# African Peace Facility

## ANNUAL REPORT 2017

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As neighbours and partners, Europe and Africa cooperate closely on a vast range of important issues. In the area of peace and security, the African Peace Facility (APF) has contributed significantly to enhanced dialogue and cooperation between the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU) since its creation in December 2003. Peace and security is one of the priority areas identified under the Africa-EU partnership established in Lisbon in 2007. It was reconfirmed as a priority at the 4th Africa-EU Summit in Brussels in April 2014.

The APF is an instrument financed under the European Development Fund (EDF). In 2017, as in previous years, the largest share of APF funds was allocated to African-led Peace Support Operations. The APF also offers long-term financial support for the full operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). It provides our African partners with an accessible and quick source of funding for the early prevention, management and resolution of crises (the Early Response Mechanism).

Between the 29th and 30th of November 2017, in Abidjan (Cote d’Ivoire), the 5th African Union – European Union Summit brought together EU and African leaders to define the future direction for cooperation between the two continents, under the overarching theme of “Investing in youth for a sustainable future”. Through the final political declaration, they “recognised the need to strengthen the relationship between the AU and EU and agreed on the principle of developing as soon as possible a framework document, which will put our partnership on peace and security on a more solid and structured basis, taking into account the complexity of these threats and the need to address their root causes.” In addition to the adoption of a Joint Declaration, leaders agreed on four common strategic priorities for the period leading to the next Summit, including “Strengthening Resilience, Peace, Security and Governance”.

The area of peace and security will remain high on the agenda. It is one of the priorities of the Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council for a “renewed impetus of the Africa-EU partnership” as well as one of the cornerstones of the European Union’s proposal for a renewed partnership with countries from Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, when the current Cotonou Partnership Agreement expires in February 2020.

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1. See section 6, page 32 for a full list of acronyms.
Objective of the Annual Report

This Annual Report contributes to the fulfilment of the European Commission’s legal commitment “to prepare an activity report on the use of the [APF] funds for the information of the Council and the EDF Committee on an annual basis.”  

The report starts with a general overview of the APF instrument, including its origin and initiation, policy context, priorities, legal basis, evolution and current challenges. The next section provides an update on the three main areas of action from January-December 2017. Lastly, a chapter on the management of the APF is presented. The annex to the report contains updated facts and figures on the budget and its initiatives.

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4 Council Regulation (EU) 2015/322 of 2 March 2015 on the implementation of the 11th European Development Fund (Article 15(e)), under the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement (Cotonou Agreement).
1. Executive summary

Based on the recognition that peace is a necessary precondition for sustainable development, the European Union (EU) established the African Peace Facility (APF) in December 2003 in response to an African request to support peace and security.

On 27 April 2017, the European Commission adopted a decision on the 2017-2018 Action Programme of the APF which was then turned into a Financing Agreement with the AUC. The overall objective of this Action Programme is to contribute to promoting peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development. This supports Sustainable Development Goal 16 (on peace, justice and strong institutions) and the African Union’s Agenda 2063 commitment “to silence the guns by 2020” and therefore reduce the number of violent conflicts on the continent. Its specific objective is to effectively support the African Union Commission (AUC) and the sub-regional organisations carrying out a peace and security operation with an AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) mandate in implementing the African peace and security agenda and to address conflicts on the continent in a comprehensive manner.

Over the years, the APF has become one of the main instruments supporting Africa-EU cooperation on peace and security. EUR 2.7 billion has been allocated to the APF since it was created. EUR 2.3 billion has been contracted and EUR 2.2 billion was paid through this instrument by the end of 2017.

This support enables the African Union (AU) and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs) or other sub-regional organisations carrying out a peace and security operation with an AU PSC mandate to strengthen their respective roles in peace and security, take responsibility for the stability of the continent, and emerge as internationally recognised actors in the political and security arenas.

The strategic approach of the APF is based on a combination of immediate short-term funding in the event of crises and longer-term support for institutional capacity-building in peace and security.

In 2017, the APF continued to support the AU, the RECs/RMs and other sub-regional organisations carrying out a peace and security operation with an AU PSC mandate. The activities funded fall into three categories:

1. African-led Peace Support Operations (PSOs);
   In 2017 the most active PSOs were in Somalia, Guinea Bissau, South Sudan, the Gambia, the Lake Chad Basin, the Sahel and Central Africa. The largest part of the APF’s financing continued to be directed to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

2. Operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA);
   Support for capacity-building continued through the third phase of the APSA Support Programme, which contributes to the implementation of the 2016-2020 APSA Roadmap. To ensure proper implementation of the APSA, the AUC Salaries Programme in Peace and Security enabled the African Union to sustain its personnel costs. The AU Liaison Offices Programme enabled the AU to maintain its network of liaison offices deployed in conflict and post-conflict countries in Africa. The APF also continued to support the AU in the acquisition of a Command, Control, Communication and Information System (C3IS) and it supported the further development of the AU Continental Early Warning System (CEWS).

3. Initiatives under the Early Response Mechanism (ERM).
   The ERM continued to support the AU and the RECs in preventing crises across Africa. In 2017, it funded four initiatives in the field of mediation (Libya), shuttle diplomacy (South Sudan), conflict prevention related to electoral processes (Liberia) as well as the kick start of a PSO (the Gambia).

The European Commission has increased its control over the implementation and financial management of APF activities by partnering with implementing organisations to respond to concerns regarding transparency, accountability and reporting requirements. One of the major challenges faced by the APSA institutions is to strengthen the institutional capacities in line with their political ambitions. To address this issue, the European Commission and the AUC updated in May 2017 the Aide Memoire signed in April 2016 which outlines measures to strengthen the AUC’s financial management capacities. Such measures also apply to the RECs/RMs. Two monitoring mechanisms have also been set up, one at the political level that meets on a yearly basis, and the other one that meets quarterly at the technical level.
2. The African Peace Facility: overview

Its origins: the African Union (AU) and the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)

The AU was established in 2002 with a broad political mandate in the area of peace-building and conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa. Together with the African RECs and RMs, the AU established the APSA as a structural and long-term response to African peace and security challenges.

The APSA is made up of several components and structures:
- The AU Peace and Security Council (AU PSC), which is the central decision-making body;
- Eight RECs with a mandate in peace and security, which form the pillars of the overall security architecture:
  - Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)
  - Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD)
  - Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)
  - East African Community (EAC)
  - Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)
  - Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
  - Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)
  - Southern African Development Community (SADC);
- Two Regional Mechanisms (RMs):
  - Eastern Africa Standby Force Coordination Mechanism (EASFCOM)
  - North African Regional Capability (NARC);
- The Panel of the Wise (POW) with a mandate in conflict prevention and resolution;
- The African Standby Force (ASF);
- The African Peace Fund with a mandate to promote the work of the AUC’s Peace and Security Department (AU PSD); and
- The Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) with the role of supporting AU PSC decision-making and guiding deployment of the ASF.

The 2002 Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union establishes the primary responsibility of the AU for promoting peace, security and stability in Africa.\(^5\)

The links between the AUC and the RECs/RMs were formalised through the signature of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in 2008.\(^6\) While reaffirming the AU primary responsibility, this MoU also insists on the principles of subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative advantages in order to optimise the partnership between the AU and the RECs/RMs in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability.\(^7\)

The policy context

The APF was created to foster peace and security on the continent in response to a request made by the AU Summit in Maputo in July 2003.\(^8\) The overall objective of the APF is to support peace, stability and security in Africa and provide the basis for sustainable development, based on the principle of African ownership.

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\(^6\) Article 21 of the same Protocol.

\(^7\) Article 16 of the same Protocol.


\(^9\) Article IV of this MoU.

Peace and security is one of the main pillars of the EU’s 2005 Strategy for Africa.\(^\text{11}\) In order to further enhance its support in this area, the EU put forward a concept for strengthening African capabilities for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in 2006.\(^\text{12}\)

The Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES),\(^\text{13}\) adopted in Lisbon in 2007, defined peace and security as one of the eight areas of partnership (the Africa-EU Peace and Security Partnership). The aim of the partnership is to support “African solutions for African problems” and one of its key areas of cooperation is the operationalisation of the APSA. The JAES and its successive Action Plans were renewed at the third Africa-EU Summit in Tripoli in 2010.\(^\text{14}\)

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The main priorities

The APF is a pan-African instrument in nature. Financial support must be requested by and provided to the AU, a REC/RM or an other sub-regional organisation carrying out a peace and security operation with an AU PSC mandate. Undertakings at the national level are not eligible for funding.

Since its creation, the APF has evolved into the main tool for implementing the Africa-EU peace and security cooperation in complementarity with:
- the Regional and National programmes under the EDF;
- the EU Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP);
- the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa;
- actions under the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP); and
- military and civilian missions and operations under the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

The 3 components of the APF are:
- African-led Peace Support Operations (PSOs);
- operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA);
- initiatives under the Early Response Mechanism (ERM).

The legal basis

The Cotonou Agreement provides the overall legal framework for the APF.

The second revision of the Cotonou Agreement in 2010 also recognised the interdependence between security and development stating that "without development and poverty reduction there can be no sustainable peace and security, and that without peace and security there can be no sustainable development".

The APF as an instrument under the EDF is currently regulated by Article 15 of the 11th EDF Implementation Regulation, which defines the specific sources of funding and procedures applicable. This Article is then completed by multiannual Action Programmes approved by the Council, which are translated into Financing Decisions adopted by the Commission and ultimately into Financing Agreements between the Commission and the AUC. It is the APF 2017-2018 Action Programme that is currently implemented.

Financing of the APF

Due to the limitations of the Treaties, the EU budget is not able to cover all EU areas of action in the field of security and defence. However the EDF, which is the main instrument for funding the Cotonou Agreement, is not part of the EU budget and is subject to different rules. The APF has been, in the main, funded by the ‘intra-ACP’ envelopes of the 9th, 10th and now 11th EDFs. Occasionally, other sources have been used, for example de-commitments from previous (‘closed’) EDFs, regional EDF envelopes, additional voluntary contributions from EU Member States to the EDF and in one case the EU budget for expenses eligible under the APF.

APF funds can be used to finance costs incurred by African peace-keeping forces under the banner of the AU, or of a REC/RM or another sub-regional organisation carrying out a peace and security operation with an AU PSC mandate. These funds cover, for instance, the cost of transporting troops, soldiers’ living expenses, and the development of capabilities. The list of non-eligible APF expenditure includes ammunition, arms and specific military equipment, spare parts for arms and military equipment, salaries and military training for soldiers.

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21 EU Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali), EUTM CAR, EUTM Somalia; EU Capacity Building Missions in the Sahel (EUCAP Sahel Niger and EUCAP Sahel Mali), EUCAP Somalia and; EU NAVFOR Somalia.
22 See in particular Article 1 (on “Objectives of the partnership”), Article 8(5) (on “Political dialogue”), Article 11 (on “Peace building policies, conflict prevention and resolution, response to situations of fragility”), Articles 28(2)(a) and 29(1) (on “Regional Cooperation and Integration”): http://register.corsilium.europa.eu/doc/twi?%3EN%26f%5ST%2009565%262010%2001%20NIT.
25 EUR 7.5 million contribution from the South Africa Heading to supplement the 9th EDF envelope.
The decision-making procedure

Each intervention to be financed by the APF has to be specifically requested by the AU, by a REC/RM or by another sub-regional organisation carrying out a peace and security operation with an AU PSC mandate. If a request comes from a REC/RM or another sub-regional organisation carrying out a peace and security operation with an AU PSC mandate, it must be submitted and endorsed by the AU.

The European External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Commission present a joint information note on the intervention requested, with recommendations to the relevant Council preparatory working groups. The EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) then decides on the political appropriateness of the intervention requested.

For support of new peace operations, once the request has been endorsed by the PSC, the Commission must adopt a formal decision on the envisaged intervention. No Commission decision is needed for the extension or renewal of support to an existing peace operation, or for support to operationalise the APSA.

An accelerated procedure exists for APF interventions requiring an urgent response under the ERM, which aims to respond to requests within 10 days.

Beneficiaries and partners

The direct beneficiaries of the APF are the AU, the RECs/RMs or sub-regional organisations carrying out a peace and security operation with an AU PSC mandate, and the relevant institutions and structures within or related to the APSA. The final beneficiaries are the people of Africa who will be less affected by conflicts and who will live in a safer environment.

The EU is not the only actor providing assistance to the AU and the regional organisations in the area of peace and security. A wide range of other donors such as international organisations like the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and individual countries like the United States, China, Turkey and some EU Member States are active in this field as well. Particularly for PSOs (e.g. AMISOM), considerable support is provided by the UN, other international organisations, EU Member States and non-EU countries. An EU-led AU partners’ group on peace and security meets on a regular basis in Addis Ababa to ensure that support is complementary.

Evolution and current challenges

Since its creation in December 2003, the APF has evolved in two ways; its scope has broadened and it has become part of a wider EU strategy for peace and security in Africa.

In financial terms, almost EUR 2.7 billion has been allocated to the APF since it was created. EUR 2.3 billion has been contracted and EUR 2.2 billion has been paid over the period from 2004 to 2017.

- Under the 9th EDF, EUR 348 million was committed in total. This amount includes additional voluntary contributions amounting to about EUR 24 million (after decommitments of uncontracted amounts) made by Belgium, the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, and Luxembourg.

- Under the 10th EDF, over EUR 751 million was committed26. This includes an additional voluntary contribution by Belgium of EUR 0.6 million for the Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the CAR (MICOPAX).

- Under the 11th EDF, the 2014-2016 Action Programme was adopted by the Commission in July 2014 with an initial contribution of EUR 750 million. Due to increasing needs an additional EUR 150 million was allocated in December 2015 and an additional EUR 150 million in December 2016. An additional voluntary contribution of EUR 1.24 million was made by Denmark for AMISOM. Following decommitments of uncontracted amounts, the total amount committed for 2014-2016 reached EUR 1,030.5 million.

Still under the 11th EDF, the 2017-2018 Action Programme was adopted by the Commission in April 2017 with a contribution of EUR 535 million.

2. THE AFRICAN PEACE FACILITY: OVERVIEW

Over the period 2004-2017, annual contracts have averaged EUR 167 million and annual payments have averaged EUR 157 million. There is an upward trend for both contracts and payments, especially since 2010.
The bulk of the APF envelope between 2004 and 2017 was allocated to PSOs (EUR 2,109.7 million or 90.9% of total contracts). EUR 170 million (7.3%) was used for capacity-building and EUR 28 million (1.2%) for the ERM (see Figure 3).

Together with an increasing number of crises, this evolution has led to a situation where the financing needs of the APF have increasingly mobilised development funds. This has triggered a particularly vivid debate over the financial sustainability of the APF over the last three years.

The principles adopted by the EU Political and Security Committee of the Council in July 2015, aimed at ensuring the financing of on-going PSOs in the short-term while increasing the predictability and financial sustainability of the APF in the longer-term, have led to a series of initiatives, including:

- launching joint demarches to AU Member States to explain the APF’s limitations, to underline the need to raise African funding for African-led PSOs, and to recall their collective commitment to gradually cover 25% of the AU peace and security budget by 2020;\textsuperscript{28}
- launching demarches to other international partners, countries and organisations from other regions to attract further funding for African-led PSOs and capacity-building programmes;\textsuperscript{29}
- enhancing EU dialogue with the UN on supporting sustainable African-led PSOs, including during the last UN-EU Steering Committee on Crisis Management;
- introducing a new ceiling in PSOs contracts for a maximum EU contribution of 80% for troop allowances and a similar ceiling for AMISOM as from January 2016;
- introducing specific previsions concerning an exit strategy into contracts;
- promoting a new model of support programmes, i.e. shifting support from troops costs to capacity-building and identifying a relevant exit strategy; and
- supporting more ODA-eligible capacity-building and activities under the ERM, such as mediation and diplomacy.

\textsuperscript{27} EUR 13.3 million for Audit, Evaluation, Communication and Technical Assistance are not included in this figure.
\textsuperscript{28} In particular Troop Contributing Countries to African-led PSOs funded by the APF.
\textsuperscript{29} AU Summit in South Africa in June 2015, a decision reconfirmed by the 24\textsuperscript{th} Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union held in Addis Ababa (30-31 January 2015).
\textsuperscript{30} Australia, Brazil, China, India, Japan, Kuwait, Norway, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, League of Arab States and UN.
In January 2016, the AU mandated Dr Donald Kaberuka as its High Representative for the Peace Fund to develop a sustainable financial strategy for the pan-African Peace Fund. Dr Kaberuka proposed a 0.2% levy on all eligible African imported goods to fund the AU’s operating, programme, and peace and security operations budget.

This levy should allow the AU to meet the requirement to fund 25% of African-led peace support operations by 2020, a target laid down in 2015 by the AU Assembly of Heads of States, with a contribution of USD 325m in 2017, rising to a total of USD 400m by 2020. It would finance mediation and preventive diplomacy, institutional capacity-building, and peace support operations. The remainder would fund the AU’s general budget.

The full implementation of the levy was planned for the end of 2017 but, as of January 2018, 21 AU Member States had started implementing the Kigali Decision. Out of these, only 12 Member States had enacted internal law for the implementation of the levy and had started collecting it. The 2017 target for the Peace Fund was USD 65m. As of January 2018, a total amount of USD 29.5 million has been collected. While short of the annual target, this represents the largest amount of funding that AU Member States have contributed to the Peace Fund since 1993.

In parallel, a report presented by Paul Kagame at the AU Summit of January 2017 and addressing shortcomings in the functioning of the AU, especially concerning better management, impact and financing, was discussed amongst African Heads of State at the AU Summit in July 2017. The installation of a new AU Commission in April 2017 resulted in slow progress achieved in this area, but key measures have already been implemented such as the approval of the Peace Fund governing structure.

### ODA Eligibility of APF funded initiatives in 2017

Continuing the new approach taken in 2015, only a small part of the APF disbursements have been included in the EDF amounts reported by the EU as eligible to Official Development Aid (ODA) according to the Development Aid Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). A distinction has been made between those programmes that are very largely reportable and those programmes that have little reportable activities.

In the context of the APF, a further distinction ought to be made between military PSOs and non-military PSOs (such as CTSAMM and Burundi HR0s/MEs). Assessment of ERM-related amounts depend on the type of activities supported, while amounts dedicated to support capacity building and technical assistance are considered fully ODA-eligible.

Following this approach, in 2017 all payments made to AMISOM, ECOMIB, G5 Sahel, RCI-LRA and the second phase of the ERM have been considered as non-eligible for ODA whereas those for Burundi HR0s/MEs and CTSAMM have been considered as eligible. All payments under the APSA support programme, the Joint Financing Agreements (JFA Salaries and JFA AU Liaison Offices) and technical assistance have also been considered as eligible for ODA.

In financial terms, EUR 21 million out of around EUR 385 million paid in 2017 has been reported (around 5.4% of total payments).

The OECD/DAC agreed in February 2016 to new rules allowing for a wider set of peace and security activities to be considered as ODA. This adjustment did not have a significant consequence on the ODA-eligibility of the APF.

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31 Kaberuka, D. AU Peace Fund, Securing Predictable and sustainable financing for peace in Africa, 26 August 2016, which was adopted at the 27th AU Summit in August 2016.
3. Activities and achievements in 2017

3.1. African-led PSOs

The PSOs are aimed at providing public security through a range of military and civilian tasks, including peacekeeping, maintenance of public order, policing, infrastructure reconstruction, political dialogue and national reconciliation. Several African-led operations have been deployed since 2004, often in a very hostile environment and a sensitive political context.

**African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)**

Following years of political instability and recurring conflicts, the UN Security Council authorised the African Union to deploy the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in February 2007 in order to promote long-term peace, security and effective governance.

Since then, AMISOM has contributed to:
- the establishment of new federal institutions in August/September 2012;
- the adoption of a new provisional constitution and provisions for presidential elections in the first quarter of 2017; and
- the effort to combat Al-Shabaab militants.

In 2017, AMISOM continued to play an important role in providing the security space needed to ensure the ongoing progress of the political process in Somalia. The EU financial support, which accounts for more than 75% of the PSOs contracted under the 2017-2018 APF Action Programme in 2017, remains vital for AMISOM to fulfil its mandate.

Overall, AMISOM is financed by a broad set of donations, from the EU, the UN, and through financial and in-kind contributions provided bilaterally to the AU or directly to the AMISOM troop contributing countries, in particular the United States.

Since 2007, the EU has provided more than EUR 1.5 billion to the AU for AMISOM (including EUR 239.4 million in 2017) making the EU one of AMISOM's biggest partners. EU funds are used to cover:
- allowances for AMISOM troops;
- salaries and allowances for the police component of the mission;
- international and local civilian staff salaries;
- operational costs for the mission’s offices in Nairobi/Mogadishu and the AMISOM General Dhagabadan Training Camp in Mogadishu; and
- costs for AMISOM Quick Impact Projects (QIPs).

The APF’s financial support to AMISOM is an integral part of the EU’s comprehensive and long-term support for security and development efforts in Somalia. This approach contains political, diplomatic, civilian, military, humanitarian, and development dimensions. It includes three EU military missions, in the framework of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy:
- the EU Naval Force Operation ATALANTA (EU NAVFOR);
- the EU military training mission in Somalia (EUTM Somalia); and
- the EU civilian maritime security capacity-building mission (EUCAP Nestor).

The regional indicative programme for Eastern Africa, Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean (EA-SA-IO) also supports capacity-building to tackle issues such as terrorism, and cross border and transnational organised crime as well as the political building process in Somalia.

However, armed attacks against AMISOM, the Somali National Armed Forces, the Somali Police Force and increasingly against civilian targets, take place regularly in Mogadishu and elsewhere, clearly showing Al-Shabaab capacity and intent to intimidate the population and to disrupt the political process. AMISOM’s presence and operational dynamism remains essential for the foreseeable future.

But as Somalia is moving towards a federal State with institutions, it also has to take over more responsibility in ensuring its own security, allowing a gradual take-over of Somali security forces from AMISOM. The adoption of a National Security Architecture (NSA) by the Somali Federal Government and Federal Member States in April 2017 represents a political landmark in this regard. A successive, greater role for Somali security forces is in line with the authorisation of AMISOM provided by the UN Security Council which, in its resolution UNSCR 2372(2017) of 30 August 2017, shifted AMISOM’s primary strategic objective from reducing the threat posed by Al-Shabaab to enabling a take-over of security tasks to Somali security forces. It is also reflected in the commitment taken...
by the Somali Federal Government at the Somali Security Conference in Mogadishu in December 2017 to elaborate, by February/March 2018, a conditions-based transition plan with clear timelines for the transfer of security authority from AMISOM to the Somali security forces.

**ECOWAS Mission in Guinea Bissau (ECOMIB)**
Established by Heads of States and Governments of the region in the aftermath of the military coup in Guinea Bissau on 12 April 2012, ECOMIB deployed, in 2017, 476 troops including military and police personnel in order to:
- facilitate the withdrawal of the Angola Technical and Military Assistance Mission in Guinea Bissau (MISSANG);
- provide security to the transitional government and people of Guinea Bissau;
- assist in the effective implementation of the Defence and Security Sector Reform Program (DSSRP); and
- provide security for fresh elections and a return to democratic rule.

ECOMIB’s mandate was renewed until the end of 2017 due to the persisting political crisis and instability in the country.

The EU provided EUR 15.2 million from July 2015 to December 2017 to help the government of Guinea Bissau consolidate its authority. The bulk of the APF contribution covers the allowances of troops on the ground. Despite the difficult political context, ECOMIB has been successful in ensuring stability and providing a safe and secure environment to the population.

**Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord’s Resistance Army (RCI-LRA)**
The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) represented a destabilising factor in the Central African sub-region which threatened security and human rights. In 2005, the LRA leaders were the first people to be indicted by the International Criminal Court for war crimes and crimes against humanity. In response to continuing attacks, the AUC established the RCI-LRA to defeat the LRA in the border region of Uganda, the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and South Sudan.

The RCI-LRA brings together those countries affected by LRA violence with the aim of providing a joint political, diplomatic and military response. It has proven successful in considerably wearing down the LRA, reducing the number of attacks, and encouraging combatants to defect.
Between 2013 and 2017, the APF support was provided in coordination with the United States. While the latter ensured logistical support and military advice to the troops, the EU focused on the political and diplomatic tracks and direct support to military headquarters and the secretariat.

The APF support came to an end on 30 June 2017 following the decision by the United States to stop their operational support to the AU Regional Task Force (AU-RTF), which in turn triggered the withdrawal of the Ugandan Forces. The final phase of APF support covered the period from 1 January to 30 June 2017 and mainly focused on supporting the phasing down of the AU-RTF in view of the withdrawal of the US and Ugandan forces.

The operation made the LRA a quasi-insignificant threat in the region. It reduced the number of attacks and abductions and increased the number of LRA fighters who were captured or surrendered.

**Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) of the Lake Chad Basin Commission**

Over the past eight years, the Boko Haram insurgency has been gradually spreading from north-east Nigeria to a large portion of the Lake Chad Basin. Its attacks against the population have severely affected the north-east of Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon and Niger and threatened regional stability. More than 13,000 have been killed, 2.5 million people have been internally displaced, and an estimated 250,000 people have fled to neighbouring countries. In response, the countries concerned (Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger) and Benin have reactivated the MNJTF under the auspices of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) and mandated by the AU PSC.

In August 2016, the EU signed an agreement with the AU for EUR 50 million until January 2018 to strengthen the regional coordination of the response and support the effective coordination and command of military operations through:

- the construction and maintenance of MNJTF headquarters in Ndjamena;
- sector Headquarters in Cameroon and Niger; and
- transport, communication and medical evacuation capabilities.

While the LCBC has the political authority over the MNJTF, the AUC ensures the oversight of the management of the operation. This set-up was necessary as the LCBC does not have the capacities to manage the EU funding. However, difficulties related to procurement processes at the AUC resulted in substantial delays in the implementation of the EU support.

The APF support to MNJTF is one element of a broader, coordinated and coherent EU strategy to support resilience, stabilisation and economic recovery in the Lake Chad Basin. Operations conducted by the MNJTF have led to security progress in reducing Boko Haram’s capacity of movement by pushing them back into their sanctuaries and in dismantling one of its two splinter parties, the Shekau branch. As a result, humanitarian access was increased, in particular in Chad.

**IGAD-led Ceasefire Transitional Security Arrangement Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM) in South Sudan**

In January 2016, the IGAD-led Monitoring and Verification Mission in South Sudan (MVM) transitioned into the Ceasefire Transitional Security Arrangement Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM), which is part of the Agreement on Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (ARCISS) signed in August 2015. The extended mandate of CTSAMM includes:

- monitoring, investigating and verifying violations of the Permanent Ceasefire and the Transitional Security Arrangement (PCTSA) on a regular basis;
- reporting and giving recommendations to the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC), which monitors the implementation of the Transnational Security Arrangement (TSA) of the ARCISS;
- monitoring the disarmament, demobilisation and repatriation of non-state security actors.

The APF support to CTSAMM amounts to EUR 9.16 million from May 2016 to January 2018 for the maintenance of:

- the Joint Technical Committee (JTC – CTSAMM) HQ based in Juba;
- the IGAD South Sudan Office in charge of the coordination of the financial support to CTSAMM based in Addis Ababa; and

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34 Support to the AU Special Envoy, coordination meetings, preparation and adoption of the strategic documents.
17

3. Activities and Achievements in 2017

- the planned sixteen Monitoring and Verification Teams (MVTs) spread throughout the territory of South Sudan.

The non-compliance of the signatory parties with the Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS) and the subsequent deterioration of the security situation have hampered the work of CTSAMM in 2017. However, in June 2017, IGAD decided to convene a High Level Revitalisation Forum (HLRF) of the parties to the Agreement on Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS). The first phase of the forum took place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, between 18-22 December 2017, and concluded with the signature of the “Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, Protection of Civilians and Humanitarian Access (CoH)”. One of the key priorities of the agreement refers to the enhanced role for CTSAMM.

African Union deployment of Human Rights Observers and Military Experts Mission in Burundi (Burundi HROs/MEs)

The support to the AU deployment of Human Rights Observers (HROs) and Military Experts (MEs) Mission in Burundi aims at increasing awareness of the Human Rights and security situation as well as strengthening justice for victims of Human Rights violations in the country.

In view of the degradation of the political and security crisis in Burundi, the Early Response Mechanism had first supported the deployment of AU HROs and MEs between May 2015 and October 2016. In late 2016, the AUC requested longer term funding for an increased mission for the period November 2016 to October 2017, which was granted. In December 2017, the operation was extended until the end of March 2018.

The APF support to Burundi HROs/MEs amounts to EUR 7.8 million from November 2016 to March 2018 and covers:

- salaries and allowances of up to 57 Human Rights Observers and 16 Military Experts; and
- support to staff as well as travel and running costs for the offices and equipment.

The effectiveness of the ongoing operation is limited due to political and operational reasons. The Memorandum of Understanding between the Burundian Government and the AU still has to be signed, leaving the mission with little room for manoeuvre. Despite limited access out of Bujumbura, the HROs monitored the Human Rights and security situation and produced reports regularly transmitted to the AU. They have also followed up numerous cases of Human Rights violations. The MEs, who have been deployed to assist the disarmament process, have also been facing difficulties and travel limitations.

ECOWAS Mission in the Gambia (ECOMIG)

ECOMIG has been successful in preventing violence and maintaining stability following the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule in the Gambia in January 2017. The APF supported the initial deployment of ECOMIG (February-May 2017) through the ERM, which helped overcome the initial resistance of President Jammeh in accepting the electoral result.

In view of the fragility of the security situation, the mandate of the ECOMIG was renewed by the ECOWAS Heads of State and Government on 4 June 2017 until 20 May 2018. APF support to ECOMIG amounts to EUR 7.5 million and mainly involves:

- security provision to the new President and members of Government and Institutions;
- the establishment of joint patrols between ECOMIG forces and the Gambian Armed Forces; and
- the training of the Gambian Armed Forces.

APF support to ECOMIG is part of a wider EU development cooperation effort in the country, most notably through EU budget support and the EU’s Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace funding. In early February 2017, the EU Commissioner for Development and International Cooperation visited Banjul to express the full support of the EU to the agenda of the new government, which is based on democratic reforms in full respect of human rights and the rule of law.

G5 Sahel Joint Force

The main objective of the EU support to the G5 Sahel Joint Force is to contribute to the re-establishment of effective state control over areas affected by armed terrorist groups and criminal groups in order to create favourable conditions for the socio-economic development of the G5 Sahel region.

The EU has welcomed the creation of this force as a clear demonstration of the G5 Sahel countries’ willingness to tackle the deteriorating security environment in the region and to cooperate against transnational threats in a coordinated and structured manner. On 1 June 2017, the EU Political and Security Committee recognised the political appropriateness of supporting the G5 Sahel Joint Force. On 3 June 2017, the G5 Sahel addressed a EUR 50 M financing request to the EU, subsequently endorsed by the AU on 15 June 2017. This request focused on six areas of support, covering:

- the provision of equipment to the force (terrestrial mobility, counter-IED equipment, personal protection equipment);
- the building of infrastructure (headquarters, command posts); and
- the provision of services (e.g. casualty evacuation).

In order to ensure that the Joint Force’s headquarters and three command posts are adequately manned and equipped to perform their assigned duties, support is implemented through a Delegation Agreement signed in August 2017 with Expertise France, the French agency for international technical cooperation.

UNSC Resolution 2391 (2017) of 8 December 2017 called for international support to the G5 Sahel Joint Force, specifically for the establishment and implementation of “a robust compliance framework to prevent, investigate, address and publicly report violations and abuses of human rights law and violations of international humanitarian law” related to the Joint Force. The Resolution also called for the facilitation of support to Joint Force operations on Malian territory through the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). The Resolution noted with appreciation the proposal made by the EU that the APF could serve as a mechanism for channelling international voluntary contributions in support of the Joint Force. The necessary arrangements are expected to be finalised in early 2018.

The APF support to the Joint Force is part of the EU’s integrated approach to the Sahel and is complementary to ongoing actions under the EU Trust Fund for Africa, the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), and CSDP missions in the region (EUTM Mali, EUCAP Sahel Mali and EUCAP Sahel Niger).
3. ACTIVITIES AND ACHIEVEMENTS IN 2017

MAP 1 – African-led Peace operations supported by the APF in 2017

AMISOM
AU Mission in Somalia

ECOMIB
ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau

RCI-LRA
Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord’s Resistance Army

MNJTF
Multi-National Joint Task Force of the Lake Chad Basin Commission

CTSAMM
IGAD-led Ceasefire Transitional Security Arrangement Monitoring Mechanism in South Sudan

ECOMIG
ECOWAS Mission in the Gambia

HROs/MEs
AU deployment of Human Rights Observers and Military Experts in Burundi

G5 Sahel Joint Force
3.2. Capacity-building

Capacity-building has become a major component of the APF since its establishment, with the aim of increasing the capacity of the AU and the RECs/RMs in the area of peace and security. This should have a positive knock-on effect for the planning and conduct of PSOs, as well as for the operationalisation of the APSA.

A number of support programmes have been rolled out to give the AU and the RECs/RMs the necessary instruments to address security challenges through effective and efficient institutions. The most important of them is the APSA support programme.

The APSA support programme

The successive phases of the APSA support programmes aim to strengthen the capacity and efficiency of the AUC and RECs/RMs to prevent or respond to crises and conflicts in Africa by operationalising the APSA. The first two phases of the APSA support programme (for EUR 44.2 million) came to an end in August and December 2015 respectively. The latter was mainly a bridging programme to support the formulation of the 2016-2020 APSA Roadmap by the AUC and RECs/RMs.

The content and design of the current APSA support programme mirrors the strategic priorities identified in the Roadmap:

- conflict prevention, crisis (early warning systems) and conflict management (African Standby Force), and mediation;
- post conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding;
- strategic security issues (terrorism, Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), piracy, etc.); and
- coordination and partnerships.

Through the third phase of the APSA Support Programme, the EUR 28.8 million committed from January 2016 to December 2018 covers the operationalisation of these priorities at the continental level (by the AU) and at the regional level (by ECOWAS, EAC, SADC, IGAD, EASF, ECCAS, NARC and COMESA).
Ensuring coherence and complementarity between continental and regional peace and security activities remains a challenge that must be addressed by the AU and RECs/RMs. The Kagame report “the imperative to reinforce our union” is a welcomed development in this regard as it calls for a clearer subsidiarity between the AU and the RECs.

**AUC salaries in peace and security**

The programme, implemented as a joint financing arrangement with other development partners (Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Norway), aims at sustaining the costs of AUC personnel working on the implementation of peace and security programmes. Therefore it directly contributes to the operationalisation of the APSA and ensures that a closer link is maintained between continental and regional peace and security activities in Africa. Moreover, it provides a basis for the AU/EU dialogue on progress in the implementation of APSA.

A fourth phase of this programme (EUR 5 million from September 2016 to December 2017), providing temporary support to the AUC while it formulates a new human resources policy and implements the AU Summit decisions on its financing, came to an end on 31 December 2017. A fifth phase is expected to take over as of January 2018. It should confirm the ongoing trend of increased AU financial ownership and reduced reliance on external funding.

**African Union Liaison Offices (AU LOs)**

The programme, funded with other development partners (Sweden, Denmark, Norway and the United Kingdom) through a joint financing arrangement, aims at supporting the network of AU LOs in conflict and post conflict countries in Africa. The most recent phase of this programme was for EUR 7 million from January 2016 to December 2017.

These offices, mandated by the AU Peace and Security Council, are key elements of the APSA, ensuring AU presence in these countries and contributing to the fulfilment of its mandate relating to the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in Africa.

In 2017, an evaluation concluded that the AU LOs continued to play a crucial role in particular through consultations and dialogue with the relevant national parties and political actors in their host countries. However, this evaluation also offered recommendations to increase the efficiency of the AU LOs. These recommendations shall be taken into account as the preparations for a potential fifth phase of APF support are ongoing.

**Command, Control, Communication and Information System (C3IS)**

The AU and EU agreed during the Amani Africa II planning sessions on the need to create a technical working group to plan for the establishment of a C3IS for African-led PSOs. This was in order to help close the capacity gap preventing Africa from playing a more effective role in managing conflicts on the ground and in asserting its leadership.

In 2013, the AU and the EU signed an agreement to acquire and set up the C3IS system for management of African-led PSOs with a EUR 12.5 million contribution from the APF. The implementation period of the programme covers the period from March 2013 to September 2018.

The overall objective is to put in place a continental structure enabling the AU to rapidly deploy strategic and operational communication, and command and control capabilities between the AU in Addis Ababa, the regional level and the mission in the field (mission HQ, force HQ and three sectors HQs). The C3IS will provide secure data, and voice and video services through satellite communication between the AU, the sub-regional organisations and the peace missions deployed at country or regional level. It will also provide IT systems to convey orders, and generate reports and maps for the management of the operations on the ground.

The continuation of this programme will depend on the AUC’s strengthened and renewed commitment to implement the procurement process within agreed deadlines.

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35 Chad, Guinea Bissau, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ivory Coast, Libya, Sudan, Madagascar, Western Sahara (relocated in the African Union, Ethiopia), Liberia, Comoros, Mali, Central African Republic, South Sudan.
JRC – AU Continental Early Warning System (AU CEWS) scientific and technical cooperation

From 2007 to 2014, the EU Joint Research Centre (JRC) provided a range of systems, tools and methods to strengthen the AU capabilities to anticipate and prevent conflicts in Africa. These have contributed in particular to setting up and reinforcing the AU Continental Early Warning System (CEWS).

On 1 March 2017, the JRC launched the fourth phase of its cooperation with the AU CEWS, this time under APF funding (EUR 1 million for a 16-month period). The action contributes to achieving the first strategic objective (Conflict prevention) of the 2016-2020 APSA Roadmap by further enhancing the capacity of the CEWS staff to develop the technical and analytic skills necessary to deploy and operate the CEWS components. The programme will also extend and improve the early warning system to enable AU decision-makers to enhance their early detection of emerging risks and situations.

3.3. Early Response Mechanism (ERM)

The ERM was established in 2009 to strengthen the flexibility of the APF to address urgent crises across Africa by providing the AU and REC with an immediately available and reliable source of funding for the first steps of actions aimed at preventing, managing and resolving crises.

Following the conclusion of a positive first phase of the ERM in 2015, the AU and the EU signed a EUR 15 million agreement for a second phase, from August 2015 to July 2018.

ERM initiatives under the programme have had a strong focus on unforeseeable, urgent early stages of conflicts and crises which include but are not limited to:
- setting up mediation or political negotiations’ processes;
- shuttle diplomacy;
- supporting the deployment of security or human rights observers;
- supporting the prevention of violence related to electoral processes; or
- fact-finding missions for the preparation of PSOs.

In 2017, the ERM funded four initiatives for EUR 3.9 million supporting ECOWAS’ electoral violence prevention initiative in Liberia, IGAD’s efforts to revitalise the peace process in South Sudan, the rapid deployment of ECOMIG in support of democratic transition in the Gambia and the AU High Representative in Libya.
MAP 2 – Initiatives supported under the ERM in 2017

- Elections in Liberia
- Initial deployment of ECOMIG in the Gambia
- High Revitalization Forum in South Sudan
- African Union High Representative (AUHR) in Libya
In 2017, the ERM funded four actions for a total amount of EUR 3.9 million that were instrumental in either preventing or mitigating conflict in several African regions.

In Libya, the ERM supported the AU High Representative (AU HR) to undertake a series of consultations with the Libyan authorities and other relevant stakeholders, in order to foster constructive political dialogue aimed at national reconciliation. The AU HR has also participated in the Constitution Drafting Assembly and has established contacts with the Government of National Accord of Libya.

In the Gambia, the ERM supported the initial deployment of ECOMIG from February to May 2017, which helped in overcoming the initial resistance of President Jammeh to accept the results of the presidential election of 1st December 2016. ECOMIG has been successful in preventing violence and maintaining stability following the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule.

In South Sudan, the ERM supports IGAD’s efforts to revitalise the ARCSS. The main objective of the IGAD High Level Revitalisation Forum (HLRF) is to examine the transitional process for the full implementation of the ARCSS and to bring sustainable peace through an all-inclusive political dialogue. To date, the HLRF has achieved the signature by the parties of the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, Protection of Civilians and Humanitarian Access (CoH).

In Liberia, the ERM supports preventive diplomacy activities and related engagement of key political actors to ensure a peaceful electoral process in Liberia. This contributed to a smooth transition of power.
4. Management of the APF

4.1 APF Management

The European Commission implements the APF through a number of partners: the AUC, RECs/RMs, a Member State’s agency (Expertise France) and framework contractors for technical assistance.

The systems of some of the beneficiaries of the APF face a number of challenges to cope with EU requirements related to the operational and financial management of funds, including internal control processes, transparency, accountability and reporting requirements. Therefore, the EU has adopted a set of measures to ensure proper management. On the one hand, financial expost audits are systematically conducted for all APF programmes managed by the AUC and the RECs/RMs. On the other hand, the European Commission and the AUC subsequently signed an Aide Memoire in April 2016 and amended its content in May 2017 in order to strengthen the AUC’s financial management capacities and the joint monitoring mechanisms. Such measures apply to the RECs/RMs.

Monitoring

Two coordination mechanisms have been foreseen to improve governance and oversight of the APF.

At the political level, a Joint Coordination Committee (JCC) has been established. The JCC is jointly chaired by the AUC and the EU and comprises representatives of the RECs/RMs. It monitors the implementation of the APF through regular meetings and exchanges on implementation and operational issues between the relevant departments of the AUC and Commission services, the EEAS and the EU Delegation to the AU in Addis Ababa. The JCC should meet on a yearly basis to discuss the status of the EU-Africa partnership in the area of peace and security. In view of the AU-EU Summit, which took place on 29-30 November 2017, the JCC adopted a SOM (Senior Officials Meeting) format and had as a main task to prepare the Summit Peace and Security outcome. It took place on 5th July 2017 in Addis Ababa and included, besides the AU and the EU, the RECs/RMs. The UN was also invited.

The second mechanism is the Steering Committee which meets on a regular basis at technical level in order to oversee the management of the overall AU-EU development cooperation and to track progress, particularly in relation to the implementation of the Aide Mémoire. The third Steering Committee meeting was held on 24 May 2017 in Addis Ababa.

Additionally, APF programmes are regularly monitored through specific meetings, field visits, external results-oriented monitoring missions and/or external evaluations, as relevant.

APF communication and visibility

In 2017, the European Commission put in place a communication strategy to accompany the implementation of the APF Action Programme 2017-2018. A two-year contract for an amount of EUR 500,000 was signed in July 2017 with the company Landell Mills to develop and implement the strategy.

The main activities will include organising communication events in Brussels and Addis Ababa; enhancing the engagement on social media by launching mini-campaigns; and developing specific products such as APF brochures, videos and reportages. Other activities organised in 2017 included an APF event during the European Development Days as well as the publication and wide dissemination of the APF annual report 2016.

4.2. Exchange of staff and technical assistance to reinforce the management of the APF

A trilateral Administrative Arrangement between the European Commission, the EEAS and the AUC was signed in April 2016 to foster better administrative cooperation between institutions in sectors of common interest, such as on staff professional development, policy-making processes and financial management. Under the Arrangement, the EEAS and European Commission staff will be able to work and exchange expertise, for a limited period of time, in the administration of the African Union Commission and vice-versa.

Several staff exchange initiatives took place in 2017. Ten staff from the Human Resources and Audit departments of the AUC visited counterpart units of the European Commission in DG HR and IAS in October/November. On the EU side, a retired DG BUDG head of unit conducted two missions in July and September to advise AUC on financial management issues.
Moreover, since February 2017, the European Commission provided results-oriented technical assistance to the AUC, to address financial management issues. Those experts worked in the following specific areas: procurement, PPEP (Property, Plant and Equipment Policy), audit, IPSAS (International Public Service Accounting Standards), ERM (Enterprise Risk Management) and SAP (Systems, Applications and Products).
## 5. ANNEX – Tables and figures

### Figure 1 – APF contracted amounts per type of activity, 2004-2017 (in million EUR)\(^{36}\)

- Peace Support Operations: 170 million EUR
- Capacity Building: 28 million EUR
- Early Response Mechanism: 5 million EUR

### Table 1 – APF financial overview under the 9th, 10th, and 11th EDF (in million EUR)

<table>
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<th>Global Commitments Total</th>
<th>Individual Commitments (contracted) (PSO, CB, ERM only)</th>
<th>Individual Commitments (paid) (PSO, CB, ERM only)</th>
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\(^{36}\) EUR 13.3 million for Audit, Evaluation, Communication and Technical Assistance are not included in this figure.
Graph 1 – APF financial overview under the 9th, 10th and 11th EDF: individual commitments for PSOs, CB, ERM (contracted, in million EUR)

Graph 2 – APF financial overview under the 9th, 10th and 11th EDF: individual commitments for PSOs (contracted, in million EUR)
Graph 3 – APSA support programmes 2010-2016 (in million EUR) – commitments AUC/RECs/RMs

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<th>Organisation</th>
<th>APSA SP I</th>
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Contingencies amounts are not taken into account.

37 Contingencies amounts are not taken into account.
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<th>Title</th>
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### 6. GLOSSARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFISM-CAR/ MISCA</td>
<td>African-led International Support Mission in the CAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFISMA</td>
<td>African-led International Support Mission to Mali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMIS</td>
<td>AU Mission in Sudan</td>
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<td>AMISEC</td>
<td>AU Mission for support to the Elections in the Comoros</td>
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<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>AU Mission in Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMU</td>
<td>Arab Maghreb Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APF</td>
<td>African Peace Facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APSA</td>
<td>African Peace and Security Architecture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Standby Force(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUC</td>
<td>AU Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU LO</td>
<td>AU Liaison Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUHIP</td>
<td>AU High Level Implementation Panel (Darfur)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU PSC</td>
<td>AU Peace and Security Council</td>
</tr>
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<td>AU PSD</td>
<td>Peace and Security Department of the AU</td>
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<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Contribution Agreements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEN-SAD</td>
<td>Community of Sahel-Saharan States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEWS</td>
<td>Continental Early Warning System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy (of the EU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy (of the EU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTSSAMM</td>
<td>Ceasefire Transitional Security Arrangement Monitoring Mechanism in South Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3IS</td>
<td>Command, Control, Communication and Information System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEVCO</td>
<td>Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>EASF</td>
<td>Eastern Africa Standby Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EASFCOM</td>
<td>Eastern Africa Standby Force Coordination Mechanism</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOMIG</td>
<td>ECOWAS Mission in the Gambia</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Development Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERM</td>
<td>Early Response Mechanism</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EU PSC</td>
<td>Political and Security Committee of the EU</td>
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<td>EUCAP NESTOR</td>
<td>EU Mission on Regional Maritime Capacity Building</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUTMSomalia</td>
<td>EU Training Mission in Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOMUC</td>
<td>CEMAC Multinational Force (Force Multinationale de la CEMAC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICSP</td>
<td>Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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<td>JAES</td>
<td>Joint Africa-EU Strategy</td>
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<td>JCC</td>
<td>Joint Coordination Committee</td>
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<td>JCM</td>
<td>Joint Coordination Mechanism (under the RCI-LRA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>JRC</td>
<td>Joint Research Centre (European Commission)</td>
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<td>JFA</td>
<td>Joint Financing Arrangement</td>
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<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lord's Resistance Army</td>
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<td>MAES</td>
<td>AU Electoral and Security Assistance Mission to the Comoros</td>
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<td>MICOPAX</td>
<td>Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the CAR</td>
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<td>MISCA</td>
<td>African-led International Support Mission in the CAR</td>
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<td>MNJTF</td>
<td>Multi National Joint Task Force (against Boko Haram)</td>
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<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>MVM</td>
<td>Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (IGAD)</td>
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<td>NARC</td>
<td>North African Regional Capability</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>NAVFOR</td>
<td>Naval Force of the EU</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>POW</td>
<td>Panel of the Wise (of the AU)</td>
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<td>PSO</td>
<td>Peace Support Operations</td>
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<td>Regional Indicative Programme</td>
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<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>SDG</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goal (UN)</td>
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<td>SOM</td>
<td>Senior Officials Meeting</td>
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7. CONTACTS

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