Knowledge for INtegration Governance

Mid-term
Executive Summary

Daniela Carrillo, Marina D'Odorico, Guia Gilardoni

March 2014
The text has been written and composed using deliberatively the materials produced within the KING project by the Advisory Board and the research group. The authors thank the whole KING research team and in particular Giulia Mezzetti, Veronica Riniolo, Pierre Van Wolleghem for their precious contributions and suggestions.

A full text pdf version of the present Mid-term Executive Summary is available for free download on the KING project website: www.king.ismu.org

Twitter: @KING_Project_EU
About the project

Financed by the European Commission under the scope of the European Fund for the Integration of third-country nationals 2007-2013 - Community actions 2012-2013, the project KING - Knowledge for INtegration Governance - has the objective to elaborate a report on the state of play of migrant integration in Europe through an multidisciplinary approach and to provide decision- and policy-makers with evidence-based recommendations on the design of migrant integration-related policies and on the way they should be articulated between different policy-making levels of governance.

The involvement of seven different disciplines - demography, economics, political science, social science, applied social studies, public administration and European policy - ensures the comprehensiveness of the picture concerning migrant integration and the formulation of integration policies.

The Common Basic Principles on Integration represent the point of reference for the entire reasoning. Given that CBPs are both analytical and prescriptive, the project uses these two approaches combining them. Indeed, the first approach has an analytical nature, and describes the 3 basic dimensions of the process of integration: the legal-political dimension, the socio-economic dimension, the cultural-religious dimension. The second approach has a prescriptive nature, and comprises 3 strategies - anti-discrimination, mainstreaming of integration policies, monitoring of integration policies - to provide guidance on the design of integration policies.

In the light of the frame and the scope of the research, as it was defined in October 2013, the desk research carried out in late 2013, provided a total output of 20 desk research papers. The following phase consists in empirical in-depth analysis to be carried out in each discipline during the summer 2014.
Introduction

2014 is key year regarding migration and integration in Europe, it represents the starting point for another European programme, given that the Stockholm programme\(^1\) has come to an end. The year embodies also the right moment to take stock of the issue of migrant integration because it is the tenth anniversary of the statement of Common Basic Principles on Integration, adopted by the EU Justice and Home Affairs Council in November 2004.

This Mid-term Executive Summary of the KING project intends to give a first glance on the integration process and integration policies in Europe by providing evidence and particularly on some myths linked to the migrants presence in Europe. This is critical given the widespread myths about migrants’ presence in Europe that are now firmly rooted in European public opinion.

Migration is a reality, it is a constantly growing phenomenon, and a large body of evidence shows that Europe needs migrants.

In 2013, half of all international migrants lived in 10 countries, with the US hosting the largest number (45.8 million), followed by the Russian Federation (11 million); Germany (9.8 million); Saudi Arabia (9.1 million); United Arab Emirates (7.8 million); United Kingdom (7.8 million); France (7.4 million); Canada (7.3 million); Australia (6.5 million); and Spain (6.5 million)\(^2\).

As Europe needs new citizens, because of the general ageing of the population structure as well as because migration is a resource, migrants integration has become an unavoidable issue and priority for both migrants and receiving societies.

Even though many ‘integration’ policies have already been developed, there is still much to put in place. Indeed, surveys have shown that there is a range of different obstacles to overcome in order better to capitalize on the full potential arising from migration and to achieve integration goals in reality. Facts are often overwhelmed by myths: receiving societies often think that migration levels are 3 times higher than they are; there is a growing misperception regarding the abuse of welfare provision, as well as generally misplaced fears that migrants “steal” jobs to natives. This is in addition to the mainstream mis-perception of the cultural threat posed by migrants, both at political and popular levels. The result of widespread myths distorts perceptions of the impacts of migration, feeds political exploitation of the issue for short-term electoral results, and leads to enhanced difficulties for the integration process, to the persistence of racism and discrimination, and eventually to migrants’ political exclusion.

Now, more than ever, destroying these misconceptions is crucial. Otherwise, Europe will keep on losing power in terms of its economic competitiveness, its capacity for innovation and for the rejuvenation of societies not just within Europe but at the global scale. Focusing on integration provides a better chance for achieving these aims. However, this means considering, on the one hand, that the process of integration is a huge undertaking that needs to be pursued, taking into account that migrants need to be economically, socially and legally integrated and, on the other hand, that ever-more effective strategies and policies have to be implemented.

\(^1\) http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/human_rights/fundamental_rights_within_european_union/j10034_en.htm
Migration is a reality and we need migrants: why?

Migrants are commonly perceived as a solution to the ageing of the European population. It is certainly the case that, without migration (of families and not just workers), the effects of ageing would be much more immediate and would face Western countries’ politicians with huge difficulties, compelling them to react without the margins for manoeuvre which the current presence of young immigrants allows them to have. The current contribution of migration flows to slow insofar the overall population ageing is unquestionable and very significant. In EU countries with a positive average net migration in 2001-2011, research data indicates that overall population ageing is slowed or even reversed (with the sole exception of Portugal). The opposite is true for EU countries with negative net migration in 2001-2011, the ageing manifesting itself through a loss of young people or an increase in people over 65, or both.

Alongside their contribution to slowing the overall ageing process, migrants particularly are a resource for European labour markets. Indeed, due to their favourable age distribution, migration projected over the period 2010-2020 will significantly increase the supply of labour in countries such as Italy, the United Kingdom, Spain, Germany and France.

Research evidence shows that migrants are a resource. Migrant workers, and in particular those from Western European countries, fill shortages in some sectors (e.g. manufacturing and construction) and complement, rather than replace, domestic and other migrant labour forces. The first to benefit from this are in fact natives, mainly the better-off sections of them.

Migrants enable natives to return to the labour market by decreasing the price of low-skilled services (e.g. domestic care). At the same time, complementarity also impacts on wages. Despite popular beliefs, at the aggregate level the contribution of migrants does not decrease wages for natives (with the sole exception of those relating to incumbent migrants or low-skilled natives). This positive effect can be stronger in relation to high-skilled jobs. Indeed, a shortage of high-skilled workers impacts negatively on the innovation potential in the economy of receiving countries. These kinds of shortages lead to wage increases in selected sectors and to wide wage differentials across skills levels and to larger inequalities.

In addition, the fiscal contribution of migrants may be substantial in case of countries suffering (or expecting) rapid demographic decline (even if this is only a transitory effect). Notwithstanding the fact that the fiscal impacts of migration are not large enough to prevent structural changes in ageing societies, research evidence emphasizes the positive role of migration in the sustainability of European welfare systems.
Migration requires receiving societies to face challenges: which ones?

Nowadays, societies are superdiverse because new migrants, entering Europe, are diverse across a wide range of variables including ethnicity, immigration status, rights and entitlements, labour market experiences, gender and age profiles, and patterns of spatial distribution. This presence confronts both natives, migrants and institutions with the need to face changes and to overcome challenges. Although integration theory has emphasized the two-way nature of the process, true integration can only occur when both majority and minority communities adapt to a new reality. This is barely if ever acknowledged by politicians and thus does not translate into policy and practice.

Taking into account the still valid Common Basic Principles on Integration, it is evident the role that the first CBP has on highlighting the importance of involving both migrants and receiving societies into the process of migrant integration. However, research evidence points out that this is a goal still not achieved because there is a strongly disproportionate emphasis on requiring migrants to adapt whereas little is still asked of the receiving societies.

Much of the public discourse about migrants claims they are simply seeking to access benefits, however small, of established welfare states and thus undermining the solidaristic attitudes towards welfare provision which led originally to welfare systems being established.

A growing tendency to blame migrants for a range of social and economic ills, and minorities for poor levels of achievement and social integration, have often exacerbated tensions which are easily manipulated by nationalist and, more recently, even mainstream political parties. As both groups - migrants and receiving society - should be addressed by policy measures, efforts should therefore be made in providing education about the reality of migration, introducing majorities to minorities, teaching intercultural communication skills, myth-busting and embedding migrants in organisations to try and help them adapt to insider perspectives.

In addition, there is a great need to focus initiatives on receiving communities as they strongly participate in the integration process but are too often neglected in intercultural measures. Political parties and movements deserve special attention; nationalist-populist right-wing parties and movements with strong xenophobic and anti-immigrant positions have recently gained ground in many European countries and can feed a vicious circle of more obstacles to integration, more cultural and ethnic tensions, more demands for securitisation policies. The perverse effects of mis-perceptions and discriminatory attitudes strongly hampers both economic and social integration.

For example, some aspects related to cultural or religious identity are often easily stigmatized generating prejudice and discrimination by (individuals, organisations or institutions of) the receiving society.

That leads - even if access is legally guaranteed - to fewer opportunities and lower outcomes for migrants in domains such as housing, education and health. Evidence shows that national and local media also have an important role in shaping the attitudes of natives whilst the complex interplay of local factors can be the reason for discrimination within labour market mechanisms in particular, but also in relation to housing, health and education provision.
Within virtually every EU Member State, there appears to be a growing and almost inexorable tendency towards racism and discrimination at institutional (policy) and individual levels. This is manifest in increasing numbers of incidents of racist violence and abuse and by growing disregard by institutions to the differing cultural and religious needs of migrants and minorities more generally. This tendency undermines the process of integration.

Migrants share these difficulties with longer-settled minorities and with a residuum of natives, and are structurally driven to compete with them for limited resources. This generates tensions which are easily manipulated for political motives. Until this potentially disastrous phenomenon of racism is first acknowledged and then effectively addressed at European, national and community levels, much of the vast amount of energy put into the integration of migrants will be wasted. Similarly, institutions play a crucial role in promoting equal access and equal use of public services. Evidence shows that institutions may impede access or equitable opportunities for migrants in two ways.

First, they may formally exclude them, either completely (as does the political system in many countries and cities in the case of migrants) or partially (as when social assistance and welfare systems offer only limited services to migrants). Secondly, even if access for all residents including migrants is guaranteed in principle, such institutions may hamper the achievement of equitable outcomes by virtue of their (historically and culturally determined) ways of operating – failing to take account, for example, of specific characteristics of the migrants’ situation that are attributable to their migration history, their cultural and religious background, or their language abilities.

Institutional arrangements determine to a strong degree the opportunities and scope for action of organizations, and they may also exert significant influence on how migrant organisations develop and orient themselves.

The first form of exclusion regards the political sphere. Since the nineteenth century, Western European societies have developed political structures of the nation-state type. Membership of such political communities is exclusive, accepting national citizens only. Immigrants who are aliens are excluded from that political community on principle. Societies are regulated by laws and rules that are made by and accepted by majorities of national citizens; alien immigrants do not influence the creation and implementation of such arrangements. More important still, many such arrangements legitimise distinctions between citizen and non-citizen residents, as reflected in differential social rights (e.g. access to social assistance or state pensions), industrial rights (unemployment benefits) or political and civic rights (e.g. rights to organise or vote).

In the political and legal sense, such distinctions cannot be called discriminatory (i.e. legally unjustified), since they are embedded in the nation state’s legislation. However, this is social exclusion, and it has severe consequences for the position of alien immigrants, particularly in the long term. This is the very point on which current European integration debates are focused: inequalities arising from differential legal status for aliens, difficult access to citizenship, and other such formalities. A central element of integration policies in many European countries is therefore to alleviate this legalised political exclusion through provisions like partial voting rights in local elections, diminished distinctions between inhabitants based on national citizenship, and the facilitating and promoting of naturalisation.
Integration of migrants: what? where?

As stated in CBP 1 “Integration is a dynamic, two way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States”. This definition sheds light on the necessity to balance responsibilities between migrants and natives in order to make the integration process effective. From the moment immigrants arrive in a new society, they have needs to please such as finding a home, a job, schools for themselves and their children, health facilities. They also need to establish cooperation and interaction with other individuals and groups, and getting to know and use institutions of the new society.

This last element entails that the receiving societies assume a crucial role in promoting integration. They are called to both provide services addressed to migrants, and accept and manage the occurred diversity. Indeed, the current picture of migrants’ integration processes in Europe puts the concept of acceptance of whom is “other by me” as the compass needle for supporting efficient integration paths. On the one hand, people need to get reciprocally closer and, on the other hand, chances – in terms of resources, opportunities and capitals – have to be enjoyed alike by migrants and natives so that integration can be fulfilled.

According to the CBPs, integration processes occur in three specific dimensions: the social-economic dimension, the legal-political dimension and the cultural-religious dimension. Indeed, migrants should be and should feel included into each domain of the society in which they are living. However, evidence point out that this is never completely achieved and migrants are more integrated in one dimension rather than another one. This depends on many factors such as the capacity of contexts (e.g. institutions, legal and political frameworks, receiving society’s attitudes) to support or hamper integration measures, practices and paths; the disposition of migrants and their specific characteristics.

The **LEGAL-POLITICAL DIMENSION (CBP 9)** refers to residence and political rights and statuses. The position of an immigrant or their ‘degree of integration’ has two extreme poles: on the one hand there is the position of the illegal foreign resident who is not a part of society in the legal-political sense. At the other extreme there is the position of an immigrant who is (or has become) a national citizen. In between there is enormous variation, increased in recent decades as a consequence of attempts by European states to ‘regulate’ international migration and integration, and as a consequence of new statuses and rights established by the European Union migration regimes (among others EU-nationals versus Third Country Nationals).

The **SOCIO-ECONOMIC DIMENSION (CBPs 3, 5, 6)** refers to the social and economic position of residents, irrespective of national citizenship. It relates to access to and participation in domains that are crucial for any resident: do immigrants have (equal) access to institutional facilities to find work, housing, education and health facilities, and do they use these facilities? What is the outcome of this participation as compared to natives (with the same or comparable qualifications)?

The **CULTURAL/RELIGIOUS DIMENSION (CBPs 2,4,7,8)** regards the perceptions and practices of immigrants and the receiving society and their reciprocal reactions to any differences and diversity. It is an ambiguous dimension, difficult to capture precisely since perceptions change over time, as do stereotypes and consequent discrimination, depending on historical and broader political change.

Given its on-going nature, integration is a goal to be constantly pursued, a never ending story needing to be continually reinvented.
The three dimensions are different as far as their direct objectives are concerned. However, they are interconnected and should be considered always as such. Some research evidence sheds light on the negative, if inadvertent, impacts of one domain on others due to wrong policies or attitudes. However, some practical experiences drawn from across Europe, studied through the lens of the “three dimensions”, highlight good practices for promoting efficient migration and integration policies.

The interconnections between the three dimensions

Evidence from Denmark shows that as MIGRANTS’ INCOME has improved, they are able to move to better housing areas with better schools. This could happen more or less immediately, but it rarely does so because of existing barriers in the housing and/or education systems, or in other dimensions. As stated by the CLIP final report on HOUSING, ethnic discrimination, as well as discrimination against migrants in the housing market, is a widespread phenomenon. At the same time, in the United Kingdom, a body of research shows that on average migrants pay more taxes and make less use of welfare provision than natives in general although clearly there are some groups of migrants (particularly those seeking asylum) who need more welfare support in the early period of settlement.

Another example comes from the educational domain. Whilst SCHOOLS should institutionally be obliged to accept immigrants or immigrants’ children, some of them find ways and means to avoid doing so (as, for example, by setting prohibitive fees for parents or by not offering special facilities for immigrant children, like remedial teaching or religious instruction). In this regard, one of the most serious problems arises when schools ask children for proof of residence. In countries such as the Netherlands, Poland and Hungary, schools justify identification document requests by arguing that funding is allocated according to the number of students enrolled, thus arguing that they have a problem with the presence of children without valid documentation.

Other possible barriers include the fact that minors may not live with their parents and some schools tend to deny school registration by other family relatives where parents are not present.

Growing immigration control and tough immigration discourses also have an impact on undocumented children’s access to education. Parents’ fear of being detected if sending their children to schools is regularly revealed in many interviews with undocumented immigrants. In France in 2006 the-then Minister of Interior Sarkozy sent police to schools to detect undocumented migrants who then went to fetch their children from school. In Germany, the obligation of public officials to denounce undocumented migrants in practice often prevented undocumented children’s access to education. The same practice has also been criticised in the United Kingdom.

Another important barrier to accessing both labour market and school is lack of KNOWLEDGE OF THE LOCAL LANGUAGE. Until recently, Germany did not focus on integration of guestworkers (believing they were temporary residents) and paid insufficient attention to language skills or other skills necessary for successful economic and social integration. This explains why the low qualification levels of migrants, insufficient linguistic skills and limited education, especially of second-generation migrants living in Germany, created barriers for successful employment. Consequently, there are significant employment participation and earning gaps between natives and second-generation migrants, due to low educational levels and insufficient vocational training of the latter group. By contrast, all migrants in Sweden (aged 20 – 64 and also persons between 18 and 19 who came to Sweden without their parents) receive a personalised ‘integration plan’ and assistance to help find a job and housing.

The political and legal dimension plays a role also regarding ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE SERVICES. Indeed, the high degree of autonomy held by health care institutions has tended to result in big disparities from municipality to municipality. In Brussels alone, there are nineteen municipalities with different requirements and procedures. While some are rather restrictive and ask for cumbersome...
procedures, others are more open and even proactive when providing services for undocumented immigrants. For instance, the social welfare centres in Brussels Capital and Molenbeek municipalities provide a “medical card” to secure undocumented immigrants’ treatment or receipt of medicine for certain period, thus saving them from passing through the entire procedure each time. The municipality of Munich decided in 2006 to set up a medical contact point for “uninsured people”. Similarly, Düsseldorf and Frankfurt offer anonymous consultation hours to facilitate undocumented migrants’ use of their services. In contrast with other Dutch cities, Rotterdam facilitates the vaccination of children whose parents are not registered, in the County Clerk’s office by accepting them on referral by midwives, general practitioners or schools, and by providing these vaccinations free of charge. In 2012 the Spanish government’s decision to exclude undocumented immigrants from full access to health care was opposed by several autonomous communities (e.g. Basque Country and Catalonia) and implemented differently at different regional and local levels.

Another linkage between the three dimensions is illustrated by the Citizenship Acquisition issue. Several EU member States have made citizenship harder to obtain. Under the pretext of integration, language and civic integration courses actually function as instruments to make immigration more restrictive and selective. Indeed, a general shift to more demanding integration conditions has taken place across Europe, resulting in the exclusion of large number of migrants from obtaining citizenship; this is particularly the case in Austria, Denmark and the Netherlands. Some aspects of integration tests may thus lead to social exclusion rather than to enhance integration. Therefore, acquisition of citizenship - that was seen earlier for instance in Sweden and The Netherlands as an instrument that would facilitate structural integration – is now increasingly redefined as the pinnacle of a process of cultural adaptation. Cities can, however, play a much more relevant role by promoting different kind of actions aimed at fostering access to citizenship such as language courses, information to would-be citizens and/or specific preparation to pass citizenship tests or examinations. The naturalisation campaigns carried out in some German cities, such as Berlin or Hesse are cases in point. A more developed project has been promoted by the municipality of Hamburg, where volunteer facilitators from various different communities have been trained to provide advice about citizenship procedures to those who are hesitant or need guidance because of linguistic barriers, fear of bureaucratic processes or lack of knowledge of the benefits of naturalisation.

Regarding Inter-faith Forum experiences, the Migrants Rights Network, the Conseil Roubaisien de l’Interculturalité et de la Citoyenneté, and COSIM in Dunkirk (successfully replicated in Santander) are examples of successful practice, demonstrating also that fora and networks can help small organisations to overcome the difficulties posed by limited capacity. The success of this approach depends on having the right political environment within which to operate so that institutions are open to the information they receive and are prepared to act. Otherwise, migrant participants will quickly lose faith in the forum, seeing it as a “talking shop” without any practical purpose, and withdraw their participation. The importance of enhancing inter-faith dialogue involving both the majority and minorities can be demonstrated by the outcome of the opening of a new Mosque in Duisburg. The Mosque advisory board contained a large range of different people, including a Catholic priest. The outcome of the consultations meant that there was no tension surrounding its opening. This can be compared with the planning of a new Mosque in Cologne which provoked considerable conflict. These different experiences demonstrate that the practice of diverse cultures and religions, within generally accepted EU norms, should be guaranteed, applying the principle of equity in treatment, and putting special emphasis on the implementation mode of decisions.
Strategies: how to achieve the goal of integration?

First of all, more attention should be paid to the linkages between the three key dimensions, recognizing that this interconnection is crucial in order to implement strategies aimed to support integration. As research evidence demonstrates, the socio-economic dimension of integration may be strongly influenced by the legal-political dimension, particularly if access to and rights in these critical fields are limited or even denied. Potentially, the outcomes of immigrant integration in this dimension may also be influenced by the ethnic/cultural/religious dimension; for example, where negative perceptions relating to certain groups of migrants lead to prejudice and discrimination by (individuals, organisations or institutions of) the receiving society. That leads – even if access is legally guaranteed - to fewer opportunities and lower scores for immigrants in these so-called hard domains. At the same time, EU Member States award particular importance to the socio-economic domain because it refers also to “equal outcomes” and because working on it enables results to be achieved also in the other two dimensions. However, there are many contradictions that may invalidate such efforts.

One example of this is the increasing emphasis on securitization and management of migrant flows with the aim of limiting new arrivals. Another factor that makes it hard to implement policies able to take into account the three dimensions simultaneously, is the politicalization of this domain. In more and more countries, Ministries have been set up or renamed with titles like immigration, integration, equality, anti-discrimination, cooperation, asylum or even identity. Alongside the quest for effective integration measures, politicians wanted to send a message to the public about governments’ determination to do something. Ad hoc Ministries for Integration usually appear in situations of a perceived integration crisis and under the pressure of emerging xenophobic and racist parties. The experience of France and Denmark shows how these practices are often no more than symbolic ones, generally gaining limited long-term results.

Another example is provided by the Danish idea to integrate the responsibilities for immigrant and native citizens within the same authorities. Research evidence suggests that the reassignment of both migration and integration to the Ministry of the Interior in the Netherlands and in France has led to strong links between immigration control and integration programmes, to the detriment of the latter.

Racism and exclusion are closely linked. Therefore an evidence-based analysis of reasons, and remedies, for exclusion should always be made available. A particularly insidious form of exclusion results from unintended or indirect discrimination. Institutional social exclusion, through legislation, regulations and conventions - either formulated and implemented explicitly and purposely, or adopted as an unintentional consequence of the practical functioning of existing institutions - is the most powerful mechanism of social discrimination. The impact of broad-ranging societal institutions is so great because they correspondingly extensively structure the action of organisations and of individuals.

The institutional field of education - predominantly a public sector institution - is far more tightly regulated and politically monitored than the field of recruitment and selection in free-market enterprises. This implies that the possibilities for influencing processes in the latter field, for example by government policy or by NGOs or pressure groups, are different. That is why, in the case of the Netherlands for example, minority policies in housing (subject to close political monitoring in the larger cities) and education have shown reasonable results over the past decade, but policies in the field of employment have been far less effective.

The means and possibilities of public policy to exert influence on inclusion and exclusion vary significantly in different domains.
In all European states, however, the education system is an influential public institutional domain that is crucial to both integration and anti-discrimination policies. Policies designed to solve a specific problem (e.g. social disadvantage) may have negative unintended consequences (perverse effects), amplifying the very problems that were meant to be solved. One clear example from the UK is the government’s refusal to allow asylum seekers to work. This means they cannot contribute economically (through tax and insurance), often become destitute and then end up being a burden on public expenditure. In relation to this issue, then, unintended or indirect forms of institutional exclusion should be eliminated by raising the awareness of policy-makers, e.g. through statistical evidence and analysis.

The complexity of the network responsible for implementing policy (i.e. the involvement of all possible levels of governance) is an important factor in fostering integration. EU institutions and national governments increasingly see cultural integration as a condition for inclusion, but involve local administrations in policy implementation (e.g. in organizing language and ‘citizenship’ courses). This prima facie division of labour among different levels of governance and with different types and degree of involvement of private actors must be clearly specified, taking into account the different political-institutional architectures and differing economic, social and cultural contexts.

National governments should not withdraw from the role of, at the very least, resourcing and standard-setting to ensure that local initiatives are well-resourced, properly managed, and effective. Without this central monitoring role, local projects can disappear, or be poorly managed or resourced.

Since 2006, following the Nationaler Integrationsplan (National Integration Plan) proposed by Hessen to the federal government, all those dealing with integration in politics and in wider society, worked hand in hand: these included Federal Government, the States, cities and municipalities, migrants, institutions and organizations from science, media, culture, sports, trade and industry, trade unions and religious groups (Federal Government 2007). A critical driver for the implementation of the plan was the annual Integrationsministerkonferenz (Integration Ministers’ Conference). The exchange and close cooperation resulting from these events have had positive effects on the Hessian integration policies that have also been constantly monitored.

Monitoring is a cross-cutting aspect of policy evaluation that should run alongside and support the policy-making process at all time and at all levels. It is a tool that fuels both the effectiveness of multilevel governance and the mainstreaming of integration.

On the one hand, monitoring allows policy-makers to understand integration processes and their variety, according to different profiles (gender, age, education). It renders possible the mapping of migrants’ needs so that appropriate political responses are brought about, whether through integration policies or more general social and economic ones.

On the other hand, monitoring allows policy-makers to watch over changes in the target groups’ situation and to adjust policies accordingly, provided of course that monitoring is conducted regularly and comprises a set of relatively consistent and stable indicators.

If monitoring is to be a tool serving better integration policies, the definition of the target population is of the utmost importance. The type of monitoring instrument needed will vary depending on whether non-nationals or people with a migration background are included as target groups. In the former case, second and third generations are de facto excluded from the scope of the monitoring whilst in the latter case,
needs may be better mapped and policies better designed if appropriate instruments are devised. Needs can also be pinpointed through the use of regional and local monitoring, using tools that focus down onto specific situations in specific locations. Integration needs also to be monitored in its entirety; i.e. it should be longitudinal as integration is a long process, it should mirror reality of migrants’ lives, and should encompass all the different dimensions, and not just the economic one. Monitoring should be the stepping stone to political responses that, in turn, should be monitored so as to evaluate the extent to which those responses actually address identified needs.
Conclusion

In the context of societies changing due to the growing presence of migrants, Europe has now to face a choice for which two options are available.

Europe may continue considering migration a more or less negative phenomenon and regard changing nature of its constituent societies as a problematic cultural threat. It may favor the community of nationals to the detriment of migrants, discriminating against the latter through sophisticated institutional devices. The risks Europe runs in this case are high.

- Europe may go down the road of an ageing continent with fewer workers and therefore fewer taxpayers or economic contributors, or, in a nutshell, fewer active citizens.
- Europe may fill some of its labour market gaps with low-skill workers, but it may consequently deprive itself of sources of innovation and human capital in an ever-more competitive world by opting for a suboptimal position;
- Relationships between natives and ‘foreigners’ does not improve and young migrants, skilled or otherwise, are deterred from remaining.
- For those migrants who do remain, the climate of distrust between the receiving society and ‘foreigners’ will steadily undermine future generations’ trust in each other. Intended or unintended discrimination against ‘foreigners’ may disillusion first generations and subsequently generate negative perceptions amongst second and third generations towards the receiving society, fostering potentially social conflict.

Alternatively, Europe may change its current way of thinking and support a vision of societies made by both natives and migrants. Thus, not “us” and “them”, but “we”. This kind of thinking could help to combat discrimination, to open access to its resources and facilitate migrants’ own development and enable their full economic, social and political contribution to building societies across Europe. The challenge is considerable but the long-term benefits are immeasurable.

- Europe would reverse its current demographic trend of decline, ensuring the sustainability of its economy and welfare state models.
- Europe would increases the likelihood that migrants can realise their full potential rather than being locked up by a framework of restrictions and limitations. It would attract skilled migrants, facilitating horizontal and vertical mobility and increasing its competitiveness.
- It would provide a climate of mutual understanding for newcomers that could integrate into a settled society and develop a true sense of belonging.
- European societies would then produce fully-fledged citizens, committed to the development of their societies.
Acknowledgments

The contents of the present Mid-term Executive Summary result from the joint effort carried out by all researchers involved in the KING research project, and, in particular, from the close collaboration between the Steering Group and the Advisory Board, who collected and elaborated the results of the first phase of the project. This consisted of an extensive desk research exercise conducted in each of the seven disciplines involved in the KING project – EU Policy, Political Science, Public Administration, Social Science, Applied Social Studies, Economics, and Demography.

The definitions, terms, data, evidence presented and summarized in this Mid-term Executive Summary have been drawn together thanks to the insights and the in-depth analysis provided by the research teams and the Advisory Board members. We thank Professor Gary Craig for his work in undertaking the final edit of this and other material appearing on the KING website.

For their great work and their precious contributions, we are therefore grateful to:

- the Advisory Board members: Gian Carlo Blangiardo, Martin Kahanec, Walter Kindermann, Alberto Martinelli, Yves Pascouau, Rinus Penninx, Jenny Phillimore, Alessandra Venturini.


The definition of the research design, the collection of evidence and the formulation of recommendations have been carried out by the Steering Group, formed by ISMU Foundation researchers – Guia Gilardoni, Project Coordinator, Daniela Carrillo and Marina D’Odorico, Project Co-coordinator, – and Staff Members - Veronica Riniolo, Pierre Georges Van Wolleghem, Giulia Mezzetti, as well as by representatives of the partners of the Project - Ingrid Wilkens (State of Hessen), Patricia Frias (Caripló Foundation), Altay Manço (IRFAM).

Lastly, we are grateful to the European Commission – DG Home Affairs, the State of Hessen, IRFAM - Institut de Recherches, Formations et Actions sur les Migrations, the Caripló Foundation and the Caixa Foundation for their confidence and financial support for this project.