JOINT STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

Second report on the implementation of the EU Maritime Security Strategy Action Plan
## Contents

Executive summary ........................................................................................................... 3

Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 5

Focus area 1 — Maritime information sharing initiatives ......................................................... 7
   i)  Progress made, as reported by Member States ........................................................... 7
   ii) Latest developments involving the EEAS, EDA and the Commission ....................... 13

Focus area 2 — Capacity building and capability development ............................................. 16
   i)  Progress made, as reported by Member States ........................................................... 16
   ii) Latest developments involving the EEAS, EDA and the Commission ....................... 19

Focus area 3 — Other EU regional or sectoral strategies ....................................................... 21
   i)  Progress made, as reported by Member States ........................................................... 21
   ii) Latest developments involving the EEAS and the Commission .................................. 25

Focus area 4 — Maritime research and innovation of dual- (multi-) use capabilities and training ..... 25
   i)  Progress made, as reported by Member States ........................................................... 25
   ii) Latest developments involving the EEAS, EDA and the Commission ....................... 30

Focus area 5 — Inter-agency cooperation at national, EU and international level .................... 32
   i)  Progress made, as reported by Member States ........................................................... 32
   ii) Latest developments involving the EEAS, EDA and the Commission ....................... 35

Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 41

   A. Implementation of the Action Plan on the EU Maritime Security Strategy and the EU Agenda on Security ................................................................. 41

   B. Update on the rolling Action Plan .............................................................................. 42
Executive summary

The European Union and its Member States depend on open and secure seas and oceans and therefore have a strategic interest in identifying and addressing maritime security challenges. European citizens expect effective and cost-efficient protection of maritime assets such as ports and offshore installations and of borders. Only if we make sea-borne trade safe and address potential threats from unlawful activities at sea can we make optimal use of the sea for growth and jobs and at the same time safeguard the marine environment.

Not only are the security risks and threats on our seas becoming more and more complex, but the deteriorating overall situation in neighbourhood areas in recent years has given rise to new challenges including sharp increases of migration in the Mediterranean region, human trafficking and smuggling of migrants.

Against that backdrop, under the Greek and Italian presidencies in 2014, the Council adopted an EU Maritime Security Strategy and Action Plan. This overarching strategy aims to improve the way in which the EU pre-empts and responds to all current challenges affecting people, activities and infrastructure. Through closer collaboration across the regional and national levels within the EU, it seeks to increase both situational awareness and operational efficiency.

While security issues have remained high on the political agenda, the European Union and its Member States have been working relentlessly to implement the strategy through the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and the common security and defence policy, (CSDP) and as part of the EU’s Global Strategy presented by the High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini in June 2016.

The purpose of this report is to give readers an overview of the activities currently underway at EU and national level. The report focuses on the following five priority areas identified in the first implementation report and endorsed by the Council in 2016 (detailed as ‘focus areas’ in the report):

- information sharing initiatives;
- capacity building and capability development;
- actions supporting sectoral or regional strategies development;
- research, innovation and training; and
- inter-agency cooperation.

The report builds on contributions from Member States and EU institutions and concludes that the implementation process is progressing well in the five priority areas. In particular, the strategy has led to an important change in mindset among maritime security players. Issues which were traditionally dealt with in silos, sector by sector, are now increasingly the object of cooperation across sectors. Cooperation between civilian and military authorities and shared use of their respective assets are gaining momentum. Key aspects of the EU foreign policy, for instance our comprehensive approach to the Horn of Africa, have also positively influenced the implementation of the Maritime Security

---

1 SWD(2016) 217 final
Strategy. Conversely, the Strategy’s cross-sectoral approach has been taken up in other areas, for instance in the Joint Communications on the Arctic\textsuperscript{2} and on ocean governance\textsuperscript{3}.

The report further concludes that information sharing and cross-sectoral cooperation at international, regional, sub-regional and inter-agency level rank high among the EU’s priorities and those of its Member States.

Other areas are also assessed positively in this year’s reporting exercise, for instance capacity building in third countries, the development of dual-use technologies and the development of a civil-military research agenda.

Finally, the report notes that, three years on, considerable progress has been made. Given that the Action Plan is by nature a rolling plan, revision may be needed to ensure that the policy response remains fit for current and future challenges.

In terms of follow-up, the report makes a series of suggestions for future work.

- Although the process of implementing the EU Maritime Security Strategy Action Plan is advancing well, further work is needed to fill current gaps in reporting and to obtain a fuller picture of any progress made in the maritime security domain so far.

- Whenever possible, the focus should be on developing cross-sectoral activities at national, regional and European levels.

- Each Member State should be invited to act as a potential ‘maritime security champion’ in an area of their choice, thus promoting implementation of the Action Plan.

- Each Member State should be invited to raise the visibility of the strategy among stakeholders by using the communication material available from the Commission and the EEAS.

- The Action Plan is subject to a progress assessment and possible review in order to bring actions in line with political priorities and remove actions which either have been implemented or are no longer relevant or have been made redundant by recent EU legislation. During the review process, due account should be taken of the EU’s political priorities in a rapidly changing security environment, both internally and externally, such as the development of a security agenda and the adoption of the EU’s Global Strategy\textsuperscript{4}.

\textsuperscript{2} JOIN(2016) 21 final, \textit{An integrated European Union policy for the Arctic}, 27.4.2016.


Introduction

The sea is a valuable source of wealth for European citizens. The European Union’s economy depends on open and secure seas and oceans for free trade, transport, fisheries, energy supply and tourism. It therefore has a strategic interest in identifying and addressing maritime security challenges. What’s more, European citizens expect effective and cost-efficient protection of assets such as ports, offshore installations and borders in order to keep sea-borne trade safe, address potential threats from unlawful activities at sea, and make optimal use of the sea’s potential for growth and jobs while safeguarding the marine environment. Finally, it is through adequate maritime security that the EU can maintain the rule of law in areas beyond national jurisdiction.

In the last few years, security risks and threats in the maritime domain have become more complex and intrinsically linked. The deteriorating overall situation in neighbourhood areas has also given rise to new challenges, including sharp increases in migration flows and human smuggling through the Mediterranean Sea region which need to be urgently addressed.

Against that backdrop, under the Greek and Italian presidencies in 2014, the European Council adopted an EU Maritime Security Strategy and Action Plan — an overarching strategy to improve the way the EU pre-empts and responds to all current challenges affecting people, activities and infrastructure. Through closer collaboration across regional and national levels, the strategy seeks to increase both situational awareness and operational efficiency.

A second objective is to protect the EU’s maritime interests worldwide. The strategy strengthens the link between internal and external security, and couples the overall European security strategy with maritime policy. By working together more closely and planning ahead, the European Union and its Member States can make better use of existing resources and enter into more effective and credible international partnerships.

The Maritime Security Strategy is based upon the following four principles (which are also reflected in every measure of the Action Plan): a cross-sectoral approach, functional integrity, respect for rules and principles, and maritime multilateralism — taking into account the EU’s decision-making autonomy. The strategy brings together both internal and external aspects of maritime security. So does the Action Plan, which contains actions and sub-actions for both. The Action Plan is a rolling plan, subject to regular progress assessment and review. Regular reporting on implementation is to be provided by the EEAS and Commission on the basis of contributions from the Member States.

The first report on the implementation of the Action Plan was presented to the Friends of the Presidency working group on 27 June 2016. As a follow up, the Council agreed that the second implementation report should go beyond a factual depiction of the state of implementation and place special emphasis on five priority areas that were identified under the EU’s political priorities. So while the first implementation report reflected the structure of the Action Plan, this second report focuses on those five priority areas, termed ‘focus areas.’

5 Consisting of: (i) external action; (ii) maritime awareness, surveillance and information sharing; (iii) capability development; (iv) risk management, protection of critical maritime infrastructure and crisis response; (v) maritime security research and innovation, education and training.
This report is based on input received from Member States in an online consultation, which also reflected the five priority areas, held between December 2016 and February 2017. A total of 15 reports covering January 2016 to December 2016 were received from Member States. Contributions were also received from the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the Security and Defence College (ESDC).

The objective of this second implementation report is to take stock of the implementation process at national and EU level and draw some conclusions for future work.
Focus area 1 — Maritime information sharing initiatives

i) Progress made, as reported by Member States

Member States have extensively reported on the latest developments of the initiatives in the area of information sharing, referring to the development of the voluntary common information sharing environment (CISE)\(^6\), as well as to their participation in initiatives, e.g. the Maritime Surveillance Network (MARSUR), that may complement the legally established and operational systems providing maritime surveillance to Member States; the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) and the Integrated Maritime Services (IMS) in the Union Maritime Information and Exchange System. Member States reaffirmed their active commitment to the information sharing objectives. Other developments included the use of maritime surveillance capabilities to produce a widely available and accurate recognised maritime awareness picture. Overall, there is extensive commitment to improving cross-sectoral and cross-border information exchange.

Member States that participated in the EUCISE 2020 project\(^7\) considered it an important step towards completing the roadmap for CISE. Member States participate in various CISE projects and exercises to improve and enhance interoperability between their various maritime authorities at national level\(^8\). The focus is on testing and validating the CISE concept for exchanging data at sectoral, cross-sectoral and cross-border level.

Several Member States have held workshops on CISE in national institutions in order to develop software and hardware to improve information exchange and information flow\(^9\). Regular meetings between national authorities on the main responsibilities of CISE participants are also taking place. Member States are running national research activities and development projects to investigate options for connecting EUCISE 2020 gateway with national legacy systems. They also participate in the Technical Advisory Group, composed of representatives of all relevant maritime surveillance user communities\(^10\).

Member States also reported on activities financed under the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF) programme for 2014-2020 on specific action to improve information sharing for fisheries control, in order to contribute to achieving the CISE’s objectives.

---


\(^7\) Portugal, Italy, France, Greece, Germany, Finland, Romania, Bulgaria, Ireland, Spain, Denmark, Cyprus, Sweden, Norway and the United Kingdom.

\(^8\) There is a Greek CISE project to set up an information sharing environment. Spanish coast guards are building the Spanish maritime information sharing system (SAIS) and SHAREMARE, both aiming to develop an information sharing platform in their current IT framework. Bulgaria participated in the project ‘Integrated monitoring of Bulgarian maritime spaces’ (InBulMarS) within the CISE, aimed at integrating the capabilities of authorities’ systems with competence in the maritime spaces of Bulgaria in a single platform through which a comprehensive picture of the sea surface situation can be formed.

\(^9\) A workshop on the Preparatory study for the implementation of CISE ROM within Romanian institutions was held in Bucharest on 25-26 October 2016.

\(^10\) The purpose of this group is to provide technical advice to the Commission.
Highlighting the need to develop a common maritime situational awareness picture for the EU, several Member States proposed to develop a cross-sectoral and inter-service mechanism to improve the sharing of maritime information, building on CISEE principles\(^\text{11}\). It was suggested that a mechanism to improve maritime situational awareness at EU level, based on a cross-sectoral approach, be developed to provide the EU institutions and Member States with a specific reporting tool\(^\text{12}\). This cooperation would be built on existing mechanisms in a full respect of the principle of functional integrity and avoiding duplications.

Several Member States are very actively improving cross-sectoral cooperation and interoperability between their maritime surveillance systems (action 2.1.4) to further develop a common maritime awareness picture for their agencies carrying out operational activities in the maritime domain\(^\text{13}\). Intensive inter-agency cooperation is occurring between various national maritime authorities and regular contacts and information exchanges between different authorities and stakeholders have been put in place\(^\text{14}\). Several cross-sectoral information sharing initiatives have been successfully established at different sectoral and operational levels in several Member States\(^\text{15}\). Further cross-sectoral

\(^{11}\) France put forward a non-paper to its EU partners to develop a joint cell to improve the sharing of maritime information between EU partner countries.

\(^{12}\) France proposed that the situation in the Mediterranean be considered an opportunity to develop a dedicated cross-sectoral and inter-service mechanism to be used at EU level.

\(^{13}\) Member States are participating in the ‘single window’ solution that national authorities are cooperating on. For example, Italian coast guard HQ’s are working to develop the Maritime National Single Window as part of the Italian coast guard HQ’s national VTMIS platform. The VTMIS platform was recognised as direct information-sharing on civilian and productive uses of the sea. In Greece, the national VTMIS will be modernised and its range of capabilities regarding sea area coverage and data sharing will be broadened, in order to advance cross-sectoral cooperation and interoperability.

\(^{14}\) In the United Kingdom the cross-government project Kraken was put in place between the police, the national crime agency (NCA) and the UK border force, providing a way for the maritime community and the public to report suspicious or unusual behaviour in and around coastal and maritime environments. In Romania, maritime surveillance information is exchanged between the Romanian naval force, the coast guard, the naval authority and maritime harbours administrations through dedicated IT infrastructure. Also, the Romanian coast guard hosts a working group on ‘Development of a common preventive system for early detection of illegal activities in the Black Sea’ with a view to improving the monitoring of maritime areas in real time via automatic exchange of information. The German federal police and customs authorities are working together on enabling the maritime customs service to access and to use the federal police operation control centre system. In Sweden, a network of 9 Swedish government agencies operating at sea (SIJÖBASIS) was set up to produce the maritime situational awareness picture to help prevent crises and ensure quick, efficient management when a crisis occurs. In Spain, the Spanish navy’s ‘maritime action’ is a dedicated link to the civilian administration on maritime safety and security issues in order to build up maritime situational awareness of sea areas of national interest. Also, the Spanish Navy’s maritime surveillance & operations centre (COVAM) issues real-time threat information in the form of safety warnings to all Spanish-flagged vessels transiting through piracy risk areas and informs the Spanish shipping industry of changes in the risks in such areas. The Italian coast guard, as chair of the MCGFF, held a plenary conference in 2016 ‘Mediterranean: Sharing experiences among coast guard functions’ to revive the strategic geographical and historical role of the Mediterranean as a place of exchange between different countries and authorities.

\(^{15}\) In Croatia, information-sharing takes place between the ‘central coordination’ at government level and ‘expert board’ at operational level. France reported on the creation of a maritime information cooperation and awareness centre (MICA) in Brest for exchanging relevant information in the field of maritime security with merchant or military navies through partnerships. The Lithuanian navy and state border guard service agreed on a common procurement model and drafted technical specifications for a modernised integrated sea surveillance system, which will increase the scope for exchanging sea surveillance information between national institutions. A project on a hybrid surveillance and vessel traffic monitoring system in the
cooperation plans and initiatives between national agencies are planned in the event that security risks occur, such as a further increase in migratory pressure or natural disasters.

On strengthening cross-border cooperation and information exchange to optimise surveillance of the EU maritime domain and its maritime borders (action 2.2.), Member States reported intensified exchange of information between different national authorities\(^\text{16}\). A series of new projects with a view to enhancing cross-sectoral and cross-border cooperation, interoperability and maritime situational awareness is planned in several Member States. Various plans to improve data exchange for search and rescue operations at sea were reported on\(^\text{17}\). All in all, collaboration between all operational centres in charge of coast guard actions of various Member States was encouraged with a view to exchanging maritime information and cooperating during crises or in the context of a terrorist threat.

Bilateral cooperation between Member States and the development of maritime cooperation agendas\(^\text{18}\) with partner countries was reported on\(^\text{19}\). Mainstreaming of maritime security issues in bilateral meetings with third countries to enhance cooperation and contribute to security and stability in the maritime domain was reported on by Member States. The importance of keeping maritime security in the CFSP agenda (action 1.5.3.) was stressed by one Member State.

Cooperation with international and regional organisations in the global maritime domain was reported by Member States. Progress was made in cooperation with the UN, particularly with the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Maritime Crime Programme, the Contact Group on Piracy off the coast of Somalia (CGPCS) (chaired by the Seychelles) and the CGPCS Working Group on capacity building (currently chaired by the UK), the G7 Group of Friends of the Gulf of Guinea (G7-FoGG, under the Portuguese presidency during the reporting period) and under the Oslo Paris Convention, the Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre (Narcotics) (MAOC-N) and the G7 (where, in 2016, the Presidency passed from Germany to Japan and in 2017 to Italy).

Member States acknowledged that cooperation with international partner countries and organisations at bilateral and multilateral level arose from the guidance provided by the Maritime Security Strategy and the EU’s Global Strategy.

At regional level, cooperation enabling situational information sharing between maritime operational centres was referred to by Member States, such as the signing of technical agreements between ADRION nations\(^\text{20}\), Adriatic and Ionian naval cooperation organised through the ADRION initiative,
and the sub-regional agreement on information sharing between Croatia, Italy and Slovenia on the environmental situation in the Adriatic Sea. Member States welcomed the progress made on boosting interoperability among the ADRION navies, which has resulted in greater security and stability in the maritime domain of the Adriatic and Ionian Basin.

On the need to enhance efforts in the area of maritime security and detection of threats, Member States noted their participation in the AQUAPOL network and in its regional groups (HUBS) aimed at strengthening cooperation by means of joint exercises, workshops, sharing of best practices and other common operations. Member States also noted the cooperation between border services and coast guards in the Black Sea Coast/Border Guard Cooperation Forum (BSCF) and the Black Sea Border Coordination and Information Centre. In this framework, regular meetings of different working groups are held with the main objective of improving cooperation and exchange of best practices while sharing information and improving situational awareness. Regular detailed and comprehensive risk analysis of the Baltic Sea region is carried out by one Member State and relevant proposals for improving security in the region are then submitted.

In regional inter-agency cooperation, Member States reported their participation in Baltic Sea Region Border Control Cooperation (BSRbbox), which is a cooperation initiative between the Baltic Sea countries, Norway and Iceland focusing on security-related issues. Member States further indicated their participation in various BSRbbox events, meetings and seminars. Member States actively supported the efforts made by regional partners and organisations to promote good governance in maritime security. At sub-regional level as part of the military cooperation initiative SUCBAS (Sea Surveillance Cooperation Baltic Sea), best practice in information exchange were shared in annual operator training for participating Member States. The aim of SUCBAS is to increase maritime situational awareness in the region by sharing relevant maritime data, security-related intelligence, information and knowledge between participants on a voluntary basis. In 2016, Member States regularly exchanged information with other SUCBAS participants and thus contributed to efforts to increase information exchange quality.

Several Member States referred to the conclusion of specific cooperation agreements. For example an agreement between the Italian coast guard and the French maritime gendarmerie to strengthen their mutual cooperation in ship and port security, an agreement between the United Kingdom and members of the North Sea and Channel Maritime Information Group (NSCMIG), and an agreement between France and the United Kingdom to enable information exchange by maintaining regular contacts between their respective maritime information centres.

On the development of voluntary common information sharing protocols (action 2.3.10), Member States referred to the development of such protocols on situational awareness in the maritime domain

---

21 Sub-regional agreement between Croatia, Italy and Slovenia on contingency plans for the prevention of, preparedness for and response to major marine pollution incidents in the Adriatic Sea.
22 An EU network of 13 Member States' maritime and inland navigation-related law enforcement authorities.
23 E.g. the Italian coast guard reported on its activities as a member of the Atlantic/West-Mediterranean maritime hub.
24 France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany.
25 Partnership between the UK’s National Maritime Information centre and the Maritime Operations Centre in Cherbourg in France, through a direct line of communication open 24/7.
at EU level\textsuperscript{26}, and to exchanges with other third countries and organisations. Also, several sub-regional information sharing agreements were put in place between Member States, such as the information exchange agreement between Croatia, Italy and Slovenia for the prevention of, preparedness for and response to major maritime pollution incidents in the Adriatic Sea, which is closely related to action 4.1.10 of the Action Plan whether or not related to a security incident.

Member States highlighted the need to further enhance EU inter-agency cooperation (action 2.1.5) in order to develop a common maritime awareness picture, emphasising direct communication between the national competent authorities and EU agencies as the most effective way forward. They underlined the need to boost cooperation between relevant EU agencies (including Frontex\textsuperscript{27}, EMSA\textsuperscript{28}, EFCA\textsuperscript{29}, EDA\textsuperscript{30}, and Europol\textsuperscript{31}) and national competent authorities and to strengthen coordination between new and existing EU programmes. Member States fully support inter-agency coast guard cooperation between Frontex, EFCA and EMSA and further suggest continuing to increase inter-agency cooperation in the future. They demonstrated willingness to strengthen their coordination in order to share information even more widely with other international partners.

Member States reported involvement in integrated maritime services such as those of MARSUR\textsuperscript{32} and EUROSUR. Those two initiatives were considered important tools for improving interoperability and information sharing among the participating Member States. On MARSUR, Member States reported membership of and increased and improved participation in the project. They also welcomed the organisation of relevant training venues and evaluation exercises. Reinforcement of Member States’ availabilities to share information between all relevant European maritime security stakeholders and systems was highlighted (action 2.3.3.). One Member State had successfully tested automated connection of national information systems to MARSUR\textsuperscript{33}. Ireland stressed that as chair of MARSUR it would raise Member States’ awareness of MARSUR’s capabilities and how they could be used to support CSDP objectives. As the leader of the ad hoc category B programme on MARSUR Networking Adaptive Maintenance (MARSUR II), France reported that further development and use of the maritime surveillance capability was envisaged in order to produce a widely available and accurate maritime picture. France suggested that this programme could be tested in support of Operation EUNAVFOR MED Sophia and should also be compatible with EUROSUR and other coast guard systems linked to maritime situational awareness. Some Member States had also explored

\textsuperscript{26} The United Kingdom protocols with France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany.
\textsuperscript{27} With the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2016/1624, Frontex became the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, but keeps Frontex as its common name.
\textsuperscript{28} The European Maritime Safety Agency.
\textsuperscript{29} The European Fisheries Control Agency.
\textsuperscript{30} The European Defence Agency.
\textsuperscript{31} The European Union Law Enforcement Agency.
\textsuperscript{32} The Croatian navy is developing a project to support external recognised maritime picture (RMP) sharing with MARSUR, in line with CISE and NATO information-sharing requirements. The project should reach its targeted operational capabilities within the next 2 or 3 years. The Irish navy has offered to contribute to the RMP with information from air corps maritime patrols, which can efficiently cover extensive maritime areas, and from naval service ships.
\textsuperscript{33} The German military authorities implemented and successfully tested automated connection of the national naval maritime information system to MARSUR using the dedicated MEX-node.
improvement of data exchange and interoperability with other EU programmes, such as Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean (MASE).

A number of Member States referred to their participation in the CHENS (Chiefs of European Navies) forum meetings, considering it a useful forum for cooperation and for exchanging maritime information. Member States also reported on a number of projects to share information and best practice, such as the North Atlantic Coast Guard Forum (NACGF), the European Patrol Network, BSRBCC, the Mediterranean Coast Guard Functions Forum (MCGFF) and the European Coast Guard Functions Forum (ECGFF). They referred to their participation in the ECGFF’s Working Group to develop a European Coast Guard Information Portal to share best practice, risk analysis and threat information (action 3.3.6.). Reference was also made to the MAREΣ platform (the Mediterranean AIS Regional Exchange System), allowing maritime information to be shared among participating EU Member States and third countries in the Mediterranean basin (Mauritania and Jordan included) involved in the EU project SafeMed III.

On information sharing on sea-dumped chemical munitions and unexploded ordnance sea (action 2.1.7), Member States highlighted cross-sectoral cooperation and information sharing between different national authorities, and reported on various activities in relation to searches for and assessment of chemical munitions. In October 2016, Lithuania submitted a draft resolution on cooperative measures to assess and increase awareness of environmental effects related to waste originating from chemical munitions dumped at sea to the United Nations General Assembly Second Committee. The draft resolution was sponsored by all the EU Member States. On 21 December 2016, the General Assembly adopted the resolution forwarded by the UNGA Second Committee, without a vote, reaffirming its role in promoting sustainable development. Lithuania’s Ministry of Environment hosted a dialogue seminar ‘Saving the sea together — reducing the use and impacts of hazardous substances in the Baltic Sea region’ on 8 December 2016. To boost capability for searching areas suspected to contain sea-dumped chemical munitions and unexploded ordnance, Member States installed new monitoring equipment.

On maritime border surveillance, Member States reported on the progress made in implementing the EUROSUR Regulation. National Coordination Centres (NCCs) coordinate and exchange information among all the authorities responsible for external border surveillance, and with other

34 France has seconded staff to help Madagascar implement result 5 of the MASE programme (information-sharing) and has seconded a liaison officer to the Regional Maritime Information Fusion Centre.
35 Permanent information exchange is in place between Romanian naval forces and the Ministry of Interior. Portugal’s navy reported that it had shared information on sea-dumped chemical munitions and unexploded ordnances with the national maritime authority. The Spanish navy and coast guard are responsible for gathering all relevant information on sea-dumped chemical munitions and unexploded ordnance. The information is then passed to the national point of contact and shared under the OSPAR Convention initiative.
36 In 2016 the Latvian coast guard published updated guidelines for fishermen on how to deal with dumped chemical munitions: Fisheries and warfare agents. Preventive measures, first aid and reporting.
38 In 2016 the Croatian navy acquired two autonomous underwater vehicles, which have enhanced its capability for searching areas with suspected sea-dumped chemical munitions and unexploded ordnance.
n national and third countries\textsuperscript{40} NCCs and Frontex. Cooperation under EUROSUR between national and regional coordination centres also led to information sharing initiatives\textsuperscript{41}.

ii) Latest developments involving the EEAS, EDA and the Commission

On CISE (action 2.1.1), the Commission has put great emphasis on ensuring the progress of and necessary coherence between ongoing and new preparatory actions:

- The EUCISE 2020 POV project\textsuperscript{42} has reached phase 2 — development of the test-bed. The POV consortium will use the test-bed in phase 3 (from November 2017) to validate the CISE solutions, together with the builder (an industry consortium). The project will deliver its final results in the first half of 2018.

- Ten national CISE projects, initiated under EMFF 2014-2015 calls for proposals are ongoing, to develop interoperability solutions between maritime surveillance systems at national level and between Member States using CISE specifications. An additional call for proposals was launched in March 2017.

- A study was conducted together with a consultant, Gartner, to benchmark the operational added value of CISE by collecting and assessing national inputs on necessary information flows/services that could be enabled by CISE. The inputs received from 33 authorities from 14 EU countries helped identify and prioritise 12 essential information services for national maritime authorities that would significantly improve their operational processes.

- Another study started in January 2017 to compare the CISE programme and similar processes in third countries, such as the MISE process in the US. The aim is to collect and assess relevant best practice, lessons learned and success factors, and to provide recommendations on how they can be used to further implement CISE.

Work is also ongoing to explore different standardisation options for CISE interoperability solutions (i.e. the CISE data and service model). This work will most probably lead to future industry involvement in the CISE process. Overall, as concrete results from these preparatory actions are expected at the earliest in 2018, the Commission will then consider further initiatives to ensure coherent policy approach at EU level. Until then, further work on a CISE Handbook has been postponed.

Seventeen EU Member States and Norway set up the maritime surveillance project MARSUR, under the framework of EDA. It is designed to exchange maritime situational awareness data and information between naval headquarters. From its inception, MARSUR capability has been designed to support CSDP operations and its effectiveness is being tested, since MARSUR provides support for Operation EUNAVFOR MED Sophia. A MARSUR capability demonstration for Member States and EU agencies was held on 10 May 2017. The collection, use and analysis of the most relevant

\textsuperscript{40} See Focus Area 3.  
\textsuperscript{41} A network was set-up under the project ‘The exchange of situational pictures of neighbouring external borders sections between Bulgarian and Romanian NCCs’ for real-time information exchange between the NCCs.  
\textsuperscript{42} Financed under FP7 security call 6 (FP7-SEC-2013-1), this focuses on large-scale testing of CISE technical interoperability solutions (i.e. the CISE data and service model).
information received via the MARSUR node was demonstrated. The potential of a mobile MARSUR capability deployed on a naval vessel bound for Operation Sophia’s area of operation will be also demonstrated, showing the technical scope for acting as a floating force headquarters connected to an operational headquarters in any future CSDP operation.

During 2016, Frontex improved EUROSUR fusion services with the support of EMSA, EFCA and the EU Satellite Centre. These services have increasingly been used by the Member States. Around 34 000 events on irregular migration and cross-border crime were registered in EUROSUR in 2016, and 392 analytical reports exchanged. In 2016 the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit and the EU SatCen delivered a full range of analytical reports on the coastal areas of Libya, complemented/supported by pre-frontier monitoring conducted over Libyan nexus and stopover points.

Additionally, to respond to forecasting and pre-warning analytical needs, a new service was developed. This service is based on a methodology which aims to identify indicators of activity linked to illegal migration and cross-border crime. The recent application of this methodology has led to identifying a large number of points of interest, several of which have been labelled ‘Critical’.

In the field of maritime surveillance, EMSA has continued to provide a broad range of data and integrated maritime information services, developed since 2011, for the benefit of various end-users with an interest in maritime transport and maritime traffic.

The operational situational maritime surveillance picture provided builds on full interoperability of a broad array of European systems in place: The union Maritime Information and exchange System SafeSeaNet (T-AIS and SAT-AIS), CleanSeaNet, Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT SAR SURPIC), THETIS as well as integration of oceanographic data, vessel behaviour and requirements specified at national level for their operational needs.

These integrated maritime services are provided based on EU legal requirements. The emphasis is on support for operational use for any legitimate interests including maritime security operations, not only for relevant maritime security legislation at EU and international level, but for operations such as EU NAVFOR Atalanta and MED and support for Frontex sea-border monitoring and control.

To enhance interoperability and further integrate relevant maritime information, thereby ensuring user-friendly information sharing, a new single graphical user interface, SEG Ecosystem Graphical User Interface (the visualisation of the IMS), was developed in 2016 to support the interface requirements. Consequently a common user management console will support all maritime applications and services. Users will be enabled to benefit from improvements to the current services with access to integrated data flows, more options for data visualisation, a single sign-on process, new machine-to-machine interfaces and automated vessel behaviour monitoring. This outcome has been deployed in May 2017.

New state-of-the-art technology has been fed into maritime surveillance services, factoring in further integration and interoperability of related systems and the creation of added value services at national and EU level, as requested by users. Additional resources such as remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS) complementing e.g. Copernicus maritime surveillance services will enhance the integrated maritime services provided by EMSA. The Copernicus service for security applications aims to support EU policies by providing information in response to Europe’s security challenges. It improves crisis prevention, preparedness and response in three key areas: maritime surveillance; border surveillance; and support for EU external action.
In the area of maritime surveillance, the EU’s overall objective is to support Europe’s maritime security objectives and related activities in the maritime domain. Under a delegation agreement signed in 2015, the Commission entrusted EMSA with operation of the maritime surveillance component of the Copernicus security service. Under the agreement, EMSA uses space data from Copernicus Sentinel 1 satellites combined with other sources of maritime information to effectively monitor maritime areas of interest.

The development of RPAS reflects the increasing interest among Member States and the Commission (e.g. in the coast guard package) in its potential to complement existing maritime monitoring and surveillance capacity in a number of areas. The technology is multipurpose and can be used for emergency situations and for purposes requested by Member States, the Commission or EU agencies.

In 2016, EMSA continued to provide integrated maritime services to maritime authorities in Member States and other users including EU naval forces, EFCA, Frontex, the MAOC-N and European neighbourhood policy countries associated with the SAFEMED III and TRACECA II projects.

EMSA has been providing services assisting with maritime and coastal information related to irregular migration in the Mediterranean Sea, based on a service level agreement with Frontex in the field of traffic monitoring and maritime surveillance.

A cooperation framework has also been set up between EMSA and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) to enable Member States’ administrations to obtain access to integrated maritime services for investigation purposes. In this context, EMSA has developed and provided specific training for OLAF staff to familiarise them with the tailored maritime surveillance services provided.

Integrated maritime services include the roll-out of the IMS mobile application to users, allowing access to the services via mobile platforms (smartphones and tablets). Further upgrades of the IMS mobile application are expected, including new visualisation elements and continuous improvements taking into account feedback from end-users.

In line with the Strategy’s cross-sectoral approach to maritime security, initial steps were taken in 2016 to promote cooperation between EDA and Frontex, EMSA and EFCA regarding European cooperation on Coast Guard Functions. In this context, EDA concluded a mapping of potential cooperation activities in fields such as maritime surveillance, maritime training, capability development, research and technology and RPAS. This cooperation is being further explored in 2017.
Focus area 2 — Capacity building and capability development

i) Progress made, as reported by Member States

Reporting on recent developments on national action and cooperation with third countries, Member States highlighted the need to strengthen both internal and external cooperation in order to ensure that EU security strategies are consistent and to develop relevant capacity building programmes with third countries. There was some action on harmonisation for better interoperability and standardisation in the maritime domain.

Member States extensively reported on their support to third countries in establishing and upgrading maritime security capabilities, through national involvement or participation in various EU operations and activities including search and rescue\(^\text{43}\) (action 1.4.5.) and ‘train and equip’ activities\(^\text{44}\) (action 1.4.3.). Referring to the EU’s Global Strategy and the EU Maritime Security Strategy, Member States referred to their participation in various multilateral and bilateral activities to promote and enhance maritime security in various sea basins, including the Gulf of Guinea, the Gulf of Aden and the Mediterranean Sea.

In the framework of multilateral initiatives in support of the Yaoundé Process\(^\text{45}\) and, as part of the EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea, to improve maritime situational awareness in the Gulf of Guinea. To this end, coordinated information exchange mechanisms between maritime operational centres\(^\text{46}\) were put in place (action 1.4.2.). This cooperation aims to build synergies between maritime military activities, consistent with national planning decisions, and offers education and training exercises for local maritime forces. Also, a French-British reporting centre called Marine Domain Awareness for Trade — Gulf of Guinea (MDAT-GoG), dedicated to supporting maritime industry and shipowners by sharing information and alerts on maritime risks and threats in the Gulf of Guinea, started operations in June 2016. Member States also participated in the meetings of the G7++FOGG\(^\text{47}\) (under the Portuguese Presidency) to steer capacity building in the region.

Under EUNAVFOR MED operation Sophia, Member States engaged in capacity building exercises and training for the Libyan coast guard and navy, to contribute to sharing information and implementing the UN arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya\(^\text{48}\). They made substantial

---

\(^{43}\) Portugal and the US concluded a protocol on search and rescue issues.

\(^{44}\) Portugal applies the ‘train and equip’ approach in military cooperation with Angola, Mozambique, Sao Tomé e Principe, Cape Verde and East Timor. The Spanish coast guard applies the ‘train and equip’ approach in the West Sahel Mauritania, Seahorse Med and Blue Sahel projects.

\(^{45}\) In Madagascar, France has been involved in developing the African maritime picture for East Africa, together with several countries from the Gulf of Guinea, by sending maritime information through reports and alerts to the Yaoundé centres on a weekly basis.

\(^{46}\) Involving Spain, Denmark, France and Portugal.

\(^{47}\) Composed of Germany, Canada, the United States, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Brazil (observer), South Korea, Denmark, Spain, Norway, the Netherlands, Portugal, Switzerland, the European Union, UNODC and INTERPOL. Portugal passed the G7++FOGG presidency to Italy at the beginning of 2017.

\(^{48}\) Germany deployed 2 navy ships in 2016 and contributed a trainer team for the first training package from October to November 2016. Greece provided mobile training teams to EUNAVFOR MED Sophia units to
efforts in providing training, capacity building exercises, personnel and technical support. Training is also being provided for officials of Libyan border and migration authorities to help them prevent and tackle the challenges they are facing, including as regards capacity to respond to emergencies requiring search and rescue of stranded migrants or asylum seekers, with a focus on those embarking on dangerous journeys at sea.\(^49\)

Member States contributed to EUACP Nestor Somalia, supporting more effective maritime governance and assisting in building maritime policy capacity.\(^50\)

Member States also participated in joint maritime multipurpose operations coordinated by Frontex, such as Triton, Poseidon Sea\(^51\), Hera, Indalo and Minerva, which aimed at combating illegal migration and carrying out search and rescue activities. The coordination centres responsible for these operations hosted several working visits and held dedicated training sessions.\(^52\) Several Member States incorporated lessons learned into their training activities, based on their experience of participation in EU operations.\(^53\)

Member States also supported efforts to provide more maritime security experts for EU delegations in third countries (action 1.3.3.), taking into account their operational needs, and reported on the deployment of personnel in various partner countries.\(^54\) Secondment of national advisers and mentors to administrations in third countries and international organisations including the UN family\(^55\) was also reported.\(^56\)

On cooperation and information exchange in the field of piracy prevention, relevance is given to the cooperation with several international organisations, i.e. the Maritime Security Centre — Horn of Africa (MSCHOA), Maritime Domain Awareness for Trade — Gulf of Guinea and cooperation under the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships in Asia (ReCAAP). Member States were also involved in the international Contact Group for Piracy off the

\(^49\) E.g. the Greek coast guard held a training seminar for Libyan coast guard staff on the organisation, management and operational aspects of the Piraeus Joint Rescue Coordination Centre on 6 February 2017.

\(^50\) Germany seconded 2 civilian experts and 1 police officer to support the mission in 2016. The United Kingdom provided 2 seconded advisers (a legal adviser and operations manager) to support the EU’s mission to build maritime security capacity. France also reported support for the mission.

\(^51\) Lithuania took part in the Mediterranean operation ‘Poseidon Sea 2016’ on Lesbos Island.

\(^52\) Bulgarian and Romanian personnel at coordination and operational level made a working visit to the ‘Practica di Mare’ in Rome responsible for coordination of the Triton joint operation, and to the ICC in Piraeus in Greece, responsible for coordination of the Poseidon Sea joint operation.

\(^53\) The Croatian navy incorporated lessons learned into their coast guard training after participating in Operation TRITON 15.

\(^54\) Spain provided one coast guard officer for the EU delegation in Mauritania as part of the liaison officers’ network.

\(^55\) The United Kingdom provided 2 seconded mentors to the UNODC programmes in Nigeria and Ghana and provided the UNDC with support for conducting capacity building in Ghana and Sao Tome e Principe.

\(^56\) The United Kingdom seconded a maritime adviser to the Deputy Prime Minister’s office of Somalia to provide expertise and support the office in developing a coordinated and long-term strategic maritime plan for Somalia. As part of regional maritime cooperation, the UK seconded a royal navy officer for 12 months to the Information Fusion Centre (IFC) in Singapore to identify the capacity building needs of ODA States and analysis of maritime threats in the South East Asia region.
Coast of Somalia. Various funding for counter-piracy initiatives and maritime security capacity building programmes in Africa and Asia were referred to, in particular the use of official development assistance funds, the MASE programme (European Development Fund) and the Critical Maritime Routes Programme (Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace). Regarding training on combating piracy, NATO’s Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Centre (NMIOTC), located in Crete, holds on a regular basis courses on maritime security for the armed forces of countries participating in the Djibouti Code of Conduct. One Member State highlighted its contribution to the UN’s counter-piracy Trust Fund to support new initiatives such as a fishing registration system to distinguish legitimate vessels off the coast of Somalia, and to a review of the Seychelles’ prison system.

Participation in other projects and the development of scenarios for exercises such as the Obangame Express and Phoenix, involving the US navy and European and African navies, which contribute to capacity building in the countries of Africa’s Atlantic coast, is listed among the year’s activities. In view of the progress made putting the Interregional Coordination Centre into operation in Yaoundé, new capacity building projects are being planned and financed by one Member State.

Regarding the prevention of illegal migration and human trafficking, several Member States ran different EU projects during 2016, for example West Sahel Mauritania, Seahorse Mediterranean Network and Blue Sahel, involving a number of third countries. Member States further reported on their participation in implementation of the Seaport Cooperation initiative (SEACOP), which is aimed at training and equipping inter-agency units to identify, search and interdict all forms of illicit maritime trafficking.

Member States contributed to and participated in UN capacity building exercises, in particular as part of the UNODC Maritime Crime Programme running in selected eastern and western African coastal states, and in various International Maritime Organisation working groups.

Under bilateral agreements with third countries, Member States are continuously involved in activities such as joint surveillance of waters under the jurisdiction of third countries, international ship and port facility security (ISPS) training and port security liaison programmes to enhance protective

---

57 In 2016, the United Kingdom chaired the CGPCS’s Working group 1 (naval cooperation — ‘ensuring effective naval operational coordination and supporting the building of the judicial, penal and maritime capacity of regional states to ensure they are better equipped to tackle piracy and maritime security challenges’) on capacity building.

58 The Djibouti Code of Conduct concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden was signed by Djibouti, Comoros, Ethiopia, Jordan, Madagascar, Maldives, Mozambique, Seychelles, the United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

59 The United Kingdom’s border forces have been developing the maritime intelligence and search capabilities of a number of nations, in particular in the Caribbean as part of the SeaCop.

60 Under the UNODC, the United Kingdom provided training to Kenyan maritime police and expertise and guidance on general maritime deployment duties and specialist operations such as counterterrorism, piracy and armed trafficking and helped the UNODC provide capacity building in Ghana and Sao Tome e Principe aimed at improving their ability to respond to the threat of maritime crime.

61 Sweden participated in the IMO’s working group on maritime security, which finalised and adopted guidance on the development of maritime security legislation.

62 E.g. Portugal has bilateral agreements with Cape Verde and with Sao Tome e Principe.

63 ISPS ship training was carried out by France in the framework of the bilateral agreement between France and Morocco. This initiative will continue in 2017 with a focus on the harbour-related issues.
security arrangements. They reported permanent deployments of vessels in African countries carrying out various maritime security training and support, and dedicated naval exercises. One Member State also reported on partnerships with third countries under the strategic dialogues. Specific training and dedicated seminars on enhancing development of maritime security capabilities were conducted both in third countries and in organising Member States.

On support for and development of EU maritime exercises to enhance Member States’ readiness and preparedness and EU capacity to respond to security threats (action 4.2.2.), Member States referred to their participation in various exercises, such as ‘northern Coasts’ together with other NATO countries and in the 5+5 Initiative forum of cooperation, where defence and security matters are discussed. Various capacity and capability building exercises were also addressed by Member States under regional initiatives, such as ADRION.

In cooperation with the EU agencies, especially EMISA, Member States organised various regional training courses in 2016. Several training courses on the challenges of securing maritime areas were organised by the ESDC.

ii) Latest developments involving the EEAS, EDA and the Commission

The implementation of the EU Strategy for the Gulf of Guinea progressed well. In March 2016, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) adopted the first implementation report, which shows the willingness of Member States and EU institutions to follow up on their commitments.

Cooperation continued under the G7 ++ Friends of the Gulf of Guinea (FOGG) which was chaired by Portugal in 2016, on behalf of Japan, and the Lisbon Declaration was adopted in June 2016. Cooperation also continued with industry representatives (the European Community Shipowners’

Spain deployed two vessels during the whole year 2016 in Senegal and Mauritania. Since 2013, France has contributed to improving state action at sea by African navies (against illegal fishing, drug trafficking, piracy, armed robbery and pollution, and providing search and rescue) through NEMO, a dedicated naval exercise. The Spanish navy is involved in the National Cooperative Security Programme with some countries in the Gulf of Guinea and in the West Coast of Africa, deploying two offshore patrol vessels and sharing information between COWAM and regional MOCs.

France holds strategic maritime dialogues with Japan, Australia and India. The Portuguese navy and the national maritime authority, under the Portuguese ministry of defence and the government of Cape Verde, organised a seminar in Cape Verde on maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea.

Through its federal police’s maritime education and training centre, Germany offers training and equipment support of boarding and survival training in Morocco, Tunisia and Saudi Arabia. The training centre is also involved in further developing best practices in maritime police training / boarding. The Portuguese navy organised training courses and seminars for the coast guards and navies of Angola, Mozambique, Sao Tomé e Principe, Cape Verde and East Timor, under the ‘train and equip’ approach.

Ten Western Mediterranean nations participated — Algeria, France, Italy, Libya, Malta, Mauritania, Morocco, Portugal, Spain and Tunisia. Through practical activities and a permanent exchange of ideas and experience, the initiative aims at enhancing mutual understanding and trust and includes planning and execution of maritime exercises for this purpose.

Croatia is involved in regional capability and capacity building within the ADRION initiative, addressing non-military tasks such as naval presence and surveillance, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and search and rescue.
Associations, in particular), and new partnerships were explored with important partners (US, UNODC) that are also members of the G7 ++ FOGG.

It is also important to mention that EU and Member States’ efforts will need to be matched by national and regional efforts to complete the Yaoundé architecture. West and Central African Heads of State adopted, an ambitious Code of Conduct in June 2013, in Yaoundé, for cooperation on combating transnational organised crime in the maritime domain, maritime terrorism, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and other illegal activities at sea. To accompany that political decision, the EU Strategy for the Gulf of Guinea (Council Conclusions 7224/14) was adopted in March 2014 and was followed one year later by the adoption of the Action Plan (Council Conclusions 7168/15).

Implementation of the EU’s Capability Development Plan (CDP) continues apace on the maritime priorities identified, such as low-cost maritime patrol aircraft, maritime tankers, naval surveillance systems, patrol vessels, naval training and diving, and mine countermeasures (MCM) ships. After Defence Ministers decided to revise the CDP, EDA’s Steering Board launched the process in November 2016. EDA together with Member States, EUMC and EUMS will revise the CDP priorities in line with the level of ambition set in the EU’s Global Strategy including for maritime issues, and present a new set of EU priorities to be adopted in spring 2018.

On action 1.4.7., there has long been regular dialogue between the Commission and the US coast guard on the ISPS as well as in other areas pertinent for the maritime security. Also, the Commission promotes ships, port facilities and port security with the beneficiaries of the SAFEMED and TRACECA MAR programmes.

Given the current challenges faced by Operation Sophia to operate inside Libyan territorial waters, where many drownings occur, the provision of training and capabilities to the Libyan coast guard and navy was identified in the strategic review conducted in 2016 as an effective complementary tool to contribute to the return of stability along the Libyan coast and prevent further loss of life at sea. The decision to add training as a support task for Operation Sophia’s mandate was also consistent with the inherent ability of a military operation to act as a first entry force in crisis management. Following an initial exchange of letters between the High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini and Prime Minister Faiez Serraj, the Libyan authorities formally notified the EU at the end of June 2016 that they had appointed a technical committee of seven experts under their Ministry of Defence to begin dialogue on capacity building through coast guard and navy training. That led to the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Operation Sophia on 23 August 2016. Following PSC approval on 30 August, Operation Sophia finalised preparations for an initial package of activities on board two of its ships, which began on 28 October 2016. Operation Sophia’s training has been designed to be conducted in three different packages, ranging from basic seamanship to operational sea training, all focusing heavily on human rights responsibilities. It is further aimed at enhancing Libya’s ability to fight illicit smuggling activities, and to contribute to saving lives at sea within its territorial waters. The proposed training programme is also underpinned by the objective of meeting Libyan coast guard requirements to have several crews appropriately trained to operate available patrol vessels. To date, Operation Sophia has been able to formally complete an initial package of sea-based training for an initial group of 93 trainees, including 39 personnel for 3 patrol boat crews. In line with the objectives outlined in the MoU signed with the Libyan committee of experts in July 2016,

---

71 Package 1 — at sea training in Operation Sophia units; Package 2 — shore training in EU Member States; Package 3 — at sea consolidation training in Libyan coast guard vessels.
Operation Sophia introduced a second package of shore-based training in late January 2017. This part of the training is being provided through a series of modules scheduled to be delivered in Mediterranean Member States’ training facilities. To date, modules have taken place in Greece and Malta, resulting in the training of an additional 41 personnel. An offer of subsequent modules was recently confirmed by Italy and Spain for 255 and 20 personnel, respectively.

As stated in the relevant Council decision, Operation Atalanta has, within its means and capabilities and upon request, continued activities in support of capacity building in the region, most notably to EUCAP Somalia (previously EUCAP Nestor) e.g. small boat handling training in Mogadishu. In the wider region, Operation Atalanta has conducted capacity building actions in Seychelles and Tanzania and in support of the MASE programme in Madagascar.

In 2016, EUCAP NESTOR (re-launched as EUCAP Somalia), continued its support at both federal and regional level in Somalia. This includes support for the Federal Government’s National Security Office in drafting a coast guard options paper, a national maritime threat assessment and a National Maritime Security Plan, as part of the overall reform of Somalia’s security sector. It also includes continuous support for the Somaliland coast guard (both in terms of legal framework and mentoring), or the support to the creation of the a Police Professional Development Board in Mogadishu — a permanent platform for the harmonisation, review and evaluation of police training and curricula (also covering maritime security) — and for the launch of a project in support of the refurbishment of the Police Academy in Mogadishu. EUCAP Somalia relocated its Headquarters to Mogadishu on 1 November 2016 and its Field Office in Hargeisa (Somaliland) became fully operational. The mission started its activities in Garowe (Puntland) in 2016 supporting the operational capability of the Bosasso Port Police.

**Focus area 3 — Other EU regional or sectoral strategies**

**i) Progress made, as reported by Member States**

The EU’s Emergency Response Capacity, part of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, is the main coordinator of response teams and equipment during disasters. Member States reported that they had contributed supplies and equipment to the Emergency Response Coordination Centre. One Member State reported on providing funding for furnishing and equipping maritime coordination centres under ECOWAS supervision.

Under the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, Member States have set up national capacities to intervene in disasters such as disasters on board vessels at sea or in ports and developed a single-use air-drop system for delivering disaster relief.

---

72 E.g. The Swedish coast guard provided a list of material contributions to the voluntary pool and remains prepared to provide a range of equipment if required.

73 Germany provided EUR 1 million to furnish and equip the following coordination centres — one maritime interregional coordination centre in Ivory Coast and three multinational maritime coordination centres in Benin, Ghana and Cape Verde.

74 E.g. The French initiative CAPINAV (National reinforcement capacity for intervention on board vessels) was set up in November 2016.
At bilateral level, Member States cooperate closely together on updating their operational plans for emergency coordination. They also participate in pooling and sharing projects (action 3.3.7), in developing sharing initiatives between Member States and third countries and in Frontex.

Member States conducted inter-agency and joined-up exercises (action 5.3.2 and 4.2.5) addressing issues such as humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, mass casualty scenarios and crisis response. They participated in multi-agency and cross-border exercises under the EU Civil Protection Mechanism. To enhance their capacity for disaster management and response planning to security threats, they conducted various multilateral maritime exercises, e.g. within the 5+5 initiative forum or EURMARFOR (the European Maritime Force). In addition, Member States regularly conduct exercises and training activities to maintain readiness and preparedness to respond to security threats.

While including search and rescue aspects and scenarios in the national exercises, Member States also put emphasis on the further development of more complex and more realistic search and rescue exercises at national and regional level. Member States have strengthened their national cross sector civil-military cooperation with the aim of swiftly identifying and recording incidents (also to respond to third party interference in EU Member States’ exclusive economic zone). Member States hold regular exercises and training activities for search and rescue (action 4.2.3) at regional level, too, e.g. within the ADRION and DiveSMART Baltic initiatives. Improvement of data exchange for search and rescue operations at sea as well as the collaboration with other relevant agencies to conduct search and rescue activities was noted by several Member States.

On action 4.2.6, encouraging contributions to combating illegal and unregulated archaeological research and pillage of archaeological objects, Member States reported on contributions to protection and surveillance of underwater archaeological heritage such as using military assets or engaging hydro-oceanographic research vessels or diving teams with research specialists.

---

75 In this context, France and Spain updated the Gulf of Leon plan and the Gulf of Biscay plan.
76 E.g. Spain developed polling and sharing initiatives bilaterally with France and Algeria. Various national authorities are taking steps to participate in pooling and sharing projects.
77 France, Portugal and Italy.
78 E.g. Irish defence forces participate in annual inter-agency exercises with the coast guard and health service executive for a mass casualty scenario. Ireland also holds a biannual national maritime subsurface emergency exercise with the Marine Institute, the Commissioner of Irish Lights and the coast guard. Joint exercises are also held regularly by the fire service, offshore installations operators and commercial shipping companies.
79 E.g. The Spanish Navy is participating in the multi-purpose, multi-agency exercise COASTEX17 taking place in Portuguese waters when Portugal chairs the ECGFF.
80 The coast guard services of the Baltic Sea countries participated in an international oil spill contingency maritime exercise BALEX DELTA 2016 in Lithuania.
81 EURMARFOR, composed of personnel from France, Italy, Portugal and Spain, carries out humanitarian missions, peacekeeping operations, crisis response operations etc.
82 E.g. The Spanish navy conducts annual maritime security exercises (MARSEC) in which non-EU nations also participate as observers (e.g. Morocco sends maritime units to improve interoperability and procedures in the Southern Mediterranean region).
83 A cooperation project run by the Swedish coast guard and armed forces, with partners from Poland, Finland, Denmark, Germany and Estonia, on emergency preparedness in the Baltic, aimed at boosting national diving capability and efficiency in response to any incident or crisis.
84 E.g. Spain.
There were also references to implementing and improving the Maritime Incident Response Group, consisting of fire brigades from four EU Member States\textsuperscript{85} and of Firemen on the North Sea pre-Search and Rescue (BroNS).

Work has also been carried out to increase information exchange at sea to defend against hybrid, cyber and CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) threats. Member States reported setting up national security operations centres\textsuperscript{86} monitoring cyber incidents, drafting cybersecurity threat guidance and guidelines on information security on board ships\textsuperscript{87} and holding events\textsuperscript{88}, trainings\textsuperscript{89} and exercises\textsuperscript{90} on cybersecurity. Member States also reported on their work to implement the Directive on Security of Network and Information Systems (NIS).

Member States stressed the need for a cross-sectoral approach to combat hybrid threats. A suggestion was made to consider hybrid threats under sea and hybrid threats to undersea infrastructure as additional concepts complementing the maritime security operations (MSO) concept (action 1.5.2.). Since the NATO Warsaw Summit (8 July 2016), Member States have studied various proposals to counter hybrid threats and to improve cyber coordination, such as links between NATO’s Sea Guardian and Operation Sophia\textsuperscript{91}.

On CBRN defence, Member States reported on various activities carried out at national level, such as simulations to enhance stand-off capabilities for detection of radiological material\textsuperscript{92}, promotion of early warning and traffic screening at ports of entry to detect illicit movement of radioactive materials\textsuperscript{93}. A number of seminars focusing on sea-dumped chemical munitions and unexploded ordnances were also held\textsuperscript{94}.

On the protection of critical maritime infrastructures and support for capacity building in third countries, Member States highlighted their participation in two EU projects. The Critical Maritime Routes in the Indian Ocean (CRIMARIO) project aims to enhance maritime security and safety in the wider Indian Ocean. The Migration EU expertise (MIEUX III) project provides short-term capacity building for third countries in all areas of migration. Member States also developed and conducted

\textsuperscript{85} The Netherlands, France, Belgium and the United Kingdom.
\textsuperscript{86} The Netherlands set up a security operations centre (SOC) which will monitor IT systems and provide instant response to cyber incidents when required.
\textsuperscript{87} The United Kingdom has distributed cybersecurity threat guidance and best practice guides to the UK-flagged shipping fleet. France has produced guidelines on information security on board ships available in French and in English.
\textsuperscript{88} Lithuania held an event on cybersecurity in the civilian energy infrastructure, which brought together cybersecurity experts from the Lithuanian sea oil terminal ‘Klaipedos Nafta’, together with other Baltic States, the US, IT companies and academics.
\textsuperscript{89} E.g. Greece held training courses to enhance cyber defence capabilities such as forensics, intrusion detection, malware analysis and penetration testing.
\textsuperscript{90} Lithuania held its first national cybersecurity exercise ‘Cyber Shields 2016’.
\textsuperscript{91} E.g. France.
\textsuperscript{92} E.g. NATO’s Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Centre in Crete holds various simulation exercises.
\textsuperscript{93} In this context, a new program on the regular screening of all forms of traffic at the UK points of entry for the illicit movement of radioactive materials was recently put in place by the UK (project Cyclamen).
\textsuperscript{94} E.g. Lithuania hosted a seminar ‘Saving sea together — reducing the use and impacts of hazardous substances in the Baltic Sea Region’.
exercises on disaster management and security threats scenarios. As part of the Southeast Asia Maritime Disaster Response Initiative, the UK organised a capacity building seminar on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief for the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Manila. The seminar aimed to support cooperation on maritime disaster response issues in order to arrive at a more effective, coordinated regional approach to maritime incidents.

In terms of cooperation between EU and NATO actions, Member States supported enhancing and increasing synergies between the two organisations for better interoperability, while participating in CSDP operations and missions in the global maritime domain (action 1.3.4.). Member States are also taking opportunities to assign units operating under NATO or national operational control to provide associated support in EU maritime operations, such as Sophia or Atalanta, in order to improve cost-efficient EU-NATO collaboration. Member States also referred to participating in initiatives intended to develop EU and NATO capacity for joint maritime activity in the maritime domain (action 1.1.3.), such as Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group 1 (SNMCMG1) and Baltic Naval Squadron (BALTRON). As part of the Baltic Search and Rescue activities, and pollution control effectiveness activities, Member States authorities took part in the BALEX DELTA, LITPOLRU SAREX and BALTIC BIKINI exercises together with several NATO Member States.

Several Member States stressed the need to further improve interoperability and synergies between NATO and the EU, highlighting in particular the Mediterranean Sea as an area for further development of EU-NATO cooperation. Suggestions for more cooperation on critical maritime, energy and communication infrastructure protection between EU and NATO were also raised.

The creation of a working group dedicated to the optimisation of cooperation and preparation of defence projects with the EU and NATO was reported on by one Member State.

In the framework of quick response measures and actions, Member States make use of services provided by the Frontex joint operations structures, such as the Piraeus Joint Rescue Coordination Centre, which are facilitated by the use of satellite technology made available through the cooperation between Frontex, ESA and EMSA. Member States also reported on their activities related to urgent response and crisis situations within the European Border and Coast guard framework (action 1.5.3.).

Promotion of greater sharing of best practices and threat information where appropriate was highlighted by Member States. In this context, exercises are conducted in relation to security of offshore installations and interdiction of ships in naval waters.

---

95 In 2016, the Spanish coast guard conducted an exercise ‘Gate to Africa’ with Morocco, aiming to discuss and evaluate preparedness and response to a nuclear security event involving the transport of radioactive material. The outcomes were to identify lessons learned, areas of improvement and good practice.
96 E.g. In 2016 the Spanish navy encouraged the associated support to EUNAVFOR MED Sophia as secondary roles for its ships and submarines assigned to NATO Sea Guardian.
97 E.g. Lithuania.
98 Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia participate in BALTRON, which is a combined naval force aiming to develop mine countermeasure capabilities and to increase the interoperability and compatibility of Baltic navies with NATO.
99 E.g. Ireland and Spain.
ii) Latest developments involving the EEAS and the Commission

In October 2016, a new Critical Maritime Routes project (Gulf of Guinea Information Network, GOG-IN), funded under the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace, was signed worth EUR 9.3 million, including a EUR 1.8 million Danish contribution. In 2017, several new projects will be adopted under the 11th EDF regional programmes for West and Central Africa. At the same time, various projects (financed by EU 11th European Development Fund or the Instrument Contributing for Stability and Peace, and by Member States) are now in place to support national or regional efforts in the Gulf of Guinea.

In line with the EU’s Cybersecurity Strategy, the Commission participates in ongoing follow-up of the NIS Directive to address cybersecurity issues in the maritime domain (action 4.1.8). The Commission also holds dialogues and explores consensual actions in the field of cybersecurity for the protection of maritime infrastructure (action 3.2.2.).

The Member States, via the Commission and using EMSAs Integrated Maritime Services, have continued contributing to the maritime surveillance picture to EU Naval Forces — Indian Ocean (EUNAVFOR), the EU Naval Forces — Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR-MED).

The European Commission Services have been closely monitoring maritime disputes (action 1.6.1.).

Focus area 4 — Maritime research and innovation of dual- (multi-) use capabilities and training

i) Progress made, as reported by Member States

Focus area 4 brings together the latest actions and the progress made in research and innovation, in particular on the dual- (multi-) use capabilities for maritime operations and the latest activities in education and training on maritime security.

Member States participated in dedicated research and development and training activities in maritime capability development organised at national level or within the framework of the ECGFF\(^ {100}\), Frontex\(^ {101}\), EMSA\(^ {102}\), EDA\(^ {103}\) and other organisations and programmes\(^ {104}\). Member States continue to

---

\(^ {100}\) Under the Chairmanship of the ECGFF (2016-2017), Portugal started the planning process of a multiagency multipurpose exercise that will involve Portuguese agencies, European agencies and ECGFF Member States exercising all coast guard functions (action 1.2.1). Member States participate in the European Coast Guard Functions Academy network projects, the main purpose of which is to establish a network of academies and training institutions offering trainings for coast guard functions under the ECGFF. The objective of the project is to enhance the coherence and effectiveness of Coast Guard Function actions and activities and enable the interoperability and cooperation amongst different bodies carrying out coast guard functions. Several Member States participated in the EU funded project entitled ‘European Coast Guard Functions Academy Network for European Sectorial Qualification’s Framework for Coast Guarding — ECGFA NET’ (ECGFA NET).

\(^ {101}\) Portugal participated in the Border Surveillance working group set up by the Frontex to study the best practices in coast surveillance, in particular on acquisitions. Spanish Coast Guard officers attended all training activities related to the European Border and Coast Guard Agency Master of Border Management.
support efforts to enhance cooperation with European and International agencies and institutions in maritime capability development. Member States considered the links to foster cooperation in maritime capability development between EU agencies, research, training and education centres and Member States centres of excellence, including NATO accredited ones, as opportune and necessary. They also considered that they should be further strengthened (action 5.1.11.).

On the establishment of a network of R&D experts to create a clear vision and propose a cross-sectoral maritime security research agenda (action 5.2.4.), several Member States have put in place expert networks, where national experts, academia and industry are represented. The establishment of a R&D expert network at the EU level was supported by Member States. Some Member States noted that they are unable to provide many R&D experts to participate in the network due to limited human resources.

On the need to foster cooperation in the area of maritime capability development between research centres, Member States reported on their commitments and work undertaken in promoting the creation of alliances between various institutes and research centres. Member States also reported on the support to companies and institutions engaged in research, innovation and security and defence arena, while providing them with resources and expertise, including advice and information on specific capability development requirements.

Various activities providing for the development of R&D activities and projects among different national authorities were referred to by Member States. National programmes on research and cross-sectoral training exercises are carried out by Member States. Reference to academic research activities and projects and participation by academics in various projects under EMODNET (European Marine Observation and Data Network) or EUBSR (projects SEAGLE, CHEMSAR) was also made by some Member States.

---

102 In 2016 Latvia organised a training course with EMSA on the use of IMDatE and SafeSeaNet ship reporting formalities.

103 The EDA Naval Training Pooling and Sharing Initiative which is focused on exploring pooling and sharing opportunities for Naval Training is also mentioned.

104 The IMO or CEPOL (European Network for Police Training and Education) are also mentioned.

105 E.g. The Netherlands established a network ‘Maritime operations and systems’ of experts on maritime security. The network exchanges information and aims to define and prioritise knowledge and technology for a successful defence strategy. The Netherlands proposed to also set up a similar network at EU level.

106 In Ireland, the Irish Maritime and Energy Resource Cluster (IMERC) is an alliance between the Naval Service, Cork Institute of Technology (CIT) and University College Cork (UCC) which brings together, among other things, expertise in maritime operations and maritime technology.

107 The Irish Naval Service is engaged in a research projects that can improve the use of airborne sensors to improve situational awareness. For example project AEOLUS which seeks to integrate airborne sensors with kite technology to create a new concept in airborne sensor platforms.

108 The Portuguese Navy and Portuguese National Maritime authority are involved in several R&D projects with the Hydrographic Institute and the Navy Research Centre.

109 Research and development programme specific to maritime security issues to assist in protective security of ports/port facilities and shipping maintained by the United Kingdom.

110 Lithuanian Klaipėda University conducts research activities in shipping and port security and logistics area. The Portuguese Navy Research Centre (CINAV) cooperates regularly with military and civilian academies to identify solutions to counter threats, without duplicating efforts. The Irish Naval Service works with Limerick University to further develop its capability with maritime underwater systems.
Research projects on the development of innovative sensors technologies (action 5.2.7.) to improve the early detection and localisation of small vessels have also been reported. Member States have also explored novel platforms to improve the highly-needed continuous surveillance. Also, a new concept on deep sea monitoring, allowing for a permanent monitoring of the maritime environment thanks to sensors applications was developed by one Member State under the co-funding of EDA. Several projects have been undertaken by Member States, in the area of maritime polar capabilities (action 3.1.12.).

Research in energy security and in particular the diversification in the use of fuels for naval units has been further advanced in some Member States. Also, Member States work hard in enabling cooperation between meteorological and oceanographic institutes, at both on national and European level, in particular on ocean weather forecasting (action 5.1.9.). For example, systems tracking oil spills and other hazardous substances in the Baltic Sea, such as SeaTrackWeb, were developed.

Under the civil-military agenda for research and innovation in support of maritime security, including the development of dual-use and multipurpose capabilities (action 5.2. and onwards), reference is made to projects developed to support Member State capabilities under European and national initiatives. Participation in various national and European projects ensuring that military capabilities are available to fill gaps that may appear in non-military tasks in the maritime domain are emphasised by several Member States. Further development of dual-use platforms and capacities and planning of joint activities designed for multiple use capabilities for maritime operations, to avoid duplication of already existing capacities, was considered for future projects. Reference is also made to various FP7 or Horizon 2020 projects, such as PERSEUS or EU POV CLOSEYE, seeking to create innovative solutions which are dual-use and of cross-sectoral benefit and bringing together both military and civil authorities of different Member States. Several Member States expressed their intention to further participate in maritime security related projects under Horizon 2020.

---

111 The German civil research project EMSec-DLR, involving the German federal police, the German Maritime Search and Rescue Service (DGzRS) and the coastal water police. Also, the Dutch Ministry of Defence has started several research activities in this area.

112 E.g. under the Horizon 2020 project, Ireland focused on the area of Radar Systems for the surveillance of coastal and pre-frontier areas and on a project on the detection of low flying UAV’s near shore.

113 The Portuguese navy in a partnership with a civilian company have developed the project ‘Turtle’ a new concept for the monitoring of the deep sea, combining the characteristics of the long and lasting permanence with the autonomous repositioning and very efficient up-and-down movements in the water column.

114 The Irish Naval Service is engaged with the cold water immersion project work that may assist capability development considerations for cold water maritime operations.

115 E.g. the development of a LNG bunker supply vessel in Lithuania which will secure a LNG transport service to the company’s onshore LNG reloading station.

116 E.g. Portugal, Greece, Ireland, and Latvia.

117 France has contributed to identifying innovative research topics under the preparatory action and the subsequent European Defence research programme, such as VTOL RPAS (surveillance missions in maritime environment, operation from naval platforms, land operations and support).

118 E.g. Under the Horizon 2020 fund, the Spanish navy has developed a project called ‘Underwater signature monitoring and Analysis centre (USMA)’ which will be installed in Cartagena waters and will be used by both military and civilian ships.
Closer cooperation between military and civilian bodies and sharing cross-sectoral civil military capabilities works well in number of Member States\textsuperscript{119}. Further progress on cooperation between civilian-military institutions in maritime domain was registered\textsuperscript{120}. In terms of efficiency improvements and reducing the costs of maritime capabilities, several Member States mentioned their actions enabling cross-national asset maintenances and trainings of maintenance personnel (action 3.1.5)\textsuperscript{121}. Some Member States also reported on developing studies to optimise the use of their assets and personnel\textsuperscript{122}. Also, in partnership with EU agencies, Member States developed and tested innovative technology solutions in maritime surveillance, aiming at enhancing the capabilities of maritime situational awareness.

Overall, Member States are in favour of dual-use of technologies and an emphasis is given to the application of dual-use technologies in practice, such as using patrol vessels for pollution response or environmental and fishery control purposes. Access to EU structural and investment funds to promote innovation, dual-use R&T and R&D across the maritime technological and industrial base in maritime security were identified as being crucial for further developments to be achieved.

Under the EU exercises policy, Member States inserted parts of maritime security into the national exercises scenarios and trainings. Also, in order to improve maritime security-related trainings, three Member States participated in incorporating military training requirements in the maritime security domain in order to strengthen EU military trainings\textsuperscript{123}.

Training courses between various national authorities to promote the cross-sectoral approach to maritime security and increase interoperability are being taken up in Member States\textsuperscript{124}. Inter-departmental participation in trainings and exercises on security\textsuperscript{125}, and bilateral exchanges between Member States have been promoted, especially in terms of naval and cyber defence trainings. Cybersecurity is consistently included in Member State’s planning and exercises. Cyber defence courses that increase cyber defence capabilities such as forensics, intrusion detection, malware analysis and penetration testing, are also organised by some Member States\textsuperscript{126}.

\textsuperscript{119} E.g. The UK has sought a closer cooperation between the civilian-military assets through the maritime integration project which resulted in the creation of a Joint Maritime Operations Centre.

\textsuperscript{120} E.g. Croatia has contributed to the cooperation between civilian-military institutions in the maritime domain through the cross-sectoral coordination based on 24/7 interaction.

\textsuperscript{121} A bilateral agreement was reached between the Dutch and Belgium navies on uniting command, training together and carrying out joint combined maritime operations. A development of a multi-role vessel (MRV) with a countermine and counter-improvised explosive devices capabilities was undertaken by the Irish Defence Forces Naval Fleet.

\textsuperscript{122} E.g. Through the Navy Research Centre, the Portuguese Navy developed studies on how to optimise the use of assets and personnel.

\textsuperscript{123} Co-leadership by Italy, Germany and Greece.

\textsuperscript{124} E.g. Klaipéda Shipping School in Lithuania provides training course on security training for seafarers with designated security duties.

\textsuperscript{125} Irish Defence Forces regularly conduct joint exercises involving the NS, AC and SOF with Ireland’s various maritime related agencies, including the Coast Guard, Revenue Customs & Excise, the Fire Service, offshore installations operators and commercial shipping companies.

\textsuperscript{126} E.g. Hellenic Navy.
Academic training activities dedicated to maritime security are being developed. To promote maritime safety and environmental protection, the Spanish Maritime Safety Centre Jovellanos also provides trainings for the international oil industry.

High-level specialised trainings (action 5.1.1.), also targeted towards authorities carrying out coast guard functions, are organised in several Member States. The idea is to develop, establish, promote and implement minimum common training standards.

On the promotion of joined-up exercises (actions 5.3. and onwards), Member States organised and participated in annual training exercises, both at national and multilateral level. Participation of third countries as observers in the annual maritime security exercises was encouraged and welcomed by Member States in order to improve their interoperability and their knowledge of the maritime security procedures. In this context, the participation of Member States in international exercises in order to share experiences and improve relations with other countries was highlighted.

Under the European Coast Guard Functions Academy, Member States welcomed the establishment of the ECGF Training Portal (phase I) and the implementation and support to the European Network of Academies in the field of coast guard functions (phase II).

The Energy Security Centre of Excellence (ENSECCOE) in Vilnius contributes to the protection of critical infrastructures in the maritime domain, organises regular exhibitions, conferences and seminars on maritime security where Member States and the EU institutions participated. Member States also highlighted their participation in various CSDP seminars focusing on the maritime security organised by the ESDC. Reference to their participation in exchange best practices seminars and risk analysis activities with third countries were also made.

Member States took part in the annual ‘Steering Group’ meeting of the European Carrier Group Interoperability Initiative, which aims to enhance interoperability, through greater cooperation and combined joint trainings and exercises, at both tactical and operational levels. This multinational initiative aims to allow for more rapid and effective deployment during EU or NATO missions.

Member States listed an inventory of existing maritime university modules, study subjects and short courses related to maritime security. Also, a reference was made to the ESDC and other courses.

---

127 E.g. Klaipėda Shipping School in Lithuania provides training course on security training for seafarers with designated security duties.
128 E.g. Irish Naval Forces conduct ‘Ship readiness and evaluation training’ using its Fleet Operational Readiness Evaluation and Evaluation trainings sections.
129 A military exercise ‘Lightning strike’ was conducted to train Lithuanian Navy to support the State border guard service operations. Also, a maritime exercise to train common procedures on the scenario of preventing unsanctioned vessel entering the port of Klaipėda was organised by Lithuanian navy and the Coast Guard District of the State border guard service.
130 International exercises such as ORSEC 2016 (Pollution exercise organised by France), ASAREX 2016 (SAR exercise organised by Portugal), SAREX (SAR exercise organised by Morocco) or OSCAMED 2016 (Air surveillance operation organised by RAMOGEPOL) etc.
131 First CSDP seminar EU-South America & Mexico organised by the European Security and Defence College from 29 November to 2 December 2016 in Madrid.
132 Spanish Coast Guard participated in various seminars on the sharing of best practise with Spanish, Lebanese, Jordan and Peruvian port authorities within European initiatives.
133 Lithuanian Maritime Academy provides professional bachelor study programmes, study subjects and short courses related to maritime safety ensuring. Also, Lithuanian Klaipėda University provides since 2016 a
organised under its framework. An overall support to universities and educational programmes was also reported, together with the promotion of the development of educational platforms for maritime related courses.

ii) Latest developments involving the EEAS, EDA and the Commission

Efforts are ongoing to further develop a civil-military security research agenda for the maritime domain (action 5.2.4). The need for an agenda has also been mentioned in the European Defence Action Plan (EDAP) adopted by the Commission on 30 November 2015 (COM(2016) 950 final).

Action 5.2.4 seeks to enhance civil-military research coordination through the development of a joint research agenda. The aim is that the joint research agenda will be subsequently used by Member States and relevant EU entities as a potential basis for future R&T prioritisation and investment. The expected outcome being a harmonisation of R&T objectives that will ultimately enable an increase in collaborative research initiatives, both from an international and a civil-military perspective. The agenda will also contribute to the EDAP, which, together with its use as an input in future Horizon 2020 calls, provide additional vehicles for the implementation of the agenda priorities.

Following on from the 2016 workshop hosted by the European Commission's Joint Research Centre (JRC), the draft agenda was sent to the network for input and comment. In an effort to boost cooperation, the JRC attended the 31st EDA Maritime Capability Technology group meeting in November 2016. Planning has begun on a follow up to the workshop, which will be hosted in EDA and will incorporate the input of relevant industry interest groups and associations as well as Frontex and other relevant agencies. The workshop will be used to finalise the agenda and will have a strong emphasis on the implementation of the agenda which represents a positive outcome for the initiative.

Focusing on the civil-military aspects of maritime research and technology, EDA will also:

- organise a Maritime Security Conference with emphasis on Unmanned Maritime Systems, to be held at the Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Centre in Greece in November 2017;
- launch a project (EORF) that aims to create a working group for the analysis of potential common modular architectures for the integration of Sensors, both Optronics and Radiofrequency, which will mainly apply to maritime surveillance; and
- launch a project (DEEPLEARN) to apply the innovative technologies of Deep Learning to the Defence domain, taking into account the specific characteristics of the data available in these cases. Maritime surveillance is one of the domains that were analysed and the detection of abnormal behaviour is one of the main objectives.

Related to the sub-action 5.2.5, Member States have been contacted by EDA to foster and gather cooperative dual-use projects supporting EU maritime security policy. As a result, Member States

---

bachelor study programme ‘Engineering of Liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals’, which includes topics related to LNG operational safety, port safety and security.

134 Under the ESDC, French Institute of Advanced Studies in National Defence has organised an annual course covering diplomatic, institutional, legal and operational issues related to the implementation of the EU Maritime Security Strategy.

have submitted three draft projects to EDA, all resulting from the cooperation between Bulgarian, Cypriot and Greek stakeholders (e.g. ministries of defence, universities, RTOs, clusters). EDA is in contact with the competent European Structural and Investment Fund (ESIF) Interreg transnational managing authority publishing calls and allocating ESIF Interreg funding to get an initial feedback on the eligibility of these above mentioned projects.

As a result, a first cooperative project on maritime security is ready to develop fully its application folder, in preparation for the publication of a call for proposals by the Interreg authority. Another project is exchanging with the managing authority on its potential eligibility. The third project is being fine-tuned by its consortium. EDA is looking forward to the next official call to be released in 2017 by the mentioned authority. As soon as the 2017 call for proposals is published, EDA is ready to support the application of these projects by ensuring the coherence with the Interreg eligibility rules.

Also, in the context of the SAFEMED programme, EMSA organised specific training for SAFEMED beneficiaries in maritime transport security related matters.

The ESDC network is a dedicated civil-military training provider for CSDP structures, missions and operations at EU level. Following the launch of the Action Plan (action 5.1), the ESDC started to mainstream the Maritime Security Strategy and its corresponding Action Plan as a horizontal subject across several standard courses. In June 2016 the ESDC co-organised with France a maritime security course for 50 participants based on a curriculum approved by the Member States.

In parallel, the development of a similar curriculum was initiated by Greece (the Hellenic Naval Academy) for cadets/junior officers in the context of the European Initiative for the exchange of young officers (Military Erasmus). A pilot course organised in Athens in 2016 with 40 participants from Member States was also opened up to civilian students and junior staff members of other relevant civilian services, including the coast guard. The same course was offered again in April 2017 and its draft curriculum will be discussed in the implementation group of the initiative with that aim that it can be adopted to form part of the standard course.

Moreover, in line with the action 5.1.3, the ESDC introduced maritime security as one of ten thesis topics in the context of the biannual CSDP Olympiad in 2016. The ESDC also launched a procedure to set up strategic partnership under Erasmus+ between naval academies, inviting Member State’s naval academies to a dedicated meeting on 7 December 2016. Five academies have already presented programmes expressing their interest. Additional dedicated meetings will be organised in 2017. Another two projects, namely a Joint CSDP Master degree and a Doctoral School on CSDP, can be linked to action 5.2. A concept paper on the Doctoral School on the CSDP project has also been adopted by the Executive Academy Board.

136 From Greece, Poland, Spain, Italy, Romania and Bulgaria.
137 These will be offered from September 2017 by one civilian university (Poland) and two military academies (Austria and the Czech Republic).
138 The kick-off meeting for this project will take place in June 2017. Invitations have been sent out to interested civilian and military academic institutions and 16 have already expressed an interest in participating in the project.
EDA is organising a migrant handling course at the NATO’s NMIOTC in Greece from 22 May until 02 June 2017. EU agencies concerned were also invited.

**Focus area 5 — Inter-agency cooperation at national, EU and international level**

**i) Progress made, as reported by Member States**

Member States have extensively reported on the planning and conduct of EU maritime security exercises with third countries and international or regional organisations, under CSDP operations and missions (actions 1.2.1 and 1.3.2). EU exercises in adjacent sea basins and other areas of interest were also covered. At operational level, this involved participation in operations coordinated by Frontex, such as operations Triton, Poseidon Sea, Hera, Indalo and Minerva, as well as national contributions to EU naval operations, such as to Operation EUNAVFOR MED Sophia and Operation EUNAVFOR Atalanta. Member States also participated in multinational operations conducted together with third countries. Intentions to participate in future EU led operations were confirmed by some Member States.

Continued efforts to disrupt cross-border and organised crime including the smuggling of migrants and trafficking of human beings were registered during the reporting period. Deployments in the Aegean and in the Mediterranean Sea in order to detect, monitor and report on migrant flows were widely reported. Also, in cooperation with NATO MARCOM Allied Maritime Command), joint activities complementary to Frontex operations in the area involving the monitoring, surveillance and reconnaissance in the Aegean Sea in order to tackle illegal trafficking and irregular migration were undertaken. Permanent deployments in African countries to strengthen their fight against smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings were also highlighted. Member States made use of the Shared Awareness and De-confliction in the Mediterranean (SHADE MED) forum while increasing their participation in the forum in 2016.

---

139 This course has been organised at the request of Member States in the frame of EDA’s project team naval training to address the need for proper education and training of Member States’ navies on the handling of migrants.

140 E.g. Romania participates in the Black Sea Harmony Operation, together with Black Sea littoral States and Turkey, addressing security challenges and threats in the region.

141 E.g. The Netherlands has deployed two naval ships in the Aegean to detect, monitor and report on migrant flows from Turkey to Greece, in close cooperation and coordination with Greek and Turkish coastguards.

142 EUNAVFOR MED Sophia — Spanish navy has deployed and maintained permanently one frigate in the area of operation in order to detect traffickers and to undertake rescue at sea operations of migrants. The Lithuanian navy has deployed one officer to the operation. France has deployed one ship and surveillance assets since summer 2016. Also, Irish Defence Forces deployed a ship to the Mediterranean in May 2016 that has contributed to the rescue of migrants in the course of the year.

143 Spanish deployments in Senegal and Mauritania.

144 The SHADE MED is a forum and has no legal authority and the participation is entirely voluntary. Representatives from nations and organisations interested in or impacted by the migratory phenomenon in the Mediterranean basin can meet to de-conflict and coordinate their maritime security operations (MSO) by sharing situational awareness, assessment of the evolution of trends and best practices. Its primary aim is to provide a mechanism for de-conflicting and where possible coordinating military and
Member States are also cooperating within the Seahorse Atlantic network, where the Spanish NCC-EUROSUR coordinates with Algeria, Morocco, Senegal, Mauritania, Gambia, Cape Verde and Guinea Bissau to strengthen cooperation and improve their capacity to combat illegal migration and provide support to maritime operations in the Atlantic Ocean. Within the Seahorse Mediterranean network, activities are taking place to improve the situational awareness of the Libyan authorities on the irregular migration flows and illicit trafficking and in particular those taking place in their coastal regions and territorial waters. It should reinforce their reaction capacity, both at national level and in cooperation with the other Mediterranean region countries.

As part of the emergency response to crises linked to the smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings, some Member States have made available their coastal patrol vessels\textsuperscript{145}, according to the inter-agency cooperation under the Regulation (EC) No 1624/2016. An enhanced cooperation in surveillance of common patrolling zones between Member States and their neighbouring countries under the ‘common patrols’ project launched by Frontex was also mentioned\textsuperscript{146}.

Some Member States described their national contribution of naval assets and other efforts to the CSDP naval operations EUNAVFOR Atalanta operating in the Indian Ocean\textsuperscript{147}. Member States welcomed the success of the operation, highlighting that since 2014, there has been only one piracy attack against the chemical tanker CPO Korea. Member States also pointed out that supporting Member States underlined that Operation EUNAVFOR Atalanta in the Indian Ocean is key for the EU to maintain maritime security off the coast of Somalia. One Member State noted that although the level of pirate attacks has decreased substantially, crime structures are still in place. Therefore, the EU, as a key maritime security provider in this region, should carefully manage a ‘transition strategy’ to Atalanta, to ensure the continuity in maritime security in the region. Some Member States provide support and enable the participation of third countries navies in the maritime security activities of the EUNAVFOR Atalanta. Within this framework, building on the successful participation of a Colombian war ship in Atalanta in 2015, dialogue is maintained with countries such as Colombia, Peru, Mexico, and Brazil on their individual involvement for 2017. Also, some Member States placed emphasis on the financial support needed for maritime security activities as a key factor to strengthen and to enhance EU regional responses in the global maritime domain.

civilian resources, military and civilian operations and industry practices to achieve the maximum efficiency and effectiveness in managing MSO related to the migratory phenomenon in the Mediterranean. SHADE MED does not take legally binding decisions but seeks instead to develop a common understanding on both the evolution of the phenomenon and on how the activities should be effectively de-conflicted and coordinated. For more info: https://eeas.europa.eu/csdp-missions-operations/eunavfor-med/12349/shared-awareness-and-de-confliction-mediterranean_en

\textsuperscript{145} E.g. The Hellenic navy actively supports the Hellenic coastguard by providing it with units charged with patrolling the eastern Aegean Sea on a 24/7 basis. The Romanian GIRBP makes available coastal patrol vessels.  

\textsuperscript{146} Exchange of liaison officers on Bulgarian and Romanian vessels and conduct of weekly conference calls on the results from the common patrolling checks of vessels was reported on by Bulgaria and Romania. 

\textsuperscript{147} Spain deployed one frigate and one special operation maritime task unit (SOMTU) in the operation. The Croatian navy deployed a second AVPD (autonomous vessel protection detachment) to the operation from October 2016 to January 2017. The United Kingdom continued to provide the Force Commander and Operational HQ for the operation.
On drug trafficking (action 1.3.2.) Member States reported on their efforts, in cooperation with MAOC-N, to disrupt the flow of narcotics\textsuperscript{148} to combat illicit drug trafficking across the Atlantic. Member States also highlighted their activities in various sea basins which have resulted in the interception of drugs, cigarettes, arms and ammunition\textsuperscript{149}. In support of the UNODC, several Member States focused on capacity buildings aimed at improving third countries’ abilities to respond to maritime crime threats\textsuperscript{150}.

On the possible improvement of the rapid response mechanism for a rapid reaction at sea (action 1.5.1.), Member States considered that a planning and conduct capability within the EU structure and the commitment of Member States are important factors to improve the response mechanism. One Member State considered it important to create a permanent structure able to plan and conduct MSO, both military and civilian, in order to improve the ongoing process. In this context, evaluation on how to improve financial measures and procedures should be undertaken in order to encourage Member States to commit their means in the mechanism. At national level, several Member States are involved in the revision of the EU MSO concept (action 1.5.2.). On additional concepts to complement the MSO concept, the hybrid threat under sea concept was considered as particularly relevant, together with the hybrid threats to undersea infrastructures.

The importance of mainstreaming maritime security in the CFSP agenda and the integration of maritime issues in the EU Global Strategy were stressed by some Member States (action 1.5.3.).

Member States are also supporting the development of EU maritime exercises to improve the readiness and preparedness of Member States and the EU’s ability to respond to security threats as defined in the EU Maritime Security Strategy\textsuperscript{151}. Memberships in existing fora such as EURMARFOR, the European Amphibious Initiative, and the Carrier Group Interoperability Initiative were raised. Member States also referred to their involvement in the 5+5 Initiative, together with five North African countries\textsuperscript{152}, which includes the planning and execution of dedicated maritime exercises (action 1.5.4).

On the standardisation of air, naval and other maritime assets, Member States continued to include technical requirements in the projects for new assets, in order to comply with international standardisation regulations (action 3.2.4.) The implementation of innovative characteristics in air and naval assets was noted as a result of the participation by Member States’ maritime surveillance authorities in EU projects, such as EU POV CLOSEYE\textsuperscript{153}.

On promoting the wider sharing of best practice, risk analysis and knowledge-sharing (action 3.3.6.), Member States participated in various fora such as the ECGFF, MCGFF, European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region, NACGF and CHENS. These fora, where Member States share their needs,

\textsuperscript{148} E.g. The Netherlands contributed to the disrupting of the flow of narcotics from the Caribbean towards Europe and the United States.
\textsuperscript{149} E.g. The UK’s NMIC has supported a range of activity in the Mediterranean including the supply of vessels of interest data to Frontex.
\textsuperscript{150} E.g. Capacity building exercises were conducted by the UK in Ghana and Sao Tome e Principe.
\textsuperscript{151} E.g. The Dutch navy intends to participate in ‘Emerald Move’, an exercise planned under the European Amphibious Initiative.
\textsuperscript{152} Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia.
\textsuperscript{153} [www.closeye.eu](http://www.closeye.eu) (Guardia Civil ES, Guarda Nacional Republicana PT, Marina Militare IT).
priorities, information and best practice, provide appropriate guidance to support the definition and the implementation of regional and sub-regional maritime to achieve collectively a better and more secure maritime environment. Member States considered it key for reaching their objectives in terms of sharing best practice, risk analysis and information sharing on threats. Member States also reported on their participation in the risk analysis courses provided by the ECGFF academies network.

Member States\textsuperscript{154} reported on the wider sharing of best practice, risk analysis and threat information in cooperation with social partners acting in the ports, maritime transport sectors and offshore installations\textsuperscript{155} (action 3.3.1.). Best practice and risk analysis activities have also been conducted with the port authorities of third countries within the context of European initiatives\textsuperscript{156}. Member States also listed risk assessment activities and activities supporting risk analysis that had been carried out during the reporting period. Development of contingency plans, risk analysis and related guidelines for securing sea-based energy corridors and offshore installations in the maritime energy sector were also referred to. New risk analysis techniques, such as MARINT which is oriented to the vessels tracking, were explored\textsuperscript{157}.

Member States also reported on the sharing of maritime security related intelligence (action 4.1.6.), through establishing a MoUs with other EU Member States\textsuperscript{158}, convening dedicated workshops\textsuperscript{159} or through established mechanisms, such as the MDAT-Gog between France and the United Kingdom.

ii) Latest developments involving the EEAS, EDA and the Commission

During this second reporting period, Commission activities focused largely on putting in place the relevant inter-agency work on European cooperation on coast guard functions under the border and coast guard package. Negotiations with co-legislators took place during the first half of 2016 and the measures were adopted in September 2016, when a joint mandate for Frontex, EMSA and EFCA was introduced in their respective mandates. The mandate provides for cooperation in five key areas:

- information exchange;
- provision of information services;
- capacity building;
- risk management; and
- multi-purpose operations.

\textsuperscript{154} E.g. The Spanish navy (COVAM) conducted constant information sharing with port authorities and the Harbour Master’s office.
\textsuperscript{155} Joint exercises involving the Irish naval service, AC and SOF assets took place in relation to security of offshore installations and the ban of ships in national waters.
\textsuperscript{156} E.g. The Spanish coastguard provided various seminars and trainings to the port authorities of Lebanon, Jordan and Peru on best practice and risk analysis.
\textsuperscript{157} E.g. Spanish coast guard
\textsuperscript{158} E.g. The Spanish navy has signed different MoUs with some EU countries on mutual cooperation, including sharing of maritime security related intelligence.
\textsuperscript{159} E.g. The Portuguese navy and the National Maritime Authority convened a seminar in Cape Verde related to the maritime security information sharing in the Gulf of Guinea.
The main purpose of this cooperation is to streamline the activities of the three agencies mentioned above and avoid duplication in order to provide improved services to national authorities carrying out coast guard functions.

To test this inter-agency cooperation, a pilot project was launched in 2016 with a specific focus on the central Mediterranean. A closing conference for this project was organised by the agencies and hosted by EMSA in Lisbon on 2 June 2017.

A progress report covering inter alia this inter-agency cooperation was adopted by the Commission on 2 March 2017\(^{160}\).

The joint mandate also foresees enhanced services to with national authorities which require continued close interaction with Member States competent authorities. The Agencies therefore took the initiative of launching a European coastguard co-operation network, which held its first meeting in Warsaw hosted by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency in November 2016. Enhanced co-operation with national authorities can also be facilitated by interaction with the European Coast guard functions forum, a voluntary entity consisting of national coast guard authorities.

In the same frame, the European Defence Agency had contacts with the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, EMSA, EFCA as well as the relevant DGs in order to investigate civ/mil synergies. Identified areas with potential for such synergies are capacity building, research and technology, maritime surveillance and RPAS.

During 2016 and the first half of 2017, several back to back meetings were held between EU agencies and the ECGFF to explore synergies and to avoid duplication. The ECGFF will be an important interlocutor for the EU agencies in implementing this new action in the best possible way. Funds have been provided to the ECGFF from the EMFF.

The Commission has also conducted a study on risk assessment capacities of Member States’ maritime authorities carrying out European coast guard functions\(^{161}\). Several Member States took part in the study which aimed at identifying commonalities and ways to enhance interoperability and cooperation between civilian and military bodies carrying out coast guard functions across borders and sectors in the specific domain of risk assessment which will feed into the Commission’s work in that respect\(^{162}\).

In 2016, the Commission organised five meetings of the Maritime Security Committee (MARSEC) and of the Stakeholders’ Advisory Group (SAGMAS) on maritime security. The purpose of the meetings was to share best practice, risk analysis and threat information among public and private partners in cooperation with social partners acting in the ports, maritime transport sectors and offshore installations (action 3.3.1).

Also, the Commission conducted 83 maritime transport security inspections in the Member States, mainly inspecting ports, port facilities, national administrations and ships. Overall, since 2005 over 900 maritime security inspections have been carried out by the Commission (action 3.3.2.).

\(^{160}\) COM(2017) 201 final.

\(^{161}\) Evaluation of risk assessment capacity at the level of Member States’ authorities performing coastguard functions in order to identify commonalities and ways to enhance interoperability and cooperation in this field across the EU.

The year 2016 represents a crucial year in the development of the EU-NATO relations. In 2016 the EU and NATO have stepped up their cooperation at the operation and political levels, and in different thematic areas of shared interest for the two organisations, including maritime security.

An EU-NATO Joint Declaration was signed on July 2016. It builds on the Euro-Atlantic security, intended to step up the common efforts and looking at further ways of working together in order to achieve mutual reinforcement. The Joint Declaration underlines the common EU-NATO intention to broaden operational cooperation at sea, including on the maritime aspects of migration, through an increased sharing of maritime situational awareness, better coordination and mutual reinforcement of activities in the Mediterranean and elsewhere. The maritime domain will benefit from other thematic areas where the two Organisations intend to step up their common efforts. Maritime means could benefit from:

- the development of coherent, complementary and interoperable defence capabilities;
- an envisaged stronger defence industry and greater defence research;
- increased coordination on exercises; and
- capacity building aimed at enhancing the resilience of eastern and southern partners.

On the EU side the commitment to further actions in the EU-NATO cooperation can also be found in the Bratislava Declaration and the 6 December 2016 European Council Conclusions, where the Council highlighted that the Implementation of the Joint Declaration is a key political priority for the EU. It constitutes an essential element of broader efforts aimed at strengthening the EU’s ability to act as a security provider, in line with the Council Conclusions on implementing the EU Global Strategy in the area of Security and Defence and the European Defence Action Plan’, recalling not only the need of a cross-sectoral or cross thematic approach, but the importance also of maintaining consistency among different policies.

The European Council Conclusions endorsed the ‘common set of proposals’, while NATO endorsed them at the North Atlantic Council. On maritime security policy and operational cooperation, the document included the following:

– By December 2016, enhance cooperation and coordination between Operation Sea Guardian and EU NAVFOR MED Sophia in the Mediterranean, through information sharing and logistical support and through practical interaction between the two operations.

– Building on synergies between the EU operation and NATO in the Aegean, NATO and EU will study opportunities, in the first semester of 2017, for further maritime cooperation between them.

---

163 Joint Declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the Commission and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, dated 08 July 2016.
164 Bratislava Declaration signed during the informal meeting of the 27 Heads of State or Government. Bratislava 16 September 2016. Head of States or Government of the 27 EU countries expressed their willingness to strengthen EU cooperation on external security and for these objectives they highlighted as a concrete measure to start implementation of the EU-NATO Joint Declaration immediately.
165 Doc. 15283/16 Council Conclusions on the Implementation of the Joint Declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the Commission and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation dated 6 December 2016.
– In support of the above goals, the EU and NATO will continue to make full use of the mechanism on SHADE MED.

– Organise during the first semester of 2017 a lessons learned seminar building on experience from the fight against piracy in the Indian Ocean, and on the interactions in the Mediterranean.

– Compile during the first semester of 2017 an overview of relevant maritime exercises by respective organisations with a view to identifying further opportunities for possible interaction.

– Increase the frequency of meetings with partners participating in respective operations, starting in 2017.

To implement these actions EUNAVFOR MED Sophia and NATO Operation Sea Guardian have increased their cooperation starting from information sharing.

Further improvements in cooperation have also occurred between EUNAVFOR MED Sophia and Frontex operations, but also between the Agency’s operations and NATO operation Sea Guardian. All the preceding activities are taking place in the Mediterranean to deal with the migration crisis and to enhance the outcome of the different operations and to better secure the EU external border, information exchange has been improved. Moreover EUNAVFOR MED, Frontex and NATO have placed a liaison officer in the framework of the respective activities to further support the respective ongoing operations.

The SHADE MED mechanism, building upon its achievement in the Horn of Africa, has become a reality also in the Mediterranean. Three SHADE forums have been organised on issues connected to the Mediterranean migration aspects. The first one in November 2015 was hosted by EUNAVFOR MED Sophia, the second, in May 2016 was hosted by the Italian Navy and the third, in November 2016 was hosted by the NATO Joint Forces Command Naples.

On best practice and lessons learned, work has started to organise a lessons learned seminar building on experience from the fight against piracy in the Indian Ocean, and on the interactions in the Mediterranean. The seminar will be held at the end of June 2017.

Cooperation with ASEAN Nations and ASEAN Regional Forum (ASEAN/ARF) was taken one step further in line with the guidance provided by the EU Maritime Security Strategy and the EU Global Strategy in building regional maritime multilateralism. In the spring 2016, the EEAS took an active role in the drafting process of the ASEAN Regional Forum’s ARF Ministerial statement on enhancing cooperation among maritime law enforcement agencies. This statement is the only one adopted by the ARF on maritime security. Following this work, the EU has been designated, together with Vietnam and Australia to co-chair the next 2018-2020 cycle of the Inter-sessional Meeting on Maritime Security of the ARF. The EU co-chairmanship of the Inter-sessional Meeting on Maritime Security represents the recognition by ARF community of the EU’s role as a global maritime security provider. Over the next three years, the EU will have to play the role of the honest broker between countries party to the ARF.

The third EU-ASEAN high level dialogue on maritime security took place in 2016 with a focus on maritime security challenges. With an outstanding European presence building further on the outcomes of the previous editions, the third high level dialogue on maritime security jointly identified areas of cooperation summarising the findings over the three past editions. While several ASEAN participants acknowledged that the intra-European cooperation levels were beyond reach on the existing ASEAN
political and legal frameworks as well as resources, they however highlighted numerous ASEAN initiatives and identified merits in trying to pursue a process similar to the EU Maritime Security Strategy on the ASEAN scale in the medium to long term.

The conclusions of the 14-15 October 2016 ARF Ministerial conference confirmed that ASEAN and EU share a mutual interest in maritime security, a multi-faceted challenge that has a significant impact in both regions especially as Asian countries have been increasingly investing in maritime connectivity to boost regional trade, thus inducing more security challenges. Thanks to the 2016 achievements (including the successful 3rd EU-ASEAN HLD) in an increasing contextual tension, the EU, as co-chairmanship of the ARF inter-sessional meeting on maritime security, will have until summer 2020 to weigh on the ASEAN specific agenda and promote there its own maritime security vision, interests and objectives as they are all laid down in the EU Maritime Security Strategy and echoed in June 2016 in the Global Strategy.

Cooperation with the African Union reached an important milestone in the year 2016. The African Union organised a Heads of State and Government Extraordinary Summit for maritime security, safety and development in held in Togo in Lomé, on 15 October 2016. The EU supported the African Union endeavour in organising the first African Union Summit dedicated to maritime security.

The key deliverable of the Summit was the signature of the Lomé Charter implementing the African Union 2050 strategy. It embodies the recognition that security and development go hand in hand together and, at the same time, echoes the importance of the cross-sectoral approach as prescribed in the EU Maritime Security Strategy. Cooperation with the EU will be key to take this process forward. For the moment, 32 African countries have signed the Lomé Charter.

The Commission and the EEAS began preparing the 2017 edition of the Our Oceans Conference, which will be held in Malta on the 6-7 October 2017. The 2017 edition will contribute to the advancement of global maritime security and to the presentation of new commitments on safe, secure and well managed oceans. The emphasis on the Mediterranean, the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean should pave the way for further actions carried out in these sea basins.

On customs, the EU Risk Management Strategy and Action Plan supports the EU Maritime Security Strategy as the two strategies share several objectives, in particular in the area of improving multi-agency cooperation and information sharing between customs and other authorities at national and at EU level. For effective risk management, customs also depend on information and intelligence received from other relevant agencies.

In July 2016 the Commission submitted a progress report on the implementation of its Risk Management Strategy and Action Plan and on the results achieved. In its December 2016 Conclusions on this progress report, the Council underlined that the development of appropriate IT systems is crucial to ensure the availability and sharing of supply chain data and risk-relevant information and that timely funding is essential. Work is continuing on the reform of the Customs Advance Cargo Information System (ICS2) to provide an effective framework and capacity for the EU to systematically address supply chain security risks including the maritime domain which will directly impact customs’ capacity to fully contribute to the EU Maritime Security Strategy including addressing the need to ensure adequate resourcing for ICS2.

166 COM(2016) 476 and SWD(2016) 242]
From a customs perspective, cooperation with other government authorities remains one of the core priorities in the context of the EU AEO concept. On maritime security and product safety: discussions at national and EU level are ongoing in order to improve the mutual understanding of the different security schemes and explore possibilities for future cooperation between customs and other authorities.

At global level, cooperation with other competent authorities and the alignment of programmes has been recognised as an essential factor for developing a robust AEO programme. In order to ensure global supply chain security and to avoid duplication of efforts and costs for economic operators and authorities, the EU AEO concept has been incorporated into the WCO SAFE Framework of Standards (WCO SAFE FoS).

For exchanging information from customs transaction systems to smart and secure trade lanes between EU and China, technical work with Member States and China is continuing.

At EU level, risk information is shared among customs authorities via the Community Customs Risk Management System (CRMS) and implemented in the national customs systems and databases on top of existing common risk criteria. Through projects initiated by Member States (as the maritime ENS pilot project) gaps and variances in national systems and applications have been identified.

Within these projects, possible solutions to overcome weaknesses and non-equivalence in protecting the borders of the EU customs union are examined. Also, the Customs 2020 Contraffic-ENS Pilot Project Group has tested the application of data analytics techniques by combining container status movement data (Contraffic) primarily with data of Entry Summary Declarations (ENS) as well as pre-arrival datasets. An administrative arrangement initiated by the Commission will be implemented in 2016-2018 to provide a preliminary solution design for the operational integration of Container Status Messages in real-time customs risk management and in flexible data analytics.
Conclusion

A. Implementation of the Action Plan on the EU Maritime Security Strategy and the EU Agenda on Security

Security issues continue to be high on the political agenda.

The High Representative/Vice-President has consequently adopted an EU Global Strategy where security, good governance and resilience are important features. In a time where the EU is increasingly reasserting its role as a global security provider, maritime security and the governance of the oceans continue to be high on the EU agenda on foreign and security policy.

In 2016, the Commission took the initiative to designate a specific security portfolio to the newly appointed Commissioner King, with the ambition to step up the EU response to security threats and risks under the Task Force for the Security Union. The Commission has since then published monthly reports on the Security Union on a wide variety of issues which are also relevant for the maritime domain.

In 2016, the EEAS and Member States have taken measures to develop a set of activities to improve maritime security in the global domain, both at the operational and at the diplomatic level. Regional maritime multilateralism and support to the capacity building of coastal states across regions are a token of EU engagement. Substantial developments were achieved in developing cooperative relations with key partners across regions.

The continued priority on security matters is also reflected in the numerous activities included in this report. As shown above, response activities to risks and threats in the maritime domain remain high with numerous activities in particular in the identified focus areas. Therefore, it is the impression of the Commission, EDA and the EEAS that the implementation process is progressing well.

The Commission, EDA and the EEAS have in particular witnessed an important change in the mindset among interested parties dealing with maritime security issues: issues which traditionally were dealt with sector by sector are now increasingly subject to cross sector cooperation. What can be noted in particular is that the need for cooperation between civilian and military authorities and dual-use of their respective assets are gaining momentum among relevant interested groups. It is evident that existing regulatory frameworks that pre-existed the EU Maritime Security Strategy, as well as key aspects of EU foreign policy. For instance the EU comprehensive approach to the Horn of Africa, have positively influenced the EU Maritime Security Strategy. The cross-sectoral approach prescribed in the EU Maritime Security Strategy has positively influenced other policy processes. For instance the adoption of the Joint Artic Communication\textsuperscript{167}, or the Oceans Governance Communication\textsuperscript{168}, which should be interpreted in line and applied in complementarity with the EU Maritime Security Strategy.

All 15 reports received from Member States followed the basis of the questionnaire and seem to indicate that Member States interests and priorities are clustered around the core areas identified.

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{167} Communication of 27.4.2016 JOIN(2016) 21 final.}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{168} Communication of 10.11.2016 JOIN(2016) 49 final.}
However, implementing activities falling outside the five core areas identified in the questionnaire were not reported.

Member States reports, including the latest developments reported by the Commission, EDA and the EEAS, indicate that information sharing and cross-sectoral cooperation, at the regional, sub-regional and inter-agency level, as well as at the international level, appear to be ranking high as priority areas for the EU and its Member States.

Other areas are also well reflected in this year’s reporting exercise, for instance, capacity building in third countries, the development of dual use technologies or the development of a civil military research agenda. From the Commission and the EEAS perspective, it is clear that a further work to improve information sharing and exchange solutions, and cooperation with partner countries and organisations, at operational and diplomatic levels, are among the core areas to develop in years to come.

Regional and sub-regional initiatives, for instance in the Baltic, Black Sea and the Mediterranean, seem to indicate how Member States coordinate, work together and where the niche areas for cooperation and complementarily are to be found. This emphasises the need for regional approaches in different sea basins.

The Commission, EDA and the EEAS also note that there are similar cross-sectoral initiatives, for instance in research, purpose being developed at national level. By sharing their reports, Member States will have the opportunity to identify possible areas for increased synergies, cooperation and pulling of sharing of resources and capabilities between Member States and EU institutions.

Member States reports are anchored in the cross-sectoral approach of the EU Maritime Security Strategy, which indicated that the implementation process is advancing and maritime security is subject to cross sector cooperation. However, Member States reports remain very diverse. Each report contains unique information, reflecting how maritime authorities are organised and coordinated at the national level and which maritime sector was given a more preponderant role in a specific time frame according to national and European political priorities.

The high number of actions under the Action Plan on the EU Maritime Security Strategy (134 actions) and the diverse national reports continues to make it difficult to build a full picture of the implementation process and draw definite conclusions. However, the revised reporting format certainly tries to achieve more focused reporting.

B. Update on the rolling Action Plan

The implementation of the Action Plan on the EU Maritime Security Strategy process is progressing well. Further work needs to be carried out at the national and at the EU level to achieve a more comprehensive picture of all the advancements achieved so far in maritime security cross-sectoral areas.

Therefore, the Commission, EDA and the EEAS consider that, whenever possible, more focus should be given to the development of cross-sectoral activities both at the national, regional and European levels. At the same time, the Commission and the EEAS note that while performing different sectoral
functions, a high degree of specialisation, which is required by the implementation of EU legislation, should be maintained.

Bearing in mind that the one of the key tenant’s underpinning the Action Plan on the EU Maritime Security Strategy is the promotion of cross-sectoral cooperation, and, in particular civil military cooperation, the Commission, EDA and the EEAS would like to invite each Member State to identify areas where they could act as a potential maritime security champion in promoting the implementation of the Action Plan on the EU Maritime Security Strategy and the cross-sectoral approach.

The Commission, EDA and the EEAS also recall the need for appropriate maritime security communication activities both at EU and national level in order to boost the visibility of the strategy among relevant interested groups. In 2015, the Commission produced communication material which is available on their website and which can also be used by Member States. The Commission, EDA and the EEAS therefore encourage Member States to promote the EU Maritime Security Strategy.

At the same time, the Commission, EDA and the EEAS recall that the Action Plan was designed together with Member States as a rolling plan and living document, subject to regular reporting and to review and update every four years. Therefore, the Commission, EDA and the EEAS point out that three years have now passed since the adoption of the strategy and the first version of the rolling Action Plan, which requires a reflection on next steps.

One possible step would be to consider revising the rolling Action Plan during 2018. The aim would be to update actions in line with political priorities and to discard actions which have already been implemented or are no longer considered relevant, taking into consideration recently adopted EU legislation and to avoid overlaps and duplication.

The reflection on the next steps should take into consideration the key findings and conclusions of 2015 and 2016 reporting exercises, as well as other elements considered relevant to determine the status of implementation of the EU Maritime Security Strategy and its rolling Action Plan.

At the same time, the political priorities of the EU in a rapidly changing security environment, both internally and externally, in particular the development of a security agenda and the adoption of the EU Global Strategy, should also be taken into consideration in this reflection exercise in order to update the rolling Action Plan and meet current security challenges.