Dealing with radicalisation in a prison and probation context
RAN P&P - practitioners working paper

1. Introduction
National prison and probation systems are rapidly becoming more involved in radicalisation\(^1\) leading to violent extremism\(^2\). The prison environment, in particular, can be a potential breeding ground for radicalisation because of the following risks:

- recruitment of other prisoners;
- supporting extremist groups from prison;
- getting support from extremist groups outside prison;
- preparing for violent extremist/ideological inspired illegal acts after release;
- hostility to other groups of prisoners and/or staff;
- becoming more radicalised because of grievances/frustrations/anger related to being in prison.

However it should be emphasized that prison is not the main incubator for radicalisation. More importantly, both prison and probation systems are strong partners in deradicalisation/disengagement\(^3\), rehabilitation and resettlement\(^4\). Radicalisation leading to violent extremism is not a new phenomenon for prison and probation, but the current scale of the problem, together with the growing numbers of extremist offenders (especially foreign fighters) calls for reflection on existing perspectives, measures and interventions.

Scope and aim of the paper
This paper aims to provide oversight of – and insight into – the current line of thinking amongst European prison and probation practitioners, and to give advice to support decision making processes\(^5\). It does not aim to be fully comprehensive, but to provide a framework for policy makers, prison governors and probation staff that could inspire them in meeting challenges. A one-size-fits-all solution does not exist as the legislation and the prison and probation systems differ between EU Member States.

Contribution of RAN P&P
Since the launch of the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) in 2012, the Working Group on Prison and Probation (P&P) has focused on:

- preventing radicalisation, engagement with extremist groups and extremist behaviour during detention and probation,

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1 Radicalisation: the dynamic process whereby an individual comes to accept violent extremism. The reasons behind this process can be ideological, political, religious, social, economic and/or personal. We emphasise that being radical does not mean that a person will in any way follow up with action.

2 Violent extremism: promoting, supporting or committing acts of terrorism aimed at defending a political ideology which advocates racial, national, ethnic or religious supremacy and which opposes the core democratic principles and values of a given society.

3 The process of deradicalisation or disengagement includes behaviour and cognitive aspects such as beliefs. Disengagement refers to a behavioural change, such as leaving a group or changing one’s role within it. It does not necessitate a change in values or ideals, but requires an individual to relinquish the objective of achieving change through violence. Deradicalisation, however, implies a cognitive shift — i.e., a fundamental change in understanding.

4 Resettlement refers to the process where both prisoners and their families receive assistance and support from prison and probation to help them prepare for life after prison.

5 If not stated specifically, the points made in this paper apply to all ideologies that can lead to violent extremism.
• decreasing the levels of existing radicalisation among people in prison or in probation programmes.

The RAN P&P Working Group has gathered 146 practitioners in total, ranging from representatives from probation services to prison governors, prison officers, the Ministry of Justice and intelligence services, as well as NGOs and civil society organisations working with offenders. Seven large scale meetings with practitioners from all EU Member States and acknowledged researchers\(^6\) have enabled high-quality exchanges on topics such as cooperation between prisons and probation systems, risk assessments and interventions. A number of inspiring practices have also been presented around deradicalisation programmes in prisons, as an example. These practices can be found in the RAN Collection of Approaches and Practices.\(^7\)

RAN P&P has adopted the following guiding principles:

- The main objective of prison and probation is to keep society safe by implementing a judicial decision in a manner safe for civilians, employees, prisoners and convicted persons. In the long term, society is safest when prisoners are reintegrated.
- People are able to go through positive change and disengage from violence, even though some might choose not to.
- Universal human rights conventions must be respected.
- Individuals sentenced for terrorist acts do not all represent the same risks to society.
- A safer and more ordered prison environment, including in terms of dynamic relations, is a pre-condition to limiting radicalisation processes and enhancing deradicalisation/disengagement.
- To prevent radicalisation and support disengagement/deradicalisation processes, multi-agency cooperation is crucial.

This paper covers all the steps that a single individual may experience as he or she moves through the system: from prosecution/arrest or sentencing to return to society. It starts by setting the scene and explaining some of the main trends and challenges that prison and probation systems face with regard to radicalisation.

2. Setting the scene: challenges to policy makers, prison governors and practitioners in the prison and probation environment

Dealing with radicalisation leading to violent extremism in prison and probation settings poses new and recurring challenges. These challenges are often multi-faceted and can be dealt with in different ways, through different interventions at different stages of the criminal justice system. In this chapter, an overview is given of the key challenges which will be referred to in the following chapters.

**Determining the "radicalised offender" profile**

One of the key challenges to dealing with radicalisation effectively is the distinction between ‘regular’ offenders and those that can be called ‘radicalised’ or ‘extremists’. When offenders have been convicted of terrorist crimes, it can be assumed that they are violent extremists although even this boundary can be quite vague. Occasionally violent extremists are convicted for other crimes as their extremism is hard to prove. In some states, those convicted of terrorist crimes may have no intention of being violent and the offence implies no violence e.g. downloading a magazine linked to a terrorist group. Since many decisions on how to work with an individual in the prison and probation system

\(^6\) Researchers: Mark Hamm, Peter Neumann, Alison Liebling, Ferando Reinares, Farhad Kosrokhovar, Fergus McNeill and Tore Bjorgo.

depend on a first assessment, it is important to consider vulnerability to radicalisation or grooming at this initial stage.

Correlations between ‘radicalised’ offenders and a high level of social, emotional and/or psychological instability caused by problematic (social) environments are also visible. This calls for a differentiated approach which is difficult to implement through current legislation and prison and probation systems.

**Prison and probation staff competences**

As society in general has become more diverse, complex and interconnected, prison society has come to reflect this. This changes the requirements for staff skills and competences, especially with regard to radicalisation and extremism, in which identity often plays a key role. Sensitivity and understanding of other cultural and religious norms, values and expressions has become increasingly important for the building of good staff-offender relationships. Prejudices and fear of staff members, leading to over-reporting and negative interactions with detainees, can undermine deradicalisation/disengagement efforts. Staff dealing directly with convicted terrorists need specific skill sets and not all staff members will be suitable. It is a challenge to select and train staff to deal with radicalisation and violent extremism.

**Differences between radicalisation and religious behaviour**

For religiously inspired extremism, it is very important not to confuse people who might have (re)discovered their faith with people who have developed radical views. Most people who convert or revert, e.g. to Islam, during imprisonment are doing so for peaceful individual motives or to bond with a group of other prisoners. However, prejudices around the linkage between religion and extremism remain very present and may hamper good risk assessment.

**The foreign fighter phenomenon**

People are leaving Europe to travel to Syria, Iraq, Mali or Ukraine to become foreign fighters and to a large extent engage in violent behaviour. Upon their return to Europe they may intend to bring harm to their home countries. In some countries, all returnees and those who prepare to travel are prosecuted, posing a new challenge for the judicial and penitentiary system. However, the profiles of individuals planning to leave or returning are very diverse and not always real cases of radicalisation.

**Barriers to multi-agency cooperation**

Given the complexity of working with violent extremists, the necessity of cooperation among professionals is crucial. This applies to a range of professionals working with an offender before, during and after imprisonment. During imprisonment, challenges include the extent to which prison governors and wardens as well as probation officers in the community can and will exchange information with social workers and therapists. The same applies for information gained by intelligence services.

Confidentiality and privacy issues can hinder multi-agency cooperation. Another challenge is ownership. Shared responsibility may lead to no-one feeling responsible in some cases. For example, after release contact between the police and intelligence services (who have primary responsibility in terms of security) and the prison and probation service (who are responsible for an effective reintegration) is key to avoid different behaviour and interventions towards the ex-offender. This calls for clear rules on ownership and information sharing.

**Balancing public protection with integration**

One of the main reasons for imprisoning individuals is protecting society from their harmful behaviour. With the exception of those who have been involved in extremely severe crimes that can be proven, most violent extremists will eventually return to society. The longer people are imprisoned, the more difficult integration into society will be. A very short sentence – as is now the fate for many returning
foreign fighters – raises another challenge: what can be done in the limited time in prison or on license to prepare people for a new start in society?

The numbers of foreign fighters expected to come into contact with the judicial system also leads to questions on interventions pre-trial and during the trial itself. Alternative sanctioning options for less serious offences and prevention of ‘detention damage’ are also being explored in different EU Member States. Probation services may play an important role in designing these alternatives.

Programmes for radicalised persons both in prison and probation are useful, but are sometimes met with criticism from both other prisoners (why do they get extra attention?) and within the media and public opinion (why are we using tax payers’ money to help terrorists?).

Lack of research, facts and figures
Despite some very good research projects in the prison and probation setting, knowledge and data on people being or becoming radicalised during prison and probation are limited. Data is also lacking on the evaluation and effectiveness of programmes and interventions. It is clear that, thus far, very few prisoners radicalised in prison have acted upon this following their return to society. This might change rapidly with a growing prison population of foreign fighters. Experience shows that these individuals are often younger than other prison radicals and can have quite a shallow ideological basis. Moreover, they are often vulnerable and prone to influence, both by extremist recruiters as well as deradicalisation professionals. More research and insights are needed to work beyond assumptions and develop evidence-based interventions.

3. Identification and risk assessment

Since one of the main challenges is to identify extremist prisoners or those being radicalised by others, these insights and recommendations will focus on the process of identification using assessment tools based on risks and needs. When it comes to signalling or identifying offenders at risk of radicalisation, it will in most cases be the first-line staff who can pick up signs of deviant behaviour, for instance through the risk assessment process. The following recommendations should be considered for risk assessment focused on radicalisation.

a) Invest in, develop and offer general awareness training to all staff. Invest in, develop and offer specific training for specialist staff.

All first-line prison and probation staff should be trained to recognise signs of radicalisation. It is not necessary for all staff members to be experts on specific ideologies or religions. It is however necessary that correctional officers have some background knowledge of the religious and cultural backgrounds of the people they are working with. This is essential to understanding the difference between normal cultural and religious-based expressions, and extremist expressions. Specialist staff should be knowledgeable and skilled on the topic of radicalisation, specific ideologies, religions and worldviews. Specialist staff can usually be divided into two categories: regular officers who work on a specialised wing or unit (e.g. a terrorist wing) and those who collate information from other experts (these can be social workers, psychologists, etc.). These specialist staff will carry out assessments and manage interventions/programmes etc. A sensible approach would be to offer more general-awareness training to all staff, and specialist training to staff working directly with incarcerated terrorists.

b) Develop a two-step procedure of risk assessment in cases of potential radicalisation.

Since identification and assessment are time-consuming and since not all signs are actual indicators of radicalisation, it is helpful to have a two-step procedure. The first step is a screening process based...
on the behaviour of the individual or information received. When this screening results in reason to believe a person is at risk of radicalisation (or has already become extremist), a more extensive and thorough risk assessment is carried out, specifically designed to determine a radicalisation related risk.

c) Assessments should be based on multiple sources of information to increase reliability. This is not particular for cases of radicalisation but should be common practice. The sources should consist of:

- **Actuarial data**: about the individual and the offence
- **Dynamic factors**: such as employment, housing, mental health, family support, etc.. Changes in these factors in particular may form triggers to increase risk, or mitigating circumstances that reduce risk.
- **Clinical factors**: professional judgement and experience, using the personal and professional experience to assess the information collected through interviews and file reading.
- **Information from partners in a multi-agency framework**: information coming from social workers, the police, intelligence services etc. about an individual’s case.

It is important to expand current risk-assessment tools to include specific radicalisation indicators.

d) Practitioners carrying out risk assessments need support from peers and management

Carrying out assessments around potential risks of radicalisation is not an easy task. Many practitioners might feel anxiety, pressure and insecurity to do the assessment ‘right’. This might lead to biases and risk averseness. To avoid this, staff members should be supported in managing their anxiety and being confident about their decisions, both those based on the results from the assessment tool and on their professional insights. A support structure for verification can be put in place.

e) Avoid labelling by having continuous cycles of risk assessment

Using assessments through which offenders fall into certain categories might provoke the idea of ‘labelling’. This may have effects both inside and outside of prison, where certain communities can feel targeted. Labelling ‘violent extremists’ or ‘terrorists’ might not do justice to the different profiles in this group. The challenge around prosecuting and detaining foreign fighters is an example of this. It is therefore important that assessments are repeated at regular intervals or at times of change, in order to illustrate a possible reduction in the level of risk that a particular offender may show as an evolution of his/her disengagement process. Assessments can have a lot of added value but also have limitations. They have to be treated as a continuous activity aligned with professional judgements.

4. Environment & risk management

The prison and probation environment is defined as both the physical environment as well as the environment as it is experienced in terms of values, atmosphere, interpersonal relationships etc. Unless probation officers also work in prison, the probation environment is usually outside of prison, before incarceration or after release. In order to manage risks, it is vital for prison managers to ensure order and effective intelligence measures. Furthermore, risk assessment, categorisation and choice of prison regime plays a role in reducing risk during imprisonment, but also in reducing the risk of reoffending after release into society. The following recommendations and considerations should be taken into account with regard to the prison and probation environment and risk management.

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f) Running a well organised, orderly prison is a key prerequisite to avoiding further criminalisation as well as radicalisation.

Research suggests that the prison environment matters in the context of radicalisation\(^8\). Precision is needed when discussing increased radicalisation risks and, equally, factors that support disengagement. Deregulating factors such as overcrowding, lack of staff, tension between prisoners and staff and poor facilities (when it comes e.g. to food, showers or work) have a negative influence on flagging and dealing with radicalisation. However, these elements do not automatically mean that the prison will function as an incubator for radicalisation. Research shows that while some overcrowded prison institutions were the starting point for offenders who later committed terrorist acts, other equally overcrowded prisons have not been.

Other factors, not related to the physical environment, are often hard to measure but are important for maintaining a healthy prison and prisoner environment:

- **Safety**: if the prison staff is not able to uphold a safe environment, prisoners will form groups that offer both friendship and protection. These groups can in certain situations become prison gangs that enhance hierarchy, level of danger, conflicts between prisoners and between prisoners and staff.
- **Trust**: a concept hard to achieve in an environment of distrust which often flourishes in prison settings. However, trust is an important factor when dealing with prisoners in general but perhaps especially when it comes to preventing radicalisation and contributing to disengagement;
- **Fairness**: to be radical is not a crime and should as such not lead to repressive measures that go further than those imposed on ordinary prisoners. However, the crime(s) committed will always be factored in when the danger posed is assessed;
- **Humanity**: an environment characterised by kind regard and concern for the person.
- **Legitimacy**: the transparency of the prison, how it responds to incidents and its moral recognition of the individual.
- **Staff-prisoner relationships**: staff confidence and competence in use of authority is crucial to establishing a good relationship based on mutual respect.
- **The presence of a charismatic extremist leader is an important factor**: such prisoners must be identified and the risk they represent must be managed.

\( g) \) **Prison regime choices: Concentration, dispersal or combinations**

Amongst the EU Member States, opinions and experiences linked to prison regimes differ. Differences in numbers, legislation, infrastructure and other essential background elements make it difficult to compare and formulate a general recommendation.

The choice of regime can nevertheless have an important impact on the potential for radicalisation/deradicalisation. In the overview table below, prison regimes have been categorised as ‘concentrated’ (placing convicted terrorists together), ‘dispersed’ (placing convicted terrorists in a regime with other prisoners not convicted of terrorism related crimes) and a combination of the two. This distinction is somewhat artificial since in reality regimes are likely to be more mixed and flexible. Also, the prisoner might be placed in different regimes throughout his/her sentence based on the assessed risk. However, this overview of advantages and disadvantages could support decision making.

It is important to emphasise that that more and extensive knowledge about these regimes and how they are organised is necessary to further inform the debate on prison regimes.

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\(^8\) E.g. ‘Whitemoore ten years after’, (Alison Liebling 2012), ‘The spectacular few’, (Mark Hamm 2013). With respect to the importance of physical conditions, the RAN P&P has no academic support for this statement, but it is our experience as practitioners.
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<th>Regime choice</th>
<th>Potential advantages</th>
<th>Potential disadvantages</th>
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| **Dispersed:** People suspected or convicted of violent extremist acts are placed among 'ordinary' prisoners and fall under the same general regime. This does not mean that offenders are placed in an ordinary unit; placement is based on risk assessment. | - Prisoners are less likely to regard themselves as marginalised because of their beliefs. They will, to some extent, be treated as ordinary prisoners.  
- Prisoners might be positively influenced because of being around different groups of prisoners with different mind-sets. | - Handled by generalist staff members instead of specialists.  
- Risk of radicalising other prisoners.  
- Both the prisoner and his/her environment require close monitoring to identify any negative influences.  
- Risk of extremists mingling with criminal networks. |
| **Concentrated/placed together:** People suspected or convicted of violent extremist acts are placed together in a separate terrorist wing. | - All the prisoners on a terrorist wing can be completely monitored in their contacts within the wing.  
- Limited opportunity to influence other prisoners.  
- Individual and group work with prisoners on deradicalisation/disengagement and other interventions.  
- Staff on a terrorist wing become experts because they work with radicalised prisoners on a daily basis; only a small group of staff members must be trained.  
- This approach may reassure the public that real and powerful measures are being taken to safeguard society. | - The terrorist wing can facilitate further radicalisation/extremist acts. New bonds between extremist prisoners can be formed and this can increase the risk when they leave prison.  
- Lack of contact can cause difficulties when socialising someone after their release.  
- Perceptions of unfairness could lead to further radicalisation of the prisoner, but also of supporters outside the prison.  
- Such facilities are expensive and need capacity for urgent situations.  
- Prisoners might feel stigmatised by being in a separate wing, yet others see it as a sign of raised status or credibility as an extremist. It could therefore lead to greater cohesion within the group  
- Deradicalisation/disengagement interventions could be hampered.  
- The approach risks establishing a group with great symbolic power. |
| **Combination:** Based on risk assessment, it is decided whether to place a person suspected or convicted of violent extremist acts in a separate or an ordinary regime. | - Tailor-made approach that fits the risk and needs of the prisoner.  
- After screening and assessment, the detainee can be placed in the most appropriate regime. | - Both regimes need to be available.  
- Need for robust assessment tools. |
h) Rehabilitation interventions

- Interventions in cooperation with the offender’s social network
As the majority of prisoners released will eventually return to their old social network, it is key to involve these people in interventions. This especially applies to the positive, non-violent extremist members of this network, who in many instances are family members. Involving them in an intervention can comprise informing them about what professionals are doing, giving them tasks/responsibilities within this framework and also providing training that prepares them to deal with their loved one when the intervention has stopped. Those within the social network that could have a negative influence should not be involved.

- Theological interventions
A lack of spiritual support (e.g. through chaplains) in the prison system can increase the receptiveness of people who are already vulnerable to radicalisation. Those who are radicalised but have some doubts can benefit from good work by the clergy. It is important that imams are respected by prisoners and not seen as being linked to the authorities, otherwise they will not be regarded as people of wisdom or listened to. It is also important that these chaplains are careful around the subject of radicalisation. First and foremost they should offer offenders spiritual care and guidance. In some cases, they might also be able to deliver alternative narratives to soften the impact of extremist narratives in prison or on probation.

- Mentoring programmes
Several EU Member States have a mentoring system in place for people who are radicalised and want to leave violent extremism. These mentors can be trained volunteers who serve as role models and guides within society. Some of them are ‘formers’, with a past as a violent extremist and experience of leaving the scene. From their personal story they know the situation a person is in, can offer guidance on pathways out of extremism and showcase alternative lifestyles. Not all countries allow formers to enter a prison.

i) Develop tailor-made intervention packages for people vulnerable to radicalisation and those who have been already radicalised
As was underlined in the introduction, a one-size-fits-all model isn’t possible in these cases. For each offender at risk of or already radicalised, a risks and needs assessment needs to be made which will inform the intervention package necessary to manage the risk and work towards reintegration. Multi-agency cooperation will help make a wide range of interventions possible, while cooperation with local churches and mosques will support theological interventions as well as connections to a network of relatives and friends so that they may be involved in the process.

5. Resettlement

The aim of resettlement should be to prevent violent behaviour and enable inclusion and participation in society. A sense of belonging and acceptance is likely to make a commitment to violence less sustainable. Radical ideas are not dangerous in themselves, even though they may remain a risk factor for violent behaviour in some circumstances.

Research on the resettlement of extremists or other radicalised offenders is currently limited. In many cases rehabilitation interventions (as mentioned above) take place throughout the sentence, but will come to an end at some point. Practice shows that in any case (not only for radicalised offenders):
• Resettlement plans should be included in the working agenda for the offender as early on in the sentence as possible.
• It is important to understand the individual, work on their problems and their possibilities.
• It is critical to plan for the end of support, to gradually reduce the individual’s reliance on others and build capacity for them to cope.
• Transitional periods are seen as points in time when the risk of recidivism is high, so it is important to have plans in place prior to them having served their full sentence. These plans should incorporate ways to deal with a problematic home or personal life and make use of human and social capital in order to prevent new offences.

j) Using a desistance-based approach is essential to work with those convicted of terrorist or violent extremist related crimes and who require resettling.

The most effective way to encourage desistance from violent radicalism may be to let the radicalised offender redefine his own identity as a non-radical – or at least a non-violent radical. Such a process is likely to be difficult to complete alone. Theories of desistance from offending suggest that desistance is co-produced with others. These others would include:
• During the sentence – correctional officers and others in the social networks of those desisting.
• Representatives of other collaborating organisations are also involved, but to a lesser extent on a daily basis.
• Those with meaningful relationships with desisting offenders and with a positive view towards non-violent behaviour must be drawn in. These may be family, friends or other loved ones.
• People who are assumed to have some authority over the offender, like religious leaders, teachers or people who formerly held the same beliefs and attitudes but have desisted from violent behaviour.

From a desistance point of view, offenders in the process of building such a relationship should:
• Receive support in addressing any criminogenic needs identified through appropriate assessment tools.
• Receive support in tackling the problems they themselves define as central to their situation and as potential causes for violent behaviour.
• Receive support in recognising and realising their potential strengths, capabilities, skills etc; and in appropriately channelling these.
• Be offered suggestions and opportunities for participating in the community, such as cultural or sports groups.
• Receive support in realistically defining and finding ways of practically attaining what they see as a good life.
• Be stimulated in re-defining their own identity through positive feedback that supports hope.

These processes should start as early as possible during the sentence and should create a situation in which the conditions for continued contact and support after the sentence are put in place.

k) Tools
Various tools can support resettlement. Structured cooperation with service-providers like housing agencies, employment agencies, educational institutions, health care etc. is one important tool. Building and supporting relationships, developing positive social bonding, supporting and stimulating personal strengths and skills, encouraging hope, offering guidance in religious and spiritual matters are also important. The question for each case should be: what are the internal and external factors that we may mobilise to help the offender (in this case, a radical one) want to live with a crime-free life?
More specific for deradicalisation or disengagement is establishing a mentor arrangement. If possible, the mentor or facilitator should work with the individual throughout the sentence and should remain a point of contact and support after release. The first weeks after release can be very intense. If the individual has spent many years in prison, this period of adjustment can be tense and difficult for them and their family and take a lot of management.

I) Barriers to resettlement

Some communities may be resistant to the individual returning, and the media may also raise concerns. Opposing extremist groups may try to antagonise the situation and inflame tensions. Probation must remain non-judgemental and supportive whilst managing the risk the individual poses to society and to themselves. Against this backdrop, it can be difficult to increase the individual’s social capital and make them feel part of a society that they perceive through media etc.) does not want them. Scrutinising someone’s culture and religion must be handled sensitively and transparently and should happen alongside work with the individual to help him/her change and grow.

6. Concluding remarks

This paper has provided an overview of the main challenges and insights gathered within the RAN P&P working group since 2011. Although much has been learned and clarified, it has become clear that some issues need further attention. The insights in this paper focus on what needs to be done, mainly to create further awareness on radicalisation risks in the prison and probation sector. The paper also includes some thoughts and recommendations on how to implement changes, but in this regard more experience should be collected.

The following topics should be addressed in the upcoming years of RAN P&P:

- The sector is experienced in dealing with radicalisation, however for most prison and probation services this was on a small scale and usually limited to only a few prisons in a specific area. The development of an increasing number of foreign fighters in prisons will lead to new dynamics and pressures in the criminal justice system. These developments need to be monitored and discussed to find new interventions and measures.
- Many prison regimes are in development and Member States are deciding on new approaches to detain convicted terrorists. A more in-depth analysis on organisational structure, incidents and impact for each regime is necessary to work towards an evidence based recommendation.
- Increasingly data shows a connection between radicalised offenders (and radicalised individuals in general) and mental health issues. This connection needs to be investigated as well as the consequences this has for the intervention packages around radicalised offenders.
- Differentiation needs to be made between adult male and female offenders, and juvenile male and female offenders, both in terms of their behaviour in the system as well as targeted interventions for these groups.
- Prisons and probation dealing with radicalisation and extremism have an increasing number of interventions at their disposal to work with. However, the impact and effectiveness of these interventions is still unclear. Impact measurement and impact analysis is necessary to move from an experienced-based to an evidence based approach.
- More insight into the resettlement process for convicted terrorist is required to understand what specific kind of support is important to prevent recidivism and promote sustainable reintegration.