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Evaluation of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement

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1. Introduction

The European Union’s relationship with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) States has been governed by a number of agreements, dating back to the Lomé convention signed in 1975, aiming to support the ACP States’ efforts to move towards self-sustained development. The Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) was signed in 2000 for a twenty-year period and will expire on 29 February 2020. It is a wide-ranging agreement that covers many policy areas under its three broadly defined pillars: (i) the political dimension, (ii) economic and trade cooperation, and (iii) development cooperation. The CPA is a legally binding agreement under which various joint institutions have been created, providing a dialogue framework for its members and fostering EU-ACP cooperation in international fora.

The European Development Fund (EDF) is the main financial instrument for providing development under the CPA. It is established outside the Union's budget by an international agreement between the representatives of the EU Member States. It is financed by direct contributions from EU Member States according to a contribution key and is covered by its own financial rules.

The CPA provides for the definition of a financial protocol for each multi-annual period of the EDF and it has been amended in that sense for each new EDF since 2000. In the field of the external actions of the European Union, on top of the CPA, the applicable legislation is composed by the basic regulations related to the different cooperation programmes adopted by the Council and the European Parliament and by the financial regulations.

Purpose of the evaluation

This evaluation assesses to what extent the CPA has achieved its objectives, with particular attention being given to its effectiveness, sustainability, impact, efficiency, relevance, coherence and EU added value. It reviews the lessons learnt and provides material for both the Impact Assessment and the recommendation to be submitted to the Council on the framework to be used to manage relations with the ACP countries and regions from 2020 onwards.

Article 95(4) of the CPA provides for the parties to enter into negotiations ‘in order to examine which provisions shall subsequently govern their relations’ 18 months before the agreement will expire, i.e. by 31 August 2018 at the latest. This evaluation directly contributes to the priority ‘A stronger global actor’ and reflects the commitment made by President Juncker in his mission letter to the Commissioner for International Cooperation and

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2 Article 1 CPA: The partnership shall be centred on the objective of reducing and eventually eradicating poverty consistent with the objectives of sustainable development and the gradual integration of the ACP countries into the world economy.

Development, Neven Mimica, to focus on ‘preparing and launching negotiations for a revised Cotonou agreement’.

**Scope of the evaluation**

The evaluation covers all forms of cooperation between the EU and the ACP countries and regions, including financial cooperation through the EDF and the general budget of the EU during the period 2000-2015. It concentrates on the three main pillars of the agreement:

1. **The political dimension.** Political dialogue, fundamental issues relating to human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, peace building and conflict prevention, migration, cooperation in international fora and with continental and regional organisations.
2. **Economic and trade cooperation.** New trade agreements (EPAs), regional cooperation, cooperation in multilateral trade and economic forums and other trade related areas.
3. **Development cooperation.** Economic, social and human development and cross-cutting issues.

The evaluation also reviews whether the various assumptions on which the Agreement was based have been respected: fundamental principles (as defined in Article 2 of the CPA), participation/involvement of the different actors as envisaged in the Agreement, the functioning of the institutional set-up, and the transparency and easy applicability of the management procedures.

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5 An evaluation of the external financing instruments (EFIs) including the EDF is currently ongoing to feed into the Mid Term review Report of the EFIs.
2. Background

Evolution of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement

Community development policy goes back to 1957 and has gone through a number of decisive phases since then. After the initial years, during which the aim was to establish ties with the Community's overseas countries and territories, cooperation continued under the Yaoundé Conventions and remained focused on French-speaking black Africa until the middle of the 1970s. After its Community's first enlargement, which took place in a markedly changing world economy, the European Community started to extend the geographical scope of its cooperation policy by opening the first Lomé Convention to other ACP countries and forging association and cooperation ties with other regions of the developing world. The Lomé Convention has been overhauled every five years to adjust it to economic and political developments, add new cooperation instruments and set fresh priorities. The last revision took place in 1995.

At the start of the 21st century the CPA established a comprehensive partnership for the economic, social and cultural development of the ACP States, based on three complementary pillars: political dimension, economic and trade cooperation and development cooperation. With a focus on eradicating poverty in the longer-term, the cooperation aims at contributing to peace, security and a stable and democratic political environment in the ACP states, with the ACP countries playing a strengthened and equal role in the international context. The parties committed themselves to acting together in order to gradually achieve the MDGs (Millennium Development Goals). Equality of partners and participation are key principles of the partnership and therefore political dialogue is essential for the cooperation to flourish.

Since 2000, new priorities and urgent needs arisen in the international context have rendered necessary successive revisions of the CPA.

The first amended version of the CPA was signed in Luxembourg in 2005, preserving and building on its acquis. On the background of pressing concerns brought about by international terrorism, increased fragility and conflict situations in poor countries, global environmental threats and accompanying migratory flows, Parties committed themselves to deepen political cooperation and even more strongly to a development-driven agenda, including its non-aid policies, based on ownership and partners’ equality. The MDGs became the targets and principles for development. Dialogue on the essential elements of the CPA was reinforced and a more direct link with Article 96 (Consultation Procedure) was introduced to render dialogue covering the essential elements systematic and formalised. The participatory approach was strengthened by promoting involvement of non-state actors (NSAs) and local authorities. Cooperation on security issues, such as fight against terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as against international crime, with due regard to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, was agreed.
The second (very comprehensive) revision of the CPA was signed in Ouagadougou in 2010. It reflected new priorities linked to the aid effectiveness agenda (Paris, Accra6), with a stronger focus on the ownership of the ACP states of the design and implementation of the development agenda. It also targeted the coherence of EU policies and programmes and their alignment with long-term development strategies of the ACP states. The revised CPA emphasised the importance of regional and continental integration of ACP countries, recognising ACP regional organisations and the African Union (AU) as actors in the ACP-EU partnership. The role of ACP national parliaments was also emphasised. The mutual dependence between sustainable development and peace and security and the need to address root causes of conflicts as early as possible (reference to fragile situations) were acknowledged. The need for joint approaches towards major challenges (e.g. food security, climate change, HIV/AIDS) was reinforced. The role of the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), trade adaptation strategies and aid for trade in the light of the expiry of preferences at the end of 2007 was reaffirmed.

Description of the objectives

The initial text of the CPA, together with the revisions of 2005 and 2010, as described above, provide the basis for reconstructing its intervention logic (IL). As the CPA does not include an intervention logical framework, one was drawn in the context of the evaluation.

Generally, the causal relationships of contribution on which the reconstructed IL is built rely on a set of core assumptions with regard to the attitude of the partners, their respect of the spirit of the partnership and their capacity to translate it into action. Such basic assumptions are:

- The framework of principles established in the CPA, including the links between peace, security and development and the respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms will continue to be adhered to by the parties.
- Common understanding frameworks are built to address priority issues and mechanisms to further develop them are put in place.
- Obligations under international conventions are implemented and parties cooperate with each other at all levels.
- Interest and commitment of the parties will be maintained, adapted and developed throughout the duration of the CPA.
- Equality of partners and ownership of the ACP countries are respected in CPA actions’ design and implementation.
- Participation of key actors in ACP countries, including parliaments, local authorities, civil society and private sector, alongside governments, takes place.
- The EU ensures enhanced and continued coherence of its policies with the CPA objectives and modalities.
- Management procedures are transparent, efficient and easy to apply.

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Joint institutions are functional (effective and efficient).

The flow of effects shown in the diagrams of the IL on the following pages highlights the causal relationship of contribution among its different levels.

Pillar I: Political dimension

The political dimension, as stated in the Partnership Agreement signed in 2000, intends to promote the consistency and relevance of ACP-EU cooperation strategies making it possible to address all issues of common interest. Article 8 of the CPA sets out the specific modalities for a regular, comprehensive, balanced and deep political dialogue aimed at strengthening cooperation and promoting an effective system of multilateralism, which would mean a greater say of ACP countries in international relations. Political dialogue is conducted in a flexible way, under either a formal or an informal framework and at the most appropriate territorial level. Regional organisations and national parliaments are also encouraged to participate.

Issues of common interest constitute the basis for cooperation and include a wide range of policies related to peace-building, conflict prevention, migration, respect for human rights,
democratic principles, rule of law and good governance. Good governance, as stated in the CPA, underpins the ACP-EU Partnerships.

The Pillar I contribution to the final goals of reduction and eventually eradication of poverty, sustainable peace and security worldwide and a strengthened/equal position of the ACP countries in the international relationships is made of three specific impacts, i.e. three medium-long term expected effects, as follows:
- ACP countries being an integral part of multilateral international relations;
- stable and democratic political environments in the ACP countries maintained and consolidated;
- regional, sub-regional and continental cooperation for peace and security strengthened.

**Pillar II: Trade and economic cooperation**

The objective of the economic and trade cooperation in the CPA is to increase the parity of the ACP countries in the global economy, by enhancing their production, supply and trading capacity as well as their capacity to attract investments, ensuring conformity with WTO provisions. The key principles of Pillar II highlight the importance of strategic partnerships, based on a comprehensive approach and built on regional integration initiatives and differentiated responses according to the different national contexts.
In the CPA, the Parties agreed to take all the necessary measures to ensure the conclusion of new WTO-compatible Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). EPAs focus explicitly on ACP development, taking account of their socio-economic circumstances and including technical support and training, and measures to promote knowledge transfer and strengthen public services.

The Pillar II contribution to the final goals of reduction and eventually eradication of poverty, sustainable peace and security worldwide and a strengthened/equal position of the ACP countries in the international relationships is made of three specific impacts, i.e. three medium-long term expected effects, as follows:

- increased share in international trade and world economy with no damage for vital areas;
- diversified and stable economies attractive for foreign investment, with reduced dependency on specific commodities;
- integrated regional, sub-regional and continental networks enhance goods, persons and knowledge exchange.

**Pillar III: Development cooperation**

The CPA proposes an integrated approach that incorporates economic, social and human, cultural, environmental and institutional elements that must be locally owned. EU and ACP
states, and their partners, shall work together to establish a consolidated and effective strategic framework and to measure progress towards results. The relevant support framework establishes the principle of mainstreaming into all areas of cooperation the following three horizontal or cross-cutting themes: gender equality, environmental sustainability, and institutional development and capacity building.

The Agreement puts emphasis on three focal areas for support: 1) economic development, with a focus on private sector development and investment, macroeconomic and structural policies and reforms, and sector policies, 2) social and human development, focusing on social sector policies, youth issues, and cultural development and 3) regional cooperation and integration.

The Pillar III contribution to the final goals of reduction and eventually eradication of poverty, sustainable peace and security worldwide and a strengthened/equal position of the ACP countries in the international relationships is made of two specific impacts, i.e. two medium-long term expected effects, as follows:

- inclusive sustainable growth, through economic, cultural, social and environmentally sustainable development of ACP countries;
- advanced and consolidated regional, sub-regional and continental cooperation and integration.
The evaluation went through the intervention logic(s) and tested the main assumptions made when going through the logical chain from activities to impact.

**Baseline**

The main objectives of the CPA and the expected impacts are in line with the Green Paper presented by the Commission (November 1996) on relations between the European Union and the ACP countries on the eve of the 21st century ‘Challenges and options for a new partnership’ that presented the following six interdependent factors providing the yardstick by which future development prospects may be gauged:

1. **Peace and security, minimum conditions for development**

Civil war has exacted a heavy toll in the ACP countries, with little prospect of improvement in the medium-term (from 1996 onwards). Apart from their devastating direct effects in the countries concerned, these conflicts also have a ‘domino effect’ in the sense that their repercussions, in particular the loss of confidence by economic operators are felt throughout the region. Despite this bleak outlook, in some countries with a minimum of social stability, economic growth is still generating an increase in income per capita.

2. **Necessary economic and institutional reforms**

The rate of investment in many countries is still too low. The implementation of economic reforms in an increasing number of countries since the end of the 1980s has helped reduce risk factors. Institutional reforms take longer and are more difficult to implement than liberalisation policies; they concern the development and modernisation of the financial system, tax reforms, public expenditure management, the improvement of the legal and regulatory framework, the reform of public enterprises and privatisation.

The reforms introduced in some of the ACP countries before 1996 to facilitate the development of the private sector and improve export potential still have a long way to go. Matters such as trade liberalisation, the improvement of the regulatory framework, the development of the financial system, the functioning of the labour market and the need to create room for manoeuvre in social policy are thus set to dominate the economic policy agenda of the region for some time to come.

3. **Democratisation and economic liberalisation**

The dual process of economic and political transition (switch to a market economy and a pluralist system) brings with it both synergies and special problems. First, reforms may give rise to broad public debate between Government and civil society, in particular

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representatives of the private sector, thereby providing the Government with a credible mandate. Second, problems in so far as the implementation of stabilisation policies in tandem with liberalisation will be hampered temporarily by the emergence of democracy. This happens mainly when progress is slow and modest, delaying the benefits derived from improved supply conditions and prolonging the period of socio-economic austerity.

4. Issues relating to the social transformation

While there may be a consensus on minimum economic reform, structural reforms — whose implications are more pervasive and distributive effects more subtle — are more controversial and meet with greater resistance. In Sub-Saharan Africa the mechanisms of group solidarity have failed to ensure equitable distribution of the fruits of economic activity. The result is a very selective form of solidarity to the benefit of a privileged minority close to those in power.

Furthermore, the entire international community is faced with the problem of reconciling the major political commitments entered into at Rio, Cairo, Copenhagen and Beijing in support of sustainable development based on human needs with the reality of economic development in an increasingly competitive international environment.

5. Reducing poverty

The improvement in economic growth during the 1990s has undoubtedly helped halt or check the spread of poverty in some countries, but has not reduced it. This would require, inter alia, more sustained economic growth. The World Bank estimates that, given the economic structures and population growth rates in sub-Saharan Africa, an increase in GDP of 5% per annum would still not suffice to stabilise the numbers living below the poverty threshold.

A great deal also needs to be done to improve the impact of growth on poverty: access to basic social services should be widened significantly and, in some countries, access to productive resources (education, training, land ownership, electricity, capital and credit, etc.) could be greatly improved: entire population groups are practically excluded from the formal sector of the economy. Women are particularly vulnerable and an improvement of their socio-economic situation would act as an effective lever in curbing poverty.

6. Integration into the world economy

The integration of the ACP countries into the world trade arena hinges on the success of domestic economic policies and on enhanced economic competitiveness and access to foreign markets. While globalisation has at the time already reduced trade barriers and the cost of engaging in international trade, access to international markets was becoming more complex and dependent on other non-tariff barrier trade-related considerations. In the market access equation, the level of tariffs plays an increasingly reduced role and other aspects such as competition policies, technical, sanitary and phytosanitary standards, subsidies, anti-dumping
and countervailing policies, environmental and social regulations, intellectual property laws, investment codes, etc., have increasingly come to the fore as major determinants of market access.

**Fast evolving context**

The world is becoming more populated, connected, interdependent, complex and with new security challenges. More frequent and more devastating climate change impacts threaten social and economic stability. This makes our global environment more unpredictable, creating instability, but also opening new opportunities. The adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the new global commitments to tackle climate change represents a historic shift in the way the international community is working together on sustainable development. Yet, existing commitments are not always translated into effective action, and at times they are not fully in line with EU interests and ambitions.

Global challenges, by definition cannot be addressed by the EU alone. These challenges have a huge potential impact on the EU’s sustainable development. In this regard, climate change is often cited as it remains the single most pressing environmental issue posing serious threats to the achievement of sustainable development in the EU and all around the world. The globalisation is strengthening the interdependence for all actors. Yet, globalisation patterns are increasingly driven by actors with different values and agendas, thus requiring political dialogue centred on obtaining consensus on key common interests.
3. Evaluation questions

The CPA is assessed according to the following evaluation criteria.

Relevance
To what extent are the objectives and assumptions of the CPA still valid, i.e. responding to critical needs and problems? What were the changes in the general context during the period under assessment and what were their driving factors?

Effectiveness
To what extent have the objectives of the CPA been achieved or are in the process of being achieved? The determining factors which influenced the achievement (or non-achievement) will be assessed as well.

Efficiency
Were the available tools, instruments and resources for the achieved changes used in an optimal manner and which factors were most influential (timeline, procedures, capacity, mal-governance)?

Sustainability
How sustainable are the achievements and are there possible trends?

Impact
What have been the effects of the interventions (including the unintended effects)?

Coherence
To what extent has the CPA been in line with wider EU policies and international obligations?

EU added value
What is the additional value resulting from the EU intervention(s) compared to what could be achieved by Member States?

In order to provide an assessment according to the above criteria, twelve questions (EQs), related to the main topics of the CPA, have been formulated. They shed light on some critical points of the intervention logics mentioned in the previous section. The replies to these questions provide the basis for the overarching conclusions on each evaluation criterion. Each question does not necessarily contribute to each single evaluation criterion. However, the questions taken together address the whole spectrum of evaluation criteria. The main conclusions of the evaluation by evaluation criteria are presented in section 7.
The following table presents an overview of the questions, their coverage and attribution to the respective articles and pillar of the CPA:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation question</th>
<th>Articles</th>
<th>Coverage</th>
<th>Pillar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To what extent has political dialogue at different levels (national, regional and through the joint ACP-EU institutions) facilitated the establishment of agreed priorities and shared agendas?</td>
<td>8-12</td>
<td></td>
<td>Political dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent have the mechanisms mentioned in the Articles 8, 96 and 97 (i.e. political dialogue, consultation procedure, appropriate measures, and suspension of the agreement) contributed to meaningful improvements in the field of the essential and fundamental elements (human rights, democratic principles, rule of law and good governance) in ACP countries?</td>
<td>2-3, 8-10, 96, 97</td>
<td></td>
<td>Human rights, democracy, rule of law and good governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent has the implementation of the different instruments and approaches of the CPA improved peace and security in ACP countries/regions and has enhanced their capacity to cope with crises?</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td>Peace and security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent have the provisions from Article 13 of the CPA contributed to meaningful improvements in addressing the structural constraints associated with the migratory flows?</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td>Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent have EU interventions under the CPA (new trading arrangements, dialogue, cooperation programmes) fostered the smooth and gradual integration of the ACP States into the world economy and enabled the ACP states to play a full part in international trade?</td>
<td>1,19, 34-38, 41-52</td>
<td></td>
<td>Integration of ACP states into the world economy and their share in international trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent has mutual cooperation between EU and ACP countries improved the identification and furthering of common interests in international fora?</td>
<td>39, 40</td>
<td></td>
<td>ACP-EU international economic and trade cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent has the CPA contributed to macroeconomic growth/stabilisation and institutional reforms and policies at national and regional level resulting in a favourable environment for investment and the development of the private sector?</td>
<td>21-24, 28-30</td>
<td></td>
<td>Macroeconomic reforms, private sector and investment, Social infrastructure and services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent has the CPA contributed to improved coverage, quality and access to basic social infrastructure and services?</td>
<td>25-27</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cross-cutting issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent has the CPA contributed to the attainment of substantial results on cross-cutting issues?</td>
<td>31-33</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent has the design and implementation of EU interventions adequately delivered on poverty reduction and addressed the needs of the most vulnerable groups?</td>
<td>1,19, 25-27</td>
<td></td>
<td>Poverty reduction and the needs of most vulnerable groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent has the work of the joint institutions contributed to the results achieved by the CPA?</td>
<td>14-17</td>
<td></td>
<td>Joint institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent has the EU mix of tools (instruments, approaches and financing modalities) and the co-management system contributed to reaching the goals of the ACP-EU partnership?</td>
<td>4-7, 55-83</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mix of tools</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. Method

How was the evaluation carried out and over what time period?

The methodology of this evaluation of the CPA has essentially followed the approach established by the EU for conducting strategic evaluations of external assistance and by the Better Regulation guidelines. It analysed the EU strategy towards the ACP from conception to implementation, assessing the results of EU financial and non-financial activities between 2000 and 2015.

It provides information to help understand how far the objectives of the CPA have been reached and why, and how far the Agreement has contributed to reduce poverty in ACP countries, to enhance peace and security, and to strengthen their role in international economic relationship. It contributes to the Impact Assessment and the future recommendation to the Council for a new partnership between the European Union and the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries after 2020.

Actors

The evaluation was steered by a core team of the Post-Cotonou Taskforce. To conduct the evaluation work, the Commission set up a taskforce with representatives of the main units involved in the implementation of the CPA. Other Commission services and the European External Action Service (EEAS) were associated, so that all chapters (development cooperation, political dimension and trade cooperation) could be reviewed. The taskforce members provided inputs according to their respective fields of competence to the above mentioned topics and questions of the evaluation.

Evidence base

It is a mixed evaluation based on several inputs:

1. A targeted consultation phase took place in spring 2015, with seven thematic Round Tables in different EU Member States (Brussels, The Hague, Bonn, Paris, Luxembourg, London and Riga) to analyse and evaluate different aspects (backward and forward looking) of the CPA.

2. A public consultation: The European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy launched on 6 October 2015 a public consultation meant to take stock of the current Partnership Agreement, to explore the extent to which it remains valid for the future and offers a platform to advance joint interests. It put forward key questions pertaining to the partnership and relations between

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the EU and the ACP countries after 2020. The replies to the consultation were analysed and presented in a final report, which was made available in March 2016.9

3. An internal survey addressed to EU delegations: In parallel to the public consultation, an internal survey was launched on 22 October 2015 in order to capture the opinions and experience of staff in the field about different aspects of the CPA. EU delegations consulted Member States’ Embassies in the process and reflected a collective assessment.

4. Review of the strategic evaluations managed by DEVCO (2000-2015). The DEVCO Evaluation Unit, through a competitive tender, contracted an external consultant to conduct a study10 that covered the 111 geographical (country and regional), and thematic and aid modalities evaluations related to ACP countries, managed by the Joint Evaluation Unit since 2000 (see Annex 3 for the methodological approach and Annex 4 for the list of evaluations).

5. Contributions from Commission services and the EEAS: The ‘Post-Cotonou’ task force conducted various consultations with EU institutions’ services in Brussels, on the basis of the 12 evaluation questions (EQ) and the related judgment criteria (JC). The various services answered one or more EQs, according to their areas of expertise. Abundant background material was also provided to the task force, which was used to prepare the final answers to the EQs as reported in Section 6 of this evaluation.

Robustness of the findings

A main part of the evidence base of the evaluation comes from the review of existing strategic evaluations which summarises the reliability of the available data as follows11. Reviewing a total amount of 111 evaluation reports called for a systematic approach to data analysis. The reports were clustered in three categories based on their relevance (high, partial and limited) for the following benefits:

- adding a qualitative dimension: A greater weight was attributed to segments extracted from reports considered as highly relevant, which facilitated and sped up the analysing and synthesising processes;
- a quicker and more focused extraction process: Documents were treated differently based on their category and the search of relevant pieces of information was done with high precision.

A set of codes represented the backbone of the data extraction process. These codes guided the analysis of the reports and helped structure the mass of information and establish direct links to the Evaluation Questions. The synthesis of the findings has led to answering the EQs; where not possible, gaps of information have been identified. These gaps concerned the

11 See as well details in annex 3.
political dimension – including immigration - and the joint institutions and they have been mitigated and addressed by internal reviews and other available studies.

Furthermore, the review of the strategic evaluations provided an analysis of the level of evidence by Evaluation Question and Judgment Criteria. Three levels of evidence combine quantitative and qualitative aspects and have been defined as follows:

- High: Extensive and substantial information, thorough analysis on ACP countries and clear examples informing the JC occur with a high incidence; trends can be easily identified over time.
- Medium: Relevant and specific information and/or less focused analysis on ACP countries and/or a number of concrete examples informing the JC occur with a lower incidence; trends can be identified but not always confirmed.
- Low: Limited or no specific information on ACP countries and very few examples are available; it is not possible to establish trends over time.

The table in annex 3 presents the level of evidence linked to the EQs and the number of evaluations which fed into the respective EQs.

**Limitations of the findings**

A number of limitations (e.g. data, timing, etc.) were found during the evaluation process and, consequently, mitigating measures were taken (see above). With the earlier mentioned inputs, all evaluation criteria were supposed to be fully addressed. However, a main part of the evidence base of the evaluation comes from the review of existing strategic evaluations and what does not exist in those evaluations (or cannot be triangulated) cannot be correctly analysed and/or answered.

Information on coherence and EU added value is rather limited in the questions dealing with the trade and development cooperation pillars since the existing thematic and country evaluations did not provide sufficient information on these issues.
5. Implementation state of play

Political dimension

Since the entry into force of the CPA, the EU has established a regular political dialogue at country level with almost all ACP governments. Started in mid-2000’s with African countries and only recently with the Caribbean (after 2012) and Pacific islands (with some as recently as 2014, e.g. Papua New Guinea), structured bilateral political dialogue takes place at least once a year with the majority of ACP countries’ governments, and more often in many cases. Formal Article 8 political dialogue gathers, on one side, the EU ambassadors accredited to the respective partner country, headed by the Head of EU Delegation and, on the other side, a high-level delegation usually headed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the partner country or, in several African countries, by the Head of State or Government. It is a format for political dialogue only followed with the ACP countries. Exceptionally among ACP countries, EU senior officials have on many occasions led political dialogue with the Pacific countries.

Agendas of political dialogue have generally included a varying mix of domestic, regional and global issues, depending on the local context and the shared priorities at any given moment of both the EU and the host government. Whilst respect of essential and fundamental elements, particularly human rights and issues related to electoral processes and reforms have been systematically addressed with all ACP countries, they have played a much more significant role in relation to African countries, where they have generally dominated political dialogue agendas. For example, global issues and cooperation in international fora have been addressed more systematically and played a more important role in relation with the Caribbean countries than the rest of the ACP. In the Pacific, climate change and development cooperation issues have played a more significant role.

Economic and trade cooperation

The increased integration of the ACP States into the world economy is evidenced by their increased importance in trade flows, the ACP countries’ increasing WTO membership and the group’s increasing role in international trade negotiations. In terms of trade flows, ACP integration in global markets has seen a stronger increase than intraregional integration for most ACP regions and for the ACP group as a whole. For Sub-Saharan Africa, however, intra-regional trade share in total trade has increased from 16 % in 2000 to 24 % in 2014. For the Caribbean, the share has remained more or less stable over the period, whereas in the Pacific, it has increased from 1.3 % to 6.3 %.

ACP-EU trade has steadily grown since the signature of the CPA in 2000, regardless of the global financial and economic crisis which started in 2008/2009 and caused a brief temporary drop in the trade flows. Trade flows with the ACP more than doubled in the period 2000-2014, representing in 2014 5 % of EU exports (above the ASEAN) and 5.4 % of EU imports, up respectively from 1.5 % and 1.8 % in 2000. Clearly, the expiry of the non-reciprocal
Cotonou trade regime in 2007 had no adverse effect on the overall ACP-EU trade flows, as both exports and imports have steadily grown since then. However, this has to be analysed towards the evolution of the trade arrangements between the parties. New arrangements for ACP-EU trade, the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), have been gradually introduced with the majority of ACP countries, coupled with the Market Access Regulation that has ensured duty-free quota-free access to the EU market in the transitional period before the implementation of the EPAs.

**Development cooperation**

**Sector priorities**

In 2000, the Commission issued a Communication on EU development policy\textsuperscript{12} which identified 6 priorities of EU development aid: i) the link between trade and development, ii) support for regional integration and cooperation, iii) support for macroeconomic policies, iv) transport, v) food security and sustainable rural development, and vi) institutional capacity building, particularly in the area of good governance and the rule of law.

EDF 9 was well aligned with these priorities, with the Fund principally targeting its resources on transport (30\%) and macroeconomic support for Poverty reduction including budget financing for PRSPs (23\%). Other major priorities of EDF 9 included institutional support / capacity building (11\%), food security / rural development (9\%) and social sectors (9\%). While the energy sector remained marginal until EDF 11, it was under EDF 9 that the ACP-EU Energy facility was established to finance projects aiming to increase access to energy services for the poor in ACP countries. The sector priorities of EDF 10 presented certain continuity with the previous EDF, giving main importance to infrastructure/transport and budget support.

The adoption of the Agenda for Change in 2012 marked a shift in the choice of sectors. For EDF 11 a strong preference was given to sectors contributing to inclusive and sustainable growth. Agriculture comes on top (21\%) and energy reached the fourth position (10\%) in the programming documents. EU investment in the agricultural sector marks a renewed global interest in the sector following the 2008 food crisis and the recognition of the importance of agriculture to alleviate poverty. Governance in its wide understanding (including support to public finances) still attracts 19\% of EDF

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programmed resources. Although transport is no longer the main focus of the EDF in the country programming, it remains the 3rd main sector, taking into account the important amounts foreseen in the regional programming. Awareness as regards climate change has much increased over the past years. While environment and natural resources account for 8% of EDF 11 programmed resources, climate and bio-diversity related actions will be tracked in all sectors. Finally, EDF 11 health accounts for 9%, education 5% and social protection 0.5%.

**Assessment in qualitative terms**

- **Presented by the EU Monitoring (ROM)**

  The evidence-based ‘Results-Oriented Monitoring (ROM) ACP Results Study 2000-13’ is based on six regions and 5621 ROM reports on 3671 projects that correspond to 42% of the active ACP & OCT portfolio and represent 56% in terms of financial commitments. The study concerned the five Development Assistance Criteria (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, sustainability) in line with the ROM methodology itself. The time range covers the period 2000-13, in practice going back to 1998 for EDF 8 projects. Projects examined fall under EDF 8, 9, 10 and 11. The wealth of quantitative data, including their limitations, has been complemented by a qualitative approach aiming at gathering information on the causal factors to explain variations and trends.

  - **ACP aggregated performance**

    Overall, the ACP aggregated performance rates are close or below the EU average. The EU average is calculated on the basis of the aggregated performance of each of the regions applying the ROM methodology (besides ACP, Western Balkans, Neighbourhood, Asia, and Latin America). ACP relevance/quality of design and impact are close to the EU average (respectively, 72% and 70% against 75% and 72% for the EU). ACP efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability score considerably lower (respectively, 53% for the first criteria and 57% for the last one against 63-62-64% for the EU). Although the same approach applied to the 5 regions, thus allowing for overall quantitative comparability, it would be hazardous to draw further qualitative conclusions given the specificities of the ROM by region and the changing nature of contexts and conditions.

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14 ROM is based on specific eligibility criteria. Therefore, the sample is not random. Statistically speaking, the data are substantial but not representative.
15 The study is composed of 6 geographical reports, 3 thematic reports, and 1 general report. The qualitative approach has produced 99 country profiles and 61 sector case-studies.
- **ACP overall performance by criteria**

  Given its time range, the study focused on the long term trends by type of criterion. Performance rates are used for (i) comparative analysis (rates of a portfolio compared to average) and (ii) time bound analysis (evolution of the rate over time).

  Overall, strong improvements in relevance/quality of design were observed, with a sharp increase between EDF 8 (55.6 %) and 10 EDF (91.3 %). Such a performance is at least partly linked to the introduction of the internal quality assurance system.

  The rate of sustainability also improved steadily over time, from 46.3 % under the EDF 8 to 59.4 % under EDF 10. However, sustainability in the ACP region scored lower than in other regions. Overall, it is difficult to determine a clear evolution pattern. Moreover, ROM reports may contain a considerable bias depending upon the stage of the project cycle: theoretical assessments made at inception may have to face with reality over time.

  Efficiency and effectiveness show a similar pattern and are, overall, stationary (both experienced a low peak under EDF 9 but otherwise never reached 60 %). Improvements in relevance/design were not sufficient to considerably influence the efficiency rating. Trends analysis for effectiveness is inconclusive.

  Finally, impact assessment in the ROM methodology is faced with the limitations affecting effectiveness. Due to the difficulty in measuring the contribution of the project purpose to its overall goal, impact may be subjective and reflect a theoretical stand.

- **Some insights on performance by criteria**

  A few positive correlations could be drawn. Both involve the type of implementing partners, in terms of relevance/quality of design and efficiency.

  In terms of relevance/quality of design, over time, the advantage of Non State Actors (NSAs) as compared to public administration (and even regional bodies) has been narrowing (public administration having steadily improved, while international NSAs have maintained their performance over the past ten years). The same can be observed in terms of efficiency. International NSAs were still performing well while public administration slowly improved their efficiency rate (they were both scoring around 60 % in 2013).

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16 Efficiency reached 56.6 % at the end of the period, while effectiveness reached 52.8 %.
17 Impact improved from 67 % under the EDF 8 to 80.3 % under EDF 10. According to the conclusions of the study, it tends to reflect the improvement of design, not the stagnating rates of effectiveness.
18 Five categories of agents were identified: public administration, international NSA, regional bodies, UN agencies, local NSA. Here, they are quoted according to their decreasing weight in terms of level of funds. In terms of number of entities, international NSA score the highest followed by public administration, while UN agencies slightly outnumber regional bodies.
In terms of sustainability, it is important to underline that social sustainability (e.g. ownership by target groups, transfer of responsibility) did not represent a major constraint, while financial sustainability remains an issue (53% all ACP). Overall, ACP regional sustainability rates reflect the political and governance issues of several countries, including fragile ones. The analysis by sector resulted in no clear overall trend in performance.

- Presented by external reviews

Beside reviews internal to the European institutions, development aid actors contribute to thinking and analysis of EU development aid results and effectiveness. In this light, two main review exercises undertaken by the OECD\(^{19}\) and DFID\(^{20}\) have comprehensively analysed the effectiveness and performance of European development assistance, with specific focus on the EDF. Furthermore the ECDPM published (January 2016) a report on the future of ACP-EU relations.\(^{21}\)

DFID’s Multilateral Aid Review (MAR) ranked the EDF at the 11\(^{th}\) position (out of the 43 of multilateral organisations reviewed) for its ‘very good value for money’.\(^{22}\) Financial management of the EDF was significantly improved since the EDF 9 which introduced a sunset clause preventing the rollover of uncommitted balances to the next EDF. In this light, financial resource management is widely satisfactory and the EDF is now recognised for its ‘strong financial accountability processes, and clear and transparent resource allocation procedures based on need and performance’.\(^{23}\)

In spite of certain limitations (inflexible/cumbersome rules and limited flexibility after funds have been programmed, weak implementation of gender strategy, absence of results-framework), it also stressed several positive points (unique partnership model highly appreciated in country and accompanied by political dialogue, strong monitoring and financial management systems, moderate administration costs, high predictability of funding, allocations based on needs and performance, high levels of budget support with results-based tranches). By its sheer size and poverty focus, DFID considered the EDF was ‘critical to (...) achieving the MDGs’. As shown in the MAR update in 2013, the European Commission had already rectified some of the major weaknesses by establishing a result framework and developing a Gender Action Plan.

The comprehensive ‘Peer review’ carried out by the OEDC (2012) recognised the instrumental role of the EU in advancing a number of key global issues such as financing for development, aid effectiveness and policy coherence for development referring to the

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20 DFID, Multilateral Aid Review (2011) and Update (2013).
21 Policy management report 21: The future of ACP-EU relations — A political economy analysis.
22 Most of the organisations with better scoring were humanitarian agencies (ICRC, CERF, OCHA, UNHCR …).
23 See supra DFID (2011).
European Consensus on Development. Devolution of authorities to Delegations is widely seen as a successful step in modernising EU development cooperation, even though the review called for further devolution of responsibilities to the Delegations which however did not appear to be possible in the institutional set up of the implementation of EU external assistance. It recognised that the Lisbon Treaty would give the EU a stronger role in international debates, including on development cooperation. While the duration of programming cycle (5 to 7 years) enables high predictability of funding, the OECD insisted that the annual predictability could be improved in practice. It also pointed out slowness and lack of flexibility as a major challenge hindering the implementation of the EDF and delaying disbursements. The EDF is positively perceived by Member States which recognise the added value of the EU for the volume of funding it can provide and ability to scale-up existing successful initiatives.24

The ECDPM report stressed the importance for the CPA review process to address a set of essential questions based on 15 years of CPA implementation and important changes in the international context. The questions concern the rationale to maintain the partnership; were the objectives of the CPA reached; the tools of the partnership; the future added value of the ACP group; the link between the ACP-EU partnership and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The report underlines that a business as usual approach will not suffice and that it is in the interest of all parties to ensure an open, well-informed and result-oriented debate on the future of the partnership.

Assessment in quantitative terms25

- Implementation: allocations commitments and payments

Under the CPA, more than EUR 66 billion has been allocated to the ACP countries with a part of EDF 8 and the entire EDF 9, 10 and 11. The tables below show the net amounts in current prices allocated under each Fund and the percentages by region. Overall allocations increased considerably under the CPA, while the regional allocations more than doubled from one EDF to the next. The geographical breakdown remained relatively stable over the period with a strong focus on Africa with 77 % of the total allocations, while the countries in the Caribbean and Pacific received respectively 6 % and 2 % of the allocations. The remaining 15 % concern the intra-ACP resources, that are used when national and/or regional action proves impossible or less effective. A good example is the African Peace Facility which uses approximately 25 % of the intra-ACP resources.

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24 See supra OECD (2012).
25 Source: Annual Reports 2010-2014 on the European Union’s development and external assistance policies and their implementation; DEVCO annual Budget & EDF Implementation Reports.
Evolution of EDF appropriations by 31.12.2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ALLOCATION</th>
<th>EDF 8</th>
<th>EDF 9</th>
<th>EDF 10</th>
<th>EDF 11</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A Envelope - National Allocations</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>8,955</td>
<td>13,703</td>
<td>14,799</td>
<td>37,875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Envelope - National Allocations</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>1,232</td>
<td>2,035</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>3,788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional allocations</td>
<td>1,441</td>
<td>2,018</td>
<td>5,640</td>
<td>8,504</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intra-ACP allocations</td>
<td>3,833</td>
<td>3,590</td>
<td>9,567</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserves</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4,089</td>
<td>4,175</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>761</td>
<td>995</td>
<td>1,071</td>
<td>2,337</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>654</td>
<td>14,938</td>
<td>21,181</td>
<td>29,453</td>
<td>66,227</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The level of implementation can be assessed by the level of commitments, contracts and payments and their proportion of the allocations.

The implementation of EDF 8 and 9 is practically completed (close to 100%). For EDF 10, the levels of contracting and payments are respectively 90% and 70%, meaning that a number of projects are still ongoing. EDF 11 is still at the beginning of its implementation period which explains the current levels of commitments (22%), contracts (14%) and payments (5%).

### Implementation of EDF at 31.12.2015

Aid programming and allocations are adopted in the beginning of the implementation period; specific programmes are then identified and formulated for the Commission to make financing decisions. Decisions continue to be adopted until the end of the EDF period which marks the limit for financial commitments. Over the period the average yearly commitments amount to EUR 3 202 million while the average yearly payments are around EUR 2 692 million. The payment level has increased steadily over the period from EUR 2 billion to EUR 3.5 billion/year related to the increasing allocations for the different EDF’s.
During the year 2014 the EU external aid comprising Budget and EDF resources amounted to 7% of the overall budget. DG DEVCO managed 65% of this envelope while EDF resources directly related to the CPA amounted to 0.9% of the total Commission Budget. Before the entry into force of EDF 11, financial commitments were made under a transitional facility, with limited endowments from previous EDFs, which explains the low level of commitments in 2014. It is estimated that during the period between 2002 and 2015 EDF resources fluctuated between 1 and 3% of total Commission budget.
External assistance by main OECD sectors

Sector breakdown ACP compared to overall external assistance (commitments)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector of Destination</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social infrastructures, education, health, water, government and civil society, other</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic infrastructures and services: transport, communications, energy, other services</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production, agriculture, forestry and fishing, industry, mining and construction, trade and tourism</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water/urban/transport; environment, other</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social infrastructures, education, health, water, government and civil society, other</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget support, food aid, food security</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian aid; Emergency response, reconstruction relief and rehabilitation, disaster prevention and preparedness</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other/Unallocated; admin costs, unspecified</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The commitments concerning social infrastructures have increased over the period for both ACP and overall external assistance; those on economic infrastructures were more or less stable while commitments for budget support have significantly decreased by the end of the period. The relative importance of the commitments on social infrastructures is about the same for EDF and overall external assistance, while the relative importance of commitments on economic infrastructures and budget support is considerable higher for the EDF as compared to the overall external assistance.

Monitoring arrangements

The management and the monitoring of the EU external assistance are to a large extent devolved from HQ to EU Delegations and monitoring reports are used to inform HQ services. The annual External Assistance Management Report (EAMR) is a structured report providing an overview of the activities of a Delegation. However, it does not report in detail on individual projects beyond flagging on their performance and mentioning implementation issues that need to be brought to the attention of the concerned Director in HQ.

Reform of reporting principles and modalities on the basis of monitoring activities is underway. Noteworthy is the introduction of reporting on results, on the basis of the new EU Results Framework, which is based on project reporting on results, at present in relation to projects completed in a given year. In the future it should be replaced by annual performance and results reporting on on-going projects. The quest for improvement of the project cycle management has also led to the identification of the limitations of the existing information management systems used by DEVCO and to the decision to conceive and develop a new operational management information system (OPSYS). Indeed, improved monitoring and reporting systems require setting up new information management systems. Interesting in this regard is the planned possibility for implementing partners to report on activities and to
communicate results directly into the new operational information management systems - which EU staff would be requested to validate/reject/comment.

The newly adopted EU Results framework will increase accountability and transparency and demonstrate to external stakeholders how the EU contributes to development progress in the countries and regions to which it provides development assistance. It also provides relevant information to inform internal management decisions, thus strengthening the framework for ensuring effectiveness of EU financed development aid.

Besides, the EU also makes use of external expertise to review projects (Results Oriented Monitoring - ROM) as well as to evaluate development cooperation actions. The approach towards the use of ROM has been fully revised and the methodology for ROM missions has been substantially improved in order to optimise their use. The focus is in particular on projects for which strengthened monitoring is required or for which the Delegations do not have the required expertise at a given point of time, which the Delegations could not visit or which are innovative.
6. Answers to the evaluation questions

1. To what extent has political and policy dialogue at different levels (national, regional and through the joint ACP-EU institutions) facilitated the establishment of agreed priorities and shared agendas?

Political dialogue in the CPA framework

The political dimension is one of the innovations introduced in the ACP-EU partnership by the CPA (Articles 8-13). As defined in Article 8 of the CPA, political dialogue offers the basis and the framework for regular, comprehensive, balanced and deep political dialogue with the ACP countries at national, regional or all-ACP level, on any subject of common, general or regional interest, including cooperation strategies. The objective of the dialogue is to exchange information, foster mutual understanding and to facilitate the establishment of agreed priorities and shared agendas, facilitate consultations and strengthen cooperation between the Parties within the international fora.

Flexibility is the key feature and the main asset of political dialogue (as noted also in the ACP-EU guidelines for Article 8 political dialogue, endorsed by the ACP-EU Joint Council in 2003), making it an efficient tool in terms of content (covering issues of common interest, e.g. regional developments or global issues or of specific interest to any of the parties), format (involvement of appropriate interlocutors) and modalities (formal or informal, according to the need; frequency; agenda, etc.), adapted to each specific circumstance.

Country level/bilateral political dialogue

Article 8 on political dialogue has proved relevant in taking stock of cooperation and ensuring continuity of bilateral relations; has been an efficient framework for high-level, frank and open exchanges, including, in many cases, on sensitive issues, that have in turn strengthened trust and fostered better mutual understanding. It has proved an efficient platform for the EU to explain and promote its interests and values, encourage policies and maintain pressure for reforms. However, going beyond exchanges of views has proved difficult, follow-up has been limited across the board and generally EU-driven, although in a number of cases, there is agreement to take work forward jointly at technical level through the setting up of joint working structures or task forces with the Government (e.g. Rwanda, Ethiopia — on economic issues and media freedom or Swaziland — a Business Environment working group to facilitate inclusive dialogue among stakeholders, including on human rights and good governance FDI related).

Quality of political dialogue has improved over the last years, with initial significant focus on essential elements being gradually broadened to include issues of wider interest to both the EU and ACP countries, such as tackling regional security challenges, promoting better investment or promoting cooperation within international fora, for example, through
exchanges on post-2015 development agenda or climate change. However, continued efforts on both the EU and ACP side are still necessary to realise its full potential as a relevant tool for promoting EU and/or ACP interests and for improving engagement in international fora. As Article 8 political dialogue is often perceived by the ACP countries to be an EU-driven process, and allowed it to be so, it can be argued that ACP countries have also not made full use of political dialogue as a tool to enhance their partnership with the EU. Many of them have rarely proactively sought dialogue on issues going beyond the domestic remit, have not involved themselves actively in setting the agenda for the dialogue or following it up and many are still reluctant to have political dialogue.

Political dialogue is more established, mature and effective in some cases than in others. For a number of African countries, a stronger political relationship has been developed on the foundation of Article 8 and the political dimension of the Cotonou Agreement (CPA), inspired by the broader political framework provided by the Joint-Africa EU Strategy (JAES) and the acknowledgment of strong political interests in closer ties. That was the case with the EU-Cape Verde Special Partnership, the Strategic Partnership with South Africa and the enhanced political dialogue and cooperation with Nigeria, Angola and more recently, Ethiopia in the context of so-called ‘Joint Way Forward’. Annual ministerial dialogues, followed up by regular sector dialogues and cooperation in areas of mutual interests underpin these partnerships, as well as annual summits in the case of South Africa.

In many ACP countries (depending also on how ACP governments have organised their cooperation locally with international donors), political dialogue is complemented by ‘policy dialogue’, allowing to discuss in more depth different sector policies and areas for cooperation, in close connection with EU development funding. These ‘policy dialogues’ are typically held with line Ministries (of ACP countries) and aim to jointly agree benchmarks in terms of policy commitments or assess their implementation within the framework of development programmes, typically budget support programmes.

Budget support is, in principle, an efficient key tool, where it is used, for establishing shared priorities and ensuring that the financial and technical resources put in place are used accordingly (Mozambique, Uganda, Burkina Faso and others). In the last decade, budget support seems to have partly lost some of its leverage, especially in the fast growing countries, due to its reduced financial weight on recipients’ budgets and also to reasons related to a change of priorities among both the partner countries and the EU Member States.

Conducting in parallel both political and policy dialogue can be a real challenge. The Budget Support evaluations show that synergies between the two vary from strong and delivering effective results to weaker, uncoordinated outcomes. Whilst these processes are and should remain distinct, they can valuably feed into each other as obviously the outcome of policy dialogues may provide useful insights for political dialogue meetings and vice versa.
Political dialogue at regional level

The EU has undertaken political dialogue at ministerial level with a number of regional organisations — underlining the added value of the EU — taking into account their specific competences. Regular and structured political dialogue has been taken forward with ECOWAS and SADC, at senior officials and ministerial level, annually, to the extent possible, since the early 90’s. Political dialogue with CARIFORUM was inaugurated at ministerial level in 2010 and is taken forward on an annual basis, complemented by High Level Meetings, at heads of state or government level, every two years. Ministerial political dialogue with IGAD started in 2003 and has taken place six times so far.

In parallel with the signature of the Cotonou Agreement, the EU laid the foundations for dialogue with the African continent, formalised at the 1st EU-Africa summit in Cairo in 2000. The African Union emerged in 2002, projecting an increased pan-African ambition and endowed with a new institutional framework facilitating dialogue with the rest of the world. Political dialogue with the African Union was subsequently enhanced at various levels, further confirmed and enriched through the adoption of the Joint Africa EU-Strategy (JAES) at the second summit in Lisbon, in 2007. Summit level meetings, with very good turnout on both sides, have further taken place in 2010 in Libya and 2014 in Brussels. In addition, the annual meetings of College to College as well as of PSC to PSC meetings bear witness of the dynamism of the EU Africa partnership.

In coherence with wider EU policies, dialogues have addressed a wide range of issues of mutual interest: peace, security and stability issues, including specific crisis situations; upcoming electoral processes in the regions concerned; economic and trade issues (particularly EPAs); development cooperation and EDF Regional Programming, including support to regional integration agendas and enhancing the institutional capacity of regional organisations; global issues and strengthening cooperation in international fora. Specific items, such as sustainable management of oceanic resources in the Pacific, maritime security with the Gulf of Guinea in West Africa have featured on the agenda as well.

Political dialogue with some regional organisations, i.e. ECOWAS and SADC, preceded the CPA. Established mostly out of a political need to promote regional ownership, stronger regional cooperation and action on issues of common concern, it has been driven forward by joint interests. Political dialogue with CARIFORUM and the Pacific Islands Forum was inspired by the Article 8 of the CPA, but it has been taken forward in the wider political framework of regional political strategies adopted more recently, i.e. the Joint EU-Caribbean Strategy (2012), the Strategy for a strengthened partnership between the EU and the Pacific Islands (2006) and the EU Development Strategy for the Pacific (2012). The EU-CARIFORUM framework, strongly encouraged by the EU, has the advantage of being the only forum with the whole Caribbean region, and it is an important building block for wider formats (EU-CELAC). The simultaneous membership of CELAC and ACP provides additional opportunities for the Caribbean countries; importantly, this dual membership is
fully compatible with, and provides additional clout for, bilateral political dialogue under the CPA.

Successive revisions of the CPA have recognised and contributed to the strengthening of dialogue and cooperation with regional organisations, by increasing their role in the management of the EDF Regional Cooperation Programmes and the APF. In several cases, participating in negotiations on the Economic Partnership Agreements, as empowered by their constituent countries has also contributed to strengthening their role and relations with the EU. Dialogue and cooperation with regional organisations has made use of the different instruments the CPA provides, but also of wider EU instruments.

Political dialogue with regional organisations has showed a positive impact by fostering better mutual understanding of positions, has allowed the EU to raise awareness on security issues with impact beyond the region and promote more regional ownership over issues such as maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea or drug trafficking in West Africa. It has allowed for coordinated or joint messages, coherent approaches and unity of action in specific crisis situations, for example on Madagascar and Lesotho with SADC, on Guinea Bissau with ECOWAS, or on Somalia with IGAD, including through joint missions on the ground. Several joint assessment missions AU-UN-EU-ECOWAS-CPLP to Guinea Bissau in 2012-2013 have helped maintain international attention on the situation on the ground and in formulating recommendations for international support. A joint EU-IGAD confidence-building mission to Kismayo (Somalia) took place in 2013 to collect views on state formation.

Political dialogue with regional organisations has also contributed to the identification of concrete opportunities for support, for example, under the EDF’s African Peace Facility (e.g. support to the IGAD South Sudan Monitoring and Verification Mechanism, support to ECOWAS’ ECOMIB or CEEAC’s MICOPAX).

To sum up

Formal political dialogue is a young feature of a long-standing ACP-EU relationship and is work in progress. With formal EU political dialogue having started in the last 10 years and in some cases, much more recently, the fact that it takes place regularly and with a constant high level participation and turnover from partners is a relevant basis on which to further build political relations.

Political dialogue is increasingly seen as a process, in which the formal Article 8 session is one, albeit important, milestone, complementary to a variety of contacts and interactions at different levels (informal meetings, policy dialogues, diplomatic demarches, etc.) and it is nurtured on a daily basis.

Conducting in parallel both political and policy dialogue is a real challenge at times. The evaluations show cases where such combinations have been either effective or weak. However, both processes are distinct, whilst obviously the outcome of policy dialogues may provide useful insights for political dialogue meetings and vice versa.
At country level, political dialogue has efficiently enabled regular exchange of views on an increasingly wider set of issues, both domestic and related to global issues, and has contributed to fostering better mutual understanding and to identification of common priorities. In recent years, it has also led, in several cases, and particularly with those countries with which a more sophisticated partnership has been put in place, to the establishment of concrete follow-up and sector cooperation mechanisms at different levels. However, continued engagement on both the EU and ACP side are necessary to realise the full potential of the partnership in promoting joint interests and effective cooperation in international fora. Political dialogue with regional organisations has fostered better mutual understanding of positions, has allowed the EU to raise awareness on security issues with impact beyond the region and promote more regional ownership over issues such as maritime security or drug trafficking.
2. To what extent have the mechanisms mentioned in the Articles 8, 96 and 97 (i.e. political dialogue, consultation procedure, appropriate measures, and suspension of the agreement) contributed to meaningful improvements in the field of the essential and fundamental elements (human rights, democratic principles, rule of law and good governance) in ACP countries?

Global developments: Greater stability and accountability, but deteriorating effectiveness of governments and regulation

Available time-series on fundamental rights and good governance performances across ACP countries, suggest a dilemma emerging in terms of a trade-off between: greater accountability and stability through time, with reduced rule of law, quality of regulation, governmental effectiveness as well as control of corruption. Such data are based on a wide range of different performances across sub-regional and national performances, and as such the emerging message might be misleading. Nonetheless, a certain element of concern in the current performance of ACP countries in terms of good governance is certainly suggested (particularly so in SSA countries, where scoring is generally lower than in the ACP region considered as a whole).

ACP: Good Governance Performances

![Graph showing ACP: Good Governance Performances](Image)

**Source:** Word Bank (Good Governance Indicators)

Essential and fundamental elements in the CPA framework

Besides providing a clear framework for carrying out political dialogue under Article 8 (see EQ 1), the CPA political dimension defines essential elements regarding human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law’ and the fundamental element regarding good governance (Article 9), and provides for a consultation procedure and possible appropriate measures in case of a failure to fulfil an obligation related to the essential elements (Article 96) or serious cases of corruption (Article 97).

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26 Percentile rank indicates the country’s rank among all countries covered by the aggregate indicator, with 0 corresponding to lowest rank, and 100 to highest rank.
The references to democracy, human rights and the rule of law as ‘essential elements’ of cooperation, as well as provisions on possible appropriate measures to be adopted in the event of violations was largely a response to serious governance challenges in certain ACP states that were a liability to the partnership as a whole and to the use of EDF resources in particular. Note that Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between ACP partners and the EU are explicitly based on the ‘essential elements’ of the Cotonou Agreement and refer to the appropriate measures under the Cotonou Agreement in their non-execution clauses. In practice, this means that trade preferences under the EPA could be suspended following the suspension mechanism of the CPA, if a party acted in breach of the essential elements clause.

**Human rights, democratic principles, rule of law and good governance**

- In the framework of Article 8 political dialogue

In general, the EP studies\(^{27}\) and the EEAS internal reviews\(^{28}\) point at the relevance of holding these dialogues as an efficient way of keeping communication channels open with governments on these issues. However, a number of major challenges are identified: geopolitical, security and economic interests may interfere and water down EU positioning in favour of human rights in a given country; little ownership and commitment by governments regarding the dialogue (making it an EU-led process); lack of political will to change or improve the human rights situation; resistance by some ACP governments to address politically sensitive or taboo issues like LGBTI issues, death penalty, ICC, etc. A recent study by the European Parliament\(^{29}\) mentions in this respect the benefit that such a dialogue may have as a ‘lifeline’ to CSOs working on human rights, particularly in repressive environments.

Political dialogues on democracy, governance and human rights have rather gained ground under the regional frameworks that the EU and ACP countries have concluded throughout the years, notably the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (a human rights dialogue between the EU and the AU takes place annually\(^{30}\)); the EU-CARIFORUM and EU-Pacific Islands Forum. This approach was promoted by the EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy (2012); it is difficult to assess whether these regional dialogues are more effective than bilateral ones.

\(^{27}\) EP study ‘Political dialogue on Human Rights under Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement’ (2014) — Also relevant for this evaluation is the EP report on the use of the political instruments for the protection of Human Rights, democracy and the rule of law under the Cotonou Agreement of 2007.

\(^{28}\) See footnote 25 above. A separate internal EU review on how human rights issues are addressed during in Article 8 political dialogue was conducted in 2014-2015.


\(^{30}\) The African Union has beefed up its normative framework for democratic governance on the continent, specifically in the area of unconstitutional changes in government. This is particularly relevant because, with the exception of Fiji and Haiti, all Article 96 consultations have been with AU Member States.
The CPA, compared with agreements in other regions of the world, has by far the most substantial essential elements clause and accompanying legal instruments for dealing with non-execution. The CPA’s legal and institutional architecture that enables them to engage with the ACP around shared values therefore has a clear added value, and is often perceived as a ‘unique’ aspect compared with EU policy frameworks with other partner countries or regions. The table in next page makes a basic comparison between the political dialogue components of the CPA and a select number of other EU agreements with non-EU (‘third’) countries that have a trade dimension as well as a political dialogue component. In practice, while Article 96 tends to be applied comparatively regularly, the essential elements clauses in the other agreements are rarely invoked. More targeted CFSP measures and a review of support strategies are often preferred instead for those countries than the suspension of aid cooperation.

**Comparison of political dialogue and conditionality components of selected agreements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Framework for political dialogue</th>
<th>Essential elements clause</th>
<th>Specific reference to human rights in international law</th>
<th>Specific reference to democratic principles</th>
<th>Dispute settlement mechanism</th>
<th>Option for appropriate measures</th>
<th>Invocation of dispute settlement &amp; appropriate measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colombo Partnership Agreement: all ACP countries</td>
<td>Detailed (art 9-13)</td>
<td>Comprehensive</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Selectively yet regularly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements (EMAs)</td>
<td>Concise</td>
<td>Yes, with variation in terms of specific legal instruments referred to</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Rare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) with post-communist countries</td>
<td>Concise</td>
<td>Yes, with variation in terms of specific legal instruments referred to</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Rare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Lisbon PCAs: ASEAN member states (Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia) and Iraq</td>
<td>Concise</td>
<td>Yes, with variation in terms of specific legal instruments referred to</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


- In the framework of Articles 96 and 97

Formal consultations under Article 96 are foreseen in the case of a failure by a party to respect an obligation related to the essential elements of the CPA. Article 96 is clearly designed as a measure of last resort ([Art. 96 (1)(a)]: ‘all possible options for dialogue under Article 8’ [Art. 96 (1)(a)] must be exhausted, with two exceptions: in ‘cases of special urgency’ and in cases where ‘there is persistent lack of compliance with commitments taken by one of the Parties during an earlier dialogue, or by a failure to engage in dialogue in good faith’.
The 2005 review of the Cotonou Agreement reinforced the link between Article 8 and Article 96 by introducing the idea of intensifying dialogue on essential elements’, making it more systematic and formalised, where appropriate and in order to prevent situations arising in which recourse to Article 96 is deemed necessary (art. 8(8) and Annex VII). In practice, these provisions have been used only in two cases so far, very recently, and there is not enough evidence to assess its implementation or effectiveness.

### Article 96 Consultation procedures (2000-2015)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Start date of consultation procedure</th>
<th>End date of appropriate measures</th>
<th>Reasons for invoking art. 96</th>
<th>Appropriate measures taken</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>26/09/2000</td>
<td>31/12/2005</td>
<td>Irregularities during elections</td>
<td>Partial suspension of EDF aid and redirection towards civil society and private sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>19/10/2000</td>
<td>12/04/2001</td>
<td>Coup d’État</td>
<td>New EDF programmes subject to conditions of free and fair elections and the appointment of a legitimate government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>15/02/2001</td>
<td>30/06/2002</td>
<td>Irregularities during elections and involvement with human rights violations by the RUF, lack of freedom of the press and of expression; corruption</td>
<td>NIP instalments made conditional on free and fair elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>23/07/2001</td>
<td>22/02/2002</td>
<td>Irregularities during elections and advancement of HR and RoL</td>
<td>&quot;Smart sanctions&quot;, suspension of budget support and redirection of aid to civil society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>11/01/2002</td>
<td>20/08/2012</td>
<td>Irregularities during elections and deterioration of HR and RoL</td>
<td>“Smart sanctions”, suspension of budget support and redirection of aid to civil society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>22/05/2003</td>
<td>30/06/2005</td>
<td>Coup d’État</td>
<td>Macro-economic support suspended, depending on electoral plan and clearer public finance; complete resumption only after elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>19/01/2004</td>
<td>20/09/2004</td>
<td>Coup d’État</td>
<td>No suspension of aid and special funds for supporting transition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>14/04/2004</td>
<td>15/11/2007</td>
<td>Irregularities during elections</td>
<td>No suspension of aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>20/07/2004</td>
<td>14/04/2009</td>
<td>Irregularities during elections</td>
<td>Partial suspension of upcoming EDF aid, conditional on progress towards free and fair elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>30/11/2005</td>
<td>29/05/2006</td>
<td>Coup d’État</td>
<td>10th EDF CSP conditional on elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>18/04/2007</td>
<td>30/09/2013</td>
<td>Coup d’État</td>
<td>10th EDF CSP conditional on respect to commitments made; future sugar allocation subject to respect to commitments and new government in place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>20/10/2008</td>
<td>06/04/2009</td>
<td>Coup d’État</td>
<td>10th EDF budget support programme made conditional on full return to constitutional order; partial suspension of on-going support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>29/04/2009</td>
<td>02/12/2013</td>
<td>Coup d’État</td>
<td>Resumption of Debt relief programs and renegotiation of EDF CSP subject to regime change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>06/07/2009</td>
<td>06/12/2012</td>
<td>Coup d’État</td>
<td>EU took over NAO duties; suspension of budget support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Start date of consultation procedure</td>
<td>End date of appropriate measures</td>
<td>Reasons for invoking art. 96</td>
<td>Appropriate measures taken</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>08/12/2009</td>
<td>21/09/2010</td>
<td>Referendum for third mandate of President in view of Presidential elections</td>
<td>EU took over NAO duties. Partial suspension of aid and upcoming EDF funding made conditional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-</td>
<td>29/03/2011</td>
<td>01/07/2015</td>
<td>Deterioration of RoL and HR</td>
<td>Suspension of budget support and partial suspension of EDF projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bissau</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>26/10/2015</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>Disputed election and third term</td>
<td>Consultation procedure ongoing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Beke et al. (2014); Bradley (2005); Laakso, Kivimäki and Seppanen (2007); Mackie and Zinke (2005); Mbangu (2005). Various official Council documents

At first glance, the track record of Article 96 procedures looks overall positive (table above). To illustrate its impact, in five out of seven selected cases until 2007, the measures adopted following Article 96 consultations (mostly partial aid suspension) were considered to have achieved a positive result,31 i.e. promoting a return to democratic rule. These are: Central African Republic (2003-2005), Côte d’Ivoire (2000-2002), Fiji (2001-2003), Haiti (2001), and Togo (1993-1994/1998-2006).

In these cases, the positive outcome sprung from a number of conditions:32 (i) a strong partner-country willingness to engage, (ii) a coherent response from the entire international community (e.g. the heavy involvement of the Organisation of American States in the resolution of the Haitian democratic crisis in 2001); (iii) active involvement of the ACP Group, of neighbouring countries and of major regional organisations (e.g. in Guinea Bissau in 2003, where the active involvement of neighbouring countries, the UNSC, as well as of the ACP Group, increased the ability of Article 96 to generate positive changes in the country, or in Central African Republic in 2003).33

A recurrent criticism regards the inconsistent use of Article 96. It is pointed out that it is only used when the EU feels it can realistically influence a positive outcome. In this respect, the most likely trigger for the use of Article 96 is a coup d’état, closely followed by irregularities during elections.34 By contrast, no cases can be found where Human Rights violations constituted the only motive for holding consultations.35 This shows that the use of Article 96 is reactive rather than proactive, and that its consultation procedure, while being highly useful, does not allow going beyond solving the crises at hand, and remains ill-suited to provide for effective and lasting solutions to deep-rooted instability in weak states. The inconsistent use can be explained in part because Member States with

31 http://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2940&context=soss_research, Zimbabwe and Guinea Conakry at the time of the publication were the ‘negative exceptions’.
35 As an example, the Commission proposed in 2004 to re-open consultations with Côte d’Ivoire in view of the Human Rights breaches that followed the intensification of fighting in the north of the country that started in 2002. However, the Council rejected the proposal arguing that the threat of civil war would render Article 96 consultations ineffective.
strong links to the third party concerned may argue strongly either for or against it (although this phenomenon is not limited to the ACP countries).

Some researches point to the fact that the use of Article 96 has not always been coherent since the very beginning. They conclude that in practice it is not always clear whether or not the measures should be binding as well for Member States bilateral cooperation programmes with the country in question. The EU in some cases prefers ‘silent diplomacy’ instead of a consultation process that attracts public attention. In other cases (e.g. Zimbabwe and Burundi), Member states with strong ties have lobbied to invoke the clause in part in response to domestic pressures. The use made of Article 96 (also compared to the lack of use of the essential elements clause present in the Agreements with other countries or regions across the Globe or the possibilities offered by the TFEU (Article 218 (9)) or the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties (Article 60) to suspend partly or in its entirety the application of the Agreement) has given rise to criticism.

- In the framework of other instruments

The framework for addressing human rights and democracy in ACP-EU relations extends beyond the political mechanisms (Art. 8, 9, 96 and 97) of the Cotonou Agreement. The development pillar of the CPA provides instrumental tools to improve human rights, democracy and rule of law. The 10th EDF put forward a stronger vision of governance, based on both a holistic and an incentive approach, and linked its programming to the Article 8 political dialogue. EDF allocations for governance have progressively increased from 11.5% under the 9th EDF, to up to 13.4% under the 10th EDF, and to almost 30% under the 11th EDF.

Different governance-related areas have been financially supported. Budget support programmes have effectively contributed to improved public finance management (PFM) and budget transparency, and recently comprehensive thematic (or sector) approaches have been established (e.g. State Building Contracts). EU support to the judiciary in ACP

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38 https://www.eumonitor.nl/9353000/1/j0xvik7.m1c3gvxp/yj6ipmtx7.my0.
39 Already in 2006, the EU had launched the Governance Incentive Tranche (GIT) to support governance reform though positive conditionality. Though endowed with significant funds (EUR 2.7 billion from the 10th EDF), the desired changes did not materialise and the GIT quickly lost momentum, political traction and leverage capacity in the vast majority of ACP countries. Similar ‘Governance rewarding funds’ in other regions (for example ENP South and East) also lost their momentum and were deemed to be ‘paternalistic’.
countries, between 2000 and 2009 covered 65 projects/programs of various sizes for an amount of approximately EUR 590 million, including 12 post-conflict zones and three transitional justice projects. Target countries included Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Jamaica, Gambia, Niger, Nigeria, Malawi or Togo. Other areas supported with EDF funds included the reform of public administration and decentralisation (e.g. Benin, Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Madagascar, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, etc.) or the fight against corruption. Electoral assistance has featured high as a priority for EU support, along with electoral observation. The EU has deployed about 80 EOMs (out of a total of around 120) in ACP countries since 2000.41 These missions were aimed at increasing transparency of the electoral process and strengthening voters' confidence in the process by deterring fraud, abuse and electoral violence. Efforts to ensure effective follow-up to recommendations formulated by EOMs have increased in recent years. Recommendations have been consistently raised with all relevant interlocutors in partner countries, contributing to debates on improving the electoral framework and, hence to creating conditions for more inclusive political processes.

Legally binding

The CPA is a legally-binding framework for dialogue and cooperation between the EU and the ACP countries. A strong majority from the public consultation agrees that the legally-binding nature has been instrumental to its effective implementation. This has been more relevant for some of its provisions than others. On the one hand, the CPA has laid down the legal foundation for political dialogue (Article 8) and consultations (Article 96), which was particularly useful to engage in dialogue and consultation on human rights, democracy and rule of law — defined as essential elements of the CPA — including in cases of violations of these elements. On the other hand, the legally-binding nature of the CPA did not necessarily always ensure effective engagement in political dialogue nor did it result in full implementation of the agreement. This is illustrated by a number of provisions that have not been fully implemented often due to lack of political will (e.g. Article 6 on non-state actors, Article 13 on migration). There is also the criticism that legally-binding agreements do not provide enough room for flexibility and aim at the lowest common denominator.

To sum up

In some cases the partner countries consider discussions on human rights and fundamental principles as not consistent with their values and culture, resulting in a lack of political will to change or improve the human rights situation. Equally, the resistance by some ACP governments to address politically sensitive or taboo issues (LGBTI issues, death penalty, ICC, etc.) shows that the respect of fundamental principles has not yet the same priority for the different partners.

The use of Article 96 has not always been coherent and effective: it did provide a sound and legally-based procedure for mutual engagement on sensitive issues in a sensitive context and has led to a positive outcome in some cases, but the conclusion often was that parties agreed to disagree, and it did not necessarily lead to respect of the fundamental principles of the CPA. A recurrent criticism regards the inconsistent use of Article 96. It is pointed out that it is only used when the EU feels it can realistically influence a positive outcome. The EU in some cases prefers ‘silent diplomacy’ instead of a consultation process that attracts public attention.

The legally-binding nature of the CPA has been more relevant for some of its provisions than others. On the one hand, the CPA has laid down the legal foundation for political dialogue and consultations, which was useful to engage in dialogue and consultation on human rights, democracy and rule of law. On the other hand, the legally-binding nature of the CPA did not necessarily ensure real and effective engagement in political dialogue nor did it result in full implementation of the agreement. This is illustrated by a number of provisions that have not been fully implemented (e.g. Article 6 on non-state actors, Article 13 on migration).

Ultimately, the real effectiveness of the mechanisms mentioned in the Articles 8, 96 and 97 for meaningful improvements in the field of the essential and fundamental elements is determined by the political will on both sides and the willingness of neighbouring countries and regional institutions to weigh in.
3. To what extent has the implementation of the different instruments and approaches of the CPA improved peace and security in ACP countries/regions and has enhanced their capacity to cope with crises?

Global developments: Enduring conflicts, a threat for overall stability of Sub-Saharan Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Country count</th>
<th>Population in ACP conflict/fragile situations</th>
<th>Percentage of ACP total population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>205,764,478</td>
<td>24.2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10,413,211</td>
<td>1.2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1,890,609</td>
<td>0.2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>25</strong></td>
<td><strong>218,068,298</strong></td>
<td><strong>25.6 %</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: World Bank (2014)*

Peace and security in the CPA framework

Peace and security became a strategic area in ACP-EU relations from 2000 onwards, as peace-building and conflict prevention and resolution became an objective of the CPA. In that context and more particularly following the first Africa-EU Summit in Cairo in April that year, and as the EU’s CSDP (EU crisis management or stabilisation missions) was gaining ground, the EU’s foreign and security policy began to increasingly focus on Africa.

The first revision of the CPA in 2005, which needs to be seen in a post 9/11 context and as the EU adopted its first European Security Strategy in 2003, enlarged the scope of its security provisions to include the fight against terrorism (art.11A) and against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (art. 11B), which became a significant element of the CPA. ACP and EU countries also agreed, not without difficulties, to include a reference to the International Criminal Court and the Statute of Rome (Article 11 §6), which had entered into force in July 2002. The second revision of the CPA in 2010 took place in a context of key EU and international decisions in the areas of international development. The two revisions improved the coherence of the CPA with wider EU policies.

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44 The European Consensus on Development (2005), the EU’s Comprehensive Approach to fragility and conflict (2007), the EU Agenda for Change (2011), and internationally, the UN negotiations on the MDGs, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), the Accra Agenda for Action (2008), and the Busan New Deal of 2011, influenced the introduction on the CPA of the concept of state fragility and human security, the links between security and development, the recognition of poverty as a root cause of conflict, and the acknowledgment of new types of transnational security threats such as organised crime, piracy and trafficking of people, drugs and weapons (revised Article 11 CPA).
Despite the progressive enlargement of the security provisions under the binding Cotonou Agreement, the impact and effectiveness of the ACP-EU framework in promoting security and peace has been overshadowed by the growing political importance of the EU’s regional partnerships with the African, Caribbean and Pacific regions, developed within the framework of the CPA itself. This is particularly evident in the case of Africa, where most situations of conflict and fragility happen and where the EU and its Member States have the most evident geo-strategic interests, which explains why it has largely focused its attention on that continent since the 2000’s. It is in this context that the African Peace Facility (APF) was established in 2003, to provide the necessary means to support the African Union (not yet a partner of the ACP-EU partnership then) to engage in genuine African peace support operations. The CPA (art. 11) and the existence of the EDF outside the EU budget made possible to support in a comprehensive and integrated manner African efforts, particularly the provision of support to operations having military or defence implications, whose coverage under the Treaty on the EU (Article 41.2 TEU) would have been much more complex and uncertain.

The APF can therefore be considered an overall success of the CPA in the peace and security area, even though there are considerable financial management challenges. The support received under the APF to build the AU’s security capacities enhanced the AU’s ability to take ownership of and lead African efforts to bring about and sustain peace on the continent and turned it into the EU’s main interlocutor in this strategic area of the EU-Africa Partnership. This came at the expense of the ACP Group, whose role in this area has been negligible.

The success of the APF resulted in substantial increases of its funding over the years, increasing proportionally the management challenges, and in particular its financial management, mainly by the AUC. This combined with the fact that the financial management capacities of the AUC are not fully up to international standards as shown by the non-compliance of 3 out of 6 pillars in the pillar assessment, has led the European Commission to launch an internal audit which confirmed the need for closer monitoring of the management of the APF. The Commission decided to set up a special task force for assisting the AUC in improving the financial management of the APF. It therefore discussed and signed an Aide Memoire with the AUC, laying out the measures to strengthen the AUC’s financial management as well as the corresponding monitoring tool.

The African Union became a full partner of the ACP-EU relationship in 2010, when its leading role in peace building, conflict prevention and resolution and in tackling new or expanding security threats was recognised in the revised Article 11 CPA. A similar

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45 Decision No 3/2003 of the ACP-EC Council of Ministers of 11 December 2003 on the use of resources from the long-term development envelope of the 9th EDF for the creation of a Peace Facility for Africa.

46 Also outside the ACP-EU partnership, and the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, a number of (sub) regional approaches to EU external action, such as on the Great Lakes, Gulf of Guinea, Sahel, and Horn of Africa, set out EU political priorities and interests specifically in these regions, including on peace and security. These are important policy documents and as such influence the programming and benefit of EDF regional funds in Africa (e.g. Sahel strategy priorities in ECOWAS).
conclusion can be made with respect to the Caribbean (the Joint Caribbean-EU Partnership Strategy⁴⁷) and the Pacific (the 2006 Strategy for a Strengthened Partnership⁴⁸), although with a lesser impact than in the case with Africa, since the EU peace and security interests in these regions have a different profile than in the case of Africa.

At bilateral level, peace and security issues have also been part of the Article 8 political dialogue with a number of partners. Cases in point include drug trafficking (with Guyana, Suriname, Barbados, Mozambique and Liberia), international terrorism/ISIL (Trinidad and Tobago), piracy (Mozambique, Togo, Mauritius, Seychelles), organised crime, SALW and human trafficking (Senegal, Guinea and Liberia), or terrorism and radicalisation/Boko Haram (Benin, Niger, Angola, Côte d’Ivoire).

**CPA contribution to improvements in peace and security and conflict prevention in ACP countries and regions**

The relevance of the EU’s increasing support to ACP countries in the areas of peace and security (under the EDF and other EU financial and non-financial instruments) may be understood as well by looking at a number of key EU policies and strategies in this area next to the CPA framework itself.⁴⁹ Such strategies benefit from other sources of support, which include the CSDP budget but also national member states’ contributions and other. In terms of figures, according to the 10th EDF performance review,⁵⁰ the average percentage of EDF funds dedicated to peace and security related sectors compared to overall amounts was of 2.7% under EDF 9 and 10.

The African Peace Facility financed with the intra-ACP envelope of the European Development Fund (EDF) is probably the most relevant EU instrument to support cooperation with Africa in the area of Peace and Security. As such, it is widely recognised to have had a direct and positive impact in the resolution of a number of crises in the continent.⁵¹ Since 2004, a total amount of EUR 1.8 billion⁵² has allowed to finance African-led peace support operations in a number of conflict-affected countries (e.g. Somalia, Mali, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, Uganda, Guinea Bissau). APF support has also effectively contributed to the enhancement of the African Union and the

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⁴⁹ Including the EU’s Comprehensive Approach to external conflict and crises, the Agenda for Change or the recent Joint Communication on Capacity building in support of security and development (2015), but also the EU regional strategies on Sahel, Horn of Africa, etc.

⁵⁰ Evaluation of EU Support to Conflict Prevention and Peace-Building (CPPB), 2011 ([https://www.eumonitor.nl/9353000/1/j9vviik7_m1c3gypv/v6ipatw6 my0](https://www.eumonitor.nl/9353000/1/j9vviik7_m1c3gypv/v6ipatw6 my0)).

⁵¹ The 2013 external evaluation of the African Peace Facility recognised the added-value and relevance of APF-supported actions, which ‘have had a direct and positive impact on the lives of millions of Africans affected by political crisis’, although there is room for improvement in terms of effectiveness (due to the capacity weaknesses of the AU Commission and RECs), and complementarity with other EU financing and political tools, including the RIPs, although good examples can be found, e.g. in Somalia and Mali. Another evaluation of the APF done in 2015 by the ACP-EU JPA also acknowledges the relevance and impact of this instrument.

⁵² During EDF 10 period (2008-2013), the EU committed EUR 815 million through the APF. Under EDF 11, the APF is now at EUR 900M only for the 2014-2016 period. This represents an annual increase of more than 200%.
RECs’ capacities to prevent and react to crisis and threats to stability by strengthening the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), the main African-created mechanism to prevent and manage conflicts and for mediation efforts, with important tools and structures and initiatives, e.g. the Panel of the Wise, the Peace and Security Council, the Continental Early Warning System, or the African Standby Force.

APF support to the APSA has been complemented by specific assistance via the EDF Regional Indicative Programmes (RIPs) to reinforce the capacities of Africa’s regional organisations (RECs), as building blocks of the AU, to prevent and manage conflict and security threats in their regions, including cross-border spilling threats like terrorism and violent extremism, organised crime, or piracy. Under EDF 11 (2014-2020), over EUR 450 Million are dedicated to this sector in all African RIPs.

The EU has further expanded its engagement and investment in conflict prevention and peace building, in complementarity with and beyond the EDF, through the IcSP (ex IfS), EU Electoral Observation Missions (EOMs), CSDP missions, use of preventive sanctions, humanitarian assistance, the work of EUSRs and support to civil society, as part of the efforts towards ensuring a comprehensive approach in fragile and conflict-affected situations.

**Achievements in peace and security and conflict prevention in ACP countries and regions in the framework of EDF programmes**

Under EDF 10 and 11, an increasing number of national indicative programmes have retained peace and security as a specific priority sector. Although to a much less extent than in Africa, peace and security — in their wider sense, including good governance actions — have also been retained in Caribbean and Pacific as focal sectors under the previous and the current EDF 11 regional and national programmes.

Flexible and efficient crisis and emergency instruments have been introduced over the years including special procedures (including the emergency (and post-emergency) assistance

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53 For example, the regional evaluation for West Africa (2008) provided evidence of the positive results of the Commission’s support to ECOWAS, in terms of contributions to its institutional CPPB capacity-building and to technical expertise, but highlighted the fact that support had been mainly limited to a funding function.

54 In coherence with the EU’s Comprehensive Approach to external conflict and crises of (Joint Communication 2013 and Council Conclusions in May 2014).

55 As examples, the EU has deployed five civilian CSDP crisis management missions and operations in Africa since 2003, as well as five EU’s autonomous military operations (EUFOR Artemis, EUFOR DRC, EUFOR Chad, EUNAVFOR Atlanta, EUFOR CAR) and both military training missions (EUTM Somalia and EUTM Mali).

56 Examples include the Central African Republic (EDF 11, EUR 43M); Somalia (EDF 11, 100M), Chad (EUR 65M), Niger (support for justice and the rule of law, EUR 15 M), Nigeria (Support to the criminal Justice Sector, EUR 28 million), a defence reform programme in DRC (EUR 20 million), Guinea Conakry (SSR programme, EUR 20 M), Somalia – (support to the Governance and Security Sectors, EUR 54 million), Guinea Bissau (State-Building), Liberia (institutional and capacity-building, EUR 20M), etc. EDF NIP’s have further made significant contributions to development, peace and stability in Ethiopia (EC evaluation, 2012), and a positive contribution to conflict mitigation, stabilisation, reconstruction and rehabilitation in ACP countries including Angola, the Central African Republic, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste. .

defined in Articles 72 and 73 of the Cotonou Agreement)\textsuperscript{58}. While early-warning mechanisms have not always enhanced its capacity to detect and react to nascent conflicts (e.g. Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire); the reaction once the conflict had broken out has often been rapid, with positive effects on stabilisation. The EU’s support contributed positively to conflict mitigation, stabilisation, reconstruction and rehabilitation (Liberia, Angola, Sierra Leone, Central African Republic) through capacity building initiatives to security forces, demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of former combatants, rehabilitation of victims of conflict, law enforcement agencies and awareness-raising activities (e.g. Caribbean, Timor Leste, Burundi, Rep. of Congo). Support to the recovery of agriculture and access to basic social services in the affected areas (e.g. Angola, Kenya) have also contributed to enhance security and peace.

The COM thematic evaluation (dated July 2011) on EC support to conflict prevention and peace-building (CPPB) unambiguously concluded that the COM transformed itself in the first decade of 21st century into one of the main donors in the field of CPPB, whilst strengthening its policy framework in CPPB and clearly made a tangible and positive contribution on mitigation, stabilisation of conflicts as well as on post conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction through an "integrated approach" of its wide range of instruments and actions contributing to effective CPPB. In this context, the EU has also been a strong supporter of civil society organisations engaged in conflict prevention and peace building issues, mainly through international NGOs and specialised networks.

Despite increasing efforts, the linking of short-term and long-term support was often challenged in practice particularly on account of the lack of capacity of national authorities (e.g. Central African Republic and the FOMUC/MICOPAX, ECOWAS) along with insufficient exit strategies or premature transition from rehabilitation to development. There are cases where a LRRD approach has been promoted (e.g. Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, Angola, Haiti) with mixed results. Individual cases also illustrate the risk of moving too rapidly towards development, both for the Commission’s strategy and for the priorities of the partner governments (e.g. Liberia, Timor-Leste).

Support has generally not been geared to tackling the root causes of conflict, but rather to mitigating their consequences or to provision of ‘classic’ development support in a conflict context (e.g. Ethiopia, Timor Leste, Burundi). Political dialogue was used to a certain extent to address root causes, but this has not been systematic.

The absence until recent years of a dedicated EU conflict analysis capacity translated into weak and insufficiently documented conflict analyses and monitoring frameworks. Support to national initiatives and involvement of local populations has not been systematic.

\textsuperscript{58} Evidence provided by evaluations of the Instrument for Stability (predecessor of IcSP) and the Joint Communication of 11 December 2013 on the “EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises”.

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Added value of EU interventions

While there may be room for improvement in many cases, there is evidence of a clear added-value of EU interventions, which have been critical for the adoption of important policies for poverty reduction and for macroeconomic and sector policies - all key for reconstructing a country - with respect to EU Member States own programmes, as the evaluation on EU cooperation with Central African Republic in 2009 showed.\(^{59}\) The EU’s comparative advantages include (i) its long term presence, making it a reliable partner, (ii) its critical mass in terms of financial support, (iii) its wide range of instruments and (iv) its recognised thematic experience in sectors.\(^{60}\) The evaluation of EU cooperation in Rwanda (2006) stated that ‘where the EU action was believed to have strongly contributed to the resolution of regional conflicts since no Member States could have been able to bilaterally conduct simultaneous diplomatic and military interventions together with socio-economic investments, as the EU did’.

In countries such as Côte d’Ivoire or Sierra Leone, together with the major donors and those with historical ties (France and United Kingdom, both with military forces in the country), the EU’s ‘financial weight allowed it to be a major player by providing large contributions to peacekeeping forces (in Côte d’Ivoire for the MICECI) and directly to the government through General Budget Support following the conflict in Sierra Leone’. Moreover ‘the EU was able to ensure a presence in Côte d’Ivoire during the 2002-2005 crisis whereas all other EU-MS ceased their cooperation. This allowed the EU to play a leading role in coordination in the wake of the crisis when the EU-MS re-started their cooperation’.

To sum up

The impact and effectiveness of the ACP-EU framework in promoting security and peace has been overshadowed by the growing political importance of the EU’s regional partnerships with the African, Caribbean and Pacific, with a limited role for the ACP level. This suggests that the ACP-EU platform might not be the best suited for EU action in this area.

The African Peace Facility financed with the intra-ACP envelope of the European Development Fund (EDF) is one of the most relevant EU instruments to support cooperation with Africa in the area of Peace and Security. As such, it is widely recognised to have had a direct and positive impact in the resolution of a number of crises in the continent.

Under the 10\(^{th}\) and 11\(^{th}\) EDF, an increasing number of national indicative programmes have retained peace and security as a specific priority sector.

Despite increasing efforts, the linking of short-term and long-term support was often challenged in practice particularly on account of the lack of capacity of national authorities along with insufficient exit strategies or premature transition from rehabilitation to development.

\(^{59}\) In Central Africa Republic, the Commission was the largest donor, which provided it with important political leverage.

\(^{60}\) EU handbook on operating in situations of conflict & fragility and Evaluation of EU Support to Conflict Prevention and Peace-Building (CPPB).
Support has generally not been geared to tackling the root causes of conflict, but rather to mitigating their consequences (humanitarian needs and development losses) or to provision of ‘classic’ development support in a conflict context. Political dialogue was used to a certain extent to address root causes, but this has not been systematic.

EU action has strongly contributed to the resolution of regional conflicts through its different comparative advantages like long term presence, important financial support and wide range of instruments.
4. To what extent have the provisions from Article 13 of the CPA contributed to meaningful improvements in addressing the structural constraints associated with the migratory flows?

Global developments: South-South migration and intra-regional migration

Globally, in 2015 South-South migration exceeded South-North migration by 2%. South-South migration and intra-regional migration is a significant phenomenon for the ACP countries even though there are also significant migration outflows towards the EU countries. The relative importance of South-South migration varies considerably from region to region and sub-region to sub-region. The sources for mapping migration within and from the ACP countries are often missing, out of date, or inconsistent with definitions used in other countries and intraregional migration flows are often informal and not captured in official statistics.

According to the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs statistics, around 50% of African migration is within the continent, but there is a significant difference between Sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa in this regard. Intraregional emigration in Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for almost 65 per cent of total emigrants, the largest intracontinental or South-South movement of people in the world. In contrast, more than 90 per cent of emigrants from North Africa head to countries outside Africa. Intra-African emigration is driven largely by a search for job opportunities in neighbouring countries, by the complexities of historical state formation — colonial borders often overlooked linguistic and ethnic commonalities — as well as by waves of internal and cross-border conflicts.

The recording of refugee flows by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated the numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Africa at 14.9 million in 2015. Important new displacements caused by conflict, violence and human rights abuses are likely to continue to affect many countries in Africa in following years. Somalia was the third-largest source country of refugees worldwide and the largest in sub-Saharan Africa, with the number of Somali refugees remaining stable at 1.1 million. South Sudan (744 100) was the fourth-largest source country of refugees worldwide, followed by Sudan (640 900), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (535 300) and the Central African Republic (470 600). Half of the top 10 refugee-hosting countries are now located in sub-Saharan Africa (Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Chad, Sudan), with four of them being least developed countries.

Article 13 of the CPA

Compared to the Lomé Convention, Article 13 of the Cotonou Agreement provides a broader framework for cooperation between the EU and the ACP countries in the area of migration. It specifies that the issue of migration shall be the subject of an in-depth dialogue; it addresses human rights, fair treatment of legally residing ACP nationals, tackling root causes of migration, training of ACP nationals and irregular migration. For the first time, it contains the obligation — on both sides — to readmit their nationals who are illegally present on the territory of the other party without further formalities, and provide them with appropriate identity documents for that purpose. In addition to this obligation, Article 13 also foresees the possible negotiation of bilateral agreements on return and readmission of own nationals, also covering, if deemed necessary by any of the parties, arrangements for the readmission of third country nationals and stateless persons. Adequate assistance to ACP countries to implement such agreements has been foreseen. Nevertheless, Article 13 does not cover all aspects of migration as covered under the EU's Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM)\(^\text{65}\), the European Agenda on Migration or the Valletta Action Plan.

During the first ten years of the existence of the CPA, migration was not a subject of in depth dialogue foreseen in paragraph 1 of Article 13. The ACP-EU dialogue on migration was given a new impetus as a result of the negotiations on the second revision of the Cotonou Agreement in 2010, during which the parties failed to reach agreement on revisions to Article 13. The EU was requesting changes to the Article which would make it easier for EU Member States to return irregular migrants from the EU to their home countries. ACP states resisted incorporating such a provision in the Agreement, instead wanting to deal with readmission issues on a bi-lateral basis. As a result of this disagreement, Article 13 of the Agreement remained unchanged but the EU and ACP instead agreed on a “Joint Declaration on Migration and Development (Article 13).\(^\text{66}\)

Parties undertook to work towards the timely completion of the migration dialogue and a first report about the dialogue was endorsed by the ACP-EU Council of Ministers on 31 May 2011. This Council stated that the dialogue should prepare the ground for the next revision of the Agreement and identified a series of issues that would require a more in-depth dialogue\(^\text{67}\). It also committed to strengthen the operational aspects of the cooperation in the area of (a) visas, (b) remittances and (c) readmission. Fight against trafficking in human beings and smuggling of migrants was added in 2014 as a forth topic. As a result, a series of experts meetings took place and produced four sets of recommendations on the four topics that were subsequently endorsed by the ACP-EU Council of Ministers (in 2012 and 2015 respectively).

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\(^{66}\) It states that “this dialogue would build on three pillars (in accordance with the EU’s Global Approach on Migration and Mobility GAMM): 1. Migration and Development, including issues relating to diasporas, brain drain and remittances; 2. Legal migration including admission, mobility and movement of skills and services; and 3. Illegal migration, including smuggling and trafficking of human beings and border management, as well as readmission.”  
\(^{67}\) http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-2115-2011-INIT/en/pdf , a) mobility of skilled persons; b) legal migration; c) readmission; d) visa e) smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings; f) migrants’ rights and g) remittances
Discussions allowed a regular exchange of information and networking on three of the above issues (on remittances the first expert meeting will only take place in July 2016), their concrete operational outcome was however very limited.

Evaluation of the CPA cooperation on migration

The effectiveness of the implementation of Article 13 was uneven and led to uneven results, bearing in mind differences in contexts between the Caribbean and Pacific regions and Africa. Whereas migration, both legal and irregular, from some regions in Africa (Sahel and Lake Chad, Horn of Africa) to the EU is an important phenomenon, there is very little migration from the Caribbean and Pacific regions to the EU.

- Fair treatment of third country nationals who reside legally in EU-MS or ACP countries

Currently, Article 13 refers to legal migration only in relation to the fair treatment of ACP nationals legally residing or non-discrimination of those being employed in the EU. The number of legal residents from ACP countries has constantly increased between 2008 and 2014. The number of all valid residence permits issued to African states’ nationals at the end of each year increased gradually, year after year, from 1,250,393 in 2008 to 1,682,733 in 2014, (with a sharp increase from 2011 to 2012). However it is difficult to determine to what extent the ACP-EU cooperation framework contributed to it. A similar trend was noted for the Pacific countries (number of permits more than tripled from 881 to 2,975 in the same period), while the number of residence permits only slightly increased for the Caribbean region (from 270,000 to 289,000).

Regarding non-discrimination against ACP nationals legally employed on the territory of the EU, the implementation of Article 13 has been quite satisfactory. There were no complaints about the implementation of this principle before the Court of Justice since 2000 and the European Commission has only received very few official complaints.

- Prevention policies in the context of irregular immigration

The current provisions on irregular migration focus on political dialogue, establishing prevention policy, and on ensuring that the rights and dignity of migrants are respected in the return procedure and on readmission. There is only little irregular migration from the Caribbean countries (annually between 4,500 and 6,400, decreasing since 2008, with a slight increase in 2014 again; major source countries are Cuba, Jamaica and the Dominican Republic), and even less from the Pacific states (approx. 30 per year on average, Fiji being the major contributor).  

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68 Eurostat — All valid permits by reason, length of validity and citizenship on 31 December of each year.
69 Eurostat — Third country nationals found to be illegally present — annual data (rounded) [migr_eipre].
Following an assessment of a number of criteria, most importantly that they do not represent a significant migratory or security risk, a number of countries in both regions were exempted from the visa requirement. This was however not linked to the implementation of Article 13.

The situation is very different regarding the African countries, some of which, e.g. Nigeria, Somalia and Senegal, figure among the top 27 countries from where irregular migrants have been apprehended in the EU Member States between 2008 and 2014. The number of Africans staying irregularly in the EU decreased annually between 2008 and 2011, but then increased in 2013 to 72,370 and again, very sharply, to 134,895 in 2014. Eritrea was the major origin country, followed by Somalia and Nigeria.

The figures for asylum seekers coming from Africa varied between 61,650 and 84,400 in 2008-2012 and then started to increase sharply in 2013 to 96,920 then to 152,110 in 2014. The major origin countries in terms of absolute figures are Eritrea, Somalia, Nigeria, Senegal, Mali, The Gambia, Guinea and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The maximum number of asylum seekers from the Pacific region was 15 in 2011 and 2012. International protection/asylum is however an issue which is not covered under Article 13.

The above described trends and the existence of huge regional differences in migration led to a number of regional initiatives to enhance dialogue and cooperation on migration:
- The Rabat process started in 2006 in order to respond to the challenges of increasing flows of irregular migration from Sub-Saharan Africa to Europe along the West-African migration route. The Rabat Process covers cooperation on legal migration and mobility; prevention of irregular migration and measures to counteract it; migration and development and international protection.
- The Africa-EU Migration, Mobility and Employment (MME) Partnership was launched at the Africa-EU Summit in Lisbon, in December 2007. The EU-Africa Summit in 2014 adopted a Declaration on Migration and Mobility, and an Action plan 2014-2017, focusing on the following priorities: fighting trafficking in human beings; remittances; diaspora; mobility and labour migration (including intra-African mobility); international protection (including internally displaced persons) and irregular migration.
- The Khartoum Process was launched in November 2014 in Rome in order to tackle the increasing irregular migration, smuggling and trafficking in human beings along the Eastern-/Horn of Africa migration route. It is a regional dialogue with nine African countries (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Egypt and...
Tunisia), as well as the African Union Commission. It is led by a Steering Committee comprised of five EU Member States (Italy, France, Germany, UK, Malta), five African countries (Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Sudan), the European and African Union Commissions and the EEAS.

More recently, the Valetta Summit organised at heads of state level with some African countries in November 2015, adopted a Political Declaration and an Action Plan to be implemented in five key areas: development benefits of migration and root causes; legal migration and mobility; protection and asylum; prevention and fight against irregular migration, migrant smuggling and human trafficking; and return, readmission and reintegration.

The regional fora, such as the Rabat and Khartoum processes that have been established independently from the CPA, have proven to be currently the best channels for cooperation on the fight against irregular migration, trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling, since these crimes are inherently cross-border crimes, with regional specificities, therefore concerted and coordinated international cooperation on specific (regional) routes is better suited to addressing the problems at hand.

Seen the regional differences, an ACP wide approach, particularly in relation to cooperation and implementation would not be efficient for targeting the needs of many source and transit countries in West and East Africa. For this reason smaller specific problem related regional cooperation frameworks are created that are more favourable to achieve concrete results. The Valetta Action Plan has also taken the regional approach. In addition, the above mentioned regional initiatives encompass the North African countries which are very important source and also transit countries for irregular migration.

In addition, reinforced bilateral dialogues on migration and mobility between the EU and African ACP countries have taken place, e.g. in the framework of a Mobility Partnership (MP) with Cape Verde and Common Agendas on Migration and Mobility (CAMM) with Nigeria and Ethiopia, or more recently the High-Level Dialogues. They allow for more concrete and effective targeted cooperation taking into account the specificities of a given partner country.

• Acceptation by EU-Member States and ACP countries of return and of readmission of any of their nationals illegally present on their respective territories

The legal obligation to readmit its own nationals contained in Article 13 of the CPA is a key provision for the EU. In practice, Member States witnessed unsatisfactory and ineffective implementation of Article 13 requirements, and uneven cooperation from African countries, with Cameroun and Mali showing particularly low rates (around 11 %) and others (such as Ghana or Nigeria) having higher rates, of around 30 %, but still well below the average which is 40 %.
In the Pacific region, the only country with a mentionable number of nationals ordered to leave is Fiji (average 27 per year during the period 2008-2014) and the return rate was high (more than 50%).

From the Caribbean region, the most nationals ordered to leave were from the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Haiti, Suriname and Cuba between 2008 and 2014. Jamaica had the highest share in terms of returned nationals (over 50 %); the other countries had much lower shares (around 20-30 %).

**EDF funded programmes**

The concrete migration-related strategies and projects are mostly designed in the framework of bilateral or specific regional cooperation formats e.g. the Rabat and Khartoum process, supported by funding from the EDF. The EU support to a number of African countries in the field of migration through the EDF funds has contributed to developing migration-sensitive policies, addressing some of the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement and strengthening migrants’ and refugees’ rights:

Support to Free Movement of Persons and Migration management in West Africa: EUR 24 million allocated to support the effective implementation of the ECOWAS Free Movement of Persons’ Protocols and the ECOWAS Common Approach on Migration.

Support the reintegration of returnees and to the management of labour migration in Ethiopia: EUR 10 million to improve the reintegration system and assistance to Ethiopian returnees; to improve access to legal migration through enhanced capacity of relevant government institutions and to provide awareness raising about migration.

Promote better management of migration in Nigeria: EUR 10.8 million to facilitate the revision, adoption and implementation of the draft National Migration Policy, which was developed by the Nigerian Government.

Support to the Government of Zambia for the Implementation of Policy and the National Plan of Action against Human Trafficking: EUR 1.5 million to support the Government to reduce the incidence of human trafficking and to build capacity amongst public officials, service providers and non-state actors to detect and respond to cases of trafficking.

The Intra-ACP Migration Facility (ACP Migration) implemented within the framework of the Cotonou Agreement and financed for a total of EUR 25 million by the European Development Fund (EDF) aimed at supporting ACP States to improve the management of the intra-ACP migration flows and at enhancing their positive impact on development. The Facility focused on South-South migratory flows and composed of three interrelated components (strengthening the institutional capacity in the six ACP regions and twelve pilot countries, creating an ‘ACP Observatory for migration’ and building the capacity of ACP civil society, at regional and national levels).
Due to ongoing unprecedented levels of irregular migration, the EU Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa has been created to support the most fragile and affected African countries (November 2015). The Trust Fund aims to help foster stability in the regions to respond to the challenges of irregular migration and displacement and to contribute to better migration management. More specifically, it will help address the root causes of destabilisation, displacement and irregular migration, by promoting economic and equal opportunities, security and development.

To sum up

The implementation of Article 13 has been satisfactory regarding non-discrimination against ACP nationals legally employed on the territory of the EU. There were no complaints about the implementation of this principle before the Court of Justice since the entry into force of the CPA and the European Commission has only received very few official complaints.

There is very little irregular migration from the Caribbean countries and even less from the Pacific states but some of the sub Saharan countries figure among the top 27 countries from where irregular migrants have been apprehended in the EU Member States. The annual number of irregular migrants and asylum seekers from sub Saharan Africa has been decreasing between 2008 and 2012 but increased again since 2013 sharply and reached unprecedented levels. The implementation of Article 13 was therefore not successful in terms of establishing prevention policies regarding irregular migration.

On readmission, the legal obligation in CPA Article 13 to readmit its own nationals has in practice seen unsatisfactory implementation. Recent developments show the importance to review the agreement in the area of return and readmission.

The added value of the ACP-EU cooperation on migration should be seen as providing platform for dialogue which can be a first step for deepened cooperation on regional or bilateral basis. It allows exchanges of views and first identification of obstacles and challenges. However, it does not address migration in a comprehensive way, as reflected in the EU's GAMM, the European Agenda on Migration and the Valletta Action Plan.

More focused regional processes, such as the Rabat and Khartoum processes approach, have proven to be currently the best channels for cooperation on the fight against irregular migration, trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling. Although these formats do not fall together with specific existing regional structures, they bring together the countries involved with the support of regional or continental structures.
5. To what extent have EU interventions under the CPA (new trading arrangements, dialogue, cooperation programmes) fostered the smooth and gradual integration of the ACP States into the world economy and enabled the ACP states to play a full part in international trade?  

**Global developments: Regional and global trade integration**

The increased and effective integration of the ACP States into the world economy is evidenced by their increased importance in trade flows, the ACP countries’ increasing WTO membership and the group’s increasing role in international trade negotiations. In terms of trade flows, ACP integration in global markets has seen a stronger increase than intraregional integration for most ACP regions and for the ACP group as a whole. For Sub-Saharan Africa, however, intra-regional trade share in total trade has increased from 16% in 2000 to 24% in 2014. For the Caribbean, the share has remained more or less stable over the period, whereas in the Pacific, it has increased from 1.3% to 6.3%.  

At sector level, regional integration has been strongest in agricultural products, textiles, and machinery and transport equipment, particularly in the Caribbean region. In Africa, EAC is the region for which intraregional trade has grown fastest as compared to overall trade. The trade policies of ACP countries have played a significant role in limiting regional integration. ACP exporters often face higher tariffs in ACP markets than in third markets. Trade liberalisation has progressed at different speeds across sub regions within the ACP group, with the Caribbean region and the EAC offering the most beneficial conditions for sub regional trade. So far only the EAC customs union appears to offer free market access within the sub-region.

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EU- ACP trade: overall

ACP-EU trade has steadily grown since the signature of the CPA in 2000, regardless of the global financial and economic crisis which started in 2008/2009 and caused a brief temporary drop in the trade flows. Trade flows with the ACP more than doubled in the period 2000-2014, representing in 2014 5% of EU exports (above the ASEAN) and 5.4% of EU imports, up respectively from 1.5% and 1.8% in 2000. Clearly, the expiry of the non-reciprocal Cotonou trade regime in 2007 had no adverse impact on the overall ACP-EU trade flows, as both exports and imports have steadily grown since then. However, this has to be analysed towards the evolution and efficiency of the trade arrangements between the parties. New arrangements for ACP-EU trade, the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), have been gradually introduced with the majority of ACP countries, coupled with the Market Access Regulation that has ensured duty-free quota-free access to the EU market in the transitional period before the implementation of the EPAs.77

These arrangements extended duty-free quota-free access to the EU market to all products except for arms. Moreover, the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) have benefitted from duty-free quota-free access to the EU market for all products except for arms under the Everything-But-Arms (EBA) part of the Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) since 2001.78

The ACP trade with the world increased proportionally more (trebled) in the same period, which is significant in a global context characterised by the emergence of new economic powers such as the BRICS countries, especially China, and the increased competition in the EU market. As a group, the ACP occupy the 7th place as a trading partner with the EU after the US, China, Russia, MEDA, Switzerland and ASEAN. By comparison, the EU’s trade with Mercosur accounts for much less, ca. 2.8% of the total EU trade. It is particularly noteworthy that the ACP were able — not only to maintain — but to increase their share against a huge surge in the EU’s trade with China, which caused many other trading partners, including the US, to lose significant market share in the EU.79

The ACP as a block has maintained a surplus in their trade with the EU over these years. The EU is a major trading partner for the ACP, accounting for 24% of their imports and 17% of their exports, whereas the situation by region varies widely and the fluctuation of oil prices has affected especially Africa’s export figures in terms of value. ACP exports to the EU are dominated by Africa and by minerals. With 27.3% of Sub-Saharan Africa’s total trade, the EU is their main trading partner, ahead of China (10.7%), the United States (8.4%) and India 6.8%.80 In 2015, China’s imports from Africa have been reported to have dropped

78 Hence, few ACP countries have seen the scope of their market access preferences to the EU shrink since the expiry of the CPA regime and even those countries export mostly products that enter the EU market at a 0 MFN duty. All this makes for a smooth transition out of the trade regime of the Cotonou Agreement, and makes it difficult to distil the precise impact of the CPA arrangements on the ACP-EU trade flows.
significantly, by nearly 40%, which highlights the importance of the EU as Africa’s export destination. In 2014, Africa accounted for 97.6% of ACP exports to the EU and South Africa alone for almost a quarter (21.6%). Only 4.2% of ACP exports to the EU originate from the Caribbean and as little as 0.3% from the Pacific Region, as these regions are far smaller and trade more with neighbours.

**EU-ACP trade: selected sectors**

Trade in agriculture continues to rely on commodities with an increase, over the past 10 years up to 2014, from under EUR 5 billion to over EUR 7 billion. However, little increase has been apparent in processed, value added products. Overall the ACPs hold a EUR 3 billion trade surplus in farm goods, which fell from EUR 5 billion over the 10-year period to 2014.

The EU is the main destination for agricultural and transformed goods from ACP countries — but commodities still represent a large share of ACP-EU trade. The bulk of the ACP exports to the EU have consisted of mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials, whereas exports of manufactured goods have remained stable over the past few years at around 25%. Yet, the EU is the largest importer of manufactured products from ACP countries (more than 22% of ACP exports of manufactured products in 2014).

Industrialisation and diversification of ACP economies remain limited. At global level, ACP countries are on average significantly less diversified than other developing countries, often due to their small size, remoteness or being land-locked. However, the Caribbean region and two regions in Africa (EAC and Central Africa) have managed to diversify their exports over the last 10 years. Manufactured goods now represent more than 28% of the total of EAC exports to the rest of the world (against only 17% in 2000). In Central Africa, the share of manufactured goods amounts to 25% (6% in 2000).

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ACP-EU trade: investments

In the area of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from the EU to the ACP, there is a considerable degree of volatility in investment flows; FDI stocks show some consistency over the past few years. The sharp decline of EU’s investment flows to Sub-Saharan Africa between 2009 and 2011 (see chart) coincides with the economic crisis. By comparison, however, the EU remains by far the main investor in Sub-Saharan Africa, well ahead of China and the United States.

EU contribution in the context of CPA

- Strengthening of regional trade and integration frameworks

EU support towards strengthening regional trade and greater integration of ACP countries into the world economy has been based on a range of factors. Certainly one of the main elements has been the negotiation of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). In general, the EPA process has served as a learning experience and has efficiently allowed advancing the ACP regional integration processes in which the nature of the challenges is often similar to EPA negotiations. ACP partners have obtained access to a wealth of data and expertise, also thanks to the technical assistance provided by the EU and its Member States.

One of the objectives of EPAs is to contribute to ACP regional integration, for which they provide concrete mechanisms:

Flexible rules of origin and the possibility to cumulate origin while sourcing inputs are crucial in this regard. This will be facilitated by an ACP Joint Undertaking on Administrative Cooperation Agreements adopted in 2015.

Provisions on regional preferences oblige countries within a region to give each other at least the same treatment as to the EU, whereas they can apply better preferences among each other than in relation to the EU. In practice, this means that tariffs will need to be cut between countries in the EPA regions (if not already done so), which will help the creation of regional value chains, thanks to the combined effect of an EPA and regional free trade or customs union arrangements.

Other provisions, especially those addressing standards, technical barriers to trade, regulatory frameworks and trade facilitation, are aimed to help build a predictable and standardised business environment that would address some of the bottlenecks impeding trade and regional integration in the ACP. The EU provided assistance to support regulatory convergence and trade facilitation within regions; in the ESA-IO region, for
instance, standards harmonisation has been enhanced and the establishment of the EAC and SADC Customs Unions has been facilitated.86

In relation to regional integration in general, the strategic evaluations of development cooperation87 highlighted inefficiencies generated by the overlapping of regional organisations, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. A mixed political will in the Caribbean has prevented a stronger impact of support actions provided, whilst lack of sufficient strategic analysis (i.e. linkages between integration and growth) has undermined the process in the case of Pacific and OCTs regions.

The evaluations provide a few examples of support to productive sectors that are the catalyst for more structural change in beneficiary countries due, inter alia, to the combination of trade-related support and investments in infrastructure. Particularly, the transport sector (e.g. Kenya Northern Corridor; Core Road Network-Zambia), driven by negotiations with the African Regional Economic Communities (RECs), has facilitated regional connectivity.

- **ACP-EU trade flows — Aid-for Trade & Trade Related Assistance**

From 2005 to 2013, the total aggregate Aid-for-Trade from the EU and its Member States to ACP countries amounted to EUR 22.5 billion;88 including measures to enhance competitiveness, strengthen RECs, regional trade integration initiatives, budgetary adjustments, fiscal reform, infrastructure upgrading and investment promotion, as provided for in Article 37(1) CPA.

In the context of the CPA, efficient Trade Related Assistance (TRA) support packages were provided that were tailor-made to the specific conditions of ACP countries and especially related to the quality of infrastructures and capacity enhancement of technicians. There has been significant contribution in terms of trade policy analysis, including diagnostic studies, support to trade strategies and capacity development. Impact was mainly achieved in better-prepared countries, and where greater dependence on EU trade increased the competitive pressure for compliance.

The Aid for Trade concept has pushed TRA to embrace trade diversification and support to the private sector, but the results of such an enlarged scope are not yet particularly strong. There is a weak coordination between regional and country support strategies and

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86 Evaluation of the EU’s trade related assistance in third countries (2013) and Thematic global evaluation of the European Union’s support to integrated border management and fight against organised crime (2013).
87 Review of DEVCO strategic evaluations.
the assistance has focused specific export sectors, but not the expansion and consolidation of the value chains and the related bottlenecks in the business environments.89

Several ACP countries have developed new sectors along their traditional commodity exports. For example, Kenya developed a blooming horticultural export sector and canned pineapples, Mauritius financial services and tourism, Solomon Islands canned tuna, Nigeria and Ethiopia leather products. Yet, sustainability remains limited, as expected overall results have not been achieved in terms of diversification and reduction of commodity-dependency in the ACP at large.

- Conclusion of WTO-compatible Economic Partnership Agreements

Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) are the main deliverable of the CPA in the area of trade policy. While they are self-standing international agreements, they are explicitly based on the objectives and the essential and fundamental elements of the CPA. EPAs also contain non-execution clauses which provide for a procedural bridge allowing to adopt appropriate measures under the CPA in case of violation of such elements. In practice, this means that trade preferences under the EPA could be suspended following the suspension mechanism of Articles 96 or 97 CPA – this possibility has so far never been used.

While the scope and content of EPAs as such are not regulated by the CPA, it was agreed that opening up of ACP markets needed to be gradual and controlled to achieve development objectives, and that negotiations needed to take account of the different levels of development between the parties, the socio-economic impact on ACP countries, as well as their capacity to adapt and adjust their economies to the liberalisation process (Article 37 CPA). To respond to these needs, EPAs foresee specific asymmetries in favour of the ACP, such as the exclusion of sensitive products from liberalisation, long transition periods, flexible rules of origin and special safeguards and measures for agriculture, food security and infant industry protection. For example, in the EAC EPA, agricultural products are largely excluded from liberalisation, which only covers 3% of agricultural trade over a period of 15 to 25 years. Together with Aid for Trade and regular monitoring of impact, these measures further ensure full compliance with the principle of Policy Coherence for Development.

EPAs are instrumental in fostering the integration of ACP countries into the world economy, not only because they remove progressively trade barriers between the parties and enhance trade cooperation but also because they create a favourable environment for trade and investment. The long-term duty-free quota-free access to the EU market — with legal certainty, stability and predictability brought by EPAs as compared to unilateral measures — contributes to ACP partners’ ability to attract both foreign and domestic investments and increase trade with the EU. The fact that the ACP countries can choose

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89 Evaluation of the EU’s trade related assistance in third countries (2013).
between generally applicable unilateral EU Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP)\(^\text{90}\) and the reciprocal but asymmetric EPAs — both development-oriented and WTO-compatible — ensures that due regard is paid to the ACP political choices and development priorities, as predicated by Article 34(1).

The initial ambition to conclude comprehensive EPAs by 2007 proved over-ambitious and therefore the parties opted for interim agreements in 2007, while regional negotiations on full EPAs continued. While negotiations, apart from Caribbean, lasted longer than expected mainly because of the limited interest on the ACP side to conclude, it is not rare for trade negotiations to last over 10 years. Four EPAs are currently in application: EU-Caribbean EPA with 14 countries\(^\text{91}\) since the end of 2008, EU-Pacific EPA with Papua New Guinea since 2011 and Fiji since 2014; EU-Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) EPA with Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles and Zimbabwe since 2012; and finally EU-Central Africa EPA with Cameroon since 2014. In 2014, negotiations were concluded with three more regions: the Southern African Development Community (SADC) EPA group of six countries\(^\text{92}\) (signed on 10 June 2016); the West Africa region covering 16 countries\(^\text{93}\); and the East African Community (EAC) covering five countries\(^\text{94}\). EPAs have been concluded in all ACP regions and currently cover the majority of ACP countries (49 out of 79).\(^\text{95}\)

Some ACP countries have chosen not to enter into an EPA, partly due to a lack of market access incentive as they may already benefit from duty-free quota-free access to the EU market under the Everything But Arms (EBA) scheme or their main export items (such as oil) may already enter the EU market at a zero-duty under the multilateral rule of Most Favoured Nation (MFN).

EPAs aim at developing an open, transparent and strong WTO-compatible framework for trade between the EU and ACP partners. At this stage, the evidence on the actual impact of EPAs remains limited, as the implementation of the EPAs under application is too recent to have relevant data and the effects of EPAs are felt gradually in the long term. A study on the implementation and results of the EU-Caribbean EPA, in application since the end of 2008, was published in late 2014.\(^\text{96}\) In aggregate terms, actual changes in import and export flows have remained limited, as the economic crisis largely overshadowed the results and little changed in Cariforum market access to the EU. Significantly, however, the study found that in terms of exports to Europe, if the Caribbean region had not had the EPA (and thus would have had to trade with the EU

\(^{90}\) For ACP countries not party to an EPA, the GSP remains available on the same terms as for other developing countries, including the duty-free quota-free access to EU market to all products but arms from the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) under the EBA scheme; standard GSP for other developing countries below the income level of Upper Middle Income Countries; and the GSP+ to eligible developing countries who have ratified and implemented 27 conventions on governance, labour rights and environment. These arrangements are not part of the CPA framework.

\(^{91}\) Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, St. Kitts and Nevis, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago. Haiti has signed but not ratified the EPA, nor is it provisionally applying it.

\(^{92}\) Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland.

\(^{93}\) Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo.

\(^{94}\) Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda.


under the GSP or MFN), there would have been a serious adverse impact on the region’s trading opportunities and key export sectors such as bananas and sugar that are not covered by the GSP. Tangible results have been achieved especially in the Dominican Republic. In the Pacific, in turn, Papua New Guinea (PNG) has repeatedly reported, in the context of the joint ACP-EU institutions, that significant investments have flown in and tens of thousands of jobs have been created especially in the canned fisheries sector as a result of the application of their EPA since late 2011.97

To sum up

ACP-EU trade has steadily grown since the signature of the CPA in 2000, regardless of the global financial and economic crisis, and trade flows with the ACP more than doubled in the period 2000-2014, while the ACP trade with the world increased proportionally more (trebled) in the same period, which is significant in a global context characterised by the emergence of new economic powers such as the BRICS countries. The ACP as a block has maintained a surplus in their trade with the EU over these years and the EU remains by far the main investor in ACP Africa, well ahead of China and the United States.

The CPA has supported the integration of the ACP States into the world economy. This is evidenced by the increase in trade, increasing number of concluded and implemented EPAs, as well as the ACP countries’ increasing WTO membership and the group’s increasing role in international trade negotiations (see as well EQ 6). After the expiry of the non-reciprocal preference regime in 2007, EPAs are the main deliverable of the CPA in the area of trade policy. Along with the growing trade negotiation experience in the context of EPA negotiations and the increased aid for trade mobilised for trade-capacity building, the CPA has improved ACP partners’ capacity to negotiate trade agreements and to participate in international trade.

At this stage, though, evidence on the actual impact of EPAs remains limited, as the implementation of the EPAs under application is too recent to have relevant data and the effects of EPAs are felt gradually in the long term.

The CPA has not achieved the expected results in increasing diversification and reducing commodity-dependency. The EPAs are expected to contribute to diversification in medium and long term, provided that they are well implemented. To be able to attract new investment in sectors that are vital for growth and job creation, ACP countries remain in need of a transparent, stable and rules-based business climate, to which EPAs will contribute.

97 Most recently, ACP-EU Joint Ministerial Council of April 2015.
6. To what extent has mutual cooperation between EU and ACP countries improved the identification and furthering of common interests in international economic and trade fora? 98

Global developments

In the field of development, the ACP Group is one among several intergovernmental organisations that have received a standing invitation to participate as observers in the work of the UN General Assembly. As such, they can participate in main meetings and deliver statements during the sessions of the General Assembly, the UN ECOSOC, at UN conferences or other UN High Level meetings. The ACP Group has for example joined forces delivering an ACP Declaration at the World Summit for Sustainable Development, in Johannesburg, in 2002. In practice however, this has been a rare occurrence and the ACP countries have usually rather acted through other UN groupings such as G77, SIDS, LDCs or regional ones.

More recently, the ACP also joined partners in the first steps of post-Busan South-South cooperation efforts by agreeing in April 2012 on an outline of initial actions aimed towards building a system for South-South and Triangular cooperation, which has been drawn up by a working group of multilateral partners, including the ACP Group. However, the effectiveness of its interventions, through declarations and working documents, is limited since the Group is generally not recognised as a negotiating group. The figure below shows ACP memberships in various groupings.

The ACP Group is more homogeneous than the G77, which brings together both emerging and developing countries and where 43 countries do not belong to any other group. Out of the current 48 Least Developed Countries (LDC), 40 are ACP. 99 This situation has offered a

99 Moreover, 37 ACP are Small Island Developing States (SIDS) acting through the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS); 16 ACP belong to the Landlocked Developing Countries (LLDC). ACP countries are also part of several intergovernmental regional organisations that can attend and participate at the UN meetings, and often deliver statements,
potential space for the ACP Group to play a coordination role within the G77, with the possibility of bringing together both issue-based and regional groupings.\textsuperscript{100} Up to now, however, this potential has not been exploited by the ACP.

Since the G77 includes the BRICS, it is often divided on development issues although in the UN most of the groupings, coalitions or intergovernmental organisations tend to align their statements with the positions of the G77. Under these circumstances, the relatively higher homogeneity of the ACP Group could have represented a comparative advantage in terms of forming coalitions on (specific) common interests. However, this has not lived up to its potential, although it was done during the negotiations of the Paris agreement (2015) on climate change.

In UN agencies, programmes and funds, for example in the FAO, ACP countries have been more visible and active in a number of occasions where, thanks to their informal status, they have been able to have an impact on some negotiations. Another example is the fact that UNIDO established a specific relationship with the ACPs through the signature in 2011 of a relationship agreement with the ACP Group to boost inclusive sustainable industrialisation. Taken in isolation, the ACP Group encompasses countries with very different profiles in terms of economic development (from LDCs to High Income Countries), geographic characteristics (landlocked vs SIDS) or political backgrounds. This may be one of the reasons why the group only added value on a limited number of international negotiations, like trade, climate change or development.

Other international organisations or groupings besides the UN (e.g.: OECD,\textsuperscript{101} G-7, G-20\textsuperscript{102}) and international financial institutions (e.g.: World Bank, IMF, African Development Bank) do not have any institutional relation, neither formal nor informal, with the ACP as a group.

**ACP-EU cooperation in international fora**

The effectiveness of the EU ACP interactions is shown by the adoption of joint positions on food prices, the world economic financial crisis, EPAs, regional integration, development aid effectiveness, climate change, post-2015 global development framework, combating drought and desertification, international migration and development (see list underneath). The relatively long list of joint resolutions, declarations or statements of ACP-EU interactions on global issues is positive, particularly in comparison to the limited ambition expressed in the CPA until 2010. However, joint efforts have had a limited impact on internal discussions of such as the African Union, the CARICOM/CARIFORUM, the Association of Caribbean States and the Pacific Islands Forum.

\textsuperscript{100} A significant number of ACP countries (15) are Upper Middle Income Countries (UMICs) and members of the G77. This means, on one hand, the ACP Group could keep strong relations with its UMIC members within the G77 group. On the other hand, it could also mean less appeal for the G77 to accept the role of the ACP Group as a coordinator if ties between the ACP Group and UMICS were to be loosened.

\textsuperscript{101} On the other hand, they do have relations with BRICS and LDC groupings and are increasingly involving developing countries in their work.

\textsuperscript{102} They have an extensive outreach plan and regularly associate developing countries to their work; the ACP group as such is not invited, but ACP countries can participate in G-20’s work through their membership in other different groupings.
the G77 and other groups when they developed their negotiating positions and therefore on the final outcome. There has been little joint engagement and lack of follow-up, thus diminishing the possible impact. This can be linked amongst others to the institutional setting of the Cotonou Agreement which has not foreseen processes to facilitate such cooperation in an efficient way. These processes have also not been established after 2010, when the ambition to strengthen cooperation in international fora was added in art.8. Notwithstanding this, the recent Paris Agreement on climate change has shown the possible results of EU ACP cooperation in international fora on key common interests, bridging the ranks between developed and non-developed countries and bringing all stakeholders to an agreement, including all other members of G77.

ACP-EU cooperation in international fora

List of joint acts ACP-EU Declarations, Statements and Decisions

- Decision of the ACP-EU Council on settling all ACP Heavily Indebted Poor Countries LDCs’ ‘special loans’ remaining after full application of HIPC debt alleviation mechanisms (2003)
- Decision on a draft joint document on the 5th WTO Ministerial Conference was referred to and a mandate was given to the ACP-EU Committee of Ambassadors for its further examination
- ACP-EU Joint Declaration on the UN Summit on MDGs in September 2005 (2005)
- Declaration of the ACP-EU Council of Ministers on HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis (2006)
- Joint political resolution on top-of-agenda issues such as food prices, Economic Partnership Agreements and regional integration, and the effectiveness of development aid, ahead of Accra, New York and Doha international conferences (2008).
- ACP-EU Joint Resolution on the economic and financial crisis (2009), with a view to the upcoming UN High-level Conference on World financial and economic crisis and its impact on Development
- ACP-EU joint declaration on climate change (2009)
- ACP-EU joint declaration on migration and development (2010)
- ACP-EU Joint declaration on the MDGs (2010)
- EU in the United Nations General Assembly (2011)
- ACP-EU Council of Ministers Joint Declaration on Rio+20 (2012)
- ACP-EU Joint Declaration on the High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development (2013)
- ACP-EU Joint declaration on the development agenda beyond 2015 (2014)
- Joint ACP-EU Cooperation Framework for Private Sector Development support in ACP Countries (2014)

As regards Article 39 of the CPA, the EU and the ACP have cooperated closely in recent years in identifying and furthering their common interests at the WTO, where the ACP capacity of collective action has been demonstrated. WTO issues are a regular part of the trade dialogue within the Joint Ministerial Trade Committee (JMTC) and the Trade Cooperation Subcommittee. In this context, the ACP and the EU have identified and agreed
upon a common interest to pursue strong development-oriented outcomes in the negotiations on the Doha Development Agenda (DDA). This dialogue has allowed the exchange of views ahead of WTO Ministerial Conferences (MC) and Global Aid for Trade Reviews, which has contributed to better understanding on the Parties’ motivations, intentions and expectations. As concrete recent examples, the constructive relations between the ACP and the EU played a genuine role in the process leading to the Trade Facilitation Agreement, as well as the success in the MC10 in Nairobi where they worked towards a meaningful and balanced outcome in a number of development-oriented areas (export competition, cotton, international food aid, LDC issues).

Equally, recent changes in the international landscape (emerging countries’ increased influence, lower degree of homogeneity in the G77, shared vulnerability and interdependence in front of challenges such as climate change) have created space for changes in alliances at global level, which have recently allowed the building of common ACP-EU views with a significant impact on negotiations.

On occasions, ACP countries and in particular the LDCs and the SIDS have adopted different positions from those of the G77 and closer to EU positions. This made possible to build relevant and effective alliances with SIDS countries and ACP countries during climate change negotiations in the COP 21 and with LDCs in the negotiations of the 2030 Agenda on sustainable development.

COP 21
The ACP Group has been a major partner in the preparation of and at the Paris Conference on climate change, despite not being an established negotiation group under the UN Convention on Climate Change. Most visibly, the EU and ACP Group teamed up during the high-level segment of the Conference to press together in the media space for the required key parameters of an ambitious agreement. What came to be known as the ‘High Ambition Coalition’ was already including the majority of countries of the world and was soon joined by the US, Canada, Mexico, Brazil and Australia, building extra pressure on other major economies. Some observers hailed this as a ‘game changer’ that the EU found itself on the winning side of the political argument, whereas developing countries, including the African Group, were perceived until then to be aligned behind the interests of emerging economies.

As to Article 40 of the CPA, commodities are a recurring item in the trade dialogue within the joint institutions, including the Joint Ministerial Trade Committee (JMTC). Moreover, regular contacts through Joint Working Parties on commodities such as rice, sugar, banana, cotton, beef and veal have allowed a constructive exchange of views and a proper implementation of market measures as well as the provision of Cotonou Protocols. The relevant ACP countries have used the ACP-EU platform to express concerns over the situation in global markets, preference erosion and the disbursement of the accompanying measures, which the EU has taken into account to the extent possible.

Mutual cooperation between the EU and ACP in this area has resulted in efficient measures to promote and support restructuring processes in ACP countries and allowed them to adjust to new market conditions. For instance, to overcome the challenges created by the settlements concerning the ACP-EU regime of bananas with Latin American banana exporters by the
‘Geneva Agreement on Trade in Bananas’ (GATB) and with the United States in a separate EU-US settlement agreement in 2009, the EU adopted in 2010 a new ACP support programme on bananas, the Banana Accompanying Measures (BAM). In the sector of sugar, Accompanying Measures for Sugar Protocol countries (AMSP) are another example of such temporary measures, designed to accompany the adaptation process of Sugar Protocol countries to new market conditions resulting from the 2006 EU reform of the sugar Common Market Organisation ending production quotas.

Furthermore, in Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations with other parties, the EU has taken account of ACP Group’s identified interests in certain sensitive products, such as bananas, sugar, rum, rice and beef and liberalised such products only gradually and partially in the form of tariff reductions or tariff-rate quotas (TRQs). The EU’s GSP also excludes all of these products, except for the Everything But Arms scheme applied to the LDCs, implying that the ACP continue to enjoy substantial preferences in relation to non-LDC developing countries.

**Trade related assistance and capacity building to negotiate and monitor international agreements**

ACP countries account for significant membership at the World Trade Organisation (WTO), including 62 voting members out of 163. Collective action on their part can therefore have weight in consensus and coalition building but also in creating opposition.

The EU has systematically supported ACP countries' applications for membership and approached market access negotiations with them in a proactive and constructive way, taking into account the special relationship engendered by the CPA and by the EPAs in applicable cases. Six ACP countries acceded to the WTO after the signature of the Cotonou Agreement: Tonga (2007), Cape Verde (2008), Samoa and Vanuatu (2012), Liberia and Seychelles (2015). Bahamas, Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Sao Tome and Principe as well as Sudan are in the process of negotiating their accession to the WTO. The EU has also supported the implementation of the ‘Guidelines for LDCs accession’ as a tool to facilitate the accession of the least-developed among ACP members. The EU considers the accession of LDCs as a priority for the WTO.

Under the CPA, the EU assisted ACP countries to improve the identification and furthering of common interests in international economic and trade through two sets of effective actions namely (a) provision of trade related assistance for the identification and implementation of common interests in international economic and trade cooperation, and (b) capacity building on trade negotiations and monitoring of international agreements.

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103 WTO document WT/L/846.
• Trade Related Assistance

Between 2004 and 2010, EU’s direct support to Trade Related Assistance (TRA), excluding the support channelled through budget support, has been concentrated in three main regions, with ACP ranking first (48%, see figure below).

**Direct Commission’s support to TRA: Regional breakdown of contracted amounts 2004-2010**

![Pie chart showing regional breakdown of contracted amounts 2004-2010.](chart.png)

Source: Evaluation of the European Union’s Trade-related Assistance in Third Countries

TRA was mainly devoted to the support of regional (trade) organisations and/or regional trade agreements followed by work on business support/promotion and policy and administrative management.

• Capacity building on International Trade

The EU has provided valuable assistance to trade negotiation capacities and has improved the capacity of ACP public institutions involved in trade policy and facilitation, but with insufficient analysis of the context shaping the incentive frameworks for trade development, especially in more fragile environments.\(^\text{104}\)

Targeted support has been provided on legal framework revision, technical training and equipment provision, as they emerged as key capacity constraints (e.g. Botswana, Caribbean, Pacific). The impact of legislation revision needs to be seen only in the longer term, but the groundwork for reform has been firmly established in most cases. Substantial progress has been made in terms of institutional strengthening, training and equipment. The improvement of the harmonisation and implementation of agreements on standards, by unblocking key capacity constraints has contributed with mixed results to implement new protocols, framework agreements and harmonised regulations. For example, the EU has spearheaded the process of establishing regional SPS (Sanitary and Phytosanitary) and TBT (Technical Barriers to Trade) regulations, although often the overlapping regional

\(^{104}\) Review of the strategic evaluations managed by DEVCO — Particip GmbH, 2016.
organisations in Africa and the resistance of the national systems have hampered their effectiveness (e.g. SADC/COMESA/EAC Tripartite Task Force).

To sum up

International cooperation between the EU and ACP has been very limited, reflecting the limited objectives of the CPA in this regard. Joint ACP-EU resolutions, declarations or statements have had limited impact on internal discussions of the G77 and other groups when they developed their negotiating positions and therefore on the final outcome of negotiations in international fora. The situation did not substantially change after 2010 although the ambition to strengthen cooperation in international fora was added in Art.8.

Changes in the international landscape have created space for changes in alliances at global level. The ACP Group has been a key partner of the ‘High Ambition Coalition’ during COP21 negotiations leading to the Paris Agreement on climate change. This should be built upon for potential future cooperation.

In recent years, the EU and the ACP have cooperated closely in identifying and furthering their common interests at the WTO, aligned to art 39 of the CPA. WTO issues are a regular part of the trade dialogue within the Joint Ministerial Trade Committee (JMTC) and the Trade Cooperation Subcommittee. As regards Article 40, mutual cooperation between the EU and ACP has resulted in concrete measures to promote and support restructuring processes in ACP countries and allowed them to adjust to new conditions on international commodity markets. Furthermore, in negotiations with other parties, the EU has taken account of ACP Group’s identified interests in certain sensitive products.

As foreseen by the CPA, support to trade negotiation capacities and trade related Assistance has been provided and improved the capacity of ACP public institutions involved in trade policy and facilitation.
7. To what extent has the CPA contributed to macroeconomic growth/stabilisation and institutional reforms and policies at national and regional level resulting in a favourable environment for investment and the development of the private sector?  

Global developments

- Consistent GDP growth without equitable wealth redistribution

During most of the 15 years of CPA implementation, a significant number of ACP states have experienced a relatively steady positive performance in terms of economic growth. African countries showed greater resilience to the global crisis and better performances after 2009 as compared to the world economy as a whole.

![Graph: ACP: GDP Growth (Percent change)](source: World Bank, World Development Indicators)

Particularly the low income countries, and even fragile states, have been characterised by a period of high economic growth. Oil exporting countries also perform relatively well. However, growth has been often achieved without inclusiveness (i.e. lack of redistribution of incomes) and growing patterns of inequality are emerging.

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106 The trends are based on available aggregated and disaggregated performances, adjusted to reflect ACP countries as much as possible.

### Sub-Saharan Africa: Real GDP Growth

(Percent change)

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<td>4.0</td>
<td>6.7</td>
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<td>6.9</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.7</td>
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<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.6</td>
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<tr>
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<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fragile states</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** IMF, World Economic Outlook database — (p): projections

- **Still limited improvements towards a more conductive business climate**

Due to limited time-series, it is difficult to give a comparative snapshot of the performance of ACP countries in terms of general business climate improvement. Judging on available information, some progress has been made in certain parameters (e.g. days to start a business), but overall scoring of business climate still remains unfavourably high in ACP countries and particularly in SSA.

### Sub-Saharan Africa: Business Climate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>World</th>
<th>Sub-Saharan Africa</th>
<th>Caribbean small states</th>
<th>Pacific island small states</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ease of doing business index</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>95.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>143.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Days required to start a business</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>24.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** World Bank (Global Indicators)

- **Increasing public contributions but limited private investments**

Performance in attracting investments across ACP countries shows a persisting prevalence of public investments, with limited role for private financing particularly in Sub Saharan Africa. The ability of country economies to trigger greater private investments seem to be therefore limited and greater support to business climate remains essential in the future.

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108 Ease of doing business ranks economies from 1 to 189, with first place being the best.
EU contribution in the context of CPA

- Macroeconomic stability and fiscal/monetary policy

Significant and effective contribution has been provided to foster macroeconomic stabilisation, mainly through Budget Support (BS), by assisting in limiting fiscal deficit and stabilising public expenditure levels. Local capacities in Public Finance Management have been enhanced, mainly through BS dialogue and accompanying measures, including ability of more adequate matching between budget allocations and local policy priorities. Some positive reports on the role of CPA in promoting better fiscal policy and tax collection have also emerged throughout the public consultation.

Macro stability has indirectly supported the investment climate, through greater predictability for foreign investments, coupled with an increased share of domestically financed development spending and reduced pressure on the domestic banking sector. These aspects have been relevant in supporting local private sector through greater opportunities for access to finance and an increased ratio of private sector credit. In these areas, countries with BS are showing generally better impacts than the non-BS ones.\(^{110}\)

- Direct support to the development of the private sector

Private sector development at the national level, as supported by grant programmes under the CPA, has been generally ineffective and not consistent.\(^ {111}\) Although Private Sector Development (PSD) constituted a cross-cutting concern in the National Indicative Programmes (NIPs), and PSD interventions were streamlined in different thematic

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\(^{110}\) ‘Budget support: Financial implementation, Risk Assessment, and Selected Poverty, Macroeconomic and Fiscal Results’, 2015, DG DEVCO.

\(^ {111}\) Review of the strategic evaluations managed by DEVCO ___ Particip GmbH, 2016.
activities, these actions have not found adequate response and commitment at the governmental level. Direct support to enterprises, quality standards and enhanced competitiveness had a limited success. Access to credit has been difficult, particularly for micro, small and medium-sized enterprises, often operating in the informal sector. Microfinance provided an important source of support, but was not sufficient to meet the broad demand of enterprises.

The CPA established as well the ACP Investment Facility (IF) as a revolving fund, operated and managed by EIB, where loan amortisations are reinvested in new operations. It supports investments by private and commercially run public entities in all economic sectors through the provision of medium- to long-term financing through risk-bearing financial instruments. The focus has been on access to finance of SMEs and microfinance. Accompanying capacity building measures are provided to strengthen ACP financial intermediaries and end beneficiaries. They are complemented by investments in infrastructure aimed to strengthen the enabling environment. Among other actors, the IF has added value and was more effective in providing access to long-term financing as well as loans in local currencies, and has had a catalytic effect. Intermediaries and end beneficiaries would benefit from enhanced technical assistance support.

- Sector policy support including agriculture, rural policy and infrastructural support

In these sectors, institutional and regulatory reforms have generally been viewed as encouraging, although the assessments of effectiveness of support vary across the regions. Particular challenges were encountered in the transition process from EU support for reform schemes to partner country’s management of these schemes.

Specific support to commodity sectors has provided for increased sector competitiveness (e.g. support to banana and sugar in the Caribbean), however, it was generally not mainstreamed in comprehensive agricultural and rural development interventions. The approach to the traditional commodity support was recently reviewed with a focus on production chains, risk management, diversification, integration into international trade and sustainable business. These actions are too recent to be truly assessed.

Improving basic infrastructure addresses some of the basic constraints of private sector growth. The CPA support to infrastructure planning and implementation (mainly roads, but also water and energy supply) has been functional to support long-term competitiveness. As a consequence, the EU contribution has played a leading role for the development of regional transport networks. This confirms that cooperation on infrastructure and transport policy plays a key role for the development of sustainable, safe, secure and multimodal transport corridors, including all modes of transport (land,

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112 Evaluation of the EU’s support to private sector in third countries (2013).
civil aviation, and maritime). Nonetheless, poor maintenance of infrastructure has shown to be a key constraint for greater investments and private sector development.\textsuperscript{114} Despite intensive dialogue with the partner countries, allocations for road maintenance are inadequate in many countries. In some cases, procedural, programming and management inefficiencies have delayed the use of available resources and partially limited the potentials of promoted initiatives. As a result, routine maintenance is deficient in many countries, leading to loss of serviceability and accessibility and premature deterioration and negatively impacting the sustainability of infrastructure programmes. Energy policies contributing to economic growth and private sector development have met with some encouraging success in the framework of the Africa-EU Energy Partnership (AEEP).

The project and programme approach, under certain conditions, has shown to be effective\textsuperscript{115} for capacity development support but often overlooks the actual incentive framework. To improve sustainability, greater efforts should therefore be put on the assessment of the political economy dimension of identified problems to ensure more effective impact on its root causes.\textsuperscript{116}

Research & Innovation efforts have contributed to development outcomes (e.g. the International Potato Centre (CIP)) but largely in an ad-hoc manner that did not promote systematic and sustainable progress neither on wider development processes nor on creating conducive conditions for R&I. The lack of a core policy commitment to R&I has weakened uptake and sustainability\textsuperscript{117}.

- Effective democratic governance and CSOs / private sector inclusion

Over the past decade, good-governance, accountability and anti-corruption\textsuperscript{118} support has become increasingly relevant. Nonetheless, partially due to the complexity and novelty of such contributions, impact in reinforcing a number of critical governance processes has been limited so far (e.g. lack of parliamentary control and weak oversight bodies, etc.). The private sector was often not thoroughly consulted when institutional and regulatory reforms conducive to PSD were prepared and undertaken, resulting in limited targeting of private business.\textsuperscript{119} The need has thus emerged to better involve local non-state actors and the private sector in local policy dialogue. More involvement will foster greater trust in policy decisions, will strengthen their reliability and trigger increased interest for long-term local and foreign investment.

\textsuperscript{114} Review of the strategic evaluations managed by DEVCO– February 2016  __ Particip GmbH.
\textsuperscript{115} Thematic evaluation of the EU support to good governance (2006).
\textsuperscript{116} Evaluation of the EU’s trade-related assistance in third countries (2013).
\textsuperscript{118} Review of the strategic evaluations managed by DEVCO __ Particip GmbH, 2016.
\textsuperscript{119} Evaluation of the EU’s support to private sector in third countries (2013).
• Strengthened regionalisation

Important support has been provided, under the 9th and 10th EDF, to assure more effective intra- and extra-regional trade integration (e.g. policies and regulations in the Eastern and Southern Africa and Western Indian Ocean region) and a more favourable investment climate. At the intra-ACP level, various support instruments have been put in place, and amongst those the Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Fund (GEEREF)\textsuperscript{120} the ACP/EU Microfinance Programme, the Private Sector Enabling Environment Facility (BizClim) and PROINVEST received positive evaluations; however, the CDE, an ACP-EU joint institution with the aim to support businesses in ACP countries was closed in 2014 in relation with its performance.\textsuperscript{121} Particularly in Africa, limited coordination between regional and national support plans and implementation, and overlapping and different capacities of the regional organisations remain important obstacles toward effective regional integration, which is essential to promote private sector development and to attract investment.

To sum up

During most of the 15 years of CPA implementation, a significant number of ACP states have experienced a relatively steady positive performance in terms of economic growth. African countries showed greater resilience to the global crisis and better performances after 2009 as compared to the world economy as a whole.

Support to macroeconomic stabilisation, improved public finance management (PFM) and more strategic as well as efficient public expenditure — a precondition for sustainable economic growth — have represented the bulk of EU contribution, and an indirect support to private sector development. In such domains, CPA interventions are considered as relevant and generally effective.

Significant support has also been provided in the areas of credit to SMEs/MMEs, microcredit schemes, and risk-bearing instruments, the latter mainly due to the establishment of the ACP Investment Facility. Nonetheless, attempts to support public institutions to deal with private sector promotion have shown to be weak, while the direct support to private sector organisations has been occasional and not always suitable for the EU procedures and intervention modalities.

While the trend for a stronger role of the private sector has been growing over the years, its full engagement in the definition of the development strategies and in fostering economic growth remained largely below its potential. This was largely due to the constraints present in the business environment, where the state often exerts undue interference upon the market,

\textsuperscript{120} An innovative risk capital-based fund of which the EU is the founder and lead donor.

\textsuperscript{121} Evaluation of the Centre for the development of enterprise, final report, ADE, 2011.
and an excessive risk adverse/protectionist attitude by a constrained private sector to properly engage in difficult environments.

Support to agricultural sector has been concentrated on specific critical aspects (e.g. food security, focusing on vulnerable communities), while not sufficiently fostering the private sector capacity to promote sustainable innovation and greater diversification of value chains. The CPA support to infrastructure planning and implementation (mainly roads, but also water and energy supply) has been functional to support long-term competitiveness. As a consequence, the EU contribution has played a leading role for the development of regional transport networks. Nonetheless, poor maintenance of infrastructure has shown to be a key constraint for greater investments and private sector development.
8. To what extent has the CPA contributed to improved coverage, quality and access to basic social infrastructure and services?  

Global developments

Globally much progress has been made in enabling more children to go to school. The number of out-of-school children has fallen by almost half since 2000. Gender parity in enrolment improved in most countries but significant gaps persist in several countries, especially at secondary and higher levels. At the same time, literacy rates for young people aged 15 to 24 increased from 83% in 1990 to projected 91% in 2015. However, about 60 million primary-aged children, more than half of whom live in conflict-affected areas, are still not in primary school. Over 250 million children are in school but not learning the essential knowledge and skills appropriate for their grade. The quality gap in education in sub-Saharan Africa is confirmed by a recent assessment of student abilities in mathematics and reading by PASEC in 10 countries in Francophone West Africa. Over 70% of early primary pupils have not achieved the ‘sufficient’ level in language, and over 50% in mathematics. At the end of the primary cycle, close to 60% of pupils are below this level in both subjects.

Major progress has been made in improving child survival. The under –fives’ mortality rate has halved since 1990, from 90 to a projected 43 deaths per 1000 live births in 2015. Greater declines have been achieved amongst the poorest households than amongst the richest in all regions. Despite these advances, progress has been insufficient to achieve the MDG target of two-thirds reduction in death of children under five by 2015.

The maternal mortality ratio almost halved from 1990 to 2015. Despite this progress, achievements still fall short of the MDG target to reduce the ratio by three-quarters by 2015. In 2002 the world was struggling to coordinate a global battle against HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis (TB) and malaria, when many countries had limited access to suitable treatment and care options. However concerted efforts have turned the tide and the number of death caused by HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria — six million each year at the beginning of the millennium — has decreased by 40%.

The MDG drinking water target coverage was met in 2010, five years ahead of schedule. But much remains to be done: in 2015, 663 million people — mostly the poor and marginalised — still lack access to an improved drinking water source; nearly half of them are in sub-Saharan Africa. With regard to the MDG sanitation target, coverage of improved sanitation increased from 49% in 1990 to 68% in 2015. But more than one third of the global population — some 2.4 billion people — still do not use an improved sanitation facility.

123 http://www.pasec.confemen.org/
EU contribution in the context of CPA

- Availability of basic social infrastructure and services

**Health.** ACP Governments have been supported since the early 2000s to establish comprehensive health policies. A range of support modalities has been used to promote efficiently greater availability of health services across ACP countries. Amongst those, project and sector budget support, General Budget Support (GBS) and Global Trust Funds. In the last decade, a more prominent role of Trust Funds has emerged coupled with the reduction of GBS. The partnership has also supported global health initiatives such as the Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis and the GAVI Vaccine Alliance and has been a significant provider of WASH\(^\text{125}\) programming through both EDF 9 and EDF 10, supporting over 350 projects.

As a result, EU contribution has supported the effective increase in availability of health services in terms of range of services provided, reconstruction of deteriorated structures, staff deployed, as well as delivery of new health facilities including clinics in underserved regions. Despite evidence of overall progress the structures are still not adequate and quality of services could be improved. In general, the underfunding by the partner governments and failure to effectively address the human resources crisis are seen as the key factors of the limited improvements.

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\(^{124}\) World Bank — World Development Indicators (average figures may hide substantial differences at country level)

\(^{125}\) The concept of WASH groups together water, sanitation, and hygiene because the impacts of deficiencies in each area overlaps strongly, and so need to be addressed together in order to achieve a strong positive impact on public health.
In 2004, the ACP-EU Water Facility was established. The specific objectives have been to help achieve the water and sanitation Millennium Development Goals, and to contribute to improved water governance and management of water resources, and to the sustainable development and maintenance of water infrastructure. The Facility has provided EUR 712 million for 308 projects in more than 50 ACP countries for the period 2008-2013. Overall, this funding has increased access to water and generally has made good use of standard technology and locally available materials.

**Education.** The EU has supported ACP countries’ efforts to improve the availability of education, including through bilateral programmes, the Global Partnership for Education and the EU’s higher education cooperation programmes. The EU has contributed to ACP countries having more educational infrastructure and teaching and learning resources, increased numbers of trained teachers and incentives for training opportunities. However, new resources and inputs provided are still insufficient; sustainability is impacted by important increases in enrolment figures as a result of population growth. In terms of support to different levels of school education, EU support has focused on the primary level, with only a small share of overall support providing direct assistance to secondary education – mostly in medium human development countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Performance of EU in supporting ACP countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>MDG2:</strong> Achieve universal primary education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 9 million additional pupils were enrolled in primary education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 192 000 primary school teachers were trained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 10 000 schools were built or renovated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MDG4:</strong> Reduce child mortality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 5 million children under one year of age were immunised against measles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• More than 3 800 health centres and facilities were built, renewed or furnished</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MDG5:</strong> Improve maternal health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Almost 5.5 million births were attended by skilled health personnel,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 8 million consultations on reproductive health were carried-out,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MDG6:</strong> Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 264.000 people with advanced HIV infection received antiretroviral combination therapy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MDG7C:</strong> Improve WASH services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 42 million people received connection to improved drinking water,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 17 million people received connection to sanitation facilities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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126 EU Development assistance for basic education in Sub Saharan Africa and South Asia, European Court of Auditors, Special Report No 12/2010

127 Thematic global evaluation of European Commission support to the education sector in partner countries (including basic and secondary education) 2000-2007 (2010).

128 European Commission: The EU’s contribution to the Millennium Development Goals.
Quality of basic social infrastructure and services

**Health.** EU support has contributed to the strengthening of health policies across ACP countries, for example through greater capacity in data analysis, national strategic health planning, performance monitoring, and sector coordination. Greater support to sector management and governance capabilities (e.g. PFM and accountability) has been provided. As a result, health systems have been often strengthened, with evidence of some progress in greater quality of health services in a range of ACP countries. Nonetheless, results depend on local implementation capacity and health-provider structures are still largely inadequate, with clear room for improvements. For example, poor progress has been recorded with respect to essential medicine supply, (e.g. basic benefit packages). Evaluations suggest that greater support to human resources in the sector must be assured in the future, as well as effective access to financing opportunities.

**Education.** ACP governments have been assisted through Sector Budget Support (SBS) and sector support programmes to improve the quality of the education sector. Budget support has played a catalytic role, in strengthening systems and tools to improve education sector policies, service delivery and resourcing. As a result, government ownership has been high and new education policies and plans have been set-up or improved since the late nineties. Nonetheless, and despite some improvements in terms of systems’ capacities (e.g. Burundi, Madagascar, Namibia, Pacific), the actual impact on the quality of education is still weak. Notwithstanding the increase in enrolment, learning targets identified by ACP governments often remain unmet. EU provision under the CPA has also strengthened the capacity of higher education institutions and supported greater mobility of staff and student from ACP countries to EU countries and between ACP countries (e.g. Edulink, Erasmus Mundus, Intra-ACP Academic Mobility Scheme, African Higher Education Harmonisation and Tuning initiative).

Accessibility of basic social infrastructure and services

**Health.** EU support for a greater accessibility of health services in ACP countries has been channelled specifically to those with special needs. A key concern has been to increase access through the reduction of cost barriers, and for this purpose specific budget and project financing support has been provided to countries engaged in such priorities (e.g. Burkina Faso). Basic health care provision programmes have also been promoted (e.g. GBS programmes aimed at improving availability of indicators related to maternal...
health) coupled with additional contributions through global initiatives (e.g. GFATM, GAVI, polio eradication). These efforts have been effective, particularly with respect to improving maternal health, although gaps remain between rural and urban areas, and, in increasing the utilisation of health facilities by children, although to a lesser extent. As a consequence, amongst other results, higher immunisation rates have been achieved, as well as greater monitoring of growth and nutrition status.

**Education.** Evidence of a significant increase in access to school has also been recorded, especially for primary education, with net enrolment rates in primary education rising from 59% in 1999 to 79% in 2012. The majority of countries supported by the EU in this sector are in Sub-Saharan Africa (i.e. 15 out of the 19 under the 10th EDF), with free access to primary education promoted in many of these countries during the past decade. As for equitable access, the school enrolment rate for girls has grown faster than for boys across ACP countries. In this respect, EU investments in rural areas have been significant, resulting in strong increases of access for the poor (e.g. Zambia, Tanzania), although important differences among geographic areas persist across the region.

- **Role of civil society organisations**

  There is ample evidence of positive contributions made by CSOs, through EU support, in delivering social services to poor communities from rural and urban areas (e.g. housing, education, health, water, etc.) in the absence of effective public services. CSO involvement contributed as well to communities’ ability to demand for accountability by facilitating their increased involvement in the planning, implementation and monitoring of service delivery. The use of CSO’s and non-governmental actors was particularly high in fragile countries, where public service delivery cannot be guaranteed by government, or when official cooperation was suspended. The role of the private sector in the provisioning of essential services is increasing as well.

  While there is a growing trend to involve CSOs in dialogue processes organised in specific sectors (health, education, water and sanitation), the intensity and quality of participation tends to vary substantially, and hence it is difficult to assess the impact of actions, beyond the positive results of individual projects and/or programmes.

  The level of involvement of CSOs in the implementation or in the monitoring of public action varied largely in function of the context and of potential divergences with the government in place. CSOs have varying spaces to exist and operate. In some countries,

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135 Review of the strategic evaluations managed by DEVCO—February 2016 — Particip.
137 Positive examples were found in Uganda, Somalia, or Dominican Republic, where EU support has been particularly successful in contributing to strengthening NSAs and in developing their capacity to participate in policy dialogue with government. Source: Review of the strategic evaluations managed by DEVCO __ Particip 2016.
there is a relatively enabling environment that facilitates a minimum of dialogue between citizens and State; while in others, Governments consider that nation-building and development in general can only be fostered by the State. In both cases, and when participating in tri-partite discussions with the EU and the State, CSOs are mostly perceived and consulted as service providers, rather than as governance actors. Few stakeholders see the overall situation improving for CSOs in Africa, while many others see it declining, particularly for certain types of CSOs.\textsuperscript{138}

**To sum up**

Since the late nineties, the relevance of the CPA is shown by its support to ACP governments in shaping and financing education and health policies, and contributed to improved strategies and increased availability of social infrastructure and services, with a focus on the poor. GBS has been a major supporting modality, while sector programmes in Education and Global funds in health have increased during the last decade.

The supported government policies have led to improved and more equitable access to basic services, including a significant increase in enrolment rates in primary and secondary school, improved rates of access to basic health, with positive impacts on the literacy and basic health indicators.

The quality of the government services has been partly overlooked, and improvements have in some instances stagnated or been reversed as a result of high population growth, low levels of funding by the partner governments and conflicts or natural disasters. The contributions made by CSOs are positive but their involvement in the implementation and in particular in the monitoring of public action indicates varying (and often reduced) spaces to exist and operate.

9. To what extent has the CPA contributed to the attainment of substantial results on cross-cutting issues? ¹³⁹

The CPA distinguishes in its Part 3 under the cooperation strategies and the areas of support a number of thematic and cross-cutting issues. The four issues, gender, HIV/AIDS, environment and natural resources, climate change are the subject of the current evaluation question.

Global developments ¹⁴⁰

Gender equality and women’s empowerment are both human rights and drivers of development. Improving women’s participation at all levels of society can have significant positive impacts. It can facilitate reconstruction and help to build peaceful societies. It also provides a way to change rules and social norms that limit girls and boys, women and men from fulfilling their potential. Globally, significant progress has been made towards achieving gender equality and girls’ and women’s’ empowerment. Nonetheless, still much needs to be done to address persistent violations of woman’s rights occurring on a daily basis. The gender gap is even greater when gender inequality is combined with other forms of exclusion such as disability, age, caste, ethnicity, sexual orientation, geographical remoteness or religion.

In 2002 the world was struggling to coordinate a global battle against HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis (TB) and malaria while many countries had limited access to suitable treatment and care options. However, concerted efforts have turned the tide and the number of death caused by HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis (TB) and malaria — six million each year at the beginning of the millennium — has decreased by 40%. New HIV infections are declining while treatments are becoming more widely available. Between 2000 and 2013 greater efforts to combat malaria helped to reduce the incidence by 30% globally (34% in Africa). Over the same period malaria mortality rates fell by an estimated 47% worldwide (53% in children aged < 5 years).

Increasing greenhouse gas emissions and rapid climate change, depletion of natural resources and degradation of ecosystems pose critical challenges to development. Global targets on access to improved water supplies and reduced numbers of people living in slums have been achieved before the MDG deadline of 2015, but the loss of environmental resources and biodiversity continue at unprecedented rates. Over the last 20 years, global awareness of environmental and climate change issues has grown rapidly and takes centre-stage in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The majority of ACP countries have ratified the main multilateral environmental agreements (notably on climate change, desertification and biological diversity). Many of them have adopted quite comprehensive policy and legal

¹³⁹ Main sources of ‘Review of the strategic evaluations managed by DEVCO–February 2016 _ Particip’: Evaluation of EU Support to Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment (GEWE) in Partner Countries (2015); Thematic evaluation of EU support to environment and climate change in third countries (2015); Regional/country evaluations
¹⁴⁰ The trends are based on available aggregated and disaggregated performances, adjusted to reflect ACP countries as much as possible.
framework in relation with environment and climate change and these have been mainstreamed to some extent into national development plans and poverty reduction strategies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>World</th>
<th>Sub-Saharan Africa</th>
<th>Caribbean small states</th>
<th>Pacific island small states</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary completion rate, female (%)</td>
<td>77.0</td>
<td>78.2</td>
<td>91.4</td>
<td>48.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary completion rate, male (%)</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>84.3</td>
<td>93.1</td>
<td>59.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult literacy rate, population 15+ years, female (%)</td>
<td>69.5</td>
<td>77.0</td>
<td>81.3</td>
<td>42.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult literacy rate, population 15+ years, male (%)</td>
<td>82.2</td>
<td>86.9</td>
<td>89.1</td>
<td>63.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevalence of HIV, female (% ages 15-24)</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevalence of HIV, male (% ages 15-24)</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population growth (annual%)</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural population (% of total population)</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>73.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban population (% of total population)</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

141 World Bank — World Development Indicators (average figures may hide substantial differences at national level).
EU contribution in the context of CPA

- Gender sensitive approach

Coherence of the CPA in this context is shown by the fact that European policies and actions on gender in development cooperation are guided by many different international and European commitments. The practical implementation was coordinated by the Gender Action Plan (GAP 2010-2015) adopted by the Council in 2010. Yearly reports on the GAP by the EU delegations gave an indication of progress on the implementation. In total 25 delegations in ACP countries prepared a gender analysis over the period of implementation of the GAP. This implies that there are still important deficiencies in the integration of a gender perspective in EU development cooperation.

The OECD Gender marker is a policy marker created by OECD which marks the relevance of gender equality (0= no relevance; 1= significant; 2= main relevance) in each programme and project. The table below shows the disbursements under the European Development Fund (EDF). The share of programmes and projects where Gender is targeted has grown overall, although the number of projects/programmes where gender is a principal objective has decreased since 2012.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not marked</td>
<td>2,502</td>
<td>2,133</td>
<td>2,421</td>
<td>2,106</td>
<td>2,341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>626</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>638</td>
<td>839</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>606</td>
<td>589</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principal</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share</td>
<td>28.1 %</td>
<td>29.3 %</td>
<td>27.1 %</td>
<td>30.3 %</td>
<td>35.8 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thematic evaluations reveal that delivery on the institutional commitment and leadership of Gender Equality and Women Empowerment (GEWE) agenda was weak. There seems to be a mismatch between the EU strong policy commitments and the organisational capacity to deliver on them. In fact, gender analysis was rarely used to inform strategy and programming and gender-sensitive indicators were not adequately integrated in programme/project results frameworks. Furthermore, despite the importance attributed to context assessments, understanding of the gender sensitive aspects was usually limited and therefore reflected in weak country strategy objectives, programmes and dialogue with respect to the gender approach.

- Fight against HIV/AIDS

EU support to fight HIV/AIDS has been largely channelled through contributions to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM). The Global Fund

142 Evaluation of EU Support to Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment (GEWE) in Partner Countries (2015).
spends about 50% of its resources on combating HIV/AIDS, and more than 2/3 of all resources go to ACP countries. A strategic review\textsuperscript{144} undertaken in 2015 confirmed impact of global efforts against the three diseases and that the level of funding is an important factor in this regard.

The Commission has supported the Global Fund since its creation in 2001 at the initiative of the G8. The EU and its Member States have provided 50% of total funding. Between 2001 and 2015, the EU disbursed EUR 1 330 million in payments to the GFATM, out of which EUR 630 million came from the EDF and EUR 700 million from the DCI. The European Commission has pledged EUR 370 million over the period 2014-2016 (215 million from the EDF and 155 million from the DCI). These contributions have allowed the scaling up of effective access to HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment, care and support, which resulted in an increase in the number of people with advanced HIV infection receiving antiretroviral (ARV) therapy. As a result of the collective efforts of all governments and partners, including the EU and the CPA, nearly 40 per cent of all people living with HIV in low- and middle-income countries had access to ARV therapy in 2014—a striking increase from less than 1% in 2000 and just 4% in 2005.

HIV/AIDS has been mostly tackled as part of specific health sector interventions, and in some cases support to education,\textsuperscript{145} food security and infrastructures.\textsuperscript{146} In this regard, support has been focused on the availability and access to health services (e.g. Rep. Congo, Angola). In some countries, positive results have been achieved by moving from stand-alone projects to more systemic approaches aimed at promoting greater social protection (e.g. Lesotho, Angola, Botswana) and combined with capacity support to national institutions.\textsuperscript{147}

- Mainstreaming environmental sustainability and mitigation / adaptation to climate change

There is good evidence that Environment and Climate Change considerations have been relevant and increasingly integrated into EU cooperation with ACP countries. Over time, the Commission has developed a comprehensive approach and toolkit to promote environment and climate change (E&CC) mainstreaming, which supports the cooperation with ACP countries (as well as other geographic financing instruments).

\textsuperscript{144} http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/terg/strategicreview/.
\textsuperscript{145} A considerable number of teachers are victims of AIDS every year in Botswana, Zambia and Uganda.
\textsuperscript{146} The road transport network is recognised as a powerful vector in propagation of HIV/AIDS with incidence mapping of HIV/AIDS concentrations forming a sombre representation of major road corridors. Transport workers, migrant workers, and local populations in border communities and migrant populations in general are especially vulnerable to HIV/AIDS. All project interventions supported by EU (and most other sector donors) have included provision for sensitisation and information dissemination on HIV/AIDS to populations in road catchment areas (and to contractors’ work forces). The cases of Ethiopia and Zambia have been quoted as typical of activities of HIV/AIDS sensitisation in the SSA transport sector.
\textsuperscript{147} Under EDF8: Regional Support for an Expanded Response to HIV and AIDS; The Regional HIV/AIDS Awareness and Education Programme (Soul City) Edutainment, The Health and Development Innovative Consortium (HDIC) — Network of ACP Universities to strengthen National HIV/AIDS Responses.
Country Environmental Profiles have been produced for at least 38 ACP countries (32 African countries, 2 Caribbean ones and 4 Pacific ones), and Regional Environmental profiles were also prepared for Central Africa (CEMAC countries) and overseas countries and territories, in order to inform the programming of the 10th EDF (2007-2013) in the concerned countries and regions. These Profiles provide a detailed analysis of the state of the environment in partner countries and regions, of the policies and institutions, of the quality of environment and climate change integration in national policies and of the implications for EU cooperation.\footnote{Inventory of country environmental profiles established by the former EuropeAid Environment Helpdesk (2009).} Environmental Impact Assessment is systematically undertaken for large EU-financed infrastructure projects — in line with both national legislation and EU guidelines. Strategic Environmental Assessments are increasingly used to inform the development of sector policies.

Assessments of the quality of ENV/CC integration in a sample of 100 projects and programmes in ‘environmentally sensitive’ sectors were conducted in 2009 and 2010 and concluded that the quality of environmental integration was rated as good or very good for 45% of the projects, 66% of the sector support programmes, and 33.3% of the General Budget Support Programmes. Reviews of 2014-2017 programming documents\footnote{Review of 2014-2017 programming documents: conclusions and recommendations — Final report, 30 July 2015.} concluded that the average score for the quality of ENV/CC integration in a sample of 66 EDF 11 Multiannual Indicative Programmes was 69% (qualified as ‘good’): the quality of E&CC integration was assessed as ‘good’ or ‘very good’ for 62% of the MIPs. This is comparable to the score for DCI countries and significantly better than for ENI countries.

ACP was among the main beneficiary regions of the EU support to environment and climate change adaptation and mitigation, receiving 45% of all funds\footnote{Thematic global evaluation of the EU support to environment and climate change in third countries (2007-2013), 2015.} mainly at country level or through multi-country initiatives like the ACP-EU Energy Facility, the Sustainable Energy for All initiative (SE4ALL), the Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA) and other intra ACP programmes to strengthen environmental governance and desertification. Important synergies and complementarities between the CPA and thematic programmes addressing environment and climate change (e.g. Environment and Natural Resource Thematic Programme - ENRTP) have been observed.

The EU support has effectively contributed to raise awareness on environment and climate change, to strengthen institutional capacities and environmental governance, to build the capacities of civil society (assertive civil society organisations specialised on environment and climate change have emerged), to support ACP countries’ participation in Multilateral Environmental Agreements, to promote climate change adaptation and mitigation, renewable energy and energy efficiency and to protect ecosystems: 1.9 million km² of forest protected and continued conservation of 1.1 million km² of protected areas over the period 2004-2014\footnote{The EU’s contribution to the Millennium Development goals.}. However sustainability remains an important issue, the scale and duration of efforts by partner countries and the EU has been largely insufficient to reverse
environmental degradation and counter the powerful drivers underpinning it (e.g. growing populations compounded by unsustainable production and consumption patterns).

Policy dialogue between the ACP and EU has also grown significantly (e.g. the Joint ACP EU Declaration on the Post 2015 Development Agenda - June 2014). The activities of the GCCA have enhanced the capacity of ACP Regional organisations, to support the policy dialogue and to deliver services to their member states, with a focus on LDCs’ and SIDs’, in view to address vulnerabilities and improve Climate Change and Disaster Preparedness.

Political cooperation between the EU and ACP on these issues has increased and culminated at the COP 21 on climate change where this cooperation was instrumental to develop the high ambition coalition that led to the Paris Agreement (see as well EQ 6).

- Role of the private sector and CSOs

As for other policy areas, local and international CSOs have been an important vehicle to channel EU funding and deliver effective services in a range of sectors. Between 2007 and 2013, for example, CSOs received 44% of Gender-targeted funding.

A significant share (16%) of the Environment and Natural Resource Thematic Programme funds for the period 2007-2014 have been channelled through Civil Society Organisations. Calls for Proposals are regularly organised in areas such as FLEGT, independent forest observation, biodiversity and wildlife conservation, Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD), etc. Capacity building initiatives by CSO’s have been successfully provided through the Green Economy and Social and Environmental Entrepreneurship in Africa Programme and the Partnership for Action on Green economy (PAGE) programme.

However, the predominance of urban-based NGOs in policy processes, as compared to the involvement of decentralised, grassroots CSOs seem to pose some issues of legitimacy. Political restrictions and control-oriented regulatory frameworks are persisting as a limit to the engagement of the local civil society in public policy and political dialogue.

The recent Thematic Evaluation on Environment and Climate Change (2007-2014) highlighted that growing engagement with the private sector on access to sustainable energy and the promotion of the green economy through sustainable production and consumption have led to promising results.

To sum up

Globally, significant progress has been made towards achieving gender equality and girls’ and women’s’ empowerment. Nonetheless, much still needs to be done to address persistent violations of woman’s rights occurring on a daily basis. The strong EU policy commitments were not always matched by its organisational capacity to deliver, which resulted in country
strategy objectives, programmes and dialogue that did not sufficiently consider a balanced gender approach.

On HIV/AIDS, the increase in EU spending through the Global Fund has contributed to the increase in the number of people on treatment. A strategic review undertaken in 2015 confirmed impact of global efforts against the three diseases and that the level of funding is an important factor in this regard. Positive results have been obtained as well to tackle HIV/AIDS as part of specific health sector interventions, and in some cases support to education, food security and infrastructures.

Environment and Climate Change considerations have been increasingly integrated into EU cooperation with ACP countries. Useful and quality guidelines and tools have been promoted resulting in a significant step forward to increasing the mainstreaming capacities of the EU delegations. The EU support has contributed to raise awareness on environment and climate change, to strengthen institutional capacities and environmental governance and to build the capacities of civil society. However, despite increased efforts in cooperation on environment and climate change under the CPA, sustainability remains an important issue. The scale and duration of efforts by partner countries and the EU has been largely insufficient to reverse environmental degradation and counter the powerful drivers underpinning it (e.g. unsustainable production and consumption patterns). Political cooperation between the EU and ACP on these issues has increased over time and culminated at the COP 21 on climate change where this cooperation was key to develop the high ambition coalition that led to the Paris Agreement on climate change.

Local and international CSOs have been an important channel to vehicle EU funding and deliver effective services in a range of sectors. Between 2007 and 2013, CSOs received 44% of Gender-targeted funding and a significant share of the Environment and Natural Resource Thematic Programme funds (2007-2014) was channelled as well through CSO’s.
10. To what extent has the design and implementation of EU interventions adequately delivered on poverty reduction and addressed the needs of the most vulnerable groups?  

Global developments - Mixed patterns in fight against income poverty

For the ACP group as a whole, the fight against poverty has been successful: the share of people living in extreme poverty (1.25 US$/a day) decreased from 56% to 46% between 1990 and 2011. However, while in relative terms the poverty decreased, it significantly increased in absolute terms, from 277 million in 1990 to 390 million in 2002 and to almost 404 million in 2011, due to population growth. The changes in ACP mainly reflect the trends of Sub-Saharan Africa.

It is important to note that the performance of the LDCs, which account for half of the ACP countries, was better on average than the other group of ACP countries. The absolute number of the extreme poor in the ACP members actually increased between 2002 and 2011 from 390 to 403 million while for LDCs it decreased from 357 to 335 million (see underneath table).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Share and number of people living in absolute poverty</th>
<th>ACP</th>
<th>SSA</th>
<th>LDC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Share (%)</strong></td>
<td>55.95</td>
<td>55.99</td>
<td>45.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Absolute numbers (millions)</strong></td>
<td>277</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>403.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Importantly though, a shift from lower towards higher incomes levels has been recorded at country level across the ACP group, resulting in potentially better income conditions on average across the region. In 2000, in fact, a total of 44 states were Low Income Countries (LICs), 30 were Middle Income Countries (MICs) and 1 was a high-income country (HIC). In 2015 this repartition had changed to 26 LICs, 43 MICs and 7 HICs (figure below).

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152 Main sources of ‘Review of the strategic evaluations managed by DEVCO—February 2016 — Particip’: Joint evaluation of general budget support (2006), Thematic global evaluation of European Commission support in the sectors if ESI (employment and social inclusion) in partner countries (including vocational training) (2011) and a wide range of country evaluations, as well as BS evaluations.

153 The trends are based on available aggregated and disaggregated performances, adjusted to reflect ACP countries as much as possible.

154 Performance mainly reflects trends in Sub-Saharan Africa where between 1990 and 2011 the people living on 1.25$/ day decreased from around 57 % to 47 %. However, absolute number of extreme poor in SSA increased from 267 to 397 million.

155 Refers to 1.25/day poverty line: [http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/index.htm?0.0](http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/index.htm?0.0).
EU contribution in the context of CPA

- Overall contribution to reduction of income poverty and inclusive growth

Poverty reduction is one of the main objectives of the CPA. Since 2000, the EU has allocated the majority of EDF resources towards those ACP countries most in need, in particular Least Developed Countries. Over time, the latter’s allocation share has further increased passing from 75.3 % under EDF 9 to 81.1 % under EDF 11, while Upper Middle-Income Countries’ share decreased from 5.5 % under EDF 9 to 1.9 % under EDF 11 (see as well EQ 12).

The CPA has contributed positively to the reduction of poverty, this particularly through its efficient BS aid modality. The eligibility criteria for budget support have been essential elements to ensure the pre-conditions for effective poverty eradication. Amongst those: stability-oriented macroeconomic policy and more efficient and effective systems for collecting revenues. By fostering macroeconomic stability and other pre-conditions, budget support has been instrumental and had an important impact on the reduction of extreme poverty in assisted countries. In contrast, extreme poverty broadly remained stagnant in those ACP countries not receiving budget support.

EU budget support was therefore well targeted at countries with higher levels of poverty, although inequality issues have not been sufficiently addressed. It appears thus that the CPA, for objective difficulties and probably also for its nature of an inter-governmental agreement, has hardly succeeded to put in place growth distribution policies, based on access to assets and not only to services by the poor. As a result some trends in income

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158 Review of the strategic evaluations managed by DEVCO—February 2016 — Particip.
inequalities might mitigate the potentials of growth and impact sustainability and would thus require a more diversified approach towards poverty eradication.\textsuperscript{159}

Some concrete examples of the EU contribution through the EDF, to the MDG goals and thus multidimensional poverty between 2004 and 2013 are presented in the following box.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|}
\hline
**Performance of EU in supporting ACP countries** \textsuperscript{160} \\
(see as well box in EQ 8) \\
\hline
MDG 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger  \\
- 3 million people were trained in technical and vocational training and education.  \\
- Almost 6 million people benefitted from employment related interventions.  \\
- 34 million people were assisted through food security related social transfers.  \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

A range of EU interventions — next to those already mentioned in the previous EQ’s — has contributed to address specific aspects of poverty, namely food security, social protection, employment and vulnerability. These aspects are discussed in the following sections.

- **Food insecurity and vulnerability to global crisis**

Non-income poverty aspects are an essential threat to ACP countries. Amongst these, access to food is a central element of EU support. In order to support the most vulnerable individuals, EU intervention has been focused particularly on those countries most prone to food droughts and exposed to global food crises. Within such a framework, food security has been addressed through a multifaceted approach, including: foreign currency facility to channel a large part of food aid and generate counterpart funds to be used as budget support; support was provided as well to agriculture production and some value chain activity. Food security was equally promoted through various area-based interventions to enhance the resilience at community level against climatic shocks.

Interventions re-establishing productive assets after a crisis (e.g. those under PSNP)\textsuperscript{161} were reported as having an important impact on household capacity to recover from shock. A substantial positive impact was also reported for SAHEL countries supported by targeted food security interventions under the RPCA (Réseau de Prevention des Crises Alimentaire) funded under NIPs or by AGIR.\textsuperscript{162} A generally effective and direct way to increase access to food was support channelled through NGOs.

Nonetheless, EU interventions were not effective in assuring long-term sustainability of such results. In this respect, a too limited use of social transfer programmes to graduate beneficiaries out of subsidies was highlighted as an issue in both PSNP and Farm Input

\textsuperscript{159} Recent IMF and OECD studies show that increases in inequality not only threaten social and political stability but also economic development: http://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/inequality/ http://www.oecd.org/social/inequality.htm.

\textsuperscript{160} European Commission: The EU’s contribution to the Millennium Development Goals.

\textsuperscript{161} Kenya 2014 Evaluation of EU cooperation and Ethiopia 2012 Evaluation of EU cooperation.

\textsuperscript{162} Refer to 2007 Burkina evaluation of the cooperation (response to question evaluative 4 CJ 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4).
Subsidy evaluations. Limited support has been provided to strengthen the ability of ACP countries in financing such interventions autonomously, in the absence of EU contribution. Area-based interventions have therefore been conceived according to a project approach, but have not promoted more strategic impacts and systemic changes in country approaches to food vulnerability, particularly in case of post conflict interventions.

Furthermore, food security has mainly been addressed at a ‘national level’ and not enough effort has been put to promote regional integrated approaches across all involved countries and regional institutions. Some positive examples do exist in this respect, as in the case of the African Trans-boundary River Basin Support programme, coordinated by SADC, or the improved road networks on food security in West Africa. However, these initiatives have been sporadic and further effort for greater action at the regional levels is required.

Global initiatives also have been promoted to address malnutrition, such as the Scaling Up Nutrition Initiative on improving intergovernmental coordination in 55 member countries. These initiatives have been effective in fostering institutional and policy changes in dealing with nutrition. Furthermore, case studies recently completed by the Commission in 5 of the 40 priority partner countries, reveal promising results on malnutrition. These five countries (Niger, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Rwanda and Bangladesh) are all demonstrating a faster decline in stunting than was predicted, and will have prevented an extra 590,000 children becoming stunted by 2025 respectively. This is an important marker in the progress towards achieving the EU international commitment of supporting partner countries in reducing stunting by 7 Million children by 2025.

- Employment and social protection

Social protection and support to employment is an essential element of fight against poverty. The evaluation of Indicative Programmes on Employment and Social Inclusion (ESI) shows that 38% of ACP countries have at least one ESI-relevant sector as a core area of intervention (i.e. 22 countries in Africa, 5 in the Caribbean and 3 in the Pacific). These interventions include actions on vocational education and training, private sector development, as well as institutional strengthening through Trade Related Assistance at the regional levels. In low-income African countries, ESI-related aspect were included in EC’s country analyses and translated into the EU response strategy in the period 2007/2013. Nonetheless, actions supporting training and labour market needs have been judged poorly integrated in most CSPs.

163 Malawi 2011 Evaluation of EU cooperation.
164 Court of Auditors’ Special Report N°1/2012 ‘Effectiveness of the EU development Aid for food security in Sub-Saharan Africa; Malawi and Zambia evaluation reports. .
165 Court of Auditor’s Special Report N°1/2012 ‘Effectiveness of the EU development Aid for food security in Sub-Saharan Africa; Malawi and Zambia evaluation reports.
Importantly, attention to employment was not duly addressed in the assistance to Private Sector Development (PSD) and remained mainly under actions towards education, vocational or social assistance in an effort to improve labour force employability. Employment concerns were not systematically mainstreamed in the economic reform programmes, although positive exceptions existed under specific programme (e.g. banana, rum and rice support). Most EU interventions in support of trade, macroeconomic stability, economic reform and private sector development have not explicitly focused on employment creation as the main target.

Moreover, contribution to employment in the informal sector has been limited, as it was mainly based on specific project-initiatives and not mainstreamed into broader policy support. This aspect is particularly relevant in Sub-Saharan Africa, where the informal economy plays an essential role employing up to 66% of all non-agricultural workers, reaching 90% of workers if agricultural employment is included.

- **Vulnerable communities in fragile countries**

Addressing country fragility is an essential aspect in assuring the pre-condition for long-term sustainability of poverty eradication in a country. The European Consensus on Development (2005) set out an approach to ‘addressing state fragility’ through governance reforms, rule of law, anti-corruption measures and the building of viable State institutions. It’s a holistic approach linking peace, security and development, according to the international Principles for engagement in Fragile States (OECD). In the cases where an important effort was put to integrate different instruments and components in country programmes (e.g. Haiti and Burundi) with the aim to address state building and rehabilitation, results were reported as limited due to poor governmental commitments. State Building Contracts (SBCs) have recently proved to be flexible GBS instruments for rapid support to fragile states (e.g. Mali, South Sudan, Haiti) and could be a response to such weaknesses encountered, provided that they rely on high-level political dialogue. However, their implementation is quite recent and there is not yet evidence of emerging results in available evaluations.

The development of resilience/LRRD approaches in a number of countries (e.g. Haiti, Mali, South Sudan, CAR, Sahel countries), even if still recent have proved to be useful to make support to vulnerable communities in fragile states an important objective of the cooperation with ACP countries. EDF unique features (encompassing development and humanitarian action in cases of emergencies and unpredictable events) and flexibility has allowed tackling effectively a number of crisis situations; most recent example is the ECHO-DEVCO response to El Niño.

Evidence of EU effectiveness in peace-building and conflict prevention is provided by the *Thematic Evaluation of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding* (2011) and some country-level evaluations held between 2011 and 2015 in eight fragile and conflict affected
states. Nonetheless, EU response has tended to be reactive, focusing on short-term interventions to address crises rather than anticipating (and preventing) socio-political crisis. An effective peace-building approach requires a deep analysis of the root causes of conflict in the interests of preventing conflict and preventing relapses into conflict.

To sum up

Since 2000 the EU has allocated the majority of EDF resources towards those ACP countries most in need, in particular Least Developed Countries. Available evidence suggests that EU contribution has promoted relevant and effective support towards the eradication of poverty, including income poverty, food security and social protection targeting the most vulnerable communities.

By fostering macroeconomic stability and other pre-conditions, budget support has been instrumental in reducing extreme poverty in assisted countries. Eligibility criteria for budget support have been essential elements to ensure the pre-conditions for effective poverty eradication while significant Joint BS amounts contributed directly to poverty reduction. EU budget support was well targeted at countries with higher levels of poverty, although inequality issues have not been sufficiently addressed.

The CPA has thus contributed to strengthening the endogenous factors of growth, by supporting macroeconomic stability, PFM, trade and transport networks (EQ 7). And it has contributed to improved strategies and increased availability of social infrastructure and services, with a focus on the poor (EQ 8).

Food security has been addressed through a multifaceted approach and through various area-based interventions to enhance the resilience at community level against climatic shocks. Interventions re-establishing productive assets after a crisis were reported as having an important impact of household capacity to recover from shock. Nonetheless, EU interventions were not effective in assuring long-term sustainability of such results.

Employment concerns were not systematically mainstreamed in the economic reform programmes and attention to employment was not duly addressed in the assistance to Private Sector Development (PSD). These concerns remained mainly under actions towards vocational or social assistance in an effort to improve labour force employability.

Evidence suggests a strong focus of EU interventions towards post-conflict stabilisation, resulting in some positive impacts in this area (see as well EQ 3). This evidence points as well to a need for more regular investment in contextual analysis to inform targeted and relevant EU interventions, so to develop and implement a systematic approach to conflict analysis.

167 Nepal, Yemen, Kenya, OPT, Cameroon, East Timor, Ethiopia, Burundi.
11. To what extent has the work of the joint institutions contributed to the results achieved by the CPA?

Overview of Joint ACP-EU institutions

Joint Institutions provided for under Art. 14 of the CPA are the ACP-EU Council of Ministers, the ACP-EU Committee of Ambassadors and the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly (JPA). The institutional framework that stems out the CPA is depicted in the next figure.

The ACP-EU Council of Ministers is the main institution of the ACP-EU institutional framework. It meets annually alternatively in an EU and an ACP country and is composed of members of the Council of the EU, members of the European Commission/EEAS and a member of the government of each ACP State. The Council is supported by two permanent committees, namely the ACP-EU Development Finance Cooperation Committee (DFCC) and the ACP-EU Joint Ministerial Trade Committee (JMTC); their work feeds into the annual meeting of the Joint Council of Ministers. Article 15 of the CPA assigns to the Council the functions of conducting political dialogue; adopting the policy guidelines and taking the decisions necessary for the implementation of the provisions of the Agreement; scrutinising and resolving issues preventing the effective and efficient implementation of the Agreement or presenting an obstacle to achieving its objectives; and ensuring the smooth functioning of the consultation mechanisms. It also plays a key role in revision of the CPA annexes.168

The ACP-EU Committee of Ambassadors’ role is to ‘assist the Council of Ministers in the fulfilment of its tasks and carry out any mandate entrusted to it by the Council. In this context, it shall monitor implementation of this Agreement and progress towards achieving the objectives set therein’.169 It comprises, on the one hand, the permanent representative of each

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168 By simple decision (Article 81).
169 CPA, Article 16.
Member State to the European Union and a representative of the Commission and, on the other hand, the head of mission of each ACP State to the European Union. It is supported in its work by the ACP-EU Council’s Secretariat.

The **ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly (JPA)** is a consultative body composed of a total of 156 members from the EU and the ACP. The JPA meets twice-yearly in a plenary session, alternately in the EU and in an ACP State. It also meets in a different format at regional level to foster regional integration and cooperation between national parliaments. Its objectives are to promote democratic processes through dialogue and consultation; facilitate greater understanding between the peoples and raising public awareness of development issues; discuss issues pertaining to development and the partnership; discuss the annual reports of the ACP-EU Council of Ministers and to make recommendations with a view to achieving the objectives of the Agreement; advocate for institutional development and capacity building of national parliaments in accordance with Article 33(1) of the Agreement.

**Flow of information between the EU and ACP through the Joint Institutions**

In general terms, key to effective functioning of any institutional system is a good flow of timely and quality information. In this specific case, the CPA institutional setting seems beset with difficulties relating to exchange of information, involvement in each other’s activities and synchronisation of activities.

A closer look into the network of actors and relationships between them reveals that there is a correspondence between the institutions and two pillars of the partnership, namely development cooperation and trade, through dedicated ministerial committees. Political dialogue was to be taken forward both within the institutional framework, particularly the Joint Council, but possibly also the Joint Parliamentary Assembly, as well as outside, at the appropriate level. However, in practice, the role of these joint institutions has not materialised as foreseen.

The possibility for the Joint Institutions to rely on the expertise of working groups and committees has not been exploited in full; it has been used on commodities with some notable operational outcomes (e.g. sugar, rum, bananas, cotton), while more global issues seem to have received less attention. Equally, monitoring activities at the level of the Committee of Ambassadors have not been evident.

Another missed opportunity is related to the general provisions on cooperation in international fora (e.g. Article 39) where the Joint Institutions have not been used as a space for dialogue and negotiation to promote cooperation between the European Union and the ACP Group in the international arena.

Furthermore, the Joint Institutions have weak interactions with key players (e.g. non-state actors) that could contribute to sustainable and inclusive development in ACP countries and to further strengthen relations between the European Union and the ACP States. It is worth
recalling that attempts were made to build bridges with the Joint Institutions (JMC, particularly in the first half of the period covered by the Agreement, and JPA) but this did not result in a pattern of sound and regular interaction.

A majority of respondents to the Joint Public Consultation believes the institutional set-up did not facilitate an adequate and efficient flow of information between the EU and the ACP for a number of reasons. Joint institutions have functioned in a rather bureaucratic way, focusing mainly on financial and technical cooperation while side-lining the political substance of the partnership. Moreover, the low level participation from EU Member states and ownership from ACP partners, and the insufficient involvement of joint institutions in political dialogue bore little resemblance between what was originally foreseen and what has actually been achieved. The Joint Public Consultation revealed as well that the institutional framework is not well known by the respondents, confirming their lack of visibility.

**Effectiveness and efficiency of ACP EU joint institutions**

On effectiveness, the framework set up by the CPA, modelled on the EU institutional setting, is comprehensive and relatively well-designed. Institutional practice was however undermined by unequal interest in the joint institutions. While the institutional framework generates limited political interest by EU Member States, processes are extremely politicised on the ACP side. In these circumstances, important decisions to EU and ACP countries have increasingly been taken outside of the ACP-EU institutional framework (e.g. recent example of Valetta Summit).

Furthermore, legal requirements pertaining decision-making from both sides (EU and ACP) imply lengthy preparatory work and must comply with EU decision-making procedures. The decision-making process may appear scripted to external practitioners because legal requirements compel the adoption of positions ahead of Joint Councils, which restricts the role of the Joint Councils to purely formal and ceremonial meetings. In this respect, ‘joint’ institutions have not functioned as such and decision-making resulted in two parallel processes, with significant involvement of the European Commission which has a recognised right of legislative initiative.

It seems legitimate to question the ability of the whole institutional setting to innovate, to address emerging concerns or to settle disputes. Although rules of procedures are adopted for each joint institution, processes and workflows are not systematically written down and remain unclear, leaving room for delays and informal practices. While their performance and accountability was difficult to track, these meetings remain however useful to position outstanding ACP-EU issues to the top of the political agenda.

Despite some attempts in its first meetings, the Joint Ministerial Council played a limited role in political dialogue which was rather taken forward by Parties at national or regional and sub-regional level. Typical political pillar issues have been addressed more frequently in the exchanges within the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly with the representatives of the
EU Council. Whilst these offer a good opportunity for EU and ACP parliamentarians to exchange views with the Council, they result, when coupled with the non-binding character of the JPA resolutions, in limited impact on ACP-EU policy making. The work of the Council would have benefited from additional exchanges between ACP and EU sides at the technical level. On the ACP side, the lack of delegated power to the ACP Secretariat also adversely impacted the effectiveness of institutional practice.

Decisions delegated to the Committee of Ambassadors remain very formal as they follow the ‘written procedure’ and are adopted by an exchange of letters between both parties. The content of annual reports of the joint institutions would need to be qualitatively improved to provide additional details on achievements against objectives, and the assessment of fulfilment of respective roles and overall institutional performance.

About efficiency, the CPA provision for meetings at the level of Heads of State or Government, upon joint agreement and in an appropriate format, introduced in the 2010 second revision of the CPA has not been used. At the executive level, all joint institutions may set up committees, working parties or expert groups to support them in their tasks. However, such direct support and recourse to experts has been used only occasionally.

While most ACP States are usually represented at ministerial level, usually only the EU Member State holding the Presidency at the time of the meeting is represented at this level. Most of the time, other Member States are represented by senior officials either from their capitals or Embassies (Permanent Representatives in Brussels or Ambassador when Council is held in an ACP country), which is not very satisfying for the ACP side. It is mainly due to the lack of substantive discussions during Joint Council meetings and the fact that the EU Council, which adopted decisions ahead of the meeting, can be represented by its Presidency.

On the financing of the institutional framework, analysis revealed that the cost of joint institutions since the entry into force of EDF 9 amounts to an annual average of EUR 9.5 million. For the period 2014-2020, it corresponds to 0.25% of EDF 11. The budget allocated to the ACP Secretariat\textsuperscript{170} represents the main part of the overall support.

\textsuperscript{170} The ACP Secretariat is responsible for the administrative management of the ACP Group of States (Georgetown Agreement, 1975, Article 4). Managed by a Secretary General, assisted by three assistant SGs, it is composed of about 75 staff (Brussels) and has an antenna in Geneva (WTO issues). Over the period covered by the CPA, the ACP Secretariat is expected to receive an average supporting grant of EUR 8 million per year financed under the EDF (Intra ACP).
The robustness of the institutional setting has been tested on a number of occasions, revealing vulnerabilities and missing or weak mechanisms. Visible signs of stress have emerged on these occasions, manifesting themselves, for example, in the cancellation of a session of the Joint Parliamentary Assembly, or a meeting of a Standing Committee, low turnout of Ministers in Ministerial meetings, skipping the holding of the Ministerial Trade Committee. In particular:

- The **Council of Ministers** is the main institution of the CPA institutional framework and is indispensable to address global partnership issues. The Council also represents an occasion for the EU to reach out to each member of the ACP Group of States at a political level. In this respect, the Council is a key forum to exchange views with the ACP party at high level. In theory, the Council was meant to play an important role in conducting political dialogue, but in practice this was taken forward at national and regional level, with little involvement of the ACP Group, ACP Secretariat or joint institutions. The limited political substance has affected participation by EU Ministers who can be represented by the EU Commissioner and the Minister of the EU Member States holding the Presidency. There are however examples of successful and efficient Council meetings where the importance of the issues on the agenda involved thorough preparation by both sides and positive outcomes of Council meetings. Added value of ACP-EU Councils could be greater if both parties acknowledged its potential leverage on the international scene. In this respect, synergies need to be reinforced at both political and technical levels. Overall issues of common interest between EU and ACP countries need to be put forward within the institutional framework and positions prepared jointly and collaboratively well ahead of the meetings. The current setting is also adversely affected by the limited role and mandate of the ACP Secretariat. Where the Commission provides technical inputs to the Council, the ACP Secretariat does not play a similar role in supporting the ACP Ministers and Ambassadors during the joint meetings for lack of delegation of power (or negotiation mandate) from the ACP States.

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171 Source: consolidation of figures from EDF’s programming documents.
172 The length of the last 3 EDF has increased from 5 to 7 years, duration which partly offsets the increase in absolute terms.
174 35th and 37th sessions of the ACP-EU Council of Ministers in Ouagadougou (adoption of the 2nd revision of the CPA, declaration on migration & development..) and Port Vila (discussions on ACP-EU Development Cooperation after 2013 / differentiated partnerships).
- The rules of procedure of the **Committee of Ambassadors** (revised in 2005) provide that committees, sub-committees and working parties shall assist the Committee of Ambassadors. With few recent thematic exceptions (e.g. migration, private sector development), the Committee of Ambassadors has been confined to meeting once a year. In practice, its role has thus been limited and essentially confined to preparing the Council agenda and implementing some decisions, mostly of practical nature. It did not fulfil its role in terms of monitoring the implementation of the CPA.

- Limited human and financial resources for the **Joint Parliamentary Assembly** on the ACP side make it difficult to organise its meetings effectively while at the same time the format of the plenary sessions is not conducive to run efficient meetings. The JPA is criticised for its limited usefulness and its cost.\(^{175}\) While its activities may not be exactly matching its objectives, in particular its role to facilitate greater understanding between the peoples and raising public awareness of development issues, the JPA is not necessarily well equipped to fulfil its objectives satisfactorily. However, it contributes to promote parliamentary empowerment of ACP representatives, through learning processes and through the advocacy for formal recognition of national parliaments. This is also the case for the election observation missions organised by the JPA that bring together Members of European and ACP Parliaments and thus contributes to develop election observation capacity in ACP countries.\(^{176}\) Therefore, the JPA can be considered as an instrument for democratic capacity building. Specific analysis on the period 2009-2016\(^{177}\) highlighted that the cost incurred by the organisation of the JPA amounted to EUR 10M to the European Commission.\(^{178}\) These figures do not account for MEP travel and translation expenditures that are accounted for separately.

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176 European Parliament’s annual reports.
177 Not including cost for organisation of Joint Councils, CoA (not covered by the Commission) nor the EP budget to organise the JPA.
178 Between 2009 and 2016, the European Commission contracted Programme Estimates with the ACP Secretariat with an annual budget ranging from EUR 1 450 – 1 580 million.
Commission and EP annual budget for JPA, amount contracted and % budget used

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<tr>
<td><strong>European Commission Programme Estimates (Contracted)</strong></td>
<td>1,450,000</td>
<td>1,450,000</td>
<td>1,450,000</td>
<td>1,450,000</td>
<td>1,450,000</td>
<td>1,580,000*</td>
<td>1,600,000</td>
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<td><strong>European Commission Disbursements</strong></td>
<td>1,308,919</td>
<td>1,051,243</td>
<td>1,016,685</td>
<td>1,365,181</td>
<td>1,406,136</td>
<td>1,369,037</td>
<td>ongoing</td>
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<td><strong>European Parliament Budget appropriation 3046-00 / 03043-00-20</strong></td>
<td>478,000</td>
<td>426,000</td>
<td>451,000</td>
<td>260,000</td>
<td>150,300</td>
<td>280,000</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>n.a</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Contracted commitment by end of year</strong></td>
<td>185,766</td>
<td>175,993</td>
<td>144,025</td>
<td>113,534</td>
<td>67,115</td>
<td>74,202</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>% of EP budget used</strong></td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic &amp; Social Committee</strong></td>
<td>387,598***</td>
<td>511,959***</td>
<td>222,000*</td>
<td>250,000**</td>
<td></td>
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* budget as per contract
** annual average based on AAP 2016 (2016-2018)
*** contracted on multi-annual basis

To sum up

The framework set up by the CPA, modelled on the EU institutional setting, is comprehensive. However, despite high ambitions set on the Cotonou agreement, the work of the joint institutions has been held back in many ways. For instance, institutional practice was limited by unequal political interest and administrative burden from both sides to comply with the legal requirements pertaining to decision-making.

The joint institutions had some added-value in terms of addressing global partnership issues such as revisions of the agreement or its annexes (ACP-EU Council), and in promoting parliamentary empowerment (JPA).

While the institutional framework is relevant to the spirit of the Partnership, a clarification of the roles of each institution and means of implementation would increase their efficiency and ability to address global challenges. In particular, enhanced responsibilities of the ACP Secretariat would simplify decision-making and increase the possibility for the EU and ACP side to work ‘jointly’ on issues.
12. To what extent has the EU mix of tools (instruments, approaches and financing modalities) and the co-management system contributed to reaching the goals of the ACP-EU partnership? 179

Financial instruments

The EDF is the main financial instrument benefitting the ACP countries being implemented through National, Regional and Intra-ACP multi-annual programmes and encompassing measures for development and humanitarian interventions in cases of emergencies and unpredictable events. In addition to the EDF, ACP partner countries are benefiting under the Union’s budget from the thematic programmes financed under the Development Cooperation Instrument, the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace, as well as the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights.

Due to the variety of interventions, it is difficult to provide a comprehensive judgment on the financial instruments. 180 Nonetheless, evaluations 181 have revealed that EU instruments at national level have been mostly relevant and the overall effectiveness of EU instruments in supporting local needs and priority can be judged generally positive. This said coherence and complementarity between EDF and other EU instruments 182 need to be reinforced. In some cases a low degree of knowledge of the instruments in place has been identified by the review report.

Weaknesses in governance and management at the intra-ACP level and limited absorption capacity among regional organisations 183 have been also noted in evaluations. To address these issues, the programming exercise of EDF 11 has increased the attention to the complementarity between programmes (national, regional, Intra-ACP), although it is too early to assess the actual effectiveness of such improvements.

Resource allocation

Since the year 2000, the allocation of EDF resources under the EDF 9, 10 and 11 has been based on objective methodologies (qualitative and quantitative) to measure needs and performance and establish indicative national envelopes. Common measures of needs in all methodologies are population size and income per capita, although EDF 10 and 11 have used

179 Main sources of ‘Review of the strategic evaluations managed by DEVCO—February 2016 — Particip’: Evaluating coordination and complementarity of country strategy papers with national development priorities (2006), Evaluation of Commission’s aid delivery through development banks and EIB (2008), Evaluation of Commission’s external cooperation with partner countries through the organisations of the UN family (2008), Evaluation of EU aid delivery through civil society organisations, Mid-term evaluation of the Investment Facility and EIB own resources operations in ACP countries and the OCTs and numerous Regional/country evaluations.


182 An evaluation of the external financing instruments (EFIs) including the EDF is currently ongoing to feed into the Mid Term review Report of the EFIs.

weighting methods and capping to avoid too large divergences in aid per capita. At the same time, each EDF has employed different methods of weighting for needs, such as an Indicator for Social Development derived from the UNDP Human Development Index for EDF 9, demographic dynamics, prevalence rate of AIDS and the UNDP Human Poverty Index for EDF 10 and the Human Assets Index for EDF 11. Further methodological differences exist in the measurement of vulnerability, as well as in the assessment of performance in implementation and use of programmable resources (i.e. absorption capacity).

From the analysis of the allocation methodologies of EDF 9, 10 and 11 it is possible to recognise a growing use of a limited number of international indicators. Further adjustments can be made based on a qualitative assessment of a country situation and more particularly on the evolutions in the political/security situation and its absorption capacity. In terms of actual allocations, it is possible to notice a trend towards those countries most in need, and in particular Least Developed Countries (their allocation share passed from 75.3 % under EDF 9 to 81.1 % under EDF 11, while Upper Middle-Income Countries’ share decreased from 5.5 % under EDF 9 to 1.9 % under EDF 11).

The ‘Governance Incentive Tranche’ (GIT) is worth mentioning here. The principles underlying the GIT, mainly based on ownership and partnership, were very much aligned with those of the CPA and the aid effectiveness agenda. A total amount of EUR 2.7 billion was earmarked from the EDF 10 to provide, through an incentive mechanism, a top up to National Indicative Programmes for countries demonstrating their governance commitments. In practice, the ownership of partner countries in this process remained limited and tranches were mainly disbursed ex-ante, according to the country intentions of reforms rather than on the basis of actual implementation of such reforms. In this respect, it was acknowledged that the GIT had a limited impact in promoting ownership of national governance agendas or improving the political dialogue.

The Mid-Term Review (MTR) of EDF 10 confirmed these conclusions, in particular the absence of indicators, means of verification, lack of specific actions, tight timeframes that affected the ownership.

**Funding approaches and modalities**

Three implementation modalities are commonly used for the management of the EDF, namely project, sector-wide and GBS approach. As emerged from evaluations, the three approaches are not to be intended as ‘alternative’ one to the other, as they have their own specific features and may be applied to address different objectives. The combination and/or sequencing of such approaches — according to the country context and the specific needs emerging locally — has been instrumental to maximise the effects of the overall EU support to ACP countries.

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184 UNDP HDI covers three dimensions (health, education, living conditions). UNDP HPI, introduced in 2010, completes the monetary measures of poverty identifying deprivations across the three HDI dimensions. The HAI is one of the three criteria used to identify an LDC. It generally measures the level of human capital via specific indicators covering health, nutrition and education.


186 Review of the strategic evaluations managed by DEVCO— February 2016 — Particip.
Project modality resulted in higher donor control, with positive contributions, often involving CSOs, in delivering social services to poor communities (e.g. housing, education, health, food security, water, human rights). In some cases, it has been useful to support innovative or pilot interventions. However, it has also shown limitations in terms of cost-effectiveness, ownership and sustainability. Furthermore, EU support through projects has been often fragmented, by lacking strategic dialogue with national authorities and not having been mainstreamed in sector strategies. Concerns are raised as well on its efficiency, due to the administrative burden generated by EDF procedures and the involvement of a range of implementing partners with variable performance records.187

In light of EU commitment to the aid effectiveness agenda, other approaches and implementation modalities have therefore been promoted, such as sector approach and general budget support. Significant value-added has been reported on sector and general budget support, due to greater efficiency and effectiveness in promoting EU/MS coalitions in a range of countries and policy areas.

Sector approach is ‘a marriage between government ownership and efficient sector management and well-coordinated donor funding’.188 Its advantages include global vision, flexibility, avoidance of duplication and integrated activities. The disadvantages can include high transaction costs, dominance by the strongest donors, concentration on macro-level policies and limited local participation. The sector approach has been implemented through sector budget support in most cases, but sometimes also through participation in sector trust funds or just coordinated support and GBS.

General budget support (GBS) has proved to be an effective modality, especially in the first decade of the 2000s. It has supported comprehensive poverty reduction strategies, accompanied significant processes of economic growth and strengthened focus on risk management, transparency and results.189 Budget support was best placed to respond to the new aid effectiveness agenda formalised in 2005 with the adoption of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the European Consensus for Development. MDG-Contracts were consequently introduced as a form of enhanced general budget support to highlight the contractual nature of this predictable, long-term financial commitment, and focus on MDG-related results. As already noted in EQ 7, significant contribution has been provided to foster macroeconomic stabilisation, by assisting in limiting fiscal deficit and stabilising public expenditure levels. Local capacities in Public Finance Management have been enhanced, mainly through BS dialogue and accompanying measures, including ability in a more adequate matching of budget allocations and local policy priorities. Some positive reports on the role of ACP in promoting better fiscal policy and tax collection have also emerged throughout the public consultation. Furthermore EQ 8 indicated that GBS has been a major supporting modality to shape and finance education and health policies, and contributed to improved strategies and increased availability of social infrastructure and services, with a

188 Thematic global evaluation of European Commission support to the education sector in partner countries (2010).
189 Review of the strategic evaluations managed by DEVCO–February 2016 — Particip.)
focus on the poor. And EQ 10 added that Budget support evaluations\textsuperscript{190} together with a number of country strategy evaluations conclude that significant joint BS amounts contribute to poverty reduction through two specific effects: 1) macroeconomic stability and improved PFM policies, thus boosting growth and income poverty reduction; and 2) increasing investment and improving policies in basic social services, which increase access to and possibly quality of the services for the poor, thus reducing non-income poverty.

 Nonetheless, in cases where strategic convergence of partners, trust and financial leverage have declined, GBS has shown significant weaknesses, including formalisation and deterioration of dialogue, distorted use of funds, slowdown of key sector reform processes. Attempts to mitigate such weaknesses, through the introduction of stricter links between targets and disbursements (e.g. variable tranches), have contributed to reducing the quality of dialogue without improving the strategic effectiveness.

 Therefore, whenever the conditions for its adoption are in place, GBS is recommended. For future reference, the modality would benefit from greater complementary with Sector-Wide Approaches (SWAp), sector budget support, and other accompanying measures (e.g. stand-alone projects in specific cases), so to open pathways into new areas of cooperation and strengthen the capacity of actors.\textsuperscript{191}

 State Building Contracts\textsuperscript{192} have recently been provided to fragile states and post-conflict countries to support a medium to long-term reform agenda in various systemic areas for such countries (PFM, revenue management, policy design, structural reforms). As such they have filled an important financial gap for countries that need urgent and short-term support, so to re-establish vital state functions and basic service delivery.

**Support provided through implementing partners**

Cooperation programmes and projects are implemented under two distinctive modes: either under direct management, where the European Commission signs the contracts, or under indirect management, where the beneficiary country/region signs and the European Commission assumes the funding by endorsing the contract. For the sake of effectiveness and impact, the aid may be channelled through another body, be it an international organisation, a Member State agency, a civil society organisation or the authorities of partner countries, thus forming a wide range of implementing partners and modalities. These different approaches are assessed hereafter.

\textsuperscript{191} EU Strategic evaluations on BS in Uganda and Burkina, Haiti evaluation
\textsuperscript{192} Part of structural adjustment support, implemented through BS Programs.
• Authorities of partner countries

National/Regional Authorising Officers (NAOs/RAOs) represent ACP countries in all operations financed by the EDF (co-management). Different studies suggest that the role of the NAO as described in CPA is too complex and wide to be efficiently fulfilled by one single entity. Support units to the NAO are therefore set-up and EDF resources are provided to support these units and to help the NAO to implement EDF-funded activities. These units implement and monitor EDF activities, in cooperation with the EU Delegation. Though they are not defined as parallel implementation units, they often operate in parallel to the rest of the state and the capacity support focuses on ensuring their staff can apply complex EU procedures rather than supporting broader state capacity development.

Furthermore, when it comes to programme implementation evidence suggests that NAOs often tend to centralise power and sometimes even marginalise line ministries in decision-making and implementation. Equally, EU support to civil society organisations has often been hampered by the NAO services. Despite more than 20 years of NAO capacity development, lack of capacity is a recurrent statement in the assessment of NAO systems, and progress towards sustainability is still limited. Furthermore, support to the NAO structures has showed reduced efficiency; it implied significant costs without always translating into more ‘ownership’. Nevertheless, and importantly, EU Delegations highlight that co-management in programming, monitoring and evaluation between partners (donor-beneficiary relation), has provided an important tool for mutual engagement in the field of development cooperation.

• Member States

Cooperation with Member States has increased over the last years, since the launch of delegated cooperation in 2008 and the expansion of blending facilities. Joint programming with Member States is on the increase as well.

Delegated cooperation allows the European Commission to transfer funds to accredited bodies from Member States (or exceptionally from other development partners) via a Delegation Agreement or a Pillar–Assessed Grant. Similarly, Transfer Agreements enable the European Commission to manage funds transferred by Member States. Such

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194 ‘Implementing the Agenda for Change — An independent analysis of the EDF11 national programming: key findings’, ECDPM, September 2015.
195 ‘Evaluation of the European Community’s Institutional Support Cooperation with National and Regional Authorising Officers’ (COTA/GRET, 2003), and ‘Striking the right balance: The future of NAOs in ACP-EU cooperation’ (ECDPM Discussion Paper 73).
196 33 % of the NAO-SUs are supported entirely by EU funds and 53 % of the NAO-SUs rely on international expertise, a figure that is not improving over time: international Technical Assistance was present in 52 % of the NAO-SUs in 2004.
197 See Annex 2, Summary of the EU Delegations’ consultation.
agreements are concluded when a donor is considered better placed than the EU in terms of a well-established and recognised technical and financial management capacity in a particular sector. Available evidence suggests that Delegated cooperation is instrumental in fostering better donor coordination, although too much concentration on a few Member States should be avoided. Delegated cooperation is only one form of cooperation with EU Member States and its impact on the ACP-EU partnership is currently being evaluated.

Joint programming with EU Member States was launched in 2012/13 in 55 countries, out of which 26 are ACP countries. In Joint Programming, EU development partners and like-minded donors develop together a joint strategy. The strategy responds to the partner country’s national development plan, allows coordinated actions and the different roles of the partners across a range of relevant sectors/areas, sets the overall objectives at sector level and gives provisional figures for their financing over the joint strategy period. In its start-up phase, joint programming was intentionally focused on analytical and strategic aspects with a view to ensure a step by step and pragmatic approach and build Member States’ buy-in. Partner countries show mixed feelings on this instrument. On the one hand, they agree on advantages in joint programming in terms of decreased transaction costs. On the other, however, they fear that it might have a negative impact on the total ODA, bilateral relations with Member States and the EU. They also see risks in a reduction of their ability to change priorities and allocation of funds, and losing overall flexibility.

Joint programming is now entering a new phase with a higher ambition, including where possible replacement of NIPs by Joint Strategies, potentially reinforcing ownership and reducing transaction costs for both partner country and development partners. An evaluation of joint programming is currently ongoing.

- International Organisations

The share of the EDF portfolio channelled through to international organisations has evolved over the years; a main part concerns contributions to the African Peace Facility and the Global Health Fund. There are good reasons to cooperate with international organisations when they can bring added value in a specific field, notably in fragile and crises contexts. However, the effectiveness of such cooperation is increasingly questioned by the EP, some Member States and even inside the EU Commission (EU delegations). Through time, there have been in fact recurrent challenges on high administrative costs, higher level of financial errors with impact on the overall error rate, reporting weaknesses, lack of EU visibility and ownership, harmonisation and results-orientation. Continued cooperation with IO should be fully based on their comparative advantages and value for money and caution should be put on its possible misuse.

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199 Others concern joint approaches at sector level such as joint analysis/appraisals, or joint actions/implementation through budget support, trust funds, etc.
Civil Society Organisations

The level of involvement of CSO in the implementation or in the monitoring of public action varied largely in function of the context and the potential divergences with the government in place (see as well EQ 8). In some countries, there is a relatively enabling environment which facilitates a minimum of dialogue between citizens and State, while in others, governments consider that nation-building and development in general can only be fostered by the State. In most cases, and particularly when participating in tri-partite discussions with the EU and the State, CSOs are mostly perceived and consulted as effective service providers, rather than as governance actors.

As a result, evidence of positive contributions made by CSOs through EU support has emerged, often in delivering social services to poor communities from rural and urban areas (e.g. housing, education, health, water, etc.). This is particularly the case in the absence of effective public services. It allows as well the EU to keep close connections with grassroots organisations across ACP countries. However, activities have often shown a weak sustainability and entailed heavy workloads, given the relatively small size of contracts delivered and the high fragmentation of actors involved. Nonetheless, it is important to further develop this level of activity, by assuring more effective procedural mechanisms (e.g. through grants in cascades), reducing management costs and allowing the greatest involvement of CSOs across remote areas of ACP countries. Equally, at local level, synergies between CSOs, local governments and private sector should be better addressed in order to strengthen sustainability, efficiency and better representativeness.

Different instruments, facilities and other additional financial support

Blending

The Blending instrument combines EU grants with loans or equity from public and more recently private financiers. The EU grant element is intended to be used strategically to attract additional financing for important investments in EU partner countries. It has gradually evolved into an important tool of EU external cooperation, complementing other implementation modalities, while following national, regional or thematic priorities. Since 2007, the EU has established several blending facilities,200 being funded by EDF’s national or regional programmes, which provide the basis for establishing project pipelines. It is estimated that since 2007, EUR 2 billion worth of EU grants have leveraged approximately EUR 20 billion of loans by European finance institutions and regional development banks.201 Blending has been generally perceived as a powerful and efficient instrument for policy dialogue via close involvement of EU Delegations, while assuring strong links and complementarities with other EU projects and programmes.

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201 European Commission, Blending: EU aid to catalyse investments, European Union, 2015.
Evaluation and audits performed on blending facilities concluded that these are valuable and effective instruments in supporting their respective objectives. In particular, project identification, relevance and design were considered positive, and the instruments achieved their goal of leveraging significant financial resources. They also pointed to the significant contribution brought to the development of partnerships and increased coordination and cooperation among finance institutions as well as with the Commission. A number of recommendations\textsuperscript{202} were made, notably in terms of improvements to the decision-making structure and the role of EU Delegations, as well as further exploring the involvement of private sector and the use of specific financial instruments such as risk mitigation instruments. These findings have been used to improve the accountability and documentation of the decision-making process, in particular on the aspects relating to additionality resulting from the EU grant.

The governance was adapted to simplify the decision-making process, ensure that projects submitted are mature and strengthen the role of Delegations. Commission’s monitoring of the projects has also been reinforced.

- **African Peace Facility**

The African Peace Facility (APF)\textsuperscript{203} was established in 2003, to provide the necessary means to support the African Union (not yet a partner of the ACP-EU partnership then) to engage in genuine African peace support operations. See evaluation question three for further details.

- **Debt Relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)**

HIPC is a global initiative designed in response to the many developing countries facing an insurmountable debt overhang since the ‘90s (and aggravating in 2000)\textsuperscript{204}. The initiative has proved to be very effective, as macroeconomic imbalances were reduced and fiscal space freed for poverty reducing expenditure. The EU (including the EIB) actively participated in this effort, providing over EUR 0.5 billion of debt relief on past EDF loans. In addition, the EU financed almost EUR 1 billion of partial debt relief relating to African Development Bank loans. The gains attained permitted promoting strong debt management systems in partner countries. However, debt levels are rising again rapidly in a number of developing countries, due to a range of issues including large non-concessional borrowing from emerging donors (e.g. China).

\textsuperscript{202} European Court of Auditors report, October 2014 and EU Platform on Blending (2014).
\textsuperscript{203} Decision No 3/2003 of the ACP-EC Council of Ministers of 11 December 2003 on the use of resources from the long-term development envelope of the 9th EDF for the creation of a Peace Facility for Africa.
\textsuperscript{204} http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2014/121214.pdf
• FLEX and V-FLEX

The instruments were introduced to assure rapid responses to crises, and were provided either as an additional single payment to already existing budget support programmes, or other existing projects/programmes including social safety nets. Specifically, the FLEX instrument was conceived to mitigate shocks due to international price fluctuations (e.g. export revenues), whilst Vulnerability-FLEX consisted of macroeconomic support when countries with little resilience capacity were exposed to short-term financial crisis due to external factors. The experience with the FLEX mechanism shows that the speed of response is critical to avoid pro-cyclicality in our support (i.e. FLEX funds arriving too late and often in a different phase of the economic cycle). Both FLEX and V-FLEX instruments have been applied in several ACP countries, ensuring rapid responses to crises. Lessons learned for a possible future shock absorbing mechanism concern the following aspects: (i) need for forward looking risk assessment and identification of most vulnerable countries; (ii) inclusion of an incentive for recipient countries to reinforce the resilience of their economic and social system, including the food security of the populations.

• ACP Investment Facility and EIB Own Resources

The ACP Investment Facility (IF), operated and managed by EIB, was established under the Cotonou Agreement as a revolving fund, where loan amortisations are reinvested in new operations. The facility was established to support projects promoting the development of the private sector and commercially-run public enterprise, and started functioning in 2003. It provides a range of risk-bearing instruments that allow it to support a wide range of higher risk operations. It has proven to be a financially sustainable facility. The IF is complemented by EIB Own Resources guaranteed by EU Member States.

The 2010 IF mid-term evaluation identified specific strengths of the EIB support provided under the Cotonou mandate. First, IF resources, by virtue of their higher risk-bearing capacity, provided development financing that could not have been provided through Own Resources. Second, the EIB’s acknowledged financial rigour and technical competence in project instruction and risk analysis led to quality projects and hence imparted confidence to other lenders. However, fulfilment of the mandate has not been maximised. Indeed, while IF- and Own Resources -funded projects contributed to generating development impact, the lack of a prioritisation strategy precluded maximisation of this impact. Furthermore, only limited efforts were deployed with credit enhancement instruments designed for mobilising commercial finance, with the result that the catalytic potential and risk-bearing capacity were underutilised. The limited coordination between the EIB and the Commission and to a certain extent with other IFIs/DFIs also hampered maximisation.
The 2015 Court of Auditors special report on the ACP IF\cite{205} concluded that the IF adds value to EU development cooperation with ACP countries and, the Court sees as very positive the combined use of diversified products by the Bank (debt, equity, TA) to pursue the development objectives as enshrined in the Cotonou Agreement.

- Trust Funds (TFs)

TFs are a development tool that pools together resources from different donors in order to enable a quick, flexible, and collective EU response to the different dimensions of an emergency situation. Two types of TFs have been introduced in the 11\textsuperscript{th} EDF Financial Regulation (Article 42), based on the EU Budget financial regulation.\cite{206} An ‘Emergency and Post-Emergency’ TF to address all type of crisis, allows the EU Commission to decide and apply rapid award procedures and to delegate implementing tasks if deemed to be more efficient. A ‘Thematic’ TF with the aim of addressing global challenges, allows the Commission to directly implement required activities under its standard procedures.

The short experience of the EU Bèkou Trust Fund offers an example of a flexible and safe method for donors of financing activities in the context of multi-partner cooperation. It enabled them to give form to and act upon their political commitment to resolving the crisis in the Central African Republic (without incurring prohibitive transaction costs), while saving time and allowing swift implementation of activities. It supports the implementation of a strategic LRRD/Resilience approach. This new way of working has ensured additional resources aimed at achieving concrete results in tackling crises and global challenges in general and importantly fostered greater EU visibility and leadership in coordinating donor activities. The use of TFs is still in its early stages and more data and analysis will be available at a later stage.

To sum up

The toolkit of the CPA has made an important contribution to the goals of the ACP-EU partnership, by providing a wide range of tools (instruments, approaches and financing modalities) to be used by a range of implementing actors. This multiplicity of tools has permitted the design and implementation of programmes tailored to the actual needs and constraints of the different contexts and partners. However, efficient management is a main concern. Delays and various inefficiencies mainly due to complex administrative procedures and the lack of adequate staff at all levels are often mentioned as bottlenecks affecting the quality of the programming and implementation cycle.

The important role given to the National Authorising Officers of the EDF at the level of programming, monitoring and evaluation has enhanced the principles of co-management and

\ \footnote{205} \ ECA Special Report no. 14, ‘The ACP Investment Facility: does it provide added value?’.
\ \footnote{206} \ Since the adoption of the financial regulation, the EU has established 2 Trust funds totally or partly funded by the EDF 11: the Bèkou Trust Fund in Central African Republic and the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa.
ownership. Nonetheless, revisiting their current role in implementation activities could offer considerable opportunities to tackle inefficiencies in EU aid delivery.

An effort for greater focus of intervention has emerged across the cycle of EDF Programming. The programming exercise of EDF 11 has increased as well the attention to the complementarity between programmes (national, regional, Intra-ACP) and the complementarity between instruments (e.g. DCI thematic and EDF, or EIDHR and EDF). Where there was strong convergence of objective and mutual trust, General Budget Support has proven to be an effective modality aimed at reaching CPA goals and has showed the increasing importance of the use of country systems to lower burdens, transaction costs and it has confirmed the EU ability to respond to its commitments within the aid effectiveness agenda.

Coordination amongst implementation partners has been strengthened through a range of modalities including joint programming, delegated cooperation, as well as increased involvement of CSO’s. However, continued cooperation should be based on the comparative advantages of each partner and their capacity to provide value for money.

The CPA has shown a strong capacity in responding to unforeseen needs through a range of dedicated financial facilities (e.g. HIPC, FLEX/V-FLEX, Trust Funds). Furthermore, innovative instruments were developed in the context of the overall changing financial environment (e.g. blending). The ACP Investment Facility (IF), operated and managed by EIB, has added value to the EU’s development cooperation in support of private sector development.
Summary of the evaluation questions

Objectives and assumptions

The objectives and assumptions that defined the CPA when it was negotiated have remained relevant and valid throughout the time it has been in force.

Good progress has been made towards achieving the main objectives of the partnership, and the EU has responded to the critical needs and problems of its partners. The action taken by the EU under the CPA has contributed to the eradication of poverty, the strengthening of the capacity of regional organisations to intervene in conflict management and peace building, and the integration of the ACP States into the world economy. There is still, however, significant work to be done to fully achieve these objectives. This is to be expected given the level of ambition of the objectives of the CPA relative to the available resources.

The main assumptions underlying the partnership relate to the respect by the parties to the CPA of the fundamental principles of the Agreement in the areas of human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law. Other assumptions relate to issues such as ownership, the mobilisation of key actors and the functioning of joint institutions. These assumptions have not always been met on the side of the EU’s ACP partners.

The CPA has contributed to the strengthening of democracy and human rights in the ACP countries. The democratisation process, although slow and discontinuous, has advanced. For some of the ACP governments, however, respecting the fundamental elements of the Agreement has not yet become a priority, as demonstrated by their resistance to addressing politically sensitive issues.

The central role of the EDF National Authorising Officers in programming, monitoring and evaluation is recognised to have strengthened the principles of co-management and ownership. Nonetheless, revisiting their current role in implementation could open up various ways of tackling inefficiencies in the delivery of EU aid.

The level of involvement of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in the implementation and monitoring of public action has varied considerably. Depending on the context and the relations with the government in office, the CSOs have been allowed varying spaces within which to exist and operate. In some countries, the environment is relatively conducive to the involvement of CSOs, which facilitates a minimum of dialogue between the citizens and the State, while in others their space has been or is still being reduced further.

The framework for the joint institutions set up by the CPA reflects the spirit of the partnership. Institutional practice is, however, seen as complicated and burdensome, characterised by processes that slow down decision-making and hamper efficiency. The role of the various institutions should therefore be clarified and streamlined in order to increase efficiency.
Analysis needs to be carried out into how the changes in the world as a whole and in the interests and ambitions of the EU and ACP countries have affected the objectives and assumptions of the CPA. On the basis of this, the parties need to decide what changes should be made to the Agreement to maintain or increase its relevance.

**The three pillars of the partnership**

The CPA established a comprehensive partnership for the political, economic, social and cultural development of the ACP States. It is based on three complementary pillars: the political dimension, economic and trade cooperation, and development cooperation. The CPA is seen as a comprehensive and unique model for north-south cooperation. Its three-pillar structure has allowed the EU and its partners to increasingly play an effective role in a wide range of geographic and thematic areas, from peace and security, to democracy, trade and development. Nonetheless, stronger complementarity between the different pillars could have further strengthened this role.

**Some of the stronger features**

- **Political dimension pillar**

  Formal political dialogue is a relatively new feature and is considered an important element of a lasting ACP-EU relationship. The current CPA has provided the basis for what has become a structured political dialogue at country level between the EU and most ACP governments, and a valuable framework for conducting open exchanges and communicating views, including on sensitive issues, and for maintaining and developing bilateral relations. The nature of political dialogue, meaning that it takes place regularly and at high level, makes it a very good basis on which to further develop political relations.

  Political dialogue with regional organisations has contributed to better mutual understanding of the parties’ respective positions, has allowed the EU to raise awareness on security issues that have an impact beyond the region and to promote greater regional ownership of issues such as maritime security and drug trafficking. The growing political importance of the EU’s regional partnerships has also inspired the African Peace Facility, which was set up within the CPA framework to support Africa in building its African Peace and Security Architecture and to contribute to crisis prevention and resolution in Africa.

- **Trade and economic cooperation pillar**

  The increase in trade flows to and from the ACP countries, the increasing number of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) concluded, the growing number of ACP countries that are members of the WTO and the group’s increasing role in international
trade negotiations are evidence of the importance of CPA support for the integration of the ACP States into the world economy.

The EPAs have been the main deliverable of the CPA in the area of trade policy after the expiry of the non-reciprocal preference regime that was in place until 2007. The CPA has given the ACP partners’ experience in trade negotiation and helped to build their trade capacity, thus strengthening their ability to negotiate trade agreements and to participate in international trade.

In recent years, the EU and the ACP have cooperated closely in identifying and furthering their common interests at the WTO, and the changes in the international landscape have created scope for changes in alliances at global level.

- Development cooperation pillar

The EU has contributed significantly, through the implementation of the CPA, to the eradication of poverty, and the improvement of food security and social protection for the most vulnerable communities in ACP countries.

One source of evidence of the success of the CPA in this area are the evaluations of the budget support programmes, which have been instrumental in reducing extreme poverty in the beneficiary countries. General budget support has been one of the main ways of improving economic governance, as it has promoted macroeconomic stability, improved public finance management and encouraged more strategic and efficient public expenditure.

Furthermore, the government policies targeted at the poor that have received support have led to improved and more equitable access to basic services. There has been a significant increase in enrolment rates in primary and secondary school and rates of access to basic healthcare have improved, which has had a positive effect on the literacy and basic health indicators. The number of people on treatment for HIV/AIDS has also increased.

In other areas, EU support has contributed to raising awareness of environmental issues and climate change and to strengthening institutional capacity and environmental governance. Political cooperation between the EU and ACP on these issues has increased over time, and was instrumental in creating the international ‘High Ambition Coalition’ that led to the Paris Agreement on climate change.

Over the 15-year period the CPA has been in place, it has generally made a significant contribution to promoting macroeconomic stabilisation. The CPA is considered to be an important factor in the relatively steady positive economic growth experienced by a significant number of ACP States since the conclusion of the Agreement. African countries also showed greater resilience to the global crisis and better performance in the years since 2009 compared to the world economy as a whole.
Some of the weaker features

- Political dimension pillar

The ACP-EU cooperation is based on mutual interests and shared values. In some cases, however, the partner countries have considered discussions on human rights and fundamental principles to be inconsistent with their own values and culture, resulting in a lack of political will to change or improve the human rights situation. Similarly, the resistance by some ACP governments to addressing politically sensitive or taboo issues (e.g. LGBTI issues, the death penalty and ICC) shows that the respect of fundamental principles has not yet become a priority in the same way for all the partners.

The use of Article 8 (political dialogue) and Article 96 (consultation procedures) has not always been effective: whilst it did provide a sound and legally based procedure for mutual engagement on sensitive issues, the conclusion of discussions was often that the parties would agree to disagree, and the discussions did not therefore necessarily lead to the fundamental principles of the CPA being respected. The Articles provide a sound legal basis but their effectiveness is ultimately determined by the political will on both sides and the willingness of neighbouring countries and regional institutions to weigh in.

The peace and security provisions have been improved with the revisions introduced under the CPA. Implementation has, however, mainly been concentrated at sub-regional and regional African level, with a very limited role for the ACP level. This suggests that the EU-ACP platform might not be the best route for EU action in this area. Furthermore, in many cases no link was made between short-term and long-term support. This was due to the lack of capacity within national authorities, inadequate exit strategies and the transition from rehabilitation to development being made prematurely.

The legal obligation contained in Article 13 of the CPA, requiring countries to readmit their own nationals has not, in practice, been implemented satisfactorily. Notwithstanding this provision, it has not been at the core of the EU’s political engagement with ACP countries for long, and cooperation from African countries has been uneven. Recent developments show the importance of reviewing the provisions included in the Agreement on return and readmission and learning from the migration and mobility dialogues launched between Europe and Africa in recent years.

- Trade and economic cooperation pillar

The expected results on increasing diversification and reducing commodity dependency have not yet been achieved. More work still needs to be done to create a transparent, stable and rules-based business climate that will attract new investment in sectors that are vital for growth and job creation.
The ACP-EU cooperation in international fora has led to the adoption of numerous joint ACP-EU resolutions, declarations and statements on global issues. These joint efforts have, however, had limited impact on the internal discussions held by the G77 and other groups when working out their negotiating positions, and therefore on the final outcome of international negotiations.

- Development cooperation pillar

The support provided in conflict situations has generally not been directed at tackling the root causes of conflict, but rather at mitigating the consequences or providing ‘classic’ development support. The assessment of the political and economic dimensions of the problems identified — intended to ensure better understanding of and greater impact on the root causes of the problems — has not been adequate.

The contribution made by the CPA to promoting inclusive growth, and specifically to increasing the level of participation of the poor and accelerating the reduction of the incidence of poverty, has been insufficient. The CPA has not been able to have a meaningful influence on either the internal mechanisms determining income distribution or the political economy equilibria in the ACP societies. For growth to become more inclusive, the productivity of the labour force would need to increase in the agricultural and the urban informal sectors, where the most employment is still concentrated.

The support provided to private sector development via government institutions has been shown to be ineffective, while the support provided directly to private sector organisations and productive sectors has been occasional and not always compatible with the procedures and systems for providing EU support.

The support provided to social infrastructures and services has not sufficiently taken into account the quality and resources of the government services. Improvements to quality have stagnated in some cases or have even been reversed as a result of high population growth, low levels of funding from partner governments and conflict or natural disasters.

Population growth has not received sufficient attention and is, in many ACP countries, becoming a significant factor contributing to potential vulnerability. It has, in the past, often been considered as a ‘population dividend’, but is currently more often seen as disruptive, in cases where it threatens the sustainability of the progress achieved to date.

The EU’s strong policy commitments on gender equality and the empowerment of women have not always been matched by its organisational capacity to deliver results, which has led to country strategy objectives, programmes and dialogues that have not given sufficient consideration to a balanced gender approach.

The sustainability of the achievements of the CPA remains a fundamental issue. While a number of new instruments and approaches have been developed under the CPA, it is
important to note that improved sustainability is, in particular, dependent on the political will and commitment shown by domestic decision-makers.

The tools of the partnership

The CPA provides a legally binding framework for dialogue and cooperation between the EU and the ACP countries. The legally binding nature has made the framework effective and has often been essential for implementing the provisions contained in the CPA. The legally binding nature has, however, been more relevant for some of its provisions than others. It has helped in the development of trade relations between the EU and ACP countries, and an increasing number of EPAs have been concluded, based on the objectives and fundamental principles of the CPA. Likewise, a large majority of the replies to the public consultation and the survey of the EU Delegations stated that the legally binding nature has been critical for the implementation of the CPA, as it meant that there was a legal foundation for political dialogue and consultations. This type of dialogue did not, however, necessarily lead to full implementation of the Agreement, as illustrated by the provisions that have not been fully implemented (e.g. Article 6 on non-state actors and Article 13 on migration). Overall, the legally binding nature is seen as having produced a number of advantages and no significant disadvantages.

The tools of the CPA have made an important contribution to achieving the objectives of the ACP-EU partnership, thanks to their variety (instruments, approaches and financing modalities) and the range of implementing actors they involve. The choice of tools available has allowed the design and implementation of programmes to be tailored to the needs and constraints of each of the different contexts and partners. On the other hand, a number of aspects of the management of the CPA are seen as areas of concern, from an efficiency point of view. Delays and inefficiencies, mainly caused by complex administrative procedures and a lack of adequate staff at some levels, are often mentioned as the cause of bottlenecks affecting the quality of the programming and the adherence to the implementation cycle.

General budget support has generally proven to be an effective way of achieving the objectives of the CPA and has revealed the increasing importance of the use of country systems to reduce burdens and transaction costs. It has confirmed the EU’s ability to respond to its commitments under the aid effectiveness agenda.

Coordination between implementation partners has been strengthened in a variety of ways, including through joint programming, delegated cooperation, and the increased involvement of CSOs. Continued cooperation should, however, be based on the comparative advantages of each partner and their capacity to provide value for money.

The CPA has shown itself to be capable of responding to unforeseen needs via a range of dedicated financial facilities (e.g. HIPC, FLEX/V-FLEX and trust funds). Furthermore, innovative instruments have been developed in the context of the overall changing financial environment (e.g. blending), while the ACP Investment Facility, operated and managed by the
EIB, has increased the effectiveness of the EU’s development cooperation work in support of private sector development.
7. Conclusions

The conclusions are drawn from the answers to the various evaluation questions (EQs), and provide a synthesis of the main findings for each of the following evaluation criteria: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, impact, coherence and EU added value207.

Relevance

Over the last 15 years, the CPA has served as a major legal framework for EU external relations. It has reflected the evolving needs and priorities of its members over time. The ongoing relevance of the Agreement is determined by the validity of its objectives and assumptions, i.e. whether it can respond to the critical needs of and problems faced by the partner countries.

The CPA explicitly mentions three objectives: i) reducing and ultimately eradicating poverty, ii) ensuring sustainable peace and security in the ACP countries, and iii) strengthening the role played by the ACP in international economic relationships. These correspond to the ‘baseline’ defined by the Green Paper (1996) on relations between the European Union and the ACP countries on the eve of 21st century. This baseline identified six interdependent factors as indicators for measuring future development prospects: peace and security, economic and institutional reforms, democratisation and economic liberalisation, issues related to social transformation, poverty reduction and integration into the world economy. The CPA has since undergone two revisions, designed to adapt it to the evolving context and changing priorities. Ratification of these revisions has presented some challenges.

As regards the assumptions, the CPA sets out a number of core commitments with regard to the conduct of the partners, their willingness to respect the spirit of the partnership, and their capacity to translate this spirit into action through a range of CPA-specific actions related to the various pillars. These commitments are essential for the effective implementation of the partnership. Although agreed in principle, they have not always been fully respected by all partners, but have always been considered valid and relevant.

It can therefore be concluded that the objectives and assumptions that defined the CPA when it was negotiated have remained relevant and valid throughout its duration, including following its revisions.

Analysis will need to be carried out into how the fast evolving global context, mentioned in section two, continues affecting the objectives and the assumptions of the CPA, and adapt the

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207 Details on indicators related to the economic, political and social situation and their evolution over the years have been mentioned throughout the evaluation. However, the effect of the CPA on the evolution of these indicators remains extremely difficult to measure, given the presence of multiple development partners and the influence of various factors of a political and economic nature that have affected the different countries and regions.
content of the partnership to global trends and tendencies, including climate change, migration pressures, and economic development.

Effectiveness

The evaluation shows that the CPA has provided the EU with a framework to play a leading and effective role in a wide range of geographic and thematic areas. The CPA has allowed good progress to be made towards the main objectives of the partnership. There is still, however, significant work to be done to fully achieve these objectives. This is to be expected given the level of ambition of the objectives of the CPA relative to the available resources. The overview given below summarises the results obtained in the different areas starting with the main objectives of the CPA.

Available evidence suggests that action taken by the EU under the CPA has been effective in supporting the eradication of poverty, including income poverty, and in improving food security and social protection for the most vulnerable communities. Particular mention should be given to budget support, which was prioritised under the CPA. Evidence suggests that it has been instrumental in reducing extreme poverty in countries receiving assistance, thanks to its effectiveness in promoting macroeconomic stability and creating the other pre-conditions for progress in this area. The criteria used to determine eligibility for budget support have been critical to ensuring that the pre-conditions for the effective eradication of poverty are present, while the significant amounts provided as budget support have contributed directly to poverty reduction. EU budget support was well targeted at countries with higher levels of poverty, but inequality issues have not been sufficiently addressed. Over the last decade, budget support seems to have lost some of its leverage, especially in fast growing countries, due to its reduced financial significance relative to recipients’ budgets and also to reasons related to changing priorities in both the partner countries and the EU Member States.

The support for trade and economic development provided under the CPA to countries and to regional organisations has had a significant positive effect. Regional quality standards, trade regulations, trade-related international negotiations and regional infrastructure networks have been improved over the last decade, thus improving the conditions for expansion of trade and economic growth. The CPA has supported the integration of the ACP States into the world economy. While it is impossible to evaluate the precise contribution of the CPA on this, considering the variety of factors that can influence trade (e.g. macroeconomic variables, global demand, price fluctuations, political issues…), actions undertaken under the CPA have supported the increase in trade, the conclusion and implementation of EPAs, as well as the ACP countries’ increasing WTO membership and the group’s increasing role in international trade negotiations. Evidence on the actual impact of the EPAs nonetheless remains limited at this stage, as the EPAs came into force too recently for there to be relevant data and the effects of EPAs typically only become visible in the long term. Private sector development has been promoted indirectly thanks to support to macroeconomic and fiscal stabilisation, the strengthening of trade regulatory systems and improvements to transport networks (particularly at regional level). These developments have contributed to the improvement of
the local business environment and of export opportunities. Nonetheless, action taken to
directly support the strengthening of private sector organisations — including measures to
courage their direct participation in political and economic processes — and the
strengthening and diversification of supply chains (especially in the agriculture sector) is
considered to have been less effective.

The EU’s role in conflict prevention, management and resolution has made it one of the most
credible actors in the area of **peace and security**, particularly due to its rather neutral political
position. Under the CPA, the EU has helped strengthen the capacity of regional organisations
to intervene in conflict management and peace building, through the creation of flexible
instruments and the development of new approaches, including post-crisis reconstruction. Its
success in this area is also demonstrated by the creation of the African Peace Facility (APF) in
2003, the aim of which is to provide the African Union with the means to engage in genuine
African peace support operations, to build an African peace support architecture and to
strengthen conflict prevention and mediation. Although the early warning systems in place are
still weak, the response to the outbreak of conflict has often been rapid, and has contributed to
stabilisation. Following crises, prompt and effective support has been provided to promote the
recovery of agriculture and ensure access to basic social services in the areas affected. Civil
society mobilisation, which is strongly promoted under the CPA, especially through
specialised networks of NGOs, has also been of great value.

There have been mixed results in achieving the objectives related to **good governance**.
Significant progress has been made on improving economic governance. Budget support and
measures related to public finance management (PFM), which were pioneered under the CPA,
have been instrumental in this area. Action taken in the area of democratic governance is also
generally considered to have been effective, namely thanks to the support given to electoral
processes. Good governance as a whole has not, however, been systematically addressed in
the political dialogue, which, in addition to democratic governance, also covers human rights,
peace and security. The use of **Article 96** has not always been coherent or effective: whilst it
did provide a sound and legally based procedure for mutual engagement on sensitive issues,
the conclusion of discussions was often that the parties would agree to disagree, and the
discussions did not therefore necessarily lead to the fundamental principles of the CPA being
respected. Use of the Article did, however, significantly contribute to the successful return to
democracy and respect for the fundamental elements of the Agreement in a number of
important cases. The Article provides a sound legal basis but its effectiveness is ultimately
determined by the political will on both sides and the willingness of neighbouring countries
and regional institutions to weigh in.

Over the last decade in particular, the EU has developed effective means of providing support
to **fragile states**. Specific tools, such as the state building contract, have been successfully
tested in fragile countries. The combination of developing state capacity and mobilising non-
state actors has also proven to be effective. The **LRRD** approach (linking relief, rehabilitation
and development) is not, however, sufficiently integrated into the different response actions,
and the support provided to public institutions remains isolated from a number of potentially effective, but fragmented, sector and/or local sources of support.

On migration, the legal obligation set out in Article 13 of the CPA, requiring countries to readmit their own nationals, has not, in practice, been implemented satisfactorily. Notwithstanding this provision, enforcing this principle has not been at the core of the EU’s political engagement with ACP countries for long, and cooperation from African countries has been uneven. Recent developments show the importance of reviewing and strengthening the provisions on return and readmission contained in the Agreement and building on the more recent EU-Africa dialogue and cooperation processes on migration and mobility.

The government policies supported by the CPA have led to improved and more equitable access to basic social services, and specifically to a significant increase in enrolment rates in primary and secondary school and improved rates of access to basic healthcare, which has had a positive effect on the literacy and basic health indicators. The quality of government services has been partly overlooked, however, and in some cases, improvements in quality have stagnated, or even been reversed as a result of high population growth, low levels of funding by the partner governments and conflict or natural disasters.

The strong policy commitments made by the EU on gender equality and the empowerment of women have not always been matched by its organisational capacity to deliver results, which has led to country strategy objectives, programmes and dialogue that have not given sufficient consideration to a balanced gender approach.

CSOs, non-state and decentralised actors have been effectively mobilised through ad hoc programmes and specific budget lines targeted specifically at relief and rehabilitation. More needs to be done, however, to achieve the aims of consolidating and mainstreaming the strategic role of CSOs (advocacy), non-state and decentralised actors in the development processes.

The CPA provides a legally binding framework for dialogue and cooperation between the EU and the ACP countries. The legally binding nature has made the framework effective and was often essential for implementing the provisions contained in the CPA. The legally binding nature has, however, been more relevant for some of its provisions than others. It has helped in the development of trade relations between the EU and ACP countries, and an increasing number of EPAs have been concluded, based on the objectives and essential elements of the CPA. Likewise, a large majority of the replies to the public consultation and the survey of the EU Delegations stated that the legally binding nature has been critical for the implementation of the CPA, as it meant that there was a legal foundation for political dialogue and consultations. This type of dialogue did not, however, necessarily result in full implementation of the Agreement, as illustrated by the provisions that have not been fully implemented (e.g. Article 6 on non-state actors and Article 13 on migration).
Overall, the legally binding nature is seen as having produced a number of advantages and no significant disadvantages.

**Efficiency**

The partnership provides for a number of specific tools to be used to support the implementation of actions designed to contribute to achieving the objectives. The efficiency of these tools has depended on the way in which they have been used to bring about the achieved changes.

The evaluation concludes that the tools available under the CPA have made a significant contribution to achieving the objectives of the ACP-EU partnership. They have provided a wide range of instruments, approaches and financing modalities and have been used by a range of implementing actors. The choice of tools available has allowed the design and implementation of programmes to be tailored to the needs and constraints of each of the different contexts and partners. On the other hand, a number of aspects of the management of the CPA are seen as areas of concern, from an efficiency point of view. Delays and inefficiencies, mainly caused by complex administrative procedures and a lack of adequate staff at some levels, are often mentioned as the cause of bottlenecks affecting the quality of the programming and the adherence to the implementation cycle.

The results of the EU Delegations survey highlight that co-management of programming, monitoring and evaluation has been important in ensuring that National Authorising Officers (NAOs) take ownership of actions and that there is mutual engagement in the field of development cooperation. Various studies and surveys also show that the role of NAOs under the CPA is complex and varied, and that they tend to centralise power and sometimes even marginalise line ministries in decision-making and implementation. EDF resources have therefore been used to set up support units to the NAOs. Their aim is to ensure that NAO staff can apply complex EU procedures, rather than supporting the more general development of state capacity. Offering this support to the NAO structures has created significant costs, and has not always led to their taking greater ownership of actions. Furthermore, lack of capacity continues to be mentioned frequently in the assessment of NAO systems.

The management of EU external assistance has, to a large extent, been devolved to the EU Delegations, and the quality and depth of monitoring and evaluation systems is determined by the contextual conditions and the availability of resources. The principles and systems for reporting on the monitoring activities are currently being revised. Notable changes include the introduction of reporting on results — following the new EU results framework — and the full revision of the methodology for ROM (results-oriented monitoring) reports, designed to optimise their use.

The CPA created a comprehensive framework for the Joint Institutions, modelled on the EU institutional setting. Institutional practice is, however, seen as complicated and burdensome, and involves processes that slow down decision-making and hamper efficiency. While the
evaluation finds the overall institutional framework to be relevant to the spirit of the CPA, it indicates that the roles of the various institutions should be clarified and streamlined, in order to increase the efficiency of the partnership.

A total of EUR 66.2 billion has been allocated to the ACP countries and regions under the CPA. This includes a part of the eighth EDF allocation and the entire ninth, tenth and eleventh EDF allocations. Overall, allocations have increased considerably under the CPA, while the regional allocations have more than doubled from one EDF to the next. The relative geographical allocations remained relatively stable over the period in question, with a large proportion of funding being allocated to sub-Saharan Africa (77% of the total), while the countries in the Caribbean and Pacific received, respectively, 6% and 2% of the total funding. The remaining 15% of the budget concern the intra-ACP resources, and is used when national and/or regional action proves impossible or ineffective. One example of the type of action funded by intra-ACP resources is the African Peace Facility, which uses approximately 25% of the intra-ACP resources (from the tenth and eleventh EDF). The funding allocated from the eighth and ninth EDF budgets has been almost entirely used up (close to 100% of the budget spent). For the tenth EDF, contracts have been signed to a value of 90% of the total funding, and 70% of total funding has actually been paid out. Actions funded from the eleventh EDF have recently started to be implemented.

Conducting political and policy dialogue in parallel can be very challenging at times. The evaluations report on both cases where this has been accomplished successfully, and cases where results have been poor. Whilst the two processes are distinct, the outcome of policy dialogues may of course provide useful insight of relevance to political dialogue meetings, and vice versa.

Actions undertaken to improve regional integration have been shown to be efficient and conducive to boosting trade and improving economic infrastructure, and also to promoting peace and security. More still needs to be done, however to ensure coherence between action taken at regional and national level. Regional institutions are often unable to negotiate and ensure national implementation, while national governments often face resistance to and constraints in implementing specific regional programmes. The overlap between regional organisations, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, has also created inefficiencies.

**Sustainability**

The sustainability of the progress achieved under the CPA has been a central consideration, and improvements in economic and social performance have been recorded across the ACP countries. There are still, however, a number of factors threatening the sustainability of the results achieved to date.

Much of the economic growth recorded by ACP countries over recent decades has been due to the increased international demand for the raw materials they produce, including oil, gas, other minerals, cocoa and coffee. These sources of growth are particularly vulnerable, as local
economies are still far from achieving a desirable level of diversification. Both the low productivity of labour in the agriculture and urban informal sectors, where the most employment is concentrated, and regional instability have negatively affected new and long-term strategic investments.

Population growth is, in many ACP countries, another factor contributing significantly to potential vulnerability. It has, in the past, often been considered as a ‘population dividend’, but is currently more often seen as disruptive, in cases where it threatens the sustainability of the progress achieved to date, especially in countries affected by economic crises and conflict. Actually, progress made in the past (e.g. HIV/AIDS, enrolment in primary education and maternal health) is being eroded in some cases. Improvements to social conditions therefore need to be consolidated by institutional and quality development and ensuring sufficient levels of funding from the partner governments.

The CPA introduced specific instruments that could provide a rapid response to crises (FLEX and V-FLEX). Even the stable and well-performing ACP democracies remain vulnerable to external and internal shocks, however, when they lack ongoing support from local middle classes and transparent systems of checks and balances. Powerful interests groups often play an influential role while the space in which both civil society and the private sector can engage on issues is regularly limited by governments. Building competitive and attractive states is therefore a persisting challenge and a long term process that needs up-to-date long-term international partnerships.

The root causes of instability and conflict have not been adequately addressed. The world is going through a complex transition, with the emergence of new regional powers and growing middle classes. There is fierce resistance to change and emerging players often clash with one other. Strengthening the resilience of the existing states and regions of the ACP group and building solid partnerships to accelerate the consolidation of secure, democratic and competitive areas can serve to counter long-term instability and conflict.

The sustainability of the achievements of the CPA remains a fundamental issue. While a number of new instruments and approaches have been developed under the CPA, it is important to note that improved sustainability is, in particular, dependent on the political will and commitment shown by domestic decision-makers.

**Impact**

The CPA has contributed to the strengthening of democracy and human rights in the ACP countries. The democratisation process, although slow and discontinuous, has advanced. There continues to be a small number of authoritarian and failed states, however. Overall, the EIU democratic index shows democracy standards to have deteriorated in almost all regions in the last decade, with sub-Saharan Africa reporting some slight improvements. CPA actions in this area have been stepped up over the last decade. They have made a significant contribution to the electoral process in a large number of countries. The results of the political
dialogue on human rights — including associated support on HR issues provided on a case-by-case base — have, meanwhile, been more mixed.

The CPA has contributed to stabilising the security situation and maintaining peace in the ACP countries. The number of conflicts has increased significantly in recent decades, especially in Africa. The ability of the international community to react to conflict situations has improved in various areas, with regional organisations playing a critical role. These areas include: mobilisation for peace enforcement, preparation and implementation of post-conflict country emergency and rehabilitation plans, and conflict prevention networks. The EU has been at the forefront in the response action, through the provision of funds, political dialogue and partners’ coordination, institution building, ad hoc conflict prevention and post-conflict plans as well as through a substantive number of civilian and military crisis management (CSDP) actions in Africa. The EU has been one of the main partners of organisations such as the Africa Union (African Peace Facility), ECOWAS and ECCAS in all the regions of Africa affected by conflict. It has worked to develop their response capacity. The weak resilience of some of the ACP countries, however, makes them more vulnerable to increasing regional instabilities. The CPA has not yet been able to tackle sufficiently the root causes of conflicts, including shared understanding of and action against regional inequalities, discrimination and imbalances.

The CPA has contributed to an increase in trade flows within the ACP area and between the ACP countries and the rest of the world. Most ACP regions and the ACP group as a whole have seen a stronger increase in trade flows with the rest of the world than in intraregional trade. For ACP Africa, however, the share of intraregional trade in total trade has increased from 16 % in 2000 to 24 % in 2014. Trade growth has been a main driver of global economic growth in the ACPs and has overturned the negative trend in the position of the ACP group in international trade seen since the 1970s. There is strong evidence of the significant contribution made by the CPA to facilitating trade. The changes seen include improvements to trade regulations, liberalisation of trade and increases in capacity in the ACP countries, and improvements to the basic transport infrastructure serving the main regional axes. The CPA has not, however, achieved the expected results in terms of increasing diversification and reducing commodity dependency.

The overall impact on poverty reduction has been significant, if one considers the direct contributions to macroeconomic stabilisation, improved PFM, trade capacity including strengthening of the main transport networks, increased public expenditure in social sectors, etc. By strengthening these different national/regional capacities and government policies, the CPA has contributed to promoting economic growth and to increasing the access of the poor to basic services, thus contributing to the reduction of both income and non-income poverty. The CPA has, however, been less successful in achieving its aim of promoting inclusive growth, and specifically of increasing the level of participation of the poor and accelerating the reduction of the poverty incidence. The CPA has not been able to have a sufficient influence on the internal mechanisms of income distribution and the key political economy equilibria in the ACP societies. For growth to become more inclusive, the productivity of the
labour force would need to increase in the agricultural sector and the urban informal sectors, where the most employment is still concentrated.

The CPA has contributed significantly to increasing equitable access to basic social services (education, health, water and sanitation) and to improving living standards among the ACP populations, in particular the poor. Over recent decades, CPA funding has provided a significant proportion (although decreasing in recent years) of the development expenditure in the above-mentioned sectors in many ACP countries. This financial support has often been complemented by policy advice and support on capacity development, thus accompanying the efforts of the partner countries:

Universal primary enrolment and gender parity in primary education have been almost achieved, with a positive impact on literacy amongst the youth. The quality of education including its relationship with employment remains an important challenge, which is partly a consequence of the important demographic growth in Africa.

Strong progress has been made in reducing child mortality. In maternal health, malaria and HIV/AIDS, the progress has been important as well, although the challenges remain enormous and some reversal trends are being observed;

Access to safe-drinking water increases, although at a pace below the expectations and with a bias in favour of the urban areas.

Overall, the impact on improved equitable access has been high, but the quality of institutional change, the sustainability of the achievements and their capacity to affect the long-term living standards of the populations remain low. The recent sector evaluations tend to be highly critical on the capacity of basic services to meet the present needs in the ACP countries.

**Coherence, Coordination and Complementarity (3Cs)**

The evaluation shows that the 3Cs have been an important objective for the EU during the implementation of the CPA, placing it ahead of the curve in development cooperation policy. The CPA established a comprehensive partnership for the economic, social and cultural development of the ACP States. It is based on three complementary pillars: the political dimension, economic and trade cooperation, and development cooperation, and is implemented via a coherent array of instruments and support measures. The CPA is seen as a unique model for north-south cooperation —its comprehensive approach setting it apart from other development cooperation initiatives — and its three pillar structure has allowed the EU and its partners to increasingly play a coordinating and effective role in a wide range of geographic and thematic areas, from peace and security, to democracy, trade and development. The 3Cs are an integral part of the CPA.

**Coherence** has been demonstrated by combining humanitarian and emergency interventions led by the Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (DG ECHO) with longer-term programmes financed by the EDF, and with rapid stabilisation actions, EIB
investment support, trade development, actions designed to ensure access to basic services, and national and regional programmes. The review report shows that the potential coherence of the different strategies and tools of themselves is high, but the ability to generate actual synergies and to avoid fragmentation also depends on the national development actors (government and civil society). In different fragile contexts, the ability to do this has shown to be weak.

Coordination and complementarities between the EU and its Member States have initially been rather weak, but have increased over the years, in particular since the launch of delegated cooperation and the expansion of blending facilities. Joint programming with Member States is on the increase as well, while the recently created Trust Funds have promoted greater EU visibility and leadership in coordinating the activities undertaken by donors.

Importantly, Joint Programming is now entering a new phase, with more ambitious objectives, including, where possible, replacing National Indicative Programmes (NIPs) with Joint Strategies, strengthening ownership and reducing transaction costs for both partner countries and development partners.

The post-Lisbon EU foreign policy architecture has also contributed to increasing coherence, coordination and complementarities between the EU and its Member States, particularly in the conduct of political dialogue, but also in defining and coordinating the implementation of comprehensive approaches in unstable situations and areas affected by conflict.

**EU added value**

The strategic added value of the CPA has been in the ability of the EU to promote a single legally binding framework with underlying values and principles, which has been ratified by all ACP countries. The comparative advantages of an EU-wide approach have included: (i) a long-term presence, (ii) general neutrality, (iii) predictability of financial resources, (iv) critical mass mobilised in terms of financial support, (v) the wide range of instruments put in place, and (vi) recognised political and technical experience in key sectors for the partnership. These elements were unique features of the EU action, and highlighted the position of the EU as a strong and reliable partner for all ACP countries.
Annex 1. Procedural information

Lead services: DG DEVCO and the European External Action Service (EEAS)

Organisation and timing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Setting up of Post Cotonou Taskforce</td>
<td>Q2/2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted consultations with seven thematic roundtables in different EU Member States</td>
<td>Q2/2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-service Steering Group set up</td>
<td>Q2/2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal survey addressed to EU Delegations</td>
<td>Q4/2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review of Strategic evaluations</td>
<td>Q4/2015 &amp; Q1/2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter Service Consultation</td>
<td>Q2/2016</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Services participating in the Inter-service Steering Group:
AGRI, BUDG, CLIMA, CNECT, COMM, COMP, DGT-EDIT, EAC, ECFIN, ECHO, EMPL, ENER, ENV, EPSC, ESTAT, FISMA, FPI, GROW, HOME, HR, JRC, JUST, MARE, MOVE, NEAR, OLAF, REGIO, RTD, SANTE, SG, SJ, TAXUD, TRADE

Meetings ISG: 29 June 2015, 18 March 2016, 2 May 2016

External expertise was used in the context of:
- Thematic roundtables
- Review of the strategic evaluations
- Public consultation and EU delegation survey
Annex 2. Stakeholder consultation

The stakeholder consultation has been an important undertaking in the evaluation of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA). The EU has elaborated early on a consultation strategy in order to collect input and views from a wide range of stakeholders, from EU and third countries, on the key questions pertaining to the CPA and relations after 2020.

Main stakeholders: EU institutions and EU Member States, ACP countries, institutions and regional organisations, joint ACP-EU institutions, private sector, civil society organisations, academia, think-tanks, general public. The Commission’s minimum standards for public consultation have been met, and all interested parties have had the opportunity to contribute to this inclusive consultation process.

The following targeted and open public consultation activities were carried out:

- a targeted series of round tables in spring 2015 with a variety of stakeholders in different EU Member States to analyse and evaluate various aspects of the CPA and identify key issues and questions for the public consultation. The round table process was led by a team of external consultants and included participants from academia, think-tanks, private sector, civil society organisations, EU institutions and EU Member States. The round tables considered the following clusters as key to a revised partnership:
  - What kind of partnership do we want?
  - The future framework for international cooperation and development policy;
  - Means of implementation;
  - Stakeholders and institutions;
  - Regional integration and trade;
  - Global challenges;
  - Demographic developments.

The process resulted in a final report\textsuperscript{208} with key findings and recommendations for questions to be addressed in the subsequent phase of broader public consultation.

- a broad public consultation, on the basis of the Joint Consultation Paper entitled ‘Towards a new partnership between the European Union and the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries after 2020’;\textsuperscript{209}

- an internal survey in October 2015 in order to capture the experience and views of the Commission’s staff in the field; EU Delegations were requested as well to consult Member States’ embassies and capture the assessment from the respective national authorities on specific topics.

The main findings of the stakeholder consultation point to a number of strengths and weaknesses of the first 15 years of the CPA. Key messages are summarised below:


Respondents see generally a positive contribution of the CPA to human and social development, including poverty reduction. Work on peace and security as well as trade was positively evaluated, although the latter to a lesser extent than expected. In some other areas, respondents have mostly a critical opinion of the effectiveness of the CPA, especially with regard to private sector development and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), migration, the democratic governance related mechanisms and the generation of EU-ACP alliances on global challenges.

The majority of replies underline the fact that the legally binding nature of the agreement has been instrumental to its implementation. This represents a major advantage as compared to partnerships based on political declarations. Some respondents underline that without this legal characteristic no leverage in the political dialogue is possible.

Respondents have been generally critical on the extent to which the CPA mechanisms (i.e. political dialogue, financial support, appropriate measures, and suspension of development cooperation) have contributed to improving human rights, democracy, rule of law and good governance, including the fight against corruption. Political dialogue as foreseen in Article 8 of the CPA is seen as too EU-driven, technical and formalistic. Nevertheless, the need to preserve and strengthen political dialogue in the future was underlined by many respondents who acknowledged that political dialogue has allowed raising the profile of certain human rights and controversial issues in the development agenda.

A majority of respondents consider that the involvement of key stakeholders has been useful but not sufficient to promote human rights and democratic governance, and that more should be done to further encourage their participation. There is a large majority in favour of a stronger role of civil society actors and private sector.

Looking at ways of working, respondents consider that the system of co-management worked well at the level of programming, monitoring and evaluation but that the role of NAOs/RAOs concerning the implementation of programmes and activities needs to be reconsidered.

The majority of respondents believe that of all EU cooperation programmes, the National Indicative Programme (NIP) is the preferred one.

A consensus appeared on the need to adapt the content of the partnership to global trends and tendencies, including climate change, migration pressures, and economic development. Respondents largely agreed that the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the SDGs should be a priority, particularly the focus on poverty eradication, inequalities, the universality principle, as well as democracy, human rights, and good governance. Stakeholders stressed the need to take into account the evolved regional partnerships that the EU is forging at continental (African Union) and regional (Regional Economic Communities) level. Participants are also largely in favour of strengthening the partnership with other actors, including emerging powers (BRICs), philanthropic and regional organisations.
Annex 3. Methods and Analytical models

The methodology of this mixed evaluation of the CPA, based on five inputs, has essentially followed the approach established by the EU for conducting strategic evaluations of external assistance and by the Better Regulation guidelines. It analysed the EU strategy towards the ACP from conception to implementation, assessing the results of EU financial and non-financial activities between 2000 and 2015. The evaluation provides information to help understand how far the objectives of the CPA have been reached and why, and how far the Agreement has contributed to reduce poverty in ACP countries, to enhance peace and security, and to strengthen their role in international economic relationship.

- **Methodology of the ‘Review of strategic evaluations’**

The study encompasses analysis and synthesis of findings, conclusions, recommendations and key lessons from the evaluations, based on a predetermined set of twelve evaluation questions (with the related Judgment Criteria) that served as guidance for the analysis. The reconstructed intervention logics (for the whole CPA and for each of its three pillars) have been established and the EQs and judgment criteria, provided by the core team of the Post-Cotonou Taskforce, have been tested. A total of 111 evaluation reports provided by DEVCO Evaluation Unit — covering 111 geographical (country and regional), and thematic and aid modalities evaluations related to ACP countries — were classified and structured by the consultant according to relevance criteria, so as to diversify the level of their consideration in the final assessments. A number of codes corresponding to the Judgment Criteria were created and the reports were read extracting the text segments corresponding to the codes, including the different levels of relevance. Various rounds of synthesis work were carried out to arrive to the formulation of the answer to the EQs. The answers to the EQs have been summarised in two final products namely conclusions according to the main evaluation criteria; and lessons learned, according to some main thematic areas, as identifiable in a sufficient number of reports.

- **Selected country examples for evaluation questions (Review of strategic evaluations)**

**EQ1:** Angola, Botswana, BS Tanzania, Dominican Republic, Guyana, Nigeria, Pacific, Senegal

**EQ2:** Angola, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, Haiti, Jamaica, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Nigeria, Pacific, Timor-Leste, Togo, Uganda, Zambia

**EQ3:** Angola, Burundi, Caribbean, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Côte d’Ivoire, Jamaica, Liberia, Niger, Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Chad, Timor-Leste

**EQ4:** Mali, Nigeria, OCTs, Senegal, Guyana

**EQ5:** Caribbean, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Namibia, Nigeria, OCTs, Pacific, Zambia

**EQ6:** Botswana, Caribbean, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Pacific, SADC / COMESA / EAC Tripartite Task Force

**EQ7:** Burkina Faso, Chad, Haiti, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Guyana, Jamaica, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Pacific, Tanzania, Timor Leste, Uganda, Zambia
EQ8: Ethiopia, Pacific, Madagascar, Dominican Republic, Burkina Faso, Zambia, Uganda, Burkina Faso, Zambia, General (for health and education)

EQ9: Angola, Botswana, Burundi, Chad, Congo, Ethiopia, Jamaica, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Pacific, Timor-Leste, Uganda, OCTs, Pacific,

EQ10: Angola, Burundi, Burkina Faso, Caribbean, Ethiopia, Jamaica, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, Timor-Leste, Uganda, Zambia

EQ11: N/A

EQ12: Botswana, Burkina Faso, Caribbean, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria. Tanzania, Chad, Timor-Leste, Zambia

- **Limitations — robustness of findings**

A number of limitations (e.g. data, timing, etc.) were found during the evaluation process and, consequently, mitigating measures were taken. The analysis of the reliability of the available data is summarised as follows:

  o *For the EU Delegations’ Survey and the Joint Public Consultation (JPC)*

1. **The type of responses given by the respondents**

   - Most of the respondents to the JPC only answered parts of the questionnaire, making that, on average, the response rate to each question varied between 45% and 80%; for the EUD Survey, respondents in most cases answered all questions, albeit with different degrees of precision, relevance and evidence-based information.

   - The distinction between personal opinions (based on the respondent’s overall experience, possibly in a range of countries) and country-specific responses (reflecting the position of the EUD in a given ACP country) was not always evident.

   - Answers varied in their degrees of precision and relevance. The responses ranged from a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ type to a more elaborated reply.

   - Many questions of both questionnaires contained several sub-questions. Quite often, respondents limited their answers to only one part of the question.

2. **The identification and combination of key messages**

   - The identification of key messages entails a certain degree of interpretation and ‘subjectivity’, especially in the case of qualitative responses. To reduce the degree of subjectivity a triple filter was established: the relevance of a statement and its tagging as ‘key message’ was determined by 1) the extent to which it was related and directly responded to the question posed; 2) the fact that it was made by more than one respondent, and; 3) a peer review within the team of consultants that processed the answers.

   - The weight and importance of a statement was usually determined by its capacity to create consensus or gather a large number of respondents around it. Sometimes, however, stand-
alone statements backed by 1, 2 or 3 respondents were found with enough insight/relevance to be considered as a key message.

3. **The difficulty to identify trends based on categories of stakeholders**

- In the JPC, no robust trend could be drawn from the analysis regarding commonalities and/or divergences based on categories of stakeholder.

- Also in the JPC, key messages were usually common to several categories: Identified key messages were generally shared across the board, regardless of the group of stakeholder or geographical origin of the respondent (EU, A-C-P).

- The JPC also unveiled a limited number of respondents per category of stakeholder: Whenever such trends and groupings could be observed (for instance, when a particular key message is made mostly by CSOs, LAs or ACP public authorities), they usually did not represent more than 4 or 5 actors from that given category. Against this background, generalities and conclusions on trends could not be drawn from such a small sample of respondents, even if they belong to the same category.

- With regards to the EUD Survey, no robust trend could be drawn from the analysis regarding commonalities and/or divergences based on country classification. Identified key messages were generally shared across the board, regardless of the income classification (LIC/MIC) or geographical belonging (A-C-P) of the host-country from which the response originated.

  o *For the Review of the strategic evaluations managed by DEVCO*

Reviewing a total amount of 111 evaluation reports called for a systematic approach to data analysis. The reports were clustered in three categories based on their relevance, as illustrated in the table below, for the following benefits:

- Adding a qualitative dimension: A greater weight was attributed to segments extracted from reports considered as highly relevant, which facilitated and sped up the analysing and synthesising processes.

- A quicker and more focused extraction process: Documents were treated differently based on their category and the search of relevant pieces of information was done with high precision.

The following table summarises how the review of strategic evaluations approached this matter:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Category A — High relevance</strong></td>
<td>Reports of the first category have a clear focus on ACP countries and present strong and direct thematic links to the EQs and ICs. They cover a period which is almost entirely after the CPA has come into force (2003). Reports of this category have been read extensively and even their annexes have been taken into account for further in-depth analysis.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Category | Explanation
--- | ---
**Category B — Partial relevance** | Reports of the second category may be of relevance in temporal, thematic or geographical terms but not in all three dimensions at the same time or only to a lesser extent. The links between their subjects and the EQs and JCs are weaker and often indirect. Although ACP countries are covered, they neither represent the majority of the case studies, nor does the evaluation have a distinct ACP focus. Similarly, even though they cover a period during which the CPA has already entered into force, a considerable part of their evaluation period is before 2003. Reports of this category have been approached in the following way: First, their executive summaries and conclusions were read. This guided a streamlined reading and data extraction of the volumes (and annexes, where relevant).

**Category C — Limited relevance** | Reports of the third category focus on ACP countries only to a very limited extent, if at all, and their thematic emphasis promises very little to no information related to the EQs and JCs. More often than not, their evaluation period was before the CPA entered into force or in some cases even before it was signed. Reports of this category have only been screened rapidly by concentrating on the conclusions and recommendations to identify key lessons that might be valid and helpful despite the limited relevance of the overall report. Information from these reports is relevant to the extent to which it helps to track the continuity between the CPA and the previous agreements.

A set of codes represented the backbone of the data extraction process. These codes guided the analysis of the reports and helped structure the mass of information and establish direct links to the EQs. The synthesis of the findings has led to answering the EQs; where not possible, gaps of information have been identified.

Furthermore, the review of the strategic evaluations provided an analysis of level of evidence by Evaluation Question and Judgment Criteria. Three levels of evidence combine quantitative and qualitative aspects and have been defined as follows:

*High*: Extensive and substantial information, thorough analysis on ACP countries and clear examples informing the JC occur with a high incidence; trends can be easily identified over time.

*Medium*: Relevant and specific information and/or less focused analysis on ACP countries and/or a number of concrete examples informing the JC occur with a lower incidence; trends can be identified but not always confirmed.

*Low*: Limited or no specific information on ACP countries and very few examples are available; it is not possible to establish trends over time.

The table in the next pages presents the level of evidence linked to the EQs and JCs, the number of evaluations which fed into the respective JCs. The number of reports presents only a quantitative aspect, i.e. it is possible that a high number of evaluations provide a low level of evidence and vice versa.

The column ‘Evaluations’ refers to the number of evaluations which provided relevant information for the respective JC. One single evaluation consists of several individual reports or documents (e.g. main report, subsequent volumes, annexes etc.).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Judgment criteria</th>
<th>Number of evaluations</th>
<th>Level of evidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EQ 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC 1.1</td>
<td>Agreed priorities and shared agendas established</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judgment criteria</td>
<td>Number of evaluations</td>
<td>Level of evidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JC 1.2</strong> Local authorities, national parliaments and non-state actors involved in the implementation of the partnership</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JC 1.3</strong> CPA recognised and understood by the relevant authorities/interest groups at the different levels and perceived as still responding to critical needs and problems</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JC 1.4</strong> Unintended effects have played a minor/major role in the attainment of the results</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EQ 2</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JC 2.1</strong> Improvements have been made in the field of human rights, democratic principles, rule of law and good governance</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JC 2.2</strong> The CPA mechanisms (political dialogue, consultation procedure, appropriate measures, and suspension of the agreement, including its legally-binding characteristic) have played a substantial role in the achievement of the improvements</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JC 2.3</strong> The respect of the fundamental principles has been and still is a priority for the ACP countries</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JC 2.4</strong> Unintended effects of the mechanisms have played a minor/major role in the attainment of the results</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>✓ ✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EQ 3</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JC 3.1</strong> Evidence of CPA contribution to sustainable improvements in peace and security for the populations of the ACP countries and regions</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>✓ ✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JC 3.2</strong> Evidence of CPA contribution to improvements in conflict prevention and addressing their root causes by ACP countries</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>✓ ✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JC 3.3</strong> Evidence of complementarity and synergy between CPA, the common EU foreign and security policy and the policies of EU Member States (coordination, complementarity and coherence — 3Cs)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JC 3.4</strong> EU interventions provided an additional value in comparison to bilateral interventions of EU MS</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EQ 4</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JC 4.1</strong> The CPA contributed to the fair treatment of third country nationals who reside legally on the territories of EU Member States and ACP countries</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JC 4.2</strong> The CPA contributed to the establishment of prevention policies in the context of illegal immigration</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JC 4.3</strong> The CPA has contributed to the acception by Member States of the EU and ACP countries of the return of and the readmission of any of their</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judgment criteria</td>
<td>Number of evaluations</td>
<td>Level of evidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nationals who were illegally present on their respective territories</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC 4.4 Unintended effects have played a minor/major role in the attainment of the results</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC 4.5 EU interventions have been complementary and provided an additional value in comparison to bilateral interventions of EU MS</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EQ 5

| JC 5.1 The CPA contributed to the strengthening of regional trade and integration frameworks | 17 | ✓ |
| JC 5.2 The CPA has contributed to increased ACP-EU trade and investment flows, including key infrastructure, attractiveness of FDI and promotion of PPPs in the ACP countries | 33 | ✓ |
| JC 5.3 The CPA contributed to the conclusion of WTO-compatible Economic Partnership Programmes | 26 | ✓ |
| JC 5.4 Unintended effects have played a minor/major role in the attainment of the results | 3 | ✓ |

EQ 6

| JC 6.1 The CPA has helped in the mutual understanding of trade issues between ACP countries and EU and the identification and implementation of common interests in international fora | 4 | ✓ | ✓ |
| JC 6.2 The CPA contributed to the improved capacity of ACP countries to negotiate and monitor international agreements | 11 | ✓ | ✓ |

EQ 7

<p>| JC 7.1 The CPA contributed to disciplined and transparent fiscal and monetary policies in ACP countries, including control of parliaments and CSOs | 21 | ✓ |
| JC 7.2 The CPA contributed to the provision of timely responses, at a reasonable cost, to the challenges faced by the private sector in ACP countries, including removal of obstacles and access of formal and informal SMEs to innovative and effective financial and economic services | 50 | ✓ | ✓ |
| JC 7.3 The CPA contributed to strengthening the agricultural and rural development policies with a view to enhance inclusive growth and food security | 47 | ✓ |
| JC 7.4 The CPA contributed to establish of a democratic and efficient governance framework, including modernised PA, independent and effective justice | 33 | ✓ |
| JC 7.5 The CPA contributed to private sector and civil society organisations having a meaningful impact on preparation and implementation of policies related to economic growth and private sector development | 7 | ✓ |
| JC 7.6 The CPA contributed to strengthen the role of | 14 | ✓ |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Judgment criteria</th>
<th>Number of evaluations</th>
<th>Level of evidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>regional, sub-regional and continental organisation to support development standards and opportunities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC 7.7 Unintended effects have played a minor/major role in the attainment of the results</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC 7.8 EU interventions have been complementary and provided an additional value in comparison to bilateral interventions of EU MS</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ 8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC 8.1 The CPA contributed to the increase in availability of health and education services</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC 8.2 The CPA contributed to the increase equitable access to health and education services</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC 8.3 The CPA contributed to the establishment of effective quality assurance systems</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC 8.4 The CPA contributed to the integration of population issues in development strategies and policies</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC 8.5 The CPA contributed to private sector and civil society organisations having a meaningful impact on preparation and implementation of policies related to social infrastructures and services</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC 8.6 Unintended effects have played a minor/major role in the attainment of the results</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC 8.7 EU interventions have been complementary and provided an additional value in comparison to bilateral interventions of EU MS</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ 9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC 9.1 The CPA contributed to the integration of an effective gender sensitive approach at every level of development cooperation</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC 9.2 The CPA contributed to the effective fight against HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC 9.3 The CPA contributed to the mainstreaming of environmental sustainability into all aspects of development cooperation and support programmes and projects implemented by various actors</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC 9.4 The CPA contributed to the strengthening of policies and implementation of support programmes to mitigate and adapt to the consequences of, and the threat posed by, climate change</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC 9.5 The CPA contributed to private sector and civil society organisations having a meaningful impact on preparation and implementation of policies related to the cross-cutting issues</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC 9.6 Unintended effects have played a minor/major role in the attainment of the results</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC 9.7 EU interventions have been complementary and provided an additional value in comparison to bilateral interventions of EU MS</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judgment criteria</td>
<td>Number of evaluations</td>
<td>Level of evidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC 10.1 The CPA contributed to the overall reduction of poverty and addressed the needs of the most vulnerable groups</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC 10.2 The CPA contributed to economic inclusive growth thereby reducing income poverty</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC 10.3 The CPA contributed to reducing food insecurity and vulnerability to food crises</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>✓ ✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC 10.4 The CPA contributed to increasing employment especially for the youth and effective social protection</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>✓ ✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC 10.5 The CPA has contributed in tackling the roots of and reduce fragility</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>✓ ✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC 10.6 EU interventions have been complementary and provided an additional value in comparison to bilateral interventions of EU MS</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC 10.7 Unintended effects have played a minor/major role in the attainment of the results</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC 11.1 An effective flow of information between the Parties</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC 11.2 Effective and efficient joint institutions</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC 11.3 Joint institutions contributed to increase coordination, complementarity and coherence between the EU and its MS</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC 11.4 Added value of the joint ACP-EU institutions as compared to regional frameworks for dialogue and cooperation within the ACP regions</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC 11.5 Unintended effects of the functioning of the joint institutions</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC 12.1 Instruments (national/regional/intra ACP) effective and efficient</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC 12.2 Approaches (project approach, budget support, SWAp, joint funding) effective and efficient</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC 12.3 Financing modalities (ACP government, private sector, NSA’s, multilateral organisations and EU MS) effective and efficient</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC 12.4 Operations of the investment facility were effective and efficient</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC 12.5 Additional financial support contributed to the mitigation of the adverse effects of instability of export earnings and the safeguarding the development programme jeopardised by drops in revenue</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC 12.6 The co-management system involving national authorities in the programming and management</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judgment criteria</td>
<td>Number of evaluations</td>
<td>Level of evidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>of aid programmes has been efficient and added value compared to other EU cooperation instruments in ACP and non-ACP countries</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>JC 12.7 Co-management promoted higher ownership by the partner Governments and increased sustainability of the actions</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC 12.8 Current system of resource allocation allows adequate funding to be channelled to countries where it yields the highest impact</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC 12.9 The legally-binding characteristic of the agreement has been (and still is) instrumental in reaching the results</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC 12.10 Unintended effects of the different “tools” and the co-management system</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Malawi, 2003 & 2011
Caribbean 2, 2003-2010

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Ethiopia, 2004 & 2012
Lesotho, 2004 & 2015
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Jamaica, 2006 & 2012
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Central African Republic, 2009
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Chad, 2009 & 2015
Senegal, 2010
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Niger, 2010
OCTs, 2011
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Cameroon, 2014
Democratic Republic of Congo, 2014
Haiti, 2014
Kenya, 2014
Togo, 2014
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Timor Leste, 2015
Annex 5. Acronyms

ACP Africa, Caribbean and Pacific
AOSIS Alliance of Small Island States
AEEP Africa-EU Energy Partnership
AfT Aid for Trade
AGIR Global Alliance for Resilience
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
APF African Peace Facility
APSA African Peace and Security Architecture
AU African Union
BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
BS Budget Support
CAMM Common Agenda on Migration and Mobility
CAR Central African Republic
CARICOM Caribbean Community
CARIFORUM Forum of the Caribbean ACP States
CEEAC Economic Community of Central African States
COMESA Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa
CDE ACP Centre for the Development of Enterprises
CPA Cotonou Partnership Agreement
CELAC Community of Latin American and Caribbean States
CEMAC Economic Community of Central African States
CERF United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
COP 21 United Nations Climate Change Conference 2015
CPLP Community of Portuguese Language Countries
CPPB Conflict Prevention and Peace-Building
CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy
CSO Civil Society Organisation
CSP Country Strategy Paper
DCI Development Cooperation Instrument
DDA Doha Development Agenda
DFCC ACP-EU Development Finance Cooperation Committee
DFID UK’s Department for International Development
DG DEVCO Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development
EAC East Africa Community
EAMR External Assistance Management Report
EBA Everything-But-Arms
ECCAS Economic Community of Central African States
ECDPM European Centre for Development Policy Management
EEAS European External Action Service
ECHO European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department
ECOMIB ECOWAS Mission in Guinea Bissau
ECOSOC UN Economic and Social Council
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
EDF European Development Fund
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>EIB</td>
<td>European Investment Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>EIDHR</td>
<td>European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights</td>
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<td>ENV/CC</td>
<td>Environment and Climate Change</td>
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<tr>
<td>EOM</td>
<td>EU Election Observation Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>EQ</td>
<td>Evaluation Question</td>
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<tr>
<td>EP</td>
<td>European Parliament</td>
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<td>EPA</td>
<td>Economic Partnership Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESA-IO</td>
<td>Eastern, Southern Africa and Indian Ocean</td>
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<td>ESI</td>
<td>Employment and Social Inclusion</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUD</td>
<td>European Union delegation</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUFOR</td>
<td>European Union rapid reaction force</td>
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<td>EUSR</td>
<td>European Union Special Representative</td>
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<td>EUTM</td>
<td>European Union Training Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organisation</td>
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<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
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<tr>
<td>FGM</td>
<td>Female Genital Mutilation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLEGT</td>
<td>Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLEX</td>
<td>Flexibility Instrument</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOMUC</td>
<td>Force Multinationale en Centrafrique</td>
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<tr>
<td>G20</td>
<td>Forum for the governments and central banks from 20 major economies</td>
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<td>G77</td>
<td>Group of 77 development countries’ coalition at the United Nations</td>
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<td>GAMM</td>
<td>Global Approach on Migration and Mobility</td>
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<td>GAVI</td>
<td>International organisation created in 2000 to improve access to new and underused vaccines for children living in the world’s poorest countries</td>
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<td>GBS</td>
<td>General Budget Support</td>
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<td>GCCA</td>
<td>Global Climate Change Alliance</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEEREF</td>
<td>Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEWE</td>
<td>Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment</td>
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<td>GFATM</td>
<td>Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria</td>
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<td>GIT</td>
<td>Governance Incentive Tranche</td>
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<td>GSP</td>
<td>Generalised System of Preferences</td>
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<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
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<td>HIC</td>
<td>High Income Country</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIPC</td>
<td>Heavily Indebted Poor Country</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus infection and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome</td>
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<tr>
<td>HPI</td>
<td>Human Poverty Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>European Union Headquarters in Brussels</td>
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<td>HR</td>
<td>Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>IcSP</td>
<td>Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFIs/DFIs</td>
<td>International / Development Finance Institutions</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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IL  Intervention Logic
IF  ACP Investment Facility (operated and managed by EIB)
IMF  International Monetary Fund
IO  International Organisation
ITC  International Trade Centre
JAES  Joint-Africa EU Strategy
JC  Judgment Criteria
JMTC  ACP-EU Joint Ministerial Trade Committee
JP  Joint Programming
JPA  ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly
LDC  Least Developed Country
LGBTI  Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender and Intersex
LI  Low Income Country
LLDC  Landlocked Developing Countries
LRRD  Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
MAR  Multilateral Aid Review
MC  WTO Ministerial Conference
MDG  Millennium Development Goal
MEDA  Euro Mediterranean Partnership
MFN  Most Favoured Nation
MIC  Middle Income Country
MIP  Multiannual Indicative Programme
MME  Migration, Mobility and Employment
MTR  Mid-Term Review
NAO  National Authorising Officer
NGO  Non-governmental Organisation
NIP  National Indicative Programme
NSA  Non-State Actor
OCHA  United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OCTs  Overseas countries and territories
ODA  Overseas Development Assistance
OECD  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OPSYS  Operational Management Information System
PAGE  Partnership for Action on Green Economy
PASEC  Programme for the Analysis of Education Systems
PFM  Public Finance Management
PSNP  Product Safety Net Programme
PROINVEST  ACP-EU partnership programme for the promotion of investment and technology flows in ACP countries
PRSP  Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PSC  Political and Security Committee / Peace and Security Council
PSD  Private Sector Development
PSO  Peace Support Operation
RAO  Regional Authorising Officer
RPCA  Prevention of Food Crises Network
REC  Regional Economic Community
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>REDD</td>
<td>Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation</td>
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<tr>
<td>RIP</td>
<td>Regional Indicative Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDPPs</td>
<td>Regional Development and Protection Programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROM</td>
<td>Results-Oriented Monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern Africa Development Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAHEL</td>
<td>Eco-climatic and biogeographic zone of transition in Africa between the Sahara Desert to the north and the Sudanian Savanna to the south</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALW</td>
<td>Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBC</td>
<td>State Building Contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE4ALL</td>
<td>Sustainable Energy for All Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIDS</td>
<td>Small Islands Development States</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMEs</td>
<td>Small and Medium-scale Enterprises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPS</td>
<td>Sanitary and Phytosanitary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSA</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWAp</td>
<td>Sector-Wide Approaches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TA</td>
<td>Transfer Agreements</td>
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<tr>
<td>TB</td>
<td>Tuberculosis</td>
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<td>TBT</td>
<td>Technical Barrier to Trade</td>
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<td>TF</td>
<td>Trust Fund</td>
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<td>TRA</td>
<td>Trade Related Assistance</td>
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<td>UEMOA</td>
<td>West African Economic and Monetary Union</td>
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<td>UMICs</td>
<td>Upper Middle Income Countries</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commission for the Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIDO</td>
<td>United Nations Industrial Development Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V-FLEX</td>
<td>Vulnerability Flexibility Instrument</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASH</td>
<td>Water, Sanitation and Hygiene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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