



EUROPEAN SEMESTER THEMATIC FACTSHEET

ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET POLICIES

1. INTRODUCTION

The main goal of active labour market policies (ALMPs) is to increase the employment opportunities for jobseekers and to improve matching between jobs (vacancies) and workers (i.e. the unemployed)¹. In so doing, ALMPs can contribute to employment and GDP growth and reduce unemployment and benefit dependency. ALMPs range from institutional and workplace training offers over indirect employment incentives (job-retainment, job-sharing, recruitment subsidy) to the setting up of sheltered and supported employment or to the provision of direct job creation (public work schemes) and start-up incentives. ALMPs help ensure that the unemployed return to employment as fast as possible and in the best possible job match, by providing them with the support they need to successfully re-enter the labour market. Through re-skilling and up-skilling measures, ALMP can also help to direct people into areas that face skills

¹ The OECD defines ALMPs as follows: 'Active labour market programmes include all social expenditure (other than education) which is aimed at the improvement of the beneficiaries' prospect of finding gainful employment or to otherwise increase their earnings capacity. This category includes spending on public employment services and administration, labour market training, special programmes for youth when in transition from school to work, labour market programmes to provide or promote employment for unemployed and other persons (excluding young and disabled persons) and special programmes for the disabled.'

shortages. This helps cope with structural change and increase resilience of the economy in times of change. ALMPs are a key component of what are called 'activation strategies' and are typically linked to the unemployment insurance/assistance systems through benefit conditionality². Participation in ALMPs have in basically all EU countries become a pre-requisite for (continuing) receipt of benefit.

Unemployment, and especially long-term unemployment (i.e. at least 12 months of unemployment), can have serious adverse consequences for the individual, society and the economic system³. The long-term

² See for example John P. Martin, 'Activation and Active Labour Market Policies in OECD Countries: Stylized Facts and Evidence on Their Effectiveness', IZA Policy Paper No 84, June 2014.

³ This note mainly focuses on preventing long-term unemployment, for a number of reasons. First, long-term unemployment typically has impacts that go beyond those seen for unemployment in general, both in terms of its severity and duration. This necessitates the use of ALMPs. Second, to avoid what are called 'deadweight losses' as much as possible, ALMPs in the proper sense (i.e. 'real measures' in addition to the public employment service providing labour market services) should best be targeted at those most detached from the labour market, which are mainly the long-term unemployed. This would improve the (cost-) effectiveness of ALMPs. Third, the evolution of long-term unemployment gives a good impression of how well ALMPs work, much better than for total unemployment, given that the latter is to a larger extent influenced by cyclical fluctuations.

unemployed find it more difficult to get hired as time goes by and face lower earnings and career prospects. At national level, persistently high long-term unemployment jeopardises overall employment policy goals, lowers the ability to allocate the right jobs to the right people and undermines occupational and geographical mobility⁴.

Workers' human capital (whether actual or as perceived by employers) may deteriorate during a long unemployment spell, and the time devoted to searching for a job typically declines. Both factors imply that the probability of leaving unemployment falls with its duration, leading to an increased probability of remaining unemployed. Over time, unemployed workers become more likely to leave the labour force and retire, enrol in disability programmes, or simply become 'discouraged workers' as unemployment continues⁵. Therefore, it is essential to intervene early, at the beginning of the unemployment spell.

In addition, the impact of the crisis on the labour market highlighted the critical importance of skills, qualifications and work-experience. Young and low-skilled workers bore the brunt of the crisis. ALMP can play a crucial role in giving people access to skills and work-experience and address the key obstacle for these target groups to find a job.

The principal target groups of ALMPs are long-term unemployed and in particular young people⁶, older workers, low-skilled people. However, ALMPs also aim at supporting the mainstream short-term unemployed re-gaining the labour market. The importance of ALMPs is well reflected

in Commission policy documents, notably in the Employment Guidelines 6 and 7⁷.

To improve progress in addressing long-term unemployment, in February 2016 the Council adopted a Recommendation on the integration of the long-term unemployed into the labour market⁸. The Recommendation supports the Europe 2020 objectives by contributing to the goals of increasing the employment rate and reducing poverty.

On 17 November 2017, the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission proclaimed jointly the European Pillar of Social Rights. The principles and rights set out in the European Pillar of Social Rights will be reflected in the work under the European Semester, in particular, with the help of a new Social Scoreboard. The pillar contains a reference to ALMPs⁹.

Finally, the Joint Employment Report 2017 notes that '*Tackling long-term unemployment remains a priority*'.

This factsheet mainly focuses on the long-term unemployed, who face the most severe barriers for entering the labour market and who depend on active support.

The note is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews EU countries' performance on long-term unemployment, activation support and spending on ALMPs. Section 3 discusses the available evidence on potential ALMP policies to address unemployment effectively. Section 4 provides a short general overview of policy implementation in the EU.

⁴ See 'Long-Term Unemployment: There is no Easy Fix', <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/archives/37154>.

⁵ See A. Nichols, J. Mitchell, and S. Lindner, 'Consequences of Long-Term Unemployment', <http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412887-consequences-of-long-term-unemployment.pdf>.

⁶ See the thematic factsheet on youth employment.

⁷ Council Decision (EU) 2016/1838 of 13 October 2016.

⁸ 2016/C 67/01.

⁹ '*Everyone has the right to timely and tailor-made assistance to improve employment or self-employment prospects. This includes the right to receive support for job search, training and qualification... people unemployed have the right to personalised, continuous and consistent support. The long-term unemployed have the right to an in-depth individual assessment at the latest after 18 months of unemployment.*'

A separate thematic factsheet explains the issues and challenges linked to Public Employment Services.

Finally this thematic factsheet is closely linked to the thematic factsheet on Unemployment benefits through the conditionality requirements which exist in many Member States.

2. POLICY CHALLENGES: AN OVERVIEW OF PERFORMANCE IN EU COUNTRIES

The extent of long-term unemployment (LTU) is one of the main indicators from which the adequacy and/or success of ALMPs (and public employment services) can be judged.

Long-term unemployment which stood at 2.6% in the EU in 2008 increased significantly during the period since 2008 and reached 5.1% before declining to 4% in 2016. In all Member States and reached 5.1% before declining to 4% in 2016 (see Figure 1). Increases have been particularly strong in Greece, Spain, Croatia, Portugal, Italy, Cyprus and Ireland, contributing to a growing divergence between Member States over this period. After 6 years of subdued growth and low job demand, long-term unemployment has emerged (alongside youth unemployment) as the main employment legacy of the crisis, with significant negative social and economic consequences for individuals and society. Long-term unemployment brings considerable challenges: as unemployment duration increases, the connection to the labour market deteriorates, with a sharp decrease in the likelihood of re-employment in stable jobs, and an increase in the risk of inactivity. The longer the unemployment period, the more support is needed to help people return to the labour market. Barriers to participation tend to accumulate, often requiring the involvement of more support services.

The main factor driving the rise in long-term unemployment since the crisis has been the inability of the labour market to accommodate the inflows of workers made redundant as a result of

restructuring, either due to insufficient labour demand and/or increased mismatches between labour demand and supply.

The effects of the crisis have been exacerbated by institutional deficiencies. One such phenomenon is segmentation, in which a high proportion of people with temporary/part-time contracts (the 'flexible margin') lost their jobs, whereas those with high job security and high redundancy costs (the 'rigid core') kept theirs. Another issue is the inadequacy of ALMPs and in particular of public employment services, which in many countries have failed to properly manage the large increase in the numbers of unemployed in a situation of protracted economic slack.

Long-term unemployment affects certain groups such as young people¹⁰ and low-skilled workers¹¹ more than others, and especially hits those that work in declining occupations and sectors. As stated, the overall state of the economy remains an important factor in determining changes in the levels and flows to and from the ranks of the long-term unemployed, but there are also country-specific effects, with some Member States ensuring relatively high transition rates back to employment.

More recently, between 2014 and 2015, the LTU rate decreased in most Member States (Figure 2), with the rate further increasing in seven Member States, including some with comparatively low LTU rates (Austria, Finland, Luxembourg).

In addition to the LTU rate, one can also look at the share of long-term unemployment within total unemployment. This gives an indication of the incidence of the phenomenon. In the EU-28¹² the

¹⁰ In 2016, 5.5% or 29.5% of youth unemployment was long term unemployed.

¹¹ For low skilled there are currently no standard data but previously data from Q2 2015 showed that LTU may be as high as 9.3%.

¹² The countries covered by data in this factsheet are the EU-28, unless otherwise specified.

incidence of long-term unemployment¹³ went up from 34.7% in 2008 (fourth quarter) to 48.3% in 2015 (fourth quarter), reflecting a decline in job finding rates because of continuously low labour demand and increasing skills mismatches, which is related to economic restructuring and the gradual deterioration of skills as unemployment spells get longer. Member States perform very differently on the incidence of long-term unemployment, with rates in Q4-2015 at the lower end (below 30%) in Denmark, Finland, Sweden and the UK, and over 55% in Bulgaria, Ireland, Greece, Croatia, Italy, Portugal and Slovakia.


Participation in ALMPs can help reduce long-term unemployment by facilitating outflows from unemployment rather than by affecting inflows into unemployment, which are largely cyclical. As Figure 3 shows, countries with the lowest LTU rates

(Sweden, Austria, Luxembourg, Denmark, Finland and Germany) are among those where the level of participation in ALMPs is highest. For several other Member States, activation support does not seem proportional to the unemployment challenge that they face.

Higher unemployment rates are generally counteracted by a mix of passive and ALMPs, as shown in Figure 4. Some Member States with high unemployment spend relatively small shares of their GDP on labour market services and active measures (particularly Bulgaria, Slovakia, Cyprus, Croatia and Greece). At the same time these countries have comparatively high spending on passive measures such as unemployment benefits (particularly Ireland and Spain, and Portugal and Italy to a somewhat lesser extent).


¹³ The incidence of long-term unemployment is calculated as the number of persons that have been *unemployed for more than 12 months* divided by the *total number of unemployed*.

Figure 1 – Long-term unemployment rates in % of the active population for the EU-28, and in the individual Member States in 2008 and 2016




Source: Eurostat, LFS.

Figure 2 – Share of long-term unemployment in total unemployment in %




Source: Eurostat, LFS.

Figure 3 – Activation support (participants per 100 persons wanting to work, 2015) and long-term unemployment rates by Member State, 2016



Source: Eurostat, LMP database.

Figure 4 – Expenditure on labour market services, active and passive measures (% of GDP; left-hand side) and unemployment rates (right-hand side) by Member State, 2016



Source: Eurostat, LMP database.

Note: 'Labour market services' refer to LMP database category 1, 'active measures' to categories 2-7 and 'passive measures' to categories 8-9 (out-of-work income maintenance and support, early retirement). LMP data for Greece and the UK are for 2010, for Cyprus for 2012 and for Ireland and Spain for 2013.

3. POLICY LEVERS TO ADDRESS THE POLICY CHALLENGES

Unemployment can have several causes, such as a lack of labour demand or inadequate skills. It can also be influenced by institutional factors such as employment protection legislation and labour taxation. A separate thematic factsheet explains the issues and challenges linked to Employment Protection. Some of these causes can be dealt with using ALMPs, but they do not work for all unemployed people and under all circumstances. The design, coverage and targeting of ALMPs and the way they are implemented (i.e. by public employment services or others) matter a lot in terms of their effectiveness and efficiency. By now there is a fair amount of evidence as to what policies work best, for whom and under which circumstances. However, it is a common assumption that early intervention is crucial for preventing long term unemployment. A study by Ecorys and IZA concludes that *'there is not one particular policy that can serve as a universal tool for improving the labour market perspectives of the unemployed'*¹⁴. In fact it stresses that all ALMPs have both merits and shortcomings. In practice this means that policies will have to be tailor-made to each individual unemployed person, which calls for effective profiling techniques. This individual approach includes detecting whether someone is short-term employed or potentially long-term unemployed.

Even though many evaluation studies face methodological shortcomings¹⁵, some broad conclusions can be drawn from the existing literature, which can provide policy guidance to Member States in shaping their ALMPs (see box on page 8)^{16 17}. **Hiring incentives** for firms in the

market sector are not very effective overall (except in the case of very low labour demand), as they tend to come with relatively large deadweight losses¹⁸. Moreover, there is a risk that employers displace non-subsidised workers with subsidised workers or wait until job seekers become eligible for subsidies. So if used, such incentives should be well targeted and run on a small-scale and temporary basis. Mechanisms also need to be in place to provide incentives for employers to retain workers after the subsidy expires or combined with other ALMP measures to improve the employability of beneficiaries. The lowest effectiveness is typically found for direct employment creation in the public sector (including public works schemes).

ALMPs aimed at retaining employment, such as short-time working schemes, should be used only for short periods of time and during severe recessions. More cost-effective and desirable are ALMPs which redistribute incentives to people not currently on the labour market, so that their connection to the labour market is strengthened and their incentive to leave unemployment is supported. These ALMPs are particularly effective during recoveries.

Generally there is a delay between the implementation of ALMPs and their effect on the labour market, although this is more the case for some measures than for others. Studies based on micro data suggest that though the effects of ALMPs on job finding rates tend to be quite small in the short run, their longer term impact is generally more substantial¹⁹.

European Commission, *Employment in Europe Report*, 2006. Kluve et al. (2010; 'The Effectiveness of European Active Labour Market Programmes', *Labour Economics* 17, pp. 904-18) and Kluve et al. (2010; 'Active Labour Market Policy Evaluations: A Meta Analysis', *The Economic Journal* 120, pp. 452-77) offer broad (meta-) analyses based on a large number of studies.

¹⁷ A more extensive overview of the effectiveness of ALMPs is provided in Annex 2.

¹⁸ Subsidised jobs would have been created/maintained anyway.

¹⁹ 'Effective Active Labour Market Policies', J. Boone & J. C. van Ours, IZA DP No 1335, 2004.

¹⁴ Ecorys/IZA, 'Analysis of Costs and Benefits of Active Compared to Passive Measures', 2012.

¹⁵ Methodological problems are mostly related to the counterfactual being missing, which then needs to be construed by the data, e.g. using matching techniques. Random experiments do not face this problem but they are still rare.

¹⁶ A quite comprehensive evaluation of the effectiveness of ALMPs can be found in

Active labour market policies: tools and target groups

The success of ALMPs depends not only on expenditure levels but most importantly on the design of the measures and the way they are implemented.

- **Counselling and job-search assistance:** these measures are mostly useful for short-term unemployed, but they may still play a valuable role beyond this if they form part of an individualised or 'tailor-made' approach to support for the unemployed. The individualisation of support includes advice combined with a range of potential types of support, including vocational training, job-search assistance, 'motivation' courses and social support, according to the assessed needs of the jobseeker.
- **Subsidies to employers:** such programmes are relatively costly and are typically targeted at the most disadvantaged groups, for whom other measures have proved ineffective. Such measures can play an important role in positively influencing the attitudes of employers towards the long-term unemployed, by bringing the two groups in contact with each other and by providing an opportunity for employers to 'test' prospective employees at lower than full-wage costs.
- **Direct employment/job-creation schemes:** These schemes are typically targeted at the medium- and longer term unemployed to avoid perverse employment effects on the short-term unemployed, for example where participants who might otherwise have found 'real' jobs are kept off the labour market while they are participating in the scheme. These schemes are also typically more stable and long-lasting to ensure their efficiency and cost effectiveness.
- **Training** is usually found to have the strongest positive long-term effects, but it is expensive. On-the-job training, general programmes and vocational training are all suitable but for different purposes. Studies show that general programmes contribute to a better matching of skills, particularly after the first entry into the labour market, while (certified) vocational training programmes (workplace-based or combined with school-based training) have been shown to be very effective in facilitating the transition from education to work.

To reduce the risk of long-term unemployment it is important to adapt the mix of activation measures and their institutional setting to economic circumstances. The challenge is to ensure that spending on activation measures remains effective even in an economic climate where the creation of jobs is difficult. In a constrained labour market one needs to consider the precise balance between 'train first' versus 'work first' approaches.

Public employment services have a crucial role to play in re-integrating the unemployed. This is because they are best suited to addressing diverse groups of the unemployed²⁰. For a public employment service to function well it needs:

- a sufficient number of staff, who are properly trained in aspects that improve the quality of the service, such as discrimination, decent jobs, and dealing with sensitive cases;

- integrated services that liaise effectively with other state services, especially those related to education, health, housing and other social services);
- a well-built evaluation and follow-up system²¹.

Indeed, monitoring and evaluation are essential for assessing and increasing effectiveness. ALMPs are generally not monitored and assessed as a rule. Developing an evaluation culture is important, and there are different factors which can contribute to this. These include political commitment to evidence-based policy-making (and accountability), legal requirements for evaluation, evaluation requirements of European funding and training and education of evaluators to ensure evaluation throughout the policy cycle.

²⁰ See Thematic factsheet on public employment services.

²¹ EAPN: Fighting for a Social Europe Free of Poverty: <http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=10834>.

Showcasing an ALMP tool: employment incentives for job creation and support

Employment incentives are typically targeted, temporary and conditional payments or reductions of tax/social security contributions that make labour cheaper for employers, and in turn increase labour demand. Across the EU, one sixth of ALMP spending went to employment incentives, preceded in importance by expenditure on training and labour market services.

In a setting of low labour demand, employment incentives can be an attractive instrument for supporting employment while also improving the employability of specific vulnerable groups. For this reason, and given the limited fiscal space in many Member States, the Council Recommendation for the Youth Guarantee (2013) called for targeted and well-designed wage and recruitment subsidies, while the Council Recommendation for long-term unemployed (2016) recommended focusing financial incentives on schemes supporting integration into the labour market, such as recruitment subsidies and the reduction of social insurance contributions.

However, if not well designed, employment incentives may result in wasteful spending of public money, particularly if the subsidised jobs would have been created/maintained anyway (what is called 'deadweight loss'), or if the subsidies simply induce employers to hire/keep certain workers instead of others (known as 'displacement effects'). They may also reduce productivity if they create incentives for companies to substitute more productive workers with less productive ones. If jobs are created only for the duration of the subsidy, this still improves the employability of the involved workers, but the net social benefit is much more limited, or even negative.

Design features that help to maximise the benefits of employment incentives include:

- **targeting unemployed people who have limited chances for employment** (e.g. the long-term unemployed, to minimise the risk of deadweight loss), but also groups with a considerable potential increase in productivity (e.g. young people without work experience who have been unable to find a job within a certain time);
- **ensuring that the subsidised period increases the productivity** of the worker, e.g. through an effective training component and coaching;
- **introducing conditions to increase the probability that the employment relationship will be extended beyond the subsidised period** (e.g. checks that the beneficiary is still employed by the firm at a certain point in time after the end of the subsidy, and/or that gross or net job creation is taking place in the firm);
- **regular monitoring and assessment** of subsidised firms and their hiring behaviour, and of beneficiary workers.

Related literature:

Brown, A. (2015), 'Can hiring subsidies benefit the unemployed?' IZA World of Labor 2015; European Commission (2014). 'Stimulating job demand: the design of effective hiring subsidies in Europe,' European Employment Policy Observatory; HoPES (2013), 'HoPES Note on Criteria for sustainable wage subsidies.' A response from the European Network of Heads of Public Employment Services to calls for action agreed at the Berlin Conference on Youth Employment on 3 July 2013.

Against the background of fiscal consolidation measures, fiscal room for manoeuvre is limited and public expenditures across the board are under pressure. Therefore, particular attention should be given to prioritising growth-friendly expenditure. This includes strengthening, when needed, the coverage of public employment services and ALMPs, but also strengthening their effectiveness, particularly through appropriate targeting and individualisation of support.

4. CROSS-EXAMINATION OF POLICY STATE OF PLAY

EU practice shows that ALMPs are becoming increasingly diverse in nature, following a more tailored approach to individual needs. There is also a stronger focus on enforcing work availability and mutual obligation requirements. This means that benefit recipients are expected to engage in monitored job-search activities and improve their employability 'in exchange' for receiving benefits. In recent years, Member States have placed increased priority on achieving effective coordination of ALMPs with the administration of benefits and 'make-work-pay' policies, so as to implement consistent activation strategies.

Tailoring support to individual needs frequently requires better coordination of services across organisations. In response to this need, Member States agreed in the Council Recommendation to establish a single point of contact for the long-term unemployed. Data exchange and interoperability platforms are crucial for effective delivery of services. Some countries are well advanced in putting in place a single point of contact, while others are just taking the first steps towards coordinating service provision across organisations.

Delivery of ALMPs continues to be challenging in some Member States. There is scope for public employment services to: (i) enhance their effectiveness and efficiency to ensure jobseekers find jobs more easily; and (ii) to do so at the lowest possible cost. In several Member States, public employment services could still

provide more individualised and better targeted services. These issues have been addressed (albeit to different degrees) in country-specific recommendations to several Member States over the past few years as part of the 'European Semester' economic monitoring process.

A number of countries are for example making support to the long-term unemployed more individualised, in line with the Council Recommendation, which called for job integration agreements tailoring support to individual needs with clear rights and obligations for both the unemployed and the support bodies. Other countries have outsourced employment services for the long-term unemployed, while another group of countries have increased training for the long-term unemployed.

In Bulgaria measures were taken to improve the targeting of ALMPs and better integrate the employment and social services for disadvantaged groups. The measure encourages the hiring of the long-term unemployed under Article 55(c) of the Employment Promotion Act) and under the state budget-financed programme for training and employment of the long-term unemployed. Up to 2 900 long-term unemployed people will be targeted, with a total of EUR 4.6 million being put into the initiative.

In Denmark a job premium scheme has been launched to increase the incentives for long-term unemployed people to take on work. Long-term unemployed people who enter employment may receive a tax-free job premium amounting to 10% of the earned income, up to a maximum of DKK 2 500 (EUR 336) per month. This premium may be granted for up to 18 months, giving a maximum total job premium of DKK 45 000 (EUR 6 053) per person. This is a temporary policy initiative due to run for 2 years (from 1 April 2017 to 1 April 2019).

In Estonia the 2017-2020 labour market programme includes provision for the Unemployment Insurance Fund to offer active measures to prevent unemployment. These involve measures to

support participation in formal training, training vouchers and compensation of training expenses for employers. The measures will be targeted at those people still in the labour market. The main target groups will be people with no professional qualifications, people with outdated education and skills, poor Estonian language skills, those in the 50+ age group or people in need of a new job for health reasons.

In France a plan for financing additional training courses for 500 000 job seekers has been established and has so far led to close to 1.1 million training actions in sectors with positive labour and economic prospects. Some 28% of the training was targeted at low-qualified people, 29% at young people, and 20% at long-term jobseekers. The plan is implemented by regional councils, which represent the level of local government in France responsible for vocational education and training through state-region conventions. Under the conventions, the regions decide

on the training to be proposed and public employment services offer the training to jobseekers. The plan has been extended to the first half of 2017.

Finally, Portugal has launched a measure that will help unemployed people obtain permanent contracts, focusing on vulnerable groups such as young people, the long-term unemployed and older workers. With this new measure, support for obtaining fixed-term contracts will be granted only **in exceptional cases** (e.g. to very vulnerable groups such as refugees and former convicts). The scheme also supports the conversion of fixed-term contracts into permanent contracts. The target set in Portugal's national reform programme for 2017 is the creation of 15 000 jobs. More than 10 000 jobs have already been supported under this measure.

Date: 11.11.2017

ANNEX: STATISTICAL INDICATORS

Table 1 – Long-term unemployment rates for the EU, the euro area and in the individual Member States in 2014 and 2015 by gender

Gender: Time:	Women		Men	
	2015	2016	2015	2016
EU-28	4.5	4.0	4.5	3.9
EA-19	5.6	5.1	5.5	4.8
BE	3.9	3.8	4.8	4.2
BG	5.0	4.1	6.1	4.8
CZ	2.9	2.0	2.0	1.4
DK	1.7	1.4	1.6	1.3
DE	1.7	1.4	2.3	1.9
EE	2.2	1.8	2.5	2.4
IE	3.6	2.9	6.7	5.4
EL	21.2	20.5	15.8	14.1
ES	12.4	10.8	10.5	8.4
FR	3.9	4.0	4.6	4.6
HR	10.5	6.5	10.1	6.8
IT	7.4	7.4	6.6	6.2
CY	6.2	5.2	7.5	6.3
LV	3.6	3.1	5.4	4.9
LT	3.4	2.6	4.4	3.4
LU	1.9	2.1	1.9	2.2
HU	3.1	2.4	3.1	2.3
MT	1.3	1.8	3.0	2.0
NL	2.9	2.7	3.0	2.4
AT	1.4	1.7	1.9	2.2
PL	3.0	2.1	2.9	2.2
PT	7.2	6.0	7.3	6.4
RO	2.6	2.5	3.3	3.3
SI	5.4	4.5	4.1	4.1
SK	8.3	6.3	6.9	5.5
FI	1.8	2.0	2.7	2.5
SE	1.2	1.1	1.7	1.4
UK	1.3	1.1	1.9	1.5

Source: Eurostat.

Table 2 – Long-term unemployment (12 months or more) as a percentage of total unemployment, by gender (%)

Gender: Time:	Women		Men	
	2015	2016	2015	2016
EU-28	47.6	46.2	48.6	46.7
EA-19	51.0	49.8	51.3	49.6
BE	50.6	50.8	52.5	52.2
BG	59.6	58.9	62.4	59.2
CZ	46.8	42.6	47.8	41.5
DK	26.2	21.6	27.5	23.0
DE	41.3	38.2	45.3	42.6
EE	35.7	30.1	40.8	32.8
IE	46.6	43.7	61.7	58.8
EL	72.7	71.1	73.1	72.0
ES	50.4	46.1	51.6	48.4
FR	43.6	46.1	42.6	44.2
HR	61.3	47.2	64.8	54.0
IT	58.0	57.7	58.1	57.1
CY	41.8	38.2	49.2	50.1
LV	41.2	37.0	48.5	44.9
LT	42.1	39.1	43.6	37.7
LU	25.8	32.1	31.0	37.3
HU	44.0	47.3	47.1	45.8
MT	37.2	35.2	54.4	45.3
NL	40.2	40.7	45.6	42.3
AT	25.9	29.7	31.8	34.3
PL	38.8	34.0	39.6	35.8
PT	56.1	53.4	58.8	57.3
RO	44.1	49.8	43.8	50.1
SI	53.8	52.5	50.7	54.1
SK	64.7	58.4	66.9	62.3
FI	20.3	22.9	27.8	28.2
SE	17.0	16.9	21.9	19.5
UK	26.3	23.3	34.3	30.3

Source: Eurostat.