Gender, Age and Generations

State of the art report Cluster C8

Russell King, Mark Thomson, Tony Fielding and Tony Warnes
SCMR-Sussex Centre for Migration and Population Studies,
University of Sussex

December 2004
## CONTENTS

### INTRODUCTION

1 **HIGHLIGHTING THE ROLE OF TIME IN THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION**
   2.1 Torsten Hägerstrand’s ‘time geography’
   2.2 Saulo Cwerner’s ‘times of migration’

2 **COMPARATIVE STRATEGIES FOR STUDYING TIME IN MIGRATION**
   3.1 Historical and geographical comparisons
   3.2 Typologies of comparison

3 **INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND THE LIFE-COURSE**
   4.1 Migration and age
   4.2 Life-course stages as a stimulus of migration
   4.3 Life-stages, human capital and the consequences for migration
   4.4 Migration, development inequalities and differential life-course stages
   4.5 Multiple affiliations and residences
   4.6 The research agenda

4 **LONGITUDINAL STUDIES OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRANTS**
   5.2 The Longitudinal Study for England and Wales
   5.3 Event History Analysis

5 **GENDER**
   6.1 Moving beyond invisibility
   6.2 Gendering the age of migration
   6.3 Summing-up and future research

6 **THE FAMILY**
   7.1 Types of family migration
   7.2 Home- and host-country perspectives
   7.3 Theorising and deconstructing the family in European migration
   7.4 Prospects for the future

7 **GENERATIONS OF MIGRANTS**
   8.1 Theories of second-generation integration
   8.2 The European second generation
Acknowledgements

Whilst this report has benefited from discussion sessions in which many C8 members participated, the authors are especially grateful for helpful written feedback and input from Jacqueline Andall, Stephanie Condon, Maurice Crul, Rosita Fibbi, Flip Lindo, Joana Lopes Martins, Leo Lucassen, Valentina Napolitano Quayson, Mies van Niekerk, Maria João Valente Rosa, Marlene de Vries and Susanne Wessendorf. For the record, Russell King drafted sections 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, most of 9, and 10; Mark Thomson sections 8 and 9.1, Tony Warnes section 4 and Tony Fielding section 5.

The Authors

Russell King is Professor of Geography and Co-Director of the Sussex Centre for Migration Research, University of Sussex
Mark Thomson is Research Officer in the Sussex Centre for Migration Research
Tony Fielding is Professor of Human Geography at the University of Sussex
Tony Warnes is Professor of Social Gerontology and Director of the Sheffield Institute for Studies on Ageing, University of Sheffield

Sussex Centre for Migration Research
University of Sussex
January 2005
INTRODUCTION

This state of the art report examines the time dimension of migration and integration, as well as several cross-cutting categorisations – gender, age, generations and changing family structures – which are, to a greater or lesser extent, time-dependent. This is an extremely broad canvas on which to try to paint a picture of the temporal and socio-demographic dimensions of the processes of immigration and integration in Europe; the danger is to try to cover too much ground, invading the territories of many of the other research clusters in the IMISCOE Network.

So let us be clear at the outset what this report can and cannot do. It is easier to clarify the former than the latter. What we cannot do is to review all the literature on time-based processes of migration and of integration of migrants in Europe; and nor can we cover all the myriad studies on gender, age, generations and family structures of migrant groups. Nevertheless we do need to recognise that time is inescapably inscribed into process – both the process of international migration which is the focus of clusters A1 and A2, and the process of settlement and integration of immigrants and their descendants in the destination society which is the domain of clusters B3-B6.

What we can do in this report is rather more difficult to specify. Our first task, however, is obvious: to stress the practical and theoretical importance of time in the study of migration. This is dealt with in section 2 of the paper, where we deal in concepts and generalities rather than reference lots of case-studies. In section 3 we move to a more methodological analysis, and set out a series of possible strategies for studying comparatively the role of time in migration. We are aware here of the Network’s strong emphasis on comparison as a systematic methodology of research, and of the need to engage in a variety of types of comparison – for instance between different immigrant groups, or different host societies, or between immigrant and autochthonous populations, or ‘before and after’ studies etc.

Sections 4 and 5 review two specific epistemologies for studying migration through time, one broadly qualitative and the other quantitative, although this methodological distinction is not absolute. The life-course approach (section 4) focuses on the individual as the unit of analysis; through migration the individual is sited in, and shifts through, geographical, social and political space, at the same time progressing through various life stages and transitions. The focus on the individual, however, needs to be balanced by a realisation of the importance, for many cases, of the family/household context, whereby individuals are conjoined, at least for part of their life-courses, within a kinship unit that can heavily influence their migration decision-making and behaviour.

Longitudinal studies of international migrants (section 5) are derived from linked census records; from individual data culled from population registers; from specially-commissioned longitudinal surveys, for instance tracing the lives of immigrants from the moment they enter the country; and from oral histories. Issues of data confidentiality may limit what can be achieved here, but reference will be made to the work of Fielding (1995), amongst others, in exploring the social mobility of the UK’s minority ethnic populations through the British census’s Longitudinal Study dataset, as well as some examples from other European countries.

In their ‘extreme’ forms, oral-history life-course studies and census-based longitudinal surveys represent very different, almost irreconcilable approaches to documenting and interpreting the time trajectories of migrants. The former approach generates rich insights but for small samples whose statistical representativeness or
relevance to the ‘bigger picture’ may not be demonstrated or even demonstrable. The latter technique suffers from the common faults of census and other official survey data, namely that they are only provided (with some exceptions) at an aggregate level, for a limited range of variables, and for discrete census dates, usually every ten years. One possible bridging method which will be outlined in section 5 is event history analysis. This combines the standard chronological life-course approach with the statistical power of a large survey, concentrating on variables that relate to specific points in time, such as a ‘migration event’.

Sections 2-5, then, represent our attempt to introduce, theorise and operationalise the critical dimension of time into the study of international migration and integration in Europe. The succeeding four parts of the report, sections 6-9, switch the focus away from time per se, i.e. as a continuous and longitudinal variable, towards a range of cross-sectional and cross-cutting axes of analysis. Each of these is, in one way or another, time-dependent or incorporates the temporal factor in some fashion, but time as such is not the defining variable.

Of these cross-cutting dimensions, gender (section 6) is arguably the most important. It needs to be stressed at the outset that gender is not only about women. Nevertheless, we must recognise that European countries are hosting growing numbers of female migrants, that women are increasingly migrating independently of men, that some migrant communities are composed almost entirely of women, and that many past studies of migration, including ‘historic’ migrations, need to be re-examined through a more female-sensitive perspective. Perhaps the key question that needs to be asked is this: what do past and contemporary migration flows suggest about the changing nature of gender relations of migration over time? The ‘over time’ part of this question can be analysed in at least two ways. First, by comparing a past (e.g. nineteenth century) with a contemporary migration process. And second by examining the changing patriarchal and social control patterns through the stages of a single migration cycle from pre-departure to the period of settlement and integration abroad (and, if relevant, after the return to the country of origin). Prevailing values in the country of immigration are usually more favourable to women’s increased autonomy and freedom, although there may be specific circumstances of the migrant community’s experience (social exclusion, enclavement etc.) which turn this potential advantage the other way.

We close this introductory note on gender and migration with an important general point. Gender is a key analytical category not only in the work of cluster C8, but throughout the Network. Our decision to devote a section in this report to gender represents a dilemma, and a challenge, to gender studies and the work of IMISCOE as a whole. Gender needs to be both specifically and visibly foregrounded, and for there to be gender perspectives and awareness throughout all the research and outputs of the Network. Highlighting gender in one section or cluster does not absolve its being overlooked or downplayed elsewhere. Thus, we strongly advocate that gender issues be integrated into the work of all clusters where pertinent; and that such issues should not be limited to the ‘female side’ of the story, nor studied solely by female researchers.

The other three cross-cutting demographic categories are perhaps less controversial, but not less important because of their apparent straightforwardness. The family (section 7) represents an important interface with gender-based studies of migration, so that we can think of a triangular intersection of migration, gender and the family. Yet families, which act as ‘containers’ for migration, but also are ruptured by it in other circumstances, are becoming less uniform and homogenous:
cohabitation, separation, divorce, ‘reconstituted’ families and same-sex couples are all increasing (Bailey and Boyle 2004). The meaning and nature of the concepts of family and household are challenged both by broad social changes in Europe, and by the increasing diversity of types of migration and mobility, as earlier labour migrations are overlain by migrants who are refugees and asylum-seekers, clandestine entrants, skilled professionals, students, retirement migrants and many others (King 2002).

From family-framed studies of migration it is but a small step to the study of generations. There has been an established tradition of studying the generational progression and performance of migrants in the United States, but relatively little large-scale comparative work in Europe. Section 8 will review the scattered European literature on this aspect of the longer-term evolution of migrant communities, and pay particular attention to new research initiatives (Crul and Vermeulen 2003a).

The final cross-cutting theme focuses on age-related migration streams (section 9). This part of the paper returns to the age-migration profiles which were introduced as part of the life-course approach in section 4, and picks out as examples three types of migration which are specifically life-stage or age-related: child migration, student migration, and retirement migration. These are important, yet under-researched components of King’s (2002) new map of European migration. They are reviewed and presented here not as a complete survey of age-related migration processes, but as exemplars of the variety of migrant forms in the post-labour-migration era.

Section 10 concludes the paper by highlighting key findings and trends. The main purposes of this final section, however, are to identify gaps in the literatures covered by cluster C8, and to specify priorities for further, especially comparative, research on time-based studies of migrants and the integration process. The list of research possibilities will be provisional and open-ended, particularly to accommodate research suggestions from other clusters in the IMISCOE Network.
HIGHLIGHTING THE ROLE OF TIME IN THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

The key *problematique* of this report is to understand how migration and integration unfold *through time, across generations and as gendered processes*. Setting aside the gender and generational aspects for a moment, how can we foreground time in the migration process? Conventionally conceptualised as a time-space phenomenon, the temporal dimension is often central in definitions of migration, for instance as a relocation to another place for a significant period of time, or as a permanent or semi-permanent shift of residence, either within or to another country. Moreover, there are often implicit thresholds of time and distance contained within definitions of migration, in order to differentiate migration from other, shorter-term and shorter-distance forms of mobility. Thus, migration may be defined as a semi-permanent, long-distance change of the place of residence; whereas a short-distance move is regarded as residential relocation, and short-term moves such as tourism or business trips are regarded as temporary mobility (Malmberg 1997: 23). The linear co-relation between time and space in defining and framing migration and mobility, graphically portrayed as distance on the x axis and time on the y axis, produces an integrated time-space continuum of mobility and migration types, ranging on the one hand from the daily walk round the corner for the newspaper or a loaf of bread, to, at the other end of the time-space graph, a permanent relocation to another continent (Figure 1a).

But where, exactly, along the diagonal line in Figure 1a, does migration ‘begin’? In reality migration merges easily, but confusingly, with other forms of mobility. Take, for example, seasonal moves: the East European migrant construction worker who moves to a Western European country for a few months a year; or, a historical example, the itinerant Irish workers who moved to Britain in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to harvest potatoes or dig the canals. And how about the ‘residential tourists’ or ‘snowbirds’ who escape the harsh weather of Northern Europe by wintering in southern Spain or the Canary Islands? Or Erasmus students who study in another European country for their ‘year abroad’, or who head off for a few months on a working holiday?

Clearly, the temporal ‘edges’ of migration are very hard to define. In one sense this should not bother us – the examples given above (and there are many more) are all forms of human movement and temporary relocation which are worthy of study and analysis. Where it does concern the work of IMISCOE, however, is in its relationship to integration and social cohesion: the shorter the time-frame of mobility and ‘residence abroad’, the less relevant the question of integration tends to become.

Figure 1a was always a simple continuum, and has become more so in the era of globalisation, especially with changing technologies of movement and communication. So, instead, we can imagine a matrix of mobility/migration types, combining short- and longer-term time and space variables in different combinations (Figure 1b).

Now, when we move from definition to the *analysis* of migration, the distance factor tends to take over. Much theorising of migration, especially by geographers, sees distance as the explanatory or independent variable. For Boyle *et al.* (1998: 5-33), migration is a quintessentially spatial *event* to be mapped by the means of flow-arrows and choropleths of migration intensity. For Hammar *et al.* (1997) the concept of migratory space is used to bring together findings pertaining to the causes of migration and its relationship to development – the concept is not just physical space but also ‘larger opportunity structures, social life and subjective images, values and
meanings’ that condition propensity for migration (Faist 1997: 247-8, 252). Thus, the measurement of distance can be straightforward mensuration in kilometres (often in log-linear form), or modified by actual or symbolic barriers such as mountain ranges, international frontiers, or socio-cultural distance (language, religion, ethnicity etc.). For economists modelling migration flows or propensities, the distance variable may be both spatial and expressed as gradients of wages, real incomes, unemployment, or perceptions or expectations of these. In all these studies, time tends to disappear behind the battery of distance, economic and social variables, and to be lost from the maps, graphs and regressions.

Figure 1 Combining time and space in the definition of migration: linear (1a) and matrix (1b) models. Source: partly after Malmberg (1997: 25).

1a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lifetime</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Distance</th>
<th>Global scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Permanent resettlement in another country</td>
<td>Permanent labour migration</td>
<td>Temporary labour migration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>relocation</td>
<td>Seasonal migration, contract migration</td>
<td>Residual tourism, working holidays</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Annual holidays</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weekend away, recreational trips</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social visits</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Journey to work</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shopping, journey to school</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1b

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Permanent migration/relocation</th>
<th>Local migration (e.g. intra-urban residential relocation)</th>
<th>Rural-urban migration</th>
<th>Inter-regional migration</th>
<th>International migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Short-term movement</td>
<td>Commuting</td>
<td>Seasonal migration</td>
<td>Circulation</td>
<td>Long-distance commuting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recreational moves</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Business travel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distance</th>
<th>Global scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Short distance</td>
<td>Middle distance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Beyond the simple categorisations of Figure 1, the measurement and deeper ontological meaning of time in human mobility has been curiously overlooked. In the remainder of this section we refer to two strands of work which have attempted to reclaim the central importance of time in the study of human migration: the classic work of the Swedish geographer Torsten Hägerstrand in the field of time geography; and the more recent initiative of the Brazilian sociologist Saulo Cwerner in exploring the multiple embeddedness of time in migration, and of migration in time.

2.1 Torsten Hägerstrand’s ‘time geography’

*Time geography* is mainly associated with Hägerstrand and his disciples and colleagues in the ‘Lund School’ of Human Geography who were particularly active in this field between the 1960s and early 1980s. Hägerstrand believed that the criteria for good social science ‘are not to be found along the spatial cross-section but along the time-axis and in the particular sequence of events which makes up the life of each individual human being. It is the biographies of people that should count’ (1975: 3). Hägerstrand’s thinking was profoundly influenced by his childhood experiences of the rapidly-changing countryside in southern Sweden. Here, he became acutely aware of the rhythmic mobilities of everyday life as people travelled between home, the fields, the woods, the school and their social activities; consequently there is a strong element of autobiography and personal observation in some of his work (see, for instance, Hägerstrand 1982). In such small, relatively homogenous and now ‘historic’ rural communities, the subtle and detailed insights of time geography, based on individuals’ life-paths, carry most weight. It is less certain how such analysis might inform, or be derived from, the much more complex and dynamic environment of the modern metropolis or of international migration streams. We return to this question presently.

Key components of time geography are firstly, as noted, the *time-path* of movement: in Pred’s words (1977: 208), ‘a weaving dance through time-space’ from birth till death, although many of Hägerstrand’s plottings of these life-paths were micro-temporal – a day, a week, a year. Second, fixed points (home, workplace, community centre) are termed *stations*; it is here that individuals meet to form a group (an ‘activity bundle’) for a particular purpose, which might be related to a longer-term *project* such as creating a family, sustaining a livelihood, building a house, educating their children. Such projects might be idealistic (such as the notion of migrating to America to make one’s fortune), but they are also situational; they are dependent on time and place and individuals’ relations with each other and with the structures of authority; they become ‘going concerns in the flow of real life’ (Hägerstrand 1982: 324).

Next, Hägerstrand draws attention to three kinds of time-geographical constraints that condition people’s abilities and opportunities to carry out various activities and projects, including migration (Malmberg 1997: 144). First, there are *capacity* or *capability* constraints, where the individual lacks the physical, financial and social means to realise certain acts; for migrants, distance and travel costs are obvious examples. Second, there are *coupling* constraints, whereby the individual cannot move abroad because of personal or family obligations or the impossibility of being...
engaged in two or more projects in different locations at the same time. Third, *steering* constraints are mechanisms created with the intention of facilitating, or blocking, access to migration – such as special incentive schemes for certain categories of migrants, or immigration laws to prevent migration. These sets of constraints enabled Hägerstrand to focus not just on what people do and where they move, but also what they are *free* or *able* to do by way of actions and movement. By analogy, they also help the researcher to trace the barriers which prevent certain events – like migration – from occurring. As some recent key writings have shown, it is as important to explain non-migration as it is to explain why people do move (Fischer et al. 1997; Hammar and Tamas 1997); and a clear distinction needs to be made between *aspiration* and *ability* to migrate (Carling 2002).

Much of the uniqueness of Hägerstrand’s approach to a time geography of migration lies in his innovative attempts to represent the mobile life-path webs of individuals in three-dimensional time-space: ‘we need to rise up from the flat map with its static patterns and think in terms of a world on the move, a world of incessant permutations’ (Hägerstrand 1982: 324). One of Hägerstrand’s solutions is to represent space in two dimensions, set out as a tilted flat plane, leaving the third axis, the vertical one, for time. The result is a *time-space container* or *diorama* in which life-paths can be imaginatively, but also clearly, positioned.

A retrospective evaluation of Hägerstrand’s *œuvre* raises several perplexities and questions. The approach is both disarmingly simple and all-embracingly complex. Behind the technical fix of all those life-paths snaking through time-space lay Hägerstrand’s belief in the richness and social embeddedness of people’s lifeworlds and his almost utopian concern with quality of life and everyday freedoms (1970, 1975). Yet a cynic might sweep away the posturing terminology and microscopically elaborate diagrams as an overblown waste of time (the irony of such a criticism should not go unnoticed!). Surely this is not the case. And yet, why has the initiative not been continued or resurrected? Was it just a passing fad of human geography a generation ago? From the point of view of comparative research on international migration and its evolution over time, a major limitation was time geography’s preoccupation with daily, weekly and seasonal rhythms of mobility, and localised studies of individuals and very small samples. Apart from some fleeting references to Swedish emigration to America in the late nineteenth century, little mention is made of long-distance emigration; in fact the emigrants’ life-paths were not followed, unless they returned to the village (Hägerstrand 1978: 130, 139). Most of the research that did spin off from Hägerstrand’s time geography did not concern itself directly with migration beyond local-scale movements. The three-volume study on time geography edited by Carlstein et al. (1978) contains almost no references to international migration in its 28 constituent chapters.

As we shall see later, there are some echoes of Hägerstrand’s life-paths and of the time-geography paradigm in life-course research on migration. What is missing from the life-course approach, in comparison to Hägerstrand’s work, is the wide conceptual range of the latter’s approach which ‘holds together time and space, individual and society, ecology and place … address(ing) many of the dualisms which modern social theory attempts to overcome’ (Pred 1977: 207). Also missing are the imaginative diagrams of individual and collective life-paths through time-space that Hägerstrand and Carlstein pioneered. On the one hand, it should not be too difficult to enlarge the scale of these stylised mappings from the farm or the village to embrace the reach of modern international migrations. Boyle et al. (1998: 2-4) make an illustrative effort to do this when they graph their own migration histories in the opening pages of their
textbook. On the other hand, a move to larger scales of migration and to larger life-path datasets does present problems of representation. Multiple life-lines would intersect, tangle and coalesce into a spaghetti-like vision where meaningful patterns in the data would probably be lost. Statistical generalisation and computer-generated colour-based diagrams may be two possible ways forward (Southall and White 1998).

2.2 Saulo Cwerner’s ‘times of migration’

We now turn to the recent work of Saulo Cwerner whose stimulating paper ‘The Times of Migration’ (2001) mirrors the title of his Lancaster PhD (1999). Cwerner notes (2001: 8) that the literature on the sociology of time almost completely overlooks migration, although he acknowledges the relevance of certain theoretical tools such as ‘time-space distanciation’ and the notion of ‘absent others’ (cf. Giddens 1990), as well as cross-cultural differences in the conventions and meanings of time (Sorokin 1964; Zerubavel 1981). Instead, Cwerner draws inspiration from a little-known early foray into time, culture and migration by Elchardus et al. (1987) and from the more recent work of Lash and Urry into the transformation of time and the increasing mobility of people as fundamental aspects of the new social landscape of flows and signs (Lash and Urry 1994; Urry 2000).

If migrants are largely absent from the time-sociology literature, then time is often an important, if inconsistently treated, theme in the migration literature. Migration classics such as Castles and Kosack (1973), Piore (1979) and Castles and Miller (1993) draw out a number of key temporal themes in the process of migration into Europe and other advanced industrial societies. These include the (initially) temporary nature of labour migration, migrant workers’ willingness to do jobs under time constraints (shift and night work, job insecurity) which are unattractive to the host-country workforce, the passage from a transient state to a more permanent attachment to the host society, and the stability and evolution of migrants’ social networks over time at varying stages of the labour migration process. The ‘temporariness’ of migration coupled with the postponement of return (which may eventually become a ‘myth’ – Anwar 1979) sets up a series of conflicts and ambivalences relating to ethnic identity and assimilation, cultural belonging and multiculturalism, family ties to ‘home’ and ‘abroad’, diasporas and transnational spaces (Roberts 1995; Westin 1998). Finally, constructions of citizenship and legal requirements for residence and work permits or naturalisation are often suffused with temporal language and precise ‘time gates’ for access (Cwerner 2001: 10; see also Bauböck 1998; Hammar 1994).

In the most original part of his analysis, Cwerner (2001: 17-30) sets out an eight-fold conceptual framework for the ‘times of migration’. Empirical examples are drawn from his fieldwork with Brazilian immigrants in London, but the scheme probably holds for most immigrant groups that have migrated cross-culturally and hence experience ‘cultures of time’, that is to say ‘complex clusters or articulations of a diversity of temporal perceptions, representations, rhythms and organisation’ (Cwerner 2001: 17). Although all of the following eight ‘times’ can be experienced simultaneously, there is a sense of development of a (Brazilian) ‘immigrant career’ contained in the listing. The first three (strange, heteronomous and asynchronous times) are concerned with practical and symbolic levels of adjustment to the host society and so are more or less pressing issues from the moment of arrival. The second group (remembered, collage and liminal times) become more expressive as the immigrant experience develops. And the final pair (nomadic and diasporic times) are part of the long-term temporal outlook of the migrant experience.
Strange times. Immigrants arrive with their own temporal baggage, some of which has to be jettisoned in order to conform to the socio-temporal organisation of life in the host society. A whole new semiotics of time has to be learnt (Zerubavel 1987). Examples include adjustment to the weather, the seasons and different lengths of day and night (especially for migrants moving from low to high latitudes); differences in the ‘pace’ of life, punctuality (for work, social appointments) and the ‘elasticity’ of time; and attitudes towards eating, drinking and meal-times (e.g. Brazilians’ reactions to British pub culture or eating whilst working).

Heteronomous times. Migrants become subject to different laws and rules which create temporal alienation: their time, and use of it, are perceived to be beyond their control. Hence, whilst ‘strange times’ can be adapted to, heteronomous times are largely unavoidable, except by taking radical and possibly illegal steps. Key examples of heteronomous times include the ‘time rules’ for the issue of visas and work permits, and the wider regime of immigration control in which immigrants are caught in a series of ‘time traps’. For Brazilians in London, there is a stark contrast between the freedom of choice that prompted them to migrate (most are of educated and wealthy background and migrated for ‘adventure’), and the strong sense of fear and oppression that develops when they lose their ‘time sovereignty’. For this migrant group there are various possible mechanisms for escaping time traps, at least for a while: becoming a student by enrolling in an English-language school; acquiring EU citizenship (for those who can ‘prove’ a European parent or grandparent); or marriage to a British or EU citizen.

Asynchronous times. In the past, distance and the slow speed of travel and communication created ‘time rifts’ between immigrants and their homeland. Immigrants engage a series of strategies to keep in touch with their country of origin via newspapers and magazines, videos, letters, telephone calls, satellite TV, email and the Internet. As these communicative media become more instant and accessible, migrants can to some extent, overcome the time lags and ‘resynchronise’ with their homeland. Nevertheless certain disjunctures remain – time zones, different calendars, festival days etc. Brazilians in London are forced to celebrate carnival indoors, in winter!

Remembered times. Memory provides another temporal link to the (imagined) homeland, although this link may fade with the passage of time. Remembered times are activated and expressed both through a general feeling of nostalgia (the Brazilian saudade) and via specific events and material artefacts – photographs, memorabilia, national food, music and dances. Social gatherings of Brazilians abroad ‘create distinctive smellscapes, soundscapes and touchscapes … that are crucial for individual and collective practices of remembering’ (Cwerner 2001: 24). Over time another remembering evolves – that of migration itself. ‘Veteran’ migrants construct narratives of their own migration – which are deployed to create both continuities and distinctions within the immigrant community.

Collage times. The globalisation of communication and information systems juxtaposes images and representations of countries and cultures in an almost random collage. This is especially the case in media and popular culture. Thus, when moving abroad, immigrants have to contend with the fact that their own memories and narratives are challenged by alternative images of themselves and their homeland which circulate in the media of the host nation. Immigrants are faced with stereotypes and caricatures of themselves and their country of origin.
(Rapport 1995). For Brazilians these images focus on carnival, poverty, street children and the destruction of the Amazon rainforest. What is more, these images are presented in news and documentary fragments that are temporally disconnected – the immigrants’ home country is ‘just an ingredient in a media salad’ (Cwerner 2001: 26).

- **Liminal times.** For many migrants, and certainly Brazilians in London, the nature of their migration is seen as temporary and transitional; they are in a constant state of indecision. This is partly because of the way they see their own migration project – as temporary yet open-ended – and partly because of the lack of certainty imposed by the host society’s rules and regulations about immigration (see heteronomous times, above). Their condition is suffused with liminality; they are ‘betwixt and between’ the home and the host countries. Cwerner is eloquent about Brazilians’ liminal lives and times in London, describing the kinds of limbo and temporal flexibility and uncertainty in which they are entrapped as transient and transitional subjects. ‘Many immigrants are ultimately on their own, drifting between informal networks of friends and fellow immigrants, lacking the most basic citizenship rights, and just managing to hang on the periphery of the new economy of the global city’ (2001: 29). But liminality is not only about transition, its fundamental ambivalence creates time ‘out of the ordinary’, when anything can happen. When the temporal horizon is short-term and unpredictable, the ‘old rules’ do not apply – for instance as regards career progression, family obligations and personal relationships. Migrants’ liminality ‘introduces a time when various masks can be worn and identities disguised … (this) favours ambiguous forms of temporality: uncertain, contingent and episodic’ (Cwerner 2001: 30). Nor is this liminal status necessarily erased when migrants return home. Indeed, for many, these liminal times continue after return, which often prompts re-emigration.

- **Diasporic times** represent the times of long-term settlement; they thrive when immigrant communities recreate, to some extent, the rhythms of social life of the homeland in the host society. By effecting a new kind of collective synchronisation, diasporas also tend to re-territorialise national times and narratives, reinstating a new kind of familiar time in place of the earlier uprootings of migration. According to Lavie and Swedenburg (1996: 17) diasporas are a ‘third time-space’, alternative to the temporariness of both the nation-state and of modernity; they express a time of indefinite origins, a time of constructing a ‘home away from home’. In London, Brazilians have so far struggled to create institutions and structures that could underpin such long-term continuity.

- **Nomadic times.** Between the liminal and the diasporic, migrants are seen as the bearers of new time conceptualisations and practices; as ‘time pioneers’ who are able to problematise and challenge dominant temporal constructs and devise new ways of thinking about and using time (Horning *et al.* 1995; Nowotny 1994). Migration becomes a way of life, never settling (for good), never returning (for good). The linear and staged life-paths of the ‘conventional’ life-course (singlehood, marriage, a family, residential stability, the career ladder) become fragmented and partial. Nomadic times are the discontinuous and heterogeneous times of uncertainty, adventure: ‘time out’ as a lifestyle. Brazilians in London lead highly individualised lives and ‘strategically use opportunities and constraints to experiment with their life-paths and self-development’ (Cwerner 2001: 30). Cwerner concludes on a utopian note: nomadic migrants ‘preview the temporal possibilities that are opened up by a truly global free movement of people, in
which personal biographies become almost totally dissociated from the narratives and histories of nation-states’ (2001: 30).

What we can conclude from Cwerner’s path-breaking attempt to theorise the temporal aspects of international migration? Three sets of points emerge. The first set echoes Cwerner’s own conclusions: ‘the times of migration, by increasing the number and intensifying the nature of temporal borders between and within nations, various social groups and individuals, reveal fundamental aspects of the global cultural geography that is being shaped by a growing set of transnational social practices ... The focus on the temporal experience of migrants can illuminate the nature of migration itself, its twists and turns, meanings and ambivalence, and the way that, in a diversity of ways, it dis-places and re-embeds people and communities around the world’ (Cwerner 2001: 32, emphasis in original). Second, there is the double challenge to the definition of the nation-state and to migration and citizenship policy. Transnational migrant practices blur traditional ethno-national allegiances and identities. Diasporic and nomadic times are crucial elements in new discourses that challenge the citizenship model of the nation-state, although there is a reflective backlash here in the way that newly-reinforced national identities are often articulated against the immigrant Other. Policy-wise, immigration policy is often constructed on the basis of short-term issues which violate the time horizons of migrant life-paths and livelihoods and which show little concern for migrants’ marginal and vulnerable status. This is the case even when other evidence squarely supports the economic case for immigration. Thirdly, despite the tautologically temporal nature of time, Cwerner’s analysis is essentially a kind of cross-sectional analysis of different dimensions of time which does not fully allow the life-histories of migrants to emerge. This leads into the next three sections of this report, which are more methodological dealing with, in turn, a typology of methods for comparison (section 3), the life-course approach (section 4), and longitudinal studies (section 5).
2 COMPARATIVE STRATEGIES FOR STUDYING TIME IN MIGRATION

In contrast to Cwerner’s approach to theorising and categorising the multiple roles of time in migration, this section adopts a more pragmatic stance. We concentrate here on setting out a range of methodologies for studying migration and migrants from a temporal perspective. Our emphasis is specifically on comparative studies, both across space and, more particularly, across and through time. Time can be considered either as a continuous variable (through life-history profiles of individual migrants or migrant groups) or as a discontinuous one (comparison of different time periods as cross-sections). In fact, this gives only a first clue as to the diversity of time-based comparative studies of migrants and migration.

3.1 Historical and geographical comparisons

Before we go any further, a trio of general points. Firstly, good, thorough cross-national comparisons of migration and integration processes are still in their infancy in Europe. The vigorous resurgence of research on migration in recent decades has by and large been a singly-country phenomenon (Portes 1997: 818). Certainly, numerous conferences have brought together European and North American scholars and many edited books and reports have been published, but such collections rarely do more than describe how things have evolved in different countries with, at most, a token effort at comparative analysis.

Second, not only has cross-national research been limited, but also cross-temporal comparisons are still in their infancy. According to Carlos Moya (2005), one of the most serious weaknesses in migration studies is the lack of dialogue between scholars who study the pre-1930 and post-1960 migration eras. Moya diagnoses part of the problem in the lack of cross-disciplinary communication: because the former flow is studied mainly by historians and the latter one by sociologists, anthropologists and political scientists, two distinct scholarly corpora has been created that barely speak to each other.

Third, a question: what historical periods of time should therefore be considered? Studies of migration and relocation in Ancient Greece and Rome reveal some striking similarities with contemporary European migrations with regard to patterns of mobility and debates over citizenship (Segal 1993: 8-9). Standard histories of European migration tend to start in the seventeenth century (Lucassen and Lucassen 1999; Moch 2003). From such studies, several broad historical generalisations stand out. European migration is set within a world-system in which Europe exploited human and natural resources since the sixteenth century, exported people to a global and colonially-defined labour market in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and then imported labour migrants in the twentieth century (Moch 2003: 6). Both the scale (geographical range) and type of migration evolved over time. Tilly (1978) describes a historical scheme which starts with local migration (for marriage, land and work) and progresses to circular and seasonal migration (typically for harvest work), and then to chain migration (rural-urban and international migration links become consolidated over time and across generations) and career migration (migrations of colonisation and long-term labour migration). To this evolutionary typology should perhaps be added coerced migration of refugees and displaced persons in the twentieth century (Moch 2003: 17). More technically complex is Zelinksy’s (1971) well-known hypothesis of the mobility transition which integrates within a similar historical time-frame the phases of ‘modernisation’ with demographic evolution and
migratory types, including international moves. From a European perspective he identifies successive phases of overseas colonisation and worker migration, labour immigration, and skilled and professional circulation. And yet, throughout this historical sequence of types and scales of European migration, the primary determinants of migration remain surprisingly constant: they are the fundamental structures of economic life – landholding systems, labour demands in rural and urban areas and at home and abroad, the distribution and deployment of capital, and demographic trends (Moch 1999).

For the purposes of this report, however, we restrict the historical frame of reference largely to the post-1945 period, but also acknowledging the value of comparisons with earlier phases of European migration in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Lucassen and Lucassen (1999: 22-4) argue strongly for such historical depth in migration studies in order to counter what they see as the narrow-mindedness of the ‘ethnicity-forever’ approach and the prematurely sweeping conclusions of ‘transnational communities’ research.

3.2 Typologies of comparison

Nancy Green (1999) has proposed a useful typology for comparative migration studies and has advanced some powerful arguments (but also caveats) for the comparative method. The process of international migration embodies an explicit or implicit comparison between past and present, one place and another, two languages and two sets of cultural norms. Comparison goes beyond the specificity of national and ethnic case-studies; it enables the researcher to understand what is specific and what is general in the phenomenon of migration – in other words what is structural, what is localised and what lies in the agency of the migrants themselves. Green points out (1999: 60) that the comparative method implies a triple choice: that of the subject (in our case, migration and integration), that of the unit (the migrant groups to be studied), and that of the level of analysis (the family, the city, the country etc.). But expectations of what the comparative method can achieve should not be too high. While two cases are usually better than one, care must be taken in the choice of the cases to be compared. Above all, there must be some logical basis for the choice. Probably not much would be gained from a comparison of Maltese and Chinese emigration, for instance. And comparisons may lead in different directions. Green (1999: 59) gives the case of the French Jews: should they be compared with French Catholics or Protestants, or with other Jews?

Green goes on (1999: 67-71) to identify three common types of comparisons in migration studies: linear (one group before and after migration), convergent (different migrant groups in one place), and divergent (the same migrant group in different places). Each bears further elaboration.

The linear model – following a Sicilian migrant of a hundred years ago to the tenements of Chicago, or a postwar Portuguese farm labourer to Paris – builds an implicit ‘before and after’ comparison into the history of the migrant’s experience. Demuth (2000) refines the before-after approach by developing a four-phase model through which to trace the migrant experience: the start of the migration, the migration journey, arrival, and the sojourn phase. Even this is not the whole story: we need to consider what happens subsequently. Does the migrant return home? What happens when s/he dies – where is the body buried? What about the second and further generations?
Second, the *convergent model* has been used frequently in studies of immigrant groups, especially in the United States where, historically, Italians and Jews have been the groups most often involved in comparative sets. Generally, a city is the reference point, and ‘cultural origins’ are taken as key explanatory variables for the varying modes and rates of adaptation and incorporation over time. Van Niekerk’s recent study of Afro- and Indo-Caribbeans in the Netherlands presents an interesting variation on the convergent model by taking two different ethnic groups from the same geographical origin and relating their pre-migration legacies to their differential educational and employment experiences in the destination country (van Niekerk 2004). Staying with the Dutch case, Vermeulen and Penninx (2000) offer a much broader treatment of the integration experiences of various minority ethnic groups, following the convergent research design.

Thirdly, the *divergent model* locates the explanation of difference at the points of arrival, not in the places of departure as in the prior model. Following Jews through their diaspora (Schnapper 1988) or tracing and comparing Italian migrants in their various destination countries (Gabaccia 2000) are familiar examples which are generally set at a fairly macro level of aggregate analysis. More micro-scale are anthropological investigations which trace migrants from one community to their different destinations – what is sometimes called the ‘village outward’ approach (Baily 1992). Compared to convergent studies, divergent studies are rare, perhaps because the premise of such a comparison works against the notion of group unity (Green 1999: 69). However, the study of single ethno-national groups in different destinations is potentially important in order to evaluate the relative weight of migrant cultural factors vis-à-vis economic and other factors at the place of settlement. Nancy Foner’s well-known work on West Indians in London and New York provides a good illustration of this; they are much more successful in the latter city (Foner 1979).

The above three-fold classification can be extended. Some comparisons can be *parallel* rather than convergent or divergent. Two examples are the study of the Irish in England and the Poles in Germany in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Belchem and Tenfelde 2003), or the comparison of Turks in Germany and Algerians in France in the 1960s and 1970s (Manfrass 1991): both these studies are of low-status workers migrating to industrial societies. Other studies combine convergent and divergent approaches, such as Zontini’s (2002a) ‘double comparative’ study of Moroccan and Filipino women in Bologna and Barcelona. And we should not overlook the possibility of building the host-society population into our comparative frameworks; or, where relevant, the home-society non-migrant population.

Lucassen (2004) rightly points out that, although the models in Green’s typology are by nature historical, based on migrant processes expressed through time, they are, nevertheless, essentially *synchronic* because the analysis is restricted to one specific time period of a few decades of migration and settlement. *Diachronic* approaches compare migrants across explicit time periods and may, in turn, be combined with the linear, convergent and divergent models of Green. *Diachronic linear* studies are not

---

2 Zontini’s study was based on a doctoral thesis (Zontini 2002b), one of several recently completed at the University of Sussex which employ an explicit comparative approach with multi-sited fieldwork. Other examples include Ammassari’s (2003) study of the emigration and return of Ghanaian and Ivorian elite migrants (see also Ammassari 2004), with field surveys carried out in Accra, Abidjan, London and Paris; and Odmalm’s (2004) thesis on the political behaviour of migrant groups in Malmö and Rotterdam, based on surveys with four immigrant groups, two of which were common to both cities (Turks and Iranians) and two of which were not (Chileans in Malmö, Surinamese in Rotterdam).
very common; they compare different cohorts of the same migrant group in the same
destination at different time periods – for instance the Irish in Britain in the late
nineteenth century with those of the 1950s and 1960s migration wave. Such studies
are usually implicit in general histories of the migration of certain groups with a long-
term experience of migration, as the Irish have (Jackson 1963). Diachronic
convergent studies are more common: in this case two or more immigrant groups are
compared across two periods of time in the same location – city, region, country. For
American studies see Alba and Nee (2003) and Gerstle and Mollenkopf (2001); and
for European analyses see the general historical study by Lucassen and Penninx
(1997) on the Netherlands, and the more focused study by Lucassen (2004) on the
integration of Poles (1880-1940) and Turks (1960-2000) in the German Ruhr. Finally
the diachronic divergent type looks at the cross-time comparison of a migrant group
of gypsy migrations as an example.

Of course, comparisons across time, of any type, are not always straightforward.
Lack of data may obstruct the comparison and the ‘worlds’ the migrants are moving
into are likely to be very different as regards economic opportunities, social
characteristics, gender relations, technologies etc. Nevertheless, the value of
comparative historical research on migrant groups remains potentially powerful.
Above all it can reveal long-term lessons from the past about family structures,
generational evolution, social networks, education, employment, residential mobility
and housing, mixed marriages and other aspects of integration which may not yet be
evident in recent immigrations.

In the ensuing sections of the report we expand further on many of the
comparative strategies mentioned above: life-course studies which are more or less
continuous through time; longitudinal datasets where temporal evolution is measured
by annual registers or periodic censuses; and generational comparisons which
structure the temporal cross-sections by the evolving demographics of the migrant
group.
3 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND THE LIFE-COURSE

This section examines the connections between the changing human life-course, patterns of international migration and consequent implications for migrants and the sending and receiving societies. While the focus is on the current situation and prospects for the near future, the topic requires a brief historical or ‘developmental’ introduction to the notion and the nature of the ‘life-course’.

Thinkers and writers in all literate societies have made generalisations about the ‘stages of life’, from infancy to the decrepitude that some reach in advanced old age. Until the 20th century, these representations had the character more of religious tracts or imaginative literature than scientific or evidence-based writing, and they were commonly framed around metaphors of the ‘journey of life’ and its states, change or metamorphosis (Cole and Winkler 1994; Eastman 1996).

The notion of the life-cycle, especially the family life-cycle, was introduced in the early-mid 20th century; Rossi employed this framework in his 1955 classic Why Families Move, a study of residential mobility in Philadelphia. The family life-cycle model continued to drive research on internal migration for the succeeding twenty years (Boyle et al. 1998: 105-09), but there was also growing criticism of its normative and deterministic nature – the notion that life is somehow pre-structured and leading back to where it came from (Bryman et al. 1987: 2). Frankenberg (1987), evaluating the relative merits of the terms life-cycle, life trajectory and life pilgrimage, opted for the last on the grounds that ‘pilgrimage’ ‘fruitfully combines individual choice with awareness of structure, the instrumental with the expressive, the passage of time with passage through space, and the symbolic with the signifying’ (1987: 137). However the term that has come to be accepted as optimally representative of individuals’ ordered-yet-negotiated diversity through their space-times lives is life-course.

The life-course became prominent in both family sociology and developmental psychology during the 1960s (Neugarten and Daton 1973). It ‘provided a way of examining the interrelationship between individual development and the family’s development as a collective unit … under changing historical and social contexts. … Unlike the [concepts of the] individual “life cycle” and the “family cycle”, the life-course paradigm … emphasises the timing by which individuals make their transitions into and out of various roles and development tasks in relation to “social time clocks”’ (Hareven 1996: 31). The relevance to migration is immediately apparent: the life-course framework contextualises not only individual and group decisions about the timing of migrations but also their formative influences and outcomes.

Life-course approaches in sociology, which can inform migration studies, focus on the socially-constructed roles and positions of people at different ages, both within their families and in relation to society. It is these, rather than the individual’s physical or mental states, that have been transformed by urbanisation, industrialisation and post-modernisation processes. To illustrate briefly, infancy is a physiological constant, but ‘childhood’ was the product of late-industrialism, the period of life during which a person is socialised, educated and trained for later economic roles. Similarly, old-age frailty is a constant, but ‘retirement’ an invention of the social protection measures introduced in late-industrialism as a stage of the life-course during which paid work ceases and people are supported by their accumulated savings and the productive efforts of younger people.
4.1 Migration and age

Students of migration, especially those with a background in both demography and sociology, were interested in the relationship between chronological age and migration propensity before their understanding was conceptualised in a life-course framework. Bogue (1968) described the relationship between age and migration as it manifested itself in the mid-20\textsuperscript{th} century; his focus, like other studies of this ilk, was on internal migration in developed societies. Young teenagers tended to show the lowest migration rates, while a sharp peak in the migration rate occurred in the late teens and early twenties (Rogers and Castro 1981, 1986), followed by a steep but exponentially declining decrease in rates. The only departure from the unimodal form was a decrease in the migration rate in the first few years of life. Children of six years of age were less migratory than those of six months: a feature readily explained by the likely migration rate of their parents.

During the 1970s and 1980s, two departures in old age from the post-adolescence exponential decline were shown, one relating to a 'retirement-age' peak, the other to a positive association between age above 75 years and residential mobility. Both census and behavioural studies established that among populations with a high standard of living and high life expectancy, there is a temporary rise in propensity to migrate around the normal age of retirement from full-time paid work (Cribier 1989a, 1989b; Karn 1977; Law and Warnes 1980, 1982).

After the age of 50 years, the likelihood of moving peaks among people in their early 60s and is positively related to income, social class and house ownership. Long-distance moves (including international migration) are most likely among married couples and those who have been most mobile earlier in life. These moves are particularly pronounced from large metropolitan areas and, not being balanced by counter-flows (unlike most other migration streams), have a significant redistributive effect on the location of the elderly population, as shown most clearly for Florida (Rogers 1989). Analysis of census data and surveys of retirement migrants have enabled the characteristics of the participants in these long-distance migrations to be described (Warnes 1983). Retirement peak migrations are now prominent in international migrations by northern Europeans, and displace many thousands a year to Mediterranean destinations (King et al. 2000). This latter topic is described in more detail in section 9.3.

The other departure from the exponential decline of migration propensity with age involves moves in advanced old age. Studies from nations with continuous registration data, and improved disaggregation of census series by single years of age after 65 years, have shown the existence of a rising propensity to migrate among those who survive beyond their mid-70s (Poulain 1988). Unlike the retirement peak moves, most of these are short-distance, intra-urban moves and they are most likely among single, divorced and widowed persons. It is likely that the majority are triggered by bereavement, ill-health, frailty and increasing dependency.

4.2 Life-course stages as a stimulus of migration

Put simply, contemporary highly-developed or post-modern societies display three life-course stages, characterised successively by socialisation, economic and family production, and retirement. For ease of reference, these can be termed the first, second and third ages of the contemporary life-course. The sequence stimulates migration both directly and in subtle ways that play out over time. The direct stimulus is readily
understood. In the language of microeconomics, the optimal locations for each stage of life are not the same. For example, the countries or regions which maximise job and earnings opportunities differ from those which maximise the material standard of living and quality of life in retirement. As individuals and households progress from one stage to the next, their ‘optimum location requirements’ change, and the transitions stimulate many to migrate.

The connection was recognised by the pioneer student of migration, E.G. Ravenstein (1885), when he noted that young adults predominated among migrants. He inferred the dominance of the economic motive with the phrase that they moved ‘to improve themselves in material respects’, and he identified differences in migration propensities between males and females, foregrounding our discussion in section 6, below.

More subtle connections between life-course stages and migration arise first because the calculation of where it is best to live is not simply for one day or the next month, but is to a greater or lesser extent a prospective assessment (Figure 2). Migrants are of course concerned with their short-term earnings and standard of life, but they are also motivated by better prospects in the years to come for themselves and, among many, for their partners and dependants. It is not rare for the calculus to incorporate their children’s prospects even beyond the parents’ or decision-makers’ lifetimes. However, it is also the case that some migrants fail in their goals – say to find a well-paid job or a high-quality residential setting for retirement – and therefore reverse their decision and return. Others realise (or knew all along) that the migration entails losses as well as gains. Many distance themselves from close relatives and friends; many go to countries in which they cannot speak the language or have little knowledge of the local job and housing markets or social and health services; and many migrate to countries in which they are ‘outsiders’, with fewer rights and entitlements than the citizens, and in which they may be subject to discrimination, exploitation, exclusion and abuse.

![Figure 2 Migration and the accumulation of human capital through the life-course](image_url)

Many migrations can be rated a success or failure within a few weeks or months. The life-course paradigm draws our attention, however, to the long-term consequences for the migrant, their dependants and descendants, and indeed the family members that they leave in the regions of origin. Some parents or siblings
benefit from remittances sent home; others are deprived of the practical support and social engagement that the migrant once provided as part of a family-based residential grouping. King’s (2004) recent work in Albania provides a vivid case-study of the widespread material and emotional deprivation in the country’s interior villages that have been heavily depopulated by out-migration – this, too, is picked up again later, in section 9.3.

4.3 Life-stages, human capital and the consequences for migration

As longevity and the duration of retirement have increased in developed societies, so the accumulation of material and social resources, or human capital, during working age becomes an increasingly influential factor in the quality of life in old age. The concept of ‘human capital’ has mainly been applied to a young adult’s skills, knowledge and assets acquired from upbringing and education, and which are deployed in the competition for employment and status through early and mid-adult life. The concept is however readily adaptable to the circumstances of a person on the threshold of old age or retirement, and usefully illuminates the long-term consequences of having been an international migrant.

Many components of comparative advantage of human capital at the two major life transitions, from the first to the second ages, and from the second to the third, are the same. Assets and income condition the material standard of life at all life stages, but both a priori reasoning and observation suggest that other dimensions of human capital have markedly different weights at the two major life-stage transitions. For instance, social networks are less likely to influence the quality of life in retirement than occupational positioning and progress; while health, wealth and current and deferred income (or pension) endowments are considerably more variable among those in the seventh and later decades of life than among those in their 20s.

Variations in the resources that a migrant has accumulated arise in several ways. Aspects of a person’s migration and family histories, particularly the ages at which they moved and took up permanent residence, and where they married and had children, influence the locations of and the relationships with their close and extended kin – and therefore the availability of both routine and ‘crisis’ informal social and instrumental support. Then, the migrant’s personal history interacts with the national policy towards immigrants to determine their state welfare entitlements – pensions, income benefits, health and personal social services, and social or subsidised housing and long-term care.

As in the general population, a migrant’s educational and occupational backgrounds correlate with their lifetime earnings and income and assets in old age. The socio-economic background also strongly influences migrants’ knowledge of the host country’s welfare system and their ability to make use of the available services, especially through their language skills. These capacities are modified by information received from their relatives and friends, and by whether the migrant can turn to a community association for advice. Access to and the utilisation of services will also be strongly influenced by the receptiveness of the country’s housing, health and personal social services agencies and their staff to immigrants and cultural minorities. In short, both for young economic or labour migrants, and for retirement and amenity-seeking older migrants, there are complex relationships between their migration history, current social position, national policies, and their access to social security, housing privileges and informal and formal care (Warnes and Ford 1995).
4.4 Migration, development inequalities and differential life-course stages

The life-course interacts with international migrations and particularly their long-term outcomes in a yet more intricate way. All students of migration are aware of the representation in classical economics of net migration as the movement of a factor of production, labour, from regions of low to higher economic opportunities and wages. ‘Factor equilibrium theory’ offers one insight into and a partial understanding of a large category of international migrations, although it must never be seen as deterministic or even as necessarily the most powerful causal influence.

On a global scale, however, wide differentials in levels of development and economic opportunities associate with the forms and durations of the life-course. International migrants relocating from the least developed to the most developed world regions not only move (by definition) between countries and levels of economic development, but also into socio-demographic and welfare environments that are quite different from those that they leave. The long-term consequences for their social position and welfare are profound. To pursue this point, it is useful to outline the way in which the life-course has been transformed over the last 150 years. While a full exposition would require extensive references to demographic, social and economic history, the main features have been summarised on Figure 3.

The diagram represents five situations that can be placed both in a chronology for the most developed countries, say in Europe or North America, and in a comparative global framework of the level of contemporary economic development. The topmost graph represents the life-course as experienced by the majority of men and women in late-industrial or mid-nineteenth century Europe. Average life expectancy at birth was little more than 40 years, although this low figure was strongly influenced by the very high rate of infant mortality: in the worst industrial cities, as many as 25 per cent of all infants died in the first year of life. Infectious diseases, malnutrition and industrial accidents contributed to mortality at all adult ages, and few survived beyond 70 years of age. Compulsory schooling had not been introduced, and most children contributed to household production, farm or factory work from a very young age. Only the children of a minority of the affluent received education or experienced a ‘modern’ childhood. Nor had pensions been introduced, except for senior government, army and naval officers. Modern retirement for the majority did not exist. The life-course was dominated by the ‘second age’. These conditions broadly continue in the least developed countries of the contemporary world.

The second graph represents the situation in Europe during the 1930s. By then, longevity had increased substantially, compulsory elementary education was widespread, and retirement pensions had been introduced although by no means universally. Many other details can be interpreted from this graph and from those for later years. The underlying historical trend has been for the duration of the first and third ages to increase, and for the second age to contract. By the late twentieth century, the occupational structure had lost most unskilled manual jobs (although routine service occupations – many of them carried out by immigrants – were still numerous). To equip the population for the more demanding and skilled occupations, not only had secondary education become universal, but a majority of young people engaged in some form of further vocational education or training. The period of ‘socialisation’ had extended for most to 18 years of age, and for many for several years longer.
Figure 3  The changing life-course in Europe, 1850s to 2030s

Notes: \( E^0 \) is average life expectancy at birth (both sexes). \( E^{0\frac{1}{4}} \) is the age to which one quarter of the birth cohort is expected to survive. \( E^0 \) in England and Wales in 1930-32 was 58.7 years for men and 62.9 years for women. In 2000-02 the comparable figures were 78.7 and 83.3 years. By 2001, one quarter of males in that year’s birth cohort would attain 85 years, and one quarter of females would attain 89 years.
The final graph is a speculative attempt to represent the life-course stages in the most developed countries 25 years from now. Most observers would agree that the period of education and training will continue to increase for more and more young people into their mid-twenties (although life-long retraining and learning will also become more extensive). There is considerable uncertainty about the relative durations of the second and third ages. On the one hand, governments are increasingly persuaded that early retirement should be suppressed and replaced by phased withdrawal from the labour force; on the other hand, most workers continue to prefer early retirement if they rate their retirement income prospects as satisfactory.

So, over the last century and more, the nature of the life-course and the disposition of its stages have been radically transformed. This has several clear implications for international migrants, particularly those who move between ‘level of development’ zones. Most economic migrants from low to highly developed countries enter a ‘life-course stage context’ that differs greatly from that in which they have been socialised or gained early work experience. Their socialisation and skills acquisition put them in a weak position in competitive labour markets. They are particularly ill-prepared to finance their retirement (which generally will be forced upon them).

It also needs to be recognised that migrants and international migrations are much more diverse than the contemporary European mass-media discourse about young ‘economic migrants’ and ‘asylum-seekers’ recognises. In the UK, the most common reports nowadays are of young, single people from Eastern Europe and China staffing big city hotels, slaving in restaurants, working as casual pickers on fruit farms, and collecting sea-food on dangerous mudflats. Then there are frequent columns about the high dependence of several public services, from public transport to senior medical positions, on people trained overseas and attracted by targeted recruitment programmes. Both representations deform the picture of the nature of migration in European societies and its importance to our economies and societies, and the experience of the people involved. There is a tendency to see migrants as autonomous, making individual calculations about what they can earn and where, and their decisions as no more consequential on the migrants’ lives than a decision where to spend one’s next summer holiday.

In fact, except for the youngest migrants, most have partners and spouses, and the decision to move hundreds or thousands of kilometres for work has substantial impacts on the daily lives and the medium and long-term prospects of not only the migrants but also their families and others. From the perspective of the migrants, and in relation to the long-term consequences of international migration on both origin and destination countries or regions, the ‘decision to migrate’ needs to be conceived as a diachronic process which has both a ‘formation’ period and outcomes that play out over time, and which involves several decisions with consequences for many people. Gender and family dimensions of these migration decisions and consequences are dealt with in more detail in sections 6 and 7.

4.5 Multiple affiliations and residences

Radical improvements in international transport and travel in recent decades, combined with the spread of high incomes and wealth, have recently introduced another complication in the relationship between the life-course and migration, and not only for the most affluent. There is growing evidence from Northern European countries, specifically the Netherlands, Belgium, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland, that long-term international migrants who reach retirement are choosing to maintain
links and residences in both their adopted and their origin countries (and some in third countries too). This has been well illustrated by Poulain and Perrin (2002) using Belgium’s continuous registration data (Figure 4). Turkish-born residents of Belgium migrate to and from their origin country at all ages. Both the inward and the departure flows show the ‘young adult’ and ‘retirement’ transition peaks. The motivations are economic, social and quality of life. Both the lower living costs in Turkey and the superior health and social services in Belgium are attractors. Maintaining dual residence opportunities (with the help of relatives and friends) enables the migrants to maximise their social and family contacts and quality of life. Poulain and Perrin comment that some Turkish-Belgian migrants prefer to spend the winters in Belgium because the houses have central heating! Similar reports have been made by Bolzman and his colleagues with reference to Italian and Spanish older labour migrants in Switzerland (Bolzman et al. 2004).

![Figure 4 Turkish migrants to/from Belgium, 1991-97](image)

**Source:** Poulain and Perrin (2002)

Second-home ownership and the growth of peripatetic residential patterns introduce further complexity into mobility patterns over the life-course. Seasonal migration is increasing among the young retired population in North America. Little hard information on the same phenomenon exists in Europe, but there is no doubt that increasing numbers of retired people are spending many weeks or months in Mediterranean resorts (see 9.3, below). No clear distinction exists between a long winter-break holiday and a seasonal migration between multiple homes.

The relationship between household change and residence is also growing more complicated for younger adults. Rising age-participation rates in tertiary education and vocational training are spreading the transitional or adolescent life-course stage of alternating residence patterns, associated in England and Wales with university students. Private households of unrelated young-adult individuals in rented, leased or mortgaged properties are becoming more common in Britain and North America, and in other European countries too. Pre-marriage and post-divorce sexual unions lead frequently to cohabitation in single households, themselves difficult to monitor using standard sources. Sometimes such partnerships are formed and sustained while maintaining two residences: ‘living apart together’. Over the past few years, the
custom has grown of stable partners keeping two properties; often one is near a city centre and occupied during the working week, while the other is extra-metropolitan and retreated to at weekends. Other configurations, with shared properties in remoter rural areas or abroad, have also multiplied.

These new social forms represent subtle transformations of the life-course within the second age, particularly with respect to social reproduction and family roles. They prompt the suggestion that the coincidence between a ‘minimal household unit’, nuclear family group or other co-resident group and a single dwelling unit is breaking down. Contemporary life-styles increasingly involve peripatetic residential patterns at two or more addresses, and increasingly too cross-nationally. These will be exceptionally difficult to measure using conventional sources, not least because fiscal rules encourage the participants to present themselves as individuals separately resident at different addresses.

4.6 The research agenda

What are the implications of setting migration decisions in a life-course framework for future research? The clear implication is that migration must be conceived not as a single relocation decision by an individual at a moment in time. Such a conception neglects important aspects of the formative and decision-making processes, and, crucially, pays no attention to the outcomes and consequences of the migration in both the short and long terms. Second, migrations need to be understood in their household, family and temporal contexts: a theme we return to in section 7. Thirdly, as the length of retirement has grown to a significant period for most people, the migrant’s economic calculations are increasingly influenced by his/her prospects and opportunities not only in the second age but also the third age. Fourthly, we need a deeper ethnography of migration decision-making, with studies that consider the influence and interest of the closest relatives of the migrant cross-sectionally and in the future. Finally, migration policies will increasingly need to be informed not only by the labour market and economic growth implications for the host country, but also by considerations of the extent to which the social welfare and quality of life of the migrants when they reach the third age are protected and raised to the national norms.
4 LONGITUDINAL STUDIES OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRANTS

Despite a widely-held view that longitudinal data offer the very best basis for an understanding of migration processes, especially those processes that relate to gender issues and stages in the life course (Black et al. 2002; Ekinsmith 1996), there are surprisingly few studies of immigration and integration in the countries of the EU that fully depend upon this form of data.\(^3\) What makes this all the more surprising is that early influential studies had strong longitudinal elements in them. One might recall, for example, Ann Cornelisen’s (1969, 1976, 1980) delightful ‘non-academic’ trilogy of migrants’ lives in both Torregreca (Southern Italy) and Ulm (Germany).

So, despite the persuasiveness and realism of the longitudinal perspective within non-academic writing, the academic field of migration studies has largely ignored this approach. There are probably many reasons for this, but undoubtedly among the most important is the paucity of data. Both at the level of published data series (such as censuses) and individual research projects (such as research for a PhD), the norm is for the data to refer to the situation at a point in time. Longitudinal datasets are very expensive to generate (if based on censuses) and are very limited in the range of material they contain (if based on population registers). And within the time and resource constraints of a PhD thesis project, it is impossible to generate the rich data needed for (quantitative) longitudinal research.

Are we to interpret this absence to mean that there is little of value to be expected from a longitudinal approach? Not at all. But it does mean that we are encouraged to emphasise more the potential for such studies than their already-established contribution.

5.1 Existing approaches to longitudinal analysis of migrants

Existing contributions can be grouped under six headings: the oral history approach; other qualitative studies; quantitative analysis; empirical studies of immigrants based on panel data; empirical studies of emigrants based on panel data; and empirical studies of the social and geographical mobility of immigrants based on linked-census-record studies. We take each briefly in turn, and then focus in more detail on the sixth type.

- **Qualitative studies: the oral history approach.** Many believe that one of the best ways to develop an understanding of the longitudinal profile of a migrant’s life is through oral history. A good argument for the application of the oral history approach is provided by Al Thomson (1999). Through diaries and interviews he reconstructs the circumstances and feelings of return migrants to Britain from Australia (Thomson 2003). At the same 1998 Annual Conference of the Oral History Society on migration that Thomson addressed with his 1999 paper, there were presentations on Italian migrants in Bedford, Vietnamese refugees in the UK,

---

\(^3\) In a World of Science search for references on longitudinal studies of migration (using keywords ‘longitudinal’ and ‘migration’, and covering the period 1995 to 2004), 103 items relating to human mobility were found. Three of these were very general, and of the remaining 100 studies containing empirical results, 47 referred to internal migration, 36 were concerned with the medical and gerontological aspects of migration (e.g., the psychological effects of moving elderly people living in residential care homes), and only 17 referred to international migration. Of these, ten studies were devoted to the United States, four to countries other than those in the EU, leaving just three studies focusing on the EU (Constant and Massey 2003; Fielding 1997; Schutze 2003).
the Ukrainian community in Bradford, London Transport’s West Indian workforce, and expatriate Britons retiring to Southern Europe. Clearly, this already constitutes a rich vein of ‘longitudinal-type’ research on EU immigration and integration, and it is one that will surely continue in the future.

• Other qualitative studies. Related to the above, but not dependent on interviews, relying instead on historical data from family archives and genealogical society records, are the longitudinal studies of migration histories. A very good example of this genre is provided by Pooley and Turnbull’s (1998) study of internal migration in Britain since the eighteenth century. It is to be expected that such research in the future will encompass international migration flows as well as internal ones. There is an intriguing possibility that this historical, document-based work on individual migration paths will be reinforced in future by analyses of the person’s DNA; this combination of genetics and genealogy could turn out to be quite powerful in the reconstruction of migration histories. One further obvious, but key, point: most qualitative studies of migration contain some elements of migration history, so it needs to be emphasised that there is no simple clear-cut line to be drawn between longitudinal studies and other studies of migration.

• Quantitative studies and methods of analysis. Given that European researchers (especially in the Netherlands and Germany) have been pioneers in the development of methods for the analysis of longitudinal data (Bijleveld et al. 1998; Keilman et al. 1988; Mayer and Tuma 1990), it is remarkable that there is a shortage of migration research using longitudinal datasets. It is as though the methods have been there waiting to be used, but no one has got round to using them! Perhaps especially surprising is the continuing lack of interest in the work of the demographers Daniel Courgeau and Eva Lelievre (1989). In their ‘triple biography’ approach they set out a practical path towards the analysis of migration histories. One first discovers the three separate histories of the individual: a) their key family and friendship relationships; b) their education, training and work histories; and c) their unfolding residence relocation paths. One then explores the relationships between these three histories to discover which is connected to, or determines which, at what times, and in what contexts. Applied to international migration, this is right at the core of what we are curious about. Why, then, is there this gap between the rich potential for quantitative studies using longitudinal data and the sad reality of current research? Much of the explanation is to be found, we suspect, in the methodological chasm between the qualitative mentalities of most migration researchers, and the significant demands for quantitative skills arising from the more statistical approaches. It seems that the ‘cultural turn’, accompanied by a sharp decline in the numerical and quantitative skills of social scientists, has much to answer for.

• Empirical research on immigrants using panel studies. The richest datasets for longitudinal research are panel studies. This is where a group of people are contracted to provide information on their lives as they unfold over time through repeated rounds of surveys. Many countries in the EU now have panel studies up and running, but the information they provide only becomes useful once the study has been established for a number of years (Eckbert 1996). The UK Panel Study, for example, is only now beginning to yield data of interest to those working on the integration of immigrants in British society. A further problem is that because they are extraordinarily labour-intensive, and therefore expensive, panel studies
tend to contain rather limited samples of the population. This can have the result of ruling out any detailed work on subsamples of ethnic minorities.

- **Empirical research on emigrants using panel studies.** There is, on the other hand, a growing literature on emigrants using panel studies (Edin *et al.* 2000; Klinthall 2003; Schmidt 1997). A good example of this is the research on return migrants from Germany by Constant and Massey (2003). They use the German Socio-Economic Panel, which at the time of their research had been going for 14 years. This allowed them to investigate the links between the decision to return and the previous histories of the migrants (many of them Turks) in Germany. They found that there was a strong negative selection with respect to occupational prestige and full-time employment ‘(t)he odds of returning are highest for immigrants who are not attached to paid employment in Germany, and who have maintained strong ties to the country of origin. We also find that sending remittances is a very important and positive determinant of return migration. At the same time, we find that migrants who have created and cultivated strong ties in Germany are less likely to return to their native countries’. No surprises there, perhaps! But they also consider the question ‘does the selectivity of the return migration bias our understanding of the success of those who stay?’ (For example, if the returnees are biased towards the less successful, then analyses of the remainder will tend to exaggerate their progress). They then put the returnees back into the frame, and conclude ‘we find that estimates do not differ significantly once self-selected out-migrants are added back into the panel. In general, immigrant earnings increase with education, age, hours of work, occupational prestige, and years of residence in Germany ... and are significantly higher for males than females’ (Constant and Massey 2003: 636).

- **Empirical studies of the social and geographical mobility of immigrants based on linked-census-record studies.** As was said above, one of the main limitations of panel data is the small size of the sample. Our final type of longitudinal dataset has no such problems. Two EU countries, Britain and France, have linked their census records for a large sample of individuals from one national census to the next. The French version of this longitudinal dataset is called the ‘Echantillon Démographique Permanent’ or EDP, and it links census records from 1975 to 1990. It has not, unfortunately, been widely used by migrationists, though the work of Richard (1997) is an interesting exception. There has also been some interest in cross-Channel comparisons using both the British and the French versions of the linked-census-record datasets (Brutel 2000).

### 5.2 The Longitudinal Study for England and Wales

By far the most heavily used linked-census-record dataset is the OPCS/ONS Longitudinal Study (LS) for England and Wales (now being extended to cover Scotland). This is a 1 per cent sample of the census population (thereby yielding an astonishing sample size of about 500,000 individuals). It has been running for thirty years, so that it is possible to trace these individuals from 1971 to 1981, 1981 to 1991, and now 1991 to 2001. New entrants through births and immigration are added to the list, and exits through deaths and emigration are subtracted. It is, in short, a quite remarkable dataset.

The early uses made of the LS were not to do with migration, but were studies of the connections between social variables (such as unemployment) and subsequent morbidity or mortality (for example, cancer deaths). Then a number of researchers
came to realise the potential for LS-based research on migration. Most of this early research related to internal migration, but some saw the possibility of looking specifically at the location of ethnic minorities in the London labour and housing markets (Hamnett and Randolph 1988, 1992; see also Dale 1993; Hattersley 1999). Since then, several studies have used the LS to trace the social mobility of ethnic minorities in England and Wales (Blackwell 1999; Fielding 1995; Peloe and Rees 1999; Strelitz 2004; Walter 1999), while others have focused on the spatial mobility of ethnic minorities (Robinson 1992, 1993, 1996; Stuart 1989; Valeny 2000).

Three issues were raised in Fielding’s (1995) paper:

- In what respects do members of Black and Asian minorities differ in their social mobility characteristics from the population as a whole? The answer to this question provides information relevant to discussions about the extent to which social integration has taken place.
- In what respects and to what degree do members of Black and Asian minorities differ amongst themselves in their social mobility characteristics according to their ethnicity and country of origin?
- How do ‘second-generation immigrants’ and recently-arrived immigrants differ in their social class locations from those who have been in the British labour market for a considerable length of time?

The LS can answer all of these questions. It was shown by Fielding (1995) that ethnic minorities do differ from the norm in their social mobility characteristics, but that some of these differences are diminishing over time as the ethnic minority populations become more socially embedded in British society. The most worrying feature of their social mobility was the propensity for members of the Black and Asian minorities to enter unemployment; but some signs of entrapment in the blue-collar working class was an additional concern. On the other hand, there was a significant presence of members of Black and Asian minorities in the privileged service-class occupations, and a growing importance of Asian minorities in the small business and self-employment sector. As for differences among ethnic minorities, it was very clear that these were considerable, were persistent over time, and appear to have a marked gender dimension. And for second-generation ‘immigrants’, there are strong signs of differences emerging, especially for second-generation Asians who are entering professional and white-collar jobs at rates that are much higher than their predecessors. Finally, new immigrants from poor countries seem to be particularly disadvantaged in that, in sharp contrast to white immigrants, they are strongly biased towards working-class jobs and unemployment as destination class positions.

5.3 Event History Analysis

This technique relates continuous biographical and profile data to discrete events occurring at particular points in time (and space). The standard texts on EHA (Blossfeld and Rohwer 2002; Mayer and Tuma 1990) say relatively little about its application to migration, especially international migration. Blossfeld and Rohwer (2002: 2) footnote a number of migration studies which use EHA (e.g. Baccăūni and Courgeau 1996; Courgeau 1990; Wagner 1990), but these are almost exclusively concerned with internal migration and housing relocation.

EHA is operationalised through stochastic models which investigate the relationship between continuous-time and discrete-time variables. The aim is to
uncover causal relationships and to map out a system of causal relations in social processes (Blossfeld and Rohwer 2002: vii). Boyle et al. (1998: 50) acknowledge its potential for enabling hypotheses, explanations and inferences to be linked to research questions on migration behaviour and outcomes.

This potential has recently been taken up by a team coordinated by Flip Lindo (IMES) which is investigating the life-courses and quality of life of immigrants and ethnic minorities in seven European cities: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Bielefeld, Vienna, Stockholm, Leicester and Lisbon (the LIMITS project). The comparative methodology is a mixed convergent-divergent approach with six nationalities of migrants (Turks, Moroccans, Serbians, Pakistanis, Indians and Cape Verdeans) each of which is present in at least two of the destination cities (except Pakistanis who are only in Leicester). The idea behind this research is that common events in the life-course of first-generation immigrants play an important role in explaining differences in the economic and social positions of the immigrants and their offspring. The research expects to uncover different trends in the life-courses of immigrant groups and different outcomes in terms of socio-economic wellbeing; these variations will exist between and within migrant groups, and between receiving countries. The database of 3900 interviews should enable sufficient cases to identify relationships between and within categories of migrant and destination.
5 GENDER

Although sex has long been recognised as a variable in migrant selectivity – indeed one of Ravenstein’s so-called ‘laws’ of migration was that women are more migratory than men (1885: 196) – the theoretical aspects of gender-selective migration have only recently been addressed, one hundred years after Ravenstein. As pointed out in our Introduction, the topic of gender is all-encompassing in research into migration and integration (as it should be, indeed, in all aspects of human behaviour). The danger is that, by writing it into a dedicated section, the necessarily pervasive nature of gender is overlooked. We signal this as an issue for wider debate within the IMISCOE Network.

It is now widely appreciated that incorporating gender into research on the migration process is fundamental to a full understanding of the ‘migrant experience’ on the one hand, and, as well, for a complete grasp of the consequences of immigration and integration policies. But this realisation is not yet as universal as it should be, and some migration research remains gender-blind.

Gender cannot, of course, simply be reduced to a discussion about women. Gender is a relational social category implicated in a range of social relations linked to the process of migration (Anthias 2000: 24). Gender is a significant component of ethnic landscapes but the separation of literatures on gender and on ethnicity has undoubtedly contributed to ethnic minority women’s limited visibility both within European gender debates and within debates on migration and ethnicity (Andall 2003a: 1).

Consistent with our focus on time in this report, we structure this section chronologically into three parts. We first characterise the gender-blindness of ‘traditional’ migration research and briefly review the early attempts to incorporate gender into the study of migration in the early-mid 1980s. We then examine female migration in the ‘age of migration’, reviewing key literature of the last few years. Here, ‘feminisation’ is regarded as an important new trend in contemporary international migration, lending greater recognition to the role of women and gender relations in research and policy-making in the migration/integration field. Finally, we sum up the rather polarised nature of the debate over gender and migration, and identify some future areas of research in the gender-migration nexus.

6.1 Moving beyond invisibility

Women (and wider questions of gender relations) were often invisible in early migration research, as they were in other areas of social science. One simple reason for this was that nearly all early migration researchers were men. In the pre-1980s scholarly literature, migrants seemed to be genderless, or the assumptions were made that most migrants were men, migrating as the primary ‘breadwinners’, and that women only migrated as wives and dependants, either accompanying their menfolk, or following later once the ‘pioneering’ males had become established and could ‘call for them’. This implied view of women as ‘secondary’ or ‘passive’ migrants led to four dominant interpretations:

4 Of course, this is less true today, although males still outnumber females at the senior level – see the statistics on numbership of the IMISCOE Network. Hopefully this will change in the future. Of the current cohort of students taking the MA in Migration Studies at the University of Sussex, only four out of the 23 in the class are males.
that women migrants were both numerically and socially inferior to men;
that female migration took place primarily within the context of the family;
that women were not economically active outside the home; and
that migrant women were judged according to their position on the
tradition/modernity scale, with an assumption that they lagged behind in their
location and movement along this continuum, especially in relation to Northern
European women.

The gender-blind, male dominance of migration research up to the 1980s (and
still, to an extent, today) leads to a fatal analytical flaw. This is that descriptions,
analyses and explanations for the migration of ‘people’, by aggregating the very
different characteristics, motivations, agencies and relations of men and women, end
up by failing to accurately portray the migration behaviour of either sex. Available
statistics are partly to blame, for it is often difficult to distinguish between men and
women in individual migration streams (Zlotnik 1995).

Moreover, gender-ignorance has permeated both empirical studies and
theorisations of migration. None of the ‘standard’ theories of migration – neo-
classical equilibrium theory, rational-choice models, structuralist and political-
economy approaches, world systems analysis etc. – have much to say about gender.
Indeed, for the most part there is total silence on this issue.

This silence was broken in the early-mid 1980s by a number of landmark
statements on the role of migrating women which challenged the status quo in
migration research. Three stand out: Annie Phizacklea’s edited book One Way Ticket
(1983); Mirjana Morokvasic’s essay ‘Birds of passage are also women’ (1984) – a
feminist riposte to Piore’s Birds of Passage book of 1979; and from North America
Simon and Brettell’s International Migration: the Female Experience (1986). These
studies were inspired by the feminist movement of the preceding years and by a
critique of the purely descriptive and politically-disengaged nature of the few studies
which had been carried out on female migration.

Key findings and perspectives emerging from this ‘first wave’ of research on
migrant women were:

- that women were migrating in larger numbers than previous male-centred studies
  had implied;
- that women were not merely ‘followers’ of men, but were also primary labour
  migrants;
- that, even when women had migrated as dependents, they often entered the labour
  market after migration – however, their employment opportunities were often very
different from those of men;
- that women’s migration patterns and integration experiences varied according to
  their national/ethnic background, often reflecting different education levels, types
  of family organisation etc.;
- that migrant women and their families were treated very differently in relation to
  European host-country families.

Among other questions raised – some in only a preliminary fashion – were those
concerning the domestic/public model of women’s status in relation to different
spheres of activity; the interrelationship between women’s production and
reproduction; whether wage-earning enhances the power and status of migrant women.
within their households; and how changes in employment and lifestyle affect women’s own assessment of their well-being (Brettell 2000: 109).

First-wave studies of migrant women, however, only went so far. True, women were ‘written back’ into migration studies in compensation for their earlier omission, but the result was to give a general overview of female migration which reflected both the epistemological canons of the time and the types of (female) migration which predominated in the 1960s and 1970s. The complexity of gender relations through the migration process was not yet fully explored, nor was male migration analysed from a gendered perspective. Moreover, migration research in the 1980s still seemed uncertain where to locate migrant women conceptually – as women or as migrants?

6.2 Gendering the age of migration

In her recent writings Phizacklea (1998; 2003a; 2003b) has reappraised her earlier work, pointing out how she had over-rigidly cast the position of migrant women in a structural straightjacket which defined them as a racialised and gendered class fraction at the mercy of European and global capital. Previously caught between the ‘needs of capital’ trap on the one hand, and the excessively voluntaristic nature of the orthodox neo-classical approach on the other, Phizacklea now sees the need for a more flexible conceptualisation of migrant women and of gender relations in migration processes more generally. Following Giddens’ structuration thesis, she proposes a more transformatory interpretation of female migration by viewing structures as both constraining and enabling – as ‘both the medium and the outcome of the practices they recursively organise’ (Phizacklea 1998: 26, quoting Giddens 1984: 25; see also Goss and Lindquist 1995).

This is one strand of the ‘second wave’ of literature on migrant women and gendering migration that has emerged since the late 1990s. A second key element was the feminisation of international migration – according to Castles and Miller (1993: 8-9) this is one of four defining characteristics of the post-1980s ‘age of migration’, along with migration’s globalisation, acceleration and diversification. Feminisation of migration flows means that women play an increasingly significant role, both quantitatively and as social actors, in most types of migration. According to the IOM (2003: 6) roughly 48 per cent of all migrants are women; ‘women now move around far more independently and no longer in relation to their family position or under a man’s authority’.

The notion of migration’s feminisation was challenged by Hania Zlotnik (1995) who used statistics from seven European countries to show that there had been no significant increase in the female component of immigration since the 1970s (the shares remained more or less constant at between 43 and 49 per cent, depending on the country), and that most females migrating into Europe were doing so not to work. Zlotnik’s argument was not to downplay the significance of female migration; rather she emphasises that female migration has always been important, even if not (quite) numerically superior to male flows. Phizacklea (1998: 26-7), in turn, points out that Zlotnik’s analysis concerns only documented migration, and that women may be more numerous in unregistered flows, precisely because they have less ability to be admitted as workers (though they may, of course, take jobs after entry into a country). In Europe, women have been negatively affected by the migration control polices

5 In later editions of their book Castles and Miller added a fifth key trend, the politicisation of migration (1998: 89; 2003: 7-9). Phizacklea (2003a: 23) added a sixth, the increased institutionalisation of international migration.
implemented by most governments and have been pushed into an irregular status in
the informal economy. Women are also disadvantaged in asylum-seeking as their
experiences frequently do not fit conventional definitions of public political activity
(Freedman 2003a: 9).

The real point about the feminisation thesis is not to do with quantifying female
versus male migration, but recognising the increased agency and independence of
women in migration flows and systems. In Campani’s words (1995), women have
moved from being ‘marginal subjects’ to ‘social actors’ in the migration process.
Reappraisals of some earlier migration streams – such as early postwar Caribbean and
Irish migrations to Britain – revealed that women had always been migrating as
independent individuals and as pioneers, sometimes on their own, sometimes
alongside, or separated from, their male counterparts (Gray 1996; Phizacklea 2003a:
26-7). But the later decades of the twentieth century also witnessed the emergence of
single-sex migration streams, like Cape Verdean women in Italy (Andall 2000). Such
all-female migrations are linked to the perpetuation or reappearance of live-in
domestic work as an employment sector for migrant women in a wide range of
European and other countries (within Europe, especially Italy, Spain and Greece), and
to the increasing willingness of European governments to allow the entry of migrant
women working as live-in domestics and as carers for the elderly.6

Thirdly, globalisation sets an important context for the increased salience of
female migration and of gender relations within the migration process. Globalisation
is a double-edged sword, offering both opportunities and constraints. In some
circumstances women are the victims of globalising forces: the feminisation of
poverty, for example, highlights a major cause of women’s migration, leading large
numbers of female migrants to become involved in the transnational markets for
domestic help and sex work (Freeman 2003a: 8). Even when women migrate as
highly-skilled workers, there are discriminatory practices at work at a variety of
scales, from governmental policy to local employment markets. Gabriel (2004) has
shown, for instance, how the ‘skills discourse’ of the contemporary global debate on
managed migration entry policies into advanced countries contains gender dynamics
in which the outcomes for male and female (aspiring) skilled migrants can be very
different. However it is important not to cast migrant women too much in a victim
mould, cautions Phizacklea (2003a); their developing agency, both in decisions abou
migration and in what happens to their lives after migration, must also be
acknowledged. Often, greater personal freedom and independence are achieved. Even
so, the distinction between constraints and opportunities is far from clear-cut.
Dominant representations of women either as ‘victims’ of global capitalism or as
‘heroes’ of national development and their own families’ economic salvation

---

6 The employment of migrant women to relieve Western European women of the necessity to do
certain household tasks contains not a little feminist irony and suggests the importance of placing the
issue of the presence of migrant women in such feminised work niches into a wider gender analysis. As
Phizacklea (1998: 33-4) points out, ‘women from poor countries … allow women in more affluent
countries to escape the drudgery of housework in conditions which sometimes approximate to a
contemporary form of state-facilitated slavery. The increasing incidence of paid domestic work
highlights the hollowness of the supposedly new “spousal egalitarianism”. The hiring of a full-time
domestic worker means that patriarchal household and work structures can go unquestioned, women
pursuing a career and a family need not “rock the boat” and any guilt over exploitation is assuaged by
the knowledge that a less fortunate woman is being provided with work. Thus racialized and class
privileges are preserved as well as patriarchal structures and privileges’. See also Bridget Anderson’s
definitive volume Doing the Dirty Work (2000), based on fieldwork in Athens, Barcelona, Bologna,
Paris and Berlin, which stresses, in addition, the racialisation of domestic labour in Europe.
foreclose discussions and analyses of women’s multiple roles, class positions and lifestyles as transnational migrants operating in two (or more) ‘worlds’ (Gibson et al. 2001).

A fourth perspective of recent research on gender and migration comes from the new literature on transnational migration. As Mahler and Pessar note, this is very much an ongoing debate. These authors are quite harsh in their criticism of the main proponents of the transnational approach (e.g. Basch et al. 1994; Faist 2000; Glick-Schiller et al. 1992; Portes et al. 1999; Pries 1999; Vertovec 1999) for not ‘bringing gender in’. Mahler and Pessar (2001) propose a theoretical framework focused on ‘gendered geographies of power’ to facilitate ‘a more nuanced transnational examination of how gender articulates with migration’ (Pessar and Mahler 2003: 815). The framework is composed of three elements: ‘geographic scale’ recognises that gender operates simultaneously at several social and spatial levels (the body, the family, the ethno-national group); ‘social location’ denotes individuals’ positions within interconnected hierarchies of wealth, power and privilege; and ‘power geometries’ (cf. Massey 1994) acknowledge that time-space compression produces new geographies of power, placing people in very distinct positions regarding access to, and control over, flows, interconnections and resources. As Pessar and Mahler admit (2003: 819-23), much new work on transnational migration does foreground gender – for instance in studies of refugees and state policies, on women’s role in remittances, on women and transnational families, on gendered discourses of work and responsibility, and on return attitudes and behaviours. Much of the literature that Pessar and Mehlar cite refers to the North American immigrant scene and to the sending contexts of the Dominican Republic and Mexico. Within Europe recent work includes ‘transnational’ studies of Cape Verdean, Filipino and Moroccan women (e.g. Andall 1999, 2000; Salih 2003; Zontini 2001, 2004). This work covers a diversity of gender-migration-transnationalism interactions, including Islam, employment and other economic roles, family and care duties, transnational mothering etc. The division and dispersal of these roles and duties across different locations often puts migrant women under enormous pressures. Whether their transnational lives are enriched or oppressed is often an ambiguous line of enquiry.

This leads us to what is perhaps the key question regarding migration and gender: what do past and contemporary (female) migrations reveal about the changing nature of patriarchal relations of migration? There is hardly space here to give a reasoned answer to this question, except to sketch in a few contrasting perspectives. Inevitably these are context-dependent and situation-specific, and the evidence is mixed. Nearly 30 years ago Nermin Abadan-Unat (1977), writing of Turkish migration, pointed to the ‘pseudo-emancipation’ of Turkish women through their migration to West Germany. Somewhat more recently, Summerfield’s (1993) study of Bangladeshi and Somali women in Tower Hamlets, London, found that both groups were subject to high levels of domestic violence including regular and even ritualistic beatings. But whilst Somali women enjoyed a strong ‘sisterhood’ and were able to divorce their violent husbands with little resulting stigma, Bangladeshi women in Tower Hamlets were kept in purdah and had little opportunity to leave their husbands; if they did they were stigmatised and isolated. Although Summerfield’s data are impressionistic and inadequately referenced, the comparison is potentially very enlightening as it reveals the resources available to some migrants and not to others. It is also a reminder of the importance of examining gender relations before and after migration via carefully controlled case-studies (Nicollet 1992). Academic research into the links between interpersonal violence and migration is still in its early stages, although some issues
have been raised such as the impact of the experience of institutional and direct racism on male violent behaviour (Mama 1993). Unemployment and social relegation are also thought to be linked to enhanced risk of experiencing violence amongst the female populations of some immigrant groups (Condon 2005; Jaspard et al. 2002). And violence as a form of social control of young girls of the ‘second generation’ is also beginning to be explored (Poinsot 2001). However, as with all women who face domestic violence, it is also a question of what structures and support are available to them to help them get out of such situations. Ravi Thara (2003) highlights Asian women’s activism on issues such as violence within the Asian communities in Britain; she also demonstrates how Asian feminists simultaneously challenge ‘not only the masculinist “community” politics but also racist discursive and material practices’ in Britain (Thiara 2003: 92). Thus, beyond gender relations and violence experienced by immigrants and their descendants within the family, gendered violence in other contexts such as public space and the workplace needs to be addressed.

A rather different relationship between migration, patriarchy and female migration has been described by Mai (2001) in the Albanian context. Here, the devaluation of male roles and self-esteem due to the post-communist economic collapse and high unemployment, in which the moral order of authoritarian collectivism was replaced by a new moral (dis)order of free-wheeling economic liberalism, led to the resurrection, and mutation, of pre-communist patriarchal authority structures. Now, and for the last ten years or so, unemployed and marginalised young men orchestrate the migration of young women and girls into neighbouring countries, often for prostitution. Undoubtedly this is part of a wider phenomenon in Europe, whereby women and young girls, from a variety of migrant origins (Eastern Europe, West Africa, Latin America etc.) are increasingly caught up in trafficking networks for prostitution and sex work (Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2002).

‘Sex, marriage and maids’ is a triptych which seems to define – perhaps too closely – much recent analysis of the specific channels of female migrant access to Europe (Phizacklea 1998: 31-4). In addition to the migrations of domestic/care workers and sex workers mentioned above, marriage and migration pairs Eastern European women with West European men. International marriage brokers use catalogues and internet sites to place prospective brides from further afield, such as the Philippines and Thailand: truly a mail/male-order service! Au pairs add another category to this nexus of female-specific mobility forms (Hess and Puckhaber 2004).

Much of this recent work on female migration focuses on Southern European where, according to Anthias (2000) and King and Zontini (2000), sharply gendered migration flows for different nationalities are a part of the ‘South European model’ of labour migration which sees a post-industrial labour demand in the fields of tourism, domestic, care and other service work mainly filled by female migrants (King 2000).

Amongst the surge of second-wave literature on women, gender and migration in Europe in the 1990s and 2000s we can identify both important general studies and collections (Anthias and Lazaridis 2000; Buijs 1993; Morokvasic et al. 2003) and more specialised accounts of particular interactions. The latter include:

7 Riita Vartti’s (2003) paper on German matchmaking websites accurately reveals the blatant inequities between the male clients in Germany and the would-be brides in Eastern Europe and Asia. Based on the wide economic gap between wealthy and poor countries, the women are commodified and racialised, and stereotyped as submissive (yet sexy), family-oriented and unconcerned about age gaps or looks. Choice of partner is vested in the male client who has detailed bio-data on the women available; this choice and information are not reciprocated to the women.
• gender, migration and development (Chant 1992);
• women and the asylum process in Europe (Crawley 2001; Treacher et al. 2003);
• women and citizenship in Europe (Ackers 1998);
• migrant women within the evolving political context of security and ‘fortress Europe’ (Freedman 2003b; Kofman 1999; Lutz 1997);
• gender, employment and welfare (Kofman and Raghuram 2004; Kofman et al. 2000);
• gender and ethnicity (Andall 2003b).

Throughout these many accounts one can find a range of perspectives. Some lay emphasis on migration as a potentially liberating and transformatory experience, through which women are able to regain a measure of control over their lives and destinies – often, however, whilst remaining entrenched in the ‘service’ of their families who may depend on them for their livelihood. Other analyses are more negative: gender is seen as another layer of the multiple oppression of migrant women – structurally discriminated against as migrants, as women (both by the host society and within their own ethnic group), as members of the labouring underclass, as racially stigmatised, and, finally, as accepting these oppressive structures.

By and large recent research has tended to document migrant women’s success in escaping old patriarchal structures. At least for some groups, women’s wage-earning gives them some independence within the household sphere, leading to a more flexible division of labour in the home, and less sex-segregation in social and public spaces (Brettell 2000: 110). The new sense of control gained by women through migration, however, raises a different set of questions about return migration. Like all aspects of the migration process, the dynamics of return are highly gendered. Often it is observed that, despite a general yearning for home which is commonly shared by both sexes, women are more reluctant to go back since it would mean giving up new-won freedoms and returning to a situation in which female employment opportunities are lacking and conservative social conditions constrain women’s social relations. Gmelch and Gmelch (1995), comparing return migration to three origin countries (Barbados, Ireland, Newfoundland), found that women faced greater problems of post-return readjustment and were less satisfied than men about the return decision. This finding is backed up in a more recent study of the discourses of return articulated by Galicians in, or returned from, Switzerland (Richter 2004). For Galician men the pull of return is strong: they link their social identity to immovable goods like their land and house back in Galicia. Women’s identity is built much more around social relations and the family they have created in Switzerland. Hence women feel ‘at home’ in Switzerland, whilst their husbands still long for their Galician homeland even after decades abroad.

6.3 Summing-up and future research

Like much social research, migration research is only beginning to redress the imbalance that is the legacy of the male domination of the profession. Gunilla Bjerén characterises the ‘state of the art’ as a situation in which ‘a majority of male authors write about migration in mainstream literature as if gender did not matter, while many women authors deliver fatal criticism of main(male!)stream research from a gender perspective but are little read outside their own circle and their criticism makes little impact on the main body of knowledge’ (1997: 224-5). Hence, either the debate does not occur, or, when it does, it sometimes takes an over-exaggerated form. The
‘gender-deafness’ of many (male) migration scholars sets up a counter-tendency in some cases to remorselessly stress the gender (female) dimension. This, in turn, tends to squeeze out other key demographic categories such as children and old people, or to override other social categories such as class or ethnicity, or to simply ignore the male dimension altogether. Moreover, the study of male migration from a gendered perspective also gets overlooked. The ideal research design should firstly aim at a more nuanced analysis encompassing the intersections (intersexions, cf. Bottomley et al. 1991) of gender with race/ethnicity, class, nation, family structures etc. (Brah 1996; Yuval-Davis and Anthias 1989). Secondly it should recognise that gender is at base a relational concept – the one gender being construed in relation to the other. Hence the migration of women can only be fully understood in relation to the migration and social power of men; and vice versa. In other words, ‘the migration of men as well as of women is predicated on the time-space strategies of persons of the other sex’ (Bjerén 1997: 226, emphasis in original).

We turn now to suggestions for future research. Some of the larger-scale concerns, especially where they connect to other research priorities dealt with in this report, will be picked up and discussed further in section 10. Moreover, the list that follows is not composed of neatly discrete points: many overlap or are hierarchically related.

• The first point deals with the ‘big issues’ framing gender and migration. International migration is an area where globalisation, development and gender intersect. How can the feminisation of migration be located within global-scale processes such as the restructuring of the world economy, market-led development strategies, or the retreat from or failure of the welfare state? Sassen (2000) has written of the ‘feminisation of survival’ in poor countries through women’s involvement in ‘countergeographies of globalisation’ – alternative circuits whereby women, both as victims and as protagonists, migrate, become trafficked, send remittances and support their families and households. True, some empirical research has been done on women’s life-paths in these counter-circuits of migration, survival and development; but more needs to be done to follow Sassen’s lead in exploring the gendered political economy of migration and development. Recently Gabriel (2004) has made an interesting contribution to the debate by demonstrating how both the presumed imperatives of the global economy and the governance of international labour mobility contain particular gendered (mis)interpretations of human capital and migration. The hypothesis needs to be examined that migrant women’s gendered identities (as mothers, carers, aspirants for family reunification etc.) are frequently negated by states and by migration rules when compared both to migrant men and to European women.

• There is, furthermore, a general need for more research of a comparative and longitudinal nature which addresses the various labour market opportunities open to different ethnicities of migrant women in different European countries. For sure, there are certain employment niches, such as nursing and care of the elderly, where migrant women are overwhelmingly represented. The crisis in nurse recruitment in some European countries leads to a global competition for foreign nurses which links to important debates about brain and skill drain and impoverishment of health services in those countries from which the nurses are drawn. But what opportunities do migrant women have to move out of such gendered, racialised work niches; and how can they overcome the barriers that the host society erects to prevent such mobility? Are there opportunities for migrant women to become self-employed and business-oriented? Thus far, almost no
research has been undertaken on female migrant entrepreneurs (for an exception see Alberts 2003).

- In a similar vein, more research is needed into the political mobilisation and community activism of women migrants in European countries, in order to challenge the stereotypes of women being politically naïve and disengaged.

- How are women affected by the transition towards migration as a ‘business’ (cf. Salt and Stein 1997)? Are the same ‘illegal’ entry routes open to them as to men, or do they access different channels? Are they more vulnerable to exploitation and trafficking?

- More comparative research is needed on the ramifications of female migration and gender relations in the context of single-sex migrant flows and communities. How do such communities evolve and maintain their single-sex character (when others start off as predominantly female or male but then ‘normalise’ over time); and how are gender relations affected by the geographic distance of single-sex communities from their homeland societies and families? What marriage patterns can be observed in single-sex migrant communities – a greater tendency for exogamy?

- Taking the other side of the coin of the previous point, there has been a marked tendency to overlook the male dimension of migrant groups and employment sectors which are female-dominated. What are the roles and positions of males in immigrant communities which are numerically female-majority? And what are the mechanisms by which some feminised work areas are partially taken up by certain nationalities of males?

- Enlarging the previous point, we recommend attention be paid to the connections between migration processes and the construction of masculinity: this reflects the view that constructions of masculinity have not been given due regard within anthropology and the social sciences (Viveros Vigoya 2001). We need to understand how masculinity is constructed not only in relation to femininity, but also in relation to existing differences in class, race, ethnicity and narratives of belonging (Napolitano Quayson 2005; Streicker 1995). Although the feminisation of the labour force has been well documented, crises and redefinitions of masculinity can arise amongst the migrant population – and also amongst the non-migrant population that has stayed behind (Ní Laoire 2001).

- From a historical point of view, do we need to re-examine past European migrations – for instance those of the nineteenth or early twentieth centuries – from a gendered perspective? Should this migration history be rewritten? Were there, for example, ‘feminised’ migrations in which women were more or less equal or superior numerically to men and in which women did not necessarily move as secondary or tied migrants?

- What are the advantages and disadvantages of circular or shuttle migration from a gendered perspective in relation to the home circumstances on the one hand and to the employment situation in the destination country on the other? Morokvasic (2003) argues that theories of migration and transnationalism fail to acknowledge the relevance and distinctiveness of shuttle movements, which have become common in Central and Eastern Europe ‘post-Wall’. According to her the economic gains and orientation of shuttle mobility became ‘a strategy for staying at home and, thus, an alternative to emigration’ (2003: 102, emphasis in original). Morokvasic maintains that shuttle migrations are differentially gendered: men organise their mobility around the needs and opportunities for paid work either
side of the border; women’s migration management is geared towards combining paid work with their household and reproductive responsibilities at home.

- Next, we see an important need to study the development over time, among migrants and their offspring, of values such as freedom, individualism and autonomy of women, as well as related issues such as changing patriarchal patterns and changing social control in the migrants’ communities. These developments are assumed to be linked to prevailing values in the host country (more ‘liberal’, ‘egalitarian’ etc.), but we also need to acknowledge the relevance of changing values in the country of origin, as well as more global-scale socio-cultural trends in gender relations. In this respect we can, perhaps, distinguish two migratory movements: the migration of women (and men) themselves, and secondly the migration of feminisms and their attendant discourses and behaviours (Ram 1998: 572).

- Whilst the literature on gender and migration is now quite rich and extensive, much of it is based on retrospective narrative interviews. What is missing is immediate ethnographic observation of how gendered relationships play themselves out and are negotiated in different settings in ‘real time’ (Pessar and Mahler 2003: 826).

- We need more research – for there has been little so far – on the relationships between gender and sexuality.

- A final methodological concern is the need to study gender relations not only amongst adult migrants but also among children. Most of the existing work in this area focuses on older children, on topics such as cross-gender contacts and teenage sexuality (on Filipino teenagers in the United States see Espiritu 2001 and Wolf 1997, and on Turkish girls in the Netherlands see de Vries 1995). Pessar and Mahler (2003: 833) suggest we need to be more attentive to whether migration ‘inflects the enculturation of children to gender relations’ – an approach which, building on an earlier bullet-point, requires long-term and sensitively-handled fieldwork.
6 THE FAMILY

To write about the role of the family in migration and integration is also, almost inescapably, to write about gender and the life-course; hence, in the relevant previous sections (4 and 6) we have already given some hints about family and household dynamics in migration. In this section we first propose a typology of family migration pathways. We then examine the role of the family/household approach, first from the standpoint of emigration from the home country, and second from the perspective of arrival and integration in the destination country. Next, we engage in a more theoretical and critical discussion of the family/household approach, especially as regards its ethnocentric and normative nature. Section 7 closes with some consideration of the diversity of family and household arrangements within the context of transnational migration, and suggests some priorities for future research.

7.1 Types of family migration

Kofman (2004) argues that ‘family’ has been neglected in studies of international migration within and into Europe. She explains this with reference to the primacy of labour migration in European thinking about migration, the absence of settlement migration (more common in other immigration settings such as North America and Australia), and the lack of a family perspective in economic theories of migration. As we saw in the previous section, for too long in Europe there has been an assumed association between family migration and female dependency, rather than an active appreciation of the roles of all family members beyond school age in work and production. Where they exist, European case-studies of international family migration have tended to assume traditional paradigms of family organisation – the nuclear family above all – and have not fully explored or even acknowledged the variety of family and household types which derive from diverse home-country settings, or are evolving amongst European populations, or are developing within specific transnational migration contexts.

Several different family-migration trajectories can be identified. The following typology builds on that suggested by Kofman (2004: 244-7).

- **Whole-family migration** – where the entire family (typically a nuclear family of husband, wife and young children) is the unit of migration, moving all together at the same time. Since many European countries do not allow temporary permit-holders to be accompanied by family members, this category is not very common. Exceptions are some categories of refugees and the highly-skilled.

- **Migrations of family reunion** – where the ‘primary migrant’ from an already-existing family, having lived abroad for a certain period of time, brings over his or her remaining family members, usually spouse and children, and perhaps also parents.

\[\text{We use the terms family and household somewhat interchangeably. Nevertheless there is an analytical distinction: family involves an aggregation of individuals based on close kinship ties (although the extensiveness of these ties can vary from one culture to another); household comprises a collection of individuals, not necessarily related, living in the same dwelling. Hence households are defined by co-residence; families can be divided by migration or separation. In fact migration is a major factor which disturbs the normally close correspondence between family and the household.}\]
• **Family formation** by migrants in the host society – where two single migrants form a partnership/marriage in the destination country and create a new family there.

• **Marriage migration** – where a single migrant (or member of the ‘second generation’) takes a spouse from the home country or from another country of the migrant community’s diaspora and brings him/her to the country of immigration, where the new family is formed.

• **Split-family migration** – the case where, typically, only one member of the family migrates, leaving the rest behind. Frequent return visits are likely, perhaps leading up to a final return and family reunion in the home country.

The above are the main ‘ideal types’; many further variations exist. Taking a time-based perspective, families can be created, split and then reunified through different stages of the migration cycle. The life-history approach sees a complex interweaving of family stages with migration events: family formation or dissolution may set the scene for or trigger migration; and migration in turn may provide opportunities for, or in other cases constrain, particular family formations. Personal and intra-family relationships and dynamics can also play a significant role – such as separation, divorce, or a woman migrating to flee an abusive husband. Research on international retirement migration of Northern Europeans to Spain and other South European countries has shown that many retiring couples (a subset of family migration?) are in effect new partnerships following on from divorce or widowhood (King et al. 2000; O’Reilly 2000); the new partnership/marriage triggers a ‘fresh start’ in a new country where business and leisure opportunities (as well as the climate!) are key ‘pull factors’. Very different variations on the family-migration nexus are found where polygamy is an accepted practice in the home country. In such circumstances a male migrant may maintain separate families/households in the host and host countries, although increasingly such arrangements are frowned on by European states and their legal systems. On the other hand, it is also the case that the modern nuclear family, often attained through migration, is seen as a step away from the more extended family and its social control in the origin country. Finally, the home/host-country dichotomy needs to be refined in cases where transnational families extend across more than two locations. Andall (1999), for instance, has researched the Cape Verdean case, where some families are split between three or even four locations according to the geography of opportunity for male and female work and family duties. Women may work in Italy or Portugal, their partners and husbands in the Netherlands, whilst children are looked after by relatives in Cape Verde. These are just some of the variations on the theme of migration and the family.

### 7.2 Home- and host-country perspectives

A further important distinction can be drawn between family/household perspectives operating from the home country and from the country of immigration. Let us take each in turn.

Increasingly, the family is seen as the most appropriate unit of analysis in the examination of emigration behaviour, especially as regards the decision-making process and the causes and consequences of migration (Boyd 1989; Hugo 1999: 54-5). On the one hand, the migration decision is often made within the context of the needs and constraints of the whole family – for instance, its strategy to ensure survival and to maximise and diversify income streams. On the other hand, many of the impacts of
the migration of one (or more) family members are acutely felt by the family members ‘left behind’. These effects are both positive and negative. On the positive side:

- remittances improve living conditions, enable investments in housing, land, businesses, and children’s education, and hence improve the socio-economic status of the ‘residual family’;
- women may be empowered, in the absence of their husbands, fathers, brothers etc., to take on decision-making roles for the remaining family members;
- where it is the women who migrate, their new economic role as labour migrants may undermine patriarchal power within families.

But on the negative side:

- the prolonged absence of spouses and parents is keenly felt by those family members who do not migrate, especially partners and children;
- older people, too, can suffer from the absence of their adult children, both emotionally and materially, if there is no-one left to care for them in their old age;
- productivity of land may decline because of the absence of labour to work it.

From the perspective of the country of immigration, family migration and family reunion are processes which generally favour long-term settlement and integration. The family provides a crucial setting for immigrants’ integration, through its multiple links to various institutions and activity spheres within the host society – work, education, the health service, the neighbourhood etc. Ever since the closure of mass labour recruitment schemes in the 1970s, family reunion has been the main immigration gateway into the European Union. Nowadays, more than three-quarters of the EU’s (legal) annual inflow of immigrants is accounted for by spouses, children and other family members. Even during the era of mass recruitment of labour migrants, family reunification policy played an important role in supporting the well-being of the primary labour migrants. Policies favouring the settlement and integration of migrant families were instituted before the ‘recruitment-stop’ in recognition of the ‘human right’ of families to live together and of the fact that immigrants had become a structural necessity for the industrialised European economies (King 1998: 270). Especially after the European recessions and economic restructuring of the 1970s, most migrant families preferred, on balance, to regroup in Northern Europe rather than return to an even more uncertain economic future in the home country.

Another host-country perspective to be noted is the demographic one. Europe’s ‘second demographic transition’ sees a number of distinctive developments within European populations that can affect the context of family migration (van der Kaa 1987, 1999). Unprecedentedly low fertility regimes, demographic ageing and international migration provide new contexts for how families and households organise themselves within, and beyond, Europe. Family-based ‘replacement migration’ now looms large in current debates over European population development (United Nations 2000). Such immigration contributes significantly to what little demographic growth exists in European countries in recent years, both due to the crude aggregate numbers of new (net) immigrants and, more particularly, to their younger age structures and higher fertilities. Of course, it has to be recognised that
family-based immigration cannot be the sole solution to Europe’s declining and ageing population.

7.3 Theorising and deconstructing the family in European migration

Having mapped out these preliminary typologies and historical perspectives on family/household migration, it is important now to consider, from a more theoretical and critical point of view, the genealogy of the family approach to migration.

During the 1980s, theorisation and explanation of migration began to shift from an individual-scale focus to intermediary institutions such as families, households and social networks. One important conceptual thread emerged out of the discipline of economics where the new economics of migration moved beyond the modelling of migration behaviour predicated on individuals’ rational choice to a focus on the family as the effective decision-making unit (Stark 1984, 1991). According to the ‘new economics’, families and households act collectively not only to maximise expected income but also to minimise risks and to hedge against market failures. Unlike individuals, households are in a position to control against risks by mobilising and diversifying work, reproductive and migratory strategies across the members of the households. Income, savings and remittances earned abroad provide the ‘insurance’ against market failures (unemployment, crop damage, product price collapse etc.) which the local economic system cannot provide (Massey et al. 1993: 436).

Stark and his colleagues were then roundly criticised for failing to acknowledge tensions and conflicts within the household and for making the assumption that the household, like the individual of neoclassical economics, was a ‘rational’ decision-making unit. For, as Phizacklea (2003b: 85) memorably wrote, opening the ‘black box’ of the family often reveals a ‘can of worms’, and families and households ‘are not the cosy rational decision-making units that some accounts would have us believe’. Writers such as Hondagneu-Sotelo (1994), Phizacklea (2003b) and others argue for an analytical shift which recognises that households and families are deeply implicated in gendered and cross-generational ideologies and practices. The household, in other words, has its own internal political economy in which access to power and resources is structured along generational and gender lines. Moreover, the household is itself positioned within wider structures and relations such as social class, social networks and other migration-relevant institutions.

The deconstruction of the terms ‘household’ and ‘family’ in migration research is taken one stage further by Gunilla Bjerén (1997: 233-8) who stresses their inherent ethnocentrism and questions their cross-cultural validity. The pre-eminent assumption of the nuclear family (husband, wife, two or three children, living together in their own home) reifies a model which is both culturally specific (especially to Europe and North America) and, now, increasingly outdated in areas where it was held to be the ‘norm’. On this latter point, many European societies are increasingly comprised of single-person households (both of old and young adults), same-sex partnerships, childless couples, flat-sharing amongst non-kin, and sequences of cohabitations/marriages in which children from prior unions may or may not be

---

9 Portes (1997: 816) cautioned against taking the ‘can of worms’ argument too far. He acknowledged that men, women and children within a household may struggle and clash over conflicting migration-related goals. But he also argued that an exclusive focus on these internal differences runs the risk of ignoring the fact that households do pool resources to organise their migration decisions and can act as units despite internal contradictions.
The traditional commensal definition of the household beloved of the British census (‘feet under the table at meal-times’), which defined the lodger as a member of the household but not of the family, also unravels as different family members take their meals at different times, either in or out of the household dwelling – eating out, bringing in take-aways or ‘grazing’ from the fridge.

According to Bjerén (1997: 235), anthropologists have now given up trying to find a cross-culturally valid definition of ‘household’, even though the term continues to be used as an ‘odd-job’ word for descriptive statements about social life and migration. It is, of course, migration which is one of the powerful influences destabilising the notions of household and family, even when these latter terms are used in an unrefined, unproblematised sense. But international migration also brings together different etiologies of family and household, exposing the dangers of cultural relativism. Quite apart from the need to be able to identify the cultural significance of home-country conceptualisations of family and household in the context of immigration to another country, a further challenge is to recognise when it is the act and circumstances of migration itself which produces variants in the practice and meaning of family and household. Indeed such practices may be ‘forced’ on migrants by the immigration control policies and legal/citizenship regimes of the receiving countries.

7.4 Prospects for the future

Bjerén’s response to the challenge of defining and mapping families and households as they evolve over time, both through their natural life-course stages (family/household formation, expansion, contraction, separation etc.), and their fractioning and (possible) reunification through international migration, is to envisage ‘effective kinship links between people located within social fields encompassing two or several countries’ (1997: 237). The image portrayed is of migrants’ family/kinship networks crossing and re-forming at residential nodes within the migrant community’s transnational space. The residential nodes too have their own life-courses, based on the life-courses and family situations of the migrating individuals who make up the networks intersecting at the node, and also reflecting the economic and social opportunities that occur in different nodes. This seems to us an important point worth lingering on for a moment. Migration stretches family relations and other social networks out across transnational space, and such networks evolve and take on various forms and functions in order to respond to the geography of migratory opportunity or necessity. And it is not only migrants who move within these networks. Kearney (1986: 354) proposes the term ‘articulatory migrant network’ to denote ‘a migrant network joined together or articulated with reference to specific nodes and links through which flow persons, information, goods, services and economic value’ – and this, too, has its developmental cycle or life-course.

Plenty of evidence exists in the literatures of immigration both to Europe and North America about the different arrangements migrants make for organising their family and household livelihoods across space and over time. As an illustration, we briefly cite some Caribbean studies which exemplify a range of family/household situations brought about by migration, either to North America or to Europe (chiefly to Britain). Such arrangements reflect, on the one hand, certain Caribbean traditions

of dispersed and flexible family structures, and on the other, strategies which are adaptive responses to the conditions of migration in which many Caribbean people find themselves. Typical practices include the power of extended family networks, a high percentage of female-headed households, and the custom of sending migrant children back to the Caribbean to be raised by grandparents and other family members. In many cases Caribbean (and other) migrants are engaged in long-term circuits of migration articulated within multilocal transnational families, with parents, children and other relatives distributed in households across national borders, sometimes in several countries (Pessar 1991).

In an important article on migration and the family, Nancy Foner (1997) reflects on her Jamaican research to draw out how and why family and kinship patterns change during the course of migration. The migrant family is seen as a site where there is a dynamic interplay between structure, culture and agency. Migrants who move from one ‘world’ to another (in this case from Jamaica to New York or London) ‘fuse together the old and the new to create a new kind of family life’ (Foner 1997: 961). This fusion is by no means a straightforward process: indeed ‘immigrants walk a delicate tightrope as they challenge certain aspects of traditional family systems while they also try to retain others’ (1997: 962). Often these tensions are expressed across gender and generational lines. Examples given by Foner include children ringing up the police to complain about beatings from their parents, and women being less tolerant of their partners’ irresponsibility in diverting resources away from the household and dallying with other women (1997: 967, 971).

On the other hand, sending children home to be educated and cared for by relatives in the Caribbean has mixed results, as George Gmelch (2004: 209-10) recounts from his Barbadian research. Most parents believed their offspring would receive better schooling and enjoy a safer and healthier environment in Barbados than in inner-city London or New York. Yet long-term separations could result, so that, when reunions took place, parents and children had become estranged, in some cases not even recognising each other.

To conclude, there are several aspects of family-related international migration in Europe which warrant further attention. More European research is needed to match the greater amount of pioneering work being done on transnational families in the US, and more investigations are also needed to explore the increasing diversity of migratory forms and family structures and strategies (Kofman 2004: 256). Here are some suggested priorities:

- How, exactly, do decisions about migration (and return, and non-return) get taken within the family setting? There are few studies which look at how such discussions are negotiated (or not) when couples (and their children) migrate together. Clearly, this raises questions about gender relations within the family, but the children’s perspective is even less documented (see section 9.1).
- How are families’ discussions and options for migration constrained by immigration legislation and by economic factors? For instance, regulations on family reunion or directives on migrants’ irregular status in the host country severely limit the chances for families to reunite or even for family members to visit each other. Family reunification in the destination country is not permitted for many categories of migrant workers; whilst ‘illegal’ status effectively traps working migrants in the host country where their work is needed (and they need to work).
Marriage migration, a key moment within the life-course of migrants and their families, is seriously under-researched (Kofman 2004: 251-2). Here we are less concerned with the specific phenomenon of mail-order brides, mentioned in section 6, and more with the variety of patterns and strategies of migration for marriage. How widespread is arranged (and semi-arranged) marriage within different migrant communities? What trends are observable across the generations? What are the gender and other implications of ‘importing’ spouses from the homeland? How do host countries react to this phenomenon? Generally, it seems, with suspicion.

A related topic, also under-researched, is that of ‘mixed marriages’. How do patterns of endogamy/exogamy vary between migrant groups in different countries? Are some groups more likely to ‘marry out’? If so, why – what roles do religion, language, ‘race’, education etc. play in helping us to understand the observed patterns? Are mixed marriages/partnerships mainly with the indigenous population, or are there consistent patterns of intermarriage between certain migrant groups? What is the role of the sex ratio of different immigrant communities in this? Are there particular reactions of social stigma (or, perhaps, prestige) involved in marrying into the host population? Finally, what about the children of mixed unions (see section 8)?

Although a more limited phenomenon numerically, the migration or reunion of same-sex couples needs addressing by researchers, both as a sociological phenomenon in its own right and as regards its treatment in European or national law.

Finally, our account in section 7 has rather overlooked professional and high-skilled migrants. Much of the existing research on the family dynamics of skilled and professional migration has tended to focus on internal migration and on the US experience (Bailey and Boyle 2004: 230). Typical syndromes of this type of movement are the ‘tied migrant’ and ‘trailing spouse’ discourses (Bielby and Bielby 1992; Hardill 2002). Such issues are increasingly relevant within the Single European Market, with freedom of movement for EU citizens. However, as the work of Ackers (2004) has shown, even intra-EU family migrations throw up problems of individuals’ rights, often to the disadvantage of women and children: ‘The unique legal framework of the Community, which is designed to encourage labour mobility … is less satisfactory for dealing with the “messiness” of family dislocation’. On the other hand, in an era of dual-career households, a relevant question to ask is to what extent do negotiations take place within the family to achieve migration decisions which satisfy the balance of interests of both partners.
7 GENERATIONS OF MIGRANTS

This section discusses patterns of social mobility and integration in the children of immigrants in Europe, often referred to as second-generation immigrants. Many of the European second generation are finishing their education, and trying to transfer their acquired knowledge and skills to the workplace. Some find this transition from school to work particularly challenging, and experience the insecurities inherent in low-paid, temporary work or unemployment. Others may take advantage of so-called ‘ethnic niches’ in the labour market, although ‘higher’ aspirations amongst the second generation mean that many are reluctant to assume the ‘immigrant’ jobs their parents held. A third group are surpassing their ‘white’ peers both in education and in the workplace.

Academic interest in the second generation has brought a development in the comparative dimension of research on integration processes. Not only are researchers able to contrast patterns of integration of distinct ethnic groups, but they can also highlight the relative socio-economic performance of different generations of immigrants from the same ethnic background. Are the children of immigrants, for example, performing better in education than their parents did? Are they achieving a higher occupational status, or is the incidence of unemployment greater amongst the second generation?

Focusing on the second generation, however, raises some interesting conceptual issues. Let us consider, for instance, Brubaker’s (2001) argument that it is more appropriate to discuss integration, or to use his term ‘assimilation’, as a process that takes place across generations rather than at the individual level of analysis – ‘key changes (in language and in other domains) occur intergenerationally’ (2001: 543). This line of thought does, however, cast doubt on the extent to which first-generation immigrants can be fully integrated into the host society. Unlike their children, the first generation may hold overseas educational qualifications that employers do not appreciate or value, have limited fluency in the official language of the receiving country, or lack the knowledge and social contacts that would give improved access to labour markets (Heath and McMahon 1996: 92). Although these disadvantages are not set in stone, they may entail further disadvantage to immigrants who find it difficult to secure permanent work, decent housing, welfare support, access to healthcare etc.

The question of whether this scenario sets off a ‘cycle of cumulative disadvantage’ (UK 1975, para. 11), reflected in the poor educational results and socio-economic status of the next generation, underpins a good deal of current research on the second generation (see Iganski and Payne 1996). This is addressed below, but first it is important to briefly mention two caveats to this conceptual framework. On a more positive note, there are success stories within immigrant communities but which fail to be captured due to a lack of differentiation between distinct ethnic groups. In the British context, studies on ‘Asian’ educational and economic performance stress the importance of distinguishing between Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, and between groups by their ethnic and religious background (Gibson and Bhachu 1988; Modood 1991). Many individuals and households do possess high levels of human and social capital, and it would be a mistake to characterise all ethnic groups as socially and economically marginalised.

11 Brubaker revisits the term to emphasise the process of immigrant communities and the local population becoming similar, against the discredited notion of assimilation as a prescriptive outcome of policy or practice. In our paper, the less emotive term ‘integration’ is preferred unless quoting ideas from other research.
The second caveat relates more to the capacity and willingness of countries to accept a less rigid concept of citizenship and national identity in response to immigrant settlement. At the institutional level, changes to citizenship laws are discussed, legislation to promote ‘race relations’ is debated, whilst polemics are heard on the pros and cons of public funding for the religious and cultural activities of ethnic groups. At the level of the community, shared values and beliefs may be challenged by the cultures and religions that migrants bring with them, which then provoke reactions in the host society ranging from curiosity through to direct racism. Both public policy and community responses to immigration therefore have the potential to affect the opportunities for migrants and their offspring to integrate. What different national contexts reveal is the extent to which ‘ethnic penalties’ (Heath and McMahon 1996) exist, and are ‘passed down’ to subsequent generations of immigrants, specifically in the form of ethnic and racial discrimination.

8.1 Theories of second-generation integration

Outlined above are two sets of determinants that shape the integration processes of the second generation: external factors, such as levels of discrimination and the degree of social and residential segregation; and factors intrinsic to ethnic groups, including the ability to access social support networks, level of education and skills, and the amount of financial resources available. Intrinsic cultural values, though they risk attributing behavioural differences to ‘culture’ alone (Vermeulen 2000: 3), do offer insights into why certain ethnic groups attain higher levels of social mobility than others despite similar socio-economic backgrounds. An apt example is the value that immigrant parents attach to their children’s education.

In other words, structural and socio-cultural factors are seen to interact to produce a ‘complex process of assimilation in the second generation’ (Zhou 1997: 1000). The complexity of this process provided impetus in the 1990s for new theoretical reflections on alternative integration trajectories of native-born immigrant youth, beginning in the United States with Gans’ (1992) concept of ‘second-generation decline’ and Portes and Zhou’s (1993) theory of ‘segmented assimilation’. Portes and Zhou outlined two alternative ‘modes of incorporation’ to the classical, linear process whereby the second generation achieves social and economic mobility into ‘white, middle-class’ America: downward assimilation into the ‘native underclass’ with the effect of permanent poverty; or socio-economic advancement but with the second generation upholding the traditions and values of the immigrant community. The latter juxtaposes the classical model of assimilation into mainstream American society. The implication of classical assimilation is that immigrant youth sacrifice the cultural for the economic; that is, traditional values and beliefs are relegated to a position below the material and financial rewards of socio-economic advancement. Upward mobility through ethnic cohesion, as Portes and Zhou observed in the Punjabi Sikh and Cuban American communities, gives the lie to classical assimilation theory. Ethnic communities possess social networks that provide moral and material resources to uphold immigrant values and traditions through private education, whilst some second-generation immigrants are able to benefit from ‘ethnic niches’ created in the labour market by the established immigrant community.

As the children of immigrants in Europe follow the transition from the school to the workplace, academics researching ethnic groups in Europe have used the theory of ‘segmented assimilation’ to describe the integration and mobility patterns of the second generation. Particular focus has been on the two alternative ‘modes of
incorporation’ outlined above. To some extent this reflects the growing disparity between, on the one hand, immigrant youth who are performing well, and, on the other, the high numbers dropping out of school and failing to find secure employment. This is not simply a case of one ethnic group outperforming another, but there are also signs of polarisation within ethnic groups (see section 8.2, below).

Crul and Vermeulen (2003b) caution against simply grafting assimilation theories from the American context on to Europe. Large-scale ghettos in the United States do make Portes and Zhou’s variant of downward assimilation more likely to occur there, as well as to persist over time. In the European context, there is evidence to indicate that a trend towards downward assimilation need not be a permanent feature of immigrant communities. Recent research on second-generation Moroccans in the Netherlands suggests that, through improved educational performance, the Moroccan community is reversing its previous downward trend (Crul and Doomernik 2003). Historical studies on both sides of the Atlantic also caution against hasty characterisations of ‘second-generation decline’ or ‘segmented assimilation’, being concerned that they paint a too-rosy picture of past immigrations (Lucassen 2004; Suárez-Orozco and Suárez-Orozco 2001: 36-65; Waldinger and Perlmann 1998).

The theory of ‘segmented assimilation’ has also been criticised on a number of other counts (Crul and Vermeulen 2003b). It pays little attention to the notion that ethnic groups might actually inhibit social mobility of their members, in particular the female second generation. Neither does the theory pay sufficient attention to internal differences within ethnic groups that might account for different patterns of social mobility and integration. Also, differences between national contexts do not feature as explanatory factors. Given the one-country setting of the theory, the United States, this is perhaps unsurprising, but differences between European countries in terms of education policy, citizenship laws, discourse on immigration and race, and inequalities in society as a whole, are only some of the important variables that might account for different integration trajectories of the second generation – to which we now turn.

8.2 The European second generation

Recent studies on immigrant integration in Europe (e.g. Andall 2002; Bolzman et al. 2003; Modood et al. 1997; Tribalat 1995; van Niekerk 2004) testify to a growing interest in the second generation. Few European cross-national studies, however, have yet to emerge on the position of the second generation. To date, the EFFNATIS project (2001) is the most significant.12 This set out to compare different national integration policies and their effect on second-generation integration. Conducted in eight European countries, comparisons proved tricky because of inadequate datasets in some countries and because the same ethnic group was not studied across different national settings. The project concluded, nonetheless, that the national context was the most important variable in explaining differences in second-generation integration. Other variables – individual and family resources, ethnic group belonging, gender and perceived discrimination – were significant, but less so as explanatory factors.

12 EFFNATIS – ‘Effectiveness of National Integration Strategies Towards Second Generation Migrant Youth in a Comparative European Perspective’ (1998-2000). The EU-funded Child Immigration Project (CHIP), which also ran from 1998 to 2000, looked at issues of ‘well-being’ in children of immigrant origin (including those partly raised in the country of origin). This project gave an overview of their social integration in six European countries (Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Sweden and the UK), and in particular considered the impact of education policies on levels of integration.
Future research on the second generation in Europe is centred on two projects: ‘Dimensions of Integration – Migrant Youth in Central European Countries’, and ‘The Integration of the European Second-Generation’ (TIES). The first will conduct research in Poland, the Czech Republic, Austria and Germany, but as indicated in the title will include first- as well as second-generation migrant youth – particularly in the more recent immigrant-host societies of Poland and the Czech Republic. The ‘TIES’ project will begin its primary research in 2005, and picks up EFFNATIS’ main conclusion that the national context has a profound impact on second-generation integration (Crul and Vermeulen 2003a). Research for ‘TIES’ will be conducted in Germany and Austria (two of the EFFNATIS countries), plus the Netherlands, France, Switzerland, Belgium and Spain. Aware of the criticism that the EFFNATIS project did not compare the same ethnic group in different countries, ‘TIES’ limits its comparative dimension to study three distinct immigrant communities – the Turkish, Moroccan and ex-Yugoslavian second-generation.

Both the ‘TIES’ and ‘Dimensions of Integration’ projects cover a broad range of integration domains to include structural, social and cultural aspects as well as the question of second-generation identity.

Personnel involved in the ‘TIES’ project have already published analyses of secondary data from five of the seven countries under research (Crul and Vermeulen 2003a). These studies focused on the educational performance and labour market transition of the European second generation. In other words, the structural dimension of integration. They remind us of two important points to bear in mind when undertaking this type of cross-national comparative research, both of which have been highlighted above:

- In comparing the ‘same’ ethnic group in different countries, internal differences within the emigrant community should be acknowledged, such as socio-economic background, first-generation education, migration ‘push’ factors, religion and ethnicity. Comparative study of the Turkish second generation across Europe, as in the ‘TIES’ project, is facilitated by similarities in socio-economic background of Turkish labour migrants, many of whom originate from the same regions and even villages in Turkey. Syrian Christians and Kurds fleeing Turkey in the 1970s and 1980s, however, illustrate clear ethnic and religious differences within the Turkish community in Europe. Furthermore, the Kurdish refugees, more so than the other two groups, represented an educated political elite whose claims for recognition of Kurdish national identity and sovereignty illustrate the importance of considering a group’s own specific history (see Westin 2003).

- Datasets are to be used with caution, often being incomplete and not sufficiently disaggregated. National differences in recording statistics on ethnic groups also make cross-national studies problematic. In Germany, official statistics do not record the number of second-generation migrants, but estimates can be made by considering the share of foreign nationals born in Germany. This is only possible because most of the second generation hold their parents’ nationality. Those who have naturalised, or those who were not born in Germany but immigrated at an early age, are omitted from this data (Worbs 2003). In Sweden, the national census does not register ethnicity, language or religion (Westin 2003: 992), whilst adherents of the French ‘Republican model’ have strongly resisted the inclusion of

13 The organisers suggest that the Turkish second generation are the most suited for such a comparison as they are present in virtually all Western European countries. The Moroccan and ex-Yugoslavian second generation are respectively the second and third most suitable.
any direct measures of ethnic origin in the national census or in other major surveys in France (Alba and Silberman 2002; Simon 2003).

Two further comments need to be made here. Firstly, Andall (2002) develops the issue of internally differentiating the second generation, specifically in terms of age differences, to bring in the changing impact of immigrant-receiving countries. In her study of the second generation in Milan, older African-Italians, whose parents migrated in the 1970s, grew up in a very different political and social climate to the children of ethnic groups who arrived in the 1980s and 1990s. Although the latter are still in primary school, it is not unreasonable to expect the experiences and integration trajectories of the two age cohorts to be different given the growing political profile of immigration and asylum in the last decade or so. From a historical perspective, structural changes over time to the economy, as well as in the levels of racial and ethnic tolerance, influence the extent to which the second generation from different waves of migration are able to integrate into mainstream society.

Secondly, the definition of the second generation is not without ambiguity, especially when statistics do not distinguish between native- and foreign-born children of immigrants (Portes 1994). As Andall (2002: 391) states, ‘it seems clear that including both native-born and 15-year-old foreign-born in the same survey is likely to affect research questions probing issues of identity, social integration, and identification with the home culture in quite a significant way’. Warner and Strole (1945) initiated the use of the term ‘generation and a half” (1.5) to distinguish between native- and foreign-born children in Yankee city. A more recent paper by Rumbaut (1997) aimed to be more precise by conceiving of 1.75, and 1.25 generations in addition to the 1.5 generation. The terms refer respectively to foreign-born children arriving before the ages of 6 (pre-school), after the age of 12 (teenagers), and between 6 and 12 (pre-pubescent). Whilst these do introduce important distinctions in terms of children’s education and social development, they have so far been little used. Their value, nonetheless, lies in conceptualising distinct groups within the second generation. Many researchers hence define the second generation as native-born children or those who arrived before primary school (e.g. Andall 2002; Crul and Vermeulen 2003a). The term 1.5 generation (or ‘in-between’ generation) would then broadly refer to children who migrated after starting their school careers.14 An unambiguous definition of the third generation – the grandchildren of immigrants – is even more elusive.

The remainder of our discussion addresses the integration processes of the European second generation in three specific areas: education, the labour market, and questions of citizenship and identity. Empirical research, mainly on the Turkish and Moroccan communities, is used to explain differences in patterns of second-generation integration vis-à-vis the first generation (their parents), the 1.5 generation, the native population, and other ethnic groups. We also draw attention to different levels of social mobility within the ‘same’ ethnic group.

---

14 Simon (2003), however, defines the 1.5 generation as children born abroad but who emigrated before the age of 10. These terms also do not appear to account for children of mixed parentage; e.g. with one foreign- and one native-born parent. Is it useful conceptually to speak of a ‘2.5 generation’? The issue of intermarriage and social mobility is raised below.
8.3 Education

Several indicators point to the educational performance of the second generation: school attendance rates, highest level of qualification, drop-out rates, and the numbers repeating school years (Crul and Vermue 2003b). Poorer levels of education and higher drop-out rates, for example, appear to be a general characteristic of the Turkish second generation in Europe. In Germany, Turkish youth are statistically much less likely to graduate from the higher educational streams than native Germans, whilst in France, 46 per cent of the Turkish second-generation drop out of school without any diplomas against 24 per cent of the total population (Simon 2003; Worbs 2003). On a more positive note, respectively 73 per cent and 64 per cent of British Chinese and Indian children (some belonging to the ‘third generation’) gained five or more ‘good’ exam passes at secondary school against 51 per cent of British Whites (Saggar 2004). Let us offer some possible explanations:

- **Social and economic exclusion** – The confluence of low socio-economic position of parents, residence in disadvantaged areas, and poor educational results is well charted. As many immigrant families in Europe are of working-class origin, statistics indicate that foreign pupils concentrate in schools with disproportionate numbers of children with ‘educational difficulties’: a third of foreign pupils at school in ‘priority education zones’ in France attend schools with a share of foreign pupils over 50 per cent (Simon 2003: 1109). The concentration of migrant pupils in so-called ‘black schools’ in the Netherlands has, since the 1980s, posed real difficulties for effective teaching. Despite extra funding and support, Dutch schools with high numbers of migrant pupils remain unable to provide children with sufficient Dutch language support (Crul and Doomernik 2003: 1050). The phenomenon of ‘White flight’ from such schools in working-class areas includes a number of the earlier, pioneer immigrant families. Their children distinguish themselves from children in the wider ethnic community by their far superior Dutch language skills, with many more receiving a high recommendation from primary school (Crul 2000: 232-6).

- **‘Discrimination’ in education** – Whilst knowledge of the native language does not guarantee success at school (on the Portuguese case, see Valente Rosa and Lopes Martins n/d), some European countries rely on children’s skills in the native language to place them on higher or lower educational streams. In Germany and Austria, selection takes place at age 10, which, in combination with a relatively late school starting age (6) and limited teaching hours in primary school (half-days), disadvantages those children with little or no language skills in German prior to starting school. Teachers’ expectations for pupils, influenced by children’s racial or ethnic characteristics, highlight a more direct form of discrimination. In research on Afro-Caribbean and South Asian pupils in the UK, teachers are more disciplinary with, and less expectant of, Black (male) students compared with their Indian or Pakistani peers (Gillborn 1997).

- **Ethnic cohesion and values** – Van Niekerk’s (2004) study of Caribbeans in the Netherlands finds that educational success in the Indo-Surinamese community lends high social status to the family unit. Children feel inclined to respect their parents’ aspirations and expectations, which fosters a sense of social cohesion

---

15 Attendance at kindergarten between ages 3 and 6 has a positive effect on the German language acquisition and school performance of migrant children (Worbs 2003: 1025).
Within family and community networks. Although social cohesion also translates into high levels of social control in the family unit, the rewards for girls especially are seen in their improving results at school. In the Turkish community, however, familial control over daughters appears to have had little recompense. Statistics show that high numbers of Turkish girls drop out of school (Crul and Vermeulen 2003a). Research has pointed to ambivalence in Turkish parents’ attitudes towards their daughter’s schooling, believing that an early marriage will ward off gossip (de Vries 1990), provide extra household income (from the husband), and bring them status in the community back home (when close relatives send their son to Europe to be married) (Crul and Doomernik 2003).

- **Supportive role of family members** – Older siblings can play a pivotal role in the education of younger brothers or sisters. Where parents have inadequate skills in the official language of the country of settlement, older siblings can provide early exposure to the language, help with homework, liaise with teachers and give general encouragement. Older siblings in Turkish families are often those family members for whom an early marriage or the decision to send them ‘home’ for one or two years’ Turkish schooling proved disastrous. Their experiences provide salutary lessons, and education appears to be gaining greater social status within the Turkish expatriate community as ‘traditional values’ change (Crul and Doomernik 2003). The link between the loosening of traditional values and social mobility (cf. Thompson 1997: 53) is also highlighted by Lindo’s (2000) study of Portuguese children in the Netherlands. Their mothers, who participate more than Turkish women in social life outside the family, notably in the labour market, pick up important information about the Dutch education system and the quality of schools. This puts them in a better position to support their children’s interests vis-à-vis their husbands; e.g. when children ask permission to go on school outings, or for money to buy books (2000: 213-4).

Educational attainment in the European second generation varies within and across different ethnic groups. We have outlined above some possible reasons for this variety, but fuller explanations lie in the dynamic interplay between structure, culture and agency. Cultural factors may offer useful explanations, most plausibly when ethnic groups have similar socio-economic profiles such as the Moroccan and Turkish communities. Culture, though, should not be reified, but explained by reference to the social pressures on individuals to conform to the values of the wider ethnic community. Where Turkish parents, for example, are not as exposed to pressures to marry off daughters at an early age, they are in a better position to prioritise their daughters’ education (Lindo 2000: 218-21). Structural factors add another dimension to further explain divergent trends within the ‘same’ ethnic group, for instance where the children of pioneer migrants live and are educated in less disadvantaged areas.

Upward mobility as gauged by educational attainment is a general trend from one generation to the next, and indeed from the 1.5 generation to the second (Crul and Vermeulen 2003b; cf. Simon 2003). Given that many of the European labour migrants – the parents of the second generation – had limited opportunities at school, this should not be too surprising. Two concerns remain, however: firstly, that this upward trend conceals those children who drop out and/or fail to gain sufficient qualifications; and, secondly, that a number of the second generation are experiencing difficulties in the transition from school to the labour market.
Several indicators help determine how well the second generation are performing in the labour market: unemployment levels, differences between level of qualifications and job status, earnings, employment status (permanent or temporary), and the presence of ethnic minorities in more senior positions. We can also compare their position to that of their parents, and to the 1.5 generation, to measure the degree of mobility between generations. In the Netherlands, the unemployment rate in 1998 for the Turkish 1st, 1.5 and 2nd generation, respectively, was 27 per cent, 17 per cent and 21 per cent, whilst the rates for Moroccans were 23 per cent, 19 per cent and 29 per cent (Crul and Doomernik 2003: 1056). Similar above-average unemployment rates in France indicate that, with the exception of the Portuguese second generation, even university-educated children of immigrants find it difficult to secure employment (Simon 2003: 1111-2).

The second generation may not be able, or understandably willing, to perform the same ‘immigrant’ jobs their parents held. These positions were commonly entry-level menial jobs, which post-Fordist economic restructuring has virtually eliminated – note the high rates of first-generation unemployment in the Netherlands. Competition for fewer, more hi-tech positions makes recruitment more selective (Simon 2003). With appropriate educational skills increasingly in strong demand, the second generation suffers due to the high numbers who either drop out of school unqualified or gain few qualifications. Neither do the same opportunities exist any more for promotion from entry-level into middle-ranking jobs: today’s ‘hourglass economy’ has shrunk the number of intermediate positions into which first-generation immigrants used to be promoted (Portes and Zhou 1993). The resulting transition to the labour market, especially for the least qualified, is at best problematic, and at worst may foretell a scenario of ‘second-generation decline’ (Gans 1992). Lower rates of unemployment in the older 1.5 generation, at least in the Netherlands, tends to indicate that they have had more time to secure employment (Crul and Doomernik 2003: 1056).

Apprentice schemes – Difficulties in the school–work transition are partly offset by the existence of apprentice schemes in some European countries. Indeed, the figures cited above on second-generation unemployment are only for countries without such a scheme: unemployment levels in the Turkish second generation are three to four times lower in countries such as Germany and Austria where apprentice schemes exist (Crul and Vermeulen 2003b: 977). These schemes have allowed Turks in Germany, for example, to gain relatively secure, skilled positions in the labour market through vocational training and schooling. This

---

16 However, 1.5-generation levels of unemployment in France amongst Turks and Moroccans were higher in 1999 than levels in the second generation (Simon 2003: 1112).
partly compensates for their generally poorer educational results than the Turkish second generation in other European countries (Worbs 2003).

- **Ethnic cohesion** – High levels of social capital in ethnic communities can facilitate a smooth transition to the workplace for the European second generation. In the Portuguese community in France, ‘ethnic niches’ in construction and trade result in second-generation unemployment rates being closer to the national average. In some respects, this recalls Portes and Zhou’s theory of upward mobility through ethnic cohesion. Yet, the educational profile of many second-generation Portuguese, one of attendance on short vocational training courses, betrays little social mobility between generations. Portes and Zhou’s model is further questioned by intermarriage in the French-Moroccan community: children from mixed couples are performing better in education and in the labour market than children with two Moroccan parents (Simon 2003: 1110-6). Where low levels of exogamy in ethnic communities reflect a group’s strong social cohesion, as observed in the Turkish expatriate community, its ‘closure’ may not offer the second generation the same opportunities for social mobility, particularly via higher education (see above), as in more open, individualised communities (Crul and Vermeulen 2003b: 983).

- **Discrimination in the workplace** – For Gans (1992) and Portes and Zhou (1993) racial discrimination against children of immigrants is a major reason for ‘second-generation decline’, and why earlier white European settlers integrated more seamlessly in the United States than the darker-skinned, post-1965 immigrants. Whilst we should question this historical revisionism, many academics highlight racial and ethnic discrimination against Turks and Moroccans in Europe as a factor in limiting the second generation to their ‘own, marginal economic circuits’ (Crul and Doomernik 2003: 1057), and as a reason for their high unemployment rates (Simon 2003; see also Fibbi et al. 2003). Two other forms of discrimination need to be noted: religious and sexual. Muslims are particularly affected by religious discrimination in the labour market, and more pointedly in school, where potential employers look unfavourably on women wearing the ‘Hijab’, or on the observation of religious rituals such as prayers (Ahmad et al. 2003: 32-3). As noted in section 6, sexual discrimination adds another layer to the multiple oppression of migrant women, who may suffer discrimination within their own ethnic groups as well as from the host society. Turkish women are particularly affected by poor educational levels, high drop-out rates, and unemployment. Where gender inequalities no longer persist within migrant families, though, second-generation women appear to be integrating better than second-generation males (Mœurs et al. 2004; Worbs 2003).

The status of the second generation in the labour market offers few definitive answers to the question of their integration. Social mobility, as in education, is discernible between the first and second generations: most children of immigrants enter more qualified and skilled occupations than their parents. Higher levels of education and vocational training, especially where apprentice schemes exist, explain this. The position of the second generation varies widely across Europe, however, which is partly the result of differences in national educational systems and the existence or not of apprentice schemes. It is difficult not to agree with Crul and Vermeulen (2003b: 982-4) that generic policies in the national context have a considerable impact, for good or for bad, on second-generation integration. Where policies fail the second generation, indicated by high levels of unemployment and poor educational
attainment, there is a serious risk of underclass formation in parts of ethnic groups, and polarisation within the ‘same’ communities.

Integration, though, is also about the degree to which the second-generation feel they belong and can participate in society (outside the school and the labour market). Where discrimination occurs within institutions it can profoundly affect the life-chances of the second generation. Discrimination, though, leaves the classroom or workplace with its perpetrators. We conclude this section by briefly addressing integration in a more holistic way to include questions of citizenship and identity.

8.5 Citizenship and identity

Whether a state chooses to give or deny citizenship is a powerful tool of inclusion or exclusion. It can exclude ethnic groups from the political process, an arena in which their societal presence could be formalised and become a part of the national psyche. Formal citizenship of a country is an outward sign of belonging to the society in which ethnic groups settle, and endows first and subsequent generations with societal rights equal to the native population. Without these rights, official discourses about national identity designate immigrants and their descendants as outsiders, and give credence to the ‘them-and-us’ mindset in sections of society that fuels prejudice and discrimination against ethnic groups.

Andall (2002) discusses issues of citizenship and belonging in Italy amongst second-generation African-Italians. Tighter laws on naturalisation introduced in 1992, which restrict the second generation’s right to acquire Italian citizenship, emerged from a generally hostile political climate in which the agenda revolved around questions of national identity (2002: 395). The inability of some sections of society to conceive of an Italian who is black, despite many of the black second generation holding Italian citizenship, reflects the prevailing discourse in politics. Self-definition as Italian, or using a hyphenated identity such as African-Italian, does not conform to an accepted (or indeed, acceptable) image of the national identity in Italy. Rejection of a person’s self-definition (and self-image) by the majority brings feelings of non-belonging, and a desire to seek better opportunities elsewhere in Europe.

Conflict with society’s values and beliefs, of course, has a profound impact on identity formation in the second generation. Often, though, the second generation are able to negotiate their identity within the host society, for example through religion or culture (music, sport etc.). Contact with peers in these areas, from within and outside the ethnic community, further shapes their identity, sometimes in ways that strain relations between parents and their children. Portes and Rumbaut (2001) term this ‘dissonant acculturation’: parents are unable, due to poor language skills and lack of knowledge of the new culture, to keep up with their children’s integration, and lose control over them. ‘Downward assimilation’, to recall the theory of segmented assimilation, occurs when the second generation become involved in delinquent or criminal activities, as described in some Moroccan-Dutch youth. Recent research on the Moroccan-Dutch community, though, cautions against negatively characterising the community as a whole, notably highlighting the visible presence of successful Moroccan-Dutch women in Dutch public life (Crul and Doomernik 2003: 1042-3).

Conflict, either within families or in society, remains only one factor shaping second-generation identity. Many others act on the second generation. De Vries (2005) explores ties with Judaism to question the extent to which younger generations in the Netherlands will continue to exhibit a strong bond with Judaism. Ties with Judaism appear to be mainly a matter of personal choice for the children of Jewish
parents because expressions of a Jewish identity remain confined to family settings. Without new stimuli from the outside world, she expects these ties to weaken further especially if children choose non-Jewish partners. In previous work, de Vries (1999) considered the term *optional ethnicity* in a study of the Dutch Eurasian community: firstly, to discuss the extent to which children of immigrants have freedom to choose parts of their ethnic heritage (and discard other elements); and secondly, to question whether ethnicity is indeed an appropriate term to use once subsequent generations have diluted its original meaning and substance.

Finally, there is an emerging body of (mainly US-based) research looking at second-generation ties to the parental homeland (see, e.g., Levitt and Waters 2002). The character and significance of second-generation transnationalism depend very much on contextual factors such as socio-economic status of parents, pressures on children to integrate or be ‘transnational’, intergenerational conflict within families and ethnic groups, as well as second-generation experiences within the host society (Morawska 2003). In the European context, Wessendorf (2004) highlights forms of transnational behaviour in the descendants of postwar Italian labour migrants in Switzerland. One defining factor appears to be the difficulty experienced by second-generation Italians in obtaining Swiss citizenship. Whereas some feel particularly aggrieved by their political exclusion, others who are less politically active react by opposing the ‘Swiss majority culture which they see as petit-bourgeois and narrow-minded’ and instead, ‘emphasise Latin spontaneity’ (Wimmer 2004) and ‘what they see as *art de vivre*’ (Wessendorf 2004: 4). This dissociation from Swiss culture can lead some to ‘return’ to Italy, at least for a while.

8.6 Future research

This discussion raises some suggestions for future research on generations:

- The subject of second-generation transnationalism in Europe is in its infancy. Little is known of how significant the phenomenon is, and the multiple reasons that might induce the children of immigrants to engage in transnational practices. Attention is predominantly focused on more problematic forms of transnational behaviour, such as the emergence of religious extremism in the second generation. Research may benefit from considering how transnational practices are reproduced across generations. For example, what is the impact of intergenerational changes in these practices for the ‘homeland’; e.g. economic losses due to cuts in remittances (Lee 2004)? Does second-generation transnationalism emerge out of familial or ethnic obligation, or can we speak of an *optional* transnationalism? How do transnational practices reflect and define ethnicity in the second generation? Will these practices continue over time, or are they subject to changes in family circumstances, or to the political and social climate in sending and receiving countries?
- Upward mobility through ethnic cohesion in the European context remains a limited phenomenon. The Turkish community, which once appeared to profit from its closure and social cohesion, is now performing worse in education and in the labour market than the more open Moroccan community. To Crul and Vermeulen (2003b: 983) this suggests a retreat to *classical assimilation* – a discredited model from which researchers had tried to move away. Are other, under-researched, immigrant communities in Europe achieving upward mobility through ethnic cohesion? Or, is the phenomenon being limited by the very definition of ethnic
cohesion itself – a definition which is not progressive, remains fixed in time and place, and pays little attention to changes in the ethnic make-up of communities both in the homeland and receiving countries? Better internal differentiation of ethnic groups may reveal more satisfactory explanations for different integration trajectories with the ‘same’ ethnic group.

• Cross-national studies should pay particular attention to differences in educational systems and policies to assist transition to the labour market. The effectiveness of different national arrangements needs to be questioned, particularly in the light of findings on the potential for ‘underclass formation’ in members of the second generation (Crul and Vermeulen 2003b: 984).

• The historical perspective can introduce interesting comparisons across time between integration trajectories then and now. Are there historical examples of ‘second-generation transnationalism’, or is it a product of our time given the impact of globalisation? Are there historical parallels with the forms of prejudice and discrimination that immigrants and their descendants face today? From a historical perspective, is it too early to speak of ‘second-generation decline’?

• Finally, these suggestions for future research not only apply to the second generation. Similar questions can be asked about the 1.5 generation and, given time, the third generation.
8 AGE-RELATED MIGRATION STREAMS

If we refer back to the age-migration profile which was introduced in section 4, we find certain age cohorts which have higher propensities to migrate than others. Not surprisingly, the highest peak in the migration profile coincides with the transition from education to work; this is the point in the life-course at which individuals are likely to be, and to need to be, most geographically mobile. Given the large amount of research on labour migration, we concentrate in this section on three age-related migrations which are not work-related, or at least not directly so. In making this selection we want to redress the over-concentration on employment-related moves as the driving-force behind migration, and reflect on the wider range of life-stage and life-style factors. We pick three age-related groups: children, students and retired people. The literatures on each of these types are rather limited; hence the attractiveness of these topics for further research, especially of a cross-national comparative nature. As so often happens in migration research, the extant literature bifurcates between that on internal and international scales of movement; we focus on the latter. In reality, child, student and retirement migrations are deceptively simple categorisations and, as we shall shortly see, each breaks down into a number of subtypes.

9.1 Children as migrants

Study of child migrants cuts across academic disciplines. Law (particularly the field of human rights), along with sociology and political science, feature prominently in issues of child trafficking and asylum. Another body of literature is concerned with questions of child welfare such as the healthcare and educational needs of child migrants. Hence, we can identify two interrelated, but distinct areas of research: the processes behind the actual migration of children, and the difficulties child migrants experience upon arrival. Section 8 discussed the second in broader terms, in particular comparing long-term patterns of settlement of different generations of migrants. Here we are more concerned with the immediate impact that the arrival of child migrants has on both the children themselves, and the country of immigration.

Within the literature on child migrants in Europe, we can identify five main subtypes: refugees and asylum-seekers, victims of trafficking, migrant children with EU citizenship, migrant children of third-country nationals (TCNs), and inter-country adoptees.

Refugee and asylum-seeking children migrate for a variety of reasons, often with family members and other adults, but occasionally by themselves. Children may flee with the family unit out of fear of ethnic or racial persecution, or because the family has been forcibly displaced from their home (possibly as a result of bombing, or militia incursions), or out of severe poverty and deprivation. The circumstances causing flight, the ensuing journey to safety, and experiences in the country of asylum all impact on migrant children’s physical and emotional well-being. A study of young refugees in the UK found, somewhat alarmingly, that over 50 per cent believed their health had deteriorated since their arrival due, amongst other factors, to poverty, poor housing, bullying at school, language barriers and loneliness (Community Health South London 2000; see Rutter 2003 for refugees in UK schools). Their detention in some European countries further risks distressing children who, as research has consistently identified, have significantly higher rates of psychiatric disorder than their peers (Hodes 1998): to quote medical research carried out on detention in the
UK, ‘it places detainees in the predicaments parallel to those they may have faced under torture or previous detention [and] maintains the mechanisms of persecution which precipitated their flight’ (Pourgourides et al. 1996: 99). The principle of the child’s best interests, as set out in Article 3 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), is clearly not being applied in immigration and asylum law across the EU (Ruxton 2000, 2003).

In the UK two types of children are currently detained: those detained with other family members, and separated children who authorities believe are adults (over 18 years of age). The current practice of disputing a child’s age during an asylum claim – which has notably been described as an ‘increasingly popular sport’ (Harvey 2004: 7) – affects separated children in particular, the majority of whom are 16 or 17 year olds (UNHCR 2004). Authorities, keen to avoid the additional welfare obligations they have towards migrant children, often call on doctors to assess the age of an asylum claimant despite the high degree of uncertainty in such assessments (Mather and Kerac 2002: 52).

A European-wide initiative established in 1997, the Separated Children in Europe Programme (SCEP), defines separated children as ‘under 18 years of age who are outside their country of origin and separated from both parents or their legal/customary primary caregiver’ (2000: para. 2.1). 17 SCEP aims ‘to realise the rights and best interests of separated children who have come to or across Europe by establishing a shared policy and commitment to best practice at national and European levels’ (2000: para 1.1). Its reports have contributed to the extensive body of literature on separated children, estimated to currently number 100,000 in Europe (Ayotte 2000; Ayotte and Williamson 2001; Campani and Silva 2002; Ruxton 2000, 2003; see UNHCR 2002 for a fuller list).

Many separated children seek asylum in Europe. In 2003, 12,800 claimed asylum in the 28 industrialised countries that record sufficiently comparable data: six European countries (UK, Austria, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Germany and Norway) accounted for 73 per cent of all these claims. These numbers reflect a recent fall since 2001 in line with a similar downward trend in the total number of asylum claims (UNHCR 2004). Usually children have fewer resources, both financial and personal, than adults to enable them to flee. Sometimes parents use family money to pay for their child’s journey to safety. When children flee, however, it may be following the death or imprisonment of their parents. Their flight also exposes them to greater risks than adults, and they may have very little, if any, control over their final destination (see Ayotte 2000).

Due to their vulnerability, separated children are often the victims of trafficking, our second category of child migrant. Unlike data on asylum-seekers, statistics on child trafficking are not readily available because its hidden nature makes data collection extremely difficult. It is recognised, nonetheless, as a growing phenomenon in Europe, especially for sexual exploitation (Campani et al. 2002; IOM 2002; Kelly 2002; Kelly and Regan 2000; Renton 2001; Ruxton 2000; Wolthius and Blaak 2001). Funded as part of the EU’s STOP programme, a report by IOM (2002) in seven European countries found a rising number of children being exploited in the sex industry, and in the informal sector as street peddlers, beggars, sweatshop workers and

17 The UNHCR encourages the distinction between ‘unaccompanied’ and ‘separated’ children. The latter refers to children separated from both parents or legal/customary primary caregiver, but who may have arrived with extended family members. These family members may not provide children with the same or sufficient level of care. Few countries, however, have adopted this distinction when recording statistics (SCEP 2000: para. 2.2; UNCHR 2004: 2).
drug dealers. Most arrive from three main regions: Central and Eastern Europe (Moldavia, Romania and Ukraine), Africa (Nigeria and Sierra Leone) and Asia (China, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka); and come as irregular migrants or through the asylum route. However, the IOM report notes that a large number of child asylum-seekers disappear from their reception centres soon after claiming asylum, some of whom were subsequently found working in brothels in the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany.

Children vulnerable to trafficking exhibit similar characteristics to child asylum-seekers: flight from war-torn countries (most recently in the Balkans), from poverty or from lack of opportunity. More restrictive immigration controls in EU countries have also made children more vulnerable to trafficking and its expanding criminal networks (Salt and Stein 1997). The cost of migration is now prohibitive to many potential migrants: indeed, the IOM report cited above found that parents often accepted their child’s migration as a form of subsistence for family members left behind. Due in part to tighter immigration controls on unskilled workers, employers may turn to children as a source of cheap and casual labour.

It is important, though, not to conceive of the various forms of child exploitation as being carried out exclusively through criminal networks. Parents, or other relatives, do occasionally exploit children, in some cases by obliging them to work as street children. Altanis and Goddard (2004) in their study of refugee children in Greece found significant numbers of migrants working as street children due to the lack of public welfare support for undocumented migrants. Many families facing high levels of poverty earned (extra) income through their children’s activities on the street; selling small items (tissues, flowers, water), washing car windows, playing music, or begging (2004: 306). Albanian migrants in particular were likely to force their children to work or to beg. Mai (2001: 274), in his discussion of the trafficking of young Albanian girls to Italy, finds explanations in the ‘values and specific social practices which have been historically hegemonic within Albanian culture [and] in the emergence of new social subjects and opportunities within the recent phase of post-communist transformation’.

In contrast to the previous two types of child migrants, children of EU migrant families, our third category, do not experience migration with anything approaching the same degree of trauma and uncertainty. Ackers and Stalford (2004), in an original piece of research on this group, recognise the perceived privileged status of Community nationals, but dismiss the idea that there is relatively less merit in researching these migrants. Indeed, they challenge the perception that all migrants with EU citizenship are privileged, and therefore receive equal treatment under European and national laws. They criticise the functionalist definition of families under Community law, which conceives of women and children as the ‘non-productive appendages of male workers’, and denies full citizenship rights to ‘partners and children who fall outside the “traditional” male breadwinning, heterosexual model’ (2004: 2, 268). This can effectively mean that children’s social entitlements in the host state are contingent on the migrant worker-parent’s continued residence in the same country, or, if the family status is not recognised under Community law, children may be excluded from the benefits of citizenship. Despite an emerging body of human rights law (in particular, since the adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the European Union), migrant children still find it difficult to exercise their rights as active citizens in two notable areas. Firstly, they rarely have a say in the family’s decision to migrate; at best, they may be given the choice of staying home alone or joining the family abroad. Secondly, family breakdown may result in
children losing their derived benefits in the host state if the worker-parent returns home.

Two other issues should be noted. The education of EU migrant children, though attractive in its potential to create a shared European identity, faces several challenges due to differences between national contexts (e.g. starting age at school, how subjects are prioritised, recognition of different qualifications etc.). Dobson and Pooley (2004: 88-9) identify another problem where parents are unable to find a school for their child due to shortages of places, potentially resulting in children being out of school for considerable periods of time. Parents, if financially able, can resort to international and private foreign schooling, yet this fails to address these problems nor does it truly give migrant children the opportunity to integrate in the host state (Ackers and Stalford 2004: 225).

The second issue concerns international parental abduction following family breakdown, the incidence of which has increased in recent years facilitated in large part by the free movement provisions within the EU. Lengthy legal wrangling between separated parents over custody rights and child maintenance causes distress to children who, ultimately, may be separated by some distance from one of the parents. Other research highlights the inadequacy of the 1980 Hague Convention on International Child Abduction in dealing with women accused of abducting their child despite being the victims of domestic violence (Kaye 1999).

The fourth type of child migrant are those without EU citizenship - children of third-country nationals (TCNs). Whilst EU citizens are guaranteed a right to family life (and, therefore, family reunification) under Community law, the right for TCNs living in EU member states to be joined by family members remains largely a matter for domestic law. This right has notably been undermined by recent legislative changes in EU member states which have tightened conditions for entry of family members. For example, states have lengthened the period of residence of TCNs prior to family reunification, and lowered (in the case of Germany) the age limit for the entry of children (Kofman 2004). Despite the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999 giving the European Commission competence for immigration, a draft directive on family reunification approved by the EU Council of Ministers on 22 September 2003 does little to break with this trend towards ever more restrictive legislation. Where children are concerned, member states can limit the rights of children over the age of fifteen to family reunification, whilst states can refuse children over the age of twelve the right of entry if they are travelling separately from their family.

Once children of TCNs have moved into the host country their entitlements, for example to education, are again derived from their relationship with the parent-worker. These derived benefits often remain contingent on their worker-parent maintaining secure employment. Without a permanent residence status, non-EU parents are more liable for deportation following family breakdown, the loss of a job or criminal conviction. A child may subsequently lose their derived benefits and face deportation, or be separated from one or both of their parents (Justice 1997).

The fifth and final type of child migrant are inter-country adoptees. Inter-country adoption (ICA) is a global phenomenon: over 100 countries participate in ICA, whilst more than 30,000 children are adopted each year (Selman 2002). The recent history of ICA can be broken down into two waves after the Second World War: the first up until the mid-1970s characterised by a humanitarian concern for children in war-torn

---

18 Denmark has opted out of Title IV of the EC Treaty, whilst the UK and Ireland decide on a case-by-case basis whether to participate. Neither ‘opted into’ this directive on family reunification.
countries; the second from the mid-1970s driven by falling fertility rates in the West and the decline in the numbers of children available for adoption domestically (Lovelock 2000: 908). Hence the nature of ICA has changed from providing families for children, to finding children for families (Triseliotis 1993: 419). This raises some fundamental questions about ICA. Is it in the ‘best interests’ of adopted children? Under which circumstances is it morally acceptable to remove children from poorer societies to provide families for people in richer nations? Does ICA exploit vulnerable people and countries, and encourage a trade in children? What effects does it have on the identity of the children adopted? (Warren 1999).

The case of Romanian adopted children is illustrative in many respects. The fall of the Ceausescu regime in the late 1980s focused the media’s attention on the plight of Romanian orphans in institutional care. The high numbers in care were the result of a combination of factors: the Ceausescu regime had encouraged large families and banned abortion and birth control methods; families already in poverty found that they could not care for all their children, and placed them in institutions; institutions did not attempt to return children to their families, nor did they make much effort to find substitute families either through fostering or adoption (Warren 1999: 23-4). The subsequent adoption of Romanian ‘orphans’ by Europeans, and as far afield as New Zealand, was an act of kindness by many, but more probing media stories highlighted stories of paedophilia, child prostitution and domestic servitude as the outcome of existing trafficking networks. Debates now recognise that the child’s best interests may be better served through adoption within the home country, and efforts have since been made in Romania to move towards improving the social and economic conditions conducive to family-based care within Romania (Lowe 1993; Warren 1999).

Extending the notion of the child’s best interests, Scherman and Harré (2004) address the importance of culture for international adoptees. What importance do parents attach to their adopted children’s birth culture? To what extent do parents seek out and engage in activities connected to the birth culture of their children? Future research on these specific questions, and on the general issue of the identity of immigrant children, may offer some interesting answers.19

9.2 International student migration

Students are undoubtedly one of the main under-researched elements of the contemporary European international migration scene (King 2002: 98-9). According to SOPEMI (2001: 93), ‘a panorama of [contemporary international migration] flows cannot ignore international student mobility’. Yet the standard academic texts on migration say virtually nothing on student migrants.20 This lack of acknowledgement – ironic given that most of us who work as academics and researchers are surrounded by students! – extends both to the simple enumeration and mapping of flows and distributions, and to the conceptualisation of student mobility as a specific form of migration (if, indeed, it can be considered as a ‘pure’ migration).

Let us first be clear what types of movement are encompassed by the term ‘international student migration’ (ISM). Students may go abroad for all or part of their

19 Research currently being conducted at the University of Sussex by Rupert Brown et al. considers this question of identity: ‘Identities in transition: a longitudinal study of immigrant children’ (2004-06), funded by ESRC.

20 One partial exception is Skeldon’s Migration and Development which includes a few paragraphs on Asian students and associated issues of brain drain (1997: 108-12).
degree programme; they may move at undergraduate or postgraduate level; and they may undertake either study or a work placement. Students moving abroad for part of their study programme typically engage in a semester or year abroad; shorter-term trips such as field courses are forms of international mobility but clearly are not migration. The most publicised form of student mobility within Europe is the Erasmus scheme which has been sponsoring intra-EU mobility by offering ‘mobility grants’ to more than 1 million students since its inception in 1987. Student migration flows also take place between European countries and the rest of the world. Outward flows are particularly to North America; inward flows come for all over the world, with particular channels linking countries along linguistic and former colonial lines. But this is a fast-changing geography; notable in recent years has been the rise of China as a key source country for global student migration.

Population geographers have thus far missed a wonderful opportunity to create maps of student migration and to chart its growing global and European significance. The source data are there (of course there are the usual caveats about definition, lack of comparability etc.) but the analyses have yet to be made. Key data sources comprise UNESCO Statistical Yearbooks for the broad global picture, OECD publications for European data (see especially OECD 2001; SOPEMI 2001: 93-118) and various European Commission and Erasmus websites.21 A preliminary overview of these sources, with some graphs and tables, is presented by Findlay et al. (2003: 12-36). Interesting patterns can be observed regarding Erasmus exchanges, for instance (see also King 2003: 159-63). Some countries are clear net ‘importers’ of Erasmus exchange students, such as the UK, Ireland, the Netherlands and France. In the case of the UK, there are twice as many ‘incoming’ Erasmus students as there are ‘outgoing’ ones (20,705 as against 10,056 in 1999-2000): this is by far the biggest imbalance in the EU. The biggest net ‘exporters’ of Erasmus students are the Southern European countries, especially Italy, Spain and Greece. Germany and Finland are also consistent exporters. Interesting possibilities exist for attempting to explain and model the patterns of origin-destination flows within and beyond Europe and their evolution through time. Trend data show that, whilst growth in Erasmus numbers has been more or less continuous since 1987, certain countries (Sweden, the Netherlands and, above all, the UK) have lost momentum in their out-moving students in the last few years. The UK’s ‘export’ of Erasmus students peaked at 12,000 in 1994/5, falling back to less than 8,000 in 2002/3. A study commissioned to examine the reasons for this UK decline pointed to a range of factors, the two principal ones being finance and related issues (part-time jobs etc.), and language problems (UK students are notoriously poor at languages, the teaching of which is declining throughout the UK’s secondary and tertiary education systems). UK universities, for their part, have been much keener on recruiting high-fee students from overseas than on expanding non-income-earning EU student exchanges (King et al. 2004).

How does ISM fit into the scheme of things as regards theories of migration? To what extent do we need new theories of educated youth mobility, or can we rely on existing migration models? Here are a few preliminary thoughts. Human-capital and brain-drain theory can be applied to student mobility, especially that between poor and wealthy countries, including some student flows within Europe, for instance between south and north, and east and west. Baláž and Williams (2004) have recently surveyed Slovakian students who had studied either at university or at a language

school in the UK; the students had generally been able to access better jobs and incomes upon their return to Slovakia as a result of their foreign training and experience. These kinds of benefit are not necessarily limited to students moving from poor to rich countries. King and Ruiz-Gelices (2003), in their questionnaire surveys of British ‘Year Abroad’ graduates, found them better off in their careers, on average, than a control sample of graduates who had not been on study abroad.

Further economic perspectives on ISM see the phenomenon as a subset of elite or high-skilled migration (Findlay 2002) – more precisely as a potential flow of qualified and professional workers; and as a product of globalisation – particularly the globalisation of higher education (Altbach and Teichler 2001). In its Erasmus promotional literature, the EU tries to persuade students that, by studying in another country, they will be more competitive in European and global graduate labour markets through their acquisition of linguistic skills and an intercultural and cosmopolitan outlook (Findlay et al. 2003: 6-7). Whilst the ‘free movement’ of students within the EU is an obvious European ideal which favours the realisation of the project of European integration, barriers to the in-movement of students from other world areas remain, despite the wish of most European countries and universities to reap the economic benefits of marketing their higher education ‘industry’ to overseas markets (van Aken 2004).

The final theoretical perspective sets student mobility within a more cultural frame, as part of a wider grouping of ‘youth mobilities’ and ‘mobile identities’ which also include independent travel, backpacking, working holidays etc. (Battisti and Portelli 1994; Clarke 2004). According to Elizabeth Murphy-Lejeune (2002), student travellers accumulate ‘mobility capital’ as their adventures in different time-spaces help them gain life experience and intercultural awareness. Such mobility is also seen as a rite of passage for well-educated adolescents and young adults; the discovery of other places leads to the discovery of self. King and Ruiz-Gelices (2003: 232, 245-6) use the individualisation thesis of Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2002) to develop the argument that many British (and, most probably, other European) students construct ‘do-it-yourself’ biographies for themselves which are increasingly divorced both from the classic structures of Western society (class, family, work, locality etc.) and from the standard life-course of education, apprenticeship/training, work/career, retirement etc.

Cultural studies perspectives are also at the heart of some interesting work done on students’ identities and integration patterns abroad. Are they the ‘new strangers’ (Murphy-Lejeune 2002), or do they successfully integrate? If integration does take place, is it a form of ‘segmented assimilation’ (cf. Portes 1995; Portes and Zhou 1993; Schmitter Heisler 2000) into the host-country student population rather than into the wider mainstream host society? Or, as some studies suggest, do students at foreign universities tend to spend most of the time with people of their own nationality or language-group; or with the broader population of international students? (Murphy-Lejeune 2002). For European nationals studying abroad within the EU, is there a tendency to take on a kind of ‘European’ identity, by which their national (or regional) identity is diluted – again, some evidence suggests a partial Europeanisation of identity does indeed take place (King 2003; King and Ruiz-Gelices 2003; Murphy-Lejeune 2002).

We round off this subsection by reiterating our belief in the importance of studying migrating students. Their mobility patterns are unlike those of previous generations, when opportunities to study and travel abroad were much more limited – both by the fact that far fewer people went on to tertiary education and by the slower
speed and higher cost of European travel. Now, in Europe, in some countries, a majority of young people enters third-level education. As educational capital increases so, too, in most cases, does the desire to travel and spend time abroad. Global, European and regional cities – from London, Paris and Brussels to Barcelona, Frankfurt and Milan – offer growing opportunities, through the ongoing internationalisation of business and economic life, to graduates to pursue both their careers and their life-style aspirations. The social geographies of these often hyper-mobile young people – where they live, their lifeworlds, identities, hopes for the future – are waiting to be systematically documented.

9.3 Migration and retirement: the ‘greying’ of migration?

Towards the other end of the life-course, retirement triggers another set of possibilities for international migration, as we saw in section 4. Whilst student and recent-graduate migrants are likely to be found in the major urban centres and university cities of Europe, wealthy retirees are more likely to seek out pleasant rural and coastal landscapes, especially those in southern Europe with a warm climate. However, the relationship between international migration and old age is much more complex than simply thinking of the British in the Dordogne or Germans in Majorca. The following four multiple interconnections between migration, ageing and retirement can be identified:

- the retirement migration of wealthy Northern Europeans to coastal and rural settlements in Southern Europe;
- the retirement-in-place of earlier waves of labour migrants, originating from Southern Europe, North Africa and other poor countries, in the cities and industrial areas of Northern Europe where they have spent most or all of their working lives;
- the return/retirement migration of these labour migrants back to their countries and villages of origin;
- the problems of survival and care suffered by older people in areas of emigration where they have been ‘left behind’ by the departure of most of the rest of the population, including their own family members.

Of these four, the first has received by far the greatest research attention. The remaining three have very sparse literatures, despite the fact that the numbers involved are probably many times greater than the first type. We now review each type in turn.

The first type, generally known as international retirement migration (IRM), has now been quite thoroughly researched thanks to a flurry of recent studies. Some of these studies adopt a comparative divergent approach, looking at the same nationality in different destinations (e.g. King et al. 1998, 2000 on British retirees in four Mediterranean countries); others take a convergent comparative approach, looking at different nationalities in the same retirement destination – for instance Rodríguez et al. (1998), comparing several North European nationalities on the Costa del Sol, or Huber and O’Reilly (2004) on Swiss and British retirees, also in southern Spain. Yet others are in-depth case-studies of single groups in one destination, such as Norwegians in Spain (Myklebost 1989); Swedes in Spain (Gustafson 2001, 2002); Swiss in the Costa Blanca (Huber 2003); Germans in Majorca (Kaiser and Friedrich
2004) and Tenerife (Breuer 2004); and the British in rural France (Hoggart and Buller 1995), Fuengirola (O’Reilly 2000) and Corfu (Lazaridis et al. 1999).

Building on this corpus of research we set out below some points which we think are particularly interesting and distinctive about this genre of retirement migration research, signalling the need or potential for further research where appropriate.

- **IRM is often seen as a form of extended or residential tourism (O’Reilly 2000).** Retirees often choose to settle in a place they already know through repeated holiday visits, sometimes buying a second home there prior to retirement. Even after the retirement migration, individuals and couples may continue to shift back and forth on a seasonal basis, maintaining complex transnational links to both their ‘original’ and their ‘new’ homes. Gustafson describes the situation of dual place attachment of Swedish seasonal retirees in Spain as ‘translocal normality’ (2001: 380-2), implying it is perfectly logical for such people to feel ‘at home’ in two places. Hence retirement migration is embedded in a complex sequence of time-space moves and strategies.

- **Such dual or multiple residential links make enumeration of retired migrants living seasonally or even permanently abroad very difficult, since they may not be officially registered as resident in their retirement destination.** Censuses and municipal registers are likely to significantly underestimate foreign retirees.

- **Who is most likely to retire abroad?** The available evidence indicates retirees as middle-class, often with occupational pensions and wealth derived from property sale and inherited capital, and with above-average education. However, in some places, such as Malta and southern Spain, there are substantial numbers of blue-collar retirees, some subsisting on state pensions.

- **IRM can have powerful impacts on local property markets and settlement forms.** Rural areas such as Provence and Dordogne in France, or Tuscany in Italy, have become gentrified by foreigners who have bought up much of the available stock of farmhouses, cottages and convertible barns. In the south of Spain many international retirees have settled in urbanizaciones, purpose-built estates of villas and low-rise apartments located close to, but rarely actually on, the coast. National groups tend to be segregated between, and within, such estates, although some intermixing does occur. Huber (2004) calls urbanizaciones ‘post-modern non-places’. They are a new settlement form catering to a particular population and lifestyle; and certainly they are ripe for sociological investigation.

- **Most studies tend to indicate low levels of ‘true’ integration with local society.** Migrating at a late stage in life does not, on the face of it, provide a good setting for rapid learning of a new language – the key to integration. Cases are noted in the literature of British, German and Swedish retirees in Spain knowing only a very few words of Spanish even after 20 or 30 years of living there. But there are also cases of successful linguistic and cultural integration, notably in rural France and Tuscany. The question also arises as to what kind of host society the retirement migrants are integrating into – especially if the local area has already been deeply affected by mass tourism and settlement of foreign retirees. Studies in the Spanish costas reveal intense networks of associations amongst retirees and foreign residents for a wide range of leisure, sporting, cultural, charity and

22 Many of the studies cited in this paragraph have been brought together for comparative discussion within a European Science Foundation Scientific Network on ‘Older Migrants in Europe’. See the ESF Network’s Final Report (Warnes 2004) and the comparative analysis of Casado-Diaz et al. (2004).
religious activities. Much of this associative life takes place within national
groups. Satellite TV allows access to home-country media and removes another
reason to learn Spanish. Yet retirees often say they are living the Spanish (or
Italian, or whatever) ‘way of life’; and are certainly appreciative of the greater
respect that older people are accorded in South European societies.

- Almost no research has been carried out on the perceptions of local people
towards the retired in-migrants; this remains a major gap in comprehending the
social, economic and psychological dynamics between ‘host’ and ‘guest’
populations.
- Most research agrees that international retirement migrants lead rich, varied and
healthy lives. They ‘use imagination and creativity to fashion innovative,
developmental and positive lives … High-achiever older people (living abroad)
pursue multiple roles and activities with impressive organisation and energy …
More understanding of their new lifestyles and the social formations they are
creating would greatly inform social gerontology’ (Warnes et al. 2004: 309, 316).
There are also more deeply sociological perspectives. IRM seems to embody the
death-denying society, where it is never too late to make a rejuvenating fresh start
(Frankenberg 1987: 123; Kellaher 1984). Or there is the proleptic view whereby
IRM resorts seem to be ‘waiting-rooms’ for the final journey.
- Certainly, there are ‘black spots in paradise’ (Huber and O’Reilly 2004: 345):
death of a partner, onset of debilitating disease or infirmity, alcoholism, boredom
and loneliness. The Costa del Sol is hardly a crime-free zone, and in other places
retirees find that, as time passes, their ‘retirement haven’ becomes over-developed
by mass tourism and new construction. What circumstances precipitate the
abandonment of the dream and a return to the country of origin? Returning retirees
are difficult to research because of their fragile state of physical and/or mental
health and the fact that return may be linked to a personal tragedy. On the other
hand, a kind of veil is often drawn over return – there is, as O’Reilly (2000: 96)
says, a myth of (no) return whereby people feel they will stay abroad to the end,
no matter what.
- The general process of demographic ageing in Europe, combined with the fact that
the newer cohorts of the ‘young old’ will have even greater resources of financial,
educational and mobility capital, means that the continued growth of IRM seems
assured. New destinations will be sought out, both within the expanding EU and
beyond. Where will these destinations be?

The second type of retired migrants consists of the millions of labour migrants
who, since the late 1940s, have moved within or into Europe and have subsequently
‘aged in place’ (Warnes et al. 2004: 311). These migrants mainly came from poor,
rural backgrounds, had little education, and took on low-skilled and low-paid manual
jobs. In comparison both to the host populations of the countries they settled in, and,
even more, to the North European retired migrants seeking sun and amenities in the
south, they have endured a lifetime of disadvantage and deprivation, including poor
housing and racial discrimination. Given the fact that most of these cohorts migrated
during the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s as young men and women in their 20s and
30s, they have now reached retirement age in massive numbers, and will continue to
do so in the next few years (Fibbi et al. 1999). Yet only now are these generations of
older immigrants living in precarious conditions being ‘discovered’.

Of course, they are very far from being a homogenous population. Those who
come from countries which are now part of the EU have greater welfare and
citizenship rights than those from other countries. On the other hand, EU membership is not everything. As Warnes et al. point out (2004: 314), an older Portuguese or Greek migrant from a rural background living in Frankfurt may have fewer language skills and less knowledge of the local welfare system than an East African Gujarati business family in London or Leicester.

Two case-studies from the still-limited literature on these retired labour migrants demonstrate some relevant themes and contrasting research and policy perspectives. Bolzman et al. (2004) report relatively high rates of poverty and disadvantage in their study of older Spanish and Italians living in Switzerland. Viewed by the Swiss authorities primarily as labour migrants (a view they also had of themselves), they received (and generally needed) little welfare or health assistance during their working lives; as ‘birds of passage’ it was assumed they would eventually return home before old age. Only a minority will do so; the majority are staying on in Switzerland to be near their Swiss-born children and grandchildren (Bolzman et al. 2001). Yet neither Swiss policy-makers nor the general public have accepted the reality of this new situation of retired labour migrants. Even the terminology is revealing: from Gastarbeiter they have become Gastrentner, guest-workers to guest-pensioners. Data presented by Bolzman et al. show that unemployment is much higher amongst foreigners, that foreigners at or approaching retirement age are greatly over-represented amongst the population with low incomes, and that, proportionately, three times more foreigners than locals are in receipt of a disability allowance. Clearly, retired migrant workers have pension, welfare and health needs, but these are not fully catered for in the Swiss system. For instance, they are often not able to access full pensions and pension supplements because of their history of low-wage employment, lack of fulfillment of the ten-year unbroken residence requirement (if they have returned home for some periods of time), and shorter than required years of service. In old age, as in work, they tend not to contact officialdom to claim their full rights, partly because of language barriers and a pride of not being in receipt of too many ‘benefits’.

Our second case-study is Katy Gardner’s (2002) sensitive account of Bengali elders in London’s East End: labour migrants who arrived from Sylhet in the 1960s and 1970s. Bangladeshis are the most deprived migrant group in the UK, suffering high levels of overcrowding, concentration in social housing, unemployment and illiteracy. Gardner collected 27 narratives of Bengali elders and conducted participant observation in sheltered housing, care homes and hospices. In this ethnography of migrant ageing, key themes are ‘body talk’ (ageing bodies as a cultural site for contested debates about migration and changing senses of self-worth), notions of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ ageing and death, and gender differences. For males, Gardner found that migration is part of the construction of masculinity: work dominates, along with patriarchal authority over the family. But then ageing, illness and retirement emasculate the male figure. Work loses its powerful significance as the symbol of the male raison d’être. Illnesses like heart problems, strokes and loss of memory strike at the heart of male authority: mobility and physical power are lost, sometimes along with the ability to remember and to tell stories. For women, migration has a different

23 Contrast to the Netherlands or the UK where the equivalent groups are termed ‘ethnic minority older people’.

24 Disability allowances are very difficult to obtain in Switzerland, so the real rate of disability amongst foreigners may actually be higher. Particularly badly affected by work-induced disabilities were former construction workers – a major sector of immigrant employment in Switzerland (Bolzman et al. 2004: 418)
meaning, to do with supporting their husbands abroad, caring for their families, and sustaining Bengali culture. Narratives of sacrifice, forbearance and duty dominate, as they have to look after their sick husbands, even suppressing their own ailments. Sharp contrasts are also noted between ‘Western’ and Bengali notions of successful ageing and care in old age. In the UK and in the rest of (especially Northern) Europe, successful ageing is about independence and keeping fit, whilst health care is highly professionalised and individualised in hospitals and care homes. For Bangladeshis a ‘successful’ old age means doing little physical activity and being waited on hand and foot by one’s family. Whereas British hospitals tend to isolate old people who are gravely ill, for Bangladeshis shared family support and participation are considered vital, especially at the moment of death.

Our third type of retirement migration, the return of retired labour migrants to their homelands, has also been little studied. The ‘return of retirement’ was one of four types of return migration nominated by Cerase (1974) in his well-known typology of return migration applied to Italians returning from long-term residence in the United States. Such returnees are drawn back to their ‘native air’ or ‘native soil’ when the end of their working lives removes the initial tie to the host country that first recruited them as migrant workers. Often, however, they have difficulty in reintegrating ‘back home’ after so long away; and they may miss their grown-up children who have stayed abroad where their education and career opportunities are better. A solution for many retired labour migrants is to ‘circulate’ between their place of origin and the immigrant host society, spending part of the year in each. Although the literature is still thin, returns of retirement have been noted in a variety of settings, including Ireland (Malcolm 1996), Andalusia (Rodríguez et al. 2002), Malta and Gozo (King 1980; King and Strachan 1980), and the Caribbean (Byron and Condon 1996; Condon and Ogden 1996).

Finally, we briefly consider the older people who remain in their home countries, stripped of their families and support systems by mass emigration. Often the economies and welfare systems of their countries are too poor and disorganised to provide state pensions or proper health and social services. Such older people would normally expect that their children and other close relatives would support them both materially and if they become frail or sick. When their children migrate to another country, especially one that is far away, they lose this emotional and practical support. Of course, remittances and occasional return visits provide some compensation, but loneliness and sickness cannot be fully cured by these palliatives. Baldassar and Baldock (2000) have examined the case of long-distance care of the elderly left behind in the context of Italian migration to Australia; whilst King’s (2004) recent study of the Albanian case reveals a situation where the abandonment of old people is occasionally total, either because of the breakdown of family relations and obligations (traditionally it was the duty of the youngest son to remain with the parents), or because, as ‘illegal’ immigrants, the migrating children cannot make return visits.
9 PRIORITIES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

Our brief in this state-of-the-art report has been to ‘map the field’. Given the crosscutting nature of C8’s domain, embracing both the general role of time in migration and several specific themes – gender, age, family, generations – we have inevitably ended up mapping several fields! This has led to a longer-than-expected report.

Our objective in this final section is to suggest some new lines of research which:

- are based on existing theory, knowledge and expertise, both globally and within the Cluster and Network;
- involve imaginative extensions of existing theory and methodology;
- engage in multidisciplinary, comparative research; and
- pertain to central issues for European policy-making.

In particular we wish to stress the value of rigorously comparative, integrated research which transcends the historical specificity and local dependencies of single case-studies. The priorities listed below are a first step towards the formulation of concrete integrative activities to be undertaken by cluster members – probably with some cross-cluster collaborations – in the next phase of research.

A large number of gaps in the literature and suggestions for new research have been identified already at various points in this report: see the list of bullet-pointed suggestions in sections 4.5, 6.3, 7.4, 8.6 and a various places in section 9. There is no point in reproducing these lists again here. Instead, we strategically select some priority areas where we think the efforts of C8 members, linked to individuals and subgroups from other clusters, might best be targeted.

- Research on the long-term historical comparison of migration and integration. This is a very general research thrust. Issues of similarity and difference have relevance both at an academic level and for predictive and policy-oriented work. The historical debate over comparisons between the ‘old’ (1880-1914) and the ‘new’ (post-1965) immigrations into the United States – as Nancy Foner (2000) puts it, ‘from Ellis Island to JFK’ – has had virtually no resonance in the European context (Lucassen et al. 2004), so the possibilities for such comparisons are wide open.

- Census-based Longitudinal Surveys. The recent availability (September 2004) of the 1 per cent sample of linked census records from the UK Census enables the historical comparison of migrant and ethnic-minority profiles (employment, location etc.) to be extended to the 1991-2001 decade, building on analyses of prior decades (cf. Fielding 1995). Comparisons with the French Census’s LS and with possible other LS-type data elsewhere could be a key research priority for a small group within C8.

- From labour migration to ‘mobile livelihoods’. Studies of work migration are no longer about the ‘guestworker’ phenomenon. They are about sustaining a livelihood in an increasingly globalised world, and the role of spatial mobility in realising this aim (Olwig and Søresen 2002). According to these authors, we need ‘a more encompassing understanding of migration’ which includes ‘local, translocal, and transnational perspectives’ (2002: 10, 14). Hence life-course studies of work-related migration need to embrace the varieties, subtleties and changing dynamics of work-related international mobility, including cross-border
shuttle migration, seasonal and circular migration, irregular migration, ‘working holiday’ migration etc. There is a possible link here with B4.

- **Gendering migration, integration and return.** There is a major strategic decision to be taken about the extent to which gender is highlighted as a specific research focus for C8, and therefore whether we should take the lead in coordinating gender-specific research; or whether a more satisfactory research policy would be to build the gender dimension as a *sine qua non* into all IMISCOE research activities. A list of 12 suggested themes for gender research – mainly, it must be said, focusing on female migrants as the ‘research subjects’ – was given in section 6.3. Research lines which might be prioritised are those which have gained momentum in the globalisation era and which reflect continuing (even worsening) gender inequalities – trafficking of women for prostitution, mail-order brides, slave-like practices in domestic work and care sectors, and au pairs. We also add here the under-researched topic of migrant sexualities.

- **Transnational families** constitute another rich field for future research, given the varieties and dynanism of transnational family processes noted above – reunion, separation, transnational mothering etc. The process of family reunification – the ‘quiet migration’ – continues more or less uninterrupted since the 1960s: now it is *the* main immigration gate into the EU. However, it is a relative newcomer on the policy scene, and more detailed comparative studies, including those of past, successful family reunions, are necessary. There are opportunities here for joint work with cluster B5, where CEG (Lisbon) has an ongoing project on family reunion. Mixed marriages and marriage migration are two other topics we feel are under-researched; assemblage of basic comparative data would be a useful first initiative.

- **Cross-generational integration and identity.** Our review of the role of generations in migration and integration (section 8) highlighted that, whilst much pioneering research has been completed in the US, much less has been done in Europe. This vacuum is being filled by the EFFNATIS and TIES projects, which have already generated some published output (Crul and Vermeulen 2003a; EFFNATIS 2001). In addition the LIMITS project, like TIES coordinated from IMES, will also generate data on the second generation. These large-scale comparative projects, based partly on secondary data as well as on questionnaire and event-history analysis, could usefully be supported by more ethnographic studies which focus, for instance, on issues of second- and third-generation identity, gender and generational relations, transnational links to the home country etc. Inevitably, however, given the broad focus on integration and identity questions, cross-cluster collaboration would be necessary, especially with B5, B6 and C7.

- **Children as migrants.** Research possibilities were highlighted in 9.1, where it was also stressed that migrant children (as opposed to the foreign-born second generation) were both a highly heterogenous population, and also very little studied, except in certain crisis and humanitarian situations. We signal migrating children as a major area for potential investigation, although interest in child migrants seems to be very scattered within the Network as a whole, and other researchers would probably need to be brought on board.

- **Student migration.** This particular educational-demographic cohort is well-known to many of us through casual observation – foreign students are all around us, and indeed many of us are international research students – but very little systematic comparative research has yet been done. This research is necessary for two main reasons: the sheer numerical importance of international students and therefore
their relevance as a migratory type that needs to be measured and mapped; and because student migrants are highly likely to be the elite migrants of the future, both within and outside of Europe.

- **New mobilities.** Student migrants are one type of a broader set of ‘post-migration mobilities’ which, to some extent, challenge the very ethos of IMISCOE, with its declared focus on long-term immigration and settlement processes. ‘New mobilities’ blur and problematise conventional definitions and approaches to the study of international migration; but they are increasingly characteristic of Europe as a stage for human mobility. Hence we see tremendous scope for future research into new temporal and spatial regimes of mobility: shuttling, serial and sequential migration, errance, ‘lifestyle’ migration, working holidays etc.

- **Retirement migrants.** The ESF Scientific Network on ‘Older Migrants in Europe’ has already coordinated a significant amount of research in this domain (Warnes 2004), but a disproportionate amount is on wealthy North European retirees in Southern Europe. Retired labour migrants, now present in Europe in their millions, need more detailed comparative study. Such research must start with the fundamental question: to stay or to return?

- **New and old geographical comparisons.** Finally we point to the co-presence within C8, and even more within the wider Network, of scholars who are researching the same, or closely comparable groups. The possibility thus exists of bringing some people together to develop their work in a collaborative fashion. We see particular opportunities for group-based work on Caribbean migrants (to the UK, France and the Netherlands), on Latin American migration (from Mexico, Cuba, Ecuador, Peru) to Southern Europe, and on Moroccan, Turkish and Cape Verdean migration to a range of European countries. Obviously the precise nature of the topics to be comparatively analysed needs to be carefully worked out, but IMISCOE has the clear potential to activate such geographical synergies.
REFERENCES


Migration Research, University of Sussex.

from the ONS Longitudinal Study, paper presented at the Social Policy
Association Conference, Roehampton Institute.

Approaches to Causal Analysis. Mahwah NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.


les immigrés après la retraite ? Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales,
17 : 55-78.

d’Intégration des Jeunes Issus de la Migration Espagnole et Italienne en Suisse.
Zurich: Seismo.

migrants’ well-being in Europe: the case of Switzerland, Ageing and Society, 24:
411-29.

Bottomley, G., de Lepervanche, M. and Martin, J., eds (1991) Intersexions:
Gender/Class/Culture/Ethnicity. Sydney: Allen and Unwin.


London: Longman.

Brah, A. (1996) Cartographies of Diaspora: Contesting Identities, Gender, Racism,

networks, identities, communities and globalscapes, in Brettell, C. B. and

ed.) Older Migrants in Europe. Sheffield: Sheffield Institute for Studies on
Ageing, 39-43.

immigration and its sequels in France, Germany, and the United States, Ethnic and

dataset for cross-Channel research? Longitudinal Study Newsletter, 22: 2-6.


Oxford: Berg.

from Britain and France: towards a context-dependent explanation, Transactions
of the Institute of British Geographers, 21: 91-104.


Demographic Characteristics of Immigrant Populations. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing.


