilian monitoring mission on the ground (the EUMM), and (iii) supports the OSCE-led mechanisms on the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, including the activities of the Minsk Group Co-Chairs. Furthermore, the EU has a Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia who engages with stakeholders in the unresolved conflicts in Georgia and over Nagorno-Karabakh.

In the absence of prospects for political settlement, conflict transformation initiatives aim at building trust across the divides and to create opportunities for constructive dialogue. In some

2 Track I diplomacy is at State level (e.g. among officials); Track II is between opinion-makers (e.g. intellectuals); Track III involves people-to-people contacts (e.g. involving NGOs). Often there will be an attempt to merge different tracks for mutual benefit.
of the countries, the EU is supporting through FPI (Service for Foreign Policy Instrument) initiatives like COBERM\(^3\), implemented in Georgia and encouraging involvement of Abkhaz and South Ossetians and EPNK\(^4\), facilitating dialogue and people-to-people contacts between Azerbaijanis and Armenians. This engagement in the conflict regions contributes to creating a favourable environment and preparing the ground for long-term conflict resolution.

However, EU engagement in conflict areas has often been met with significant obstacles: EaP countries fear that support to actors in conflict regions may reinforce independence claims or reduce financial costs for Russia; the conflict-affected populations are often sceptical towards the EU as they assess the engagement to be insufficient or perceived as partial to one side of the conflict and Russia has limited political interest in seeing EU engagement in these areas. In practical terms, the EU engagement policy is also limited by the restricted access for travel and financial transactions to the conflict areas, imposed, for different reasons, by both EaP capitals and *de facto* authorities.

In addition to the abovementioned obstacles, all of these conflicts are currently to a degree overshadowed by other conflicts, e.g., in Syria and Ukraine. The relative lack of political attention, however, should not lead us to forget about the deteriorating human security in these conflict regions. This programme aims at improving the lives of every individual within the European Neighbourhood, including in the conflict regions, inter alia by applying a human rights based approach.

### 1.2 Policy Framework (Global, EU)

The EaP Brussels summit declaration, the EU Global Strategy and the ENP review have all set out increased ambitions and needs for a strengthened engagement on preventing and addressing conflicts including in the Eastern partnership region. Addressing the matter of unresolved conflicts in the EaP region is also very much in line with all four objectives under the 20 Deliverables for 2020 and contributes to the crosscutting deliverables. Additionally, the EU has a multitude of policy documents, from Council Conclusions to strategy papers to working documents and guidelines that are applicable in the conflict transformation context. The latest among them is the new EU strategic approach to Women, Peace and Security, which was adopted in December 2018.

In the context of the conflicts that this action document aims to address, the EU is either by itself or through its Member States involved in the official mechanisms mandated to deal with them. The EU is co-chairing the Geneva International Discussions, addressing the consequences of the August 2008 conflict in Georgia, and is an observer in the 5+2 negotiations on the Transnistrian settlement process. Seven EU Member States are members of the Minsk Group (with France one of three co-chairs), seeking to find a peaceful resolution to the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, which justifies EU involvement and efforts to conflict transformation.

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\(^3\) Confidence Building Early Response Mechanism  
\(^4\) European Partnership for the Peaceful Settlement of the Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh
Bilaterally the EU has Association Agreements, including Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas, with Georgia and Moldova, and a Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement with Armenia (applied provisionally as of 1 June 2018). Negotiations are ongoing with Azerbaijan on a new comprehensive agreement to replace the current Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. These agreements define the respective bilateral relations with each of the countries.

1.3 Public Policy Analysis of the partner country/region

1.3.1 Georgia

The status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia has been disputed following internal conflicts in the early 1990s. These unresolved conflicts formed the background of the conflict that erupted between Georgian and Russian armed forces in 2008. In the aftermath of the 2008 war, Russia recognised Abkhazia and South Ossetia and placed them under its political, economic and military patronage. Russia also restricted the movement of people and goods across newly built boundaries.

From the side of the Georgian government, the conflict is seen as a conflict between Georgia and Russia, with the breakaway regions as the disputed territories between those two parties rather than part of the underlying root causes existing pre-2008. This is the context in which Georgia’s policy towards the breakaway entities needs to be seen, including the Law on Occupied Territories, the Georgian Engagement Strategy with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The latest initiative regarding “Georgian State Strategy on Occupied Territories (Engagement through Cooperation)”, while targeting the population in the breakaway regions, is still rooted in this broader context. Nevertheless, long-term conflict resolution will not be possible without more attention being paid to the Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-Ossetian levels of conflict, which date back to the 1990s.

The EU’s political responses to the conflicts over South Ossetia and Abkhazia are in particular linked to the 2008 war. For the EU, the guiding principle is the non-recognition and engagement policy endorsed in December 2009.

The Geneva International Discussions (GID), co-chaired by the EU, the OSCE, the UN; involving Georgia, the Russian Federation and the United States, as well as participants from Abkhazia and South Ossetia, were initiated after the 2008 war and aim at managing the consequences of the conflicts, but GID is not mandated to deal with root causes, diverging narratives on the conflict as described above, or conflict resolution. The GID provides a forum for its participants to meet and exchange views, and is in this way contributing to relative stability on the ground. They also serve as a platform to discuss issues that can be operationalised for instance in the FPI-funded COBERM project. Beyond the discussions in the GID, the political space for engagement is limited, and the conflict-affected populations still perceive themselves as isolated.
1.3.2 Moldova

The Transnistria conflict is potentially the most promising as far as conflict transformation in the region is concerned. Both sides have a pragmatic view regarding their day-to-day interactions.

The 5+2 format (Moldova and Transnistria as participants; the OSCE, Russia and Ukraine as mediators; the EU and the U.S. as observers) has produced good results on technical small steps that help building confidence and have an impact on the life of citizens. The Transnistrian de facto authorities perceived the conflict in Ukraine as having an impact on their economy on a number of occasions. On the other hand, the result oriented approach promoted by the OSCE Chairmanships in Office allowed Chisinau and Tiraspol to achieve some positive results in recent years. Progress was achieved in the implementation of the agreements reached in areas that have a tangible impact on the lives of citizens from both banks of the Dniester river (e.g. education, transport, use of lands).

Chisinau and Tiraspol have found modalities to extend the territorial application of the Moldovan Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) with the EU to the entire territory of the Republic of Moldova. Increasingly applied customs controls supported by the EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) have reduced illegal trade. The EU’s successive Confidence-Building Measure (CBM) programmes are implemented and Member States implement projects that operate across the Dniester river.

Continued engagement by the parties will be key, to ensure a sustainable transformation of the conflict.

1.3.3 Nagorno-Karabakh

This is a conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) and seven surrounding districts under the control of the de facto authorities from Nagorno-Karabakh, but internationally recognised as part of Azerbaijan. The conflict has its origins in the early 20th century when Stalin made NK, historically Armenian and with a majority-Armenian population, part of Soviet Azerbaijan. The present conflict began in 1988, when Armenians in NK demanded that it would be transferred from Soviet Azerbaijan to Soviet Armenia. The conflict escalated into a full-scale war in the early 1990s.

Between 1988 and the ceasefire in 1994, forces in and around NK killed 20,000 people on both sides and displaced more than one million. Since 2014 there has been repeated, localised escalation, with Armenia and Azerbaijan engaging in an arms race that has turned the area into one of the most militarised in the world. In a four-day flare-up in April 2016 at least 200 service personnel were reported killed.

Conflict settlement efforts are currently led by Armenia's prime minister and Azerbaijan's president, and to a certain extent the ministers of foreign affairs. Talks between the sides, mediated by the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs – France, Russia, and the US – have not yet achieved any breakthrough. People-to-people contacts and civilian confidence-building

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5 Transnistria is a long stripe situated to the east of the Republic of Moldova in the area between the Dniester river and Ukraine. It includes as well the city of Bender and its surrounding localities on the west bank of the Dniester river.
measures are often funded by the EU’s European Partnership for the Peaceful Settlement of the Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh (EPNK) and the associated PeaCE programme.

Azerbaijan and Armenia have developed maximalist positions, creating a complex deadlock. This contributes to the extreme isolation of the NK population: the Line of Contact (LoC) is completely closed and heavily militarised, and there is little to no exchange with countries other than Armenia. It has become very difficult to access NK, including on engagement on human security issues. For instance, the NK population has no access to best practices in terms of education, health, cultural heritage, or agriculture.

While not part of the OSCE Minsk Group, the EU supports the efforts by the Minsk Group Co-Chairs for the settlement of the NK conflict. The EU funds the only international effort for conflict transformation across the conflict divide. Furthermore, the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia also maintains close contact with stakeholders over NK and informs the EU structures.

With the recent political change in Armenia, and the subsequent change of rhetoric on both sides, there is some hope that conflict transformation activities now can have more impact, including opportunities for engaging with new and/or wider audiences and help preparing the societies, ensuring the inclusion of both women and men, for peace in a more effective manner.

1.4 Stakeholder analysis

1.4.1 Georgia

Engaging individuals in South Ossetia is extremely difficult due to a policy of self-isolation by the de facto authorities and Russia’s significant military presence. The administrative boundary line (ABL) is closed, except for a crossing point in Akhalgori where local trade takes place. Financial transfers to and contacts with local organisations within South Ossetia are particularly restricted. Individuals are frequently discouraged form participation in conflict transformation activities or denied travel. The only international organisation authorised to operate in South Ossetia is the ICRC6.

Engagement with individuals in Abkhazia is far more substantial. The EU provides support via IFIs7 for the Enguri Hydropower Station, supports confidence-building and conflict transformation as well as a human rights based approach to development. In recent years, engagement in different sectors has improved the perception of the EU in civil society and the de facto authorities, although EU visibility has been low with main interlocutors being UN agencies and European NGOs.

Due to isolation, relative lack of opportunities to travel abroad and a restricted information and media space, the people in Abkhazia and South Ossetia have developed only a limited understanding of the EU position, values and aims in the conflict context.

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6 International Committee of the Red Cross
7 International financial institutions
1.4.2 Moldova

The government of the Republic of Moldova is the main stakeholder and acts through the Bureau for Reintegration of the Republic of Moldova. The bureau has to conduct consultations and negotiations to resolve the Transnistrian conflict, to develop the legislative framework and to provide the necessary assistance to the country reintegration. The line-Ministries of the relevant sectors of intervention are stakeholders of the 5+2 working groups. They are participating to the technical process of post-conflict settlement and reconstruction. The thematic 5+2 working groups aim to stimulate the settlement process and create additional leverage, which would allow the easing of tensions between the conflicting parties. Several working groups were established, starting in October 2007, to strengthen confidence and security between the two banks and to generate solutions to technical issues at the level of experts from both sides.

On the Transnistrian side, the region is led by the de facto authorities, which do not recognize the authority of Chisinau. The de facto authorities in Tiraspol are de facto responsible for the implementation of public policies and for governance in the region. Regular consultations and political dialogue are held with the de facto leadership in Tiraspol. The de facto Ministry of Foreign Affairs has the mandate to negotiate with the central authorities at political level. In 2017, the de facto authorities in Tiraspol have professionalized the aid coordination structure under the Coordination Council for Humanitarian and Technical Assistance. The two objectives of this Council are: (i) to attract the greatest number of donors willing to provide funds for the implementation of socio-economic and infrastructure projects; and (ii) to coordinate activities between donors and aid recipients in the region.

Local authorities/municipalities from both banks are beneficiaries and partners in initiatives related to confidence building measures. They are reliable partners when it comes to the implementation of projects together with civil society. Civil society, including Business associations and social partners, is an important actor through which part of the donor’s support is channelled (e.g. small grants programmes) despite some operational challenges. Cooperation between civil society from both banks has been developing significantly. Academic institutions and actors and youth organisations are also partners to which access to Erasmus + programme was granted.

1.4.3 Nagorno-Karabakh

The extreme polarisation where contacts with the population or de facto authorities in NK are heavily politicised or instrumentalised remains the main challenge for EU engagement in the conflict area, and has practical implications for working with stakeholders also in the two countries.

The basis for conflict resolution is a broad settlement endorsed by Baku and Yerevan through mutual compromises. So far, however, both capitals have demonstrated limited political will to commit to a negotiated peace. Instead of investing in conflict transformation, over the years the sides have resorted to provocations and engage in violence often leading to casualties, harsh rhetoric and a continued reinforcement of their own military capabilities. The NK conflict region is now heavily militarised, and there are no contacts across the line-of-contact between the sides.

In NK, discussions are focused on how to: i) participate in negotiations in the format of the Minsk Group, also now backed by the new Armenian leadership, but heavily opposed by
Azerbaijan, and thereby again politicising engagement in NK; ii) build capacity, which remains low and is a major obstacle for engagement in conflict transformation. Few individuals in NK have been active in conflict transformation activities, but according to the experience gained through EPNK activities, there seem to show further possibilities of broadening participation.

1.5 Problem analysis/priority areas for support

The main stakeholders in the unresolved conflicts in the EaP region tend to focus exclusively on the political and military dimensions of the disputes. In most cases therefore diametrically opposed positions have led to deadlocks in peace talks.

Communications, movement of people and goods and contacts across the conflict divides are often disrupted or restricted. Isolation and hardships, as well as tension and in some cases security incidents on the ground, reinforce "enemy images", and revive grievances from previous conflicts. This in turn leads to further entrenched conflict narratives and positions, and ultimately, as time passes, to strong, mutually-exclusive and polarised collective identities based on ethnicity or ideology internalised as part of people's own identities. Women’s experience of conflicts and their aftermath may be different from the experience made by men. Some have suffered conflict related sexual violence which shapes their perception on the conflict and yet others may be more in contact with the other side as a result of initiatives by the women’s movement or simply due to the fact that their domestic responsibilities, such as cattle herding, provide them with opportunities to meet people from the other side. Young people on the other hand lack opportunities to confront their representation of the other side with more nuanced realities. While these trends are the consequences of past armed conflicts, they are now obstacles to stabilisation and conflict resolution efforts.

These long-term and deteriorating trends are, however, also closely linked to shorter-term patterns in the conflicts, where regularly "windows of opportunity" present themselves. These need to be seized upon to introduce new possible engagement activities that then can be sustained over a longer period.

Key lessons learned from previous engagement is that community leaders need to have ownership and take responsibility for engagement activities. Change cannot be achieved from the outside. The EU can therefore only play a supporting role.

In these long-term unresolved conflicts, there is a growing need for physical and economic security, better livelihood opportunities and ways to overcome isolation. On their own, actions in these areas are obviously beneficial for those affected, but improvements in these areas can also help create and maintain an environment that is conducive to a political mediation process. The key here is to be able to deal with these aspects without necessarily requiring an agreement on the status at political level. Unfortunately, status has often been an obstacle for such pragmatic and result-oriented interventions.

As the conflicts across the EaP region are different, they cannot be addressed by a “one size fits all” approach. It is necessary to identify and assess the preconditions in each and have tailor-made approaches that are flexible, targeted, sensitive to the context, and building on opportunities and advances already created by other EU efforts. This will require an array of
implementation tools and mechanisms. Bearing in mind that good intentions are not enough, the key principle should be to do no harm and to adopt a conflict-sensitive approach.

Conflicts affect men and women differently at various levels. In this context, the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and its follow-up resolutions8 (the WPS agenda) are important to ensure that the rights, agency and protection of women and girls, as well as boys and men, are observed and upheld before, during and after conflict and that a meaningful role in decision-making is secured for women at all stages. The action should strive to promote women empowerment in conflict-related issues and address the needs and rights of women among conflict-affected people, in line with the WPS agenda. Youth also playing a major role in reconciliation processes and peacebuilding efforts, should be supported (see UNSCR 2250).

2 RISKS AND ASSUMPTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risks</th>
<th>Risk level (H/M/L)</th>
<th>Mitigating measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Change of conflict dynamics</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>The project aims at working in highly politicised and evolving contexts. The different project components will monitor the situation and adjust to the changing dynamics. Close coordination with all relevant EU actors will be assured.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholders introduce strong political preconditions</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>EU actors involved in addressing the unresolved conflicts (COM, EEAS, EU Delegations, EUSR, EU missions, etc.) will be associated in discussions on the project activities with a view to help manage conflict sensitivities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited interest, trust, and/or stakeholder buy-in</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>The project components will monitor the situation and try to adapt to the changing dynamics. All relevant EU actors (COM, EEAS, EUSR, EU Delegations, EU missions) stand ready to intervene and support the projects. Should circumstances not allow, the activities will be adjusted and refocused to work in the fields where this is still possible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inadequate coordination and lack of institutional capacity at national level</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Issues to be addressed at ad hoc and Steering Committee meetings; country-specific technical assistance should be considered to improve the capacity.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assumptions

The political and security situation allows for the implementation of project activities and does not deteriorate to a level that no longer allows engagement. National government partners remain committed and support project implementation. Trust is built among stakeholders.

Partner countries will demonstrate national ownership, which is a requisite for sustainability of the project deliverables.

3 LESSONS LEARNT AND COMPLEMENTARITY

3.1 Lessons learnt

Despite many challenges, there have been some positive engagement initiatives with the populations in each conflict area.

Projects such as the IcSP funded COBERM or EPNK, but also the ENI funded ENPARD, CBM and others, that generate benefits for both the conflict-affected populations, as well as for the EaP governments have increased the belief in the EU as a genuine broker and as having a genuine interest in improving the conditions for people living on all sides of the conflict divides.

Establishing relationships on each side as well as across the conflict divides is vital but also difficult. Experienced organisations exist in all the conflict areas, which ensure implementation of conflict-sensitive projects.

Activities facilitating people-to-people contacts allow for both bottom-up and top-down approaches. Issues under consideration in conflict management or settlement processes can be piloted in a relatively small context. Activities across the divide can also create trust in a smaller environment, later to be replicated and scaled up to ensure wider impact.

Most people and actors involved continue to associate the EU with attractive values and practices and are therefore interested in EU engagement. However, most stakeholders want such engagement to serve specific goals, particularly to further their positions on political status, and they therefore restrict EU engagement, e.g. on access, complicating EU interventions. To overcome this, those implementing must be able to react rapidly and flexibly to seize opportunities and adjust to sensitive and changing environments.

Many project activities implemented so far in the conflict-affected areas have mainly focused on assessments, training, seminars, studies, etc. Based on the positive experience under COBERM in Abkhazia these activities should now in parallel be complemented by project activities that can further improve conditions for the conflict-affected populations.

Within the constraints posed by the conflict contexts, and taking into consideration also the sensitivities involved, the EU should work on improving its visibility in the conflict-affected areas where possible and considered feasible and ensure communication on project activities
are intensified. For instance, in Abkhazia there are louder calls for more EU visibility. Making use of local implementers, to the extent possible, will most often require additional guidance from the side of the EU, but would have a greater impact.

3.2 Complementarity, synergy and donor co-ordination

Synergies shall be sought by the different projects under this action with other ongoing and upcoming EU regional initiatives when relevant and bilateral programmes in e.g. Moldova and Georgia. The proposed action on the “EU4Engagment” will ensure complementarity with bilateral programmes and provide cross-country added value. With its multi-country approach tailored to regional and individual needs and priorities. Particular attention will be paid to finding synergies with the ongoing FPI-funded EPNK and COBERM projects and which the programme in part aims to gradually replace.

Ensuring co-ordination with other donors, especially projects carried out by EU Member States, and actors on the ground is vital for the success of the programme.

4 DESCRIPTION OF THE ACTION

4.1 Overall objective, specific objective(s), expected outputs and indicative activities

The overall objective of this action is to contribute to the transformation of the unresolved conflicts in the EaP region.

The action will build on a regional, individual and multi-country approach, promoting EU best practices and ensuring compliance with human rights and the new EU Strategy on Women, Peace and Security.

Specific objective (SO) 1: Establish an environment conducive to diffusing tension and fostering better understanding amongst the conflict parties.

Expected outputs (indicative), where applicable:

- the programme’s confidence and peacebuilding efforts are inclusive and have involved civil society, including women’s organisations, opinion shapers, and where possible decision-makers;
- strengthened constructive exchange on conflict narratives;
- people-to-people contacts across dividing lines have been reinforced in the framework of the programme activities;
- in the framework of the programme synergies between different dialogue and diplomatic tracks have been strengthened;
- the target groups in the conflict-affected communities are aware of the EU’s readiness to provide support.

SO 2: To improve the socio economic development and human security of conflict-affected communities, for both women and men in all activities.

Expected outputs (indicative), where applicable:
• conflict transformation opportunities are identified, developed and where possible fulfilled by the programme, including from a gender perspective, in substantive sectors such as for example: energy, SMEs, trade (incl. local) /DCFTA coverage, agriculture, environmental and ecological threats, water management, education, healthcare, tourism, cultural heritage, justice and penitentiary;
• improved availability of healthcare services, lowered incidence of infectious diseases and better management capacities of non-communicable disease (e.g. diabetes, mental health issues, drug abuse);
• increased promotion of human rights, particularly women’s rights and the tenets of international human rights law including on missing persons;
• improved co-ordination and expertise on environmental protection and sustainability, energy security, preparedness measures and safeguarded human security, as well as ecological monitoring and protection;
• improved informal interaction between the conflict sides, including representation of women peace and reconciliation actors;
• when deemed useful, conflict transformation activities have been supported through related works and supplies.

SO 3: Improved exchange (regional, intra-regional and/or with the EU) through education and culture for both women and men in the conflict regions.

Expected outputs (indicative), where applicable:
• improved access to education and training possibilities for all conflict-affected;
• increased specialised conservation, restoration capacities for cultural heritage sites in status-neutral ways;
• improved dialogue across conflict divides through increased people-to-people contacts especially between youth, women’s organisations and education professionals;
• increased use of cultural heritage sites for confidence-building measures.

Main activities

The indicative activities identified below will be implemented in a country, multi-country and/or regional tailored manner. The activities will include but not be limited to the ones listed here below:

SO 1: Establish an environment conducive to diffusing tension and fostering better understanding amongst the conflict parties.

• local and/or external research in order to gain better understanding of the situation and support critical debate over peace alternatives in the conflicts-divided societies, including from a gender perspective;
• events that offer conflict-affected population - from youth, women’s rights advocates, business, civil society, decision influencers, local administrators, professionals etc.- practical examples of conflict resolution, engagement and training on conflict transformation techniques, support for the development of alternative narratives;
facilitate for civil society actors focusing on conflict prevention, mediation, peace building and reconciliation to exchange with, and mutually learn from their EU peers;
• support to the affected communities, wider society and possibly Track 1 actors in developing conflict transformation opportunities to help to deal with the past, e.g. on issues connected with missing persons, cultural heritage or gender specific aspects of conflict transformation;
• developing conflict sensitive and responsible journalism; developing a constructive and professionally diverse conversation through media programming, including broadcast and social media;
• cultural exchanges, trainings and performances to foster engagement between conflict affected communities;
• awareness and understanding of EU policy support; outreach that reinforces understanding of the benefits of peace and dialogue.

SO 2: To improve the socio economic development and human security of conflict-affected communities, for both women and men in all activities.
• sub-granting scheme for small scale local initiatives in support of confidence- and peacebuilding measures across the lines of conflict, reaching out to both women and men;
• support to demining actions to prepare the ground and allow progress for peacebuilding measures;
• support to the identification and implementation of infrastructure interventions strengthening interdependence across communities for example in the areas of energy, health, water, transport, education, tourism;
• support to strengthening business and trade opportunities, including sustainable agriculture;
• transfer expertise to professionals in conflict regions for example in the areas of human rights, environment, sustainable management of natural resources, waste management, health, education, media, cultural heritage, etc.

SO 3: Improved exchange (regional, intra-regional and/or with the EU) through education and culture for both women and men in the conflict regions

• allow teachers and professors from schools and universities in the conflict areas to learn from their EU peers;
• explore options for students from conflict areas to undertake study visits in the EU;
• transfer expertise to professionals in the conflict regions in the areas of education and culture;
• provide support to cross-conflict cultural heritage cooperation projects
• logistically facilitate beneficiaries’ participation in the above projects and programmes.
Youth plays a major role in reconciliation processes and peace building (see UNSCR 2250). Many young people in the conflict-affected territories are growing up without meeting anyone from the other side of the conflict line and are influenced by the narrative promoted by their elders and authorities that often blame the opposite side for the current situation. Young people can be reached through school and through their teachers but can also form their own impressions if given the possibility. This specific objective therefore aims at providing teachers and students with the possibility of (regional, intra-regional and/or with the EU) exchange through internship and exchange programmes as well as scholarship opportunities. Additionally, all parts of society can be reached through common culture, and especially the cultural heritage shared across the conflict divides. The aim of the activities carried out under this objective is to support the different sides in their capacities to use those opportunities for confidence-building.

Should, for reasons beyond the implementers control and related to the conflict development, certain activities not be implementable, the situation will be analysed together with DG NEAR, FPI, EEAS, EUSR, the concerned EU Delegation and suitable alternatives will be explored.

4.2 Intervention Logic

This action builds on the achievements under the FPI-funded projects, in particular, COBERM and EPNK and aims to gradually take over elements of these projects once they are phasing out.

Diplomatic efforts manage the conflicts but conflict resolution remains elusive. Further efforts are needed to move from the current statu quo towards conflict transformation, and it is crucial that CSOs, NGOs, including women’s organisations, opinion shapers and, where possible, decision-makers across the conflict divides are engaged. Such engagement, in areas of common interest, can help create trust, change perceptions, improve conditions and help conflict transformation and diplomatic efforts towards conflict transformation.

The project aims at engaging different conflict actors at different levels.

One aspect is to support the political efforts with studies, conferences, and enabling some follow-up actions flowing from decisions taken in the different political fora, through a service contract. A supply and works envelope will also allow for concrete actions requiring equipment or works.

Additionally, the action aims at engaging people across the conflict divides in conflict transformation activities, for instance, facilitating formulating joint definitions of key words such as “compromise” or introducing them to other conflict transformation models to enable new and different perspectives that can help fostering an environment more conducive for conflict transformation. Moreover, increased outreach to the conflict-affected communities and raised awareness on the EU’s readiness to provide support will be emphasised.

In parallel, youth, women, activists, experts, professionals, CSOs, NGOs and media shall be engaged with a series of activities that aim at improving livelihood opportunities and security of people in conflict-affected areas through support for example to education, health, business
opportunities, environment, - or any other area that might open up in the course of the conflict resolution talks - including through the implementation of a relevant sub-granting scheme and technical assistance.

Additionally connectivity and economic interdependence (transport, energy, water, DCFTA coverage) should be strengthened through small scale preparations, technical assistance and works.

Links between the different components will be established by the different implementers and their work should be mutually beneficial.

4.3 **Mainstreaming**

Resilience and conflict sensitivity are key areas of engagement in the framework of this action. All activities under this programme will be designed and implemented in accordance with the principles of good governance and human rights, gender equality, the inclusion of socially or economically deprived groups and environmental sustainability.

**Good governance and human rights:** Several civil society actors are involved in the field of conflict transformation across the different conflict areas. These actors will be closely associated to the programme and encouraged to work in a participative and transparent manner, and to take into account the special needs of the most vulnerable groups of people (women, children, disabled, elderly, destitute, and those vulnerable because of their work/geographical location, or being suspected of being ex-combatants, etc.). The programme will strive to strengthen community engagement and effective collaboration within communities, including inclusive approaches and participation of the most vulnerable.

To ensure compliance of the proposed action with the obligations stipulated in Article 10 ("Human rights") of Regulation (EU) No 230/2014, a clear human rights perspective should be incorporated throughout the different stages of the project cycle (project design/formulation; monitoring of implementation; evaluation) on the basis of the operational guidance developed to this end by the European Commission ([https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/operational-human-rights-guidance-eu-external-cooperation-actions-addressing-terrorism-organised_en](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/operational-human-rights-guidance-eu-external-cooperation-actions-addressing-terrorism-organised_en)). Any potential flow-on risk on the respect of human rights should be constantly monitored and mitigating measures need to be foreseen.

**Gender equality:** In this context, the new EU Strategy on Women, Peace and Security, which builds on the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and its follow-up resolutions are important to ensure that the rights and protection of women and girls and boys and men are observed during all phases of conflict will be a guiding document for the activities in this programme. Women have a key role to play in conflict transformation. Efforts will be made to promote strong women’s participation in the programme.

**Environmental sustainability and climate change:** While these fields are not directly targeted by the action, they are of great concern for all conflict parties involved and often provide non-politically charged fields for possible cooperation across the conflict lines. As such, the programme will work in these fields and contribute to further improvements.
4.4 Contribution to SDGs

This intervention is relevant for the 2030 Agenda. It contributes primarily to the progressive achievement of SDG 10 on reducing inequalities and SDG 16 on peace, justice and strong institutions while also contributing to SDG 5 on gender equality.

5 IMPLEMENTATION

5.1 Financing agreement

In order to implement this action, it is not foreseen to conclude a financing agreement.

5.2 Indicative implementation period

The indicative operational implementation period of this action, during which the activities described in section 4 will be carried out and the corresponding contracts and agreements implemented, is 72 months from the date of adoption by the Commission of this Financing Decision.

 Extensions of the implementation period may be agreed by the Commission’s responsible authorising officer by amending this Decision and the relevant contracts and agreements.

5.3 Implementation modalities

The Commission will ensure that the EU appropriate rules and procedures for providing financing to third parties are respected, including review procedures, where appropriate, and compliance of the action with EU restrictive measures\(^9\).

5.3.1 Procurement (direct management)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject in generic terms</th>
<th>Type (works, supplies, services)</th>
<th>Indicative number of contracts</th>
<th>Indicative trimester of launch of the procedure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Establish an environment conducive to diffusing tension and fostering better understanding amongst the conflict parties (SO1)</td>
<td>Services</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2(^{nd}) quarter 2020</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.3.2 Indirect management with an entrusted entity

This action may be implemented in indirect management with an entity, which will be selected by the Commission’s services using the following criteria: proven knowledge and expertise in the given areas of intervention, as well as a track record and the capacity to develop good working relations with government partners and demonstrated capacity to deliver work in a conflict sensitive manner across the region identified in this action.

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\(^9\) [www.sanctionsmap.eu](http://www.sanctionsmap.eu) Please note that the sanctions map is an IT tool for identifying the sanctions regimes. The source of the sanctions stems from legal acts published in the Official Journal (OJ). In case of discrepancy between the published legal acts and the updates on the website it is the OJ version that prevails.
addition, demonstrated operational and technical capacities required to implement the activities listed under SO2. The implementation by this entity entails implementing activities and reaching results as listed under the expected results related to SO2 as indicated under 4.1. For this purpose, the entity needs to be able to sub-grant and to ensure that envelopes dealing with works and supplies can be flexibly and efficiently handled. In an ideal case, the entity should be pillar assessed.

If negotiations with the above-mentioned entity fail, that part of this action may be implemented in direct management in accordance with the implementation modalities identified in section 5.3.3.

5.3.3 Grant: (direct management)

(a) Purpose of the grant
The grant will contribute to achieve the results outlined under specific objective 3, to improve exchange (regional, intra-regional and/or with the EU) through education and culture.

(b) Type of applicants targeted
The applicants targeted are national or sub-national bodies of Member States responsible for international academic cooperation and cultural relations (or relevant competent authorities or entities), i.e. bodies for activities with specific characteristics that require a particular type of body on account of its technical competence, its high degree of specialisation or its administrative powers. In case advisable, due to the political sensitivity of the topic, the consortium can include or partner with appropriate NGOs to facilitate access to the conflict-affected communities.

(c) Justification for a direct grant

5.4 Scope of geographical eligibility for procurement and grants
The geographical eligibility in terms of place of establishment for participating in procurement and grant award procedures and in terms of origin of supplies purchased as established in the basic act and set out in the relevant contractual documents shall apply, subject to the following provisions.

The Commission’s authorising officer responsible may extend the geographical eligibility on the basis of urgency or of unavailability of products and services in the markets of the countries concerned, or in other duly substantiated cases where the eligibility rules would make the realisation of this action impossible or exceedingly difficult.
5.5 Indicative budget

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Procurement – total envelope under section 5.3.1 related to SO1</th>
<th>EU contribution (amount in EUR)</th>
<th>Indicative third party contribution, in currency identified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15.000.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect management – total envelope under section 5.3.2 related to SO2</td>
<td>9,000,000</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grant – total envelope under section 5.3.3 related to SO3</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
<td>157,895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>15,000,000</td>
<td>157,895</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.6 Organisational set-up and responsibilities

The responsibility of the programme lies with the Commission. The steering of the project will be led by Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations.

The governance structure will be twofold. There will be an overall coordination meeting for all three programme components. This coordination meeting will be chaired by the Commission and will include representatives of the European External Action Service, the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia and of any other concerned Directorate-General of the Commission (e.g. the FPI). The coordination meeting shall meet at least twice per year and bring together all the different programme components to be updated on the annual activities and for the monitoring of the implementation. In the meantime, regular video conferences at working level shall be set up to ensure coordination at technical level.

Back to back to the coordination meeting, the Steering Committee meetings for each component will take place. Each Steering Committee meeting is responsible for monitoring the implementation of the respective “EU4Dialogue” component on the basis of activity reports presented by the implementing entity. These Steering Committee meetings directly feed into the overall coordination meeting.

The service provider, the representatives of the selected entity for component 2 as well as the representatives from the Member States consortium will provide the Secretariat of the Steering Committee for their respective components.

The European Commission will ensure, with the support of the implementing partners, the coordination and communication with the interested stakeholders, including relevant Commission Services and EU Delegations. Programme-specific contact points shall be nominated at headquarters and in EU Delegations to ensure coordinated internal and external communication.
Performance and Results monitoring and reporting

Performance measurement will be based on the intervention logic and the log frame matrix, including its indicators.

- Performance measurement will aim at informing the list of indicators that are part of the log frame matrix.
- In certain cases, mainly depending on when the monitoring exercise is launched, contribution to the outcomes will also be part of monitoring and for this to happen indicators defined during planning/programming at the outcome level will be the ones for which a value of measurement will need to be provided.
- In evaluation, the intervention logic will be the basis for the definition of the evaluation questions. Evaluations do mainly focus on the spheres of direct (outcomes) and indirect (impacts) influence. As such, indicators defined for these levels of the intervention logic will be used in evaluation. Depending on the specific purpose and scope of the evaluation exercise, additional indicators will be defined.

Monitoring is a management tool at the disposal of the action. It is expected to give regular and systemic information on where the Action is at any given time (and over time) relative to the different targets. Monitoring activities will aim to identify successes, problems and/or potential risks so that corrective measures are adopted in a timely fashion. Even though it is expected to focus mainly on the actions’ inputs, activities and outputs, it is also expected to look at how the outputs can effectively induce, and actually induce, the outcomes that are aimed at.

The day-to-day technical and financial monitoring of the implementation of this action will be a continuous process, and part of the implementing partner’s responsibilities. To this aim, the implementing partner shall establish a permanent internal, technical and financial monitoring system for the action and elaborate regular progress reports (not less than annual) and final reports. Every report shall provide an accurate account of implementation of the action, difficulties encountered, changes introduced, as well as the degree of achievement of its results (outputs and direct outcomes) as measured by corresponding indicators, using as reference the Logframe matrix (for project modality) or the partner’s strategy, policy or reform action plan list (for budget support).

SDGs indicators and, if applicable, any jointly agreed indicators as for instance per Joint Programming document should be taken into account.

The report shall be laid out in such a way as to allow monitoring of the means envisaged and employed and of the budget details for the action. The final report, narrative and financial, will cover the entire period of the action implementation.

Where resources are benefiting specific undertakings carrying out economic activities and those resources are granted through the budget of the State or the State contributes to the selection of the specific interventions to be supported, applicable State aid rules should be complied with.

The Commission may undertake additional project monitoring visits both through its own staff and through independent consultants recruited directly by the Commission for
independent monitoring reviews (or recruited by the responsible agent contracted by the Commission for implementing such reviews).

5.8 Evaluation
Having regard to the nature of the action, a mid-term and a final evaluation will be carried out for this action or its components via independent consultants contracted by the Commission.

The mid-term evaluation will be carried out for problem solving purposes, in particular with respect to possible needs to re-adjust the programme in line with the political developments in the region.

The final evaluation will be carried out for accountability and learning purposes at various levels (including for policy revision), taking into account in particular the fact that a possible second phase can be programmed on the basis of the lessons learned.

The Commission shall inform the implementing partner at least 30 days in advance of the dates foreseen for the evaluation missions. The implementing partner shall collaborate efficiently and effectively with the evaluation experts, and inter alia provide them with all necessary information and documentation, as well as access to the project premises and activities.

The evaluation reports shall be shared with the partner country and other key stakeholders. The implementing partner and the Commission shall analyse the conclusions and recommendations of the evaluations and, where appropriate, in agreement with the partner country, jointly decide on the follow-up actions to be taken and any adjustments necessary, including, if indicated, the reorientation of the project.

The financing of the evaluation shall be covered by another measure constituting a financing Decision.

5.9 Audit
Without prejudice to the obligations applicable to contracts concluded for the implementation of this action, the Commission may, on the basis of a risk assessment, contract independent audits or expenditure verification assignments for one or several contracts or agreements.

The financing of the audit shall be covered by another measure constituting a financing Decision.

5.10 Communication and visibility
Communication and visibility of the EU is a legal obligation for all external actions funded by the EU.

This action shall contain communication and visibility measures which shall be based on a specific Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action, to be elaborated at the start of implementation.

In terms of legal obligations on communication and visibility, the measures shall be implemented by the Commission, the partner country (for instance, concerning the reforms supported through budget support), contractors, grant beneficiaries and/or entrusted entities.
Appropriate contractual obligations shall be included in, respectively, the financing agreement, procurement and grant contracts, and delegation agreements.

The Communication and Visibility Requirements for European Union External Action (or any succeeding document) shall be used to establish the Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action and the appropriate contractual obligations.
## APPENDIX - INDICATIVE LOGFRAME MATRIX (FOR PROJECT MODALITY)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Results chain</th>
<th>Indicators (max. 15)</th>
<th>Baselines (2019)</th>
<th>Targets by the end of the contract (year)</th>
<th>Sources of data</th>
<th>Assumptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expected impact of the policy (Overall objective)</strong></td>
<td>To contribute to the transformation of the unresolved conflicts in the EaP region.</td>
<td>Extent to which the confidence between the conflict divided communities has been enhanced</td>
<td>Baselines from EPNK and COBERM</td>
<td>Increased level of interaction and cooperation</td>
<td>Reports and assessments by EU and UN agencies, international organisations and international/local NGOs; media reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expected outcomes of the policy (Specific objective(s))</strong></td>
<td><strong>SO 1:</strong> Establish an environment conducive to diffusing tension and fostering better understanding amongst the conflict parties.</td>
<td>Extent to which the EU is recognised as facilitating an effective mechanism for exchange and confidence building has increased Extent to which the conflict narratives positively evolved across the different conflicts</td>
<td>Baselines from EPNK and COBERM</td>
<td>Increased EU visibility as dialogue facilitator Conflict narratives have positively changed</td>
<td>Reports and assessments by EU and UN agencies, international organisations and international/local NGOs; media reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>SO 2:</strong> To improve the socio economic development and human security of conflict-affected communities.</td>
<td>Extent to which positive signals (such as in areas like education, culture, environment, health and others to be defined) of a conducive environment in the conflict-affected communities are visible</td>
<td>Baselines from EPNK and COBERM</td>
<td>Increased positive signals of a conducive environment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>SO 3:</strong> Improved exchange (regional, intra-regional and/or with the EU) through education and culture.</td>
<td>Extent to which the cultural and educational exchanges have been created/increased</td>
<td>Baselines from EPNK and COBERM</td>
<td>Increased CREATED cultural and educational exchanges</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outputs</td>
<td>SO 1</td>
<td>Extent to which civil society representatives, women’s organisations and opinion shapers have been included in the confidence and peace building efforts</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>Civil society representatives and opinion shapers have been effectively associated in participation in confidence and peace building efforts</td>
<td>Reports and assessments by EU and UN agencies, international organisations and international/local NGOs; media reports</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthened constructive exchange on conflict narratives;</td>
<td>Extent to which civil society, including women’s organisations, recommendations in the peace building efforts have been taken on board</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>To the extent possible civil society recommendations have been taken into account.</td>
<td>Reports and assessments by EU and UN agencies, international organisations and international/local NGOs; media reports; project progress and monitoring reports</td>
<td>In AZ, implementation of the law on foreign media may mean that the space for journalists is restricted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>people-to-people contacts across border and boundary lines have been reinforced in the framework of the programme activities;</td>
<td>Extent to which the people-to-people contacts, involving both women and men, across border and boundary lines have been reinforced</td>
<td>Baselines from EPNK and COBERM</td>
<td>Increased people-to-people contacts across the conflict divides.</td>
<td>Project progress and monitoring reports</td>
<td>Both sides of the conflicts are interested in increased contact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the framework of the programme synergies between different dialogue and diplomatic tracks have been strengthened;</td>
<td>Extent to which the formal and informal meetings for regular multi-track dialogue and communication between Track 1 and Track 2 actors, including both women and men, have increased</td>
<td>Meetings organised between Track 1 and Track 2 actors are not regular or lack completely</td>
<td>Meetings between Track 1 and Track 2 actors have increased</td>
<td>Project progress and monitoring reports, media, EU and IO reports.</td>
<td>Process not derailed by the political climate; attempts by authorities to interfere in the implementation due to political reasons are minimal; active engagement of stakeholders</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>The target groups in the conflict-affected communities are aware of the EU’s readiness to provide support.</td>
<td>Extent of the visibility of the EU’s support has increased within the target groups</td>
<td>Baselines from EPNK, COBERM and conflict specific reporting from EU Delegations</td>
<td>Increased EU visibility</td>
<td>Reports and assessments by EU and UN agencies, international organisations and international/local NGOs; media; project progress and monitoring reports</td>
<td>The conflict-affected communities are interested in the EU’s efforts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO 2</td>
<td>Extent to which conflict transformation opportunities have been identified, developed or fulfilled through increased engagement and connectivity.</td>
<td>Baselines from EPNK and COBERM</td>
<td>Increased conflict transformation opportunities implemented in at least 2 thematic areas</td>
<td>Project progress and monitoring reports</td>
<td>Process not derailed by the political climate; attempts by authorities to interfere in the implementation due to political reasons are kept to a minimum; active engagement of stakeholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved availability of healthcare services, lowered incidence of infectious diseases and better management capacities of non-communicable disease (e.g. diabetes, mental health issues, drug abuse);</td>
<td>Extent to which availability to healthcare services has increased.</td>
<td>Current medical care level and management capacities in the conflict territories is low.</td>
<td>Availability of healthcare services has increased and non-communicable diseases are better managed.</td>
<td>Project progress and monitoring reports</td>
<td>Sufficient engagement and interest of stakeholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved co-ordination and expertise on environmental protection and sustainability, energy security, preparedness measures and safeguarded human security, as well as ecological monitoring and protection;</td>
<td>Extent to which coordination and expertise in the mentioned fields has improved.</td>
<td>Coordination and expertise in the mentioned sectors is limited or non-existent.</td>
<td>Increased coordination and expertise in at least 2 thematic areas</td>
<td>Project progress and monitoring reports</td>
<td>Sufficient engagement and interest of stakeholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved informal interaction between the conflicting parties.</td>
<td>Extent to which the conflicting parties, including both women and men, interact informally.</td>
<td>Limited informal exchanges</td>
<td>Increased informal interaction between the conflicting parties</td>
<td>Project progress and monitoring reports</td>
<td>Sufficient engagement and interest of stakeholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO 3</td>
<td>Improved access to education and training possibilities;</td>
<td>Extent to which the access to education and training possibilities, for both women and men, has increased.</td>
<td>Education and training possibilities in the conflict-affected communities are limited</td>
<td>Increased access to education and trainings possibilities</td>
<td>Project progress and monitoring reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased specialised preservation, restoration capacities for cultural heritage sites;</td>
<td>Extent to which preservation and restoration capacities have increased.</td>
<td>Baselines from EPNK and COBERM/none</td>
<td>Increased capacities for preservation and restoration of cultural heritage sites.</td>
<td>Project progress and monitoring reports, media</td>
<td>Sufficient engagement and interest of stakeholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved dialogue between the divided communities through increased people-to-people contacts especially between youth and education professionals;</td>
<td>Extent to which contacts between students and teachers, including vulnerable groups, women and disabled, targeted by the programme across the divided communities have increased.</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>Contacts between students and teachers across the divided communities have increased</td>
<td>Project progress and monitoring reports</td>
<td>Process not derailed by the political climate; attempts by authorities to interfere in the actual implementation due to political reasons are kept to a minimum; active and broad engagement of stakeholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
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<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased use of cultural heritage sites for confidence building measures.</td>
<td>Extent to which the use of cultural heritage sites for confidence building measures has increased</td>
<td>Baselines from EPNK and COBERM</td>
<td>Increased joint use of cultural heritage sites by both conflicting parties</td>
<td>Project progress and monitoring reports, media</td>
<td>Sufficient engagement and interest of stakeholders</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>