



# EUROPEAN SEMESTER THEMATIC FACTSHEET

## LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN

### 1. INTRODUCTION

In all EU countries, female labour participation is lower than men's. These differences are to some extent due to deep-rooted traditional gender roles, but also due to economic incentives. Moreover, even when women do participate in the labour market, they tend to work fewer hours, work in lower-paying sectors, and occupy lower-ranking positions than men, resulting in considerable gender pay and earnings gaps.

This factsheet will focus on increasing female labour participation as a first policy objective and decreasing pay and earnings gaps as a second policy objective.

Increasing labour-force participation and raising the employment rate of women is paramount to meeting the Europe 2020 headline target (75% of the population aged 20-64 employed by 2020).

It can provide a boost to economic growth<sup>1</sup>, but also mitigate the social and financial risks of population ageing, which will put downward pressure on labour supply, with negative implications for material living standards and public finances. Improving the labour market situation of women requires continuous efforts to tackle gender gaps (in particular in terms of economic activity, pay, career prospects, and therefore

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<sup>1</sup> GDP per capita losses attributable to gender gaps in the labour market have been estimated at up to 10 percent in Europe (Cuberes and Teignier-Baqué, 2016).

pensions) and moving from a model with one male earner and one female carer to a dual model where both men and woman can be earners and carers.

The EU has been promoting greater gender equality in the labour market through a mix of legislation, policy guidance and financial support.

Several Directives exist<sup>2</sup> setting out minimum requirements to ensure equality between women and men, including minimum standards for leaves and flexible working arrangements, which can facilitate women's labour force participation.

The Commission has also issued a Recommendation in 2014 on strengthening the principle of equal pay between men and women through transparency.

Moreover, the Commission is currently preparing a 'New Start' initiative aiming to address the low participation of women in the labour market through adapting the current EU legal and policy framework to allow parents or those with dependent relatives to better balance caring and professional responsibilities and encourage a more equal use of work-life balance measures between women and men<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>2</sup> Notably the Gender Recast Directive (2006/54), Directive on Equal Treatment for Self-Employed (2010/41), Maternity Leave Directive (92/85), Parental Leave Directive (2010/18), and Directive on Part-Time Work (Directive 97/8).

<sup>3</sup> See Annex 1 of the Commission Work Programme 2017.

This factsheet is structured as follows.

Section 2 reviews the performance in EU countries with regard to female labour participation and the gender pay and earnings gaps.

Section 3 discusses the available evidence on potential policies to effectively address the challenges of low female participation and their specific conditions, and reviews the approach on this taken at the EU level.

Section 4 sketches good policy practice to increase female labour participation and reduce gender inequalities among EU countries.


**2. POLICY CHALLENGES: AN OVERVIEW OF PERFORMANCE IN EU COUNTRIES**

**2.1. A significant employment gap between women and men**

**2.1.1. Women experience lower employment rates and higher levels of part-time employment**


In 2015, the EU employment rate for men (aged 20-64) was 75.9% while it reached only 64.3% for women (Figure 1 and Table 1 in Annex). In all Member States, **employment rates of women are lower than those for men, with big variations across the EU**. This is despite the fact that women are increasingly well qualified and even out-performing men in terms of educational attainment. In 2015, 43.4% of women (aged 30-34) had tertiary education or higher compared to 34% of men.

**Figure 1 – Employment rate of the population aged 20-64 and percentage of part-time workers by gender (F/M) in 2015**



Source: Eurostat, LFS. Note: Share of part-time workers over the total working population in each gender group. Countries ordered by increasing values of female employment rate.

**Figure 2 – Gaps between male and female full-time equivalent employment rates (FTEER) and employment rate (ER) in 2015**



Source: Eurostat, LFS (lfsi\_emp\_a) and European Commission, own calculations. Note: data refer to women and men aged 20-64. Note that full time equivalents calculated with regard to the working time of a full-time full-year employee.

**A female employment rate of 60 % or below, with high differences between female and male employment rates is found in Greece, Italy, Malta, Croatia, Spain, Romania, Slovakia and Poland.**

Greater involvement of women in the workforce is particularly challenging for these Member States (see Figure 2, Figure 3 and Table 1 in Annex). Most of these Member States face severe demographic ageing<sup>4</sup>, and a great potential for increasing labour supply lies with bringing more women into the workforce. Malta, Italy, Greece, Romania, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, Ireland and Luxembourg also suffer from a large **gap between male and female employment rates**, with Malta having the largest (around 28 percentage points, and even 32.8 percentage points if considering full-time equivalent rates). In addition, the employment rate is also

strikingly low for older women (age 55-64) in some cases. As shown in Figure 7 in Annex, it is below 35% in Malta, Greece, Slovenia, Croatia, Romania and Luxembourg.

In addition to lower overall employment rates for women, there are also large differences in terms of employment in full-time equivalents, due to the generally **high share of part-time employment among women** (see Figure 2 and Table 1 in Annex). This is a typical observation in the Netherlands, where more than 75% of employed women work part-time in 2015, but the rate is also high in Germany, Austria, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Belgium and Luxembourg (see Figure 1). On average across the EU, men spend 7 hours a week more in paid work than women. While working part-time can reflect preferences, the high share of part-time employment may also stem from constraints such as the shortage or affordability of care services (notably childcare) and unequal division of unpaid work, or low financial incentives to take up full-time work. In general, working part-time is associated with lower hourly pay and earnings.

<sup>4</sup> According to the population projection, the population of working-age would shrink in a majority of Member States, and especially so in Lithuania, Latvia, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Greece, Portugal, Poland, Estonia, Romania, Germany, Croatia and Hungary, see European Commission (2015), Ageing report, [http://ec.europa.eu/economy\\_finance/publications/european\\_economy/2015/pdf/ee3\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2015/pdf/ee3_en.pdf)

### 2.1.2. Understanding the low participation of women in the labour market: the impact of caring responsibilities and financial disincentives


For specific groups of women the employment gap is even larger, in particular for mothers, migrant women and older women. For a number of countries the **impact of parenthood is high** and the employment rate of women with children under the age of 6 is more than 20 percentage points lower than the employment rate of childless women: Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia and Finland (see Figure 3). It is close to 20 percentage points in Germany and the United Kingdom.

**Childcare services** have been shown to strongly influence the participation of women in the labour market, but in many Member States, the **share of children under three years of age enrolled in formal care is low**. In particular, in Romania, Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia less than 10% of children under three years of age are enrolled in formal care (see Figure 4). Low attendance rates may reflect possible shortfalls in the provision of formal childcare services,

especially for children up to three years of age. **In addition to lack of available places**, difficulties in **access** (distance, opening hours, strict eligibility criteria), the **high out-of-pocket cost** of these services, and poor **quality** have all been shown to present obstacles to the use of these services.

Similarly, the low employment rate of older women (age 54-64) may reflect the unavailability of care facilities for (grand-) children or dependent parents (Figure 3 and Figure 8, Figure 9 and Figure 10 in Annex). Women are more likely than men to assume care responsibilities for elderly or dependent family members with long-term care needs and are thus far more likely to reduce their working hours or exit employment altogether. More than 40% of the potential female workforce in 2015 is inactive because of personal and family responsibilities in Ireland, Cyprus, Spain, Malta, and the United Kingdom (see Figure 8 in Annex). For the older age cohorts, this lack of care services can be coupled with early retirement options and difficulties in finding a job after being unemployed for a long period (Figure 11 in Annex).


Figure 3 – Employment impact of parenthood in 2014




Source: Eurostat, LFS (lfsi\_emp\_a) and European Commission, own calculations. Note: data refer to women and men aged 20-64. Note that full time equivalents calculated with regard to the working time of a full-time full-year employee.

**Figure 4 – Share of children cared for by formal arrangements in per cent of the total number of children in the respective age group, 2014**

Children up to three years of age



Children from three years of age to mandatory school age



Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC.

In addition to caring responsibilities, women can face **strong financial disincentives** when entering the labour market or wanting to work more. As a result of disincentives in some tax-benefit systems, cash transfers and tax-related support may weaken women’s (as second carers) financial incentives to work, and thus their labour force participation. The contribution of labour taxation to the

inactivity trap<sup>5</sup> is highest in Belgium, Germany, Denmark and Latvia, and, to a somewhat lesser extent, in France. The

<sup>5</sup> The inactivity trap is the implicit tax on returning to work for inactive persons and measures the part of additional gross wage that is taxed away in the case where an inactive person takes up a job.

low-wage trap<sup>6</sup> is highest in Belgium, Germany and Austria (see Table 2 in Annex).

**High childcare costs** can be a further disincentive to start or return to work for a second earner in a dual earning couple. This is particularly the case in the United Kingdom and Ireland where the childcare-related costs represent more than 23% of net family income (see Figure 12, Figure 13 and Figure 14 in Annex). The situation is even worse for low-income families<sup>7</sup>.

Finally, high gender pay gaps between women and men only further deteriorate women's financial incentive to work.


**2.2. A high gender pay gap**

**2.2.1. Women earn less than men through-out their lifetime**

**The gender pay gap remains high in Europe (16.1% in 2014 in the EU)** and is particularly high in Estonia, Austria, Czech Republic, Germany and Slovakia (see Figure 5 and Table 3 in Annex)<sup>8</sup>.

Moreover, in 2010 the gender overall earnings gap was 41.1% in the EU with strong variations from 12.3% in Lithuania to 56.3% in Malta<sup>9</sup>.

**Figure 5 – Gender pay gap in 2008 and 2014**



Source: Eurostat; unadjusted; Industry, construction and services (except public administration, defence, compulsory social security). Note that the figures show the difference between men's and women's average gross hourly earnings as percentage of men's average gross hourly earnings - for paid employees, unadjusted for personal or job characteristics.

<sup>6</sup> The low-wage trap is the rate at which taxes are increased and benefits withdrawn as earnings rise due to an increase in work productivity. The tax burden on second-earners is considered very high if: (1) the contribution from labour taxation to the inactivity trap is very high AND/OR (2) the low-wage trap is very high.


<sup>7</sup> European Commission (2012), EU Employment and Social Situation, Quarterly Report, September 2012.

<sup>8</sup> This is the 'unadjusted gender pay gap', as it does not take into account all of the factors that impact the gender pay gap, such as differences in education, labour market experience, hours worked, type of job, etc

<sup>9</sup> Eurostat, Gender overall earnings gap, 2010 (%) in Eurostat, teqges01.

High gender pay and earnings gaps contribute later on to **high pension gaps for women** in several Member States due to lower pension contributions (see Figure 6) especially in Cyprus, Germany, the Netherlands and Austria (Figure 6), thereby contributing to women's higher risk of poverty or social exclusion in old age<sup>10</sup>.

**Figure 6 – Gender gap in pensions, pensioners aged 65-79**



Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC, 2014 data, except IE (2013)

### 2.2.2. Determining the direct and indirect factors of gender pay gap

There are various potential reasons behind the gender pay gap which differ in size and impact<sup>11</sup>. These include observable factors, such as differences in work experience due to the low employment level of women described above. They also include the type of job or the sector of employment (vertical and horizontal segregation). For the EU as a whole segregation is relatively high, reaching 25.3% for occupational segregation and

<sup>10</sup> Further analysis of the drivers of the pension gap can be found in the European Semester thematic factsheet on pensions.

<sup>11</sup> Boll, C., Leppin, J., Rossen, A., Wolf, A. (2016), "Magnitude and impact factors of the gender pay gap in EU countries", Report prepared for the European Commission [http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/gender\\_pay\\_gap/2016\\_factors\\_pg\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/gender_pay_gap/2016_factors_pg_en.pdf)

18.3% for sectoral segregation. Other factors such as discrimination may also widen the gender pay gap. Moreover, the high prevalence of part-time work among female workers also contributes to the gap, as part-time-work is associated with significant lower hourly wages in most countries.

## 3. POLICY LEVERS TO ADDRESS THE IDENTIFIED POLICY CHALLENGES

### 3.1. Policy levers to address the female employment challenge

A number of policy levers could be activated to address the challenges of low participation of women in the labour market, as listed below.

#### 3.1.1. Enhancing the provision of work-life balance policies

In many Member States, the persisting deficiencies of work-life balance policies are exacerbating the female employment challenge, while in other Member States, well-designed policies are serving to remove barriers to women's participation in the labour market. Such policies include care-related leaves for children and other dependents, flexible working arrangements, and formal care services. Their effects on the division of caring responsibilities between women and men, and on female employment are summarised below.

The **provision of paid maternity/parental leave** tends to boost female labour force participation, by helping women to reconcile work and family life, by allowing them some time off with a young child to care for and/or breastfeed, and by strengthening their attachment to the labour market through a job guarantee. Evidence also shows that effective protections against dismissal for pregnant workers or workers returning from leave can be important for retention in the labour market. That being said,



excessively long leaves have been shown to create scarring effects on women's careers, and make it more difficult for them to re-enter employment after very long leaves of absence. The duration of what constitutes excessively long leave is subject to some academic debate. Some academic research<sup>12</sup> has found that the positive effects of parental leave tend to diminish after 20 weeks. Other academics<sup>13</sup> have found that there is a fairly strong case for parental leave for approximately six months, after which leave may begin to have an adverse effect on women's return to the labour market, a negative impact on wages, and on career prospects<sup>14</sup>. The OECD has cautioned against leaves longer than two years because of skill deterioration and large gaps in women's CVs which make it more difficult for them to re-enter employment<sup>15</sup>.

Moreover, a **balanced use of leave entitlements between women and men** after childbirth has also been shown to have positive effects in terms of distribution of household and care responsibilities and improved female labour market outcomes. The use of leave arrangements by fathers reduces some of the burden of care on mothers, and thus allows for a faster return of women to the labour market. That being said, fathers' take-up of paternity and parental leave is generally very low and, when fathers take leave, periods of leave are usually very short. The generosity of the benefit and the degree of flexibility (i.e., whether or not a leave can be taken on a piecemeal or part-time basis) can help to improve the likelihood that fathers will take the leave. Moreover, making parental leave entitlements non-transferable between parents and providing 'bonuses'

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<sup>12</sup> Jaumotte (2003) Female labour force participation: Past trends and main determinants in OECD countries.

<sup>13</sup> Akgündüz and Plantenga (2013) Labour market effects of parental leave in Europe; Mandel and Semyonov (2005) Family Policies, Wage Structures, and Gender Gaps: Sources of Earnings Inequality in 20 Countries.

<sup>14</sup> Plantenga (2015) Searching for welfare, work and gender equality.

<sup>15</sup> OECD (2012) *Closing the gender gap*.

incentivising the use of leave by both parents can increase the likelihood of fathers using leave.

**Childcare and long-term care** are important tools to remove obstacles to the participation of parents, especially women, in employment, as well as in entrepreneurship. However the availability and affordability of these services have been shown to influence the use of these services, with negative impacts on women's employment prospects<sup>16</sup>. 53% of mothers who declare that they do not work or that they work part-time for reasons linked to formal childcare services consider the costs to be an obstacle, and this figure is higher than 70% in some Member States<sup>17</sup>. Moreover, the accessibility of these services (physical distance), perceived low quality of these services, and the lack of opening hours that are compatible with parental employment have all been shown to present obstacles to female employment<sup>18</sup>. For older children, school hours are often incompatible with parents' full-time employment: a lack of care services for out-of-school hours<sup>19</sup> may also lead to women dropping out of the labour market or working fewer hours.

The availability of **flexible working arrangements** - such as telework and flexitime - and of **reduced working hours** (part-time work), also influence female employment. Insufficient availability of flexible working arrangements and/or of possibilities to reduce working hours can lead to people with caring responsibilities, particularly women, to drop out of the

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<sup>16</sup> The incidence of providing informal care to elderly relatives is highest among the 50 to 64-year-olds. Working women are up to 1.6 times more likely to be informal carers than working men.

<sup>17</sup> European Commission (2016) The efficiency and effectiveness of social protection systems over the life course, chapter 3.2. in Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2015.

<sup>18</sup> These services provide a range of activities to children in pre-schools and primary schools before, between (lunch) and after school hours, as well as during school holidays.

<sup>19</sup> See for instance the 2012 Eurofound Quality of Life Survey.



labour market altogether. Eurofound has reported that more than half of the inactive mothers would prefer to work part-time<sup>20</sup>. Such insufficient availability of flexible working arrangements or of possibilities to reduce working hours can also lead to women changing their job to one that is perceived as offering more flexibility or reduced working hours, which is often below their skill level or for less pay. This consequently can lead to or foster gender wage gaps. The main drivers of effective flexible working arrangements are the presence of underlying consensus amongst the social partners or employers that flexibility is valuable, a workplace culture supportive of flexible working, and responsiveness to changing needs over the life course. The design of flexible working arrangements is also central. Ensuring the quality of flexible work and a gender balanced take up of these arrangements is key to ensure work-life balance for all and equal economic independence of men and women, avoiding reinforcing gender inequalities in the labour market.

### **3.1.2. Adjusting tax-benefit systems to reduce financial disincentives for second earners**

Women's labour force participation is responsive **to fiscal (dis)incentives**. The effect of fiscal policies can affect both the decision to participate in the labour market (extensive margin) and number of hours worked (intensive margin). In the EU, there are particular disincentives to work for second earners. Empirical evidence of the negative impact of the design of the tax benefit system is provided by Thévenon (2013). Based on a sample of 18 OECD countries in the period 1980-2007, he finds a significant negative impact of an increase in the relative tax rate for second earners on female labour force participation. These results are confirmed by Christiansen et al. (2016) based a sample including various European countries in the period 2002-2012.

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<sup>20</sup> These services provide a range of activities to children in pre-schools and primary schools before, between (lunch) and after school hours, as well as during school holidays.

The most important features of the tax-benefit system affecting the work incentives for second earners are the **degree of jointness of taxation and eligibility for benefits, transferable tax credits and dependent spouse allowances**. In most of the EU countries, the unit of taxation is the individual. However, in some countries couples are taxed jointly (e.g. Germany, France, Ireland, Luxembourg and Portugal) or couples may opt for joint taxation (e.g. Spain). This may create fiscal disincentives to work, in particular in countries with high progressivity of taxation. Shifting from joint taxation systems to individual taxation systems can help reduce adverse work disincentives. Eliminating transferable tax credits between partners can also help to reduce work disincentives for the lower earner, as well as eliminating dependent spouse allowances, which can incentive women to fully withdraw from the labour market. Finally, high out-of-pocket costs for childcare and long-term care services coupled with high marginal effective tax-rates for a second earner in a household can magnify the financial disincentives for women with caring responsibilities to enter work, and therefore improving the affordability of these services can help to reduce such disincentive effects.

### **3.2. Policy levers to address the gender pay and earnings gaps**

Part-time work and career breaks for care responsibilities have a negative impact on women's hourly wages and on their career prospects. Supporting a narrowing of gender gaps in hours worked and in work experience is therefore crucial to tackle the gender pay gap. A supportive policy mix will include ensuring access to affordable and quality childcare, flexible working time arrangements, and incentives for a more equal division of unpaid work within a couple. On the contrary, long maternity/parental leaves are associated with higher gender pay gap<sup>21</sup>.

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<sup>21</sup> OECD (2012), Close the gender gap: act now.

Gender segregation, or the tendency for men and women to take on different jobs, is pervasive across Europe. Nearly 60% of EU university graduates are women, but they account for less than 33% of scientists and engineers across Europe, yet represent nearly 80% of the total workforce in the health, education and welfare sectors. Policies ensuring the attractiveness of these sectors in terms of pay, working conditions or skills recognition can also reduce the gender pay gap. Moreover, initiatives aiming at tackling gender segregation in education, training and in the labour market (examples include girls days/boys days in companies; wider initiatives attracting women into ICT and science, or general awareness-raising measures such as equal pay days) can help women to access higher-wage professions and sectors. Raising awareness among men about some of the top growth occupations that are female dominated can also help (see European Vacancy Monitor showing that primary school and early childhood teachers and personal care workers in health services are among the top growth occupations).

Strengthening public awareness of anti-discrimination laws, promoting pay transparency and improving enforcement of equal pay provisions might also reduce wage inequalities<sup>22</sup>.

#### 4. CROSS EXAMINATION OF POLICY STATE OF PLAY

Many Member States have been undertaking reforms to enhance work-life balance policies and increase the labour force participation of women.

In order to enhance the provision of childcare, most Member States have committed to **providing a childcare place for all children**, either by establishing a legal entitlement to these services or by making attendance compulsory for at least the last pre-primary year (three countries, namely Italy, Lithuania and Slovakia, have not yet

introduced either of these measures). Nevertheless, a significant 'childcare gap'<sup>23</sup> exists for many Member States between the end (maximum duration) of adequately paid leave (maternity or parental) and the start of childcare entitlement or compulsory school age. Currently six Member States (Germany, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Estonia, Slovenia) do not have a gap, although in some cases, despite the introduction of legislation to address this, availability can still be an issue (this is the case for Estonia for children under 3 years of age). In many Member States, reforms are currently ongoing to significantly expand the provision of childcare. For instance, in April 2014, Malta introduced a free childcare scheme for children under the age of three to incentivise more parents, particularly mothers, to return or to remain in work. In a national context of low female employment rates, the free childcare scheme is specifically targeted at parents who are employed and paying social security contributions, including single parents. Another member state, Austria, has announced investments totalling EUR 800 million by the year 2018/2019 for increasing the number and availability of places in all-day schools, as well as for improving the quality of their services<sup>24</sup>.

Some Member States have launched reforms to encourage a **more equal sharing of parental leave entitlements**. In Germany, a reform of parents' benefit (Elterngeld-Plus) adopted in 2014 has introduced a bonus for partners: if parents share childcare equally and work between 25 and 30 hours a

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<sup>22</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/gender\\_pay\\_gap/c\\_2014\\_1405\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/gender_pay_gap/c_2014_1405_en.pdf)

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<sup>23</sup> Note that these gaps can be identified in the legislation. However in practice, it may be that there are not significant problems with childcare availability during these 'gap months', even if availability is not guaranteed by law. It is therefore important to analyse the childcare gap together with data on childcare use.

<sup>24</sup> Childcare policies, particularly high quality early education, have a greater positive impact on children from disadvantaged backgrounds such as migrants or low income households, and can in particular improve the school readiness of disadvantaged children. - Cascio (2015), Dustmann et al. (2012).

week for at least four months, they will receive the parents' benefit for an additional four months. In addition, the reform involves new flexible forms of parental leave. The United Kingdom has introduced shared parental leave, allowing parents to share a large portion of paid leave following the birth or adoption of a child, previously only available to women.


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
## ANNEX

**Figure 7 – Employment rate by sex, 55-64 years old, 2015 (% of women and men aged 55-64)**




Source: Eurostat, LFS (lfsi\_emp\_a)

**Figure 8 – Inactivity due to looking after children or incapacitated adults or other family and personal responsibilities, 2008-2015 (women 20-64)**




Source: Eurostat, LFS, (lfsa\_igar)

**Figure 9 – Percentage of inactive women age 25-49 and 55-64 who are inactive on the grounds of looking after children or incapacitated adults in 2015**




Source: Eurostat, LFS, (lfsa\_igar)

**Figure 10 – Percentage of women working part-time aged 20-64 years old who works part-time on the grounds of looking after children or incapacitated adults in 2014**




Source: Eurostat, LFS, (lfsa\_igar)

**Figure 11 – Long-term unemployment (12 months or more) as a percentage of the total unemployment in 2015 for the age group 55-64**



Source: Eurostat, LFS; no data for Luxembourg, Romania, Austria and Malta available.


**Figure 12 – Components of net childcare costs for a couple family: full-time care at a typical childcare centre, 2012**



Source: OECD Tax-Benefit Models. (Full-time earnings = 100+100% of average earnings (AW))




**Figure 13 – Components of net childcare costs for a couple family: full-time care at a typical childcare centre, 2012**



Source: OECD Tax-Benefit Models. Note: full-time earnings = 100+67% of average earnings (AW)

**Figure 14 – Components of net childcare costs, for a lone parent: full-time care at a typical childcare centre, 2012**



Source: OECD Tax-Benefit Models. Note: full-time earnings = 100% of average earnings (AW).

**Table 1 – Employment rate, employment rate in full-time equivalent and average number of usual weekly hours of men and women, 2015**

	Employment rate (20 - 64 years old)		Full time equivalent employment rate (20-64 years old)		Average number of usual weekly hours for all employees in the main job	
	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men
<b>BE</b>	63.0	71.3	53.4	69.2	32.0	38.2
<b>BG</b>	63.8	70.4	63.5	69.8	40.3	40.9
<b>CZ</b>	66.4	83.0	64.3	83.5	38.3	40.7
<b>DK</b>	72.7	80.2	63.6	75.9	30.6	34.3
<b>DE</b>	73.6	82.3	57.1	78.7	30.1	38.3
<b>EE</b>	72.7	80.5	69.5	79.4	37.4	40.0
<b>IE</b>	62.6	75.1	53.4	71.6	31.4	37.9
<b>EL</b>	46.0	64.0	43.2	62.2	37.1	40.3
<b>ES</b>	56.4	67.6	49.7	65.7	33.8	39.0
<b>FR</b>	66.0	73.2	58.7	70.8	33.7	38.4
<b>HR</b>	55.8	65.2	54.1	64.3	39.2	40.4
<b>IT</b>	50.6	70.6	43.7	68.3	31.9	38.5
<b>CY</b>	64.1	72.2	59.0	68.4	38.4	41.5
<b>LV</b>	70.6	74.6	69.0	74.5	38.3	40.1
<b>LT</b>	72.2	74.6	70.5	74.0	37.7	39.1
<b>LU</b>	65.0	76.7	57.9	75.7	33.9	39.9
<b>HU</b>	62.2	75.8	60.3	74.8	38.9	40.3
<b>MT</b>	53.6	81.4	48.1	80.8	34.4	39.9
<b>NL</b>	70.8	81.9	48.2	75.3	24.1	33.5
<b>AT</b>	70.2	78.4	55.1	75.5	31.5	39.7
<b>PL</b>	60.9	74.7	59.2	75.0	38.4	41.2
<b>PT</b>	65.9	72.6	62.2	70.8	38.1	41.2
<b>RO</b>	57.2	74.7	55.4	73.0	40.4	40.8
<b>SI</b>	64.7	73.3	61.4	72.2	38.2	40.1
<b>SK</b>	60.3	75.0	58.0	73.6	38.4	40.3
<b>FI</b>	71.8	73.9	66.8	71.5	34.7	37.8
<b>SE</b>	78.3	82.5	67.8	77.6	34.3	37.3
<b>UK</b>	71.3	82.5	58.6	78.9	32.2	40.9
<b>EU</b>	64.3	75.9	55.3	73.4	33.3	39.1
<b>EA19</b>	63.4	74.6	52.4	70.9	32.1	38.4

Source: Eurostat, LFS, European Commission

**Table 2 – Gender-specific labour market situation and tax burden on second earners**

	Inactivity trap (2014)		Low wage trap (2014)		Employment rate female (2015)
	Trap 67% AW	Contribution of taxation	Trap 33%-67% AW	Contribution of taxation	
BE	49.1	49.1	60.0	60.0	63.0
BG	21.6	21.6	30.3	30.3	63.8
CZ	31.1	31.1	26.8	26.8	66.4
DK	52.6	39.9	40.5	40.5	72.6
DE	45.9	45.9	47.9	47.9	73.6
EE	24.2	24.2	24.2	24.2	72.6
IE	28.9	24.4	33.7	33.7	62.6
EL	8.9	26.6	18.9	34.1	46.0
ES	24.3	24.3	24.8	24.8	56.4
FR	32.4	31.1	41.4	35.7	66.0
HR	37.4	27.9	29.9	29.9	55.8
IT	30.5	26.9	37.6	36.9	50.6
LV	35.9	35.9	32.0	32.0	70.5
LT	26.6	19.9	26.7	26.7	72.2
LU	33.1	33.1	41.1	41.1	65.0
HU	36.0	34.5	34.5	34.5	62.1
MT	17.2	17.2	15.8	15.8	53.6
NL	19.1	25.5	33.7	37.5	70.8
AT	31.0	31.0	42.6	42.6	70.2
PL	34.6	29.6	30.3	30.3	60.9
PT	34.9	28.6	51.1	39.5	65.9
RO	31.9	27.6	32.2	32.2	57.2
SI	58.6	31.9	42.3	35.1	64.7
SK	8.2	29.9	8.7	29.9	60.3
FI	23.9	29.5	35.0	34.1	71.8
SE	22.0	29.6	28.6	35.2	78.3
UK	19.5	19.5	32.0	32.0	71.3

Source: Commission services, OECD. Notes: Employment rate for age group 20-64 years. Inactivity trap for second earner in two-earner couple with two children, principal earner with 100% of average wage, second earner with 67 %; low-wage trap for second earner in two-earner couple with two children, principal earner with 100% of average wage, second earner moving from 33 % to 67% of average wage. Contribution of taxation refers to the contribution to the respective trap in percentage points (other contributors are, e.g. withdrawn benefits, social assistance and housing benefits). No recent data is available for Cyprus. AW stands for average wage.

**Table 3 – Gender pay gap**

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	Difference 2014-2008
<b>BE</b>	10.2	10.1	10.2	10.2	10	10	9.9	-0.3
<b>BG</b>	12.3	13.3	13	13	14.7	13.5	13.4	1.1
<b>CZ</b>	26.2	25.9	21.6	22.6	22.2	22.1	22.1	-4.1
<b>DK</b>	17.1	16.8	15.9	16.3	16.8	16.4	15.8	-1.3
<b>DE</b>	22.8	22.6	22.3	22.2	22.4	21.6	21.6	-1.2
<b>EE</b>	27.6	26.6	27.7	27.3	30	29.9	28.3	0.7
<b>IE</b>	12.6	12.6	13.9	11.7	14.4	:	:	:
<b>EL</b>	22	:	15	:	:	:	:	:
<b>ES</b>	16.1	16.7	16.2	17.9	19.3	18.8	18.8	2.7
<b>FR</b>	16.9	15.2	15.6	15.6	15.4	15.3	15.3	-1.6
<b>HR</b>	:	:	5.7	3.4	2.9	9	10.4	:
<b>IT</b>	4.9	5.5	5.3	5.8	6.7	7.3	6.5	1.6
<b>CY</b>	19.5	17.8	16.8	16.4	16.2	15.8	15.4	-4.1
<b>LV</b>	11.8	13.1	15.5	13.6	13.8	14.4	15.2	3.4
<b>LT</b>	21.6	15.3	14.6	11.9	12.6	13.3	14.8	-6.8
<b>LU</b>	9.7	9.2	8.7	8.7	8.6	8.6	8.6	-1.1
<b>HU</b>	17.5	17.1	17.6	18	20.1	18.4	15.1	-2.4
<b>MT</b>	9.2	7.7	7.2	6.2	6.5	5.1	4.5	-4.7
<b>NL</b>	18.9	18.5	17.8	18.6	17.6	16.6	16.2	-2.7
<b>AT</b>	25.1	24.3	24	23.7	23.4	23	22.9	-2.2
<b>PL</b>	11.4	8	4.5	5.5	6.4	7.1	7.7	-3.7
<b>PT</b>	9.2	10	12.8	12.8	14.8	13	14.5	5.3
<b>RO</b>	8.5	7.4	8.8	11	9.7	9.1	10.1	1.6
<b>SI</b>	4.1	-0.9	0.9	2.3	2.5	3.2	2.9	-1.2
<b>SK</b>	20.9	21.9	19.6	20.5	21.5	19.8	21.1	0.2
<b>FI</b>	20.5	20.8	20.3	19.6	19.4	18.7	18	-2.5
<b>SE</b>	16.9	15.7	15.4	15.8	15.9	15.2	14.6	-2.3
<b>UK</b>	21.4	20.6	19.5	20.1	19.1	19.7	18.3	-3.1
<b>EU</b>	:	:	16.1	16.5	16.6	16.4	16.1	:
<b>EA19</b>	:	:	16.4	16.6	17	16.6	16.5	:

Source: Eurostat; unadjusted; Industry, construction and services (except public administration, defence, compulsory social security). Note: The figures show the difference between men's and women's average gross hourly earnings as percentage of men's average gross hourly earnings - for paid employees, unadjusted for personal or job characteristics.