Revisiting the EU fiscal framework in an era of low interest rates

by Blanchard et al.

Session discussion by Roel Beetsma (UvA & European Fiscal Board)
Policy in low interest environment: sustainability

- Thought-provoking paper
- Authors point to possibility to raise debt at no or low cost if nominal GDP growth exceeds nominal interest rate
- However, they also qualify statement by pointing to positive relationship of debt interest rate and debt ratio (Italy may be case in point)
- Note that higher steady-state debt level means more vulnerability of public finances to changes of interest rate around expected level (more safety by issuing at longer maturity)
Policy in low interest environment: quality of public finances

• Crucial is how additional debt issuance will be spent

  – Infrastructure is in many countries in a deplorable state
  – This also holds for other productive spending
  – More spending of this type is desirable: will this raise level or growth rate of GDP; higher nominal GDP growth also benefits public finances by enforcing snowball effect associated with outstanding public debt.
Policy in low interest environment: quality of public finances

- Productive spending (includes spending on R&D, education and transport) in % of total public spending before and after crisis
Policy in low interest environment: fiscal stabilization

- Limitations on monetary policy have implications for fiscal policy
  - Monetary policy based on country average; with slow relative price adjustment, there is a role for fiscal policy
  - Effective zero lower bound

- Implications for trade-off stabilization – sustainability:
  - Fiscal stimulus to raise output has little effect on debt ratio
  - Fiscal consolidation has little benefit in terms of debt ratio

- Effect of low interest environment on cross-border spill-overs of fiscal policy? Demand externalities likely become stronger due to neither inflation nor central bank policy rate moving
• National fiscal rules may deal with policy bias in the direction of excessive deficits and debts

• EU level fiscal rules justified by externalities related to high debt
  – Monetization pressure on ECB and crisis contagion
  – Positive aggregate demand externality produces too tight stabilization policy (when monetary policy constrained)

• Demand externalities have become relatively more important

• The rules mostly treat current and capital spending the same way
Proposals to revise fiscal framework: stabilization

• Fiscal policy could be collectively too tight – solutions:
  – Central fiscal capacity with borrowing capacity
  – Provision (in primary and specified in more detail in secondary law) that requires countries with fiscal space to undertake fiscal expansion; neither new institution nor common debt issuance is needed
  – Coordinated fiscal expansion based on some trigger underpinned by independent verification

• CFC has advantage of not forcing overheating countries to expand and access can be made conditional (see EFB); Article 126 modification would not need new institution, but would be politically acceptable to some countries only when other countries strictly obey the rules
Proposals to revise fiscal framework: golden rule accounting

• Current balance excludes gross investment but is modified to cover both depreciation and the difference in market and “actual” financial return.

• Since market return may exceed financial return, restrictions may be needed on current and/or capital account.

• This allows differentiation of constraints: constraint on capital account can be friendlier to public investment than constraint on overall balance.

• Accounting needs to be overseen by independent supra-national institution:
  – What qualifies as public investment?
  – Estimate depreciation rates in these categories.
  – Set methodological standards for estimating social rates of return.
Proposals to revise fiscal framework: golden rule accounting

- Education spending would need to be excluded from golden rule because of high degree of depreciation (replacing skills and knowledge of parents):
  - Not convinced that this is the case: computer and digital skills were never taught to parents
  - The problem of “underprovision” of educational investment, because the benefits are mostly reaped in the future (by current non-voters):
  - Also, current voters could reap benefits from higher growth resulting in better pension provision
  - Weigh incentives for under-provision educational spending against problems with classifying under golden rule
From fiscal rules to fiscal standards

- Agree that rules with complex and detailed contingencies do not work: observability of indicators may be problematic; not clear what optimal contingency looks like, etc.

- Authors advocate fiscal standards that lay out standards of behavior, but do not define precisely ex ante how standards are to be met

- So describe settings, in qualitative terms, in which either fiscal tightening or loosening would be appropriate

- Avoid the need to write out contingencies; circumstances change all the time
From fiscal rules to fiscal standards: comments

• How should these standards be enforced?
  – Authors are rightly skeptical about enforcement via financial markets

• Hence, need for adjudicator

• Authors favor European Court of Justice:
  – Is this practically feasible? Would potentially need to consider many cases
  – Assessment of violation of norm may come with quite some delay, so timely correction could be in danger

• Relying on initiative right of Commission may lead to under enforcement (RQMV seems to have had similar effect – see EFB, 2019), so national governments should also have possibility to bring violator to court
From fiscal rules to fiscal standards: comments

- Can we really do away with numerical rules?
- The economic motivation for 60% is quite weak; however, it is in the minds of politicians and public, and aids in commitment to sustainability
One fiscal anchor: debt ceiling at 60% of GDP

- Focus on sustainability
- Simple and observable

One operational indicator: expenditure benchmark

- Largely observable
- Built-in stabilising effect
- 3-yr ceiling: medium-term perspective
- Annual monitoring with compensation account

One escape clause replacing all existing flexibility provisions

- Flexibility without current complexity and “complete contract” approach
- Triggered based on independent analysis

Demarcate policy decisions from economic analysis

- Isolate underlying staff analysis from political considerations

How remote effectively from EFB proposals?
How remote effectively from EFB proposals?

**Limited Golden Rule**
- Protects investment by exempting specific categories of growth-enhancing expenditure from the expenditure rule
- Exemption applies to EU spending programmes
- Classification monitored by IFIs and national statistical offices

**Differentiated national debt targets or adjustment paths**
- In function of key socio-economic indicators: differences in saving, pension systems, borrowing costs, current account balance
- To be agreed within Council
• EFB argues that, once we can go beyond Treaty, there is a case for differentiation of debt targets (to be reset at given time intervals):
  – Countries with fiscal space could be required to aid in stabilizing the euro area business cycle
  – More importantly, targets could be set with a view of intergenerational equity: spreading age-related and climate-related spending
• EFB argues for general escape clause, with analysis and advice by independent body; then, decision moves to political level which has to comply or explain
Thank you!

Link EFB review report: