Foreign fighter returnees & the reintegration challenge

Introduction

As of early 2016, the number of individuals who had travelled to the conflicts in Iraq and Syria to take up arms with various Islamist insurgent and terrorist groups as ‘foreign fighters’ had risen to over 42,000.\(^1\) A significant portion of these individuals originate from European Union (EU) Member States, with a report published in April 2016 suggesting the number may be as high as 4294.\(^2\) This figure may be even higher. By early 2016, almost a third appear to have returned to their countries of origin.\(^3\) Now that the so-called ‘Islamic State’ (IS) is suffering serious military setbacks,\(^4\) the outward flow of foreign fighters appears to have sharply decreased.\(^5\) There is an unprecedented number of foreign terrorist fighters now back in the EU and with the IS’ military decline more may follow in due course. IS will want to continue to encourage those within the EU (whether returnees or supporters) to carry out attacks from where they are. This Issue Paper provides a succinct overview of the challenges and opportunities for using...
reintegration-based\textsuperscript{vi} approaches to deal with the potential security threat posed by returning foreign fighters.\textsuperscript{1}

\textsuperscript{1} Specifically those that joined jihadist extremist groups such as IS and Jabhat al-Nusra.
For people to engage in terrorism, they must be able to overcome internal moral barriers to killing others as well as obtain a basic level of proficiency in the use of firearms and explosives. The amateur nature of some of the ‘home-grown’ plots that occurred in the EU since 9/11 attest in particular to the difficulties of acquiring operational capabilities by relying often on manuals downloaded from the Internet. Foreign fighter returnees are a major security concern precisely because of their battlefield experience, training in the use of weapons and connections to international terrorist networks. The desensitisation to the use of violence, combined with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) that often accompanies combat experience and potential involvement in atrocities such as those that IS proudly publicizes, further increases the potential threat posed by returnees.

At the same time, it is crucial to emphasise that foreign fighter returnees are not a homogeneous group with regard to their potential desire to commit acts of terrorist violence in their countries of origin. Undoubtedly, there is a major risk that some foreign fighters will seek to conduct terrorist attacks after returning home. However, as Omar Ramadan recently argued, there will also be a second group of individuals who might be more accurately seen as victims of IS recruitment efforts and a third set of returnees who fall somewhere between victims and (potential) terrorists. A fourth group are those who no longer see the use of violence as justified or necessary through disillusionment or the physical or psychological trauma caused by involvement in warfare or life under IS. Irrespective of whether we agree with designators such as ‘victims’ or put stock in explanations based on naiveté or ignorance, the fact remains that addressing the foreign fighter returnee problem must take into account the diverse nature of this group of individuals; both in terms of the threat they may pose and the most effective avenues for minimizing the risk of terrorism-related recidivism.

Reintegrating terrorists and extremists back into society, particularly when they have joined terrorist groups such as IS, is a controversial undertaking. Public pressure may favour a ‘lock-them-all-up’ type approach. Aside from the discussion on the desirability of such a course of action, legal proceedings in the Netherlands have demonstrated just how difficult it can be to secure convictions for crimes allegedly committed in a foreign country, particularly one in the throes of civil war. Most individuals who are convicted of terrorism-related offenses will also be released at some point in the future. In other words, looking at ways in which the reintegration of (former) terrorists can be managed to minimize the chances of future violence is not opting for a ‘soft’ approach, but responding pragmatically to a complicated challenge.

Context: deradicalisation vs. disengagement

The reintegration of (former) terrorists can be seen as a process aimed at facilitating their reintegration into society in a way that reduces the likelihood that they will resort to terrorism-related activity. Specialist programmes that focus on reintegrating (‘jihadist’) terrorists have gained traction in recent years around the globe. Some of these initiatives focus on incarcerated terrorists or extremists, others emphasise a post-detention parole setting, and a third set spans both of these...
Despite the prevalence of these programs, there is a critical lack of knowledge on whether or not these initiatives actually contribute to terrorism-related recidivism reduction. This is principally due to a lack of evaluation research.

Although there have been some noteworthy evaluations of reintegration programs focusing on Islamist\textsuperscript{xvi} as well as left-wing and right-wing violent extremism,\textsuperscript{xvii} the majority of reintegration programs has not been evaluated.\textsuperscript{xviii} How can successful reintegration programs be designed and implemented without an understanding of if and how they work?\textsuperscript{xviii} Government agencies, which are often the main parties responsible for the design and implementation of these undertakings, may be hesitant to allow outside scrutiny of a sensitive, counterterrorism related subject.\textsuperscript{xix} Yet unless more evaluation research is conducted, policy makers, practitioners and academics are deprived of vital ‘lessons learned’ that could be used to design and implement more effective programs.\textsuperscript{xix}

A second and related shortcoming is the lack of a clear understanding of what constitutes ‘success’ in reintegrating (former) terrorists and extremists. In 2008 in the Netherlands, for instance, approximately 50% of adult and juvenile prisoners re-offended within two years of release from detention.\textsuperscript{xx} Whether a similar recidivism rate for terrorist offenders could be labelled a success is unclear for two reasons. First, given the societal impact of terrorism, many citizens may not perceive of a 50% recidivism rate as a success - or at least as neatly in line with the national average. Second, there is simply insufficient data on terrorist recidivism, particularly in the EU, leaving it unclear what would be a realistic, let alone a desirable, recidivism rate for reintegration programs to strive for.\textsuperscript{xxi} Thus, although ‘reducing recidivism’ is often the goal of reintegration programs, the lack of data on this subject prevents an objective assessment of success.

The lack of practical insights into what works when it comes to reintegrating terrorists and extremists, suggests turning to underlying mechanisms as a way of understanding how these programs work and, where necessary, can be improved. The underlying assumptions that those who design and implement reintegration programs hold about the goals to be reached and how to attain them are crucial to these efforts’ success or failure.\textsuperscript{xxii} Broadly speaking, two approaches can be discerned; deradicalisation and disengagement.\textsuperscript{xxiv} Although the following paragraphs discuss these concepts separately, it is important to note that they are not mutually exclusive; in fact, given that it is as of yet unclear what works best, a combination of both approaches offers flexibility and maximizes the chances of success.

Radicalisation and deradicalisation have become household concepts since they entered the policy debate in approximately 2004.\textsuperscript{xxv} Their popularity belies the numerous and serious shortcomings inherent in them.\textsuperscript{xxvi} Most problematic is the (often implicit) notion that the adoption of radical views necessarily leads to involvement in radical behaviour and that desistance from terrorism similarly necessitates the abandonment of such views.\textsuperscript{xxvi} Such a relationship is an oversimplification of a complex reality that falters on theoretical and empirical grounds.

For the millions of people who hold radical or extremist views, the percentage that goes on to become involved in terrorist activities is
exceedingly small. Research has also shown that not all terrorists are primarily motivated by their convictions. An approach to reintegration that focuses solely on deradicalisation misses the crucial fact that desistance from extremist and terrorist groups is predicated on a host of reasons that go beyond ideology. These reasons include disillusionment with the efficacy of violence, falling-out with compatriots and the attractions of a regular life. Conversely, factors such as peer pressure and fear of retaliation from former comrades may also form obstacles to ceasing involvement in extremist or terrorist groups.

Looking at pathways out of extremism and terrorism solely through the empirically and theoretically dubious concept of deradicalisation thus risks foregoing a host of different avenues through which to achieve the goal of recidivism reduction. If, for instance, the social benefits of membership in terrorist groups (status, comradeship and a sense of purpose) guided an individuals’ involvement in the group, creating an alternative but non-radical social environment that can offer similar benefits is vital. Of course, deradicalisation still remains a vital tool for those who were ideologically motivated to engage in terrorism in the first place. The point is that based on our current understanding of the issues at play, it should not be the only tool reintegration programmes rely on.

An overemphasis on deradicalisation also misses the manifold historical examples of terrorists who were reintegrated into society without (apparently) deradicalising first. Between the 1960s and 1990, thousands of European terrorists were incarcerated, belonging to such groups as the IRA, ETA, the Italian Red Brigades and Germany’s RAF. The majority have since been released from prison without being subjected to deradicalisation programs. The fact that most of these individuals are no longer involved in terrorism, or at least to a much lesser degree, suggests that deradicalisation is not necessarily a prerequisite for reintegration. Closer investigation of historical examples of terrorist reintegration could provide fruitful avenues for improving current efforts to minimize recidivism rates.

An alternative to a deradicalisation-focused reintegration approach can be found in the concept of disengagement. Disengagement can be seen as ‘the process whereby an individual experiences a change in role or function that is usually associated with a reduction of violent participation. It may not necessarily involve leaving the movement, but is most frequently associated with significant temporary or permanent role change’. In other words, whereas deradicalisation focuses on changing one’s beliefs, disengagement emphasizes behavioural change. Disengaged terrorists or extremists can successfully reintegrate even if they maintain their radical beliefs, provided that they no longer engage in the use of terrorist violence in any way.

As with deradicalisation, working towards disengagement requires an understanding of how and why someone became involved in extremism or terrorism in the first place. The motives for joining such groups are diverse and extend beyond the adoption of a particular ideology. Reintegration programmes should therefore be flexible and tailored to the specific background and motives of the individual. Applied to the specific issue of foreign fighter returnees, this means taking into account that while some will be dedicated and battle-hardened extremists, others may have been co-opted or motivated...
(initially) by non-violent considerations such as a wish to provide humanitarian aid. Particularly noteworthy in this regard are the young children who were taken to Iraq and Syria by their parents or the infants born in those countries to foreign fighters. Possibly subjected to IS’ indoctrination, which is specifically intended to turn them into child soldiers, such children require specific care, in part to deal with their psychological trauma and in part to deal with their potential internalization of extremist ideology.

To conclude, the dearth of evaluations of reintegration programs and the scarcity of data on terrorist recidivism rates seriously hamper our understanding of how and under what circumstances such programs work and how their efficacy can be improved. While these shortcomings urgently need to be addressed, turning to these programmes’ underlying assumptions about success and how to achieve it provides guidance on how to design and implement such initiatives. Rather than opting for either deradicalisation or disengagement, current insights suggest adopting both approaches. This has the added benefit of ensuring that reintegration programmes have a measure of flexibility in dealing with their clients, which is a prerequisite for achieving recidivism reduction given the diversity of motives and backgrounds among those who become involved in extremism and terrorism.

Reintegration programmes in the EU

Numerous reintegration programs are already underway in EU member states, with new initiatives being deployed regularly. Most initiatives cover a range of activities such as religious counselling, psychological counselling, vocational skills training, education and recreational activities. Generally speaking, the programmes that focus more heavily on religious and psychological interventions could be viewed as deradicalisation-oriented. Programmes aimed at influencing violent extremists’ behaviour could be qualified as more disengagement-oriented and often rely heavily on a combination of educational and job skills training.

Within the EU, most programmes geared toward the reintegration of violent extremists can be found in Northwest Europe such as the EXIT-programs adopted in Norway, Sweden and Germany, as well as the Danish ‘Aarhus approach’ and the Dutch reintegration initiative currently spearheaded by the Dutch Probation Service. In Germany, a number of organisations are tasked with facilitating violent extremists’ rehabilitation and reintegration and these organisations each have their own philosophy regarding deradicalisation or disengagement. Below, a short summary is provided of the programs in Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands, to provide some insights in the benefits and merits of these different initiatives.

**Denmark’s Aarhus programme**

Denmark’s so-called Aarhus Model aims to rehabilitate returning Danish IS fighters and reintegrate them into society. The Aarhus Model includes both early prevention and exit programmes. The exit programme is directed at radicalized individuals who have the intention and capabilities to commit politically and/or religiously motivated violent crimes and terrorism. The programme is a collaborative effort of the East Jutland police and Aarhus Municipality’s social services to effectively reintegrate returned extremists by (re-) establishing trust with the authorities and creating open lines of communication between returnees and local government. The programme
offers treatment including medical care and psychological counselling for dealing with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and mentoring, as well as family support and assistance to violent extremists in applying for jobs or resuming education.xxxix

Once potentially radicalized individuals are identified, local authorities (together with a Muslim cleric) approach these individuals in an effort to turn them away from radicalism and extremism. There is also an Infohouse that screens calls and sets up priority of interventions. Most work is done through the SSP-framework on crime prevention – Schools, Social Services and Police dialogue. The city’s police commissioner has claimed that this preventative effort and the dialogue it has helped establish with the Muslim community, has helped lower the number of foreign fighters departing from Aarhus from thirty in 2013 to one in 2014.xli However, some parties, including the anti-immigration Danish People’s Party, have expressed concerns regarding the program, arguing that it is too ‘soft, naïve and short-sighted’.xlii Currently, its longer-term effectiveness is still a matter of debate and too early to draw any conclusions.

Germany’s Violence Prevention Network
In Germany, several organisations are conducting rehabilitative efforts for violent extremists. One of these organisations, the Violence Prevention Network, is an NGO that works with (young) people who are susceptible to violent right-wing extremism or religious fundamentalism. The programme is conducted on a voluntary basis and individuals who sign up are brought together in small groups that meet once a week over a 23-week period. The programme’s approach is mainly aimed at deradicalisation and combines civic education and pedagogical training modules with anti-violence training. The focus on deradicalisation entails an attempt to ‘disentangle the individual’s sense of anger and hatred from their political view of the world and help in tackling both the factors driving their anger and also re-educating them in the ways of democratic society and alternative ways of expressing and answering their concerns’.xlii The training begins within five months after imprisonment and is continued through coaching upon release. The organization also offers counselling to parents whose children have, or are at risk of, joining a terrorist organization.

Even though the programme mainly aims to foster deradicalisation, it includes elements of disengagement as well. The mentor who is assigned to an individual assists him or her with finding accommodation and employment and facilitates a number of meetings with family members as well. According to an internal evaluation of the project, it can be regarded as a successful programme (the recidivism rate of participants who have completed the programme is only 5% and the dropout rate is 2%).xliii Nonetheless, the organisation does not disclose the statistics regarding the total number of participants and ‘graduates’ of the program which makes it difficult to assess these percentages in their appropriate context.

The Netherlands’ approach to reintegration
In 2012, a specific reintegration project was launched in the Netherlands which focused on offenders on probation or parole who were (suspected to be) involved in ‘jihadist’ terrorism or extremism.xliv The Dutch National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV) established this project together with the Dutch
Probation Service to improve reintegration of extremist offenders in the Netherlands. The main objective of the approach is to reduce the chance of recidivism among extremist and terrorist offenders through re-socialization and aftercare measures. Assisting the programme’s so-called clients in finding a job, schooling, housing and debt relief and addressing psychological problems or reconciliation with family members are important components of this approach.

Simultaneously, clients are monitored to prevent a return to extremist circles. When programme staff deem their charges to be receptive to such efforts, a deradicalisation-focused component is introduced that relies in part on external consultants with theological knowledge to conduct cognitive interventions. These are intended to inject some ‘grey’ into these clients’ frequently very black-or-white worldviews. Ultimately, it is hoped that these deradicalisation efforts will lead to the renunciation of support for violence. Regarding the success rate of the program, Schuurman & Bakker (2015) state that no long-term conclusions can be drawn yet as the project was still in its early stages when they carried out their evaluation.\textsuperscript{xlv}

**Response**

While many EU member states have implemented reintegration programmes either focused on deradicalisation, disengagement or both, they vary widely in the approaches taken. Differences exist with regard to who is targeted by the programmes (e.g. foreign fighter returnees, violent extremist offenders, individuals vulnerable to radicalization or all of the above); in what phase the programmes are implemented (pre-prison, in-prison, post-prison); on what basis individuals partake in the programme (voluntarily or mandatory); who is responsible for the implementation of the programme; and the programme elements that are included in the programme (e.g. psychological counselling, education, religious counselling, etc.).

Owing to the on-going uncertainties over whether such efforts are effective at curbing terrorism-related recidivism, the specific merits and drawbacks of these initiatives cannot yet be underlined conclusively. It is still possible to offer practical guidance for those designing or implementing similar programmes. This section offers a concise overview of suggestions to improve existing reintegration efforts and address the issues highlighted in previous pages. Given the number of returnees and its potential strain on existing reintegration initiatives, dealing with these issues should be given priority at local, national and EU-levels of governance.\textsuperscript{xlvii}

1. **Prioritize the evaluation of reintegration programmes**

Reintegration programmes, both new and existing, should be subjected to critical, independent and real-time evaluation so their goals, underlying assumptions about how to achieve them, organizational implementation and the degree of success can be assessed.\textsuperscript{xlvii} This is crucial to designing and implementing more effective initiatives and thus to minimising the likeliness of terrorist recidivism.

2. **Collect data on terrorist recidivism in the EU**

This critical information will enable an understanding of the extent of the problem and provide a rough yardstick for identifying programmes of above and below average effectiveness, which can in turn be used to isolate best and worst
practices. Data on terrorist recidivism will also allow the success of reintegation programmes to be measured in a comparative sense. This provides a more objective standard for gauging their success.

3. **Ensure reintegration efforts are flexible and tailor-made**

Foreign fighter returnees are not a homogeneous group. To be effective, reintegration programs need to be flexible and tailored to individual’s specific characteristics and needs. Any effort to reintegrate extremists or terrorists should start with an assessment of the individual’s needs, narratives and networks, using specific risk assessment methods for violent extremism. Currently, various risk assessment tools are being used worldwide, including the Returning Terrorist Suspect (RTS) Prioritization Model (Australia); the Dynamic Assessment Framework (Dynamisch Beoordelingskader, The Netherlands); the Extremism Risk Guidance 22+ (ERG22+) (The United Kingdom); the Violent Extremist Risk Assessment (VERA) (Canada) and the Significance Quest Assessment Test (SQAT) (US).

All these tools share a number of indicators by which to judge a person’s level of extremism. However, the underlying methodology ranges from structured professional judgment (ERG 22+, VERA, Dynamic Assessment Framework) to self-questionnaires (SQAT). In order to be used effectively, any tool has to be adapted to local circumstances and staff need training to apply the methodology appropriately. Notwithstanding the pros and cons of specific assessment tools, a structured analysis of reintegration programme to take account of participants’ life histories, personalities, cognitive skills and various other metrics is crucial to enabling the actual design and delivery of tailor-made approaches.

4. **Pursue both deradicalisation and disengagement**

Given the uncertainty over what works best when it comes to reintegrating extremists and terrorists, programmes should not depend on one single approach. Deradicalisation, which stresses weaning clients away from their ideological convictions, certainly has a place in these efforts, but it should be seen as one among many possible avenues through which to minimize the chances of terrorism-related recidivism. Disengagement stresses behavioural rather than ideological change and encompasses the varied reasons for involvement in and desistance from terrorism, providing a multitude of avenues through which to work towards reintegration. As the three examples from Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands demonstrate, rather than being viewed as mutually exclusive alternatives, reintegration programmes should include both deradicalisation and disengagement-focused efforts.

5. **Engage with foreign fighter returnees immediately**

Because of the potential threat posed by foreign fighter returnees and, alternatively, the need to assist those who may be viewed as victims of IS recruitment, the possibilities for
immediate participation in reintegration programmes upon return should be explored. Opportunities for voluntary participation should be created and publicized, perhaps as part of a counter-narratives campaign. Using ‘formers’, those who have distanced themselves from IS and similar groups, to entice others to follow suit should be considered. However, due care must be taken to gauge their sincerity.

At the same time, for those (in all probability, the majority of) returnees who will not voluntarily engage with reintegration programs. This is not necessarily an insurmountable impediment; terrorists have disengaged during imprisonment (e.g. involuntarily). Furthermore, studies have shown that individuals who enter substance abuse treatment voluntarily and those who enter it involuntary often have similar results.

6. Learn from recent history
Evaluating current reintegration programs should be prioritized. However, recent history offers a wealth of examples of European terrorists returning to society after incarceration. The experiences of countries like Spain, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Italy and Germany can offer many useful insights that have barely been tapped.

7. Incorporate best practices into reintegration programmes

Despite the dearth of evaluatory research, those studies that have been undertaken, as well as current reintegration programmes, offer several general insights of immediate practical use. These include:

- The importance of a relationship of trust between programme staff and clients, including programme workers taking the individuals and their ideas seriously;
- Any reintegration programme needs to clearly state the programme’s objectives as well as indicators of success or failure;
- Programmes have the best chance of succeeding when they are based on respect for human rights;
- Well-trained staff is of vital importance - staff need to have a thorough understanding of the programme’s objectives and a positive, consistent and fair attitude;
- Programmes need operational flexibility to adapt to unforeseen circumstances;
- There is no one-size-fits-all solution, any reintegration effort should be based on a sound intake? and risk assessment procedure to determine the individual’s needs, degree of adherence to an extremist narrative, social network and capabilities.
• Effective cooperation between the various agencies and organizations involved in reintegration efforts (e.g. probation, police, local government, public prosecution service) is of vital importance;\textsuperscript{lv}

• The controversial nature of reintegration programmes for (former) extremists and terrorists requires effective management of potential political and societal repercussions, particularly those arising from the unavoidable cases of recidivism.\textsuperscript{lv}

**Conclusion**

Reintegrating (former) extremists and terrorists into society will always be a difficult and controversial undertaking. There is likely to be strong criticism of such an approach and some might criticize it as being ‘soft’ on terrorism. With the number of returning foreign fighters expected to rise, and with ‘home-grown’ radicalisation of both the Islamist and right-wing varieties continuing apace, the question of what to do with extremists and terrorists released from prison or returned from overseas conflicts simply cannot be avoided.

Given the increase in demand for reintegration capacity the problems and gaps in the current knowledge outlined in this Issue Paper need to be addressed with some urgency. The Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) is in an excellent position to bring these issues to the attention of policy makers, practitioners and academics. Hopefully, the near future will see research projects put in place in close cooperation with policy makers and practitioner experts that will enable the reintegration of terrorists and extremists to be approached with greater confidence and a higher likelihood of achieving an actual and measurable reduction in recidivism risk.
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Perspectives on Terrorism 9, no. 6 (2015): 36-50.


4 Joby Warrick and Souad Mekhennet, "Isis Quietly Braces Itself for the Collapse of the 'Caliphate'," The Independent, 13 July 2016.


6 Included under this broad header are a diverse range of initiatives aimed at minimizing the risk of terrorist recidivism, often dubbed diversion, off-ramp and exit-programs.


Horgan and Braddock, "Rehabilitating the Terrorists?", 267-91.

There are hopeful signs that this is changing. See, for instance: Mirko Noordegraaf et al., "Gericht, Gedragen En Geborgd Interventievermogen? Evaluatie Van De Nationale Contraterrorisme-Strategie 2011-2015," (Utrecht: Utrecht University, 2016).

Several noteworthy guidelines for developing such programs have been developed nonetheless: Harald Weilnböck, "Outline for Interventions of Deradicalisation from Involvement of Violent Extremism," (Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2016); Michael J. Williams and Steven M. Kleinman, "A Utilization-Focused Guide for Conducting Terrorism Risk Reduction Program Evaluations," Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism & Political Aggression 6, no. 2 (2014).


Schmid, "Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation."


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Schuurman and Bakker, "Reintegrating Jihadist Extremists."

Schuurman and Bakker, "Reintegrating Jihadist Extremists."
For detailed studies on how to conduct such evaluatory research, see: Nelen, Leeuw, and Bogaerts, *Antiterrorismebeleid En Evaluatieonderzoek*; Veldhuis, "Designing Rehabilitation and Reintegration Programmes."; Williams and Kleinman, "A Utilization-Focused Guide," 102-46.


This challenges one of the outcomes of a recent RAN working group meeting: Radicalisation Awareness Network, "Exit Programmes and Interventions," 3.