Migration Profile

MALI

1. Structural Migration Profile
2. Flash Migration Profile (August - October 2016)

The European Commission’s Knowledge Centre on Migration and Demography (KCMD)

This publication is a Science for Policy report by the Joint Research Centre (JRC), the European Commission’s science and knowledge service. It aims to provide evidence-based scientific support to the European policymaking process. The scientific output expressed does not imply a policy position of the European Commission. Neither the European Commission nor any person acting on behalf of the Commission is responsible for the use that might be made of this publication.

Contact information
Giuliana Urso
Knowledge Centre on Migration and Demography (KCMD)
Address: Joint Research Centre, Via E. Fermi, 2749, VA 21027 Ispra, Italy
E-mail: giuliana.urso@ec.europa.eu
Tel.: +39 0332 78 6073

JRC Science Hub
https://ec.europa.eu/jrc

JRC 106577
EUR 28650 EN

© European Union, 2017

The reuse of the document is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged and the original meaning or message of the texts are not distorted. The European Commission shall not be held liable for any consequences stemming from the reuse.

How to cite this report: Giuliana Urso, Migration Profile MALI. Structural Migration Profile and Flash Migration Profile (August – October 2016), EUR, doi:10.2760/59109
All images © European Union 2017

Title Migration Profile MALI. Structural Migration Profile and Flash Migration Profile (August – October 2016)

Abstract
This publication reproduces the first test on the production of Migration Profile. It includes an example for Mali for the Structural Migration Profile (2015) and the Flash Migration Profile for the period August – October 2016.
Contents

1. Structural Migration Profile – 2015 - [Historical baseline]

- **What?** Fundamental information on the country’s structural characteristics, with a yearly and historical perspective and with a map of critical areas linked with the international framework (SDGs)
- **Why?** “Must-Know” information for the compact plus relevant derived data (including on aid, strategic relevance for the EU) available in a single, easy to interpret infographic. A strategic overview reproducible as a common framework for any country that will ensure consistency and comparability across countries
- **Where?** Structural Migration Profile Infographic_________________________ p.1
  Background table with key indicators for Mali______________________________ Annex

2. Flash Migration Profile – August/October 2016 – [Quarterly monitoring]

- **What?** Updated information on the latest developments in the country and of crucial importance for migration and development, summarized in few pages and with the support of visualization products (maps, timelines...). It provides detailed information also at sub-national level as well as take-away messages
- **Why?** To fill the knowledge gap on targeted information in the short-term, allowing to follow up on critical situations, progresses in international relation and migration movements. It provides tailored and swift information and analysis useful for the development and monitoring of compacts
- **Where?** Cube - Executive Summary______________________________________ p.5
  EU-Mali relations monitoring timeline____________________________________ 6
  Map 1: Forced Migration by region________________________________________ 7
  Map 2: Stressors mapping by region________________________________________ 8
  Map 3: Malian refugees__________________________________________________ 9
  Map 4: Mali as a transit country: main routes______________________________ 10
  **Flash Migration Profile Analysis**
    - Migration Outline____________________________________________________ p.11
    - Stressors__________________________________________________________ 12
    - Regional Perspective______________________________________________ 15
  References_____________________________________________________________ 16
  Background Media Monitoring____________________________________________ Annex
1. Structural Migration Profile: Infographic

MIGRATION OUTLINE

1. Strategic relevance of migration for Mali and for the EU

Remittances received

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Financial Inflows (€ millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>627.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>758.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>821.61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EU aid

- 21.9% of total aid (all donors)
- 2014 Total EU aid: 254.36
- 2014 EU Institutions: 16.07
- 2014 ODA: 8.3%

Refugees

- 154,170
- 0.9% of Malian population

Migrants

- 1 million
- 5.7% of Malian population

2. Demography

Total Population

- 2015: 17.6 million
- 2015: -3.7 net migration rate (per 1000)

Population and Demographic Data

- Gender: 49.6% female
- Population growth at 3% per year
- Median age: 16.2 years
- 63 children per woman
- Child dependency ratio: 95.14

- 2050: Total population: 45.4 million
- Population growth at 2.3% per year
- Median age: 21.4 years

Net migration rate

- 2015: -0.9
- 2050: -0.9

Migration groups

- Ethnic groups: Bambara 34.1%, Fulani (Peul) 14.7%, Sarakole 10.8%, Senufo 10.5%, Dogon 8.9%, Málninke 8.7%, others
- Religion: Muslim 94.9%, Christian 2.4%, Animist 2%, Others
- Income level group: Low
- Region: Sub-Saharan Africa
- Neighboring countries: Algeria, Niger, Burkina, Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Senegal, and Mauritania.
3. Migration Outline  the view from Mali

INTO

15,908 Refugees
336 Asylum seekers
4,088 Malian voluntary returnees
363,145 Migrants

WITHIN MALI

Mali Migrants
Malian Asylum seekers
IDPs
49,900

FROM

154,170 Malian Refugees
9,851 Malian Asylum seekers
1 million

the view from the EU

In 2015 Reasons

% of Residence Permits (3months +)
Residence Permits
1st Residence Permits

Family reunification
32,663
2,104

Education
1,939
686

Remunerated activities
10,459
1,273

Refugee-like protection
5,215
/

Others
50,989
2,078

Irregular crossings
10,600
10,567
6,526

Return rate 10.3% 14.3% 11.0% 11.4%

Acceptance rate 76.2% 80%

Peace agreement signed 2015

Asylum seekers (1st time application)
8,315

65% 19% 6% 69% 23% 7%

2012 2013 2014 2015
1. INFORM Risk Index

Mali vs neighbouring countries

Natural Risk

Human Risk

Socio Economic Risk

Vulnerable Groups Risk

Institutional Risk

Infrastructure Risk

2. Destinations

For Malian migrants

For Malian in a refugees-like situation
**STRESSORS**
- ~50% population under extreme poverty
- Family reunification as a reason to migrate (especially for women ~44%)
- On forced migration, slow implementation of 2015 peace agreement
- Security, malnutrition and health alert in the North

**IMPORTANCE FOR EU**
- Transit country for South West African migrants
- Diplomatic focus on security and migration
- Malians constitute 2% of total arrivals by sea in the EU (Jan–Oct 16)
- ~6% of Malians crossing the Mediterranean lost their life (IOM)
- EU institutions (Jan–Oct 16): ~EUR 118.5 mill in development aid; 41.3 mill in humanitarian aid

**CURRENT SITUATION**
- Fragile situation: in and out flows of forced migrants
- ~135,000 Malian refugees (in Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Niger)
- ~37,000 IDPs; significant IDP returns as of 2013
- ~1 million Malian emigrants mainly in Ivory Coast and Nigeria
- In the EU ~101,000 Malians, with only 5,215 refugees

**IMPACT**
- In Gao and Timbuktu regions, ~40% population affected by forced movements
- Risks for Malians in refugee camps (early marriage, joining armed groups, competition with cities for natural resources, fatalities)
- ~EUR 830 mill remittances (Jan–Oct 16)

**ACTIONS TAKEN SO FAR**
- Two national strategies, four regional intervention plans, two protocols with IOM and UNHCR
- G5 Sahel decision to create a joint force for security threats
- Green project to remove incentives to migrate (11 countries)
- Sept 16: Ministerial meeting on implementation of peace agreement
- AIR initiatives on productive use of remittances

**POTENTIAL EVOLUTION**
- UN MINUSMA mission warn not to be able to fully implement its mandate
- Population expected to increase by 150% by 2050 (UN projection)
- Net migration rate expected to reduce by 2050 (UN projection)
- Diaspora warned about need for more secure administrative documents
Estonian Prime Minister

By helping to resolve the conflict in this region, we will contribute towards reducing the migratory pressures on Europe. Mali is the Estonia's 2nd largest peacekeeping mission.

EU Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy

The EU's democracy priorities relate to the reinforcement of the Malian state and its presence on the ground, especially in the north.

In 2015 actions supported transparent electoral processes, gender equality, good governance, justice sector reform, and security sector reform.

EU Commissioner - Mimica

6 development projects, for a total amount of EUR 57 million.

Focused on 4 main areas: State reform and consolidation of the rule of law, rural development and food security, education and the road sector.

Rabat Process: Euro-African Meeting on migration and development

Diaspora engagement strategies: investment and entrepreneurship.

Dutch Prime Minister

The Dutch mission will contribute to peace and stability in the Sahel region, and therefore to security in Europe.

The Netherlands has decided to continue the mission in Mali also in 2017, with reduced staff (290 vs. 400).

German Chancellor

I believe it is very important, that the countries of Africa do not lose their best brains.

Germany has more than 500 soldiers in Mali.

EU First Progress Report on the Partnership Framework

Key challenges and next steps:

- Finalise agreement on Standard Operating Procedures and start implementation;
- Carry out planned identification missions in Member States;
- Strengthen EU agencies' involvement on the ground (European Border and Coast Guard and EUROPOL);
- Deployment of the European Migration Liaison Officer;
- Harness opportunities offered for legal migration channels, ERASMUS opportunities and other policies and tools.

EU EEAS - Mogherini

We are starting to see the very first operational results on ground.

Dutch Foreign Minister

By investing in investigative and judicial capacity, the countries can address the [smuggling] more effectively.

Joint Consultative Meeting between the AU Peace and Security Council and the EU Political and Security Committee

Deep concern with the increase in terrorist activities on the Sahel/Mali, and commitment to supporting the implementation of the peace agreement.

Malian President

We want our young people to stay in our country and not drown in the Mediterranean.

President du Conseil supérieur de la diaspora malienne

Il faut investir dans les infrastructures et améliorer les moyens d’existence afin de maintenir les populations sur place et surtout les plus jeunes.
The analysis of those who have left the country or are in a displaced condition (still forced) versus those who have come back to their place (back) allows for a few considerations:

- The most affected regions are Timbuktu and Gao. This is true for the number of the two components of forced migration, meaning refugees and IDPs. It is even more evident if the absolute numbers are compared with the population of the region of origin, checking for the percentage of people involved (graph on the right). The number of people affected in Timbuktu, being partially deserted, acquires even a stronger importance.
- Since the crisis, a number of people have eventually come back. Especially the number of returned IDPs is particularly high.
- However, this doesn't necessarily mean that we assist to a constant decrease of forced migrants, since the data are on stock population. Therefore, if a number of people are coming back, some others are still leaving the country.

Source: Elaboration on UNHCR and national/IOM data
**Map 2: Stressors mapping by region**

**INFORM Index**

**Conflicts fatalities 2016**

**Comments:**

**INFORM index maps:** Food insecurity is more intense in the areas also affected by forced migration. Other stressors, such as the prolonged conflict situation, can have an impact on food availability. Natural risk is often considered one of the concurrent stressor especially for internal migration; in Mali it has to be noticed that part of the North is desertic.

Sources: The data presented in the two maps on top come from the INFORM index for risk management (2016). The risk ranges from 0 to 10 (10 being high risk). More specifically, food insecurity refers to the Cadre Harmonisé (06-08 2016) and assesses the current risk o’ food insecurity, while the natural risk index includes four components (food insecurity probability over a period of 5 years), physical exposure to flood, land degradation, droughts probability and historical impact). More on INFORM at the following link [http://www.inform-index.org/](http://www.inform-index.org/)

**Conflict map:** Notwithstanding the peace agreement signed in 2015, conflicts have continued during 2016. Clashes have interested not only the North region of Timbuktu, but also Gao and in the latest months of August and September especially Kidai and the central Mopti (highlighted in grey in the map).

Source: Data on fatalities from ACLED.
Map 3:

Malian refugees, October 2016

- Equivalent of the 7th largest city in Mauritania, competing with Bassikounou for water provision.
- Scarce funds, no cash component given to refugees in August.
- 14,000 school-age residents at risk of joining armed groups or of early marriages as not enough education and training ensured.

Refugees and people in a refugee-like situation. First half 2015
- < 3,000
- 3,000 - 4,000
- > 5,000

Good practice, evouchers to refugees will save $60,000 per year.

Malian refugees
- < 20
- 20 - 100
- 100 - 2,000
- 2,000 - 5,250
- > 5,250

Total refugees
= 1,000 men
= 1,000 women

Refugees destinations
- Niger
- Mauritania
- Burkina Faso

Refugees camps
- Refugee Camp
- Refugee Location
- Ref. Urban Location

SOURCES: Refugees data: UNHCR Sahel operation; Vector data: Made with Natural Earth.
Map 4: Mali as a transit country: main routes

1. Mali is an important transit country for migrants from other parts of West Africa, especially from Guinea, Senegal and Gambia. From July to September 2016, around 7640 migrants, almost entirely men, have transited in Mali; of those, 1/3 declares the intention to reach Europe.

Countries of origin
- Gambia
- Guinea
- Senegal
- Mixed origin

2. Eleven countries of the Sahel, with the support of various players such as the AU, the EU and the WB, are progressing in the construction of a ‘Grande Muraille Verte’, a tree belt running from Senegal to Djibouti (about 7000 km) to preserve the productivity of the land. Green projects can be seen as a response to drought, food insecurity and consequently have the potential to create more socio-economic opportunities and contribute to remove incentives to migrate.

3. In October, IOM has received by Japan equipment for data collection at border for a value of CFAF 120 million (around EUR 181 300) to support Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso in the management of migratory flows.


Legend
- Muraille Verte
- Sahel region

IOM, Agence panafricaine de la grande muraille verte, media. Vector data: Made with Natural Earth.
1. **High level meetings.** As has emerged in several diplomatic missions that took place in September and October 2016\(^1\) (*see Timeline*), migration and peace are considered as strictly linked, security concerns being identified as one of the main drivers for migratory movements. A strong commitment to support the implementation of the peace agreement has been shown by the AU, the EU and various MS.\(^2\)

2. **Financial inflows.** Under the EU Emergency Trust Fund, six cooperation projects have been signed at the end of September for a total amount of EUR 57 million for support on economic regeneration and job creation, diaspora investments, security and development in the North and education.\(^3\) In 2016 (*until October*), a provisional amount of EUR 159.8 million (118.5 in development aid and 41.3 in humanitarian aid) was disbursed by the EC (DEVCO, FPI and ECHO)\(^4\). In the same period, Malian diaspora has sent home USD 910 million (around EUR 830 million) as official recorded remittances, more than five times the received EC aid.\(^5\) In 2015, remittances accounted for 7.02% of GDP, and 20% of the total were sent from the EU (15.6% from France alone).\(^6\) Malian government aims to channel this flow more on productive investments rather than the current trend on social investments. More specifically, the Malian minister for the diaspora indicated some lines of action such as the reduction of the costs of migrants’ remittances, the promotion of migrants’ saving or the local development.\(^7\) Along the same line, the African Institute for Remittances (AIR) has launched activities towards improving data reporting, lowering the costs of sending money to and within Africa (currently at 9% vs 3% target in the SDGs), conducting quarterly surveys\(^8\) and starting consultation with several Central Banks\(^9\).

3. **Impact on EU.** UNHCR reported a flow of 7,052 arrivals by sea from Mali to Italy (Jan – September 2016), of which 2,030 between August and September;\(^10\) around 0.04% of Malian population or in other words, an equivalent of 0.46% of the young population of 20-24 years.\(^11\) Accounting for less than 2.2% of total arrivals by sea,\(^12\) Mali does not appear to be one of the first countries of origin in EU. In August 2016, around 1,000 Malians have lodged a first asylum request (total first requests in August around 130,000).\(^13\) Nonetheless, the EU is the destination for 10% of the Malian emigrants,\(^14\) the Malian refugee-like population (originated from the North of the country) remains for the majority in the neighbouring countries, only around 3% currently lives in the EU.\(^15\)

### DEMOGRAPHY

1. **Demographic projections.** In the coming years, differences in demographic growth across countries will be increasingly evident. According to UNPD projections, by the middle of the 21st century, in Mali population will increase by 150%, fifth in the ranking of the ‘growing’ countries (passing from 17.6 to 45.5 million). This population increase will have as an effect the enlargement of the population pyramid’s base in a country with an already young population (median age of 16 years vs a worldwide average of 30 years). Key areas that could be affected or become under stress are food security, education, health care, housing and employment.\(^16\)

2. **Migration projections.** Nevertheless, the same UNPD projections for net migration rate forecast a reduction from -3.7 to -0.9 per 1,000 persons in 2050. Combined with population growth, the net number of migrants is still projected to decrease by 100,000 already in the next five years.\(^17\)
1. Numbers & Policies. In 2015, Malian emigrants amount to 1 million, mainly living in Ivory Coast and Nigeria. However, the current focus is on forced migration of Malians. Data released in August by the Minister of Solidarity and Humanitarian Action (MSAH) and by UNHCR are presented in the boxes. Although the stock of refugees does not seem to change significantly, in and out flows are still present. New IDPs have been detected in Gao (around 3,600 in September) while UNHCR warns about new refugees in Niger. In the last two years, the MSAH has developed several policy documents such as the national policy on humanitarian assistance and its action plan 2016-2020 (Jan 2015), the management of IDPs and returnees strategy (Apr 2015), four urgent regional intervention plans (July 2015) and two protocols with IOM and UNHCR. Mali is also hosting around 15,000 refugees; among them, some from Central African Republic, Ivory Coast and Congo have protested on 19 September for better living conditions.

2. Significant Return. While some people still leave Mali as refugees or move internally as IDPs, according to governmental figures, more than 470,000 IDPs have returned home after the crisis, while the voluntary return of refugees is progressing at a slower pace. The most affected regions are Gao and Timbuktu, where the share of population affected by the crisis (IDPs, refugees or returnees) is as high as 40% (see map 1: Forced Migration by region). Due to the recurrent conflicts, according to UNHCR, conditions in parts of northern Mali are not yet conducive to returns in safety and dignity, therefore, voluntary repatriation is currently not promoted, although around 4,000 people have returned between August and October. Forced return is viewed as a failure since migration is considered as an important investment for the family; as a consequence, returnees often remain in Bamako to organize a new departure, said the Ambassador of Mali in Brussels. Data provided in August by the Directorate on Social Development highlights the number of 6,000 returnees as of 2013 from around ten African countries. In 2016 (till August), approximately 1,200 forced returnees have been registered; Algeria seems to be one of the top sending countries of Malian returnees in this year. The return rate of irregular migrants to Mali from the EU was only 11.4% in 2015 (400 people out of 3,505).

Political

1. Stressor. Despite the signature of the peace agreement in June 2015, the deterioration of the security situation hampers migration management efforts. Clashes continue in northern Mali (Kidal and Timbuktu regions) and have spread also in the center (Mopti region, where a terrorist group took over the town of Boni for few hours) (see map 2: Stressors). From August to October 2016, attacks have caused 54 fatalities, which have targeted civilians, the Malian Defense and Security Forces, without...
sparing UN peacekeepers (69 deaths since MINUSMA establishment in 2013). Also aid organizations have been targeted, this impacting the deployment of humanitarian assistance. These attacks led to the forced displacement of civilians, while UNHCR reports a constant influx of refugees into Niger, said to be the highest number since 2012, with around 5,450 new arrivals from January to July 2016.

2. Peace Implementation. The main difficulties for an incisive action in the North remain dry climate conditions, the identification of terrorist groups and the limited presence of Mali authorities in the territory. The governor of Mali visited Kidal in October for the first time after two years and only upon green light from the former rebels of the Coordination of Azawad Movement (CMA). After the fifth ministerial reshuffle in July, in August President Keita designated Soumeylou Boubeye Maiga, former Minister of Defence, as the new Secretary General of the Presidency and in September the Minister of Defence and Veterans was replaced by the Minister of Territorial Administration. The President of Mali stated that hostilities had effectively ceased between the government and signatory groups and that challenges are rather linked to the activities of terrorist groups and asymmetric attacks on civilians and peacekeeping forces. On the other hand, participants of the Ministerial Meeting on the Implementation of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali called by the UN on 23rd September, urged the Government of Mali and the signatory parties to translate their commitments under the Agreement into immediate actions, with concrete and prioritized benchmarks and timelines for implementation. In particular, commitments were related to the establishment of interim authorities, the restoration and extension of State authority (basic social services, accountability, truth and reconciliation), joint patrols as well as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) activities. On 14 October, the Malian government eventually designated interim authorities, however in the North they have been questioned for being ‘non-inclusive’. UN MINUSMA has thus warned of not being able to fully implement its mandate if cease-fire in Kidal and the peace agreement will not be implemented by all parties. To better operate in this fragile security environment, resolution 2295 of June 2016 extended the MINUSMA mandate until June 2017 and increased its force levels to 13,289 military personnel (up from 11,240) and 1,920 police personnel (up from 1,440); however, in September the additional personnel had not been deployed yet. On the 31st October, Reuters informed that another Islamist militant group – Ansar Dine, alleged author of attacks in Mopti – has agreed to cease attacks in Mali.

3. Electoral process. One of the areas supported in 2015 by the EU has been the transparent electoral process as well as the modernization of Malian security forces through security sector reform. It has to be noted that thousands of people have protested against a new electoral law approved in September that raises the fee required to run for president by two and a half times.

SOCIO ECONOMIC

1. Development strategy. A shared opinion among national and international actors is that security concerns cannot be addressed without a parallel development strategy. The fight against poverty will also be a deterrent for irregular migration, according to the president of the Supreme Council of Malian Diaspora (Csdm), who suggested to invest in infrastructures and living conditions. Ban Ki Moon stressed the discrepancy between pledge in the humanitarian response plan for 2016 and effective disbursement, which stands at a ratio of 3:1. In September the AU convened a conference of Ministers
of Finance to review the annual budget and define self-financing mechanisms of operations and programs in view of the evolution of development programs.\textsuperscript{55}

2. Stressor. \textbf{Almost half of the population in Mali is living in extreme poverty} (latest data available 2009).\textsuperscript{56} The government has proposed a five-pillar framework to progress on the SDGs, namely strengthening peace and security; reinforcing macroeconomic stability; promoting accelerated growth of sustainable pro-poor policies leading to the creation of jobs; development and access to basic social services; and institutional development and good governance.\textsuperscript{57}

3. North. \textbf{A grave conjunction of security / health / malnutrition criticalities can be noticed in the North}, where 86,119 cumulated cases of malaria have been confirmed in the first half of 2016 (+ 47\% as compared to the previous year)\textsuperscript{58}. Preliminary results released in September by the Ministry of Health and its UN partners, point at alarming rates of acute malnutrition, which in the regions of Timbuktu and Gao (important transit in the migratory route) are close to the emergency level of 15\%.\textsuperscript{59} Both indicators are considered to be prominent factors of under-five mortality, while children suffer also from the closure of a number of schools in the North. OCHA foresees some 3 million people at risk of food insecurity in 2017.\textsuperscript{60}

4. Socio-cultural. According to the annual report on human development (September), the main root causes for migration are economic (degradation of agricultural areas), environmental (climate change) and ‘socio-cultural’.\textsuperscript{61} In Mali, almost half of the international migrants are women,\textsuperscript{62} for the vast majority driven by family reunification reasons\textsuperscript{63} but who more and more are also leaving in search of a job or to escape conflict or forced marriages\textsuperscript{64}; according to UN figures, 55\% of girls in Mali are married before the age of 18.\textsuperscript{65} From indications gathered in refugee camps, many were subjected to gender-based violence while in Mali.\textsuperscript{66}

\section*{ENVIRONMENTAL}

1. Concurrent stressor. According to the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), neither desertification nor drought on its own cause conflict or forced migration, whereas converging factors such as political tension, weak institutions, economic marginalization, and policy interventions create the conditions that make people able or unable to cope with climate change. Worldwide, land degradation will force people to move within their own region or to nearby cities, namely a push factor for internal migration. In the case of Mali, previous decreasing rainfalls have caused a decline in the harvest and pushed herders and farmers to move into cities in search for employment. Bamako, as a consequence, in 20 years has grown from 600,000 to around 2 million.\textsuperscript{67}

2. Role of the State. Of the same opinion Climate Home,\textsuperscript{68} which says that State intervention can modify the impact of adverse climate conditions on conflict and migration. What is indicated as crucial is to invest on sustainable land management (unsustainable land use practices cost Mali about 8\% of its GDP), to improve land tenure security and access to market and rural services. This needs a strong government involvement in reforms on credit, market access and rural infrastructural development.\textsuperscript{69}

3. Flood alert. Currently, an alert on flooding of the Inner Niger Delta has been issued by Wetlands International in Mali. According to the source, although flood is needed for rice farming, fishing and cattle herding, people are not prepared for such extent of flooding, this puts lives, homes and animal at risk.\textsuperscript{70} In the last humanitarian bulletin (August-Sept), OCHA stated that in 2016 more than 18,000
people have been affected by floods, 2,400 houses destroyed and nearly 200 hectares of farms flooded by rainwater.\textsuperscript{71} In July, floods killed 14 people. \textsuperscript{72}

### REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON MIGRATION

1. **Risks at refugee camps:** At Mbera camp (Mauritania) funds are scarce, and with recent and the expected arrivals, in August refugees have not received the cash component they were supposed to receive (£3.20).\textsuperscript{73} Education and training needs are not properly addressed for the 14,000 school-age residents of the camp, this posing them at risk of joining armed groups or of early marriages.\textsuperscript{74} The camp has become so big to be equivalent to the seventh largest town in Mauritania, and it is now competing with nearby Bassikonou for water provision. There is therefore a need to appease Mauritanians living nearby.\textsuperscript{75} Tabareybarey and Tassalit camps (Niger) have been attacked, with at least 24 people killed, including soldiers. As a good practice, in August WFP and UNHCR have replaced cash with e-vouchers in the Mangaize camp (Niger), to respond to the need of Malian refugees; a change that is estimated will save $60,000 per year.\textsuperscript{76} (See map 3: Malian refugees).

2. **Smuggling route.** Mali is an important transit country for migrants from other parts of West Africa, especially from Guinea (40%), Senegal (15%) and Gambia (12%)(See map 4: Routes). According to IOM, in three months (July-Sept), around 7,640 migrants, almost entirely men, have transited in Gao (to go to Algeria) and Benena (to go to Burkina Faso, Niger and Libya), although a third route through Timbuktu has been recently detected. Of those, 1/3 declares the intention to reach Europe.\textsuperscript{77} Agadez (Niger) is considered one of the most important smuggling points in Africa. From there, migrants from Western African countries who have arrived usually via bus through Mali and Burkina Faso, continue the travel via Algeria or across the Sahara to Libya and from there with smugglers across the Mediterranean. A migrant testifies that from Mali to Algeria he had to pay eight times for a total of 1,070,000 CFA (around EUR 1,500).\textsuperscript{78} Only the last passage by boat it is estimated to cost nearly USD 5,000, while smugglers who ferried migrants across the Sahara take up to USD 500 a time.\textsuperscript{79} However, migrants from Western Africa generally prefer to remain in the West African sub-region.\textsuperscript{80} In addition, the journey to Europe is perilous: according to IOM sub-Saharan Africa is a region that has experienced a high fatality rate in the Mediterranean (1,218 in 2015, including 376 Malians = around a rate of 6% of fatalities for Malians crossing the Mediterranean).\textsuperscript{81}

3. **Malian Documents.** In October, the president of the Supreme Council of Malian Diaspora (Csdm) deplored the fact that many African immigrants seek to obtain a Malian identity card to enter Europe, therefore he called on the authorities to make Malian administrative documents more secure.\textsuperscript{82}

### REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON STRESSORS

1. **Political stressor.** In October, IOM has received from Japan equipment for data collection at border for a value of CFAF 120 million (around EUR 181,300) to support Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso for better management of the migratory flows.\textsuperscript{83} Security concerns are shared among neighbouring countries of Mali since, especially Burkina Faso, Chad and Niger, have been victims of attacks by jihadist elements from Mali. In addition, the conclusion of the Ministerial Meeting on the Implementation of the
Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali stressed that the stabilization of Mali would only be possible with the strong and effective engagement of the countries of the entire region. Their role should vary from the strengthening of border control, to the support of Malian defense and the enhancement of cooperation with MINUSMA. The AU has already set up a regional task force for the elimination of the Lord’s Resistance Army and created a Multi-national joint task force (MNJTF) for West Africa in 2015. The G5 Sahel (gathering Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad and Burkina Faso) intends to create a joint force to address the security threats in the region.

2. Environmental stressor. Regarding the link between environment and migration, green projects can be seen as a response to drought, food insecurity and consequently have the potential to create more socio-economic opportunities and contribute to remove incentives to migrate. Eleven countries of the Sahel, with the support of various players such as the AU, the EU and the WB, are progressing in the construction of a ‘Grande Muraille Verte’, a tree belt running from Senegal to Djibouti (about 7 000 km) to restore 50 million hectares of land and reduce CO2 production, and thus to preserve the productivity of the land.

REFERENCES MEDIA MONITORING (available in the Annex)

1 05.09.16 - Prime Minister Rõivas on a visit to Mali, 06.10.16 - Réunion euro-africaine sur la migration et le développement ou processus de Rabat: Les revenus des migrants à réorienter dans les secteurs productifs, 07.10.16 - Les Pays-Bas prolongent leur mission au Mali en 2017, 09.10.16 - Germany’s President, on first leg of Africa trip, pledges help for Mali, 10.10.16 - Merkel’s migration mission to Mali, 14.10.16 - Merkel’s Africa visit provokes mixed reaction, 15.10.16 - Le président du CSDM Mohamed chérif Haidara : “Angela Merkel est la seule responsable européenne qui se bat pour alléger les souffrances des immigrés”, 18.10.16 - EU hails first result in Africa migration deals, 24.10.16 - The Netherlands helps to combat people smuggling in Mali.


3 10.10.16 - Coopération Mali-Union européenne : 37 milliards de FCFA pour plusieurs projets

4 Development and humanitarian data on migration for Mali are extracted from EU Aid Explorer (https://euaidexplorer.ec.europa.eu/HumanitarianDonorAtlas.do ). Data for development are from IATI registry, EU institution include DEVCO, FPI, NEAR and EIB (NB for Mali no contributions have been published in IATI from EIB and NEAR for the period of analysis; ECHO is included in Humanitarian count). To the IATI database, information on EU Emergency Trust Fund on Mali have been included (available at http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/africa/eu-emergency-trust-fund/sahel-region-and-lake-chad-area_en ). For humanitarian aid, data source is EDRIS (https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/hac/).

5 Data on personal remittances received as % of GDP acquired via WB website; analysis on World Bank estimates, bilateral remittances matrix 2015.

6 06.10.16 - Réunion euro-africaine sur la migration et le développement ou processus de Rabat: Les revenus des migrants à réorienter dans les secteurs productifs

7 24.08.16 - High Cost of Remittance flow within Africa: The African Institute for Remittances (AIR) to work with key market players to lower the cost of sending money to and within Africa

8 24.08.16 - Africa benefits from net positive remittances flows

9 UNHCR, Italy Sea Arrivals Dashboard. January-September 2016; UNHCR, Italy Sea Arrivals Dashboard. January-July 2016. Malians in Spain and Greece not reported as single nationality by UNHCR as not among the top ten nationalities and reported as ‘others’ (less than 140).

10 The population of Mali in 2015 was at 17.6 million, 1 523 000 in the age group 20-24 (UNPD).


12 Eurostat, Asylum and first time asylum applicants by citizenship, age and sex Monthly data (rounded)[migr_asyappctzm].

13 Considering in 2015 all the valid resident permits (3months +)(Eurostat).
See Structural MP.

23.09.16 - Population Growth Extremes: Doublers and Decliners


UNDESA, Migration Stock by Origin and Destination Country, 2015.

UNPD, international migration wallchart 2015.

15.08.16 - Assistance humanitaire aux réfugiés et déplacés de la crise malienne


13.10.16 - Direction Nationale du Developpement Social – DNDS, Matrice de Suive des deplacements (DTM)

31.08.16 - Fact sheet UNHCR

15.08.16 - Assistance humanitaire aux réfugiés et déplacés de la crise malienne

UNHCR – mid2015 figures.

19.09.16 – La police déloge des réfugiés.

13.10.16 - Direction Nationale du Developpement Social – DNDS, Matrice de Suive des deplacements (DTM)

31.08.16 - Fact sheet UNHCR

10.09.16 - Migrants africains: «Les retours forçés se passent toujours mal»

15.08.16 - Migration clandestine: plus de 6000 Maliens expulsés depuis 2013

18.10.16 - First Progress Report on the Partnership Framework with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration

Elaboration on Eurostat data, Third country nationals ordered to leave - annual data (rounded).

18.10.16 - First Progress Report on the Partnership Framework with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration

ACLED, 2016 realtime data.

30.09.16 - Security Council Report_ October 2016 Monthly Forecast

11.08.16 - Clashes Stall Aid in Northern Mali

29.09.16 - Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali

31.08.16 - Fact sheet UNHCR

05.09.16 - A new African force for Mali?

17.10.16 - Mali governor visits troubled region for first time in years

29.09.16 - Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali

23.09.16 - Defeating Terrorism, Human Trafficking Crucial for Addressing Huge Migratory Flows into Europe, Speakers from Continent Stress as General Debate Continues

23.09.16 - Conclusions of the Ministerial Meeting on the Implementation of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali

30.09.16 - Security Council Report_ October 2016 Monthly Forecast

31.10.16 – UNHCR Operational Update

06.10.16 - Lack of Progress in Implementing Mali Peace Accord Threatens Peace, Stability Framework, Peacekeeping Chief Tells Security Council

20.09.16 - La MINUSMA dénonce la dégradation sécuritaire dans la région de Kidal

18.10.16 - First Progress Report on the Partnership Framework with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration, 05.09.16 - A new African force for Mali?

30.09.16 - Security Council Report_ October 2016 Monthly Forecast

31.10.16 - Mali Islamist militant leader announces unilateral cease-fire


02.10.16 - Thousands of opposition supporters protest in Mali

15.10.16 - Le président du CSDM Mohamed chérif Haïdara : “Angela Merkel est la seule responsable européenne qui se bat pour alléger les souffrances des immigrés”

29.09.16 - Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali
55 16.09.16 - Conference of Ministers of Finance kicks off on modalities of financing the African Union
57 17.10.16 - Technology Gap, Climate Change among Obstacles to Eradicating Poverty, Speakers Say in Second Committee
58 06.08.16 - Mali - Malaria
59 16.09.16 - Mali - Conflict and undernutrition
60 30.09.16 - OCHA - Humanitarian bulletin August – September 2016
61 23.09.16 - Lancement du Rapport national sur le développement humain
62 UNPD, international migration wallchart 2015.
63 27.10.16 - Migration féminine au Mali : Pourquoi partent-elles donc ?
64 27.10.16 - Mme Cissé Oumou Ahmar Traoré, Journaliste-écrivaine : «La féminisation du phénomène migratoire apparaît comme un facteur d’émancipation»
65 10.08.16 - Threat of marriage hangs over young Malian refugee girls in Mauritania
66 17.08.16 - Refugees claim abuse by soldiers as Mali’s conflict spreads
67 27.10.16 - Land degradation could force 135M people to migrate in next 30 yrs
68 08.09.16 - Is climate change causing conflict in the Sahel?
69 27.10.16 - Land degradation could force 135M people to migrate in next 30 yrs
70 12.09.16 - Extreme flooding predicted to hit Mali’s Inner Niger Delta
71 30.09.16 - Humanitarian bulletin - OCHA (August – September 2016)
72 10.08.16 - Mali floods leave 14 dead in a month
73 17.08.16 - Refugees claim abuse by soldiers as Mali’s conflict spreads
74 10.08.16 - Threat of marriage hangs over young Malian refugee girls in Mauritania
75 17.08.16 - Refugees claim abuse by soldiers as Mali’s conflict spreads
76 08.09.16 - Technology makes life easier for Malian refugees in Niger
77 27.10.16 - Mali: le carrefour des migrants de l’Afrique de l’ouest vers l’Europe
78 29.10.16 - Au Mali, les routes migratoires passent par Gao et Benena
79 12.09.16 - Occupation: Migrant. One African’s 12-year quest for Europe
80 30.09.16 - Humanitarian bulletin - OCHA (August – September 2016)
81 According to IOM data, around 5826 Malians arrived in Italy (not significant numbers of arrivals in other MS)
82 11.10.16 - Mohamed C. Haidara, président du CSDM : “La carte d’identité malienne n’est pas sécurisée”
18.10.16 - Collecte de données aux frontières : Trois postes bientôt équipés
23.09.16 - Conclusions of the Ministerial Meeting on the Implementation of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali
30.08.2016 - Africa builds ‘Great Green Wall’ against extremism and misery
Europe Direct is a service to help you find answers to your questions about the European Union.

Freephone number (*):
00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11

(*) The information given is free, as are most calls (though some operators, phone boxes or hotels may charge you).


HOW TO OBTAIN EU PUBLICATIONS

Free publications:
• one copy:
  via EU Bookshop (http://bookshop.europa.eu);
• more than one copy or posters/maps:
  from the European Union’s representations (http://ec.europa.eu/represent_en.htm);
  from the delegations in non-EU countries (http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/index_en.htm);
  by contacting the Europe Direct service (http://europa.eu/europedirect/index_en.htm) or calling 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (freephone number from anywhere in the EU) (*).

(*) The information given is free, as are most calls (though some operators, phone boxes or hotels may charge you).

Priced publications:
• via EU Bookshop (http://bookshop.europa.eu).
JRC Mission

As the science and knowledge service of the European Commission, the Joint Research Centre’s mission is to support EU policies with independent evidence throughout the whole policy cycle.

EU Science Hub
ec.europa.eu/jrc

@EU_ScienceHub
EU Science Hub - Joint Research Centre
Joint Research Centre
EU Science Hub

doi:10.2760/59109