



# EUROPEAN SEMESTER THEMATIC FACTSHEET

## ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET POLICIES

### 1. INTRODUCTION

The main goal of active labour market policies (ALMPs) is to increase the employment opportunities for job seekers and to improve matching between jobs (vacancies) and workers (i.e. the unemployed).<sup>1</sup> In so doing ALMPs can contribute to employment and GDP growth and reduce unemployment and benefit dependency. ALMPs help ensure that the unemployed return to employment as fast as possible and in the best possible job match, by providing them with the support they need to successfully re-enter the labour market. ALMPs are a key component of the so-called "activation strategies", encompassing the interactions between unemployment insurance/assistance systems, ALMPs and benefit conditionality.<sup>2</sup> In this context,

participation in ALMPs such as PES counselling, training or active job search have become a prerequisite for (continuing) benefit receipt (mutual responsibilities approach) in basically all EU countries. This approach is generally referred to as *workfare* or *work first*.

Unemployment and especially long-term unemployment (at least 12 months of unemployment) can have serious adverse consequences for the individual, society and the economic system.<sup>3</sup> The long-term unemployed find it more difficult to get hired as time goes by and face lower earnings and career prospects. At national level, persistently high long-term unemployment jeopardises overall employment policy goals, lowers the ability to allocate the right jobs to the

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<sup>1</sup> The OECD defines ALMPs as follows: "Active labour market programmes includes all social expenditure (other than education) which is aimed at the improvement of the beneficiaries' prospect of finding gainful employment or to otherwise increase their earnings capacity. This category includes spending on public employment services and administration, labour market training, special programmes for youth when in transition from school to work, labour market programmes to provide or promote employment for unemployed and other persons (excluding young and disabled persons) and special programmes for the disabled."

<sup>2</sup> See for example John P. Martin, "Activation and Active Labour Market Policies in OECD Countries: Stylized Facts and Evidence on Their Effectiveness", IZA Policy Paper No. 84, June 2014.

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<sup>3</sup> This note mainly focuses on long-term unemployment, for a number of reasons. First, long-term unemployment typically has impacts that go beyond those seen for unemployment at large, both in terms of its severity and duration. This necessitates the use of ALMPs. Second, in order to avoid so-called deadweight losses as much as possible, ALMPs in the proper sense (i.e. "real measures" in addition to the PES providing labour market services) should best be targeted at those most detached from the labour market, which are mainly the long-term unemployed. This would improve the (cost-) effectiveness of ALMPs. Third, the evolution of long-term unemployment gives a good impression of how well ALMPs work, much better than for total unemployment, given that the latter is influenced by cyclical fluctuations to a larger extent.

right people and undermines occupational and geographical mobility.<sup>4</sup>

Workers' human capital (whether actual or as perceived by employers) may deteriorate during a long unemployment spell, and the time devoted to job search typically declines. Both factors imply that the probability of leaving unemployment falls with its duration, leading to an increased probability of remaining unemployed ("hysteresis"). Unemployed workers are found to become more likely over time to leave the labour force and retire, enrol in disability programs, or simply become "discouraged workers" as unemployment continues.<sup>5</sup> In case there is inadequate coverage and income protection, this can lead to marginalisation, and increased risks of poverty and social exclusion.

The principal target groups of active labour market policies are young people<sup>6</sup>, older workers, low-skilled and long term unemployed with particular barriers to enter the labour market but these policies also aim at supporting mainstream short term unemployed. The importance of ALMPs is well reflected in Commission policy documents notably in the new Employment Guidelines 6 and 7<sup>7</sup>.

The Joint Employment Report 2017 notes that *"Tackling long-term unemployment remains a priority. Though decreasing in 2015 as a percentage of the active population, long-term unemployment still accounts for almost 50% of total unemployment, and remains very high in some Member States. Increasing duration of unemployment implies depreciation of skills, lower attachment to the labour market and ultimately higher risk of social*

*exclusion. Moreover, it risks turning cyclical unemployment into structural, with negative consequence on potential growth."*

This note mainly focuses on long term unemployed who face the most severe barriers for entering the labour market. The note is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the performance in EU countries as regards long-term unemployment, activation support and spending on ALMPs. Section 3 discusses the available evidence on potential policies to effectively address long-term unemployment. Section 4 provides a short general overview of policy implementation in the EU.

## 2. 2. POLICY CHALLENGES: AN OVERVIEW OF PERFORMANCE IN EU COUNTRIES

Long-term unemployment (LTU) is one of the main indicators from which the adequacy and/or success of ALMPs (and public employment services) can be judged. Since the start of the crisis in 2008, long-term unemployment rates have increased in all Member States, except Germany and Luxemburg (Figure 1). Increases have been particularly strong in Greece, Spain, Croatia, Portugal, Italy, Cyprus and Ireland, contributing to a growing divergence between Member States over this period. After six years of subdued growth and low job demand, long-term unemployment has emerged (alongside youth unemployment) as the main employment legacy of the crisis, with significant negative social and economic consequences for individuals and society. Long-term unemployment brings considerable challenges: as unemployment duration increases, the connection to the labour market deteriorates, with a sharp decrease in the likelihood of re-employment in stable jobs, and an increase in the risk of inactivity. The longer the unemployment period, the more support is needed to help people return to the labour market. Barriers to participation tend to accumulate, often requiring the involvement of more support services.

The main factor driving the rise in long-term unemployment since the crisis has

<sup>4</sup> See "Long-Term Unemployment: There is no Easy Fix", <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/archives/37154>.

<sup>5</sup> See A. Nichols, J. Mitchell, and S. Lindner, "Consequences of Long-Term Unemployment", <http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412887-consequences-of-long-term-unemployment.pdf>.

<sup>6</sup> See the thematic factsheet on youth employment.

<sup>7</sup> Council Decision (EU) 2015/1848.

been the inability of the labour market to accommodate the inflows of workers made redundant as a result of restructuring, either due to insufficient labour demand and/or to increased mismatches between labour demand and labour supply.

The effects of the crisis have been exacerbated by institutional deficiencies, such as segmentation (whereby a high proportion of people on the `flexible margin` with temporary/part-time contracts lost their jobs as opposed to the `rigid core` associated with high job security and high redundancy costs), and the inadequacy of ALMPs and in particular of PES that in many countries have failed to properly manage the large increase in the stock of unemployed in a situation of protracted economic slack.

Long-term unemployment affects certain groups, such as young people and low-skilled workers more than others, and especially hits those that work in declining occupations and sectors. As stated, the overall state of the economy remains an important factor in determining changes in the levels and flows to and from long-term unemployment, but there are also country-specific effects with some Member States ensuring relatively high transition rates back to employment.

More recently, between 2014 and 2015, the LTU rate decreased in most Member States (Figure 2), with the rate further increasing in 7 Member States, including some with comparatively low LTU rates (Austria, Finland, Luxembourg).

In addition to the LTU rate, one can also look at the share of LTU within total unemployment, i.e. the incidence of LTU. In the EU-28 the incidence of LTU<sup>8</sup> has gone up from 34.7% in 2008 (4th quarter) to 48.3% in 2015 (4th quarter), reflecting a decline in job finding rates because of continuously low labour demand and increasing skills mismatches, which is related to economic restructuring and the gradual deterioration of skills as

unemployment spells get longer. Member States perform very differently regarding the incidence of LTU, with rates in 2015Q4 at the lower end (below 30%) in Denmark, Finland, Sweden and the UK, while they were over 55% in Bulgaria, Ireland, Greece, Croatia, Italy, Portugal and Slovakia.


Participation in ALMPs can help reducing LTU by facilitating outflows from unemployment (rather than by affecting inflows into unemployment, which are largely cyclical). As Figure 3 shows, countries with the lowest long-term unemployment rates (Sweden, Austria, Luxembourg, Denmark, Finland and Germany) are among those where the level of participation in ALMPs is highest. For several other Member States activation support does not seem proportional to the unemployment challenge that they face.

Higher unemployment rates are generally counteracted by a mix of passive and active labour market policies, as shown in Figure 4. Some Member States with high unemployment spend relatively small shares of their GDP on labour market services and active measures (notably Bulgaria, Slovakia, Cyprus, Croatia and Greece). At the same time they can have comparatively high spending on passive measures such as unemployment benefits (notably Ireland and Spain, and Portugal and Italy to a somewhat lesser extent).

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
<sup>8</sup> The incidence of LTU is calculated as the number of persons that have been *unemployed for more than 12 months* divided by the *total number of unemployed*.

**Figure 1: Long-term unemployment rates in % of the active population for the EU-28, EA-19 and in the Member States in 2008 and 2014**




Source: Eurostat, LFS

**Figure 2a: Long-term unemployment rates in % of the active population, 2014 and 2015 [the Annex provides data by sex and for older workers (50-64)]**




Source: Eurostat, LFS

**Figure 2b: Share of long term unemployment in total unemployment in %**




Source: Eurostat, LFS

**Figure 3: Activation support (LMP participants per 100 persons wanting to work) and long-term unemployment rates by Member State, 2014**



Source: Eurostat, LMP database (Note: for activation support 2009 data for the United Kingdom, 2012 data for Cyprus and 2013 data for Greece, Ireland and Spain)

**Figure 4: Expenditure on labour market services, active and passive measures (% of GDP; left-hand side) and unemployment rates (right-hand side) by Member State, 2014**



Source: Eurostat, LMP database (Note: Labour market services refer to LMP database category 1, active measures to categories 2-7 and passive measures to categories 8-9 (Out-of-work income maintenance and support, early retirement). LMP data for Greece and the United Kingdom are for 2010, for Cyprus for 2012 and for Ireland and Spain for 2013)

### 3. 3. POLICY LEVERS TO ADDRESS THE POLICY CHALLENGES

(Long-term) unemployment can have several causes, such as a lack of labour demand, inadequate skills, institutional factors such as employment protection legislation (EPL), labour taxation etc. Some of these causes can be dealt with by using ALMPs, but they do not work for all unemployed and under all circumstances. The design, coverage and targeting of ALMPs as well as the way they are implemented (by Public Employment Services (PES) or others) matter a lot in terms of their effectiveness and efficiency. By now there is a fair amount of evidence as to what policies work best for whom under which circumstances. A study by Ecorys and IZA concludes that *"there is not one particular policy that can serve as a universal tool for improving the labour market perspectives of the unemployed"*.<sup>9</sup> In fact it stresses that all ALMPs have both merits and shortcomings. In practice this means that policies will have to be tailor-made to the individual unemployed (including detecting short-term versus potentially long-term unemployed), which calls for effective profiling techniques.

Even though many evaluation studies face methodological shortcomings<sup>10</sup>, some broad conclusions can be drawn from the existing literature, which can provide policy guidance to Member States in shaping their ALMPs.<sup>11,12</sup> Hiring incentives

for firms in the market sector are not very effective overall, as they tend to come with relatively large deadweight losses. Moreover, there is a risk that employers displace non-subsidised workers with subsidised workers or wait until job seekers become eligible for subsidies. So if used, they should be well targeted and run at a small-scale and on a temporary basis. Mechanisms need to be in place which provide incentives for employers to retain workers after the subsidy expires or combined with other ALMP measures in order to improve the employability of beneficiaries within integrated programmes. The lowest effectiveness is typically found for direct employment creation in the public sector (including public works schemes).

ALMPs aimed at retaining employment, such as short-time working schemes, should be used only for short periods of time and during severe recessions. More cost-effective and desirable are ALMPs which redistribute incentives to outsiders on the labour market, whereby their attachment to the labour market is strengthened and their incentive to leave unemployment is supported. These ALMPs are particularly effective during recoveries.

Generally there is a delay between the implementation of ALMPs and the effect they will have on the labour market, although this is more so for some measures than for others. Studies based on micro data suggest that though the effects of ALMPs on job finding rates tend to be quite small in the short run, their longer term impact is generally more substantial.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Ecorys/IZA, "Analysis of Costs and Benefits of Active Compared to Passive Measures", 2012.

<sup>10</sup> Methodological problems are mostly related to the counterfactual being missing which then needs to be construed by the data, e.g. by matching techniques. Random experiments do not face this problem but they are still rare.

<sup>11</sup> A quite comprehensive evaluation of the effectiveness of ALMPs can be found in European Commission, *Employment in Europe Report*, 2006. Kluve et al. (2010; "The Effectiveness of European Active Labour Market Programmes", *Labour Economics* 17, pp. 904-18) and Kluve et al. (2010; "Active Labour Market Policy Evaluations: A Meta Analysis", *The Economic Journal* 120, pp. 452-77) offer

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broad (meta-) analyses based on a large number of studies.

<sup>12</sup> A more extensive overview of the effectiveness of ALMPs is provided in Annex 2.

<sup>13</sup> "Effective Active Labour Market Policies", J. Boone & J. C. van Ours, IZA DP No. 1335, 2004.

### Active labour market policies: Tools and target groups

The success of ALMPs depends not only on expenditure levels but most importantly on the design of the measures and the way they are implemented:

- **Counselling and job-search assistance:** These measures are mostly useful for short-term unemployed –, but they may still play a valuable role beyond this scope if they form part of an individualised or ‘tailor-made’ approach to support for the unemployed. The individualisation of support includes advice combined with a range of potential interventions, including vocational training, job-search assistance, ‘motivation’ courses, and social support, according to the assessed needs of the job-seeker.
- **Subsidies to employers:** These programs are found to be relative costly and are typically targeted at the most disadvantaged groups for whom other measures have proved ineffective. Such measures can play an important role in influencing positively the attitudes of employers to the long-term unemployed, through bringing them in contact with each other, and providing an opportunity of ‘testing them’ at lower than full wage costs.
- **Direct employment/job-creation schemes:** These schemes are typically targeted at medium and longer term unemployed to avoid perverse employment effects on the short term unemployed, through participants who might otherwise have found ‘real’ jobs, being held off the labour market during the period of participation. These schemes are also typically more stable and long lasting to ensure their efficiency and cost-effectiveness.
- **Training** is usually found to have the strongest positive long-term effects but it is expensive. On-the-job trainings, general programmes and vocational training are all suitable but for different purposes. Studies show that general programmes contribute to a better matching of skills, particularly after the first entry into the labour market while (certified) vocational training programmes (workplace-based or combined with school-based) have been shown to be very effective in facilitating the transition from education to work.

To reduce the risk of long-term unemployment it is important to adapt the mix of activation measures and their institutional setting to economic circumstances. The challenge is to ensure that spending on activation measures remains effective even in an economic climate where the creation of jobs is difficult. In a constrained labour market one needs to consider the precise balance between “train first” versus “work first” approaches.

Public Employment Services (PES) have a crucial role to play in re-integrating the unemployed as they are best suited to address heterogeneous groups of unemployed<sup>14</sup>. Sufficient staffing, adequate training (PES staff needs to be well trained in qualitative aspects, such as discrimination, decent jobs, dealing with sensitive cases); integrated services (effectively liaise with other state services, especially those related to education, health, housing, and other needed social

<sup>14</sup> See Thematic factsheet on public employment services.

services) and a well-built evaluation and follow-up system are all key pre-requisites for the effective functioning of the PES.<sup>15</sup> Indeed, monitoring and evaluation are essential for assessing and increasing effectiveness. ALMPs are generally not monitored and assessed as a rule. Developing an evaluation culture is important, and there are different factors which can contribute to this. These include political commitment to evidence-based policy-making (and accountability), legal requirements for evaluation, evaluation requirements of European funding and training and education of evaluators to ensure evaluation throughout the policy cycle.

<sup>15</sup> EAPN: Fighting for a Social Europe Free of Poverty:  
[http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=24&ved=0CD0QFjADOBQ&url=http%3A%2F%2Fec.europa.eu%2Fsocial%2FblobServlet%3FdocId%3D10834%26langId%3Den&ei=eRuPUt28A4nWswbtvYC4BQ&usq=AFQjCNHpfFjtC1T2-QRpxFKz\\_19bhshcdQ](http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=24&ved=0CD0QFjADOBQ&url=http%3A%2F%2Fec.europa.eu%2Fsocial%2FblobServlet%3FdocId%3D10834%26langId%3Den&ei=eRuPUt28A4nWswbtvYC4BQ&usq=AFQjCNHpfFjtC1T2-QRpxFKz_19bhshcdQ)

### **Showcasing an ALMP tool: employment incentives for job creation and support**

Employment incentives are typically targeted, temporary and conditional payments or reductions of tax/social security contributions that make labour cheaper for employers, and in turn increase labour demand. Across the EU, one-sixth of ALMP spending went to employment incentives, preceded in importance by expenditure on training and labour market services.

In a setting of low labour demand, employment incentives can be an attractive instrument for supporting employment while also improving the employability of specific vulnerable groups. For this reason, and given the limited fiscal space in many Member States, the Council recommendation for the Youth Guarantee (2013) called for targeted and well-designed wage and recruitment subsidies and the Council recommendation for long-term unemployed (2016) recommended focusing financial incentives on schemes supporting integration into the labour market, such as recruitment subsidies and the reduction of social insurance contributions.

However, if not well designed, employment incentives may result in wasteful spending of public money, particularly if the subsidised jobs would have been created/maintained anyway (deadweight loss), or if the subsidies simply induce employers to hire/keep certain workers instead of others (displacement effects). They may also reduce productivity to the extent that they create incentives for companies to substitute more productive workers with less productive ones. If jobs are created only for the duration of the subsidy, this still improves employability of the involved workers, but the net social benefit is much more limited, or even negative.

Design features that help to maximise the benefits of employment incentives include:

- **targeting the unemployed who have limited chances for employment** (e.g. long-term unemployed to minimise the risk of deadweight loss), but also groups with a considerable potential increase in productivity (e.g. young people without work experience who have been unable to find a job within a certain time),
- **ensuring that the subsidised period increases the productivity** of the worker, e.g. through an effective training component and coaching,
- **introducing conditions aimed at increasing the probability of an extension of the employment relationship beyond the subsidised period** (e.g. checks that the beneficiary is still employed by the firm at a certain point in time after the expiration of the subsidy, and/or having gross or net job creation in the firm),
- **regular monitoring and assessment** of subsidised firms and their hiring behaviour as well as of beneficiary workers.

Related literature: Brown, A. (2015), "Can hiring subsidies benefit the unemployed?" IZA World of Labor 2015; European Commission (2014). "Stimulating job demand: the design of effective hiring subsidies in Europe," European Employment Policy Observatory; HoPES (2013), "HoPES Note on Criteria for sustainable wage subsidies." A response from the European network of Heads of Public Employment Services to calls for action agreed at the Berlin Conference on Youth Employment on 3rd July 2013.

Against the background of fiscal consolidation measures, fiscal room for manoeuvre is limited and public expenditures across the board are under pressure. Therefore, particular attention should be given to prioritising growth-friendly expenditure, including reinforcing, when needed, the coverage of PES and ALMPs, but also their effectiveness with notably appropriate targeting and individualisation of support. In general terms ALMPs should facilitate necessary (sectorial) reallocation, and furthermore support the employability of the long-term unemployed – hence ALMPs increase labour supply and help in avoiding labour shortages.

#### 4.4. CROSS-EXAMINATION OF POLICY STATE OF PLAY

Practice shows that ALMPs are becoming increasingly diverse in nature, following a more tailored approach to individual needs. In addition there is a stronger focus on enforcing work availability and mutual obligation requirements, meaning that benefit recipients are expected to engage in monitored job search activities and improve their employability, "in exchange" for receiving benefits. In recent years, Member States have placed increased priority on the effective co-ordination of ALMPs with the administration of benefits and make-work-pay policies, so as to implement coherent activation strategies.

Delivery of ALMPs continues to be challenging in some Member States. There is scope for Public Employment Services to enhance their effectiveness and efficiency to ensure jobseekers find jobs more easily and to do so at the lowest possible cost. In several Member States, PES could still provide more individualised and better targeted services. In some cases lower levels of government expenditures can cause difficulties in ensuring sufficient coverage of ALMPs and/or sufficient individualisation of services and satisfactory implementation. These issues have been addressed (albeit to different degrees) in country-specific recommendations to

several Member States over the past years.

A number of countries are reinforcing the individualisation of support provided to the long-term unemployed, in line with the Council Recommendation focusing on job integration agreements tailoring support to individual needs with clear rights and obligations for both the unemployed and the support bodies. Other countries have accordingly outsourced employment services for the long-term unemployed while yet another group of countries have reinforced the provision of training for the long-term unemployed.

More concretely, several examples of new active measures recently taken by member States can be mentioned. Finland started implementing a reform of support to the long-term unemployed, providing a single point of contact to better coordinate employment services, benefits and social services for the long-term unemployed at municipal level. In France, the national action plan against long-term unemployment adopted in 2015 combines a reinforcement of personalised, intensive counselling, aiming to reach 460,000 beneficiaries in 2017, an increased offer of subsidised contracts and vocational training and a new scheme of work-based training for older workers or those with lower qualifications, as well as better access to childcare and housing support. Long-term unemployed will also benefit from the 500,000 supplementary trainings for jobseekers in 2016, which will double jobseekers' training offers and of which one third should target specifically long-term unemployed and/or low-qualified.

In Germany there exist two programmes to combat long-term unemployment: the ESF-programme "*Bundesprogramm zum Abbau der Langzeitarbeitslosigkeit*" and the programme *social participation on the labour market (Soziale Teilhabe am Arbeitsmarkt)*. The ESF-programme focusses on promoting qualifications for long-term unemployed persons (at least 2 years without occupation) older than 35 without (relevant) professional training. For persons who are unemployed for longer than 5 years, particularly intensive

follow-up and measures are provided. The programme started in the first quarter of 2015. The programme *social participation on the labour market* for those most detached from it aims at improving employability and promoting social participation for persons that are unemployed for more than 4 years that have health problems or families that are receiving unemployment benefits (*Familienbedarfsgemeinschaft*).

In Latvia, the Ministry of Welfare has developed a set of activities aimed at the social and labour market integration of the long-term unemployed. They will have the opportunity to receive individual and group consultations, including career counselling, and motivational programmes for job search, among other things. Finally, in Sweden, the job and development guarantee is targeted towards job seekers who have been outside the labour market for a long time. The scheme contains individually designed measures and is composed of three phases, the last one being the employment phase. To help long-term unemployed get back into the labour market, the government has decided to increase the number of extra jobs within the welfare system (health care or educational system). The extra jobs are paid according to the prevailing collective agreements and are thought of as a stepping stone towards unsubsidised employment. To increase the outflow from the job and development guarantee programme there is special employment support in the form of a subsidy to the employer of 85 per cent of the wage cost up to a ceiling of SEK 890 per day and mentor support. The extra jobs proposal took effect in August.

In spite of these measures, long-term unemployment is addressed by current reforms in less than half of the Member States. Also, recent Country Specific Recommendations in this area have only been partially implemented. To improve progress in addressing long-term unemployment, in February 2016 the Council adopted a Recommendation on the integration of the long-term unemployed

into the labour market<sup>16</sup> The recommendation will support the Europe 2020 objectives by contributing to the goals of increasing the employment rate and reducing poverty.

The Recommendation calls on Member States to:

- Encourage the registration of jobseekers with an employment service, in particular through improved provision of information on the support available;
- Provide personalised guidance to those concerned through Employment services, and other partners supporting labour market integration;
- Offer a job-integration agreement at the very latest when they have reached 18 months of unemployment to registered long-term unemployed persons not covered by the Youth Guarantee;
- Encourage and develop partnerships between employers, social partners, employment services, government authorities, social services and education and training providers to provide services that better meet the needs of enterprises and registered long-term unemployed persons.

Tailoring support to individual needs frequently required better coordination of services across organisations, and Member States agreed in the Council Recommendation to establish a single point of contact for the long-term unemployed. Data exchange and interoperability platforms are crucial for effective delivery of services. While some countries are well-advanced in the delivery of a single point of contact, other countries are taking first steps to coordinate service provision across organisations.

Date: 11.11.2016

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<sup>16</sup> 2016/C 67/01

### 3.1. Annex: Statistical Indicators

**Table 1** Long-term unemployment rates for EU, EA and in the Member States in 2014 and 2015 by sex

Sex:	Women		Men	
Time:	2014	2015	2014	2015
EU28	5.0	4.5	5.0	4.5
EA19	6.1	5.6	6.0	5.5
BE	3.8	3.9	4.7	4.8
BG	6.0	5.0	7.7	6.1
CZ	3.2	2.9	2.2	2.0
DK	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.6
DE	1.9	1.7	2.4	2.3
EE	2.7	2.2	3.9	2.5
IE	4.5	3.6	8.2	6.7
EL	22.4	21.2	17.2	15.8
ES	13.7	12.4	12.3	10.5
FR	3.9	3.9	4.5	4.6
HR	10.7	10.5	9.6	10.1
IT	8.6	7.4	7.1	6.6
CY	7.0	6.2	8.3	7.5
LV	4.0	3.6	5.3	5.4
LT	4.2	3.4	5.4	4.4
LU	1.6	1.9	1.6	1.9
HU	3.7	3.1	3.6	3.1
MT	2.0	1.3	3.2	3.0
NL	3.0	2.9	2.8	3.0
AT	1.4	1.4	1.7	1.9
PL	4.1	3.0	3.7	2.9
PT	8.5	7.2	8.4	7.3
RO	2.4	2.6	3.1	3.3
SI	5.7	5.4	4.9	4.1
SK	9.1	8.3	9.4	6.9
FI	1.6	1.8	2.2	2.7
SE	1.3	1.2	1.6	1.7
UK	1.8	1.3	2.6	1.9

Source: Eurostat

**Table 2 Long-term unemployment (12 months or more) as a percentage of total unemployment, by age (%)**

Age:	15-64		50-64	
Time:	2014	2015	2014	2015
EU28	49.6	48.5	61.1	61.1
EA19	52.6	51.6	64.5	64.4
BE	49.9	51.7	68.4	71.3
BG	60.3	61.1	66.0	67.5
CZ	43.6	47.4	51.4	56.9
DK	25.2	26.9	41.8	39.4
DE	44.3	44.0	60.3	58.0
EE	45.2	38.8	54.7	51.6
IE	59.2	57.6	73.2	72.3
EL	73.4	73.0	80.9	82.8
ES	52.8	51.6	66.1	66.9
FR	44.2	44.3	59.7	60.8
HR	58.5	63.0	68.6	79.1
IT	61.4	58.9	65.1	62.2
CY	47.7	45.3	57.4	61.9
LV	43.0	45.5	48.8	54.4
LT	44.6	42.8	58.8	53.4
LU	27.3	28.4	56.6	42.1
HU	47.4	45.5	60.1	61.6
MT	46.9	43.4	57.9	60.7
NL	39.4	43.2	57.9	65.1
AT	27.2	29.2	46.2	47.3
PL	42.7	39.3	50.4	48.2
PT	59.5	57.2	77.7	76.4
RO	41.1	43.9	40.0	44.8
SI	54.5	52.3	66.0	65.5
SK	70.2	65.8	78.3	71.2
FI	22.4	24.6	40.3	42.0
SE	19.0	20.8	33.3	35.8
UK	35.7	30.6	46.4	41.0

Source: Eurostat