Introduction

Tasked by the European Commission to boost communication and dialogue amongst practitioners, national policymakers and academic evidence-based researchers, the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) Centre of Excellence held a research seminar on 17 October in Amsterdam.

The Final Report (May 2018) of the High-Level Commission Expert Group on Radicalisation (HLCEG-R) was the springboard for the research seminar.

The seminar focused on:
• priority topics
• dialogue amongst researchers, practitioners and policymakers
• perspectives on future priorities so as to address current knowledge gaps, and how to better link researchers and their output.

This paper was prepared by Magnus Ranstorp, Quality Manager of the RAN Centre of Excellence.
Researchers, practitioners and policymakers form the three pillars of a successful approach to preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE). For the HLCEG-R, increasing synergy and the interplay between these stakeholders is a priority.

The RAN research seminar has initiated a more systematic exchange between these stakeholders. With this in mind, the research community, the policymaking community and practitioners identified how to streamline their research priorities and modalities so as to integrate research evidence into practices and policies. Practitioners, policymakers and researchers discussed the most pressing challenges in P/CVE from their respective positions, and explored how each stakeholder could address these challenges through cooperation and joint focus.

Moreover, the research seminar explored primary research efforts and identified challenges and principal subjects for future research under HLCEG-R-prioritised topics. This ex post paper takes stock of the current evidence base of HLCEG-R-prioritised areas and the triologue involving stakeholders in research, practice and policymaking. It also takes stock of prioritised topics to be studied through closer collaboration in the future.
Policymakers, practitioners and academics: sharing lessons and dilemmas

The EU research context of violent extremism and radicalisation is a highly complex arena: researchers work across many different academic disciplines (political science, international relations, sociology, criminology, religious studies, etc.) on specific violent extremism issues using various qualitative and quantitative methods. Despite the high volume of research material, many within and beyond the academic community recognise the necessity to undertake literature reviews and stock-taking of evidence-based research. Much of the scholarly work on CVE is based on theory and anecdotes rather than hard data tested through rigorous scientific methods. As Rohlwing (2016) astutely observes: ‘what is chronically missing are empirical studies and good qualitative and quantitative evidence to bolster — or challenge — the common assumptions about CVE practice and policy.’ (1) This legitimate critique of the state of CVE-related research is borne out below in our brief review of evidence-based findings in each of the prioritised research themes highlighted by, and organised in line with, the HLCEG-R report. Despite the compelling academic contributions to this body of research, there is an urgent need to focus on better quality, interdisciplinary efforts and identification of research on prioritised P/CVE issues. It is necessary to take stock of fragmented research, and identify and prioritise the research and knowledge gaps to address.

Practitioners and policymakers working on P/CVE issues also indicate that we need a more robust evidence base to develop and implement effective P/CVE-initiatives. More research is required to better drive policy and programming design as well as risk assessment and evaluation tools.

The academic community and practitioner/policymaking communities have faced a number of challenges in their collaboration. First, academics want ‘more clarity on definitions, concepts and framing related to countering violent extremism research.’ (2) Second, while academics often communicate in obtuse and overcomplicated language to non-academics, academics frequently overlook the practical, on-the-ground realities that practitioners experience. Third, academics have difficulty accessing hard, primary data: limitations in accessing/sharing classified information, as well as data protection and privacy legislation set out by governments complicate access to data for academics. In turn, this seriously impacts the academic community's ability to test underlying assumptions about violent extremism and P/CVE-measures. Fourth, academics and practitioners operate on different time-scales: practitioners are pressed to deliver results quickly, while academics are subject to scientific rigour and have the advantage of working with a longer time perspective. The drawback is that by the time academics publish their insights, the nature of the problem may have shifted and/or become less


relevant. In sum, 'there are notable differences between academics and practitioners with respect to the goals they seek to influence, the social systems in which they operate, the variables they attempt to manipulate, and acceptable time frames for addressing problems' (\(^{(1)}\)).

Nevertheless, while cooperation between the research community and the practitioner/policymaking fields in P/CVE research poses challenges, crucially, it also presents many **shared opportunities**.

First, academics can apply **scientific rigour** and carry out **quality control** on practitioner methods and programmes. Providing the evidence base is key for programme design, implementation and evaluation. Second, practitioners can improve their own **critical thinking** so as to better distinguish between good and bad data (\(^{(4)}\)), while academics can help **make sense of their scientific findings**, which often feature inaccessible details and contextualisation. Third, academics and practitioners can simultaneously direct their efforts towards the joint **design, implementation** and **evaluation of P/CVE measures**. Fourth, practitioner and policymaking participation in research discussions, focus and design **ensures policy and practical relevance** of research efforts. Fifth, closer collaboration ensures focused, targeted efforts and a necessary, **reflective knowledge inventory or stock-taking** from the body of research, to register knowledge, knowledge gaps, and any lacking elements that hinder advances in both theory and practice.

The research seminar focused on these challenges and opportunities for researchers, practitioners and policymakers, concentrating on the substance of the research on the priority areas identified by HLCEG-R report as well as the process of exchanging perspectives and lessons learned.

**Insights from the seminar**

The European Commission, having funded over 400 000 research topics, stresses that P/CVE research needs to be further consolidated in a wider process through a **trialogue** between academics, policymakers and practitioners, and possibly through co-creation processes. By asking policymakers and practitioners what will be needed in 5 to 10 years from now, the research community can anticipate circumstances and needs, and identify knowledge and gaps through closer trialogue efforts.

**France** is forging closer collaboration between research, policy and practice. Since 2016, such collaboration has increased the dialogue between researchers and policymakers over P/CVE issues. The French National Center for Scientific Research (**Centre national de la recherche scientifique — CNRS**) has reached an understanding with security and intelligence agencies, and fosters close collaboration between policymakers and the academic community, on violent extremism issues. Various scientific committees have been created under French ministries: for instance, the Scientific Council for Radicalisation Processes (Conseil scientifique sur les processus de radicalisation — **CosPRAD**) was established by the French prime minister in 2017. It maps research on radicalisation, and connects researchers and their output to policymakers.

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Benchmarking and thematic workshops strengthen this cooperation. Several platforms exist to facilitate exchange and dialogue amongst researchers, policymakers and practitioners. The Interministerial Committee for the Prevention of Crime and Radicalisation (Comité interministériel de prévention de la délinquance et de la radicalisation — CIPDR) funds and coordinates the convergence of these French efforts on multiple levels.

Finland has a national network of researchers on violent extremism issues. There is structured cooperation with good mutual understanding of differences between roles and of boundaries between research and policymaking communities. Researchers provide evidence-based knowledge but do not provide policy input. Through regular seminars, the latest evidence from academia is delivered to the policymaking community. Policymakers integrate the latest academic evidence into the national strategy on CVE.

Some EU states have a long(er) tradition of cooperation across researchers, policymakers and practitioners, while other countries have set up specific structures for cooperation such as scientific committees on P/CVE issues, think tanks or national networks. This type of cooperation is a win-win situation for all: it fosters interaction, policymakers can actively learn from and support research, evaluation becomes more effective through closer dialogue, and research, supported by government, becomes accessible for a larger audience.

A mutual understanding of other parties' roles and responsibilities and a willingness to invest time and resources will build a solid foundation for cooperation. It is essential that the dialogue between researchers and policymakers be constructively respectful, without hostility.

Report structure

This ex post report explores the following research themes: (a) signs and risks of radicalisation: risk assessment tools; (b) understanding resilience factors; (c) the evidence base for radicalisation factors and pathways, including trends in home-grown radicalisation and returning foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs); (d) evaluations of different prison regimes and pathways leading towards and from radicalisation in prison; (e) dealing with vulnerable groups (children, migrants and asylum seekers); (f) extremist ideas and their dissemination via the Internet or other media; (g) evaluation and successful interventions in P/CVE; and (h) research lessons from P/CVE beyond the EU.

Each theme includes a section which also contains a summary of some of the research insights and evidence bases from peer-reviewed academic contributions. It is by no means exhaustive, but acts as a reference point for building on knowledge from the academic community as well as from practitioner and policymaking perspectives. Insights from discussions at the research seminar are featured at the end of each section under 'Research gaps and findings'.

Signs and risks of radicalisation: risk assessment tools

According to Borum (2015), there are eight risk clusters involved in violent extremism and terrorism: affect/emotions, behaviours, cognitive style, beliefs/ideology, attitudes, social factors,
and identities and capacities (5). Significant research has been carried out on how to better conduct specialised terrorism-related risk assessments. The existing risk assessment tools concentrate on assessing individuals’ thinking and reasoning and these individuals’ risk of committing violent acts. Examples are the Extremism Risk Guidance (ERG 22+), the Vulnerability Assessment Framework (VAF), the Violent Extremism Risk Assessment, version 2 (VERA-2), the Structured Assessment of Violent Extremism (SAVE) and the Terrorist Radicalization Assessment Protocol (TRAP-18). Many of these risk assessment tools have three components: engagement, intent and capability. These are further subdivided into specific risk indicators predicting and assessing psychological predictors, affinities and attitudes towards terrorism, extremism and radicalisation. All risk assessment tools feature lists of indicators for factors like the following: (a) beliefs and attitudes, (b) context and intent, (c) history and capabilities, (d) commitment and motivation, and (e) protective circumstances.

The British government employs ERG 22+ in the screening process of individuals referred to the Channel process. Similarly, VERA-2 is widely used by prison and probation services in several countries. The IR46 (Islamitisch Radicaliseringsmodel) is a Dutch risk assessment model used in a multi-agency setting by Haaglanden Regional Safety House (Veiligheidshuis). These risk assessment tools share ‘risk dimensions, such as intent and capability, and risk factors, like injustices or grievances, indoctrination, dehumanisation, us-and-them thinking’ (6). There are a number of differences between the different risk assessment instruments. The ERG 22+ was developed for individuals convicted of terrorism offences. VERA-2 is a specialised risk assessment tool designed for use with individuals either having history of extremist violence, and/or actively involved in violent extremism (breaking the law). TRAP-18 is used as an investigative framework and employs 8 proximal warning behaviours and 10 longer term distal characteristics. TRAP-18 is a ‘risk investigative template’ designed to guide intelligence analysts in making threat assessments of targeted violence. Similar to TRAP-18, the RAN CoE Returnee 45 is a risk investigative tool that has not yet been tested or validated. In addition, the VERA-2 creators also designed CYBERA (derived from the term CYBER-VERA) which combines cyber-related risk indicators with VERA-2 risk indicators.

The Structured Assessment of Violent Extremism (SAVE) is designed to assess the extremist way of thinking and the influence this has on mindsets, in terms of committing violence. SAVE comprises a ‘checklist inventory of 30 ‘cognitive’ risk indicators (i.e. perceptions and beliefs) and a software program which functions as visualisation application’ (7). A structured professional judgement (SPJ) tool, Model of Analysis for Differentiating Delusional Disorder from the Radicalization of Extreme Beliefs–17 Factor (MADDD-or-Rad-17) was developed by Mark Cunningham (2018) to determine whether an

offense is the product of a delusional disorder or is due to the radicalisation of extreme beliefs (⁸).

Broadly speaking, there are **three basic models of risk assessment**, as explained below.

- Professional judgement involving risk predictions based solely on the professional’s experience and knowledge of the individual being assessed.
- Actuarial tools based on checklists of risk indicators, using a formula which results in an overall risk prediction (e.g. high, medium or low risk).
- SPJ, which combines both approaches (professional and actuarial) to guide the process systematically, identifying risks and evaluating the individual in context. In this SPJ model, assessment is based on both the presence and relevance of risk factors for the individual concerned.

These models guide the multi-agency process, create a shared understanding across government agencies and provide usable risk indicators for future violence. They are also useful from a rehabilitation/treatment perspective, as some risk assessments include protective factors.

Research efforts assess the reliability of these risk assessment tools and the subjectivity of professional judgement in risk assessments. Researchers highlight methodological issues such as low base rates as well as validation and reliability problems in capturing diverse personality types and risky behaviours. Some researchers have questioned whether the rating scales used in VERA-2 have in fact been reviewed or evidenced at all (⁹).

In a systematic review of risk assessment tools, Scarcella et al. (2016) note that only half of the studies/tools they looked at contained a transparent description of instruments, and the assessment of psychometric properties was of poor quality overall. This study encourages researchers to develop a gold standard of validity and reliability for risk assessment guidelines and checklists. It stresses that 'instruments need to be tested, validity and reliability need to be cross-verified, and studies need to be capable of being replicated and critiqued.' Serious ethical issues arise if these risk assessment tools are used without prior disclosure of study results.

Further research is necessary on the relative value of the risk factors. Borum (2015) proposes eight core domains 'as a framework for data gathering: Affect/Emotions, Behaviours, Cognitive Style, Beliefs/Ideology, Attitudes, Social factors, Identities, and Capacities, with each domain containing more specific lines of inquiry to include both "activating" and "disinhibiting" mechanisms' (¹⁰).

Some researchers stress the need to contextualise risk factors when assessing individual trajectories, in order to determine which factors are more significant. Others argue that it is necessary to distinguish between vulnerability in general and the specific vulnerability related to radicalisation. Hence, it is important to 'disaggregate "vulnerability" to radicalisation into two dimensions: susceptibility to moral change and

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susceptibility to exposure to radicalising settings’ (13). The former dimension is governed by cognitive capabilities and value-based rules, while the latter is governed by social and self selection. Borum (2014) argues that risk assessments need to focus on an individual’s ‘motivational, attributional, volitional, emotional, attitudinal, and worldview propensities’ (13).

Different forms of criticism are directed against risk assessment tools. Very few risk assessment tools and risk factors are empirically validated. They are also applied inconsistently, and there is an overemphasis on static risk factors (13). Some argue that there is an overemphasis on the individual, and not enough emphasis on the individual’s interrelationship with contextual factors (the environment). Others claim that the aim of risk assessment tools is to identify the individual’s risk of being radicalised rather than of violence.

Another noteworthy issue is the level of assessor skill and training: this is important, as risk assessments often are carried out by a single assessor. The question of who should be conducting risk assessments is also relevant. For example, van de Weert and Eijkman raise the issue of subjectivity in the detection of radicalisation and violent extremism: they observe that youth workers are insufficiently equipped to detect (violent) extremism at the local level (14).

**Research gaps and findings**

A number of EU projects have studied the risk assessment of violent extremists. The research indicates a positive correlation between mental health disorders and violent extremism (but there is no causality) — a fact that is sometimes difficult for policymakers to acknowledge. Although various EU-funded tools have been developed, it is clear that they complement each other rather than compete with or duplicate the other’s efforts.

The European project ‘Database and Assessment of Risks of violent Extremists’ (DARE) developed a database of convicted terrorists and violent extremists and their acts. The accompanying DARE codebook identifies the most critical risk factors, and it will be used to systematically score judicial files. The DARE codebook utilises ‘demographic data, indictment and act analysis, analysis of the subject, criminal and personal history, developmental pathway, psychopathology, radicalisation, and items of the risk assessment instrument for violent extremism VERA-2R’ (15).

DARE and other similar projects must take into account and conform to the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (Regulation (EU)

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(17) DARE Codebook Violent Extremists (Version 05-10-18) in author’s possession.
2016/679). In so doing, one option is to use encrypted personal data.

MINDb4ACT is a collaborative project with 7 law enforcement agencies (LEAs), think tanks, research centres, universities, industry associations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) based in 10 Member States (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Austria, Poland, Finland and the United Kingdom). Through 21 pilot projects, practices and interventions will be held in 5 key areas: (a) prisons and the judiciary, (b) schools and learning centres, (c) immigration hotspots and asylum centres, (d) cities, and (e) the internet and media (15). The objective is to prevent rather than predict violent extremism.

'Policy recommendation and improved communication tools for law enforcement and security agencies preventing violent radicalisation' (Pericles) is a project dedicated to the 'transitional processes of radicalisation' (16). This project followed 15 offenders in Germany, and found, following a professional diagnosis, that 6 of the 15 suffered from mental disorders. Far-right extremist attitudes are on the rise in young individuals from the age of 15, and are more likely if the young individual's family holds such attitudes than if his or her friends do.

Understanding resilience factors

Broadly speaking, resilience is an individual's ability to adapt to and overcome adversity in the face of challenging circumstances and traumas. The issue of resilience is complex and multifaceted, as the level of resilience must be taken into account: resilience at individual level (to overcome a terrorist attack or to foster individual resilience to reject extremist messages) or resilience at community level (developing strong social bonds critical to preventing violence and community polarisation).

There are many protective factors in violence prevention that are applicable to violent extremism.

Sieckelinck and Gielen (2017) identify several protective factors that promote resilience in individuals: enhancing social coping skills through anger management and conflict resolution; democratic citizenship; religious knowledge, counter-narratives and internet-safeguarding measures; participation and trauma therapy; a supportive and warm family environment; and autonomy, self-esteem and a sense of self-control (agency) which includes social and emotional well-being and life skills (18).

In a systematic review of research on protective factors against extremism and violent radicalisation, Lösel et al. (2018) identify 30 different protective factors with a protective effect: 'self-control, adherence to law, acceptance of police legitimacy, illness, positive parenting behaviour, non-violent significant others, good school achievement, non-violent peers, contact to foreigners, and a basic attachment to society.'(19)

19 Friedrich Lösel, Sonja King, Doris Bender, Irina Jugl. ”Protective Factors Against Extremism and Violent Radicalization: A Systematic Review of the Evidence”,
In a different study on violent extremism in higher education, Van Brunt, Murphy and Zedginidze (2017) identify several protective factors: social connection, pluralistic inclusivity, non-violent outlets, social safety, emotional stability, professional/academic engagement, global competence, empathy, resilience and consequences of actions (20).

Bhui et al. (2014) tested hypotheses about depression, psychosocial adversity and social assets as risk and resiliency factors in the early phases of radicalisation (21). Having surveyed 608 individuals of Pakistani or Bangladeshi family origins, aged 18 to 45, of Muslim heritage and living in East London and Bradford, they found that those with most sympathy for violent protest and terrorism were more likely to report depression, and that religion was important to these individuals.

Researchers identify a close interrelationship between individual resilience and community resilience. Some researchers suggest that social connections, social groups and social capital are fundamental to community resilience. Engaging marginalised or underrepresented community members is an important means of strengthening community resilience. Research shows that policies resulting in the creation of 'suspect communities' undermine resilience. While a strong social sense of identity within specific ethnic or religious groups may build resilience against extremism, social marginalisation may lead to a vulnerability to violent extremism. The development of strong partnerships between communities and government is a central component of strengthening community resilience.

Ellis and Abdi (2017) argue that there are three types of social connections which are critical to a resilient community in relation to violent extremism: bonds, bridging and linking (22). It is essential that governments work across these three dimensions to strengthen their links and partnerships with communities.

Grossman et al. (2017) developed Building Resilience to Violent Extremism (BRAVE-14), a validated 5-factor, 14-item measure for identifying and understanding young individuals' resilience to violent extremism at community level. There are five factors underpinning youth resilience to violent extremism: cultural identity and connectedness, bridging capital, linking capital, violence-related behaviours, and violence-related beliefs (23).

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Various models exist for boosting resilience in communities. In particular, successful partnership involves identifying important issues to community members rather than focusing on violent extremism. Promoting an atmosphere of trust, respect and co-creation are essential ingredients. Some researchers advance the idea that Community-Based Participatory Research (CBPR) is a useful model that has helped address violence among ethnic minority youths (24).

Exploring community resilience in Denmark, Dalgaard-Nielsen and Schack (2016) conclude that 'a high-level CVE knowledge but no trust from the community equals little impact' (25). A report by CERTA (2016) resilience to radicalisation and violent extremism in Denmark concludes that families, close friends and mentors alongside religious communities are the strongest factors positively influencing resilience (26).

Gielen (2017) provides a useful overview of the existing resilience literature and efforts to use resilience training on vulnerable individuals and groups. In particular, she points out that it is worthwhile developing and evaluating resilience tools and mentoring programmes within the education sector (27). Likewise, various methods are applied to foster community resilience in 'More than a Game', a sport-focused youth mentoring programme in Melbourne, Australia that uses team-based sports to address issues of identity, belonging and cultural isolation amongst young Muslim men (28).

Another important area of research inquiry is the role of community policing in strengthening community resilience. Very few studies exist that address or chart the difficult relationship-forming processes between community police and local communities. An exception is the study by Staniforth (2014) which outlines neighbourhood policing principles (29). More research is also needed on how to effectively reach and communicate with young individuals on the subject of violent extremism.

**Research gaps and findings**

It is important to define resilience and it is essential to focus on protective factors rather than merely identifying potential risk factors. What protective factors are at work in cases where some individuals become radicalised and others do not? More research is needed on protective factors and the dynamic interaction between these factors as well as on the correlation between protective and risk factors.

Policymakers must adopt a holistic strengths-based approach focusing on resilience rather than a risk-based approach alone. A three-pronged approach is effective in promoting resilience, as it


addresses emotional, relational, and ideological aspects. Resilience in young individuals can be stimulated through participation, empowerment and increased social cohesion. Additionally, resilience must be strengthened through education efforts and social media literacy.

There is a need for evaluation of multi-agency approaches, as these are often restricted to single interventions. It is important to understand how multi-agency collaboration actually accounts for protective factors in assessments.

Another area lacking research is the means of building resilience in young individuals who are already expressing anger towards society. A significant challenge for those working in this area is understanding that resilience works best in individuals who do not need it.

The evidence base for radicalisation factors and pathways, including trends in home-grown radicalisation and returning FTGs

Existing research shows radicalisation is driven and sustained by multiple causes. Understanding radicalisation and pathways towards violent extremism calls for multicausal and multilevel explanations: there is no single profile and individuals do not follow one single track.

A related RAN Issue Paper (2016) conceptualises violent extremism as a kaleidoscope of factors, creating individual, and at times interlocking, combinations: these include individual socio-psychological factors, social factors, political factors, ideological and/or religious dimensions, the role of culture and identity issues, and trauma and other trigger mechanisms, all of which exist alongside three key drivers that act as a motor of radicalisation, namely group dynamics, radicalisers/groomers, and the role of social media’ (30). The radicalisation mechanisms are the product of the interplay between various push and pull factors within individuals, radicalisation settings (such as prisons or so-called underground extremist milieus) and group dynamics.

Recent research on radicalisation factors and pathways focuses on understanding specific factors, underlying processes and their interplay. Unravelling and comprehending the interrelationships of these factors is key to prevention intervention. Researchers make the case that research needs to grasp the underlying driving forces and tipping points for radicalisation that leads to violence as well as for radicalisation that does not lead to violence.

In one of the first multidisciplinary systematic literature reviews focusing on the radicalisation of young individuals in Europe, Campelo et al. (2018) highlight a multitude of vulnerability factors across different levels and advance a three-level model for radicalisation processes among youths (31). In terms of individual risk factors, the study identifies trait vulnerabilities or


psychological vulnerabilities (the depressive dimension; addictive and risky behaviour; early experiences of abandonment in their life trajectories; fragile family structures; changes during adolescence and the quest for an ideal; personal uncertainty and recovery of lost dignity; perceived injustice; triggering events such as trauma, death or other life-changing events and psychopathological mechanisms that reinforce radical engagement). The study also examines micro-environmental factors: friendships with radicalised individuals, family dysfunction, similarities with sectarian hold, and dehumanisation to justify the use of violence. At macro-environmental level, the risk factors are social polarisation, a perceived group threat, the role of religious ideology, the geopolitical context, and processes of societal change. This research points to a key role for mental health professionals, specifically adolescent psychiatry, in secondary and tertiary prevention.

Eisenman and Flavahan (2018) argue that a social-ecological framework (used by the World Health Organization) for addressing the risk and protective factors for violence is useful in understanding violent extremism. They posit that interpersonal violence is the outcome of an interplay of factors across four levels, namely of the individual, the relationship, the community and the social (32).

Decety, Pape and Workman (2018) developed a multilevel interdisciplinary framework, integrating social psychology and neuroscience, to comprehend the psychological processes that underpin group dynamics, interpersonal processes, values and micro-sociological processes (33). Their study provides an insightful flow-chart of the dynamic social and cognitive processes involved in radicalisation (see Figure 1).

Figure 1 Psychological Processes

(Full-size image available on p.33)

Vergani et al. (2018) conducted a systematic scoping review of scientific literature on radicalisation into violent extremism between 2001 and 2015. This study shows that ‘empirical research disproportionately focuses on pull factors, which appear in 78.4% of the articles, while push factors (appearing in 57.4% of the articles) and personal factors (appear in 39.2% of the articles) are comparatively under-researched’ (34). Significantly, Vergani et al. find that qualitative methods over-represent pull factors as a cause of radicalisation, while failing to explore the interaction between personal, push

and pull factors. As such, their study advocates more rigorous research designs and the use of control groups of non-violent extremists to distinguish between cognitive and behavioural radicalisation.

More research is needed on the dynamics and interplay of various push and pull factors. Researchers must also gain a greater understanding of different radicalisation pathways.

One of the most significant recent evidence-based studies, conducted by Aarhus University researcher Oluf Gøtzsche-Astrup (2018), forcefully argues for improved mechanisms of causality in understanding radicalisation processes. His extensive literature review analyses seven approaches to the psychological mechanisms of radicalisation: (a) Uncertainty-Identity Theory (Hogg & Adelman, 2013); (b) Significant Quest/3N (Webber & Kruglandski, 2018); (c) Devoted Actor Model (Atran, 2016); (d) Mindset and Worldview (Borum, 2014); (e) Reactive Approach Motivation (McGregor, Hayes & Prentice, 2015); and (f) Two-pyramid approach (McCauley & Mosalenko, 2017).

Table 1: Competing Theories

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<th>Theory</th>
<th>Focus</th>
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<tr>
<td>Uncertainty-Identity Theory</td>
<td>Fundamental uncertainty and loss of meaning or significance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significant Quest/3N</td>
<td>Fundamental uncertainty or loss of meaning or significance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devoted Actor Model</td>
<td>Shift in social identity towards a single social group rather than many groups</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mindset and Worldview</td>
<td>Experience of fundamental uncertainty or loss of meaning or significance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reactive Approach Motivation</td>
<td>Psychological mindset of authoritarianism, dogmatism and fundamentalism</td>
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<tr>
<td>Two-pyramid approach</td>
<td>Normal psychological mechanisms rather than psychopathology</td>
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This study finds that social-motivational processes are essentially driven by primitive mechanisms of aggression which create a negative motivational state of mind. Negative life experiences can become triggers as these 'stimulate a sense of uncertainty about fundamental existential questions within the individual' which is exploited by subcultures offering an alternative. Small-group dynamics counteract negative experience/emotions but can accentuate for mechanisms of political radicalisation. Aggression and Violent Behavior, 39 (March-April), 90-99.
polarisation and be a key driver in translating radical beliefs into action. Strong emotions such as anger and contempt are important motivational drivers in collective action. Another motivational factor is the ‘self- and social identity dynamic’, through a ‘disembeddedness’ process, results in an individual’s sense of self-identity being lessened and replaced by reliance on the social identity of specific groups. As such, group dynamics and radicalisation are mutually reinforcing processes.

Other commonalities identified by Gøtzsche-Astrup (2018) are evident in the part played by ideologies encompassing narratives, religions, norms, sacred values and worldviews, though it is too early to determine if ideology propels violent behaviour or if it is used to rationalise and justify violent action. This question of the role of ideology is similar to the meta-debate between Gilles Kepel’s ‘radicalisation of political Islam’ and Oliver Roy’s ‘Islamisation of radicals’.

Scott Atran’s research on sacred values suggests that individual jihadists fuse their self-identity with that of the group and hold sacred values that are exceptionally strong and difficult to break away from once they become devoted actors. These sacred values cannot be abandoned, but they can be reinterpreted. In a similar vein, the University of Oxford’s research on theories of extreme self-sacrifice led by Professor Whitehouse identifies ‘identity fusion’ as a key psychological process. This ‘identity fusion’ — a visceral sense of oneness with the group — is shaped by emotional, life-shaping experiences and motivates a strong desire to defend and protect other group members (36). This research implies that intervention needs to concentrate on ‘de-fusion’ — to understand the causal pathways for this feeling of ‘shared essence’ and how personal identities are shared with pro-group commitment. This process of ‘de-fusion’ examines extremists as personal and collective identities as well as their social networks and surrounding communities (parents, friends, teachers, etc.).

Sociologist Professor Kevin McDonald shows that different radicalisation experiences ‘highlight embodied imaginaries more than political ideologies, [and] conspiracy theories more than religion’ (37). In particular, McDonald critiques radicalisation vulnerability models, as they apprehend radicalisation as something ‘done to a person’, which fails to account for the kinds of agency at work in radicalisation experiences. Instead, McDonald argues, radicalisation is a ‘social process, full of exchanges, communications and shared emotions’ becoming ‘a form of embodied sociality, one where the ability to feel certain things makes it possible to think certain things’ (38). In this sensory process, social media and jihadi culture are important components. More empirical research is needed on the role of emotion and the relationships between push, pull and protective factors.

Along parallel lines, Professor Thomas Hegghammer et al. explore the rich inventory of jihadi cultural practices, including poetry, song, iconography and dream interpretation (39). While these factors are visibly present, further research


is needed on how jihadi culture affects individuals and groups. Research by Lohlker et al. also spotlights the rich symbolic world of online jihadism (40).

Other researchers studied the radicalisation pathways to violent extremism. French researcher Dounia Bouzar argues that IS extremists use the same four recruitment steps for all their 'radical recruits': isolation from the social environment, and indoctrination combined with a conspiratorial world-view, leading the recruits to doubt everything; self-identification of recruits as a chosen people and adoption of the group identity; a complete break from outside influences; and dehumanisation (41). Lindeklıde et al. analyse two lone-actor radicalisation pathways: 'Volatile' and 'Autonomous', whereby they find that the former (Volatile) pattern of radicalisation predominantly encompasses individuals with jihadist convictions, while right-wing extremists are drawn to the Autonomous pattern (42).

Research on the crime-terror nexus has emerged in different fields in criminology: strain-theories (blocked opportunities, adversity and stress are conditions that favour alternatives and anomie); psychology (focus on life events and significant loss); and sociology (creation of a socio-economic underclass). Limited social mobility may produce 'negative emotions (anger and frustration) which may alter social and moral boundaries placed on unconventional goals and violent means' (43). Dutch researchers conclude that there is a correlation between low socio-economic status and violent and terror offenders. Other researchers consider the Situational Action Theory of Crime Causation a useful analytical tool (44).

The issue of acculturation — the process of balancing two competing cultural influences — and its potential role in radicalisation has also been explored by researchers. Individuals at odds with their parents and feeling rejected by society embrace a third culture which provides a sense of belonging — this can lead to involvement in violent extremism. As such, counterculture and pathways to extremism and gang culture involve similar processes. For example, some researchers observe that self- and identity-uncertainty play a key psychological role in extremism (45).

Recent research on violent extremism considered the role of toxic masculinity. Exploring the role of masculinity in young men transitioning into extremism, sociologist Michael Kimmel found that a sense of victimhood and aggrieved entitlement, combined with setbacks, has led many right-wing individuals to search internally for answers which they externalise by blaming systems, immigrants

or others for their predicament \(^{(41)}\). Understanding the **role of emotions** and how these are morphed into rage and anger through the radicalisation process is key.

A recent **French multidisciplinary study** \((2018)\) exploring why European adolescents and young adults have been drawn towards radical Islamism since 2010 suggests that adolescent psychopathology plays a role in the radicalisation process \(^{(49)}\). Specifically, the study showcases the interplay between adolescent mechanisms and radical influences: adolescents' experience of turbulence and personal uncertainty, combined with triggering events, provides cognitive openings to extremist groups and ideologies offering a sense of purpose, belonging and moral certainty. This study developed a three-tiered model (Individual, Micro-Environmental, and Macro-Environmental), with risk factors extending from adolescence to 'a psychiatric condition, psychological vulnerability, abandonment issues, perceived injustice, and personal uncertainty.'

Scholars observe that research on **families and their role in radicalisation** is lacking. Families and their related dynamics are complex, and they can provide both risk and protective factors in relation to radicalisation. Families are a broad category, so it is worthwhile distinguishing between parents, siblings, aunts and uncles, and cousins. **Spalek (2016)** notes that more research is needed on 'differences between violent and non-violent radicalisation; generational differences; the implications for families of convicted terrorists; families as constituting risk and/or protective factors in relation to radicalisation' \(^{(49)}\).

Tensions within families, intra-familial violence, the functionality of families and the impact of absent or dysfunctional parents are factors worth exploring further. Similarly, it is worth analysing the sociocultural context of families and their function in different cultural settings.

Recent research by **Sikkens, van San, Sieckelinck and de Winter (2018)** reveals that most parents struggle to cope with radicalisation signs in their children and do not know how to react. This study examines how parents react to their children's interest in extremist ideologies, and advocates further research on the influence of parental support and control on deradicalisation \(^{(49)}\).

Research on radicalisation is further complicated by the fact that the empirical knowledge base is rather limited. As **Hafez and Mullins (2015)** show, most empirical research on the radicalisation of youths in Europe considers four dimensions, namely grievances, networks, ideologies and enabling support structures \(^{(50)}\). They believe that the research can be improved in three ways: with greater collaboration between researchers and the intelligence community; with research collaboration on data organisation; and with better research design, as most research selects challenges for research, policy and practice. **Security Journal**, 29(1), 39-52.


\(^{(41)}\) Spalek, B. (2016). Radicalisation, de-radicalisation and counter-radicalisation in relation to families: Key
on the dependent variable, only testing theories where radicalisation is present.

The Decker and Pyrooz (2015) research on gangs provides valuable lessons learned for the study of violent extremism and radicalisation. Their work proposes many improvements: they argue for a number of triangulation of ideas and methods, and an understanding of the symmetries and asymmetries across the selection and the (dis-) engagement processes leading into and out of groups. They urge researchers to study the collective — the clique, cell, group or organisation — rather than overlook it, and note that knowledge of the efficacy of programmes should be proportional to the investment in such programmes. They advise researchers to distinguish instrumental from symbolic activities, and understand the network of opposition underpinning extra-legal groups. They stress that research must be held accountable for false positives and false negatives, that comparative research will offer greater returns to knowledge than research conducted in isolation, and that definitions matter. They underline that there is a need for theory making and theory testing, and remind researchers of the importance of the role played by prison and by women (51).

**Research on FTFs**

Numerous studies on FTFs have been carried out in Europe. Many of these studies are descriptive, rather than using the hard evidence-based data which is often held exclusively by government security and intelligence services. There are a few exceptions — some reports are based on hard facts (complete data-sets) outlining age, gender, geography, socio-economic factors, citizenship and country of origin, etc.

Several German security agencies (2016) published a report on 784 German foreign fighters, revealing that 79 % were male and 21 % female, that 61 % were born in Germany and that two-thirds had a criminal record. While FTFs came from 162 German cities, there was a concentration of extremism hotbeds, with only 13 cities having more than 10 FTFs. This study also shows that only 10 % had returned due to disillusionment; 25 % of returnees and 22 % of their parents were willing to cooperate with government authorities when they returned. Significantly more than 48 % of returning FTFs returned to extremist milieus.

Gustafsson & Ranstorp (2017) conducted a study on 267 of 300 Swedish FTFs, based on aggregated data from the Swedish Security Services (53). It reveals that 76 % were male and 24 % female, and that 70 % were residing in segregated and socially vulnerable areas. Over 80 % came from four cities. 75 % were Swedish citizens, but only 34 % were actually born in Sweden. The study also contains a European overview of FTF statistics and a breakdown of the data. It highlights geographical hotbeds of radicalisation, microfinancing of extremism, the role of radical feeder groups in

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52 Original report by German security agencies was removed from Internet. Daniel Heinke has summarised findings. Heinke, D. (March 2017). German Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq: The
violent extremism, and how returning FTFs affect sectarianism within communities. A follow-on study (2018) on Salafism and Salafi-jihadism in Sweden maps out the different hierarchies, roles, functions and influences across 17 cities.

The Norwegian Police Security Service (Politiets sikkerhetstjeneste — PST) published a report on 137 violence-promoting jihadists, some of whom had become FTFs: 88 % were male and only 12 % were female, with 86 % becoming radicalised after 2011. The report reveals that 61 % had migrated to Norway as teenagers, and that only 21 % with minority backgrounds were born and raised in Norway. There was a strong correlation with crime, as 68 % were criminals and 46 % were involved in violent crime. Interestingly, the PST observes that 17.5 % of the jihadists had lost one or both of their parents (often before the age of 10).

Renard and Coolsaet (2018) provide a valuable overview of FTF returnees in Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands (54). The RAN CoE manual on returnees, Responses to Returnees, provides a practical practitioner’s guide to different pathways, depending on whether the returnee is a minor, is sent to prison, or is subject to non-custodial reintegration (55). This manual on returnees highlights the importance of understanding the role of gender when responding to returnees. In March 2018, the Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate of the United Nations Security Council (UNCTED) produced a research-based report on returnees and challenges of reintegration and rehabilitation of FTFs (56). The UNCTED report underscores that FTF typologies fail to reflect the complexities of the roles and challenges of returning FTFs, that the threat may be dormant for a period and that ‘imprisonment may delay the threat posed by these individuals, not reduce it’ (57). In particular, the UNCTED report stresses the importance of suitable risk assessment tools.

Existing research on FTFs has explored the gender dimension and the well-documented role of women as supporters, recruiters, facilitators, fighters and victims (58). It is important to better understand women’s roles in extremism, as well as how to respond appropriately — aspects requiring tailored gender-specific approaches. Equally, the role of children needs to be further examined in terms of trauma and rehabilitation efforts.

**Research gaps and findings**

Significant research efforts have been carried out, enhancing our understanding of radicalisation and its associated dynamics. It is essential to take stock

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of this knowledge. There are still prioritised research gaps — FTFs are still leaving for conflict zones abroad and researchers must comprehend their motivation and the mechanisms keeping them on the move. On the subject of FTF returnees, more information is needed about their motivations and signs of disengagement. A key policy area is the continuity of interventions, both within prisons and after prisoners are released. A broader understanding is needed of why individuals disengage and what conditions are required for effective deradicalisation initiatives. Other areas where more research is required are the interrelationship between online and offline components of radicalisation, the role of radicalisation agents and the dynamics of hotspots of radicalisation.

Researchers must ascertain what the critical combination of radicalisation factors is, and how this relates to interventions. More multidisciplinary research should be carried out on radicalisation pathways. At the same time, lessons learned from historical radicalisation cases should be used to contextualise present issues.

**Evaluating prison regimes and pathways towards and from radicalisation in prison**

Policy and research have increasingly prioritised the role of prisons in CVE. Prisons have been portrayed as hotbeds for radicalisation due to extremist recruiters taking advantage of the overcrowded conditions and often overwhelmed prison management. Whether radicalised inmates should be integrated into the mainstream inmate population or segregated in separate high-security facilities is subject to debate. Rehabilitation and reintegration strategies are also crucial for disengagement and deradicalisation.

Silke and Veldhuis (2017) provide a synthesis of the principal research findings on prison and violent extremism in recent years. Within the research community, ‘it is generally accepted that radicalisation primarily stems from a combination of institutional, social, and individual factors, such as overcrowding and deprivation, violence and group dynamics, and a desire for protection and belonging’ (59). In particular, they stress, two factors stand out: overcrowding and charismatic leadership. While these factors seem important in the context of prison gangs, Silke and Veldhuis point out that the evidence base is weak and anecdotal, as it draws from a small number of case studies, theoretical literature and prison gang studies from criminology.

As regards prison management of radicalised inmates, opinions differ on whether it is better to 'concentrate' or 'disperse' inmates. The Netherlands have 'concentrated' their violent extremist offenders while most other countries 'disperse' these individuals across a small number of high-security facilities. Yet Veldhuis’ research and evaluation of the Dutch cases of placing violent extremist offenders into specialised 'terrorist wings' shows that there is little effect or benefit in such an approach (60). In fact, this kind of policy can be counterproductive and increase

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recruitment, networks and planning, both inside and outside the prison. Many other countries have opted for a mixed approach, 'dispersing' violent extremist offenders into different maximum-security facilities. Yet it is clear that evidence-based research is lacking, of a type which can independently evaluate the benefits and drawbacks of different prison regimes. It is known that safe and well-operated prisons are crucial, as 'undue restrictiveness, problems with overcrowding, understaffing, gang violence and humiliating or discriminatory behaviour by prison staff can create pressing, stressful situations that can not only push vulnerable inmates into the arms of charismatic extremist leaders, but can in themselves provide a breeding ground for resentment and radicalisation' (61).

Research on the deradicalisation of violent extremist offenders held in prison is relatively limited. Much of it is derived from extra-EU examples, and it is questionable whether these lessons learned are applicable to radically different contexts.

Imams can play a crucial role in the rehabilitation efforts of terrorist prisoners. Beckford et al. (2005) find that religion plays an important role in the rehabilitation of Muslim prisoners in the United Kingdom and France. In particular, they argue that imams must be involved in deradicalisation efforts, and they 'feel that if imams are not used within prisons then inmates are more likely to be radicalised once released' (62).

Research is needed to support the training and vetting of Muslim chaplains and different dialogue intervention methods, which are lacking. Similarly, it is vital that research be carried out on prisoner and prison-staff relationships in the context of radicalisation and rehabilitation. There is some research on the impact of CVE on the prison chaplaincy and the erosion of its neutral role in providing pastoral care (63).

Reintegration efforts are crucial when releasing violent extremist offenders. This reintegration process begins in prison and continues throughout the release process and rehabilitation efforts. Dean (2012) argues that rehabilitation of terrorist offenders must undergo a five-point process which helps reintegrate prisoners once they are released.

These Healthy Identity Interventions focus on:

- 'Enabling them to meet their personal needs and desires without becoming involved with an extremist group, cause or ideology
- Addressing the specific attitudes or beliefs that enable them to harm (or support harm) to others
- Enabling them to express, tolerate and cope with powerful emotions without denigrating or harming others
- Empowering them to take more responsibility for who they are, how they live their lives and the personal commitments they make
- Encouraging them to use alternative ways to realise their goals or express their

(63) Todd, A. J. (2013). Preventing the 'neutral' chaplain? The potential impact of anti-'extremism' policy on prison chaplaincy. Practical Theology, 6(2), 144-158.
commitments without breaking the law or causing harm to others' (64).

Marsden (2015) outlines how reduction of the risk of reoffending and encouraging desistance is influenced by several factors: a constructive relationship with the offender manager; motivation to engage with the rehabilitation process; critical thinking; a balanced identity; healing family rifts; training, employment and education; rejection of the legitimacy of violence/crime in response to grievances; and addressing the denial and minimisation of the offence (65). This study advocates a shift from a focus on risks and weaknesses to a strength-based approach, in order to counterbalance risk assessment methodology. Importantly, this study used multi-attribute utility technology (MAUT) designed to understand the effectiveness of work with violent extremist and terrorist offenders. Similarly, Barrelle’s article ‘Pro-Integration: Disengagement and Life after Extremism’ (2015) provides a useful framework with which to understand disengagement processes (66).

Gielen’s (2018) methodological framework for exit programmes for female jihadists integrates Barrelle’s (2015) Pro-Integration model, which measures positive levels of social engagement across social relations, coping mechanisms, identity, ideology and action orientation (65).

Disengagement programmes in prison environments must be studied, as Cherney (2018) did with her examination of the Proactive Integrated Support Model (PRISM) intervention programme aiming to achieve disengagement in the Australian state of New South Wales (68).

One of the principal reasons for the lack of research on violent extremist offenders in prison is the difficulty gaining access to prisons for field research, since data held by prison institutions are highly restricted.

Silke and Veldhuis (2017) identify significant research gaps in prisons and in rehabilitation and reintegration efforts after release. Research on the social and psychological mechanisms at play (why do some individuals become radicalised while others do not?) needs to be undertaken in a prison environment. Also, more research is needed on the dynamics behind violent extremist inmate gangs and how prison staff can intervene in these processes. Very few studies exist on juvenile violent extremist offenders. More work needs to focus on the challenges faced by violent extremist offenders once they leave prison, and on the dynamics of recidivism. Lastly, Silke and Veldhuis urge researchers to conduct evaluation studies on prison and probation programmes


focused on terrorist or violent extremist offenders (69).

**Research gaps and findings**

Research on ERG 22+ considers the validation issue and pathways towards and from radicalisation. British government research on over 170 Islamists and 22 factors shows that all factors are relevant. Surprisingly, mental health disorders turned out to be one of the lowest factors present within the group, in contrast to other research findings. Other research findings indicate that success factors in exit programmes in prison include a lack of reoffending, a non-criminal identity, and alternatives to address injustice (this was one of the highest risk factors for the ERG 22+ research). VERA-2 and ERG 22+ seem comparable, as they are developed from the same data set and research findings.

**Empirical research on prison regimes is extremely limited.** There are very different approaches to risk assessment in prisons, as contexts in different Member States differ. It is vital to differentiate between radicalisation of ordinary prisoners and hardening of convicted extremists. A mixture of approaches (between dispersal and concentration) is the best option (depending on context). Research shows that a key element in successful intervention is skilled prison staff who can handle situations and issues confidently.

A major challenge is research access to extremist prisoners. Many empirical studies are classified and are only published after several years, thereby losing their relevance and usefulness.

**Mental health issues** seem to appear more for lone actors rather than for members of terrorist groups.

**Dealing with vulnerable groups (children, migrants and asylum seekers)**

Research on children and violent extremism has been largely neglected. Studies exist on the recruitment and radicalisation of children taken into the ranks of ISIS, and on the associated range of consequences (trauma treatment, family relations, security risk assessment issues, etc.). Most studies have focused on the phenomenon of children being recruited into the ISIS fold rather than researching rehabilitation and reintegration efforts. Much depends on the environmental setting (such as families or schools) and on whether the children are vulnerable to radicalisation or have already being radicalised.

Lynch (2016) identifies how to deal with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and trauma in child returnees from conflict zones. Specifically, this study provides detailed guidance on how to identify and work with children at risk, and on therapy methods for dealing with trauma (70). A study by Simi (2016) on white supremacists notes that a large portion of the interviewed extremists

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were experiencing family dysfunction and were victims of childhood physical and sexual abuse (\(^7\)).

Stanley et al. (2018) studied the role of social workers dealing with cases of children in radicalised settings. They recommend that social workers become skilled in four areas before carrying out home visits to families with radicalised youths: ‘1) Family work skills — working with family dynamics, power, control and involving extended family, using ecomap and genogram tools; (2) Political and ideological analysis skills; (3) Risk thinking at a sophisticated level; (4) Developing a sociological imagination (Mills 1959) to help link the person in context, highlighting historic forces as influences in where we are today.’ Similarly, Stanley et al. (2018) provide practical tools and intervention methods for dealing with families and potentially radicalised children. Specifically, they advance strength-based approaches to interventions within family settings, such as Signs of Safety, the Family Group Conference (FGC), The Good Lives Model of Offender Rehabilitation (GLM), and the Capabilities Approach (CA) (\(^7\)).

Tackling radicalisation in an education setting is another important topic. Much of the academic writing on education and radicalisation in the United Kingdom has been dominated by a ‘securitisation’ discourse. Others legitimately question the difficult role teachers have in detecting deviant behaviour as ‘educators are unwittingly drawn into a villain-victim imagery of their students’ (\(^3\)). But researchers also propose various methods to strengthen protective factors in youths at educational institutions. For example, Sewell and Hulusi (2016) provide a literature review of the psychological theories of personal uncertainty and Reactive Approach Motivation (\(^7\)).

Integrative complexity (IC) is a Cambridge-based initiative that counters oversimplification in values, thinking and identity by changing youths’ ‘mindset through broadening values, thinking and social identity complexity using action learning, group exercises, and multimedia materials’ (\(^7\)). IC interventions in Northern Ireland, for example, have resulted in increasing cognitive (and emotional) management capacities in post-conflict contexts in young individuals.

The issue of violent extremism and radicalisation as related to refugees and/or asylum seekers is complex and ambiguous, and has not been really researched to any degree. There is significant research on violent extremism and vulnerable refugee communities beyond Europe, but very little in the EU. These few studies argue that refugees or asylum seekers are vulnerable to extremist recruiters due to financial incentives or


the search for a sense of purpose or social identity. When De Bie et al. (2014) explored the interface between jihadi networks and vulnerable immigrants in the Netherlands, they find that jihadi networks offered a sense of belonging, while the relationship was primarily grounded more in pragmatic, monetary interests (76). Eleftheriadou (2018) provides a composite model for understanding radicalisation within a refugee environment (77).

There is clearly a pressing research need to focus on vulnerable groups and the connection to violent extremism or radicalisation, especially youths, as well as refugees and asylum seekers. There is scope to begin research efforts in the refugee camps in the Middle East and analyse patterns and trends compared to experiences in Europe.

Research gaps and findings

Classrooms are an effective arena for P/CVE with children. A major challenge for teachers is speaking about sensitive, controversial topics in the classroom. More research is needed on context- and culture-specific issues of religion and societal dynamics, gender relations or relationships. This research should differentiate between different student age groups.

Other research areas identified are the possible involvement of refugees or asylum seekers in terrorist plots, children returning from conflict zones and children's vulnerability to violent extremist propaganda online.

Understanding the influence of self-sufficiency (housing and job security, for instance) in bolstering resilience against radicalisation for vulnerable communities is key. Researchers in Amsterdam developed an interesting methodology to screen for self-sufficiency, with promising results in relation to violent extremists. Mental health screening is also important, as many extremists have shown signs of psychiatric problems. Further research on mental health issues (including trauma) needs to be undertaken.

Dealing with vulnerable groups in P/CVE work, without stigmatisation, is another subject needing attention. Moreover, working with these groups poses significant problems around confidentiality and information-sharing — yet another area lacking research.

Extremist ideas and their dissemination on the Internet or other media

There is an immense amount of academic literature on violent extremism and social media. This brief literature review will focus on terrorism/extremism and social media, and the implications for countering propaganda through counter-narratives and alternative narratives.

Maintain a Persistent Online Presence’ (79). Ingram (2016) provides a framework for analysing how militant Islamist propaganda and messaging ‘provide its supporters with a system of meaning that shapes how they perceive the world’, through a process where it manipulates compelling followers to legitimise and engage in violence (80).

Berger’s (2017) methodology charts extremist propaganda using a linkage-based framework that targets the themes exploited by extremist groups to mobilise potential recruits (81).

Winter (2015) explores ISIS propaganda and the various themes that feature in ISIS social media propaganda: mercy, belonging, brutality, victimhood, war and utopia (82). Glazzard (2017) makes a case for studying violent extremism as narratives in the literary sense, to understand the creative sources of violent extremism inspiration (83). Halverson et al. (2011) provide a framework for understanding the ‘master narratives’ or ‘systems of stories’ that animate jihadist propaganda (84). Schmid (2015) identifies a dozen narrative themes of ISIS that expose vulnerabilities and points the way towards developing convincing counter-arguments (85).

Some research concentrates on terrorist groups’ use of different strategies of identity-building. Rothenberger et al. (2018) analyse the discursive construction of five terrorist groups’ identity on social media, using five discursive macro strategies. This study observes that terrorist groups used strategies of demontage (dismantling) and destruction, and strategies of justification and relativisation with strong boundary construction (us-and-them thinking): ‘dehumanisation of enemies; moral justification, shift of blame, displacement of responsibility and downplaying of harmful effects’ (86).

Turning to the array of countermeasures used online on social media, Greenberg (2016) provides an overview (e.g. disruption, diversion and alternative engagement, counter-messaging) as well as concrete recommendations. Braddock and Horgan (2015) explore if and how narratives persuade, and trace the development of targeted


While the volume of academic contributions is larger than most, there is still a pressing need to examine the impact of different types of counter-narratives: which work and which do not, and importantly, why?

**Research gaps and findings**

A large body of research exists on the evolution of violent extremist and terrorist propaganda on social media. A significant challenge for law enforcement in detecting extremist propaganda on open platforms and the dark web is the interpretation, extraction and summarising of content in multiple languages. Semi (automated) detection is important for early detection efforts. More research needs to be conducted on why extremist groups move between social media platforms.

When considering the effectiveness of alternative and counter-narratives, it is useful to factor in biological algorithms, echo chambers and filter bubbles. From a neurological perspective, when an individual’s core value and identity are threatened, it is not the prefrontal cortex that reacts but the amygdala — this make individuals feel threatened. Changing individuals' minds requires a cognitive opening, and it is preferable to highlight shared values than to seek confrontation. Further studies are needed that link neuroscience and psychology, in relation to violent extremism.

Research is also lacking on the content and mechanisms of hate speech, specifically on the spectrum of propaganda from right-wing populism to extremism. Social media is multidimensional — individuals do not just consume propaganda, but also produce it. It would be useful to have a conceptual analysis of this dynamic and what it means for radicalisation processes.

There is also insufficient work on the interaction between propaganda and new technology and media platforms.

**Evaluation and successful interventions in P/CVE**

There are very few academic studies of evaluation methods in P/CVE. One of the main criticisms within the CVE field is the lack of empirical data for use in evaluating the effectiveness of the measures. Mastroe (2016) outlines some of the related challenges: 'identifying the outcome variable; availability of data to analyse; identifying

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the time frame of the analysis; and cross-case comparison of evaluation results' (91).

The US Institute of Peace (Holmer et al., 2018) considers the multitude of conceptual and practical challenges in measuring impact and value of P/CVE programmes: these include causality, accounting for the vast number of variables, addressing contextual variations, developing valid indicators and collecting relevant and reliable data, and measuring social relationships and networks (92).

Gielen (2017a) examines a number of evaluation methods in depth: effect evaluation, pragmatic evaluation, theory-driven evaluation, process evaluation, and realist evaluation. This study reviews 73 different studies/programmes found in the academic literature and the underpinning evaluation methods (93).

In another study, Gielen (2017b) advises on developing CVE intervention, as listed below.

- CVE programmes should address the grievances, causes and risk factors that lead to violent extremism.
- Make a clear distinction between CVE programme and interventions.
- Formulate goals.
- Identify target audiences accordingly.
- Formulate a theory of change for each CVE (sub)programme and intervention.
- Make use of existing theory and evaluations.
- Formulate smart indicators on three levels.
- Include researchers/evaluators prior to implementation.
- Demand a thorough project plan of external partners.
- [Employ] multi-method data collection' (94).

The RAND Corporation (2017) provides valuable lessons in this area with the development of the RAND programme Evaluation Toolkit (95).

**Research gaps and findings**

Evaluation should be included from the start of projects, and should involve practitioners from the outset, so they accept the evaluation. Impact evaluation and work towards evidence-based approaches is a top priority in the field. Research tends to focus excessively on the problem (the

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causes of radicalisation) rather than the solution (the effects of P/CVE interventions).

Research should concentrate on evaluation of the impact of multi-agency approaches, not just on single projects and interventions. Generic prevention tends to work best for those that do not need it. As such, research should better specify the target of prevention and the reasons behind this choice.

Researchers are best placed to help develop methods and indicators to measure effect and outcome, rather than just evaluating implementation and output.

Policymakers should avoid using the term 'best practices', as there are no universal benchmarks. A more accurate alternative phrase is 'good or inspiring practices'.

Research indicates that peers work as gatekeepers and are better than parents at countering and signalling radicalisation.

CVE should not be concerned with good practice alone, but should also focus on good people: in successful cases, the intervention is not necessarily the determining factor; the practitioner executing it might well be responsible for the success instead. This aspect needs to be factored in as a consideration and studied further.

Research shows that increased resilience is important, but needs to be in effect across several levels (schools, homes, community engagement and peers). Prioritise secondary and tertiary intervention for evaluation, as these areas are targeted.

**Extra-EU P/CVE research lessons**

Literature from the development and security field is significantly rich in data and scientific rigour, and there are many valuable lessons contained in reports and academic studies from the Department for International Development (DFID), the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and various United Nations (UN) bodies related to CVE programming and evaluation measures.

A study by RUSI (Glazzard et al. 2015) on the drivers of violent extremism is very useful in examining the validity of various hypotheses and its consequences for the DFID (³⁶). Additionally, RUSI (Khalil & Zeuthen, 2016) provides guidance to policymakers and implementers of CVE and risk reduction (deradicalisation) programmes (³⁷).

A United Nations University state-of-research review on children and extreme violence reveals that children join non-state armed groups for several reasons: a need to belong, a quest for significance, peer networks, risk accumulation, impulsive behaviour, and bucking authority. Furthermore, children become violent due to in-group identity, in-group love, dehumanisation, and social norms and radicalisation (³⁸).
The UNDP study *Journey to Extremism in Africa* (Ojielo, 2017) unpacks the causes, consequences and trajectories of violent extremism (99). In particular, the study makes some important recommendations: shift away from security measures alone, as security-driven responses are counterproductive; specific geographic areas (hotbeds) are higher risks; and it is important to tackle structural causes and make a distinction between 'P/CVE-specific' and 'P/CVE-relevant' interventions.

UNESCO's (Alava, 2017) global mapping of research on youth and violent extremism on social media demonstrates that rather than being the initiator or cause of violent behaviour, social media facilitates the radicalisation process (100). On the same subject, Defence Research and Development Canada provide an evidence-based review of literature and projects on CVE on social media (101).

Hedayah, another important CVE centre of excellence, holds annual state-of-the-art reviews of academic contributions on CVE and violent extremism-related issues (102).

The issue of reintegration of child soldiers is another important body of knowledge that is potentially transferable to dealing with children, extremism and trauma within the EU. Numerous international aid organisations, development organisations and the academic community have extracted important lessons on child soldiers in terms of prevention, demobilisation and reintegration.

**Research gaps and findings**

There is a wealth of research and experience outside the EU, and closer collaboration should be prioritised to exchange research and lessons. Finding evidence-based guidelines is a continuing challenge beyond the EU too, where similar experiences are noted. Performing evaluations and stressing mental health issues are priority topics.

There are important lessons to be learned from the Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence, which has invested in projects and research over the past decade. For example, the subjects studied include when and why religious movements turn to violence; collective ethics (how norms of justice influence behaviour and individuals' reactions); and gaining a better understanding of protective factors in communities.

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http://collections.unu.edu/eserv/UNU:6290/unu_briefs_SocialScience.pdf


http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0026/002603/260382e.pdf


Hedayah holds an annual research conference, where they take stock of important research findings across different regions in the world: on the role of narratives and counter-narratives; on the role of gender in P/CVE efforts; on reintegration efforts and P/CVE efforts in the education sector, etc. Important lessons can be learned by remaining aware and informed of related efforts elsewhere, and taking stock of P/CVE knowledge is crucial. A great deal of work has been carried out beyond the EU in relation to the role of women and reintegration efforts.

The exit programme of Social Welfare, Academics and Training (SWAaT) for Pakistan shows high rates of reintegration of young boys with little recidivism. Understanding and dealing with mental health issues (particularly PTSD) is key in this local context.

There are common factors leading to pathways (social grievances, poverty, a lack of literacy) and for radicalisation prevention (a sense of belonging and inclusion, critical thinking skills). Moreover, there are important lessons to be learned beyond the EU on engaging with religious leaders in the prevention of violent extremism.

**Research lessons**

There is a lack of evidence-based research, especially on the impact of P/CVE interventions, including the impact of multi-agency interventions. Therefore, research on impact evaluations and impact of multi-agency interventions (not just single projects or interventions) should be highly prioritised in the field. Also, research on protective factors and resilience is imperative.

It is crucial to continue the triologue: the success and impact of the research depends on the audience. Research should not be conducted in isolation, but rather in collaboration with policymakers and practitioners. For successful collaboration, these stakeholders should learn to trust each other and to speak the same language. This can only be achieved by providing more opportunities for interaction and nurturing a relationship. One possible pathway is to establish national points of contact for P/CVE researchers.

At the same time, it is important to manage expectations. Research produces knowledge, not solutions. Both practitioners and researchers should be included and involved at the start of an evaluation or research project, so as to manage expectations.

The EU plays an important role for the convergence of research, practice and policymaking. Funds for research should include a dedicated budget for a chapter on the implications for practitioners and policymakers, in a specific and concise way. The EU should not operate in isolation from the rest of the world. There is a wealth of data and knowledge available on other continents, and work from researchers globally can be accelerated and enhanced by joint efforts.

Proposed topics for future research include:

- asylum seekers who have exhausted all legal remedies;
- the relationship between online and offline behavioural change;
- resilience factors;
- varying opinions on meaningful change from different actors (a life-course analysis);
- family support;
- working with vulnerable communities without stigmatisation;
- confidentiality, privacy laws and information-sharing in P/CVE;
- the role of gender in radicalisation and P/CVE;
- the influence of religious education;
- the effect of mass migration on the radicalisation of hosting communities and...
preventative measures (from hospitality to hostility);
• the impact of ideology;
• the long-term sustainability of P/CVE measures and mechanisms (a lower level of terrorist threat implies fewer resources);

• hate speech, propaganda and its impact;
• right-wing extremism;
• the impact of multi-agency interventions.

## Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Capabilities Approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBPR</td>
<td>Community-Based Participatory Research</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIPDR</td>
<td>Interministerial Committee for the Prevention of Crime and Radicalisation (Comité interministériel de prévention de la délinquance et de la radicalization)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNRS</td>
<td>French National Center for Scientific Research (Centre national de la recherche scientifique)</td>
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<tr>
<td>COSPRAD</td>
<td>Scientific Council for Radicalisation Processes (Conseil scientifique sur les processus de radicalisation)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CVE</td>
<td>Countering violent extremism</td>
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<tr>
<td>CYBERA</td>
<td>CYBER-VERA</td>
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<tr>
<td>DARE</td>
<td>Database and Assessment of Risks of violent Extremists</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (UK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERG 22+</td>
<td>Extremism Risk Guidance</td>
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<td>FGC</td>
<td>Family Group Conference</td>
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<td>FTF</td>
<td>Foreign terrorist fighters</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDPR</td>
<td>EU General Data Protection Regulation</td>
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<tr>
<td>GLM</td>
<td>Good Lives Model</td>
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<tr>
<td>IC</td>
<td>Integrative complexity</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICCT</td>
<td>International Centre for Counter-Terrorism</td>
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<td>LEA</td>
<td>Law enforcement agencies</td>
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<tr>
<td>MADDD-or-Rad-17</td>
<td>Model of Analysis for Differentiating Delusional Disorder from the Radicalization of Extreme Beliefs–17 Factor</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAUT</td>
<td>Multi-attribute utility technology</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRISM</td>
<td>Proactive Integrated Support Model</td>
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<tr>
<td>PST</td>
<td>Norwegian Police Security Service (Politiets sikkerhetstjeneste)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
PTSD | Post-traumatic stress disorder  
---|---  
RAN | Radicalisation Awareness Network  
RUSI | Royal United Services Institute  
SAVE | Structured Assessment of Violent Extremism  
SPJ | Structured professional judgement  
SWAaT for Pakistan | Social Welfare, Academics and Training for Pakistan  
TRAP-18 | Terrorist Radicalization Assessment Protocol  
UN | United Nations  
UNCTED | United Nations Security Council, Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate  
UNDP | United Nations Development Programme  
UNESCO | United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation  
USAID | US Agency for International Development  
USIP | United States Institute of Peace  
VAF | Vulnerability Assessment Framework  
VERA-2 | Violent Extremism Risk Assessment, version 2