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## EX POST PAPER

# Education and radicalisation prevention: Different ways governments can support schools and teachers in preventing/countering violent extremism

Education is, arguably, central to preventing young people from being attracted to violent extremist ideologies, organisations and movements – whether extreme Islamist, far-right or other threats to cohesive, inclusive societies. Internationally, schools and education authorities have adopted a wide range of initiatives, some directly targeted at preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE), others more indirect and focused on areas such as anti-racism, citizenship or value pluralism (i). We are starting to gather evidence on “what works” in these initiatives, in terms of intervention work, building resilience and shifting attitudes. We have gathered examples of inspiring ideas. However, **this is a fast-changing field, with the rise of different origins and targets of terrorist attacks (for example, from foreign fighters to home-grown)**, the increase in neo-Nazi, racist populist movements, and shifting patterns of migration including refugees, which contribute to the manipulation of anti-immigrant attitudes.

# 1. Introduction

It has become clear that, paradoxically, initiatives need to be firmly embedded in government structures and funding allocations and remain flexible to respond to events. Not only do initiatives need to be rooted in a whole-school approach that is consistent across different areas of curriculum and pedagogy, they need sustained funding and coordination. One-off approaches such as visiting theatre groups who act out young people being drawn into extremism, or a single talk by a former extremist, can be powerful at the time but they need to be part of a longer programme that builds fundamental skills and habits in terms of critical thinking, the search for evidence, knowledge of rights, the capacity to navigate difference, digital literacy and conflict resolution. There are difficulties in long-term evaluation of initiatives in P/CVE, due to the difficulty in establishing a causal link (if children do not become extremists, was it because of the programme?). The question is how to best support schools working to maintain and strengthen an overall resilience-building approach. It would appear that government support is essential; but the type of support and its origins, in the wider context of different nation states, remains varied and changing.

Together with the question of government support comes the issue of government duties placed on schools with regard to violent extremism. On the one hand, schools are often expected to foster freedom of speech and serve as safe spaces for discussion and, on the other (as in some EU Member States), schools and colleges may have formal obligations to monitor and report possible cases of radicalisation. This has raised much opposition. The United Kingdom's (UK) Prevent strategy, for example, has prompted concern in some quarters that educational institutions are securitised through such a policy and tasked to act as the arm of the counterterrorism strategy, and that this stigmatises particular class/ethnic/religious groups as being "at risk". Schools may be asked to expand their curriculum to include extremist-related topics and skills. Schools, educators and NGOs may be wary of government intervention. Conversely, to build in and embed ways to safeguard and educate young people against hate and violent extremism may be seen less as securitisation and more as the duty of schools to support the growth of young minds and promote a healthy civil society.

The task of this paper is **to examine how or whether governments support P/CVE programmes or initiatives in schools in EU Member States**. From a survey of each Member State and an online search of laws, policies and initiatives related to counterterrorism (CT) and violent extremism, questions addressed are:

- how or whether education programmes in P/CVE are linked into broader national counterterror plans or national P/CVE policies;
- what sorts of partnerships between government and other agencies, or inter-departmental collaborations, are evident in the development and funding of school-based initiatives;
- what are the gaps or problems in support.

It proved difficult to find and develop contacts with appropriate personnel in the education sector in each Member State in order to send the survey and receive answers. Some needed to request permission from higher authorities, which was not forthcoming. Others promised to send information but did not. Some did not respond at all. This is not surprising considering it is a sensitive area, which cuts across a number of different departments. Only seven replied directly to the request for information. Elsewhere, the authors used open-source websites of the countries and their own previous research and contacts to map patterns and varieties of government support. It was felt that sufficient information was collected in order to be able to draw a range of insights and provide some in-depth case studies.

To set the stage, this paper first **summarises the needs of education from government in P/CVE before describing the surrounding contexts of such work**. This context encompasses whether a country has a specific counter-radicalisation policy, whether it has a counter violent extremism policy (which can be embedded in this or separated), and if education is cited in such policies and, if so, within what remit. From examination of what such policies specify as important, a number of diverse themes and targets in P/CVE-related work emerge, and these are exemplified in Section 3. The paper then tackles the issue from the other way around, looking at accounts of specific P/CVE projects and extracting what they say about any government support they have had. Five more extensive case studies then show the detail of the complexity of developing and sustaining programmes, and the various governmental and non-governmental actors involved. The conclusion draws out the main inferences from the investigation, and identifies which particular support structures and programming might inspire or give direction to other countries.

## 2. The needs of education in P/CVE and the need for support

The needs of education in an area such as P/CVE are immediately apparent. They fall into four main areas:

- a) *Financing*: P/CVE initiatives may involve expert NGOs and other organisations to come into schools and work with young people. These may be profit or non-profit, but they will need reimbursement for their time and will need to be paid for the production of materials such as lesson plans, assemblies, and activities such as role-plays, simulations and film-making. In countries with a national curriculum, projects would need to be embedded in curricula across age groups and reflected in textbooks and other pedagogical materials. This takes time and money. Financing of training is also key, discussed next.
- b) *Training*: The content and approach of P/CVE requires teachers to be well prepared at pre-service and in-service levels to tackle an extensive range of responsibilities, such as teaching controversial issues, religious and other aspects of diversity, human rights, the current law on CT and developing school safeguarding policies. They need to fully understand the country's shared values that would underpin resilience work. They need to know how to identify concerns and how these relate to different age phases and types of extremism (across all forms of extremism). RAN (2018) states that "Schools should invest in basic training for all teaching staff (not only those teaching politics, history or ethics) so that they are equipped to detect the signs [of radicalisation] and intervene effectively". But the question is who pays for this "investment"? Finance and training go hand in hand. P/CVE needs to be embedded in pre-service and in-service training. The specificity of work done by trained teachers has to be taken into account in their professional evaluation.
- c) *Knowledge and information*: P/CVE cuts across a range of players, departments and agencies — both governmental and non-governmental. RAN has stressed the importance of multi-agency working <sup>(ii)</sup>. Schools need information on what is available, what has been tried and tested, and how to apply for an intervention and its funding. They will need partnerships and will need to work with police or justice departments. To teach related subjects such as citizenship, they need information about the demography of the area, migration, the problems of polarisation and marginalisation. Schools and teachers need information on their legal duties (if necessary) with regard to preventing extremism and how to comply with them.
- d) *"Moral" support*: The need for financing, training and information might apply to any pedagogical or curriculum initiative, but P/CVE has particular support requirements in terms of giving teachers moral encouragement to take this area forward. Curricula always have to be adapted to today's realities and pupil needs. Yet, P/CVE can be especially controversial, operating in extremely sensitive areas, and parents and the community do not always welcome all elements unequivocally. Hence, government advocacy is important, along with endorsement on the part of school inspectors/supervisors who would specifically look for and welcome what a school was doing with regard to safeguarding against extremism — if that was within their remit. Support to find time within the curriculum is also needed.

## 3. Legislation and strategy surrounding education

### 3.1 SOURCES OF POLICY

The first question is the source of P/CVE programmes and initiatives and their funding streams. Do these derive from their counterterror legislation? An examination of all 27 Member States finds that all have **legislation** in force relating to terrorism, as required by EU law <sup>(iii)</sup>. This mostly comes under a "criminal code", but sometimes is referred to specifically as the "Anti-terrorism Act". These codes or acts invariably cite incitement or provocation to commit terrorist acts, but also recruitment into terrorism, endangering the state, having knowledge concerning plans for terrorist acts, financing of terrorism, receiving training for terrorism, travel for the purposes of terrorism and participation in combat activities of organised armed groups in another state.

The next question is how or whether this translates into, or maps onto, a national **policy** on preventing terrorism and/or a national policy on countering violent extremism and radicalisation that lead to terrorism. From the survey and the open-source published national documents, it is found that 17 Member States have a specific plan

or strategy directly labelled counterterrorism or countering radicalisation. Those that do not sometimes state that this is covered under their national security plan, or integral security concept, or that it is under preparation.

This then leads to the third question of whether there is anything specified in the legislation, policy or national action plan on P/CVE regarding education. Education is specifically mentioned in P/CVE plans in the majority of countries. This generally cites schools as sites of prevention, with teachers acting as “frontline practitioners”, or as part of a list of partners and inter-agency bodies working towards the collaboration of the community, intelligence services, police, private sector, civil society, religious leaders, etc. The Ministry of Education may be cited as part of a list of ministries relevant to CT policy, together with ministries such as those of justice, social affairs and employment, culture and science and health, welfare and sport. Education sometimes appears as part of a shift, or an updating or strengthening. For example, Bulgaria states that “at the end of 2017, the Bulgarian government was conducting an update of this strategy with a greater emphasis on providing prevention tools and resources to frontline practitioners, such as teachers and police officers”.

Furthermore, there may be a specific focus on one form of violent extremism within the policies and practices of a state, shaped by political and cultural contexts. Research for this report <sup>(iv)</sup> suggests that a focus on Islamist extremism and Daesh-related terrorism, and concern over migration restrictions and border control, is most common, with less indication that other forms, such as “home-grown” far-right movements or violence against minority groups, are viewed as a similar threat.

## 3.2 GOVERNMENT DEFINITIONS OF EXTREMISM AND P/CVE

How a government defines extremism and violent extremism may determine some of the directions and even curricula in schools.

In the **UK**, extremism has been officially defined as “*vocal or active opposition to fundamental British Values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs*”. This has come under considerable criticism; firstly, that labelling these values as “British” rather than universal feeds into broader narratives of “Britishness” and is potentially nationalistic and exclusionary; and secondly, that the implication is that if a person critiques democracy or tolerance, this automatically makes them an extremist — and that this then stifles free speech in schools and colleges. Nonetheless, the definition has generated a raft of materials for curricula and assemblies on core values, and teachers seem mostly supportive of teaching these areas.

In **Germany**, too, there is an explicit definition of PVE as “*measures to prevent and combat a rejection of the system of values of the Basic Law and the democratic constitutional state and also, in this context, to safeguard the security of citizens*” <sup>(v)</sup>. The use of the term “rejection” is similar to the UK’s “opposition”. Again, this bracketing of prevention of extremism and promotion of democracy drives almost the entire educational effort (as described later in Section 6).

In **Denmark** on the other hand, the definition is as follows: “*Extremism refers to persons or groups that commit or seek to legitimise violence or other illegal acts, with reference to societal conditions that they disagree with. The term covers e.g. left-wing extremism, right-wing extremism and militant Islamism*”. Their inter-agency collaboration to prevent extremism and radicalisation corresponds to how the Danish crime prevention effort is organised and, to a large extent, the prevention of extremism builds on the same structures known from that area. Although it mentions citizenship, democratic skills and social welfare, the emphasis in the National Action Plan is often on crime prevention, which matches the definition of extremism relating to violence and illegality.

It would seem that the definition of extremism as either a crime or an assault on democracy will, to some extent, colour the prevention processes in education and the key partners involved, particularly the police.

## 3.3 TARGETED SCHEMES, FOCAL POINTS OR INITIATIVES

Within their national plans or structures, some governments have or are developing specific initiatives for action that include education and training. Fuller country case studies are given in Section 6, but this section gives a flavour of the variety of focal points that different countries have chosen — whether centres, teams, cells, platforms or campaigns — all of which have an educational component. Examples are:

- In **Italy** there is a proposal for a **National Centre on Radicalisation** within the Ministry of the Interior to implement the national P/CVE strategy, including the training of police and magistrates as well as teachers and directors of schools.

- **Luxembourg** has a **National Centre against Radicalisation** called *Respect.lu*, a multi-agency initiative <sup>(vi)</sup>. As well as advice to those at risk of radicalisation and to families, it provides information to educators and youth workers on different processes of radicalisation.
- Since 2016, the **Belgian** Federal Public Services Interior has deployed its **Mobile Team** (EU-funded project) throughout the country to support municipalities in the development of their policy to prevent violent radicalisation. It states that through 81 field visits, the Mobile Team has been active in many municipalities, working on different topics with local stakeholders. In addition, the Flemish Community created a Flemish Action Plan and developed **Local Integral Security Cells**, consultative bodies in which education partners can be involved when necessary. Both projects are not directly linked to schools, but education actors can participate, particularly in terms of exchanging information about persons at risk of radicalisation. The different activities under the action plan are coordinated through the **Flemish Platform on Radicalisation** — a network of contact points from the various policy areas. Every 6 months an update on progress made is given to the Flemish Parliament. The co-chairs from the RAN Education and RAN Local Working Groups are part of the different Flemish platforms and share RAN insights manuals, papers and good practices.
- In **Spain**, the Ministers of Interior and Justice have launched a **campaign** supported by Google and the Spanish government called *#SomosMás* (We Are More), highlighting the role of leaders such as those of minority youth in countering discrimination and extremism. It is titled as an “educational project”, educating against hate speech, and involving “teachers, institutions, tutors, mothers, fathers, monitors ...”. Linked to this, in the aftermath of the August 2017 vehicular attacks, a coalition of 150 civic and religious groups organised a large rally in Barcelona to condemn terrorism and declare the solidarity of Spain’s Muslim community with the victims <sup>(vii)</sup>.
- **France** has proposed the creation of a **national response team** led by the Ministry of Education and DILCRAH (*Délégation Interministérielle à la Lutte Contre le Racisme, l’Antisémitisme et la Haine anti-LGBT*). This team, which aims to involve local actors and university rectors, will offer real-time adapted, flexible responses (interventions in institutions, support for educational teams, and mobilisation of associative or memorial partnerships, etc. to tackle anti-Semitism and hate in schools). It is part of the National Plan against Racism and Anti-Semitism (2018-2020) <sup>(viii)</sup> rather than the specific Prevent to Prepare plan (discussed later).

Overall, a picture starts to emerge of education being seen as part of a CT strategy, but very much in conjunction with other players and sources of intelligence and prevention. The next section examines directions regarding what education can do and why, more specifically.

## 4. Themes or directions in education strategy

Examining the priorities and programmes within P/CVE in different countries, it emerges that the actual government sector/ministry (or combined sectors of government) that are involved in P/CVE depends on the particular concerns that country has within the area of P/CVE, as well as perceptions and realities of risk and threat there. Six major themes are apparent:

### a) INTEGRATION AND COHESION

In **Austria**, the focus is on integration, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs supporting an information campaign to encourage Austrians to differentiate between Islam and violent extremism. The campaign also encourages improved integration of newly arrived refugees, German language acquisition, and education in Austrian values such as equality and democracy. This has an impact on schools. In **Greece**, concern over refugees is also evident and efforts are being made to provide specific training for officers on certain islands. **Flanders**, too, funds community campaigns and other projects promoting social cohesion.

The **Slovenian** government states that one of its priorities is the promotion of intercultural dialogue and the values of understanding and respect between civilisations, cultures, religions and beliefs. Education is cited as one of four pillars of activities (youth, education, media and migration), with the initiative “paramount” to dealing with current challenges (attacks, violence and killings based on religion, beliefs or ethnic affiliation). **France** is concerned about prejudice and stereotyping, stating “The fight against hatred, ignorance, cowardice and impunity is just beginning”, with educational institutions very much involved in this fight (see case study in Section 6).



It is significant that **Latvia** more directly cites preventive measures for the control of immigrants “from terrorism countries”, but also cites a threat from Russia. “When carrying out long-term societal integration policy, it must include a complex of measures for areas such as language, education, history, youth, etc that would allow for pre-emptively preventing threats to the national security of the Republic of Latvia caused by the national and information policy carried out by the Russian Federation” (x). Assimilation appears to be key, which has clear educational implications. The aim is to establish similar values, create a national consciousness and develop a “unified social memory” for all members of the new generation, irrespective of ethnic origin and language spoken in each family.

## b) SAFEGUARDING AND EARLY DETECTION

In the **UK**, as part of the government’s *Prevent* strategy, the Department for Education (DfE) and the Home Office support a platform called *Educate Against Hate* (mentioned later in this text). Teachers can locate teaching resources and information on the platform’s website in order to carry out their safeguarding duties. There is a counter extremism helpline for anyone concerned about extremism in school. Moreover, the site includes a section called ‘Prevent Mythbuster’ whose aim is to try to counter critiques and fears of the Prevent programme.

The **French** *Protect to Prevent* plan reinforces cooperation between institutions (education, justice, police, health and social care) in order to strengthen detection at the local level within the Family Prevention and Support Unit (CPRAF). Cooperation between prevention police and school heads is reinforced through combined training programmes.

In **Flanders**, the Action Plan mentioned earlier called for additional training of frontline practitioners, the creation of a network of Islamic experts to support practitioners and a telephone hotline for concerned individuals. All over Flanders, training sessions provide support to various schools with the goal being to promote a sustainable resilience policy. This uses the GO! (x) educational network to invest in key figures at each school trained in early detection and prevention of radicalisation.

In some countries, the reporting function is clearly prioritised. For instance, in **Denmark**, the parliament has continued to fund its CVE Action Plan, which calls for a multi-level approach that includes information sharing between schools, social services agencies, municipalities and the police. The coordination between these entities takes place in “info-houses” throughout the 12 police districts that act as storehouses of knowledge regarding radicalised behaviour among youth.

In **Slovakia** the main objective is to monitor educational practices and educational facilities “with regard to the possible occurrence of sources of extremist ideology with elements of terrorism, religious radicalisation and intolerance”. The Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Sports provides a budget for action to facilitate early recognition of radicalisation. The information is used to carry out a terrorism threat assessment for the Slovak Republic, with specific information sent to the CPU (Civil Protection Unit) assessor of terrorist threats.

In **Sweden**, schools partner with the Social Services department by relaying concerns if they are at all worried about a child who they feel may, for instance, be exposed to violent extremism. However, schools do not carry out the role of investigating and/or actively looking for signs of radicalisation on an individual level. Schools are encouraged (but not obliged) to report suspicion of serious crimes to the local police.

## c) SUPPORT AND ADVICE

Linked to reporting, but with less direct mention of the terrorist threat, are services that outline actions teachers and other individuals can take if they have concerns about a child. Many countries, such as Denmark, France, Austria and the UK, make mention of hotlines, agencies and personnel who are involved in deradicalisation and counselling services. **Austria** has an extensive set of tools in its *Beratungsstelle Extremismus* Advice Centre. Provided in four languages, it encompasses a website and video tutorials for anyone (parents, teachers, friends) concerned that a child is at risk which indicates what to look out for. With regard to referrals to authorities, it states that “we only get in touch with the young person if all parties agree to it and it makes sense for the consultation process”.

## d) TRAINING

Governments may fund teacher training programmes around P/CVE. **Cyprus** has provided all secondary school directors with training on identifying radicalised behaviour. The Ministry of Justice and Public Order also trained the staff of the Cyprus Youth Board, a public organisation responsible for youth issues and the progress and welfare of all youth in Cyprus. In **Sweden**, via the National Agency for Education, teachers receive training on how to deal with issues of extremism and racism in the classroom and among pupils at risk. The government has

tasked the Defence Research Agency with gaining better insight into terrorist propaganda and the National Agency for Education with providing teachers with better tools to address P/CVE in the classroom.

In other countries, training may cover a wider field. In **Spain**, specialised training of trainers will be focused on ideological, cultural and religious issues — especially conflicts, in-depth knowledge of Spain's constitutional framework, and specific initiatives on integration, particularly prevention of exclusion, social segregation and violent radicalisation.

In **France**, the focus of training starts with racism, in line with the concerns mentioned in Section 4(a). France has committed to strengthen training of all staff in the prevention and management of racist and anti-Semitic remarks and assumptions made in institutions. To this end, a call has been issued to systematise training designed to equip teachers facing teaching challenges or addressing so-called controversial issues.

## e) CRITICAL THINKING AND MEDIA

Critical thinking in pedagogy appears in a number of policies, albeit for different reasons. In **Portugal**, the aim is to develop critical thinking in young people, "involving the sectors of education, training and animation and providing a pedagogical education in citizenship". **Finland** lends particular credence to the role of education in P/CVE, citing the role of schools in supporting young people to think critically, embrace positive citizenship, fact check, engage in dialogue, and "act in a pluralistic society that values diversity and respects human rights, equality and fairness in accordance with the values and principles of democracy". **Denmark** cites democracy and citizenship, critical thinking and controversial issues and, in 2018, concluded a major national campaign on democracy in schools and active engagement. **Sweden**, too, stresses the strengthening of "youth knowledge and skills for active citizenship, including resilience against propaganda of violent extremism", while the **Flemish** education system also emphasises active citizenship. For **Latvia**, it is about the education of society, that is "ways of differentiating between objective information, disinformation and propaganda, thus promoting critical thinking in society and the capacity to analyse, evaluate and recognise various informational influence measures that allow the targeted destruction of trust in the Republic of Latvia and its policies". This is clearly linked with the perceptions of threat mentioned above.

## f) TACKLING UNDERLYING CAUSES OF RADICALISATION

In **Hungary**, education is seen to play a part in addressing the root causes of radicalisation. It states that long-lasting results can be achieved by more effectively tackling those social problems that create the basis of support for extremism — the fight against poverty, support for good governance, and the promotion of human rights, rule of law and democratic core values. Anti-marginalisation is a recurring theme in **Danish** policy, with the need to strengthen collaboration with parents. **Slovenia**, too, says that they must also address the root causes of and conditions conducive to the spread of radicalisation, violent extremism and terrorism.

**Luxembourg** pinpoints youth unemployment. The **Netherlands** stresses that their approach prioritises the use of preventive measures, including mentoring, counselling, and access to job-training programmes and other social services, to steer individuals away from becoming radicalised to violence. Its policy states that the government generally views repressive measures, including arrest and prosecution, as steps to take only when preventive measures fail.

As with all P/CVE initiatives, the success of education on its own in tackling underlying causes of radicalisation is impossible to measure, and direct cause-and-effect cannot be assumed.

Clearly, there cannot be a single focus, and many countries combine a number of different approaches. Nonetheless, the increasing burden placed on education to deal with issues of cohesion, individuals at risk and the roots of vulnerability begins to become apparent.

# 5. Working with civil society: Government support for NGO projects

The other way to establish the nature of government support is to examine accounts of anti-extremism projects in different countries and see whether they cite government backing as being part of their sustainability. Many P/CVE projects are funded by diverse organisations and NGOs that themselves may not be sustainable, long-term or rely on volunteers. Examination of the websites of NGOs and of a multitude of their P/CVE projects over the

last few years reveals that a number no longer seem to be operating or have limited reach. Those that are longer lasting rely on a combination of funding sources, which often include governmental bodies. Examples include:

- For the **French** *Promeneurs du Net* programme (educators having a presence on the internet to intervene and build relationships of trust with young people and respond to their concerns), it was reported that one of the key drivers of success was the national funding and organisational support provided by national bodies (government, ministries, etc.) and local governance. It involved the mobilisation of various partners, including local institutional partners and associations. In 2017, the national family benefits fund (*Caisse Nationale des Allocations Familiales*) contributed EUR 1.5 million to support the deployment of Promeneurs du Net in 88 French departments. While not directly linked to schools, it provides an “educative presence” and fosters a “critical spirit” towards information that is helpful to pedagogic practice.
- **German**-based *Ufuq.de* is a large NGO that receives financial support through various government, EU and private grants. Ufuq.de operates at the intersection of education, academia and public debate and works often with youngsters of Muslim and/or immigrant background, aiming to foster a sense of belonging and empowers them to confront the phenomena of Islamism and ethnic/nationalist ideologies. It has projects in schools such as *Bildmachen* — civic education for critical media literacy that uses political education to look at religious extremist content. Since February 2015, the Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth has supported it as a part of the *Demokratie leben!* programme (discussed later).
- The Getting on Together (GOT) project in Wales was piloted with **Welsh** government funding in 2009 and was the first of four structured interventions and programmes for schools. Home Office funding enabled the production of the DVD *Understanding Islam*, which is used in schools, colleges, communities and faith groups. In 2011, a DVD titled *Challenging Extremism* was produced. The project ran for at least 6 years, with the last website report dated 2015. An evaluation in 2013 found that the Welsh government’s Community Cohesion Unit was central to meeting GOT objectives. Community Cohesion grant funding was provided to support additional cohesion and Prevent activities. The Community Cohesion Fund proved instrumental to the success of this objective. The funding offer served to secure the attention of all 22 local authorities in Wales and promote their engagement in the Community Cohesion agenda, despite some local authorities initially expressing scepticism about the relevance of the agenda to their area. It was reported by Cardiff City Council in July 2018 that the programme was set for roll-out in Wales, Germany and Slovakia.
- From **Norway** comes *Dembra* (Democratic preparedness against racism and anti-Semitism). With the support of the Norwegian Directorate of Education and Training, this programme trains teachers and management in secondary schools to prevent extremism, anti-Semitism, racism and undemocratic attitudes in schools. After an initial 4-year pilot period in Oslo, it is now being extended to other regions in Norway, offering schools all over the country the opportunity to participate in the programme and receive guidance online. Dembra offers support to schools that want to work on addressing perceptions of “the other” among teachers and pupils. Each individual school defines as starting points the challenges that each are experiencing and designs their own project with the support of mentors and experienced trainers. The programme offers seminars on conceptual, theoretical and historical frameworks relating to the challenge and these are combined with hands-on training exercises that inspire learning inside and outside the classroom. The website Dembra.no contains learning resources related to Dembra topics, such as critical thinking, prejudice, group hostility, national minorities, radicalisation and violent extremism.
- Other examples relate to local government or city-level support. In **Antwerp**, the mission of the *Drop Out Prevention* project, based in the Education Policy Division, was to tackle the matter of unqualified and early school leavers, students who were kept in the same grade for more than 1 year, truancy, radicalisation, expulsion, inequality (poverty or language), and the gap between education and labour market. This is tackled through a close-knit guidance network for detection and follow-up of youngsters at risk, with partners comprising local educational forums and projects, schools and Pupil Guidance Centres, local welfare facilities and health services, the Justice department and police, and Flemish employment services and job centres. It is reported that the Flemish government viewed this as good practice. On the other hand, more broadly, in Flanders, the Athena Syntax project became part of the education system’s action plan. This project grew from a dialogue between teachers of science, religion and worldviews after they noticed that students were confused by discrepancies between lessons on evolution and origin narratives. The project is built upon common values of universal human rights and freedoms, and mutual respect; gender equality; secularism (the separation between church and state); and dogma-free scientific research themes. Identity is explored through art and creativity.
- **Croatia** offers a teacher training example. Here, professional teacher development in the area of intercultural education developed by an NGO, the Nansen Dialogue Centre, is government-sponsored, and it



involves the subject *Cultural and Spiritual Heritage of the Region* (CSHR). CSHR teachers are paid by the Croatian Ministry of Science, Education and Sports, and the programme brings together children from different ethnic groups to foster tolerance and prevent violent and extremist behaviour.

- In the **Netherlands**, the *Dialogue in Citizenship Education* programme was launched in 2015. The programme aims to support teachers to tackle the discussion of sensitive issues in the classroom, using a peer education methodology. This employs young role models who use their own experiences and references to engage in open conversations with students, not shying away from (positive) confrontation. The Dutch Ministries of Social Affairs and Education finance the programme.
- A final example of successful wide-ranging and cohesive government support is the Violence Prevention Network (VPN), based in **Germany**. This is a group of experienced specialists who have been successfully engaged in anti-violence work and the prevention of extremism, as well as the deradicalisation of extremist-motivated criminals, for a number of years. Since 2001, the VPN team has been working successfully in reducing ideologically motivated and religiously motivated serious crime and extreme acts of violence committed by youth. It has received support from a range of government institutions, depending on VPN targets, and these include the Federal Ministry of Family, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth, the Federal Ministry of the Interior, the Federal Ministry of Justice, the Bavarian State Ministry of the Interior and the Bavarian Federal Police department as well as a number of other federal ministries. Amongst other queries, the VPN answers questions from teachers such as "In my class, 3 religions and 5 cultures meet. How am I supposed to manage that?" With up to 200 training courses per year, VPN reaches almost 3 000 educational professionals and multipliers nationwide. Each year, their prevention workshops at schools are attended by several thousand young people.

These examples show the importance of the intersection between government and civil society in terms of how NGOs can both influence government (in what is effective anti-extremism work) and be supported by them. Preventing violent extremism cannot be all top-down.

## 6. Country case studies of government support

Countries where more extensive information is available, or that responded in full to our survey, provide salutary case studies of a government fully committed to education as part of its CT or P/CVE strategy, with vertical and horizontal coherence across different agencies. We provide six examples here, in alphabetical order. They clearly have many overlaps and commonalities, but each is given a title to indicate a standout feature. Each case study is presented under three headings: summary, principles of the approach and educational impact.

### BELGIUM: SHARING RESPONSIBILITIES

#### Summary

Under its national Action Plan Radicalisation (Plan R), Belgium adopts and promotes a holistic approach in combating terrorism and preventing violent extremism. Prevention, legal prosecution and rehabilitation comprise the major components. Such an approach presupposes close cooperation and coordination between various actors and policy areas. Responsibilities are shared between federal authorities and communities or regions.

#### Principles of approach

The Brussels Region, the Flemish Community and the French Community have drawn up their own action plans that are carried out in coordination with Plan R. The Flemish action plan for the prevention of violent radicalisation and polarisation (2017) describes the integrated approach along five policy lines: (1) coordination and cooperation in the implementation; (2) support for the local approach; (3) organisation of a person-centred approach; (4) reinforcement of knowledge and expertise; and (5) mobilisation of civil society. The key principle in this is an integrated preventive approach where every policy area — including education — assumes its responsibilities within its respective powers. The intention is not to create new structures, but rather to strengthen the existing regular provision and competencies of first-line workers.

## Educational impact

Preventive measures within the field of education are taken at the regional (community) or local level. In general, the focus lies in the reinforcement of educational first-line workers such as teachers and pupil guidance counsellors by increasing their knowledge of radicalisation (what it is, but also what it is not), handing them tools and reinforcing their competences. Secondly, the goal is to support schools in developing a school policy that fosters a warm school climate where students feel safe and valued, diversity is addressed in a positive and respectful way, and students and parents are involved in decision-making processes. Thirdly, the strengthening of resilience among pupils is supported through investment in media literacy and citizenship and the support of projects that focus on the inclusion of vulnerable student groups.

## FINLAND: USING THE CURRICULUM

### Summary

Finland has a **National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation** <sup>(xi)</sup>. This aids the Ministry of the Interior in coordinating the prevention of radicalisation at a national level. The ministry has appointed a **national cooperation group** that has representatives from various authorities and organisations. The programme targets groups and individuals who are in danger of being radicalised. The aim is to strengthen the ability of children and adolescents to identify and guard against violence-inducing messages and propaganda.

### Principles of approach

The Finnish approach to preventing violent radicalisation and extremism (as well as other destructive behaviour) involves realising the principles of the National Core Curricula for all ages. This school-wide, human rights-based approach provides tools for participation, active involvement and the building of a sustainable future including skills for resolving conflicts in a peaceful way. The principles require the following:

- student participation and agency is enhanced through all work;
- learning can also happen outside the classroom;
- transversal competencies include cultural competence, taking care of self and others, safety, multi-literacy, ICT competence, and competence in the world of work and entrepreneurship;
- inquiry-based learning;
- diversity in learning assessment to enhance participation and responsibility, and the feeling of being able to influence;
- democratic competence and conflict resolution.

### Educational impact

There is a specific guidance brochure titled 'The Prevention of violent radicalisation in schools and educational institutions' <sup>(xii)</sup> in three languages (Finnish, Swedish and English), distributed to every school, and the National Agency for Education has created a web page on P/CVE where more material is collected and modified to fit the Finnish school personnel material produced by the Council of Europe, Unesco and RAN.

The government's long-term objective is that by 2025 Finland will be a country where everyone feels at home. This means a country that is welcoming and international, populated with people representing different languages and cultures, who interact in a positive way, making the country a unique place to live. To this end, the Ministry of Education and Culture has launched an action plan named *Meaningful in Finland* to prevent hate speech and racism and foster social inclusion. It includes enhanced teacher training to prevent violent radicalisation, and promote human rights, diversity, etc., but going further than schools, establishing working groups across the Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Justice, and Ministry of Education and Culture to coordinate actions against hate speech and online bullying and promote a respectful discussion culture across society.

The strength of the Finnish approach is held to be that the type of administrative structure in schools, locally and governmentally, means that P/CVE measures are not only project-based but taken into consideration in the whole-school culture and in all teaching. In addition, Finland provides financing for P/CVE activities (training and

projects) for universities, and NGOs that work in education, the youth sector, etc. Finnish teacher training, that for all educators is at master's level, supports these aims.

## FRANCE: BOLSTERING STUDENT DEFENCES

### Summary

France has developed a new strategy in the *Prevent to Protect (Prévenir pour Protéger)* Plan launched in February 2018 <sup>(xiii)</sup>. Involving specialists and civil society at both local and national levels, the plan involves 60 measures and "aims to reorient the policy of prevention".

### Principles of approach

The aims are centred around five goals:

1. shielding minds from radicalisation,
2. widening the detection/prevention network,
3. understanding and anticipating developments in radicalisation,
4. professionalising local stakeholders and assessing their practices,
5. tailoring the methods of disengagement.

### Educational impact

The first axis involves the Education Ministry on a much higher level than previous plans.

- i) defending the values of the republican school system, by developing initiatives to support the principle of secularism at a national and regional level and implementing homework in school and half-day Wednesday programmes in disadvantaged areas to support pupils in their studies;
- ii) bolstering pupils' defences by systematising media and information literacy training (*éducation aux médias et à l'information* (EMI));
- iii) developing capacities for critical thinking and debate;
- iv) continuing pedagogical training of staff and developing specific tools and pedagogical resources online.

There is also a clear goal to make the detection of radicalisation in all schools more robust by better involving heads of schools (a guide <sup>(xiv)</sup> is provided), strengthening cooperation with trained prevention police officers, and working on a departmental level to better monitor education in private schools and home schooling.

## GERMANY <sup>(xv)</sup>: FOSTERING DEMOCRACY

### Summary

Since 2016, Germany has developed a formal and extensive *Federal Government Strategy to Prevent Extremism and Promote Democracy*. The strategy has a very strong intersectoral approach. It conceives prevention work as requiring collaboration between local authority level, regional level, federal level and international level, and explicitly builds on NGOs in the development and implementation of activities on the ground. As the title of the strategy suggests, for Germany, prevention of extremism and promotion of democracy go hand in hand.

### Principles of approach

The first of the six action areas of the strategy relates to education: *Political education, inter-cultural learning and democracy work* (the others being civil society engagement; advice, monitoring and intervention; media and the internet; research; and international cooperation). This action area pursues three main aims: to further develop educational practices and innovative approaches; to promote an understanding of political issues and strengthen democratic awareness and participation; and to enable people to deal with diversity and to strengthen the

understanding and practice of democratic values and human rights, especially in cases of conflict. The strategy document includes a comprehensive overview of the main projects, including their budgets and target groups.

## Educational impact

Preventive educational concepts are also being developed in the areas of racism, Islamophobia and hatred of Muslims, anti-gypsy/Roma attitudes, homophobia and transphobia, and in the areas of right-wing extremism, Islamist extremism and left-wing extremism. As well as areas of hate as noted above, preventive initiatives include “historical political education”, with the aim of allowing a critical analysis of the time of National Socialism and the Socialist Unity Party dictatorship in the German Democratic Republic in order to prevent these epochs from being glorified and trivialised and to make young people aware of the dangers of anti-democratic ideologies based on contempt for their fellow human beings.

There is a close link with a core aspect of Germany’s federal Preventing Violent Extremism – Education (PVE-E) policy which is to further develop existing prevention work within the *Demokratie leben* federal programme (translated as “(to) Live Democracy”) (xvi). Sponsored communities are provided by the Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth with funding for an **action and initiative fund** that can be used to finance concrete individual measures. This could be, for example, a democracy festival, a poster campaign, or teaching and information materials. There is also a youth forum.

Other noteworthy aspects of the German context are, first, the understanding of extremism (and associated prevention efforts) in a broader sense rather than merely in relation to extremism that translates into violent behaviour. Prevention efforts in Germany include addressing any form of extremist thinking that is anti-democratic, regardless of whether it involves violence or not. This approach is illustrated by the recently launched project *Respekt Coaches* (implemented in schools by the Youth Migration Services (*Jugendmigrationsdienste*). Drama educators encourage respectful relationships, and the programme aims, amongst other things, at preventing and countering “religiously motivated bullying” through social work in schools. Second, the German case is noteworthy in PVE-E, being strongly related to the role of external actors. Many states collaborate with NGOs for projects and use their resources in the classroom or attend workshops and trainings (Ufuq.de and the VPN were mentioned earlier). The *Deutsches Jugendinstitut e.V.*, a research and practice organisation specialising in youth, hosts a **Research Unit** for the Prevention of Right-Wing Extremism and Radicalisation that manages research projects on extremism prevention (most recently also including left-wing and Islamist forms). The institute is also charged with the continuous evaluation of the aforementioned government-funded programme Live Democracy.

## THE NETHERLANDS: SUPPORTING SAFE SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES

### Summary

The Netherlands action programme to *Combat jihadism* started in 2014 and had three objectives: to protect democracy and the rule of law, to combat and weaken the jihadist movement in the Netherlands, and to remove the breeding ground for radicalisation. In 2016, the National Counterterrorism Strategy 2016-2020 was set up, and in 2017 the action programme was evaluated by the Dutch Inspectorate of Justice and Security, who found that it had had an acceleratory effect on the integral approach to jihadism. It is stressed that to realise the best possible approach, governments should try to learn as much as possible from other countries, and to encourage this exchange of knowledge. The report is published in English (xvii).

### Principles of approach

Specifically for “prevention”, the Ministries of Education, of Health, Welfare and Sport, and of Justice and Security set up the programme *Preventing radicalization* for 2 years, 2018-2019, with the possibility of adding more. The Ministry of Education strongly supports educational institutions in their attempts to prevent radicalisation within the broader context of social safety and safeguarding children. The goals are to make schools aware of their responsibility towards their students with regard to radicalisation, to give schools awareness of their local areas, to strengthen cooperation between schools and local stakeholders, and provide training on these issues and how to deal with difficult situations in the classroom.

## Educational impact

In 2015, the ministry had started doing so through six concrete actions, as follows:

1. Experts from the School & Safety Foundation (*Stichting & Veiligheid*) provide customised, direct support for schools, depending on the request for help from the schools.
2. The ministry provides free, accessible training for teachers in recognising and dealing with young people who are at risk of radicalisation.
3. The ministry is investing in the various portals that are available for all educational institutions.
  - a. The School & Safety Foundation has a hotline, where schools and teachers can ask their questions on safeguarding and fostering a positive school climate, as well as on extremism and identifying and countering radicalisation.
  - b. For higher education, there is the portal for the program Integral Safety Higher Education. This portal contains information about suspicious behaviour, radicalisation and jihadism.
4. The “confidential counsellors” at the Dutch Inspectorate of Education follow special training on radicalisation. Education inspectors also devote attention to this subject in their regular supervision of school performance.
5. Municipalities play an important role in tackling radicalisation and are the first point of contact for many schools when they face problems. Municipalities can ask the School & Safety Foundation to directly help the educational institutions that need assistance most.
6. Teacher training course materials have been developed with cooperation from the Ministry of Social Affairs and higher educational institutions. These new course materials are based on peer education methodologies (mentioned earlier), demonstrated to be an effective method to discuss sensitive topics such as the Holocaust, anti-Semitism, homophobia, Islamophobia and other related sensitive issues.

Currently, the renewed *Integral Educational Approach on polarisation and extremism* (2018-2019) (part of the *Integral approach to terrorism and extremism* started in 2017), emphasises awareness and cooperation at local level to help educational institutions in referrals. Workshops and conferences aim to increase the sense of urgency; there is training on “socially difficult” subjects, such as citizenship. The updated programmes focus on extremism in a wider scope, also including far-right extremism.

For higher education, the programme *Integral Safe Higher Education* has been awarded a subsidy for activities such as the promotion/roll-out of *E-learning Worrying Behavior* as an awareness tool and keeping a train-the-trainer available to advise on worrying behaviour and radicalisation. Consultations are held with the Dutch Data Protection Authority about a privacy protocol for the higher education sector.

The Netherlands finds partnership work crucial. This includes strengthening cooperation and trust between partners from security/police and the social domains of youth and education. Therefore, there are pilots focusing on fostering this cooperation on the local level and programmes building partnerships between youth work organisations and schools.

## UK: PROCESSES TO FULFIL THE PREVENT DUTY

### Summary

The UK’s Counter-terrorism strategy 2018 is called CONTEST. This includes a strategy for preventing people from being drawn into terrorism (PREVENT), a Hate Crime Strategy and a Counter-Extremism Strategy (which includes non-violent extremism), which aims to counter the ideology spread by extremists of all types and to promote shared values. In addition, it aims to improve understanding of the causes and impacts of extremism and do more to build a partnership with all those opposed to extremism, disrupt extremists and build more cohesive communities.



## Principles of approach

All “regulated education settings” (schools, further education and higher education) are subject to the government **Prevent duty** <sup>(xviii)</sup>, which involves the institution having “due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism”. These obligations involve institutions ensuring that:

1. their staff are trained to identify vulnerabilities to being drawn into terrorism and know-how to find support for the individual,
2. they have a risk assessment to determine what their approach to a Prevent concern would be,
3. they work with partners to ensure effective safeguarding procedures are followed,
4. they have arrangements to keep children safe from terrorist and extremist material when accessing the internet.

## Educational impact

Nationally, the government provides online tools to assist in the application of Prevent duty. This includes e-learning on Prevent, the Prevent referral process and a programme named Channel, a multi-agency early intervention approach that provides support at an early stage to people who are identified as being vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism-related activity, and aims to protect and divert them away from the risk.

The government also funds and manages the website Educate Against Hate <sup>(xix)</sup> to provide practical advice, support and resources to protect children from extremism and radicalisation. The hub provides content for teachers, school leaders and parents, and has lesson plans, toolkits and work on conflict and democracy, and on the deliberative classroom, with a training catalogue and directions to initiatives such as Unicef’s Rights Respecting Schools. The DfE also funds a website hosted by the Education and Training Foundation on complying with Prevent duty <sup>(xx)</sup>.

Locally, the Home Office and DfE offer additional support for institutions to manage their requirements under the Duty. There is a network of Prevent Education Officers who are local authority employees and play a key role in supporting schools in priority areas and informing the development of policy and practice nationally. The UK also funds regional coordinators to support the higher and further education sector to embed Prevent, deliver training and link to partners such as police. The government also provides guidance to local authorities on children returning from Syria, which is not always directly relevant to schools, but is an important part of Prevent work. The DfE’s Due Diligence and Counter Extremism Division operates a Counter Extremism helpline as part of the national support provided to schools and colleges.

## 7. Gaps and issues

From the survey, a number of countries report that there are concerns in strategy still to be addressed or that present continuing needs. These can be grouped into six areas:

- **Increasing divisions and polarisation.** In **Belgium**, increasing polarisation is noticeable in all levels of society and also visible in school. This does not only exist between pupils but often also in the attitudes and views of teachers. This can intensify conflicts at school, obstruct the search for solutions and leave students even more vulnerable to extremist influences. This is a difficult issue to tackle as it no longer allows the problem to be addressed as something that concerns “the others” (i.e. minorities), but also demands self-reflection. In **the Netherlands**, citizenship training is something that teachers “do understand” and they do see young people in their schools disenfranchised from the society in which they live. Racism, failure to receive invitations to internship interviews, youth unemployment and missing out on opportunities their Dutch “white” friends enjoy are viewed as creating tension.
- **Lack of urgency.** In **the Netherlands** it was however perceived that a lack of urgency with regard to violent extremism could be a barrier. With very few terrorist attacks there, schools feel very distant from the safety and security field of work, and because the physical base of Daesh (the focus of Dutch security concerns) has fallen apart, schools think that the threats are over. Most who went to join terrorist groups were not in school at the time of departure. Also, the Dutch intelligence service concedes that most of the violent extremism has gone underground. “This nurtures a sense that if you don’t see a problem or encounter a problem, then there is no problem - most schools don’t see ‘countering violent extremism’ as their core business.” Similarly, in **Belgium**, schools are already considered to be fulfilling important

preventive measures in their day-to-day tasks. Yet, when confronted with concerns about radicalisation, but also more broadly with problems or conflicts perceived as stemming from (religious) diversity, frontline workers often “block” or “forget” their own professional competencies. It is viewed as important to keep informing frontline staff about radicalisation, raise awareness of their role, and strengthen their confidence and competencies in tackling these problems. The tackling of new challenges is viewed as crucial: policy is seen as largely lacking specific measures to address the extreme right.

- **A raft of other concerns.** Linked to this is the pressure on teachers to solve multiple challenges. **Sweden** talks of the pressures facing schools from a whole variety of problems, such as drugs, crime and health, as well as the need to apply necessary knowledge and skills. It identifies a barrier in P/CVE as inadequate understanding of education for democratic citizenship. School staff, especially teachers, could benefit from a more mutual interpretation of the role of education in their democracy, and the school’s democratic assignment.
- **Lack of confidence.** In the UK, particularly in further education, many teachers were reported to lack confidence in approaching Prevent issues with learners and found it challenging to have difficult conversations with learners on sensitive issues. In **the Netherlands**, how to raise concerns with social services (P/CVE and honour-related issues) is one identified need, while safe classrooms and support in teaching and managing controversial issues are also important topics. Some teachers find it extremely challenging to discuss difficult topics. Others feel that they are ill-equipped to detect signs of radicalisation. There is a concern about teachers intervening in radicalisation processes at an early stage when sensitivities are high and skill sets may be low in terms of recognition and appropriate referral.
- **Variation in need and in support.** **Sweden** stresses that challenges differ from school to school, and there are no “quick fixes”. In the **UK**, local implementation of the Prevent strategy varies widely, depending on the resources available, and the priority given to extremism and Prevent in the local authority. Information sharing amongst agencies is seen as very important, to enable education settings to understand and comprehend the risk that is being posed to them. **The Netherlands** also reports that increasing efforts depends on the extent to which educational institutions are equipped to deal with radicalisation, which may vary widely from school to school.
- **Balancing free speech against duties to report behaviour.** In the UK, particularly in the higher or further education field, balancing free speech and the demands of the Prevent strategy can be challenging. Educational institutions possess legal duties to report risk and apparent vulnerability and this has raised concerns over how Prevent impacts on freedom of speech and led to controversy surrounding the Prevent strategy, including negative media reports. Institutions need to make judgements about the risk posed by a particular external speaker; it can mean controversy and protest from students, academics and the media for either allowing or not allowing certain speakers. Meanwhile, it can be difficult to find someone equipped to challenge a charismatic extremist. The government believes that universities, in general, balance these duties well but there may be more work that can be done to support them.

Overall, a continuing concern is school safety and safeguarding of students across a range of possible threats to their personal security — as well as the security of the school. The question is where to place P/CVE in the list of priorities.

## 8. Conclusions

By reviewing the policies, practices and frameworks of diverse states in relation to P/CVE, we may draw a range of conclusions that might contribute to continuing learning around challenges and good practices. The needs of education were identified in Section 2 as finance, training, knowledge and moral support. It has been found to be difficult to make generalisations and recommendations about what constitutes “government” support to meet these needs, given the huge range of different partnerships that are specific to each country. Our study has revealed a complex mix of collaboration across different ministries as well as across central and local governments, local authorities and municipalities. In this field, one cannot often transplant “inspiring” practices across countries, but one can, more fundamentally, point to some prerequisites that underpin rigorous and effective strategies.

- **The need for national action plans:** Initiatives appear effective and coherent in conjunction with national action plans that then require annual reporting, lines of communication, dedicated budget allocations, clear lines of responsibility and mainstreaming into local contexts. Countries with federal and decentralised structures may be able to decide strategy locally, but the national plan, if robust and

persuasive, provides a framework for such strategy and budget support. There should be links with other national policies, for example on refugees or child protection, or social media and internet use, in terms of support for schools.

- **The continuous analysis and understanding of the threat itself:** The framing of violent extremism differs considerably from EU Member State to Member State, with many focusing on the threat from extreme Islamist-related violence. Threats from violence on the part of “home-grown” extremists or groups linked to the far right appear lacking sometimes in recognition and subsequent action. There is a need for constant appraisal of the nature of violent extremism in a country and, therefore, of the strategies to be deployed in and through education. A national action plan needs ongoing revision, and mutual information shared between the local and the national levels about the nature of extremism is critical. Information from the local level is crucial, too, in how a national policy is being received, for example, in whether it is seen as stigmatising certain groups or seems to securitise schools.
- **The role of education and the need for whole-school approaches:** Violent extremism may be viewed in some Member States as an issue for security services, and not one to be addressed more extensively, including in the field of education. Where educational initiatives are identified, they may not be viewed as P/CVE but as initiatives to improve citizenship, assimilate minorities or promote anti-racism. This may be more comfortable for teachers, but may ignore the need for specific awareness about extremism and how to address it in schools. Nonetheless, it is clear that government should support whole-school approaches where issues related to resilience, respect and inclusion would be mainstreamed across the curriculum. The role of education in the promotion of democracy is particularly important, and more than one country makes the link explicit in their programming around P/CVE.
- **Partnerships:** The import of partnerships is, however, clear. For the struggle against violent extremism there has to be coherence across departmental agencies, using expertise in different places (for example, justice with regard to prisons, social services for community welfare, youth services for clubs, health for issues of mental health, and so on). Collaboration with police is vital. A ministry or department of education can lead, but P/CVE cannot be the sole remit of such a ministry.
- **Consultation and teamwork at local levels:** To ensure buy-in at all levels, consultation locally and with frontline workers in schools, police, and social and health services is paramount in order to increase positive impact and local ownership. This may require persuasion, or help with prioritisation where the threat from violent extremism is viewed as minimal or irrelevant. Government can provide resources and support, but solutions have to be localised. We have seen how the creation of P/CVE teams, hubs and integrated cells at local level enable more tailor-made support for a school.
- **Continuity of funding:** Clearly, there needs to be sustainability of financing, particularly when the government is drawing on NGOs that may not have assured funding. Clear funding streams are needed to maintain and update websites, e-learning, and guidance documents for schools and communities, as well as helplines for students, teachers and parents. There is also a need for sustained budgets in terms of training of teachers. Training and workshops cannot be done just once, and a continuous programme, with dedicated materials, to target incoming teachers is paramount. New methodologies for training teachers to tackle controversial issues are emerging and they need piloting and review.
- **Safeguarding and early warning:** Linked to the above, well-understood safeguarding policies need to be established in schools that are linked to training and subject to supervision by a school inspectorate or supervisory body. Schools need to have established clear protocols for dealing with concerns about students at risk, with chains of discussion before referrals to outside agencies are made.
- **Evaluation:** In relation to independent evaluation and to increased learning and dissemination within countries and between countries, there remain a number of barriers:
  - Once a policy or project is proposed, we know little about how particular projects or NGOs are selected (or rejected) for government support, or whether the impetus came from government and organisations were invited to apply.
  - The measurement of success of initiatives across time and space is then difficult to assess because of the fragmentation and range of projects, with different objectives and baselines.
  - The translatability of projects to different contexts is not easily identifiable.
  - Research units to track and publicise initiatives need to be part of government programming.

A higher level of regular exchange regarding specifically P/CVE-related initiatives in the field of education across the EU, with access to local contextual knowledge and methodologically transparent evaluation and impact measurements, would allow for a longer-term assessment and exchange of best practice — as well as exchange of failures and continuing concerns. This study has identified an extensive range of impressive government practices that can be utilised for such research and exchange.

## Endnotes

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(v) The Federal Government. (2017). *Federal government strategy to prevent extremism and promote democracy*. Berlin, Germany: Federal Ministry of Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth. (action plan, p. 9).

(vi) See: <https://www.respect.lu/information/index-en.php> online.

(vii) UNHCR: *Country Reports on Terrorism 2017 – Spain*.

(viii) DILCRAH: *National Plan Against Racism and Anti-Semitism (2018-2020)*.

(ix) Ministry of Defence, Latvia. *Latvian National Security Concept*.

(x) GO! is one of the three main educational networks in Flanders. GO! embodies the practical outcome of every parent's constitutional right to choose a school within reasonable proximity to their homes. See: <http://www.learn2teach.eu/project-partners/go-belgium/> online.

(xi) Ministry of the Interior, Finland: *Preventive work to combat violent radicalisation and extremism*.

(xii) Finnish National Agency for Education: *Prevention of violent radicalisation in schools and educational institutions*.

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(<sup>xiii</sup>) GOUVERNEMENT.fr: « [Prévenir Pour Protéger](#) » – *Plan national de prévention de la radicalisation*.

(<sup>xiv</sup>) See: [Prévenir la radicalisation des jeunes](#) (2018).

(<sup>xv</sup>) We are grateful to Eleni Christodoulou and Simona Szakács for this information, which comes from their book *Preventing violent extremism through education*. Reference: Christodoulou, E., & Szakács, S. (2018). [Preventing violent extremism through education: International and German approaches](#) (pp. 45–48). Braunschweig, Germany: Georg Eckert Institute.

(<sup>xvi</sup>) Federal Ministry of Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth, Germany: [Partnerships for democracy](#).

(<sup>xvii</sup>) Inspectorate of Justice and Security, the Netherlands: [Evaluation of the Netherlands comprehensive action programme to combat jihadism](#).

(<sup>xviii</sup>) From 1 July 2015 all schools, registered early years childcare providers and registered later years childcare providers (referred to as “childcare providers”) are subject to a duty under section 26 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, in the exercise of their functions, to have “due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism”. This duty is known as the Prevent duty. See: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-duty-guidance> online.

(<sup>xix</sup>) See: <https://educateagainsthate.com/> online.

(<sup>xx</sup>) See: <http://preventforfeandtraining.org.uk/> online.