

# *The Second Generation in Europe*

Maurice Crul

*University of Amsterdam*

*University of Groningen*

Hans Vermeulen

*University of Amsterdam*

The study of integration processes has now reached a crucial stage in most Western European countries with the emergence of the second generation. The oldest children born to postwar immigrants on European soil have recently entered the job market, and we can now investigate their performance in both education and employment. This opens a unique opportunity to compare the situations of second generation migrants across countries. Ostensibly the children all have the same starting position, being born in the country of settlement. The intriguing question is how differences between immigrant groups, and also differences in national contexts, work to the benefit or detriment of the second generation. We discuss the first issue briefly, confining ourselves here to Turkish and Moroccan immigrants. In addressing the issue of national contexts, we focus primarily on policies and practices rather than on broad-reaching national integration models. We examine in detail the integration process itself in the context of vital institutional arrangements such as the education system and the mechanisms for transition to the labor market. How do such arrangements differ between countries, and how do they affect the outcomes for the second generation?

Research on the second generation of postwar immigrants is a relatively new phenomenon. Only in the past decade has it become a central focus in the study of immigrant integration. In the United States in particular, a theoretical debate has evolved in which research on the second generation plays a fundamental role. That research began to emerge in the mid-1990s, and one of the first publications was *The New Second Generation* (Portes, 1996). As the title may imply, the debate on the second generation in the United States was interrelated from the start with another discussion on whether the integration process of today differs from that which accompanied "old immigration." The latter debate also figured prominently in the 1997 special issue of *International Migration Review* (31) on the second generation in America. Essentially there are two positions in this debate: a belief that the differences outweigh the similarities (*see* Gans, 1992; Portes and Rumbaut, 1996a, 2001;

Min, 1999), and the opposite stance (*see* Foner, 2000; Perlmann and Waldinger, 1997; Waldinger and Perlmann, 1998). Representatives of the former position stress two main points. First, structural integration has now become more difficult than in the past. This increases the risk that the children of immigrants, especially those entering the social hierarchy near the bottom, will fail to climb up the social ladder in the way that the second generation did in the past. One of the first scholars to predict a “second-generation decline” was Gans (1992). Secondly, as a consequence of globalization, children of immigrants are now less likely to assimilate. Rather than adopting the majority identity, they may develop bicultural or hybrid identities. The opposing group of scholars, many of them historians or social scientists with historical interests, argue that our image of past integration is both too homogeneous and too rosy. Such observers tend to be less pessimistic, refusing to rule out ultimate assimilation as a possible outcome of the new immigration. One notable development is the re-evaluation of the concept of assimilation (*e.g.*, Glazer, 1993; *see also* Brubaker, 2001).

The postwar second generation in Europe came of age at roughly the same time as the American one – and that was when researchers began exploring it more systematically. Examples of early studies in various European countries are Seifert (1992), Crul (1994), Tribalat (1995), Veenman (1996) and Lesthaeghe (1997). International comparative research on the second generation is still scant. In fact, only one such venture has been undertaken – the EFFNATIS project, conducted from 1998 to 2000 by researchers in eight European countries. It focused on the relationships between national policies on integration and the outcomes for the second generation. Field surveys were carried out in Germany, France and England using a common questionnaire, while country reports were drawn up for Sweden, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Finland and Spain based on secondary analysis of existing data. That data often proved hard to come by. Because EFFNATIS focused on different ethnic groups in different countries, no comparisons could be made of how the same ethnic group had fared in different settings. Cross-national comparisons were therefore awkward to make.

In this special issue we discuss several topics that figure prominently in both the American and European debates (for the relevance of the American debate for research in Europe, *see* Lucassen, 2002; Vermeulen, 2001). The first issue is the danger of underclass formation, particularly in the case of groups entering the social hierarchy at the bottom; this theme of underclass formation or downward assimilation is common to both debates. Second, we

look at the divergent ways in which ethnic groups integrate into a receiving society. Although this topic has received more attention in the American research, it is highly relevant for research in Europe. Prominent in explaining differences between ethnic groups in North America has been the segmented assimilation model, and we will devote some attention to it. A third issue – and the primary focus of the present article – is the comparison of integration processes in different countries. This is an aspect that has received far more attention in European than in American research. More specifically, we compare the integration of second-generation Turkish immigrants in six European countries and draw comparisons, where possible, to the integration processes of other ethnic groups.

### *INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE RESEARCH ON INTEGRATION*

The past decade witnessed a growing number of publications on immigration and integration in different European countries (some of the comparative literature is older, *e.g.*, Entzinger, 1984; Hammar, 1985). Most such studies are policy oriented, and they have paid little systematic attention to actual integration processes. Although many confine themselves to Europe (Vermeulen, 1997; Mahnig, 1998), some also include one or more non-European countries (*e.g.*, Castles and Miller, 1993; Faist, 1995; Joppke, 1999; Mollenkopf, 1999). Many such writings have argued that national immigration and integration policies are pervaded by notions of nationality and perceptions of the nation. Many authors also seem to assume that government integration policies constitute one of the major determinants of the integration process itself. A well-known example of the viewpoint that sharply differing ideas of nationhood have a strong influence on citizenship policies is Brubaker's *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (1992).

This type of research has been criticized on a number of grounds. Several authors have warned that the influence of targeted government policies on integration outcomes should not be exaggerated (*e.g.*, Vermeulen and Penninx, 2000:228-229; Muus, 2002). Banton (2001) has recently argued that the actual integration processes in different European countries may be far more similar than much of the research on national models has suggested. Banton's critique indeed lays bare one of the major shortcomings of international comparative research so far: it has focused very little attention on the integration process itself, or it does so by merely citing a selection of existing studies.

A number of studies have looked more systematically into the position of immigrants in education and the labor market. Fase (1994) compared the educational status of migrants in four European countries, and a volume entitled *Different Cultures Same Schools*, edited by Eldering and Kloprogge (1989), gave an overview of five European countries. Four studies have compared the labor market positions of migrants in various European countries: two International Labor Organization studies by Werner (1994) and Doomernik (1998), a study by Mahnig (1998) and a recent publication by Muus (2002). The supposedly strong effect of national integration models on the situation of immigrants has received little empirical support from these studies. Both the Fase and the Eldering and Kloprogge studies traced the evolution of education policies in different countries. These have shown convergent tendencies in the past two decades (Vermeulen, 1997; Doomernik, 1998; EFFNATIS, 2001). Fase (1994:164) concluded that the policy differences prevalent in the early 1990s had little effect on the educational outcomes for migrants. More recently, Muus (2002) has analyzed the four labor market studies cited above and concluded that no link can be made between immigrant policy and labor market participation. One explanation he offers is that immigrant policies are often purposive in principle, but diffuse, or soft, when it comes to practice (*cf.* Doomernik, 1998:71). Muus further suggests that generic economic and social policies might well have an impact.

### *THE SECOND GENERATION IN EUROPE: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON*

This volume offers a cross-national comparison of the Turkish second generation in terms of educational and labor market status. We have chosen the Turks because they are the largest immigrant group in Europe, numbering up to four million, and because they reside in a large number of European countries. The focus is on six countries with sizable Turkish communities – Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, France and Austria. We have asked the authors to compare the Turkish second generation to the first generation, to the native population and, if possible, to other immigrant ethnic groups. The groups they have chosen for comparison include the Moroccans, Italians, former Yugoslavs and Portuguese.

To compare “Turks” in different countries does not necessarily mean one is comparing the “same” group. An adequate comparison must also take account of the internal differences within the Turkish emigrant populations, based on characteristics like ethnicity, first-generation education levels and

religion. All authors therefore introduce their local Turkish community in terms of migration history, composition and size. The socioeconomic backgrounds of Turkish labor migrants turn out to be fairly similar in all receiving countries, with some variations (for example, in Germany; *see* the contribution by Worbs). Similarities across countries are partly explained by the fact that many migrants in different countries originate from the same regions in Turkey, or even the same villages. Labor migrants form the vast majority of the Turkish migrants in Europe. However, there are also significant groups of refugees who fled political persecution in Turkey or the armed conflict between Kurds and Turks. Most of them arrived in Europe later than the labor migrants, and their children are still young. One reason why we confine our study to second-generation young people older than age 15 is that they are almost exclusively children of labor migrants, thereby facilitating the comparison across countries.

The second, more important reason is that our focus is on educational attainment and labor market transition, and thus involves the second-generation immigrants who have already ended their school careers and are now entering the job market. Second-generation young people still in school are therefore not included in the comparison, since their eventual status is not yet clear. One should bear in mind that most second-generation migrants over age 15 attended primary school in the 1980s and secondary school in the 1990s. In order to reconstruct their primary and secondary school environments, the authors also briefly sketch the then-prevailing educational situation in the countries in question. Since the initial wave of second-generation Turks has entered the labor market only recently, not all countries can supply detailed information on their labor market status. This is why our emphasis lies on the transition from school to labor market and not on their employment status as such.

Our comparison is devoted mainly to what is often called the structural dimension of integration, as reflected more specifically in education and the transition from school to work. Authors were also free to address any issues of sociocultural integration they considered relevant, but this introduction refers to such issues only in relation to the structural dimension.

One should be aware that we have chosen the Turkish immigrant group partly because of the sharp contrasts between it and the native populations of the Western European countries. Its socioeconomic background is extremely low (unlike the Turkish-American population, who are generally better educated; Karpat, 1995), and it is a group with a traditional Muslim background.

Turkish immigrants are widely considered to be one of the toughest groups to integrate, and they thereby put to the test the wide panoply of European national policies aimed at the integration of newcomers. We hope that analysis of the difficulties they encounter will accentuate the differences between countries.

### *THE TURKISH SECOND GENERATION IN EUROPE*

As the following articles show, Turkish labor migration exhibited comparable patterns everywhere. Beginning with Germany in 1961 and ending with Sweden in 1967, European countries signed official agreements on labor migration with Turkey. Spontaneous migration through relatives and co-villagers then also ensued, later even surpassing the scale of official immigration. The peak of labor migration was between 1971 and 1973, years in which more than half a million Turkish workers came to work in Western Europe, 90 percent of them recruited by German industry (Özüekren and Kempen, 1997:5). From 1973, the economic recession following the oil crisis slowed the demand for labor and prompted an official immigration stop in 1974. Unemployment forced many immigrants to return to their home countries, but many men who had remained began sending for their wives and children. Migration took a new upturn in the 1980s and 1990s, when the in-between generation reached marriage age and began choosing spouses from Turkey. The Turkish population in Europe now totals almost 4 million, including naturalized and second-generation Turks. More than 60 percent of them live in Germany.

Most Turkish migrants came from small villages in central Turkey or along the Black Sea coast; those from large cities (Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara) are in the minority. Some districts in central Turkey delivered inordinate numbers of migrants over the years, often dispersed among various European countries. People from the Afyon district, for instance, now reside in Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands and France. Some villages have more offspring living in Europe than in the village itself.

European industry was in need of low-skilled labor at the time, and indeed the majority of these first-generation Turkish "guestworkers" were recruited from the lowest socioeconomic strata in their home countries and had very little education. In the rural areas where most of them grew up, educational opportunities were limited to the primary school level. Generally speaking, first-generation men had finished primary school only, and most women had just a few years of schooling. Because small-scale subsistence

farming was the primary activity in this peasant way of life, school played no particular role. Sending children to school brought no advantage in the struggle for existence; having them help on the farm had a high priority. Another reason that education seemed to hold little promise was the nature of the schooling. Education in Turkey was not primarily geared to conveying knowledge that would aid people in their peasant existence, or in breaking away from it. Its main aim was to transmit the Turkish national ideology and promote the cultural integration of the country (*see* Coenen, 2001:56-73). The first generation made few advances in the European labor market – in fact, the contrary occurred. Economic crises and industrial restructuring put many Turkish immigrants out of work. Despite this, a substantial group of first-generation men did manage to start their own businesses or to help their children to do so.

Most second-generation children – those born in the country of immigration or (more broadly) those who arrived before primary school – grew up in unfavorable circumstances. Family income was often very low by European standards, and most families lived in substandard and cramped accommodations. In many neighborhood schools, children from a mix of migrant backgrounds were in the majority.

### *The Turkish Second Generation Compared to the Moroccan Second Generation*

As the articles in this volume plainly reveal, little systematic comparison has yet been made of the integration processes of many immigrant ethnic groups in European societies. Many existing databases make it utterly impossible to identify the distinctions needed for such a comparison, and some people question the political correctness of such comparisons. As a consequence, most of the comparisons of Turks with Italians, ex-Yugoslavs, Portuguese and Moroccans in the articles to follow are not very detailed.

In this introduction, we focus solely on the comparison between the Turkish and Moroccan first and second generations, linking it to the theory of segmented assimilation introduced by Portes and his associates. Segmented assimilation is a concept that applies specifically to the second generation. It implies that assimilation is neither a linear nor a homogeneous process. Since the receiving society is not homogeneous either, much depends on the segment of society into which the immigrants end up assimilating. Portes and colleagues distinguish three variants (*see, e.g.,* Portes and Rumbaut, 2001:44-69). The classical variant applies today mostly to immigrants who arrive with

greater than average human capital and who are (partly because of that) positively received by the government and the general population. Their children tend to be successful and to readily move on to middle-class strata. As in "classical" immigration, ethnicity becomes a matter of personal choice. A second variant occurs when immigrants arrive with little human capital and find a more hostile context of reception awaiting them. Many such immigrants are also forced to live in cheap housing in inner-city areas, where they come into contact with native minorities, such as lower-class blacks in the American case. The immigrants' children may join up with these native minorities and embark on a process of downward assimilation. In this variant, ethnicity becomes reactive and a mark of subordination. The third variant of segmented assimilation may be experienced by immigrants who have little human capital, but who do have entrepreneurial skills. The solidarity of co-ethnic communities then often provides them with the social capital that compensates for their lack of human capital. Ethnicity is here a source of strength. The authors call this linear ethnicity.

Turks and Moroccans both settled in Europe in the 1960s and early 1970s as a predominantly male population of low-skilled workers. Both were overwhelmingly Muslim or from Muslim backgrounds. For a long time, they seemed so similar that they were often put in the same "bag." The integration of both groups was, and still is, often thought to be highly problematic. Since the data for comparison are the most suitable for the Netherlands, we will start there. In the early 1990s, a Dutch research institute published an annual report raising the question of underclass formation. The repeated answer given by subsequent researchers was that underclass formation was most likely to affect Turks and Moroccans, but that it was still too early to know whether that would indeed happen (*see, e.g.*, Roelandt and Veenman, 1993). Both groups seemed to satisfy Portes' conditions for downward assimilation. An American researcher writing on the Netherlands concluded likewise (Gibson, 1997).

Yet systematic research, as well as journalistic efforts, have since increasingly uncovered important differences between the integration processes of the Turkish and Moroccan first and second generations. Moroccan youths from deprived neighborhoods, and by extension the entire Moroccan community, came to be more and more associated with crime. Researchers variously attributed this to parental neglect of sons, to interpersonal distrust within the Moroccan community, and to individualism. For Turks, ethnic entrepreneurship became a significant means of earning a living, but that was



much less the case for Moroccans. The entrepreneurship drew on the tight family relations and the cohesion within the Turkish community. In other words, the Turks had a good deal more social capital than the Moroccans. Research by political scientists seemed to confirm this. They found that Turks had denser networks of voluntary associations than any of the other large immigrant groups. Applying Putnam's theory of social capital, they also pointed to the higher numbers of Turkish candidates in Dutch political parties and to higher voter participation (Fennema and Tillie, 1999). The Turks as a group no longer seemed to fit into a collective downward assimilation pattern. They exhibited many features of Portes' third variant – upward mobility through ethnic cohesion. The Moroccans did still seem headed for underclass status. Relations between Moroccan parents and children showed more signs of “dissonant acculturation” than in the Turkish case.<sup>1</sup> The fact that streetwise young Moroccans began associating with Surinamese youths, who had earlier won their spurs in marginalized street life, further reinforced the parallels with Portes' downward assimilation variant.

Recent research, however, particularly on the second generation of Moroccans, has seriously called this characterization of Moroccans into question (*see* Crul and Doomernik, this issue). With regard to our central concern of social mobility, two phenomena strike the eye. First, while Turkish second-generation young people typically pursue shorter and more vocationally oriented educational tracks, Moroccans are better represented in academic tracks and higher education. Second, a remarkable gender distinction has emerged between the two groups. Turkish girls, though performing relatively well in school, are more likely than Moroccan girls to drop out to marry or work. This seems the “price” for a strong ethnic cohesion, which apparently also tends to enforce traditional gender roles. Recent research has also implicated this ethnic cohesion in other adverse effects on Turkish educational performance. Since Dutch is less often spoken in Turkish than in Moroccan families, Turkish pupils in primary school tend to lag behind in their proficiency in Dutch. They are also more likely to interrupt their Dutch school careers to attend several years of school in Turkey, a move intended to preserve ties with the “motherland.” The better educational performance of the Moroccan second generation is all the more remarkable if we realize that the educational

<sup>1</sup>Dissonant acculturation is seen as a typical characteristic for downward assimilation. It denotes a condition in which parents with little human capital are unable to keep up with their children's process of acculturation. They may lose control over them, and a process of role reversal between parents and children may occur.

level of the parents' generation was even lower than that of the Turkish parents. Many Moroccan mothers were totally illiterate.

On closer inspection, the Moroccan case does not seem to conform to the downward assimilation variant after all, nor does it qualify for the variant of upward mobility through ethnic cohesion. What then remains is Portes and Rumbaut's classical variant. This variant shares its individualistic nature with the downward assimilation variant, but Portes and Rumbaut imply that it is only available to immigrant groups arriving with relatively high levels of education. This brings us to the conclusion that the segmented assimilation model is not supported by our empirical findings.

We are well aware that the European context differs from the American situation in many ways. The existence of large-scale ghettos and greater barriers to education in the United States may make the downward assimilation path more probable there. However, the pattern of "assimilation" in the Turkish second generation is difficult to explain in terms of such contextual differences between Europe and the United States. We also believe that the obstacles posed to girls and young women by the tight social cohesion in certain immigrant groups may have received too little attention in the American literature.

When we compare the characterizations of Turks and Moroccans to other case descriptions in this volume, we should bear in mind that the composition of the "same" groups in different countries may potentially differ. However, although the present body of knowledge does not permit detailed comparisons, it is noticeable how similar the descriptions of the various Turkish communities actually are, as the readers can judge for themselves from the different contributions. The specific features of the Turkish community come forward most vividly when the Turkish immigrants and their offspring are juxtaposed with other groups, such as Italians, Moroccans or former Yugoslavs.

In three of the countries represented in this volume, the Netherlands, Belgium and France, the Moroccans form the comparison group. The descriptions of the Moroccan communities in the latter two countries again contain striking resemblances to the Dutch Moroccans. We likewise see cross-national similarities between the second generations of the two immigrant groups. As in the Netherlands, the French and Belgian Turkish second generations appear to follow shorter, vocational tracks, while Moroccans are better represented in higher education. Gender differences in education are also more pronounced for Turks. The gap between the Turkish and Moroccan sec-

ond generations is greatest in France. This seems largely attributable to the specificity of the French-Moroccan case. As a consequence of the former colonial relationship between France and Morocco, the first-generation Moroccans in France have a much higher general level of schooling than those in the other two countries, while they are also thought to be familiar with the French language.

In comparing ethnic groups so far, we have devoted little attention to the internal differentiation within groups. This is also a lacuna in many analyses by Portes and his associates. Although a dominant pattern is often evident in an ethnic group, different segments of the same group may follow different paths. The three Portes variants may even be identifiable, to some degree or another, within one and the same immigrant group. These may be traceable, in turn, to internal distinctions based on class, ethnic or subethnic origins, religion, region of origin, or immigrant status. As many authors in this volume emphasize, internal differentiation within ethnic groups needs more systematic attention.

### *THE TURKISH SECOND GENERATION COMPARED IN SIX COUNTRIES*

The articles collected here provide information on the educational status of the Turkish second generation in Europe and on its transition to the job market. The data were gathered within roughly the same time period and for approximately the same age group. Ideally, educational status and labor market status would each be described by several indicators identical in each country. Unfortunately, not all the pertinent categories of data are known for all countries. Relevant indicators for educational status are school attendance rates, educational performance of school pupils and students, highest educational attainments of graduates and dropouts, dropout percentages and repeater rates. Indicators for labor market status are the rate and duration of unemployment, current job level and income. Our comparison in this introduction draws on the available information from the articles below. Due to the incomplete evidence, we will make comparisons only with great caution, and as a rule we will only describe situations for which differences are clear and substantial.

#### *Integration Policies*

A common feature of educational policy in European immigration countries in the 1980s was their lagging adaptation to the changing realities of educa-

tion for immigrant pupils. Piecemeal engineering was the rule, and coherent sets of policy responses materialized only slowly (Fase, 1994). Initially, the persisting belief that immigrants would go home someday was the main underlying reason for the lack of policies. Policy differences between countries were greatest in the early 1980s, but the policies increasingly converged (Vermeulen, 1997; Doornik, 1998; EFFNATIS, 2001). In day-to-day practice, the sharply contrasting national integration policies (which have often been depicted as codifications of national traditions and culture) were confronted everywhere with the same basic needs of migrant children. In essence, this meant that all countries ultimately launched first- and second-language programs, compensatory programs and preparatory programs for both primary and secondary school.

The differences between countries, according to Fase's observations, lay more in the specific methods the authorities applied to deal with these issues and in the relative priority assigned to various facets. In some countries, for example, compensatory programs were integrated into school curricula, while other countries opted for separate programs and classes for migrant children. There were also wide variations in the dates of inception. Fase concludes nonetheless that such differences had few consequences for the educational status of immigrant children in the various countries (Fase, 1994:164).

Policy convergence in labor market issues has been less pronounced than in education. In some countries like the Netherlands and Sweden, targeted policies have been developed to help migrant youth integrate into the labor market. In other countries, on the contrary, access to government jobs is restricted to national citizens. In all countries, immigrant youth unemployment is a policy concern and labor market discrimination is officially acknowledged, though policies to combat that discrimination vary widely.

### *Differences in Outcomes*

The school careers of second-generation children exhibit startling differences across Europe. The greatest distinctions can be seen in the percentages of young people entering lower vocational tracks – the lowest secondary school type in all countries. In France, Belgium and the Netherlands, between one third and one half of the second-generation Turks begin their secondary school careers in lower vocational school, whereas in Germany and Austria the figure is between two thirds and three quarters. At the top end of the ladder, we see that far more second-generation Turks in France and Belgium enter preparatory tracks for higher education than in other countries. Nation-

al contexts vary widely in the types of opportunities they offer to second-generation Turks. Although one might now be tempted to conclude that France and Belgium, and to a lesser extent the Netherlands, provide the best institutional contexts for migrants, that is not the whole story. A comprehensive assessment also requires knowledge of how children perform in vocational or in academic tracks. In France, for instance, we see that as well as having higher rates of entry into preparatory tracks for higher education, the Turkish second generation also has higher school dropout rates than in other countries. Of the second-generation Turkish young people in France who have already ended their school careers, almost half have gained no secondary school diploma at all, compared to only one third in the Netherlands and substantially fewer in Germany and Austria. In the latter three countries, the majority of Turkish second-generation children enter an apprenticeship system that enables them to work and study while gaining job qualifications and experience.

Transition to the labor market likewise differs sharply between countries. The apprenticeship system in the predominantly German-speaking countries ensures a relatively smooth transition. Unemployment among second-generation Turks in countries with apprentice systems is three to four times lower than in France, Belgium or the Netherlands. Such systems apparently give young people with low vocational diplomas a start on the job market – a step much harder to accomplish in countries without such a system. The article by Worbs in this volume shows how Turkish second-generation youth in Germany have acquired a relatively secure labor market position through the apprenticeship system. In France and Belgium, and to a lesser extent in the Netherlands, we see more polarization. While a substantial group of second-generation Turks are reaching white-collar or professional positions, many qualified and unqualified workers are suffering serious unemployment as a result of their difficult transition to the labor market.

In terms of higher education, the French educational system appears more effective at guiding Turkish young people to university than the German system, while the German system is better at incorporating young adults into the labor market. Thus, although the findings presented here do not point to any clear effect of integration policies that specifically target migrants, some of the generic national institutional arrangements do seem to matter. Belgium represents an excellent case in point. The Walloon region is strongly focused on the French republican model of integration, while the Flemish region is more inspired by the Dutch multicultural model. At the

same time, the education system is the same all over Belgium and so are the school achievements of the Turkish second generation (*see* Timmerman, Vanderwaeren and Crul in this issue). This remarkable outcome is perhaps the most compelling evidence yet that integration models do not have the impact they are often purported to have.

### *Explaining Differences in Outcomes*

From the articles below and the relevant cross-national studies, we will now try to identify the factors in national education systems that either hinder or facilitate the school careers of second-generation Turks. National educational systems may differ in school duration, face-to-face contact hours with teachers, selectivity, and amounts of supplementary help and support available to children inside and outside school. In the transitions from school to work, the presence or absence of an apprenticeship system forms a major point of contrast. The only feature of the national systems that specifically relates to migrant children is the second-language training.

One significant disparity between countries lies in the age at which education begins. In France and Belgium, Turkish second-generation children start school at the age of 2-1/2, in Germany and Austria at age 6, and in the Netherlands at age 5. Thus, immigrant children in France and Belgium on average have about three more years of education in that crucial developmental phase in which they begin learning the majority language. In France and Belgium, very young Turkish children thus find themselves in situations almost every day where they have to speak French or Dutch with their peers and learn these languages in an educational environment.

Striking differences also appear in the number of face-to-face contact hours with teachers during the years of compulsory schooling. Here, once again, these are below average for Turkish pupils in the predominantly German-speaking countries, especially during the first part of their educational careers. Nine-year-olds in German schools have a total of 661 contact hours, as compared to 1,019 hours in the Netherlands, because children in Germany and Austria only attend school on a half-day basis. Turkish children in Germany thus receive about ten hours less instruction per week than those in the Netherlands. Although children in Germany and Austria are assigned more homework, help with homework is a scant resource in Turkish families. This may be a source of serious disadvantage.

A third distinction, which in combination with the first two can culminate in serious disparities, lies in school selection mechanisms. Germany

and Austria select at the age of 10. In Germany, the selection mechanism channels the children into three school levels and in Austria into two. Coupled with the late start in education and the below average contact hours, Turkish second-generation pupils in Germany and Austria are thus given little time to pull themselves out of their disadvantaged starting position. In this respect, Turkish children in Germany and Austria are in the worst possible situation. Selection in the Netherlands occurs two to four years later. Belgium selects at age 14 and France at 15. In countries with a relatively early selection, most pupils end up in short vocational streams – *Hauptschule* in Germany and Austria and lower vocational school in the Netherlands. The higher selection ages in France and Belgium result in higher percentages of Turkish children moving into more prestigious streams. As suggested above, this has its benefits and drawbacks. Though it may offer more opportunities to Turkish children than they receive in other countries, many of them falter in the higher tracks and end up with no diploma at all.

A fourth area in which major differences are evident between countries involves the amount of assistance and support made available to migrant children inside and outside school. All countries have a host of educational priority projects aimed either specifically at migrant youth or more broadly at youth with learning problems. Some programs are national, others are regional or municipal initiatives. Though cross-national comparisons are difficult to make, the most reliable data so far derive from an international study known as PISA 2000 ([www.pisa.oecd.org](http://www.pisa.oecd.org)). It questioned 15-year-olds about the supplementary assistance and support they received inside and outside school. Although it only distinguishes between youth with migrant backgrounds and native youth, it gives a good indication of the extra support received by Turkish children in each country. It delivers a clear ranking of countries. Migrant children in France, and to a lesser extent in Belgium and the Netherlands, receive the most support, and Germany performs worst of all. Since basically the same differences between countries apply to native youth, we may simply speak of divergent general education practices in different countries.

Less meaningful for explaining differences between countries, but not altogether insignificant, are the second-language programs. The options and practices of second-language education are many and varied, and there is still considerable debate about the best method for improving proficiency in official national languages (*see, e.g.*, the article by Westin in this issue). This has yielded a multitude of programs and methods, ranging from transitional bilingual programs to intensive instruction exclusively in the second lan-

guage. No country appears to have clear-cut guidelines in place for the provision of second-language teaching. Normally it is a part of primary school curricula, but it may be integrated there into mainstream language programs, given as supplementary instruction to migrant children during school hours, or provided outside of school hours. In comparing this we focus on two issues: when the countries introduced second-language programs on any substantial scale and how the quality and results of the programs roughly compare. Virtually all countries now have well-established programs. The biggest distinction lies in when they were introduced. France began implementing orientation classes back in the early 1970s. Other countries were much later to start. In the late 1980s, Belgium had only one project of any real significance, and the Netherlands did not introduce programs on a larger scale until the early 1990s. In Germany, some federal states opted for intensive second-language programs, while others provided instruction in migrant languages, creating separate classes for the children. Even into the 1990s, however, methods of learning German other than the traditional approaches were still rare. Overall, then, the group we are focusing on here – the second generation above age 15 who attended primary school in the 1980s or early 1990s – did not profit from special language programs to any reasonable degree. In most countries, the programs reached only limited numbers of children, and quality was questionable. In some cases, as in Belgium and France, second-generation children born in the country itself were mostly excluded from the programs because they were thought to have no language problems.

If we view all five of these factors together, it seems no wonder that second-generation Turks in France enter preparatory schools for higher education at higher rates than elsewhere in Europe. Children begin school early in France, have more hours of face-to-face tuition, have the most supplementary help and support available inside and outside school, and do not undergo educational selection until a fairly late age. At the other extreme are Austria and Germany, where children enter school late, are selected early, and in the former two countries also have fewer contact hours and receive less supplementary support. In France and Belgium, twice as many Turkish second-generation young people reach middle or higher educational levels than in Germany, Austria or the Netherlands. France's relatively open system does carry the disadvantage that many of the children who enter the more prestigious *lycée* wind up leaving school without a diploma.

The countries that perform rather poorly in the first stages of the educational track, Germany and Austria, do a relatively good job in the later



stages, and they also deliver more successful transitions to the job market. This can be credited in large part to their apprenticeship systems. Although the distribution of study hours in relation to working hours varies between these countries, the core principle is to introduce youngsters to working life at an early age. Turkish young people thereby get a chance to test their skills early, and once they have served in a firm as an apprentice, they are often hired to work there. In countries where no apprentice system exists, such as France, Belgium and the Netherlands, young people must venture onto the labor market alone. Many employers consider them not yet suitable for jobs and favor applicants with work experience. Getting a foothold in the job market is difficult, especially for the children of migrant parents who consequently suffer higher rates of unemployment. Where selection is tougher, discrimination seems to hit harder. In countries without apprenticeship systems, second-generation Turks with low vocational qualifications are widely shut out of the labor market. Young people without diplomas are at risk in any system, and some countries produce far more of them than others. France and the Netherlands are extreme examples in terms of Turkish school dropouts. As the Dutch, Belgium and French articles report, only those Turkish young people with high-level diplomas seem to derive benefit from a relatively accessible educational system.

Obviously there are many further contextual factors that may affect the educational and labor market status of the second generation. We shall briefly review some of these. The nature of the Turkish communities differs between the countries studied, and such differences may influence some of the results. In Sweden, the traditional labor migrants have now become a minority of the Turkish population. Political protests by Kurdish activists have adversely reflected on the Turkish community as a whole. This could well elicit a more negative public attitude towards the second generation. Another factor might be the size and concentration of the communities in cities. The image of the Turkish population in Europe that emerges from the articles in this volume is that most Turks live in the bigger cities and are further concentrated there into a limited number of neighborhoods. The conditions are very similar across countries.

Two important contextual factors that need to be considered at greater length are the variations in the overall educational and employment situations in the countries studied. Such differences may affect the position of second-generation migrants in relation to native youth. The general national level of educational attainment in France, for instance, is much higher than that in

Germany. One might therefore wonder whether the Turks living in France, who are also more educated than their counterparts elsewhere, are actually any better off in competition with the native population. This implies that the differentials between second-generation migrant youth and native youth must also be taken into account in assessing their status in a particular country. As far as the statistics allow comparisons, we find that the educational gap between Turks and the native populations in France and Belgium is indeed much narrower than in the other countries. The PISA 2000 study reveals that the widest gaps in educational status between migrants and natives are still found in Germany and Austria. The narrowest gap is in France, followed by Belgium and the Netherlands. Educational systems that allow many native children into higher education thus appear to be more accessible to ethnic minority groups as well.

The unemployment situation also differs widely between countries. Overall, unemployment in France, especially among younger people, is far higher than in countries like Germany and Austria. The youth unemployment can largely be explained by the lack of an apprenticeship system. To the extent that jobless figures for native youth are suitable for comparison, it appears that the gap between Turkish second-generation youth and native youth in France, Belgium and the Netherlands is much wider than it is in the countries with apprentice systems. Again, a system that makes more job opportunities available to native youth also smoothes the way for migrant youth. We could phrase this differently by saying that if native youth have difficulties entering higher education or the job market, the problems of migrant youth will be even greater.

## *CONCLUSION*

The comparisons we make in this issue are not comprehensive. The data needed for adequate comparisons are missing in some countries, and research on the second generation is still scant everywhere. Although we need to be cautious in drawing conclusions, we do seem to have identified some interesting leads that we hope to build on in our future research. We now want to propose some hypotheses to guide that research.

The position of second-generation Turks, Moroccans and other migrant groups varies widely between the different countries in Europe, and it is not easy to make an overall assessment of trends. The picture is further complicated by the polarizations within ethnic groups that exist in some countries. Moreover, if we view the development of different groups over time, we do

not see a linear process. The Moroccan community, for instance, once seemed headed for downward assimilation, but now seems to be rising. This underscores the hazards of premature classification.

Few comparisons between groups have been made in the literature on immigrant integration in Europe. Our exploration of second-generation integration suggests that differences between groups indeed play some part in the outcomes of their integration processes. Yet the tentative findings presented here do not fit very smoothly into the segmented assimilation model. We have compared the Turkish and Moroccan communities in particular, both of which originated in extremely disadvantaged socioeconomic circumstances in rural areas. Data on the second generation now appear to show that the Turkish community, which at first seemed to profit from its closure and strong social cohesion, is performing less well in education today than the Moroccan young people. The more open and individualized Moroccan community seems to be offering its second generation, and especially the girls, better possibilities to pursue an educational career, following a pattern that resembles what Portes calls classical assimilation.

The debate about integration seems to have had a persistent blind spot for the importance of the national context in which the second generation is trying to move forward. Although rigorous study is still urgently needed, we believe we can already conclude from the material presented here that national contexts have a considerable impact on the paths of integration that the second-generation Turks are following in the various countries.

In some countries, a sizable number of second-generation Turks have fallen behind to the point where they now seriously risk becoming an underclass. In other countries, the Turks seem to be performing well enough, either through education or the apprenticeship system, to be able to integrate smoothly. The cross-national comparisons do not yet permit unequivocal conclusions about the desirability of one system or the other. In countries where second-generation Turks have experienced a smooth transition to the labor market, only small numbers have managed to enter higher education. As one author puts it, this seems the price that Turks have to pay. In countries with more open educational systems, the second generation can reach higher, but fall deeper. The Turkish communities there are already characterized by a degree of polarization – as the first Turkish elites are emerging, another subgroup may be spiraling towards the bottom of the social hierarchy.

Interestingly, the differential outcomes reported here do not seem to be attributable to arrangements specifically targeted at migrant youth, but more

to the generic policies prevailing in each particular country. A further conclusion, then, which we again draw with some caution, is that the probability of underclass formation may be linked to the opportunities that national, generic institutional arrangements for education and labor market transition offer to the second generation. This means that that a debate on the differential effectiveness of national institutional arrangements is just as urgently needed as the discussions on distinctions between ethnic groups.

## REFERENCES

- Banton, M.  
2001 "National Integration in France and Britain," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 27:151-168.
- Bovenkerk, F. and Y. Yeşilgöz  
1998 *De Mafia van Turkije*. Amsterdam: Meulenhoff.
- Brubaker, W. R.  
2001 "The Return of Assimilation? Changing Perspectives on Immigration and Its Sequels in France, Germany and the United States," *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 24:531-548.
- 
- 1992 *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Castles, S. and M. J. Miller  
1993 *The Age of Migration. International Population Movements in the Modern World*. London: Macmillan.
- Coenen, L.  
2001 *Word Niet Zoals Wij: De Veranderende Betekenis van Onderwijs bij Turkse Gezinnen in Nederland*. Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis.
- Crul, M.  
1994 "Springen Over je Eigen Schaduw. De Onderwijsprestaties van de Tweede Generatie," *Migrantenstudies*, 10(3):168-186.
- Doomernik, J.  
1998 *The Effectiveness of Integration Policies towards Immigrants and Their Descendants in France, Germany and the Netherlands*. Geneva: International Labor Organization.
- EFFNATIS  
2001 *Effectiveness of National Integration Strategies towards Second Generation Migration Youth in a Comparative European Perspective*. Bamberg: European Forum for Migration Studies.
- Eldering, L. and J. Kloprogge  
1989 *Different Cultures Same School. Ethnic Minority Children in Europe*. Amsterdam: Swets & Zeitlinger.
- Entzinger, H.  
1984 *Het Minderhedenbeleid: Dilemma's Voor de Overheid in Nederland en zes Andere Immigratielanden in Europa*. Meppel: Boom.

- Faist, T.  
1995 *Social Citizenship for Whom? Young Turks in Germany and Mexican-Americans in the United States*. Aldershot: Avebury.
- Fase, W.  
1994 *Ethnic Divisions in Western European Education*. Münster: Waxmann.
- Fennema, M. and J. Tillie  
1999 "Political Participation and Political Trust in a Multicultural Democracy. Civic Communities and Ethnic Networks in Amsterdam," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 25:703–726.
- Foner, N.  
2000 *From Ellis Island to JFK. New York's Two Great Waves of Immigration*. New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press.
- Gans, H.  
1992 "Second Generation in Decline: Scenarios for the Economic and Ethnic Futures of Post-1965 American Immigrants," *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 15:173–192.
- Gibson, M. A.  
1997 "Conclusion: Complicating the Immigrant/Involuntary Minority Typology," *Anthropology & Education Quarterly*, 28:431–454.
- Glazer, N.  
1993 "Is Assimilation Dead?," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 530:187–202.
- Hammar, T., ed.  
1985 *European Immigration Policy: A Comparative Study*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hechter, M.  
1978 "Group Formation and the Cultural Division of Labor," *American Journal of Sociology*, 84:293–318.
- Joppke, C.  
1999 *Immigration and the Nation-State: The United States, Germany and Great Britain*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Karpat, K.  
1995 "The Turks in America." In *Turcs d'Europe...et d'ailleurs*. Ed. S. de Tapia. Paris: ERISM.
- Lesthaeghe, R., ed.  
1997 *Diversiteit in Sociale Verandering: Turkse en Marokkaanse Vrouwen in België*. Brussels: VUB-Press.
- Lucassen, L.  
2002 "Immigration Now and in the Past. Integration Processes of Immigrants in America from a European Perspective," *Journal of American Ethnic History*, 21:85–101.
- Mahnig, H.  
1998 *Integrationspolitik in Grossbritannien, Frankreich, Deutschland und den Niederlanden. Ein Vergleichende Analyse*. Neuchâtel: Swiss Forum for Migration and Population Studies.
- Min, P. G.  
1999 "A Comparison of Post-1965 and Turn-of-the-Century Immigrants in Intergenerational Mobility and Cultural Transmission," *Journal of American Ethnic History*, 19:65–94.

Mollenkopf, J.

1999 "Assimilating Immigrants in Amsterdam: A Perspective from New York," *Netherlands Journal of Social Science*, 36:126–145.

Muus, P.

2002 *Migration and Immigrant Policy, Immigrants from Turkey and Their Participation in the Labour Market: An International Comparison*. Utrecht: ERCOMER.

Özüekren, A. S. and R. van Kempen

1997 *Turks in European Cities: Housing and Urban Segregation*. Utrecht: ERCOMER.

Perlmann, J. and R. Waldinger

1997 "Second Generation in Decline? Children of Immigrants, Past and Present. A Reconsideration," *International Migration Review*, 31(4):893–922.

Portes, A.

1996 *The New Second Generation*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Portes, A. and R. Rumbaut

2001 *Legacies. The Story of the Immigrant Second Generation*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

---

1996 *Immigrant America: A Portrait*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Roelandt, T. and J. Veenman

1993 "Ethnic Groups and Underclass Formation in the Netherlands. The Dutch Ethno-class Structure." In *Immigrant Ethnic Minorities in the Dutch Labour Market: Analysis and Policies*. Ed. H. Entzinger, J. Siegers and F. Tazelaar. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers. Pp. 47–69.

Seifert, W.

1992 "Die Zweite Ausländergeneration in der Bundesrepublik. Längsschnittbeobachtungen in der Berufseinstiegsphase," *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, 44:677–696.

Tribalat, M.

1995 *Faire France. Une Enquête sur les Immigrés et Leurs Enfants*. Paris: Découverte.

Veenman, J.

1996 *Keren de Kansen*. Assen: Van Gorcum.

Vermeulen, H.

2001 *Culture and Equality: Immigrant Cultures and Social Mobility in Long-Term Perspective*. Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis.

---

1997 *Immigrant Policy for a Multicultural Society. A Comparative Study of Integration, Language and Religious Policy in Five Western European Countries*. Amsterdam: Institute of Migration and Ethnic Studies (IMES).

Vermeulen, H. and R. Pennix, eds.

2000 *Immigrant Integration: The Dutch Case*. Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis.

Waldinger, R. and J. Perlmann

1998 "Second Generation: Past, Present, Future," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 24:5–24.

Werner, H.

1994 *Integration of Foreign Workers into the Labour Market: France, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden*. Geneva: International Labor Organization.