

Multi-Agency Working and preventing violent extremism: Paper 2

A position paper from RAN H&SC

This is the second of two position papers from the Radicalisation Awareness Network's Health and Social Care (RAN H&SC) working group focusing on Multi-Agency Working (MAW). The first paper, published in 2018, provided the context for MAW in preventing and responding to violent extremism. In particular, it considered different models of MAW, difficulties sharing information across agencies, and the challenges of responding to the many and varied forms of extremism in EU countries. This second paper presents a series of case studies on MAW in the EU and identifies key considerations for those intending to introduce MAW in this space in future.

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Introduction

In January 2014, Abdullah and Jaffar Deghayes left Brighton in the UK and travelled to Syria. There the brothers joined the Al-Nusra Front, a group affiliated with al-Qaeda. Within 10 months, both had been killed. Abdullah was 18 at the time of his death, and Jaffar 17. The Brighton and Hove Local Safeguarding Children Board held a serious case review to determine if opportunities had been missed to redirect the boys' lives towards non-violence ⁽¹⁾. The review noted that the boys had complex needs, including a history of childhood trauma. They, and the wider family, had come to the attention of 'a very large number of agencies' ⁽²⁾ (38 different professionals), owing to concerns over domestic violence and physical abuse as well as over their involvement in anti-social behaviour. Concerns had also been expressed in relation to violent radicalisation.

The review concluded that there were a number of 'inconsistencies' ⁽³⁾ in practices in Brighton, including a lack of information-sharing across agencies, mistrust among practitioners and a lack of established working relationships among relevant practitioners. While individual services were not directly at fault for failing to prevent the brothers travelling to Syria, their responses to the Deghayes' needs were suboptimal — the 'system as a whole let the boys down' ⁽⁴⁾.

The Deghayes case illustrates two important facets of contemporary approaches to managing violent extremism. The first is the importance of MAW in responding to violent extremism. Where MAW is seamless, clear systems and structures exist to facilitate information-sharing: agencies no longer work in silos and different cultures across organisations do not inhibit collaboration. Most importantly, all parties responsible for supporting clients have access to the information and expertise needed to assess and manage client needs.

Second, there is a need to improve preventive action when managing violent extremism. Responding to the threat of violent extremism once it becomes manifest is not enough; it is crucial to act to address the roots of violence before its emergence, or at least as early as possible in the process of violent radicalisation. This entails identifying those at future risk of violent extremism and supporting them within a needs-based model to redirect their lives towards non-violence.

Of course, the importance of MAW in preventing violence is not unique to the field of preventing and countering violent extremism (CVE). Rather, it is considered good practice when managing the risk of all forms of violence in society. This is because violence is typically the manifestation of complex needs at individual, family and societal level, which inevitably means that 'no single agency can deal with, or

⁽¹⁾ Carmi, E. & Gianfrancesco, A. (2017). *Serious case review: Siblings W and X. Identifying the strengths and gaps in multi-agency responses to vulnerable adolescents at risk of exploitation through radicalisation*. Brighton: Brighton & Hove Local Safeguarding Children Board. Retrieved from <https://www.brightonandhovelscb.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Siblings-W-and-X-SCR-July-2017.pdf>

⁽²⁾ Carmi, E. & Gianfrancesco, A. (2017). *Serious case review: Siblings W and X. Identifying the strengths and gaps in multi-agency responses to vulnerable adolescents at risk of exploitation through radicalisation*. Brighton: Brighton & Hove Local Safeguarding Children Board. Retrieved from <https://www.brightonandhovelscb.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Siblings-W-and-X-SCR-July-2017.pdf>

⁽³⁾ Carmi, E. & Gianfrancesco, A. (2017). *Serious case review: Siblings W and X. Identifying the strengths and gaps in multi-agency responses to vulnerable adolescents at risk of exploitation through radicalisation*. Brighton: Brighton & Hove Local Safeguarding Children Board. Retrieved from <https://www.brightonandhovelscb.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Siblings-W-and-X-SCR-July-2017.pdf>

⁽⁴⁾ Graham Bartlett, Chair of the Brighton and Hove Local Safeguarding Children Board quoted by the BBC. BBC. (2017, July 25). 'Opportunities missed' to stop brothers' Syria deaths. *BBC News*. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-sussex-40738392>

be responsible for dealing with, complex community safety and crime problems' (5). The World Health Organization (WHO) reviewed and synthesised the evidence and examples of multi-agency services in violence prevention. They concluded that multi-agency partnerships that encourage nurturing relationships between young people and their primary caregivers, enhance life skills, reduce the harmful effects of alcohol and change the social and cultural norms that support violence (among others) can successfully prevent the emergence of violence in at-risk groups (6). The importance and value of multi-agency approaches has also been acknowledged in dealing with other complex societal problems including homelessness (7) and child protection (8). The challenges for MAW have also been well documented and discussed in these contexts (9).

However, MAW is less well-established in the area of P-CVE than in areas such as domestic violence, gun violence and gang-related violence (10). Our understanding of the practical aspects of the configuration, responsibilities and day-to-day running of multi-agency services in this area is relatively limited, leaving those seeking to create novel solutions without clear reference points.

Against this context, this paper presents four case studies of MAW in preventing violent extremism. In each case study, practitioners from different services come together to share information and pool expertise. The central objective of the paper is to identify key themes that emerge from the case studies, and in doing so, to provide guidance for those seeking to enhance existing responses or establish new structures in this area.

1. MAW in P-CVE

This paper complements earlier work carried out by the RAN. It is the second of two papers from the RAN H&SC working group. The first paper, published in 2018 (11), drew on the broader practice of MAW in other settings (e.g. child protection and crime prevention) in a discussion of different forms of MAW: it noted that different services provide varying amounts of value in different contexts — that is, no one model of MAW is optimal for all contexts, or all threats. Instead, each solution must be tailored to suit the specific problem that it seeks to confront. The paper also considered a range of practical challenges for MAW in P-CVE, in particular, barriers to information-sharing across agencies (e.g. security,

(5) From Berry, G., Briggs, R. E and van Staden, L. (2011). *The effectiveness of partnership working in a crime and disorder context: A rapid evidence assessment* (p. i), by London: The Home Office. Retrieved from https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/116549/horr52-report.pdf

(6) World Health Organization. (2010). *Violence prevention: the evidence*. Geneva: World Health Organization. Retrieved from https://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/4th_milestones_meeting/evidence_briefings_all.pdf

(7) Sheikh, S. & Teeman, D. (2017). *A rapid evidence assessment of what works in homelessness services*. Social Care Institute for Excellence. Retrieved from https://www.crisis.org.uk/media/238843/a_rapid_evidence_assessment_of_what_works_in_homelessness_services_2018.pdf

(8) Stroud, J. & Warren-Adamson, C. (2013). Multi-agency child protection: Can risk assessment frameworks be helpful? *Social Work & Social Sciences Review*, 16(3): 37-49. Retrieved from https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=5&ved=2ahUKEwjO273C4Y3gAhVipHEKHQ7XAwUQFjAEegQIAxAC&url=https%3A%2F%2Fjournals.whitingbirch.net%2Findex.php%2FSSWR%2Farticle%2Fdownload%2F536%2F579&usq=AOvVaw374fG1cYoFSfXbQb6L_ibh

(9) See Cheminais, R. (2009). *Effective Multi-Agency Partnerships*, London: Sage Publications.

(10) For example, there was considerable complexity in the area of MAW in responding to domestic violence two decades ago. See Harwin, N., Hague, G., & Malos, E. (1999). *The Multi-Agency Approach to Domestic Violence: New Opportunities, Old Challenges*. Whiting and Birch Ltd.

(11) Sarma, K. (2018). *Multi-agency working and preventing violent extremism I*. RAN H&SC Issue paper (April). RAN Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-papers/docs/multi-agency-working-preventing-violent-extremism-042018_en.pdf

probation, health and education), which may be rooted in cultures of secrecy in one agency (e.g. security services) and cultures of client confidentiality in another (e.g. health).

This position paper should also be read in conjunction with earlier papers on MAW by the RAN. For example, *Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Approaches and Practices* ⁽¹²⁾, focused on a multi-agency approach, provides a useful introduction to the different agencies potentially involved in MAW, including law enforcement, youth workers, social services, healthcare practitioners and civic society. It also provides a clear rationale for establishing multi-agency approaches, and gives a snapshot overview of different types of MAW operating in the EU.

MAW has also been discussed at RAN working group meetings and reported in ex post papers. In 2016, for example, RAN H&SC produced an ex post paper and handbook, *How to set up a multi-agency structure that includes the health and social care sectors?* ⁽¹³⁾. The paper, based on meetings of the working group in Copenhagen that year, advised those considering setting up new structures to involve relevant agencies, invest in relationships, create conditions that enable information-sharing, appoint a case owner and evaluate the acceptability and effectiveness of the structure. MAW was also considered at a RAN H&SC meeting on children and young people growing up in radicalised environments, which likewise highlighted the importance of information-sharing ⁽¹⁴⁾.

1.2 Focus of the report

This report complements earlier papers on multi-agency approaches to preventing and responding to violent extremism. It focuses in particular on the following themes.

Early stage prevention

In contrast to some of the earlier papers on MAW, this position paper focuses specifically on multi-agency approaches to preventing violent extremism. That is, three of the four case studies in the report offer targeted interventions for clients who may be at risk of becoming involved in extremism in the future, without indication of serious or immediate threat. As will emerge in this paper, such services work at the level of predisposing risk factors (e.g. homelessness, poor education, poverty, family-based problems) that might influence or induce individuals to become involved in violent groups.

This work is distinguished from that of other services focused on individuals believed to be at imminent risk of becoming involved in terrorism, i.e. services that target precipitating risk factors for violence. This includes preventing access to funds for travel abroad to join extremist organisations.

⁽¹²⁾ Radicalisation Awareness Network. (2018). *Preventing radicalisation to terrorism and violent extremism: Approaches and practices*. RAN Collection of Approaches and Practices. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/docs/creating_counter_violent_extremism_infrastructures_en.pdf

⁽¹³⁾ Radicalisation Awareness Network. (2016). *How to set up a multi-agency structure that includes the health and social care sectors?*. Handbook. Ex post paper. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-papers/docs/ex-post-paper-handbook-ran-hsc-18-19-may-2016-copenhagen-dk_en.pdf

⁽¹⁴⁾ Radicalisation Awareness Network. (2016). *Meeting on children and youth growing up in a radicalised family/environment*. Ex post paper. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/about-ran/ran-h-and-sc/docs/ran_h_sc_meeting_on_children_and_youth_hamburg_14-15_09_2016_en.pdf

Needs-based approach

Good practice in prevention work in public health, mental health and medicine means that management plans are based on a careful needs assessment and are designed to address clients' specific needs. This case and care management approach is needs based (i.e. bottom-up), rather than being determined by a set of preconceived beliefs (often based on population-level statistics) about the nature of the risks (i.e. top-down) ⁽¹⁵⁾. The report explores the extent to which MAW is needs based and how a needs-based approach translates into practice.

Information-sharing

The subject of information-sharing has been widely discussed and written about in relation to MAW in P-CVE. Most of this discussion has centred on barriers to information-sharing. It is less clear what practical steps can be taken to enhance information-sharing. There is a need to identify practical ways of ensuring that governance and accountability safeguards underpin the work of multi-agency approaches, and to determine the role that supervision, training and auditing play in these safeguards. Moreover, linguistic and cultural differences across agencies can hinder information-sharing; an understanding of how existing MAW approaches have overcome such barriers is valuable. Thus, a central question for consideration is how existing multi-agency solutions have overcome barriers to information-sharing or otherwise enhanced the sharing of information across agencies.

Psychological support for staff

Depending on the nature of the multi-agency approach, staff may work with highly traumatised individuals, carry a highly demanding caseload and/or need to remain vigilant given the potential for client involvement in extreme violence. In this context, some staff may struggle with vicarious trauma, vigilance fatigue, and ultimately, burnout. The question for consideration is how existing MAW approaches have supported staff in this context.

Mitigating threats vs supporting clients

Health and social care workers tend to be experienced in balancing the need to support their clients therapeutically, while also mitigating any forensic risk they may pose. They gain this experience through work in areas such as child protection, mental health and intellectual disabilities. However, they have less experience in environments and teams where some staff (e.g. law enforcement) are primarily concerned with risk mitigation and less attentive to the needs of the individual who may pose a risk. The question for consideration is how existing MAW approaches have sought to create a balance in motivation and focus across all agencies involved.

A common approach to risk assessment and risk management

There are many different approaches to risk assessment for terrorism in use in the EU and elsewhere. It is unclear how well these tools work, and to what extent different tools are being used by different agencies in the same jurisdiction. The question for consideration is how (or to what extent) existing MAW approaches have been able to converge on one specific approach to assessment. Their

⁽¹⁵⁾ For an example in the context of child and adolescent mental health, see Henderson, S. W., & Martin, A. (2014). Case formulation and integration of information in child and adolescent mental health. In J. M. Rey (Ed.), *IACAPAP e-Textbook of Child and Adolescent Mental Health*. Geneva: International Association for Child and Adolescent Psychiatry and Allied Professions. Retrieved from <http://iacapap.org/wp-content/uploads/A.10-CASE-FORMULATION-2014.pdf>

experiences of sharing materials and tools across the broader multi-agency team can provide valuable insight in this area.

National-level guidance

There is a sense that many existing multi-agency teams evolved through an organic process at local level, and are at least semi-autonomous from national-level influence. The question for consideration is to what extent it is important that government agencies (e.g. justice) have a role in overseeing multi-agency services at regional and local level. Such supervision or responsibility may provide opportunities for governance and accountability and for establishing a standardised approach to working with clients. Conversely, it may hamper the ability of local services to adapt to local contexts.

2. Case studies

2.1 The Info-House (Denmark)

Description and MAW

In contrast to many EU countries, Denmark has less experience of extremist violence. This said, there is growing concern in relation to the potential threat posed by returnees from Syria and Iraq, online radicalisation and recruitment into terrorism, and the crime-extremism nexus. In response to these threats, Denmark has engaged its policy, legislation and services, with the latter taking the form of a comprehensive multilayered and integrated system of MAW. It is noteworthy, that the basis for the development of the preventive response to extremist violence in Denmark builds on experience from more than 40 years of crime prevention across sectors.

In terms of policy, a series of action plans (most recently, the 2016 Preventing and Countering Extremism and Radicalisation) set out the country's approach to responding to extremism at public health level, through more targeted work with both individuals at risk of radicalisation and those already in extremist circles. Legislation supporting these efforts includes Section 115 of the Danish Administration of Justice Act. This legislates for the sharing of information across agencies such as the police, mental health and social services in crime prevention cooperation, including when that information is used to support vulnerable individuals (as opposed, for example, to aid the justice system in pursuing a criminal investigation against such individuals).

National, regional and local efforts are coordinated and supported by the Danish Centre for Prevention of Extremism in close cooperation with the National Prevention Centre under the National Police, the Preventive Security Department of the Danish Security and Intelligence Service and the Danish National Agency for Education and Quality.

These agencies advise efforts at regional and local level: they promote a standardised approach while allowing room for customisation of services locally. At local level, efforts to prevent violent radicalisation have been incorporated into three existing MAW structures, each focusing on a different population group. Schools, social services and the police (SSP) collaborate to prevent children from engaging in crime. Police, social services and psychiatry (PSP) (police, social services and health care practitioners) seek to prevent people with mental health illness from engaging in crime. Finally, prison and probation services (KSP) (police, social services and the Danish Prison and Probation Service) work locally to prevent former prisoners from reengaging in crime. Each MAW structure has a broader remit to prevent all forms of criminal activity, including the violent radicalisation of individuals into extremism.

This case study concentrates on the multi-agency system of so-called Info-houses that seek to share knowledge about prevention of extremism and assess risks of violent extremism within each of the 12 police districts and the municipalities in those districts. These Info-houses draw together staff from police and social services within the municipality who have expertise in violent radicalisation and prevention, collate information held by these services, and assess the needs of the individuals who come to their attention. In some cases, Info-houses are based on staff collaboration from the PSP, SSP and KSP. In others, the Info-houses work closely with these networks. Other relevant stakeholders apart from the police and municipality can also become involved.

The Info-house model comprises two coordinating forums: the Info-house Network, which operates at police district level; and the Info-house Municipality, which operates at municipality level.

Info-house Network

This Network is a forum for all the Municipalities in one Police District. Challenges with extremist networks across Municipal boundaries can be discussed in general terms and prevent strategies can be planned at the Police District level. Concerns about individuals are not discussed in this group. The Network also focuses on sharing knowledge and information about recent prevention initiatives, both national and international. It also collates and synthesises evidence emerging from the academic and research community. This knowledge is reviewed by the Info-house Network and then disseminated to practitioners at municipality level, ensuring that local-level practices are constantly informed by the most up-to-date evidence. The evidence is also drawn upon by the National Centre for Prevention of Extremism, National Prevention Centre at the National Police, the Prison and Probation Service, the Agency for Education and Quality and the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (Preventive Security Department).

Although ownership of the Info-house Network is shared by the different agencies involved, police are responsible for its coordination and for setting up meetings.

Info-house Municipality

The Info-house Municipality is where agencies come together to assess and manage specific cases. The overall purpose of the Info-house Municipality is achieving local coordinated collaboration between authorities, where relevant skills are linked in systematic, coordinated and qualified analysis and assessment of reported concerns. The authorities work and act based on various regulatory frameworks and undertake to implement measures and initiatives in line with current legislation.

Threat of concern

Denmark is concerned about all forms of extremism but has been particularly attuned to the risk posed by returnees from Syria and Iraq in recent years.

Assessment, formulation and intervention

The Info-houses (municipality level) can receive information on individuals of concern from members of the public, statutory agencies and services, or other practitioners. Agencies with relevant information on the case bring this information to Info-house meetings. The Police initially conduct a search in their system to assess whether a security response is necessary. If not, they can engage in the preventive effort and assessment in the Info-House.

The Danish Centre for Prevention of Extremism, in collaboration with others (e.g. the Danish National Police's National Prevention Centre, the Danish Security and Intelligence Service's Prevention Centre

and numerous local practitioners across municipalities, the police, and researchers), has developed a model for assessing risk of extremism. This assessment model is designed to be used by all personnel working jointly in Info-house Municipality collaboration.

The assessment model is a multi-agency dialogue tool used to examine the extent and nature of a reported concern. The model is used to guide assessments based on two key risk domains: risk/threat and resilience. The risk/threat domain relates to beliefs (convictions and rhetoric), readiness to use violence and sources of social influence (networks and social relations). The resilience domain relates to psychological vulnerability, family factors, networks and leisure, education and work, and individual resilience characteristics. Training in the use of the model is provided to all practitioners working with Info-houses.

Drawing on the assessment, the Info-house Municipality determines which of the risk factors are relevant to a given case, and the formulation (i.e. a holistic understanding of the individual, their needs and the risks that they may present) is presented. This formulation, in turn, is used to draw up the management plan (i.e. recommendations for how best to work with the client). If the individual is believed to pose a security threat, the case may be referred to the police and intelligence services. If there is no immediate security risk, the Info-house may suggest that the individual be supported through a range of services available through the cooperating networks (PSP, KSP and SSP), the police and local municipality services. This may include access to life skills coaching, psychological therapy and practical support, including housing and education.

Information-sharing

Sharing of information within the Info-house is provided for in legislation — Section 115 of the Administration of Justice Act ⁽¹⁶⁾. This facilitates the sharing of information between police, prison and probation, and health services, if the information is for use in supporting the individual (as opposed to prosecuting the individual).

Facilitators and barriers

A recent survey of Multi-Agency Working in the Info-houses suggests that among some of the core challenges experienced by stakeholder are the development of a common prevention vocabulary and knowledge on extremism and methodologies in prevention work. The wider Danish model of preventing and responding to violent extremism is therefore continuously underpinned by access to the most up-to-date knowledge and expertise on P-CVE. The Danish Centre for Prevention of Extremism has commissioned a related knowledge-mapping study, focusing on how individuals become involved in extremism, and the most effective and successful means of redirecting their lives onto other pathways. The knowledge synthesis is aimed primarily at practitioners in Denmark like SSP consultants, PSP participants, and members of other relevant forums for prevention. The intention is to provide practitioners with a stronger knowledge base for their work. At the same time, the synthesis should consolidate the knowledge base for outward-facing advisory initiatives for municipalities and practitioners working to prevent extremism. The key findings from the mapping are to be disseminated through presentations held in the Info-house networks and in courses run by the Danish Centre for Prevention of Extremism. Subsequently articles and knowledge briefs are commissioned to support this work based on the topics in demand from professionals in the Info-houses ⁽¹⁷⁾.

⁽¹⁶⁾ Further details on legislation are available online (<https://stopekstremisme.dk/en/offers-and-tools/legislation>).

⁽¹⁷⁾ See for example, https://stopekstremisme.dk/en?set_language=en&cl=en This is for the opening page in English. Our homepage is currently being revised content wise. This way at least first entry is correct.

2.2 Luton Family Safeguarding (UK)

MAW and description

The UK has a long history of dealing with the threat of terrorism, and today faces threats from jihadi, far-right and republican terrorism (amongst others). In response to this threat, the government's Strategy for Countering Terrorism (CONTEST) has identified prevention (i.e. the strategy's Prevent programme) as a core pillar of activities. The central objective of this pillar is to prevent people from becoming involved in, or supporting, terrorism.

Responsibility for so-called safeguarding is shared by all those working in the statutory services, including health, law enforcement and education. These services can refer those believed to be at risk to a multi-agency process known as Channel ⁽¹⁸⁾. Typically, the threshold for working with an individual under Channel is the existence of objective evidence that the individual is going through the process of violent radicalisation.

However, in some cases, statutory services may identify individuals for whom there is no objective evidence of violent radicalisation, but rather where that person is believed to be at risk of becoming radicalised in the future. This may arise, for example, where a parent has been radicalised into terrorism and may have a radicalising influence on his or her children. In such a case, the threshold for referral to Channel may not be met, and the case may fall within the remit of other statutory services.

One such service is Luton Family Safeguarding, based in the Multi-Agency Safeguarding Hub (MASH) in Luton Police Station. Luton Family Safeguarding comprises five multi-agency units, each with a mix of mental health, addiction and violence-prevention practitioners drawn from different services (e.g. violence-prevention practitioners are seconded from HM Prison and Probation Service). In addition, these units have the support of an assessment team, senior social worker and clinical psychologist. Staff from the police, health, education, social care are also co-located on the MASH site, as is the local Channel coordinator.

The key remit of Luton Family Safeguarding is child protection. This is achieved by supporting children and families where possible, and intervening to protect children where necessary ⁽¹⁹⁾. It is important to stress that Luton Family Safeguarding was not set up to prevent violent radicalisation leading to terrorism. It is a statutory service responsible for protecting children and young people from birth to the age of 25. As such, it supports children and families across a range of concerns, including children who are not attending school, are at risk of child sexual exploitation or female genital mutilation, have disabilities, commit offences or return from care ⁽²⁰⁾.

Some of these concerns pertain to the protection of children within the family system, including aspects like neglect and emotional, physical or sexual abuse of children in the home. Another set of concerns, however, relates to the life trajectory of children, including the risk of becoming involved in criminality, alcohol and drug misuse, or other behaviours that are to their long-term detriment. Risk of becoming involved in terrorism is just one of many such concerns.

⁽¹⁸⁾ See a summary of Channel online (<http://preventforfeandtraining.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/The-Prevent-Strategy-and-the-Channel-Programme-in-FE-Colleges.pdf>).

⁽¹⁹⁾ See Luton Borough Council's description of Family Safeguarding online (https://www.luton.gov.uk/Health_and_social_care/safeguarding/family-safeguarding/Pages/default.aspx).

⁽²⁰⁾ More information on the assessment and thresholds of needs, risk and intervention for children and young people is available online (<https://www.centralbedfordshirescb.org.uk/lscb-website/professionals/the-importance-of-thresholds>).

Threat of concern

Agencies in Luton are concerned with a range of different forms of extremism. Al-Muhajiroun (ALM) is a proscribed organisation in the UK ⁽²¹⁾ that has been a source of radical influence in Luton for many years. Individuals associated with ALM have travelled, or attempted to travel, to Syria from the area. Taimour Abdulwahab al-Abdaly, the suspected attacker behind the bombings in Stockholm in 2010, lived in Luton for almost a decade ⁽²²⁾ and local agencies are also concerned about extreme right-wing groups which pose a threat to peace and security in the area ⁽²³⁾ ⁽²⁴⁾.

Assessment, formulation and intervention

When a child is referred to the service, an assessment is completed by an assessment team examining parenting capacity, child development and needs, environment, etc. Thus, the service immediately differentiates between different types of presenting problems. When a case is accepted into the service by the assessment team, it is referred to the safeguarding team. Typically, the assessment team will make this referral within 10 days of completing the assessment.

In the event that the assessment team is concerned about the possibility of violent radicalisation, the case will be reviewed by a senior social worker on the team who has expertise in the area and is also connected with Channel. In consultation with Channel, this social worker can refer the case to Channel, or where it falls below the threshold for Channel, can propose that the risk be managed by the safeguarding team. In either case, there will be some degree of coordination and liaison between Channel and the safeguarding team.

In addition to the assessment, the assessment team will have prepared an initial formulation and management plan for the case. The safeguarding team record all work conducted with the family in a 'workbook' that is specific to that family (and captures all information related to that family). Where indicated in the plan, work with parents may include building parenting capacity. Similarly, depending on the management plan, the drug and alcohol worker, mental health worker or domestic violence worker (i.e. from the probation service) may become involved. Work is reviewed monthly in group-based supervision meetings.

When dealing with young people at risk of violent radicalisation, in addition to drawing on the expertise of the team, Luton Family Safeguarding also has recourse to the services of a government-approved interventionist — for example, an imam with expertise in faith formation and interpretation.

Information-sharing

As noted earlier, Luton Family Safeguarding is based in the MASH building in Luton Police Station, co-located with police officers, adult mental health workers, education outreach staff, probation staff, drug and alcohol misuse personnel, etc. The service was specifically established to facilitate the sharing of information across agencies in safeguarding young people. In a radicalisation context, the senior social worker on the safeguarding team liaises with Channel, itself a multi-agency team. On another

⁽²¹⁾ See the UK Home Office's proscribed terrorist organisations online (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/670599/20171222_Pr oscription.pdf).

⁽²²⁾ See the related article on *BBC News* online (<https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-11994611>).

⁽²³⁾ See the related article in *The Guardian* online (<https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/oct/27/uk-towns-polarised-by-far-right-sara-khan-counter-extremism-commissioner>).

⁽²⁴⁾ See Luton Women's Network Against Violence & Extremism online (https://www.luton.gov.uk/Community_and_living/crime-and-community-safety/letstalkaboutit/prevent/Pages/lwnave.aspx).

level, however, members of the safeguarding team can liaise directly with other staff on the team (e.g. probation staff working on the team as domestic violence supporters) and with co-located police officers to share information, when relevant to the safeguarding of the client.

Psychological support for staff

There is no ongoing psychological support for staff on the safeguarding team. However, individual staff members can access employee support services on a case-by-case basis. Also, staff are supported through monthly case supervision meetings as well as through professional supervision within their own professions (e.g. probation staff receive supervision within the probation service).

Facilitators and barriers

One of the key barriers to working in this area, and reported by health and social care teams across the EU, is a public perception that these teams are part of a broader counter-terrorism effort that invades privacy and unfairly targets specific communities. Such public perception can undermine trust in the authorities, ultimately undermining the ability of the teams to work effectively with children and families.

The team (and more broadly, the MASH multi-agency service) operates in an environment where different services tend to act on differing levels of evidence. Police, for example, will typically act on suspicion, whereas health and social care workers require a higher degree of evidence before becoming involved with a family. However, these contrasting positions are not unique to the problem of radicalisation; rather, they reflect the wide range of concerns that the Family Safeguarding Unit manages. In the case of Luton Family Safeguarding, the service has had to work hard to ensure that their roles and responsibilities are clear to the public, and this has been achieved through outreach activities.

2.3 The Prevention of Radicalisation and Family Support Units (CPRAF) (France)

MAW and description

Like the UK, France also has a long history of dealing with extremism. Recently, 130 people were killed in Paris on 13 November 2015, and 86 were killed in an attack in Nice in July 2016. Both attacks were claimed by the so-called Islamic State. Right wing groups pose less of a threat, according to the CPRAF, in part because they are clustered into small groups that are often in conflict with one another. Nonetheless, some groups have been dismantled in recent times.

The CPRAF are part of the French response to violent radicalisation: 101 such units operate at local level (in prefectures), and are led by a prefect — a civil servant tasked with implementing government policies at local level, both in departments and regions. The prefect, in turn, will establish the membership of the rest of the unit, based on local context. Typically, representatives are drawn from key public services including health, police, education, prison and probation. Members of associations and community groups may also be included.

The central role of the CPRAF is to follow up on cases of suspected radicalisation when there is no immediate threat to security, and to channel the appropriate resources to individuals and their families. The CPRAF have dealt with an estimated 2 600 young people and 800 families. Each prefecture is mandated to hold a meeting of CPRAF once each month.

In their work they can draw on the expertise of the National Centre for Assistance and Prevention of Radicalisation (CNAPR), which runs the free telephone number, and the Departmental Assessment Group tasked with the assessment and monitoring of all reported cases.

Assessment, formulation and intervention

Referrals into the CPRAF typically come through the police service. More specifically, the Departmental Assessment Group, run by the Prefect security staff, is in charge of the assessment and the monitoring of all reported cases of radicalized people. If concerns are rated as a threat to security, the case remains under the responsibility of security and intelligence services. If there is no threat to security, the case is oriented to the CPRAF unit. Prior to being referred to CPRAF the police will have completed a risk assessment for the client to determine risk of violent extremism and those deemed to not be at immediate risk, but potentially at future risk, are referred to CPRAF ⁽²⁵⁾. As such, CPRAF work in a similar context to the corresponding services from the UK and Denmark reviewed in this paper. Those assessed as being at more immediate risk are managed by other systems, led by law enforcement and security agencies.

Cases referred to the CPRAF are discussed at monthly team meetings, where information from the different agencies represented on the CPRAF will be shared, though typically this is handled carefully, so as to avoid the exchange of unnecessary information between agencies (see below, under 'Information-sharing'). Based on an initial formulation, the CPRAF will identify the different services that need to be commissioned to work with the individual and the family. This might include education, social and health services, among others: the number and type of practitioners involved are determined by the clients' needs. Progress with the client and family is fed back to the CPRAF through representatives, and is discussed at monthly meetings.

Threat of concern

The main threat of concern for the CPRAF at the time of writing is jihadi extremism.

Information-sharing

During monthly CPRAF meetings, information on the individual is shared among those in attendance. However, this information is limited to that needed to identify the types of services required to support the individual and their family. CPRAF meetings do not typically involve the sharing of detailed information between the different agencies in the unit. All CPRAF members sign a confidentiality agreement.

Local services and practitioners working face-to-face with individuals and their families do not attend CPRAF meetings, and this is considered a crucial aspect of the service — it allows practitioners to maintain some level of distance between the unit and those working with the clients, thus maximising trust between practitioners and clients.

Psychological support for staff

The CPRAF do not work directly with clients. Practitioners working with the clients can access professional support through their own professional channels or services, for example through

⁽²⁵⁾ Note that the French police use a bespoke risk assessment system devised in 2015 and revised in 2017, that explores warning, worrying and alarming signs of radicalisation. The 2017 revision was developed with the support of professionals including the French Federation of Psychiatrists.

supervision or employee assistance programmes that offer psychological support. However, since many will not have acquired experience working in the area of violent radicalisation, there is also a designated fund for those needing additional support ⁽²⁶⁾.

Facilitators and barriers

The main barrier encountered by the CPRAFs has been the reluctance of some stakeholders to participate in the meetings. Some of these stakeholders work in the social or health care services and didn't, initially, feel comfortable cooperating with the security services when working with clients. However, awareness-raising and training measures have largely been successful in overcoming this barrier. On a related matter, there were also initially some concerns in relation to information sharing – with some stakeholders lacking confidence that all information could be shared confidentially. This was overcome by requiring those agencies working with CPRAF to sign confidentially agreements.

The work of CPRAF has been facilitated by the presence of the National Coordination and Support Unit for Territorial Action in the Prevention of Radicalisation (CNCAAT). This Unit is part of the Inter-ministerial Committee for the Prevention of Crime and Radicalisation. The Unit was created to support the local implementation of radicalisation prevention policy under the direction of prefectures. The Unit brings together five experts seconded from several Ministries (Family, Justice, Health and Education) in order to respond to the diverse needs arising from the implementation of radicalisation prevention policy. An intranet platform was also created to facilitate the exchange between the experts of the Unit and the Prefectures.

2.4 Centre of Excellence for Deradicalisation, Bavarian State Criminal Police Office (Germany)

MAW and description

The Centre of Excellence for Deradicalisation, part of the Bavarian State Criminal Police Office and the Bavarian Network for Prevention and Deradicalisation. It is comprised of a team of 10 individuals representing different areas of expertise, including experts in theology, politics, psychology and sociology as well as police officers. An additional 10 police officers based in police departments around Bavaria act as local points-of-contact for the Centre.

One of the main duties of the Centre is to conduct risk and threat assessments as part of the case management of clients. This includes the assessment of the likely needs of those individuals who are subject to intervention. One important step of the case management is the arrangement of support by agencies that can properly address these needs. As such, the Centre assesses needs and coordinates the delivery of support by third-party service providers (e.g. the NGO, Violence Prevention Network, who is a key player in CVE and delivers individually tailored disengagement interventions on a local level). The Centre operates across Bavaria, which has a population of approximately 13 million people. 700 Salafist extremists are known to be, or to have been, active in Bavaria.

In contrast to the other three services reviewed in this report, the Centre for Excellence for Deradicalisation works with individuals who are considered to be going through the process of violent radicalisation. They also work with those who wish to disengage from violent extremism, for example individuals who return from conflict zones like Syria and Iraq. Cases involving individuals without a sufficient security risk are referred to other service providers who work in the prevention area (e.g. youth services).

⁽²⁶⁾ The Interministerial Fund for the Prevention of Crime or Fonds Interministériel de Prévention de la Délinquance (FIPD).

Threat of concern

At the time of writing, the Centre is working in the area of 'religiously motivated extremism and terrorism', including efforts to prevent individuals travelling abroad to join extremist groups.

Assessment, formulation and intervention

Cases are referred to the Centre by the police and security services, migration services, health services and other government services. A number of Government-funded NGOs also report cases to the Centre. Due to regulations on privacy and the data protection, the identities of such individuals are only revealed where there is a clear security risk. The Centre may also be contacted by members of the public through a helpline, or by individuals who are themselves seeking to find a way out of an extremist and violent environment. Staff in the Centre gather all information available on the case and complete a risk assessment system using an in-house system developed by the police, called RADAR.

During the risk assessment, the team considers the predisposing, precipitating, maintaining and protective factors in the life of the individuals, and then pulls this information together in a formulation. They may also explore the developmental pathway of the individual (i.e. examining his/her life chronologically). The Centre considers future risk propensity through risk scenarios of what may come to pass in the life of the individual. Finally, a report including the results and conclusions of the assessment is prepared.

Based on the assessment, formulation and risk scenarios, the Centre proposes a risk management plan for the client. This plan is then conveyed to one of the 10 local police officers working at local level who are tasked with facilitating the implementation of the plan. Typically, the police officer then contacts NGOs and other service providers who work face-to-face with the individual. In turn, these front-line workers report progress back to the Centre, which reviews cases at the scheduled meeting, held on a regular basis. Information is collated by the Centre team, which can then make adjustments to the management plan as needed (e.g. to bring in additional services or scale up the provision of a specific service).

Depending on the nature of the intervention needed, different members of the Centre assume a more or less active role in the case. For example, where this involves early prevention of risk, social care (e.g. psychology and health) or education practitioners may take on a more active role. However, when it is believed there is an imminent risk (e.g. of someone travelling abroad as a foreign fighter), the police will lead the case management.

Information-sharing

As part of the police, the Centre can access all information held by the police on a case. It can also share information with other government agencies as long as there is a legal basis of doing so. For example, there is a legal provision that allows information to be shared for the purposes of child protection. However, there is no legislation that specifically allows information to be shared across agencies in order to prevent violent radicalisation. The Centre reports that the agencies have developed a system for information-sharing that works, and with which all stakeholders are comfortable.

Psychological support for staff

The Centre does not have a formal psychological support structure for its members, though those working face-to-face with clients can obtain such support through their own services (e.g. social workers).

Facilitators and barriers

Early in the work of the Centre there was a sense that some of the work being done by the Centre, and in particular deradicalization work, was not necessarily a responsibility of the police. There was also some suspicion among those working in social services that the involvement of the police may be used as an opportunity to gather intelligence on clients. This said, both concerns were largely addressed over time as the stakeholders developed strong working relationships and mutual understanding of their roles and responsibilities.

The work of the Centre was supported by internal expertise in conducting risk assessment, and using risk assessment frameworks in general. Creating formal points of contacts within social work and mental health services at local and regional basis also enhanced communication between agencies.

3. Discussion and conclusions

This final section explores some of the key themes emerging from the case studies. Some of these themes were intentionally explored from the outset, while others emerged as the case studies unfolded. A key overarching observation, however, it is that three of the four case studies included here respond to the risk of violent radicalisation pre-emptively (i.e. they focus on primary prevention, in a targeted way). That is, the individuals with whom they work have yet to display any so-called 'red-flag' indicators of radicalisation, and they are not at serious or imminent threat of becoming involved in violent extremism. MAW in this context is very different to work with individuals who are believed to be in the final stages of violent radicalisation and at immediate risk of becoming involved in terrorism. This point is important, as some of the themes emerging from this report are specific to the context of early prevention, and may be less relevant to practitioners working with people further along in the process of radicalisation.

Theme 1: Needs-based approaches

The services reviewed in this paper approach their work with at-risk populations through what is traditionally termed a person-centred or client-centred approach. Such approaches are inherently needs based, with assessment and management individualised to the client, thus ensuring that responses wrap around both the individual and their family. Moreover, such approaches prioritise the concept of consent (clients engage consensually with the agencies) and the importance of mutual respect between clients and services.

This client-centred ethos is very much in line with prevention work targeting other forms of violence⁽²⁷⁾. In such interventions, the emphasis is less on the individual "fitting in" with a service offering' and more on the services being moulded around individuals to 'suit their needs, circumstances and lifestyle'⁽²⁸⁾. The key facets of person-centred working are also present in these services, with individuals consenting to work with practitioners and practitioners approaching the work with respect for the clients and their families.

Theme 2: Mitigating threats vs supporting clients

(27) For a discussion in the context of gang violence, see Gebo, E., & Campos, K. S. (2016). Perceptions of Gangs and Crews by Justice-Involved Youth and Implications for Best Practice Work. *Journal of Social Service Research*, 42(4), 478-488. doi:[10.1080/01488376.2016.1153565](https://doi.org/10.1080/01488376.2016.1153565)

(28) From *Seeing it through: Options for improving offender outcomes in the community* (p.9) by ACT Government, 2011. Retrieved

from https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=5&ved=2ahUKEwiHnaDY9I3gAhUyUBUIHXh3Cu4QFjAEegQIBhAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.cmd.act.gov.au%2F_data%2Fassets%2Fword_doc%2F0005%2F269042%2FSeeing_it_Through_-_Options_for_improving_offender_outcomes_in_the_community.doc&usg=AOvVaw3HZug6Scd43aPnO dl6JMD

One concern expressed in previous RAN meetings relates to the competing priorities among different agencies involved in multi-agency services. In particular, there was unease about police prioritising the management of risk, while health and social care practitioners prioritise support and care. While this incompatibility may feature in the work of the services reviewed in this report, in the main, practitioners reported a mutual acceptance that the priority is what is typically referred to as ‘safeguarding’ in the UK. It is likely that this shared position reflects the fact that three of the services (from Denmark, France and the UK) deal with low-risk, early prevention cases. This allows multi-agency collaboration work to put the risk of extremism in the background, and bring their other needs to the foreground. It is possible that competing priorities may emerge in other contexts, for example where the balance between risk mitigation and support is more finely balanced.

Again, the theme of competing priorities is widely discussed in the broader literature on MAW. In their review of multi-agency approaches, for example, Atkinson and colleagues note that ‘competing individual and agency priorities were also frequently cited as a challenge to multi-agency working’. The interviewees in their study reported ‘described “different priorities” or “tensions”, for example, differences in the target group, different government targets and a focus on preventative work versus crisis intervention’⁽²⁹⁾.

Theme 3: Information-sharing

RAN has debated the difficulties associated with sharing information across different agencies for several years. While the services reviewed in this report did experience difficulties with information-sharing at times, this was not a predominant concern nor something that dramatically impacted on their work. Practitioners point out that one of the primary reasons for establishing multi-agency teams is to streamline information-sharing — and thus information-sharing and MAW go hand-in-hand. The CPRAF case study illustrates that this does not necessarily mean that all information is inevitably shared, but rather that the basic information required to identify and put in place the appropriate services can suffice. Again, it should be stressed that three of the services work in prevention, where serious and immediate risk of violence is low, and thus some of the sensitivities around sharing information across police, health, education and other services may be less marked.

More broadly, however, difficulties with information-sharing are common to all forms of MAW, not just in the context of violent extremism. We know from this broader context that barriers, including those related to information-sharing, are largely overcome as agencies gain experience working together. With this experience comes trust, mutual respect and appreciation for the benefits of collaborative working⁽³⁰⁾.

Theme 4: Psychological support for staff

Staff working in multi-agency partnerships come into contact with individuals, including children, who report very traumatic experiences. One of the concerns expressed for practitioners in MAW relates to vicarious trauma or distress. Coupled with demanding caseloads and a fear of overlooking something of importance⁽³¹⁾, these practitioners can quickly find themselves struggling personally and

⁽²⁹⁾ From ‘Multi-agency working: models, challenges and key factors for success’ by M. Atkinson, P. Doherty & K. Kinder, 2005, *Journal of Early Childhood Research*, 3(1), p. 12.

⁽³⁰⁾ For an excellent overview and discussion, including in relation to multiprofessional communication in multi-agency teams, see Glenny, G. & Roaf, C. (2008). *Multiprofessional communication: Making systems work for children*. Berkshire: Open University Press.

⁽³¹⁾ Meredith Krause, for example, has discussed the phenomenon of vigilance fatigue among police officers who become overwhelmed as they struggle to assess risks based on sub-optimal information. See Kruse, M. (2012). Vigilance Fatigue in

professionally and in need of support. Yet this feature of MAW is not specific to practitioners dealing with violent radicalisation. It is an aspect of all work that involves supporting vulnerable clients and clients who potentially present a future risk of violence⁽³²⁾. This was certainly the perception of the agencies involved in the services reviewed in this paper. Luton Family Safeguarding, for example, noted that their staff could access support in supervision and from existing employee assistance programmes, which are available to all staff working in the services (not just the safeguarding teams). The CPRAF have additional funding in place for front-line workers needing support due to their work with radicalisation, yet this has rarely been sought by practitioners, to date. It is worth noting that the theme of psychological support for staff also relates, more broadly, to issues like resilience and coping, which have also been widely discussed in the health and social care areas⁽³³⁾.

Theme 5: A standardised approach to risk assessment

Each of the multi-agency services reviewed here uses some form of risk assessment. However, these assessments are typically based on semi-structured professional judgement approaches that probe a range of different risks. Such risks include suicide, drug misuse, youth crime and anti-social behaviour, domestic violence, child abuse and neglect and a range of other outcomes that are undesirable for both individuals and their communities. Thus, while popular risk assessment systems for terrorism (e.g. the Violent Extremism Risk Assessment (VERA II) or Extremism Risk Guidance (ERG 22+)) may prove useful in work with individuals at more immediate risk of becoming involved in terrorism, a broader approach to risk assessment is more typical when completing assessments in early prevention, as seen in the services reviewed here⁽³⁴⁾.

Theme 6: Different MAW models

As discussed in the first paper in this series, multi-agency teams can be described in different ways. The Luton Family Safeguarding teams are operational teams that also provide services, by contrast with the Danish Info-houses which assess need, but typically coordinate the delivery of services by other service providers. Interestingly, however, within both jurisdictions (of the UK and Denmark), different forms of multi-agency work are in evidence at different tiers in the broader prevention system, with some forms

policing: A critical threat to public safety and officer well-being. *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, December 1, 2012. US Department of Justice. Retrieved from <https://leb.fbi.gov/articles/featured-articles/vigilance-fatigue-in-policing-a-critical-threat-to-public-safety-and-officer-well-being>.

⁽³²⁾ For a recent systematic review focusing on the work of clinical psychologists, for example, see McCormack, H. M., MacIntyre, T. E., O'Shea, D., Herring, M. P., & Campbell, M. J. (2018). The Prevalence and Cause(s) of Burnout Among Applied Psychologists: A Systematic Review. *Frontiers in psychology*, 9, 1897. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01897. Retrieved from <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/30386275>. For a discussion in relation to nurses and social workers, see Ben-Zur, H. & Michael, K. (2007). Burnout, social support and coping at work among social workers, psychologists, and nurses: the role of challenge/control appraisals. *Social Work in Health Care*, 45(4): 63-82. doi:10.1300/J010v45n04_04. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/5892173_Burnout_Social_Support_and_Coping_at_Work_Among_Social_Workers_Psychologists_and_Nurses

⁽³³⁾ For a comprehensive bibliography see the University of Minnesota resource list *Stress & Resilience in the Workplace & Beyond: Articles about secondary traumatic stress, vicarious trauma, compassion fatigue and burnout* online (<https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/5aac/d3ab4b346675739b7961f305c2352e6c719f.pdf>).

⁽³⁴⁾ See Sarma, K. M. (2017). Risk assessment and the prevention of radicalization from nonviolence into terrorism. *American Psychologist*, 72(3), 278-288. doi:10.1037/amp000121. Retrieved from <https://www.apa.org/pubs/journals/releases/amp-amp000121.pdf>; Knudsen, R. A. (2018). Measuring radicalisation: risk assessment conceptualisations and practice in England and Wales, *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression*, 1-18. doi:10.1080/19434472.2018.1509105. Retrieved from <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19434472.2018.1509105>; and Pressman, D. E., & Flockton, J. (2012). Calibrating risk for violent political extremists and terrorists: The VERA 2 structured assessment. *The British Journal of Forensic Practice*, 14(4), 237-251. Retrieved from <https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2012-31240-001>

of MAW involving management of responses, others coordination of services, and others still implementation or execution of services ⁽³⁵⁾.

Luton Family Safeguarding is an implementation-level MAW and operational team (i.e. it delivers services) but it can link in with other national counter-radicalisation agencies tasked with management (e.g. the Home Office) or coordination of responses (e.g. Channel). Similarly, while the Centre of Excellence for Deradicalisation (Bavaria) and the CPRAF are examples of a coordination-level MAW (i.e. they coordinate services), both are tightly linked to other practitioners and services that are tasked with implementation, and also with national groups responsible for management of responses (e.g. the CPRAF is linked to the National Coordination and Support Unit for Territorial Action in the Prevention of Radicalisation (CNCAAT)).

What emerges from this is the sense that while MAW can function on different levels in response to radicalisation, it is key that there is some integration within a jurisdiction at the different levels — with MAW collaboration to manage, coordinate and deliver responses.

Theme 7: Agility and MAW linking to other supports

Local MAW is not isolated from other services, and can have linkages both within the community and at national level. The Family Support Units in Luton and the Prevention of Radicalisation and Family Support Units in France share some common features here. Both can draw on multiple stakeholders at local level in the community to work with young people and families where these stakeholders offer specific expertise. In Luton, for example, practitioners can request the input of former extremists and religious scholars, who can help those at risk to explore their belief systems around extremist violence.

4. Conclusions

One of the key findings of the review of the Deghayes case (mentioned in the opening section of this paper) was that there were failings in the way agencies shared information in the Brighton and Hove region, which ultimately hindered the ability of the relevant agencies to assess and manage the risks that the brothers presented. The report, in general, raised questions about the effectiveness of multi-agency collaboration in the case, while at the same time noting that services such as MASH can play a vital role in enhancing such collaboration, particularly in dealing with early predisposing risk factors for violence.

This report is primarily relevant to this type of context — early prevention, where the intervention point is early in the radicalisation process or prior to the emergence of any objective risk indicators. The review places client-centred work at the heart of MAW, emphasising the importance of assessing each individual in their own context and developing bespoke management responses that are tailored to that assessment. In this client-centred context, the working ethos is one of consent, mutual respect and empowerment of the client.

Within the multi-agency partnership, effective working systems and collaborative culture emerge over time, creating the conditions for information-sharing. These features of MAW are not the preserve of partnerships for CVE, however. Rather, they are features of MAW in general. Thus, those seeking to develop multi-agency partnerships in this area can learn lessons not only from existing approaches in the violent extremism space, but also from services put in place to respond to other complex problems.

⁽³⁵⁾ For example, see Hemmingsen, A. S. (2015). *An introduction to the Danish approach to countering and preventing extremism and radicalization* (No. 2015: 15). DIIS Reports, Danish Institute for International Studies. Retrieved from <https://www.ft.dk/samling/20151/almindel/reu/bilag/248/1617692.pdf>

5. Recommendations

- In responding to violent radicalisation, some level of integration of services and agencies at national and local level is important. At local level, MAW can facilitate the management, coordination and delivery of services. At national level, MAW can provide guidance on good practices and other forms of support to local actors. The configuration of MAW, and its resourcing, should be based on the risks and needs within each jurisdiction.
- Given the diverse pathways into terrorism, MAW should be person- or client-centred in order to meet the needs of the individual.
- MAW needs to be supported by training that can clearly identify barriers to working and ways of overcoming these barriers (e.g. trust).
- It is important that those involved in MAW share a common risk or threat assessment system. This system needs to be sensitive to the issues of interest for the different agencies involved, contributing to a shared language and purpose, and allowing for different levels of intervention (e.g. early supportive work vs a security response).
- When a new provision of MAW is established, initial difficulties are to be expected. However, the experiences of EU partners are reassuring: they indicate that many of these difficulties are addressed over time as the team becomes established and productive working practices and relationships develop.
- Some level of information-sharing is a prerequisite to effective MAW. It is up to each MAW to determine what information should be shared, as well as how that information should be shared, based on the composition of the team, legal restrictions, and the nature of the risk being mitigated .
- There is a need to create formal points of contact within social work and mental health services from a local and regional basis, to enhance communication between agencies.
- Staff should be supported through regular case-supervision meetings as well as through professional supervision within their own professions.
- The public perception of prevention efforts could hinder support planning and safeguarding. It is helpful to clarify the related roles and responsibilities to the public. This can be achieved through outreach activities.

Acronyms

ALM	Al-Muhajiroun
CNAPR	National Centre for Assistance and Prevention of Radicalisation (Centre national d'assistance et de prévention de la radicalisation)
CNCAAT	National Coordination and Support Unit for Territorial Action in the Prevention of Radicalisation (Cellule nationale de coordination et d'appui à l'action territoriale)
CoE	Centre of Excellence
CONTEST	Strategy for Countering Terrorism
CPRAF	Prevention of Radicalisation and Family Support Units (La cellule préfectorale de suivi pour la prévention de la radicalisation et l'accompagnement des familles)
CVE	Countering violent extremism
KSP	Prison and probation services
MASH	Multi-Agency Safeguarding Hub
MAW	Multi-agency work
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
PET	Danish Security and Intelligence Service (Politiets Efterretningstjeneste)
PSP	Police, social services and psychiatry
RAN	Radicalisation Awareness Network
SSP	Social services and the police
UK	United Kingdom
WHO	World Health Organization