National Contact Point, The Netherlands

European Migration Network (EMN)

A review of recent literature on the impact of immigration on Dutch society

Pilot Project under the 2003 Budget

May 2005

Ministry of Justice

Immigration and Naturalisation Service

IND Information and Analysis Centre (INDIAC)
# Contents

1. Executive summary 3-9

2. Introduction 10-11
   - 2.1. Terminology and definitions
   - 2.2. Type of material collected and analysed
   - 2.3. Problems concerning the collection and analysis of material: research gaps

3. Overview of immigration history and development 12-19
   - 3.1 Development from the 1950s onwards
   - 3.2 Development in detail from 2000 onwards
   - 3.3 Demographic figures

4. The impact of immigration on Dutch society 20-50
   - 4.1 Impact of immigration on the economy 20-37
     - 4.1.1 Taxes, pensions and the welfare system
     - 4.1.2 Consumption
     - 4.1.3 Employment
     - 4.1.4 Ethnic business owners
     - 4.1.5 Highly qualified immigrants
     - 4.1.6 Specific economic sectors
     - 4.1.7 Exports and imports
     - 4.1.8 Cultural diversity and competitiveness
   - 4.2 Impact of immigration on civil society and culture 38-45
     - 4.2.1 Immigrants and civil society
     - 4.2.2 Immigrants and the cultural context: food, sports, fashion, arts & media
   - 4.3 Impact of immigration on the political arena 46-51

5. Factors impacting on immigrants: provision of support and restrictions 52-59
   - 5.1 Social position of immigrants
   - 5.2 Access to labour and housing market
   - 5.3 Access to language education
   - 5.4 Access to health, education and welfare services
   - 5.5 Political participation

6. Bibliography 60-64
1. Executive summary

This pilot project ‘A review of recent literature on the impact of immigration on Dutch society’ is the contribution of the National Contact Point in the Netherlands within the European Migration Network (EMN) to the report on ‘the impact of immigration on Europe’s societies’.

The pilot project has a two-fold aim, namely:
1. to test the already existing national network of immigration experts and researchers
2. to answer the EMN’s questions concerning the impact of immigrants on Dutch society.

Regarding the first aim, the conclusions are that a network of immigration experts and researchers in the Netherlands has been built up. However, due to capacity problems of the National Contact Point the national network has not been fully utilised concerning this pilot project. The study was discussed with a few national partners only on a superficial basis. Since February 2005 the capacity of the National Contact Point has been enlarged to improve this situation.

A draft report was sent in December 2004 to the coordinator of the European Migration Network (the Berlin Institute for Comparative Social Research) so it could be used in their synthesis report. From January until March we have continued working on the report so that we could publish this final version with the other national contributions of the NCPs.

Regarding the EMN’s questions, the following conclusions can be drawn:

Chapter 3, overview of immigration history and development

- Not much data is available about third-country nationals. For the Netherlands, the formal nationality of immigrants is a far from satisfactory manner for gaining insights into the non-Dutch population, because a relatively high number of immigrants have acquired Dutch nationality. Besides, many immigrants from the former Dutch colonies (Surinam, Netherlands Antilles) already had Dutch nationality. In most literature and research the definition allochthon is being used. An allochthon is a person who either was born abroad or has one or two parents born abroad. Third country nationals are best described as non-Western allochthons.
- Like many countries in Western Europe, immigration has played an important role in the Netherlands. From the 1950s until recently, the number of immigrants has always been higher than the number of emigrants.
- At first immigration to the Netherlands was especially linked to the colonial past of the country, with colonies such as Surinam, the Netherlands Antilles and Indonesia (Moluccas).
- From the 1950s on, young men from a number of southern European countries (Spain, Italy, Greece, Portugal, Yugoslavia) came to the Netherlands as ‘guest workers’ based on government recruitment treaties.
- From the early 1960s, the first migrant workers from Turkey and Morocco were recruited for relatively simple work.
- During the 1970s the economic situation in the Netherlands worsened. A majority of the migrant workers from the southern European countries returned to their countries. During the 1980s the Netherlands realised that the migrant workers from Turkey and Morocco did not intend returning when their families started to come over to live in the Netherlands with their husbands. The Netherlands had in fact become an immigration society. Family reunification and family formation too accounted for and still account for a large proportion of the immigrants coming to the Netherlands.
- An increasing influx of asylum seekers led to new groups of immigrants in the Netherlands in the 1990s. The highest number was reached in 1994: 50,000 requests for asylum. The number of asylum requests stayed high with an average of 24,000 a year in the period 1999-2001. Since then the number has declined sharply: in 2003 only 13,000 asylum requests and in 2004 even a little less than 10,000 asylum requests. Asylum seekers come from various countries. The five largest...
refugee groups living in the Netherlands at present are: Afghans, Iraqis, Iranians, (former) Yugoslavians and Somalis.

Chapter 4. Impact of immigrants on the Dutch society
4.1 Economy
- The last few years have seen increasing attention being devoted to the economic aspects of immigration. This has been partly prompted by the question whether immigration can offer a solution to the ageing population.
- Recently (end of 2004) the maximisation of economic benefit has also been an important starting point in the admission policy for migrant workers.
- A fair amount of research has been carried out in the Netherlands into the socio-economic position of immigrants (first and second generation together). Labour participation, dependence on benefit and the disposable income of immigrants are researched thoroughly.
- A new longitudinal database makes it possible to follow the socio-economic dynamic of immigrants in time. This database enables research questions about year of arrival, country of birth and migration motives of cohorts of immigrants to be answered within the context of labour participation, dependence of benefit and income of non-Dutch immigrants.
- Research on the costs and benefits (taxes, pension funds etc.) of immigrants on the Dutch welfare state also exists in the Netherlands.
- Less research has been found on other topics. For example, though some research on ethnic business owners exists, no research has been found on the impact of ethnic business owners on the overall economic development in the Netherlands. Moreover, virtually no empirical research has been carried out into the effects of the highly qualified immigrants on the Dutch society. Only one study was found concerning a select group of modern migrant workers on three year working permits. Literature on the economic sectors, in which immigrants have been involved, exists. However, there is no clear overview.
- Research gaps were encountered when looking at the impact immigrants have (had) on national consumption, on imports and exports and on the employment sector. Literature on the presumed effect immigrants have on the employment sector does exist, but it is only theoretical in nature. Another research gap exists concerning the effect of cultural diversity on the Dutch economy and competitiveness in international contexts.
- Generally speaking, a rather negative picture emerges from what is known about the participation of immigrants in the economy: previous migrant workers (guest workers) and their successors (those coming to form or reunite their families) would seem to be a greater burden than benefit to the Dutch welfare state from an economic point of view. In view of the high level of dependence on benefit and low labour participation of (a number of) asylum migrant groups, this could be concluded for these groups too.
- An exception to this would appear to be (some of) the modern migrant workers (often highly educated and usually Western). They can make a positive contribution to the Dutch welfare state and knowledge economy.

More specific conclusions concerning Dutch economy are:
- Conclusions with regard to taxes, pensions and benefits:
  - No explicit studies has been found that provide an answer to the question as to what proportion of taxes paid and pension contributions can be attributed to immigrants.
  - A relatively large amount of research has been carried out into the relationship between the costs and benefits of immigrants for the Dutch welfare state. It can be concluded that the benefits (contributions) are lower than the costs (benefits received etc.) of non-Western immigrants.
  - The amount of income provides an indirect answer to the question about the contributions of immigrants to pensions and taxes.
  - The disposable income of non-Western allochthons is on average only three-quarters of the disposable income of autochthons. Contributions from non-Western allochthons are therefore on average lower than that of autochthons.
As far as receiving benefits is concerned, a relatively high number of publications have been found on the use of social provisions by immigrants. It can be concluded that non-Western allochthons, compared to autochthons, claim benefit at a disproportionately high (2.5 times more) level.

It is not only among the four classic migrant groups that the proportion of benefit recipients is high, but also among the relatively new asylum migrants.

- Conclusions regarding consumption:
  - No literature has been found which explicitly answers the questions about national consumption that can be attributed to immigrants and a potentially changing demand for local products due to the presence of immigrants.
  - No literature has been found either on the consumption patterns of immigrants.
  - However, something can be said indirectly about consumption by immigrants. The disposable income of non-Western allochthons is on average only three-quarters of the disposable income of autochthons. It is also known that allochthons do not spend their entire income in the Netherlands. They send some of it to family members in the country of origin. Non-Western allochthons would therefore appear to account for a lower percentage of national consumption than would be expected based on their proportion of the population. Their consumption level would appear to be lower than that of autochthons.

- Conclusions regarding employment:
  - No empirical studies have been carried out in the Netherlands into the effects of immigration on the labour market position of the low-skilled (displacement). The publications that have been found are only theoretical in nature.
  - In general it can be concluded that non-Western allochthons are on average less skilled than autochthons and that the native population with skills comparable to those of immigrants lose out.
  - Hartog & Zorlu (2002) conclude that a 10% increase in ethnic minorities from non-EU countries decreases the earnings of low-skilled workers by 0.42% and increases the earnings of highly-skilled workers by 0.21%. Medium-skilled natives are virtually unaffected
  - There is a great deal of information available about the labour participation of allochthons.
  - The employment ratio of non-Western allochthons is roughly three-quarters of the national average.
  - Labour participation is low not only among the four classic migrant groups, but also among the relatively new asylum migrants.
  - The rising unemployment in 2003 affected non-Western allochthons more than autochthons.
  - Non-Western allochthons are on average less skilled than autochthons.
  - The participation of non-Western allochthonous women in the labour market is generally lower than among autochthonous women.

- Conclusions with regard to ethnic business owners:
  - No literature has been found on the effect on the economic development of ethnic business ownership
  - However, there is some information known about ethnic business owners:
  - Although the number of non-Western allochthonous business owners has increased substantially during the last few years, the business ownership rate among non-Western allochthons is still significantly lower than among the population in the Netherlands as a whole
  - This is partly the consequence of the small number of allochthonous women business owners
  - The proportion of non-Western allochthonous business owners whose businesses survive is smaller than that of autochthonous business owners
  - The business income of non-Western allochthonous business owners is lower than the business income of autochthon business owners

- Conclusions regarding highly qualified immigrants:
• As far as the former migrant workers are concerned who came to the Netherlands in the 1960s (guest workers), it can be concluded that they did not bring with them any new qualifications that were not already available. The guest workers usually carried out the work that was generally regarded in the Netherlands as heavy or dirty work.

• The costs of this earlier labour migration and the family reunification and formation linked to this (benefits, education etc.) turned out to be higher than the benefits (taxes paid) for the Dutch welfare state.

• The Foreign Nationals (Employment) Act that has been in force in the Netherlands since 1995 stipulates that migrant workers are only admitted if it is clear after a strict test that there is no labour supply available within the Netherlands and the EEA to fill the job. This means that the modern migrant worker must indeed possess qualifications that are not, or not sufficiently, available in the Netherlands or the EEA.

• Virtually no empirical research has been carried out into the effects of the highly qualified migrant worker on the Dutch economy.

• A single study concerned a select group of modern migrant workers (those on three-year work permits). In view of their high disposable incomes, it can be concluded that they have a positive effect on the Dutch economy. It is not clear to what extent this select group of modern migrant workers is comparable to the group highly qualified migrants.

• Highly qualified migrants are expected to have a positive influence on the Dutch economy by contributing to the strengthening and innovation of the Dutch business sector. However, no (clear) empirical research has been found that supports this (otherwise quite plausible) theory.

- Conclusions regarding specific economic sectors:
  • There is some literature on the economic sectors in which immigrants work. However, there is no clear overview.
  • The policy pursued by the Dutch government is for labour migration to take place if persons without work are re-integrated.
  • However, in certain areas in the Netherlands the situation is such that there is a shortage of specific labour, both highly-skilled and low-skilled.
  • Immigrants work in specific sectors of the labour market.
  • We see in the Netherlands that second-generation immigrants in the labour market are moving into other sectors.

- Conclusions regarding exports and imports:
  • No research has been found into the effects of immigration on imports and exports. No records are kept of ethnicity with imports and exports.
  • No research has been found either into the effects of immigration on Dutch participation in international trade.

- Conclusions regarding cultural diversity and competitiveness:
  • Some literature has been found on cultural diversity, but this is mostly theoretical in nature. The literature that have been found are not very consistent on the nature and extent of cultural diversity within the Dutch organisations and companies.
  • No research has been found on the effects of this cultural diversity on the Dutch economy and on the competitive position of the Netherlands on the international market.

4.2 Civil society and culture
• The Netherlands has many immigrant grassroots organisations with highly diverse compositions and objectives.
• Some research has been carried out into the effect of grassroots organisations on the indigenous civil society, however no clear-cut picture emerged from this.
• Little is known about the effect on the indigenous civil society of the participation of minorities in local organisations.
• Although much has been published in the Netherlands on culture and a fair amount on the participation of allochthons in culture, little is known about the impact of immigrants on society and culture.

• As regards the media, quite a bit of research has been carried out, particularly into participation in the media. There is less literature found in other areas examined (sport, fashion and food).

• Regarding cultural terrains as media, arts, food, sports and fashion we see growing participation of migrants and there is clearly influence. But participation is still lower than that of indigenous residents, and still occurs in separate circuits in too many cases.

• The Dutch government takes as a starting point the assumption that culture can provide an important contribution to the integration of newcomers. As a result, its cultural policy devotes a great deal of attention to immigrants. Besides the aim to increase the cultural participation of immigrants, an effort is now being made to create links between the separate cultural circuits (from separate ‘pillars’ towards more interaction between the pillars).

4.3 Politics
• There is a reasonably large amount of literature and research into the extent of political participation (both active and passive) of allochthons at the level of local elections.

• Research into the participation and voting behaviour of immigrants at a non-local level hardly exists. Only two studies into the political participation of immigrants in national parliamentary elections were found. There is also little known about the participation of allochthons in trade unions.

• In general the focus of the research is on the four, still most important, ethnic groups in the Netherlands; the Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese and Antilleans. At a local level this is supplemented by large ethnic groups, such as the Cape Verdeans in Rotterdam. No research has been found on the political participation of relatively new immigrant groups (asylum groups).

• No research has been found that answers the question whether the participation of immigrants in political organisations has changed these organisations.

• Since 1985, aliens who have been living legally in the Netherlands for five years have had voting rights for local elections. Only residents of Dutch nationality may vote in national elections.

• As far as the use of passive voting rights is concerned, two developments can be observed: there are more and more (local as well as national) allochthonous representatives, and the ethnic diversity of these representatives is also increasing. Nevertheless, there is still not a proportional representation of allochthons in the municipal councils or in the Lower House of the Dutch Parliament.

• Parties of and for immigrants remain in a minority and are not successful. The presence of allochthons in municipal councils and the Lower House firstly depends on the choices of the traditional, general political parties: they decide whether or not to place allochthons on their list of candidates.

• The turnout of allochthonous voters at municipal elections lags significantly behind that of indigenous voters.

• Allochthons who vote nationally would appear, just as those who vote locally, to be more inclined to have left-wing views rather than right-wing views, although to a lesser extent.

• If we look at the turnout percentages and the number of members of the municipal councils, we can conclude that the Turks as a group are the most strongly integrated into Dutch local politics.

• The high turnout of Turkish people at elections could possibly be explained by the high level of cohesion of the Turkish community.

Chapter 5. Factors impacting on immigrants
Social position of immigrants
• In the Government’s view, the current position of residents from an immigrant background is characterised by too great a social, cultural and economic disadvantage.
• Around the year 2000, almost 500,000 first-generation allochthons (approximately 30% of the total number of first generation allochthons) did not have a sufficient command of Dutch to be able to participate successfully in the various social markets.
• At present more than 180,000 women of Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese and Antillean origin (approximately 30% of the total number of women of these origins) are socially in a deprived position.
• Turkish and Moroccan pupils who were born in the Netherlands still lag behind at the end of primary school by about two school years as far as language is concerned.
• The educational level of more than two-thirds of the Turks and Moroccans has not reached the level of a starting qualification.
• Young people from ethnic minorities are far better educated than older people, but among them too the proportion without a starting qualification is some 20% higher than among autochthonous young people.
• The net labour participation of minorities is 15 percentage points lower than the total level of participation (65%). The participation percentage of 15-24 year-olds among the minority population is 36 percentage points lower than the total.
• The proportion of those claiming benefit is twice as high among minorities as among the native Dutch population.
• The majority of second-generation Turks and Moroccans choose a partner from the country of origin.
• Many marriages between Turks or Moroccans on the one hand, and native Dutch residents on the other hand, end in divorce.
• Information on social contacts points to limited social integration. Among Turks and Moroccans, most contacts are within their own group.
• Young people from minority groups are over-represented among suspects of crime.
• The vast majority of residents with a minority background live concentrated together in particular neighbourhoods, which also means that they have fewer social contacts with native Dutch residents. The living conditions in these neighbourhoods are generally relatively unfavourable.

Access to labour and housing market
• Residents of third countries do not have free access to the Dutch labour market.
• The Netherlands pursues a selective, demand-driven labour migration policy for third-country migrant workers, based on economic motives.
• Asylum migrants may only undertake limited work as long as they do not have resident status.
• A special scheme has been in effect since 1 October 2004 in order to fast-track knowledge migrants without a work permit into the Netherlands.
• Third-country nationals have equal access with Dutch nationals to housing in the Netherlands with respect to legislation. These legal rights are obtained immediately upon receiving a residence permit and count equally for migrants in general as for recognised refugees.

Access to language education
• The Netherlands is increasingly imposing requirements on the level of integration (knowledge of Dutch language and culture) of aliens, linking this to obtaining a permanent residence permit and the Dutch nationality.
• The new integration policy increasingly places the responsibility for integration on the alien himself.
• Within this context, in the near future immigrants will have to pay for Dutch language courses themselves.

Access to health, education and welfare services
• Immigrants have equal access with nationals, with respect to legislation, to healthcare, education and social security assistance. They obtain these legal rights immediately upon receiving a residence permit.

Access to politics
• Only persons of Dutch nationality have voting rights at a national level.
• Since 1985, aliens who have been residing legally in the Netherlands for five years have had voting rights in local elections.
2. Introduction

2.1 Terminology and definitions

This review concerning the impact of immigration on Dutch society aims to focus on third-country nationals. The definition of a third-country national is ‘any person who is not a national of an EU Member State (up to the 1st of May 2004) who is granted legal residence in the territory of a Member State’. ‘However, for various reasons it makes little sense to limit a discussion of the ‘new Dutch’ (i.e. immigrants and their descendants) to the population of persons who do not have Dutch nationality.” (Engbersen et al.: 2002). Firstly, a relatively high number of immigrants have eventually acquired Dutch nationality. Secondly, many immigrants from the former Dutch colonies (Surinam, the Netherlands Antilles) already had Dutch nationality. Thirdly, according to the current regulations, children born in the Netherlands who have one parent with Dutch nationality (including naturalised immigrants) automatically receive Dutch nationality. For all these reasons a relatively large number of immigrants who have come to the Netherlands and their descendants would no longer be recognisable as such in the statistics, if these were to be limited to non-Dutch citizens. Therefore, for many years it has been common practice in the Netherlands not only to use the nationality but also the country of origin of residents as criteria for distinguishing the ‘autochthonous’ population and the ‘allochthonous’ population. The Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek - CBS - (Statistics Netherlands) uses the following definitions to define the allochthonous population:

- First-generation allochthonous individual: ‘...is a person who was born abroad and who has either one or two parents born abroad.’
- Second-generation allochthonous individual: ‘...is a person who was born in the Netherlands and who has either one or both parents born abroad.’

Looking at third-country nationals in Holland on 1 January 2002, there were more than 690,000 foreign nationals in the Netherlands. More than 30% of this group are nationals of one of the EU countries. This means that on 1 January 2002 fewer than 500,000 third-country nationals were living in the Netherlands. This is about 3% of the total population.

On 1 January 2004 more than 16 million people were living in the Netherlands. More than 3 million people are allochthonous: 1.4 million are Western allochthons and nearly 1.7 million are non-Western allochthons. The non-Western allochthons make up 10% of the total population and originate from countries such as Turkey, Morocco, Surinam, the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba, Afghanistan, Brazil, China, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, the Philippines, Ghana, Hong Kong, India, Iraq, Iran, Cape Verde Islands, Pakistan, Somalia and Vietnam.

For the Netherlands this means that the formal nationality of immigrants is a far from satisfactory manner for gaining an insight into the total size of the non-Dutch population. A relatively large number of immigrants and their descendants in the Netherlands have Dutch nationality. Surprisingly enough this is not only the case for immigrant groups who have freely settled such as Indonesians, the Surinamese and Cape Verdiens, but also for immigrant groups who have arrived fairly recently in the Netherlands, many of whom came to the Netherlands as asylum migrants (Somalis, Syrians, Angolans, Iranians, Iraqis, Ethiopians, Afghans and many other smaller groups from other countries). For each of these migrant groups fewer than one in eight people (12 per cent) still possesses the nationality of the country of origin.

Most reports on immigrants in the Netherlands use the definitions of the CBS (Statistic Netherlands). As a result not much data is available on third-country nationals. This review will therefore focus on non-Western allochthons.

1 The person has to live in the Netherlands and is registered in the Gemeentelijke Basisadministratie Persoonsgegevens - GBA - (Municipal Personal Records Database).
2 Western allochthons themselves originate from Europe (excl. the Netherlands and Turkey, incl. Southern and Eastern Europe), North America, Japan, Oceania and Indonesia.
2.2 Type of material collected and analysed

Department INDIAC, the Information and Analysis Centre of the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (INS) is the Dutch National Contact Point for the European Migration Network. Due to capacity problems of INDIAC in 2004, which have been resolved since February 2005, the initial search of materials has been limited. At the beginning of 2005 a more in-depth search has been made. We wish to thank our contact points for their contributions and advice. They have helped to identify the most relevant and most recent literature. Special thanks go to Thomas Hessels of the Minorities Integration Policy Department (DCIM) of the Ministry of Justice. He drew our attention to important studies and brought us in contact with new contact points that provided interesting information for the pilot.

The Internet was also used as a source of information on immigrants in Dutch society. Research was limited to the most recent studies to keep the report up-to-date and mostly to studies from well established organisations (NGOs, Statistics Netherlands, universities etc.). It is possible that smaller organisations, such as certain interest groups, have done research on some of the topics covered in this study such as the cultural impact of immigrants. However, these studies often represent a small immigrant group (the study population is limited to certain nationalities or a city in the Netherlands) and the liability of the study is not confirmed. Although the Netherlands is one of the better-researched regions in Europe, a large proportion of the research questions could only be partly answered.

2.3 Problems concerning the collection and analysis of material: research gaps

Although a considerable amount of research has been carried out in the Netherlands into the participation of immigrants in Dutch society, there are still many aspects that remain insufficiently studied or not studied at all. For example, nothing is known about the role of immigrants as consumers and the impact of immigrants on the Netherlands’ imports and exports. There have been no studies either into the impact of ethnic business owners on economic development, nor the impact of cultural diversity on the participation and competitive position of the Netherlands on the international market. As far as the dynamics in the socio-economic situation of migrants in the Netherlands is concerned, until recently very little was known. Based on a recently developed longitudinal database (immigration panel), now cohorts of immigrants can be tracked according to their labour participation, dependence on benefit and income.

Few studies have been carried out into the effect of grassroots organisations of allochthons on the indigenous civil society, and those which have been carried out do not produce a uniform picture. In addition, no research has been found that answers the question as to whether the participation of immigrants in political organisations has changed these organisations. There are hardly any studies at all into the turnout and voting behaviour of immigrants at any level apart from the local level.
Overview of immigration history and development

The Netherlands is a small country in the European Union with a large and dense population. On 1 January 2004 more than 16 million people were living in the Netherlands. More than 3 million people are allochthonous: 1.4 million Western and nearly 1.7 million non-Western (10% of the total population). Statistics Netherlands (CBS) expects that this group of non-Western allochthons will form 14% of the Dutch population in 2020 and number 2.4 million persons (CBS: 2004).

3.1 Development from the 1950s onwards

Colonialism

Like many countries in Western Europe, the Netherlands has experienced substantial immigration since the 1950s. Directly after the Second World War there was both immigration to and emigration from the Netherlands. For the first time in history, migration involved large numbers of people. Immigration was originally linked to the colonial past of the country, with colonies such as Surinam, the Antilles and Indonesia (Moluccan Islands). At first, because of poverty and a fast-growing population, the Dutch government pursued an active emigration policy between 1950 and 1960. About 500,000 young people emigrated to countries such as the USA, Canada and Australia under migration treaties concluded with these countries, to start a new life. Since the early 1960s until recently, the number of immigrants has always been higher than the number of emigrants.

At the same time, many people from the former Dutch colony Indonesia and later New Guinea (Dutch East Indies) migrated to the Netherlands. In general there have not been many problems with integrating them in the Dutch society, except for the fact that there has been a significant housing shortage in the country for many years (Lakeman: 1999). In 1951, about 12,500 Moluccans came to the Netherlands. This group largely consisted of the 3,578 Moluccan ex-KNIL (Royal Netherlands Indies Army) soldiers and 574 civilians and their family members. In 1951-1952 a smaller group of Moluccans in the service of the Dutch Royal Navy came to the Netherlands. Furthermore, an additional three hundred Moluccans came to the Netherlands as a consequence of the transfer of sovereignty of New Guinea to Indonesia in 1963 (NIDI, 2002).

After 1954, when the position of the former colonies in the Netherlands Antilles and Surinam was settled in the Statute of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, people from those countries holding Dutch citizenship were allowed to migrate to the Netherlands as well without much problem. Most of them came for study reasons. The mass migration of the Surinamese in the 1970s and early 1980s was linked to the independence of Surinam in 1975, when many thousands of Surinamese people emigrated to the Netherlands.

Migrant labour

Even as far back as the early 20th century, migrant workers from other European countries lived in the Netherlands (Italians, Greek). Most of them stayed only temporarily and many returned to their countries of origin during the economic crisis in the 1930s. From the 1950s onwards, young men from a number of southern European countries were given the opportunity to come as ‘guest workers’; (‘gastarbeiders’) under government recruitment treaties, the idea being that they would only stay on a temporary basis. At first, men from Italy started working in the Dutch coal mines, followed by people from such countries as Spain, Greece and Yugoslavia, to work in textile and shipping industries. The number of workers from Greece and Portugal has been much lower than the other European groups. At first, some native Dutch workers were a little reserved towards these new workers, being unsure of the effects on the labour market and unacquainted with other cultures, but there have never been serious problems and their integration in Dutch society has been successful. When the economies and

---

3 The population density of the Netherlands is 477 persons per km² (481 on 5 February 2005). In comparison: Spain 82 p/km²; United Kingdom 243 p/km²; France: 109 p/km² and Denmark 125 persons per km² (2002).
4 In 2003 there was for the first time since the 1960s a negative migration balance (CBS).
the labour markets in those countries started to improve, the level of immigration to the Netherlands decreased significantly (Vermeulen & Penninx: 1994).

During the 1960s, as in many countries in Western Europe the Dutch economy grew fast. Companies had problems filling all the vacancies, especially the lower-paid jobs in industry. Because of the higher educational level of the Dutch people, migrant workers were ‘invited’ to come and work in the country generally to do the low-paid, ‘dirty’ jobs. From the early 1960s, the first migrant workers from Turkey and Morocco were recruited. They too were meant to stay for only a short period of time, and that was their intention too. Therefore most young men left their families behind to come and do simple work to make some money in Western European societies to support their family. Most Moroccans came from the region of the Rif mountains, an economically ‘backward’ part of the country. There were practically no educational demands for their jobs, and so many of these men were unable to read or write (Lakeman: 1999). In the Netherlands, special education programmes (learning the Dutch language) were not seen as necessary by the policy-makers, because of the general view that these people would return to their countries of origin after a few years anyway.

During the late 1960s, the question was already being raised about the economic importance of migrant workers. According to many companies, immigrants had a very positive effect on the economy; however, the Social Economic Council could not evaluate at that time the impact of the foreign workforce on the micro and macro economy because of lack of data. For the countries of origin, labour migration meant that these migrant workers would generate a substantial flow of money into these countries. Countries such as Turkey and Morocco received a significant income from all the overseas labour workers, which could be regarded as a type of development aid.

After 1973
During the 1970s it became much harder to find a job in the Netherlands. After the oil crisis in 1973, problems with migrant (un-) employment started to increase. Most West-European countries closed their doors to new migrant workers and many (textile, metal) companies ran into trouble and became bankrupt. Large-scale redundancies hit the unskilled or semi-skilled workers in particular. Unemployment was high in the country during the early 1980s, and semi-skilled jobs became scarce (Vermeulen & Penninx: 1994). The unemployment rate amongst immigrant workers was much higher than amongst Dutch nationals. The government’s policy of labour migration was abandoned. After 1973, many workers from Spain, Greece and Italy returned to their countries, as had always been the intention of the government. Immigration from Turkey and Morocco however, did not stop, but the structure changed: instead of returning, family reunification started as during the 1980s, many migrant women and children came to live in the Netherlands. This was followed in the 1990s by family formation as many migrants seek a marriage partner in the country of origin. The problems of unemployment for the total population became particularly severe during the (early) 1980s, with unemployment hitting the unskilled migrant workers very hard. Because of their lack of education, it was now impossible for many of them to find a job. Many of the first-generation migrants have not been able to get back into work ever since.

During the 1990s, however, because of a growing economy and a special positive discrimination policy of the government, the employment rate amongst immigrants has increased. However, the percentage of unemployment among the non-Western allochthonous population in 2003 was 14% compared to 4% among the autochthonous population (CBS: 2004). It concerns mostly those persons with low levels of education.

Family reunification and family formation (following migrants)
The Dutch government never intended the Netherlands to become an immigration country. The workers were invited for a temporary stay. Regardless of the facts, it has taken policy-makers a long time to realise that these people were in fact were not going back to the country of origin any more. During the 1980s, people finally started to realise that the immigrants were coming, kept on coming and were staying. The Netherlands had in fact become an immigration society (Vermeulen & Penninx: 1994).
Many workers from southern European countries returned to their homelands. Some stayed in the Netherlands and had their partners come over, while others married native Dutch women. After 1974, family reunification from these countries stopped (WRR: 2001). Most Turkish and Moroccan men working had their families come over to the Netherlands. Non-European migration however concerned much larger numbers of people and it is still continuing.

Asylum
Besides an increasing influx of ‘following migrants’ from the late eighties onwards, an increasing influx of asylum seekers has led to new groups of immigrants in the Netherlands. The Netherlands has a long tradition of admitting refugees (French Huguenots in the 17th century, Belgian refugees in the First World War, Jews in the 1930s), but since the 1980s the structure has changed dramatically. There has been a growing influx of asylum seekers coming to Europe, most of them leaving their countries of origin because of the political or economic situation. In the 1990s, the number of asylum seekers coming to the Netherlands each year increased significantly, with the highest number in 1994 (50,000 requests for asylum). During the war in former Yugoslavia people from the Balkans formed a large proportion of asylum seekers in the Netherlands. Other big groups of asylum seekers were from Asia (Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan) and Africa (Somalia, Ethiopia). Among them were many unaccompanied minors, mostly from Africa. Based on statistics from the IND, in the year 2001 unaccompanied minors accounted for 18% of the influx of asylum seekers, a high level compared to other European countries, but this has been declining since then (approximately 6% in 2004)5.

3.2 Development in detail from 2000 onwards

In 2003 the growth of the non-Western allochthonous population declined to 2.8%, the lowest rate of growth since 1996. This decline in growth was among the first generation as the number of asylum migrants in particular declined. On the other hand, the number of family-forming immigrants remained at a high level. The growth of the second generation remained virtually constant. The largest group of non-Western allochthons is still formed by the Turks (352,000; 2% of the total population) and Surinamese (325,000). In third place are the Moroccans (306,000) and fourth are those from the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba (131,000). With the last group, there was a sharp decline in population growth in 2003, a year in which this group only grew by 1,400 persons, whereas in 2000 this population group grew by almost 10,000. The first generation of Antilleans in fact declined slightly in numbers in 2003 (CBS, 2004).

Despite all of the public debate on the subject, the Netherlands can hardly be called a multicultural society. Only one in ten Dutch residents is an immigrant or a child of an immigrant of a non-Western culture. However, the Netherlands does have a number of multicultural cities. In the four main cities of the Netherlands (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht) the proportion of migrants and their descendants (‘allochthons’) from non-Western countries is increasing more rapidly. A total of more than 2 million people live in these four cities. About 640,000 of them (about one in three) can be placed in the category of non-Western allochthons. In 2002 one in three residents of Amsterdam and Rotterdam belonged to the category of non-Western allochthons. In The Hague the proportion of non-Western allochthons is slightly lower (30 per cent) and in Utrecht much lower (20 per cent). In all other medium-sized cities in the Netherlands the proportion of non-Western allochthons as a percentage of the total population is significantly lower (Snel et al.: 2002).

Fewer and fewer asylum migrants are entering the Netherlands. While asylum migrants formed the largest group from 1999 to 2001 with an average of 24,000 each year, in 2004 there were only 10,000. The stricter asylum legislation has played a role here. In addition, the decline of the number of requests for asylum continued to fall in 2004. The number of asylum seekers removed from the country reached a maximum of almost 22,000 in 2003.

5 Figures from the IND Information and Analysis Centre INDIAC.
The number of migrant workers is also falling. In 2001, some 20,000 migrants came to the Netherlands to work. Two years later this was almost 4,000 fewer. Part of the reason is the less favourable economic climate.

The number of persons entering the Netherlands in the context of family reunification has been falling since 1996, with the emphasis at the end of the 1990s shifting towards family-forming immigration. Between 1999 and 2003, the number of family formers who came to the Netherlands rose by more than 7,000, thus becoming the largest group of immigrants in 2003. Three out of ten immigrants come to the Netherlands to marry or live together. Family formers come above all from Turkey and Morocco, one in three in fact in 2003. Not only first-generation Turks and Moroccans, but also those from the second generation often choose a partner from the country of origin (CBS: 2004). ‘No fewer than 75% of Turks and Moroccans in the Netherlands who are looking for a spouse end up marrying someone who lives in their country of origin.’ Hooghiemstra (2003) bases this on data from 2000. This percentage would appear to have fallen, because in 2001 only 58% of both Turkish allochthonous men and women brought his/her partner from the country of origin. Among the Moroccan men living in the Netherlands, 59% brought their partner from the country of origin whereas 52% of Moroccan women brought their partner from Morocco in 2001 (van Rijn et al.: 2004). These percentages are lower for the entire group of non-Western allochthons living in the Netherlands: in 2001, 44% of men and 32% of women brought their partner with them from the country of origin. As from 1 November 2001, the policy relating to family formation was tightened up. The minimum age for family formation – for both the head of the family and the alien, was raised from 18 to 21 years (for both parties). In addition, the standard amount that the head of the family must earn if the alien is to be eligible for family formation was increased from 100 per cent of the applicable standard under the Work and Social Assistance Act to 120 per cent of the minimum wage. This means a net monthly amount of EUR 1382.18 (including holiday allowance).

A special policy has been in force since October 2004 aimed at encouraging a particular type of labour migration, namely the immigration of knowledge migrants. Knowledge migrants are migrants who come to the Netherlands in order to work in salaried employment, from which they earn a gross income of at least EUR 45,000 or EUR 33,000 if younger than 30 years\(^6\). If an alien is permitted to live in the Netherlands as a knowledge migrant, the employer of the knowledge migrant does not need to be in possession of a work permit for that alien.

\(^6\) This income criterion does not apply if the person concerned is a doctoral student and takes up employment with an educational or research institution, and for postgraduates and university lecturers younger than 30 years old.
3.3. Demographic figures

Table 1: a summary of the Dutch population in 2004 according to group of origin.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Population in the Netherlands, 2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total population in the</td>
<td>16,258,032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autochthonous population</td>
<td>13,169,880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allochthonous population</td>
<td>3,088,152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allochthonous population</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western allochthonous</td>
<td>1,419,855</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>population</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>398,502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>389,912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>113,081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>76,457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Western allochthonous</td>
<td>1,668,297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>population</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>351,648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>306,219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinam</td>
<td>325,281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antilles/Aruba</td>
<td>130,722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other non-Western</td>
<td>554,427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>allochthonous population</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>41,694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Yugoslavia</td>
<td>76,346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>36,043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>25,001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>42,931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>28,438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Soviet Union</td>
<td>42,033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde Islands</td>
<td>19,666</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CBS (Statistics Netherlands)

In 2004, 10 per cent of the Dutch population belonged to the non-Western allochthonous population. Figures 1, 2 and 3 give a summary of this.

Figure 1. Population in the Netherlands, 2004

![Population in the Netherlands](image)
There are four main reasons for immigration: asylum, labour, family reunification and family formation. This means that in general terms four types of immigrants can be distinguished: migrant workers, family formers, family reunites and asylum migrants. Figure 4 gives a summary of the various grounds for admission for the years 1997-2001.

Source: CBS (Statistics Netherlands)
Family reunion, family formation and asylum, taken together, have been accountable for the majority of Dutch immigration in recent years. Economic criteria do not play a role in the admission of these immigrants. Their admission is largely based on the rules set out in international agreements. Figure 5 gives a summary of the migration motives in 2003.

The year 2001 saw the largest number of immigrants to the Netherlands ever: 133,000. The economic boom naturally attracted migrant workers, but there was also a substantial influx of asylum seekers, and foreign marriage partners pushed the total up even higher. Because there were few people leaving to go abroad, this created a historically high surplus in the numbers settling in the Netherlands. On balance, in 2000 and 2001 about 500,000 new inhabitants were added annually by migration alone.
The high migration balance, in combination with the high number of births, produced fast population growth. Since 2003, however, the migration balance has been negative. The sharp decline in the influx of asylum seekers is one of the main factors that explain this. The new Aliens Act (‘Vreemdelingenwet 2000’) that came into force in 2000 and changed the admission policy and the asylum procedure significantly, could have been one of the reasons for the sharp decline in the influx of asylum seekers since then.
4 The impact of immigration on Dutch society

4.1 Impact of immigrants on the Dutch economy

In general these were the key findings:

- The last few years have seen increasing attention being devoted to the economic aspects of immigration. This has been partly prompted by the question whether immigration can offer a solution to the ageing population.

- Recently (end of 2004) the maximisation of economic benefit has also been an important starting point in the admission policy for migrant workers.

- A fair amount of research has been carried out in the Netherlands into the socio-economic position of immigrants (first and second generation together). Labour participation, dependence on benefit and the disposable income of immigrants are researched thoroughly.

- A new longitudinal database makes it possible to follow the socio-economic dynamic of immigrants in time. This database enables research questions about year of arrival, country of birth and migration motives of cohorts of immigrants to be answered within the context of labour participation, dependence of benefit and income of non-Dutch immigrants.

- Research on the costs and benefits (taxes, pension funds ca.) of immigrants on the Dutch welfare state also exists in the Netherlands.

- Less research has been found on other topics. For example, though some research on ethnic business owners exists, no research has been found on the impact of ethnic business owners on the overall economic development in the Netherlands. Moreover, virtually no empirical research has been carried out into the effects of the highly qualified immigrants on the Dutch society. Only one study was found concerning a select group of modern migrant workers on three year working permits. Literature on the economic sectors, in which immigrants have been involved, exists. However, there is no clear overview.

- Research gaps were encountered when looking at the impact immigrants have (had) on national consumption, on imports and exports and on the employment sector. Literature on the presumed effect immigrants have on the employment sector does exist, but it is only theoretical in nature. Another research gap exists concerning the effect of cultural diversity on the Dutch economy and competitiveness in international contexts.

- Generally speaking, a rather negative picture emerges from what is known about the participation of immigrants in the economy: previous migrant workers (guest workers) and their successors (those coming to form or reunite their families) would seem to be a greater burden than benefit to the Dutch welfare state from an economic point of view. In view of the high level of dependence on benefit and low labour participation of (a number of) asylum migrant groups, this could be concluded for these groups too.

- An exception to this would appear to be (some of) the modern migrant workers (often highly educated and usually Western). They can make a positive contribution to the Dutch welfare state and knowledge economy.
Increasing attention for the economic impact of immigration

For some time now, immigration policy has been high on the national and international agenda. The topic of immigration policy gained momentum, when, in accordance with the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) common policies with respect to asylum and immigration in the European Union were put on the agenda. In addition to the legal, humanitarian and social aspects, the economic impact of immigration is receiving increasing attention. The economic effects of immigrations are at the core of the debate, particularly since the ageing of the population raises the question whether immigrants can help countries to cope with the economic consequences of ageing. Roodenburg et al. (2003) have answered that question: “We conclude that selective labour immigration may contribute to the economic well-being of a host country. However, large-scale immigration of labour is not considered to be effective in alleviating the financial burden of ageing in the Netherlands.” Unlike the European Commission, the Netherlands does not regard immigration as a solution to the problem of an ageing population. The Dutch position is also in line with the findings of the Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR, 2001). Their conclusion was that labour migration may be profitable for both the immigrant and his employer, but that this provides no guarantee that the outcome at the national or macro economic level will be positive. The Council did not consider labour migration – unless its selective and temporary – to be a suitable instrument for economic policy.

Since November 2004 the basic principles in the admission policy for migrant workers have been aimed at optimising economic profit for the Netherlands.

Hartog & Zorlu (2004) and Sprangers et al. (2004) point out that until recently little was known about the dynamics of the socio-economic situation of refugees and family and migrant workers in the Netherlands. In order to rectify this deficiency, a longitudinal database, an ‘immigrant panel’ was created by linking databases. This panel forms part of the collaborative project entitled ‘socio-economic dynamic immigrants’ in which the CBS is collaborating with the University of Amsterdam. The main objective is to develop new, coherent statistical information on the dynamics of the labour market, household, income and wealth. The immigrants panel enables research questions about year of arrival, country of birth and migration motives of cohorts of migrants to be answered within the context of labour participation, dependence on benefit and income of non-Dutch immigrants.

4.1.1 Taxes, pensions and the welfare system

| Question: What impact do immigrants have on the amount of taxes paid, on pension funds and on the overall welfare system, both in terms of receiving benefits and as tax-paying or fee-paying residents? |

An important recent publication (Roodenburg et al.: 2004) strongly suggests that that non-Western allochthons cost more (in the form of benefits received) to Dutch society than they produce (in the form of tax and pension contributions).

Roodenburg et al. (2004) conducted a study on the question whether immigration is a successful solution to the problem of an ageing population. As regards government finances, they conclude that new immigrants (of all ages upon arrival) are a burdensome factor if their socio-economic characteristics (performance in the labour market) correspond with the average of those already resident in the country with a non-Western background. They also state that this average negative contribution of immigrants is not only the result of their lagging behind in labour market performance, but that this is also partially caused by the generous system of collective schemes.

Research by Regioplan (Berkhout: 2003a) into the costs and benefits of the Remigration Act also suggests an overall negative balance.

---

The Netherlands is the only country in the world that provides a provision for remigration that is enshrined in law. The aim of this Remigration Act (in effect since 1 April 2000) is to facilitate the voluntary return of ethnic minorities to their country of origin if they cannot realise remigration themselves. It has been found that “over a period of ten years the benefits of the Remigration Act for the government and social funds will exceed the costs by roughly 392 million euro. For each remigrant who leaves, the savings over 10 years will amount to 33,531 euro. In other words: the abolition of the Remigration Act would lead to an increase of the burden of about 40 million euro per annum.” (Berkhout: 2003a). The fact that the target groups of the Act cost the Dutch government more money when they remain living in the Netherlands than when they return to their country of origin with a remigration payment is caused by the higher social benefits and higher expenditure on rent subsidies and healthcare. Since it concerns here a select group within the allochthons, namely persons who are unable to arrange their remigration themselves (due to lack of financial means), these results are therefore not applicable to the total population of allochthons. Incidently, the Minister of Alien Affairs and Integration subsequently announced in a letter to the Lower House that the plans to abolish the Remigration Act have been abandoned.

Focusing more specifically on the contributions of immigrants to taxes and pensions, the level of the immigrants income is an important indicator. In general it is clear that the income of allochthons is generally lower than that of autochthons. The disposable income of non-Western allochthons in 2001 amounted to only three-quarters of the disposable income of autochthons. Table 2 gives a summary.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Autochthons</th>
<th>Western allochthons</th>
<th>Non-Western allochthons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X 1,000 euro</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CBS (Statistics Netherlands)

As far as the average net household income of five new immigrant groups (Afghans, Iraqis, Iranians, (former) Yugoslavians and Somalis is concerned, it can be seen that this is still considerably lower than that of the four classic groups, namely some 500 euro lower (Maagdenburg: 2004).

**Impact immigrants on the welfare system**

Non-Western allochthons are 2.5 times more likely to receive benefit than autochthons (CBS: 2004). This difference hardly narrowed at all from the end of 1999 to 2002. First-generation migrants in particular receive benefits. Non-Western allochthons above all claim social assistance benefits much more often than autochthons. Almost 25% of non-Western allochthons from 15 to 64 years received social benefits at the end of 2001, compared to one out of eight in the group of autochthons. In addition, at the end of 2002 almost half of non-Western allochthons older than 65 years were dependent on benefits.

Older Turkish and Moroccan men in particular receive disability benefits (Boerdam: 2003). The number of new persons claiming disability benefits declined in 2003 among both the allochthonous and autochthonous population. Dependency on unemployment benefits, however, has doubled among

---

8 Target groups for the Remigration Act are ex-Yugoslavians, Cape Verdeans, Moroccans, Surinamese, Tunisians, Turks, refugees and those entitled to asylum, Greeks, Italians, Portuguese, Spanish and Moluccans.
9 Up to the end of 2001, 7,105 persons entitled to a remigration provision left the Netherlands, together with 5,587 partners. In 2002, 728 remigrants and 289 partners left the Netherlands.
10 Letter from Minister of Alien Affairs and Integration to the Chairman of the Lower House of the States General, 7 September 2004.
11 Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese and Dutch Antilleans/Arubans.
non-Western allochthons in the last two years, while this increase was less marked among autochthons. Table 3 shows an overview of the Dutch population and benefits.

Table 3. Number of persons aged 15-64 years on benefits according to group of origin, at the end of 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Standardised average\textsuperscript{13}</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Autochthons</th>
<th>Western allochthons</th>
<th>Non-Western allochthons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupationally disabled</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Assistance Benefits</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment Benefits</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Benefits</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CBS (Statistics Netherlands), 2004

The five largest groups of new immigrants, namely the Afghans, the Iraqis, Iranians, former Yugoslavians and Somalis (mostly asylum migrants) also account for a large proportion of social assistance benefits. Many newcomers have never worked in the Netherlands and are not entitled to unemployment benefits. “Somalis have the highest proportion of persons entitled to benefits (almost 66%).”\textsuperscript{14} (Maagdenburg: 2004).

Table 4 gives a summary of the number of persons on social assistance benefits for a number of groups of other non-Western allochthons. The second generation is usually still at school and therefore does not draw social assistance benefits.

\textsuperscript{12} It concerns persons on occupational disability benefits, social assistance benefits or unemployment benefits on 31 December 2002 and who could be traced in the Municipal personal records database (GBA) on 1 January 2003.

\textsuperscript{13} Corrected for differences in age and gender structure in the population.

\textsuperscript{14} Unlike Table x, this publication takes those entitled to benefits to include persons who receive study finance, AOW (state retirement pension), VUT (early retirement pension) or a retirement pension. The percentage is therefore slightly skewed.
Table 4. Proportion of persons from 15 to 65 years on social assistance benefits (2002); origin and generation\(^{15}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-Western allochthons</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Iraq</th>
<th>Afghanistan</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Iran</th>
<th>Somalia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1(^{st}) generation</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2(^{nd}) generation</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table based on table 5.2b in Rijn et al. (2004).

Sprangers et al. (2004) also conclude that the dependence of asylum migrants on benefits is high. “A quarter of male and 40% of female asylum migrants who came to the Netherlands in 1995 were drawing unemployment or social assistance benefits five years later.” Sprangers et al. (2004) mention as a possible explanation for this the fact that asylum migrants, as long as they have no residence permit, may only undertake limited work. Asylum migrants therefore do not so readily find a place in the labour market compared to other immigrants, and in addition are often dependent on benefits. Of the immigrants who migrated to the Netherlands in 1995 for family reunification or family formation, roughly one in ten depended on unemployment or social assistance benefits in 2000. For immigrants from European countries this was 2% for men, and 4% for women. The latter is roughly the same as the level for autochthons.

Conclusions with regard to taxes, pensions and benefits:

\textit{What impact do immigrants have on the amount of taxes paid, on pension funds and on the overall welfare system, both in terms of receiving benefits and as tax-paying or fee-paying residents?}

- No explicit studies has been found that provide an answer to the question as to what proportion of taxes paid and pension contributions can be attributed to immigrants.
- A relatively large amount of research has been carried out into the relationship between the costs and benefits of immigrants for the Dutch welfare state. It can be concluded that the benefits (contributions) are lower than the costs (benefits received etc.) of non-Western immigrants.
- The amount of income provides an indirect answer to the question about the contributions of immigrants to pensions and taxes.
- The disposable income of non-Western allochthons is on average only three-quarters of the disposable income of autochthons. Contributions from non-Western allochthons are therefore on average lower than that of autochthons.
- As far as receiving benefits is concerned, a relatively high number of publications have been found on the use of social provisions by immigrants. It can be concluded that non-Western allochthons, compared to autochthons, claim benefit at a disproportionately high (2.5 times more) level.
- It is not only among the four classic migrant groups that the proportion of benefit recipients is high, but also among the relatively new asylum migrants.

4.1.2 Consumption

Questions: What percentage of the overall national consumption is attributable to immigrants? Have there been any changes in the demand for local products due to the presence of immigrants?

\(^{15}\) These percentages have not been corrected according to age and gender structure in the population.
No publications have been found that provide a precise answer to the above questions. No record is kept of consumption according to ethnicity, nor has any literature been found about consumption patterns of immigrants.

It would appear to be unknown whether any changes have occurred in the demand for local products due to the presence of immigrants. As far as the level of consumption is concerned, the amount of income provides an indication. As could be observed in the previous paragraph, the income of non-Western allochthons is generally lower than that of autochthons. The disposable income of non-Western allochthons in 2001 was only three-quarters of that of autochthons.

Furthermore, it is generally known that a significant proportion of allochthons send a percentage of their income to family members in the country of origin. Based on the information from the Dutch Central Bank, for example, it is known that in 2001, some 180 million euro was transferred, in the form of private transfers of money, to Morocco and 250 million to Turkey (Snel et al.: 2003), which leads to the conclusion that non-Western allochthons do not consume their entire income in the Netherlands.

Since the disposable income of non-Western allochthons is 25% lower than that of autochthons, and since not all their income is spent in the Netherlands, it can be cautiously concluded that non-Western allochthons account for a smaller percentage of national consumption than autochthons.

Conclusions regarding consumption:

What percentage of the overall national consumption is attributable to immigrants? Have there been any changes in the demand for local products due to the presence of immigrants?

- No literature has been found which explicitly answers the questions about national consumption that can be attributed to immigrants and a potentially changing demand for local products due to the presence of immigrants.
- No literature has been found either on the consumption patterns of immigrants.
- However, something can be said indirectly about consumption by immigrants. The disposable income of non-Western allochthons is on average only three-quarters of the disposable income of autochthons. It is also known that allochthons do not spend their entire income in the Netherlands. They send some of it to family members in the country of origin. Non-Western allochthons would therefore appear to account for a lower percentage of national consumption than would be expected based on their proportion of the population. Their consumption level would appear to be lower than that of autochthons.
4.1.3 Employment

What has been the impact of immigrants on the employment sector? What has been the impact of immigrants on the employment/unemployment of the less qualified or unskilled, economically active native population?

No literature has been found that can provide a specific answer to the above questions. A considerable amount of literature was found, though, on the labour participation of immigrants. No empirical research has been carried out in the Netherlands into the effect of immigrants on the employment of less-qualified persons.

Below follows an initial summary of the labour participation of immigrants in the Netherlands.

The labour participation of non-Western allochthons is significantly lower than that of autochthons. Labour participation of non-Western allochthons fell in 2003 (CBS: 2004). Labour participation among the Surinamese is relatively high, with six out of ten persons in a job. On the other hand, in 2003 only four out of every ten Moroccans had a job. Table 5 gives a summary.

Table 5. Labour market position of persons aged 15-64 years according to group of origin, 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Autochthons</th>
<th>Western allochthons</th>
<th>Non-Western allochthons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Morocco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Surinam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Neth. Antilles and Aruba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net labour participation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment percentage</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CBS (Statistics Netherlands)

The employment rate of immigrants from non-Western countries amounts to three-quarters of the national average. The low employment rate of non-Western immigrants does not seem to be a specific problem of the Netherlands. Most countries in Europe show a relatively low employment rate of non-EU nationals, but the figure for the Netherlands is among the lowest. So far, no adequate explanation has been given for this phenomenon. It has been suggested that Dutch integration policy has been counterproductive. Other possibilities are the relatively generous and accessible disability scheme in the Netherlands and more selective immigration policies in other countries (Roodenburg et al.: 2004).

As regards the gross labour market participation of a number of new migrant groups, it is noticeable that this is generally even lower than among the four classic migrant groups. For example, the gross labour market participation of Afghans in 2003 was 43%; 45% for Iraqis, 58% for Iranians; 66% for (former) Yugoslavians and 41% for Somalis (Maagdenburg: 2004). In comparison, the gross labour participation of the four classic migrant groups in 2002 was: 50% among the Turks; 49% among the Moroccans; 71% among the Surinamese and 66% among the Antilleans (and 70% among the autochthons) (Maagdenburg: 2004).

Sprangers et al. (2004) report that more than half of the male asylum migrants that came to the Netherlands in the mid-1990s were in work in 2000, whereas for female asylum migrants in the same period this was roughly one-third. Asylum migrants who remained longer in the Netherlands did better. Of the male asylum migrants who came to the Netherlands in the early 1990s, two-thirds of men and fewer than half of the women were in work at the turn of the century. Sprangers et al. (2004) give as a possible explanation for this the fact that asylum migrants, as long as they have no residence permit, may only undertake limited work. Asylum migrants therefore find a place in the labour market less readily than other immigrants, and are furthermore more often dependent on benefits.

---

16 These are gross figures. The figures in Table x are net figures.
The rise in unemployment in 2003 affected the allochthonous more than the autochthonous population. Unemployment among non-Western allochthons remains substantially higher than that among autochthonous and Western allochthons. The difference in unemployment between the allochthons and autochthons is however smaller among young people than among persons aged 35 years or older.

Contrary to native workers, where unemployment is quite low depending on the economic situation, unemployment amongst immigrants is and has been for years relatively high. Moroccans and Turks, both men and women, have a low employment rate among immigrant groups. About half of native Dutch men work in jobs requiring a high level of education, about 40% of the Surinamese and fewer than 20% of the Turks and Moroccans. Most non-Western allochthonous women are occupied at home more than is the case with native Dutch women. The traditional family life of Turks and Moroccans is strong, especially for first-generation immigrants (CBS: 2004). There has been a debate among politicians that the economic potential of this group could be improved by introducing stronger financial and legal incentives in relation to integration. With more attention to education and integration, their situation in the labour market could be improved. The system of social welfare in the Netherlands could be seen as a negative factor, because incentives to look for a job could be lower.

Roodenburg et al. (2004) conclude that concerning the labour market, the effect of future labour migration would for instance be:
- the growth of gross domestic product, but the increase will accrue largely to immigrants in the form of wages
- a net gain in income of residents is likely to be small, or even negative
- the amount of redistribution between residents is considerable
- the more the skill distribution of immigrants differs from that of residents, the greater the redistribution will be
- residents with skills comparable to those of immigrants will lose out
- residents with skills complementary to those of immigrants will gain in the long run
- capital owners will win in the short run, but in the long run their gains will disappear;
- due to labour market imperfections, part of the income effects for resident workers will be replaced by employment effects (unemployment instead of a wage decrease).

There have been no studies in the Netherlands into the effect of immigration on the labour market position of the low-skilled or unqualified autochthonous population. Existing literature is only theoretical in nature. It is argued very generally, however, that non-Western allochthons are on average less qualified than autochthons, which means that the position of low-skilled autochthons has declined (either through loss of income or through unemployment). Incidentally, research has been carried out at an international level into the effects of migrant workers on the labour position of low-skilled or unskilled autochthons. However, various studies have produced different results, so that there is a lack of consensus.

Hartog & Zorlu (2002) studied the effects of immigration on incomes of such groups as the low-skilled. They conclude that “ethnic minorities from non-EU countries are substitutes for the low-skilled and complement the highly-skilled native Dutch workers. A 10 per cent increase of ethnic minorities from non-EU countries decreases the earnings of low-skilled workers by 0.42% and increases the earnings of highly-skilled workers by 0.21%. Medium-skilled natives are virtually unaffected.”

Conclusions regarding employment:

What has been the impact of immigrants on the employment sector? What has been the impact of immigrants on the employment/unemployment of the less qualified or unskilled, economically active native population?

- No empirical studies have been carried out in the Netherlands into the effects of immigration on the labour market position of the low-skilled (displacement). The publications that have been found are only theoretical in nature.
In general it can be concluded that non-Western allochthons are on average less skilled than autochthons and that the native population with skills comparable to those of immigrants lose out.

Hartog & Zorlu (2002) conclude that a 10% increase in ethnic minorities from non-EU countries decreases the earnings of low-skilled workers by 0.42% and increases the earnings of highly-skilled workers by 0.21%. Medium-skilled natives are virtually unaffected.

There is a great deal of information available about the labour participation of allochthons.

The employment ratio of non-Western allochthons is roughly three-quarters of the national average.

Labour participation is low not only among the four classic migrant groups, but also among the relatively new asylum migrants.

The rising unemployment in 2003 affected non-Western allochthons more than autochthons.

Non-Western allochthons are on average less skilled than autochthons.

The participation of non-Western allochthonous women in the labour market is generally lower than among autochthonous women.

4.1.4 Ethnic business owners

What has been the impact of immigrant entrepreneurial endeavours on overall economic development?

Here too, no literature has been found on the subject that can precisely answer the above-mentioned question. However, there is a limited amount of information known concerning the entrepreneurship of non-Western allochthon business owners, also referred to as ethnic business ownership. Two publications (EIM: 2004 and Tillaart and Doesborgh: 2004) provide a recent overview.

In 2002, the Netherlands had 967,000 business owners, one in eight of whom was allochthonous. Of the allochthonous business owners, more than one in three (36.6%) were non-Western. During the period from 1999 to 2002, the rise in the number of business owners was greatest among non-Western allochthons: +3.1% compared to +0.6% among Western allochthons and +0.3% among autochthons. The strong growth in the number of non-Western allochthons can be partially explained by the strong growth in the professional population among non-Western allochthons. Even so, it can be concluded that in the period from 1999-2002 the number of non-Western allochthon business owners grew faster than the working population concerned.

Business owners from the following countries of origin: Turkey, Morocco, the Netherlands Antilles/Aruba, Surinam, China/Hong Kong, together accounted for 71% of the non-Western allochthons in 2002. The largest proportion is formed by the Turks (about 11,100), followed by the Surinamese (about 8,000) and the Chinese (about 6,200). During the period from 1999 to 2002, the group of Moroccan business owners grew the most: +50%. The size of the group of Turkish and Antillean business owners also grew sharply during this period: +41% and +40%. On the other hand, growth among the Surinamese and Chinese remained static at +25% and +17% respectively.

Although the number of non-Western allochthonous business owners has increased significantly in the last few years, the business ownership rate among non-Western allochthons has remained markedly lower than among the population in the Netherlands as a whole, partly as a result of a small number of allochthonous women business owners. In 2002 the business ownership rate among non-Western allochthons was 42, considerably lower than the 96 of the autochthonous population and 75 for Western allochthons. The business ownership rate of non-Western allochthons grew much faster in the period from 1999 to 2002 than among autochthons and Western allochthons. Among the specific countries of origin, the high business ownership rate among the Chinese is particularly striking, and is

---

17 The number of business owners per 1,000 persons in the labour force, per population group.
still rising in this group. This increase is greater than any of the other specific groups, although the Turks are not far behind.

*Non-Western business owners are younger and less often female*

The proportion of female business owners among non-Western allochthons lags behind the national average of 32%. Among non-Western allochthonous business owners in 2002, only 26% were female. If we look at the specific countries of origin, we notice that the number of female business owners among Turkish and Moroccan business owners in particular is very low (17% and 12% respectively in 2002).

Another difference in the characteristics of business owners is that the average age of non-Western allochthonous business owners is some six to seven years younger than the average age of all business owners in the Netherlands: 38 years compared to 44½ years in 2002.

The majority of ethnic business owners run their businesses in the west of the Netherlands, particularly in the big cities, within which there are clear areas of concentration. Ethnic business ownership is not only concentrated in spatial terms, but also in certain sectors. Although many non-Western allochthonous business owners have businesses in the catering and trade sectors, the share of these sectors declined in the period from 1999 to 2002 whereas the share of the business services sector in particular increased. The increase in the share of the building and transport sectors is also significant.

These changes show that non-Western allochthons are following the trend of autochthonous business owners. If we look at the specific countries of origin, it is immediately noticeable that virtually all the business owners from China and Hong Kong are active in the hotel and catering sector. Moroccans and Turks are most active in trade (especially retail), but many in the catering sector too. The Surinamese are the least active in the traditional sectors of trade and catering, being more akin to the autochthonous business owner. Among the second generation of ethnic business owners, there is a shift towards a greater spread across various sectors, following the national pattern. As a result, this has resulted in business ownership making a greater contribution to realising the objectives of the Dutch entrepreneurship policy, in which innovation and growth are key words.

Tillaart and Doesborgh (2004) looked specifically at the retail trade, which produced the following picture. In mid-2004 there were 8,290 ethnic businesses active in the retail sector, of which a quarter (24%) were for food and 30% for market trading. For the autochthonous businesses in the retail sector these figures are 14% and 13% respectively. Compared to autochthonous retailers, there are relatively few business owners of home furnishing stores as well as shops for educational and recreational articles. Ethnic starters in the retail industry have systematically less chance of surviving their first year compared to autochthonous starters. In 2002, 23% of ethnic starters did not survive longer than one year, compared to 14% of autochthonous starters. The chance of survival of ethnic starters does show an upward trend, though: from 72% in 1993 to 77% in 2002. For each year of starters in retail, the second generation of ethnic starters clearly have a greater chance of survival than the first generation. Second-generation starters even have a better chance of survival than autochthonous starters in the retail trade.

*Performance of ethnic business ownership*

Of all the businesses that were set up in 1994, just over one in three was still in business in 2004. The largest proportion of these businesses belong to autochthonous business owners (38%), followed by those of Western allochthons (26%). The proportion of non-Western business owners that survive is the smallest. Only one in five (20%) of businesses that were set up in 1994 by non-Western allochthonous business owners were still in existence in 2004.

Another indicator that provides an insight into the performance of ethnic business owners is the business owner’s income. This income can consist of the profit that a sole trader can achieve, or the taxable salary received by a managing director and major shareholder. The business owner’s income that non-Western allochthonous business owners earn from the business is lower than the business owner’s income of both Western allochthons and autochthons. This applies to both the profit from the...
business for sole traders (17.6 compared to 21.4 and 20.7 x 1,000 euro) and the taxable income of a managing director and major shareholder (44.8 compared to 48.9 and 47.0 x 1,000 euro).

The poorer performance of the non-Western allochthonous business owners may possibly be explained by the observations made in the Ethnic Business Ownership Monitor (Monitor Etnisch Ondernemerschap) 2004 that starting ethnic business owners, particularly those of the first generation, do not generate the necessary innovation. ‘They often set up their own business on impulse, without carrying out a proper analysis of market opportunities. As a result they serve the same clientele with the same products or services as their customers, without any special distinctive capacity. This leads to cut-throat competition, a business income that lags behind, and a high failure percentage among young ethnic businesses.’ (EIM: 2004).

As far as the role of market seeker is concerned, the following is stated: ‘Ethnic business owners are strong in networking and responding to the needs of their customers. This strength is based on the strong ties within their own population group, particularly the close family ties. Information, financing, attitude and behaviour are derived from their own, closed network. This form of entrepreneurship has traditionally been regarded as a significant force in ethnic population groups. In the past few years, however, it has become clear that this approach has become more and more a weakness. The limited external orientation of ethnic business owners restricts their ability to discover and exploit (new) opportunities.’ The ethnic business owners’ poor fulfilment of the market seeker role is closely linked to the fact that they generally know little about the existence of the Dutch knowledge infrastructure and the facilities available for information and advice. In addition, ethnic business owners hardly come together formally in local or ethnic networks, let alone integrate in autochthonous networks and sector organisations.’

Conclusions with regard to ethnic business owners:

What has been the impact of immigrant entrepreneurial endeavours on overall economic development?

- No literature has been found on the effect on the economic development of ethnic business ownership
- However, there is some information known about ethnic business owners:
- Although the number of non-Western allochthonous business owners has increased substantially during the last few years, the business ownership rate among non-Western allochthons is still significantly lower than among the population in the Netherlands as a whole
- This is partly the consequence of the small number of allochthonous women business owners
- The proportion of non-Western allochthonous business owners whose businesses survive is smaller than that of autochthonous business owners
- The business income of non-Western allochthonous business owners is lower than the business income of autochthon business owners

4.1.5 Highly qualified immigrants

To what extent has immigration brought qualifications not previously available by the native workforce into the country and what has been the overall effect on the economy?

In order to answer the above question, a distinction needs to be made between the former guest workers who came to the Netherlands in the 1960s and 1970s and the modern migrant workers who came to the Netherlands in the 1990s.

The guest workers, mostly originating from Turkey and Morocco, initiated a process of follow-up migration of partners and children who joined them (immigration for family reunification) and marriage partners for their children (immigration for family formation). “This guest work resulted in
not only benefits but also costs to Dutch society. With benefits, one could think of taxes on income from work paid by the guest workers, their working partners if any, and by their children who moved into the labour market after their youth. Costs included the costs of educating the children and benefits paid to the guest workers, their family members and follow-up migrants. The analysis that the CPB made in this way indicated that the costs of this specific form of labour migration outweighed the benefits for most age groups.” (Roodenburg & Euwals, 2003) (ACVZ: 2004).

In addition, in respect of the earlier guest workers we may cautiously conclude that they did not bring any unique qualifications with them that were not already present. Generally speaking, the earlier guest workers carried out the work that was usually regarded in the Netherlands as dirty or heavy work.

Modern migrant workers

The principal aim of the Foreign Nationals (Employment) Act, which entered into force on 1 September 1995\(^\text{18}\), is the restrictive admission of migrant workers. This means that only migrant workers are admitted once a strict test has shown that there is no available labour supply within the Netherlands and the European Economic Area that can fill that job. It follows virtually automatically from this that the modern migrant worker must indeed possess qualifications that are not available (or not available to a sufficient degree) in the Netherlands or the EEA.

Dutch labour migration policy has a preference for temporary labour migration. In order to emphasise that, since 1 November 2000 it has been virtually impossible to extend a temporary work permit (shorter than three years). The only exception to this has been made for Turkish employees who have been working for longer than one year for the same employer\(^\text{19}\). The restrictive Dutch labour migration policy aims as much as possible to prevent the alien from possessing a residence permit for three years without interruption, after which he would be permanently admitted to the Dutch labour market and can accrue social security entitlements (from: Handbook for minorities).

The Advisory Committee for Alien Affairs (ACVZ) and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment has carried out a study into a specific group of modern migrant workers (Maagdenburg: 2004). It concerns here migrant workers who obtained work permits straight away for the maximum duration of three years. This group was chosen because it is the only category of migrant workers which, according to the rules, receives the right of permanent residence in the Netherlands after a period of time. Other categories of migrant workers who come on a shorter temporary work permit cannot acquire that right. The reason for this study was the question whether benefits outweighed the costs of labour migration in the 1990s too. The following results were found:

In the period from 1996 to October 2002, a total of 14,680 temporary work permits valid for a contiguous period of three years were issued by the CWI. This is 10% of the total number of work permits (regardless of the term of validity) that were issued in the same period (namely 144,000). In the period from 1996 to 2001, the total number of temporary work permits issued (regardless of the term of validity) grew by 200%. The growth of three-year work permits was 160%.

A relatively large number of three-year work permits are from Western countries with which the Netherlands maintains an extensive economic exchange, such as the United States and Japan. 63% of the temporary work permit holders hold the nationality of a Western country, more than 7% of a country from which the minorities in the Netherlands originate, and more than 29% of other non-Western countries (such as China and India).

The business sectors with the largest number of temporary work permits are: business services (almost 28%), education (more than 12%), wholesaling (more than 11%). More than 85% of the jobs of those holding three-year work permits belong to the category of higher positions. For example, almost 14%

---

\(^{18}\) The Wav replaced the previous Foreign Nationals(Employment) Act (Wabw) which had provided for the admission of migrant workers to the Dutch labour market since 1979.

\(^{19}\) On the grounds of Article 6 of Decree 1/80 of the Association Agreement EEC-Turkey, these employees are entitled to continue working.
of those with temporary work permits hold the position of scientific researcher, more than 12% in ICT and more than one quarter in a managerial position.

Of 42% of those with a temporary work permit, a partner originating from abroad has joined them. In addition, of those with a three-year work permit, four-fifths are men and one-fifth women.

For 60% of the 14,680 people with a temporary work permit, at the time of the measurement (October 2002) the three-year period had not yet been completed. This study could therefore not establish whether they continued their residence in the Netherlands after their work-permit period had expired. Deregistration information and income data about the people with a temporary work permit and their households in the files of the CBS provide two indications that only a limited number of the those on 3-year permits remain working in the Netherlands for a longer or shorter period after their work permit has expired, namely between a minimum of 4.4% and a maximum of 12%. The minimum of 4.4% concerns the number of naturalisation cases; the maximum of 12% concerns persons who remain working in the Netherlands for a longer period of time.

It can be concluded that those persons with a temporary work permit belong to the group of ‘much higher earners’.

If one looks at disposable income, it is noticeable that in 2000 only 12.8% of persons with a temporary work permit (compared to 45% of the Dutch population) are placed in the category of ‘low disposable income’. Of those on temporary work permits, 52.7% are in the 'middle' category, compared to 50% of the Dutch population. More than one-third (34.5%) of those on temporary work permits, compared to only 5% of the Dutch population, are in the category of 'high disposable income'.

No answer could be found to the question to what extent there is dependence on benefit among those with a three-year work permit and their family members, in so far as they continue their residence in the Netherlands after their three-year permit has expired.

As far as modern migrant workers are concerned, it can be concluded that they possess qualities that are not, or insufficiently, present in the Netherlands and the EEA (after all, this is the criterion). A small percentage of the modern migrant workers (roughly 10%), namely those with a three-year work permit, can be regarded as probably have a positive effect on the Dutch economy, in view of their (high) disposable income. Almost one-third of these persons on a three-year work permit (compared to only 5% of the Dutch population) come under the category of 'high disposable income'. However, it is not clear to what extent this select group of modern migrant workers is comparable to the group of highly qualified migrants.

Highly qualified migrants are expected to have a positive effect on the Dutch economy because of their contribution to innovation and strengthening of the Dutch business sector. However, no (clear) empirical research has been found on this.

Conclusions regarding highly qualified immigrants:

To what extent has immigration brought qualifications not previously available by the native workforce into the country and what has been the overall effect on the economy?

- As far as the former migrant workers are concerned who came to the Netherlands in the 1960s (guest workers), it can be concluded that they did not bring with them any new qualifications that were not already available. The guest workers usually carried out the work that was generally regarded in the Netherlands as heavy or dirty work.
- The costs of this earlier labour migration and the family reunification and formation linked to this (benefits, education etc.) turned out to be higher than the benefits (taxes paid) for the Dutch welfare state.
- The Foreign Nationals (Employment) Act that has been in force in the Netherlands since 1995 stipulates that migrant workers are only admitted if it is clear after a strict test that there is no labour supply available within the Netherlands and the EEA to fill the job. This means that the modern migrant worker must indeed possess qualifications that are not, or not sufficiently, available in the Netherlands or the EEA.
- Virtually no empirical research has been carried out into the effects of the highly qualified migrant

The impact of immigrants on Dutch society ~ May 12, 2005 32
A single study concerned a select group of modern migrant workers (those on three-year work permits). In view of their high disposable incomes, it can be concluded that they have a positive effect on the Dutch economy. It is not clear to what extent this select group of modern migrant workers is comparable to the group highly qualified migrants.

Highly qualified migrants are expected to have a positive influence on the Dutch economy by contributing to the strengthening and innovation of the Dutch business sector. However, no (clear) empirical research has been found that supports this (otherwise quite plausible) theory.
4.1.6 Specific economic sectors

How and to what extent have immigrants been involved in specific economic sectors? Which niches exist for migrants in the national economy, e.g. health care, agriculture, catering, etc.?

According to the Dutch government, large-scale labour migration in the Netherlands will only become an option once Dutch job seekers have been reintegrated in the labour market. This view - that has been confirmed by the Dutch labour unions - is even more relevant now that the economic situation in the Netherlands has worsened and the unemployment figures are rising. Yet this line of reasoning ignores the specific need for certain workers on the Dutch labour market. On the one hand there is a need for qualified and well-educated workers (nurses, doctors, teachers, ICT specialists, etcetera) in specific economic sectors (health, education, personal and commercial services, ICT). Dutch job seekers are often not qualified for these jobs. On the other hand there is also a need for low-skilled workers in specific economic sectors in which Dutch job seekers are often not willing to work (especially in horticulture and to a lesser extent in the hotel and catering industry). Illegal foreign immigrants often find employment in these sectors (Snel et al.: 2003).

As can be expected, there are clear differences between temporary workers from the more developed Western countries on the one hand and temporary workers from Eastern Europe and developing countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia on the other. Temporary workers from the developed Western countries (USA, Canada, Japan, Oceania, including Australia and New Zealand) predominantly work in high-skilled jobs such as executive professions and as consultants. American temporary workers are also frequently employed in the artistic professions. Temporary workers from Eastern European countries, particularly Poland, and from African countries predominantly work in the agricultural and horticultural sectors. Eastern European and Latin American temporary workers also frequently work in the artistic professions. African and Asian temporary workers often work in manufacturing jobs. African, Latin American and Asian temporary workers are also frequently employed in ‘other services’ such as cleaning jobs (Snel et al.: 2003).

Specific economic sectors where non-Western immigrants are employed are industry and employment agencies. In 1999, 17% of first-generation non-Western allochthons had a job in industry and 14% worked at an employment agency. The number of jobs available in both of these sectors has declined in recent years. (CBS: 2004). Nevertheless, the total number of jobs for first-generation immigrants increased between 1999 and 2002 due to an increase in the number of jobs in other sectors of the economy, for example in public administration. The number of first-generation allochthons in public administration rose from 18,000 in 1999 to 24,000 in 2002. A similar increase can be seen in education and health care.

A large part of second-generation non-Western allochthons continued working in retail during the period from 1999 to 2002. The influx from second-generation immigrants into the labour market increases as they finish school or look for a job outside their school hours. Besides the retail trade, many second-generation immigrants find jobs in health care, public administration and education.

As far as the five most important ‘new groups’ (asylum migrants) are concerned (Afghans, Iraqis, Iranians, former Yugoslavians and Somalis), it is clear that the business sector per group can differ considerably. “The most important employers for the new groups can be found in industry and repair firms, trade and catering, which generally corresponds with the division of the classic groups across business sectors. Among autochthons, there is a much smaller representation in the agriculture, fishing and mining sectors and industry than with the new and classic migrant groups.” (Maagdenburg: 2004)

Conclusions regarding specific economic sectors:

How and to what extent have immigrants been involved in specific economic sectors? Which niches exist for migrants in the national economy, e.g. health care, agriculture, catering, etc.?

- There is some literature on the economic sectors in which immigrants work. However, there is no clear overview.
The policy pursued by the Dutch government is for labour migration to take place if persons without work are reintegrated.

However, in certain areas in the Netherlands the situation is such that there is a shortage of specific labour, both highly-skilled and low-skilled.

Immigrants work in specific sectors of the labour market.

We see in the Netherlands that second-generation immigrants in the labour market are moving into other sectors.

4.1.7 Exports and imports

Has immigration had any effect on exports and imports and/or any influence on the host country’s participation in international trade?

No literature has been found that provides an answer to the question about the effects of immigration on imports and exports, nor has any research been found on the effect of immigration on Dutch participation in international trade. Information on imports and exports is not registered according to ethnicity. Simply looking at the changes in imports and exports since the arrival of immigrants is not very useful. All kinds of other factors such as globalisation and increasing wealth naturally play a role too.

Conclusions regarding exports and imports:

Has immigration had any effect on exports and imports and/or any influence on the host country’s participation in international trade?

- No research has been found into the effects of immigration on imports and exports. No records are kept of ethnicity with imports and exports.
- No research has been found either into the effects of immigration on Dutch participation in international trade.

4.1.8 Cultural diversity and competitiveness

Is there cultural diversity in private business and the public sector, and to what extent has this diversity influenced the national economy and competitiveness in international contexts?

There is certainly cultural diversity within organisations in the Netherlands. This applies both for the public and the private sector. The government has been pursuing a special policy for a number of years in order to increase the share of allochthonous employees within organisations. For example, until 1 January 2004 there was the Employment of Minorities (Promotion) Act (Wet SAMEN)\(^{20}\), which was introduced on 1 January 1998. This act was intended as a temporary instrument in order to increase the labour participation of allochthons through increasing awareness among employers\(^{21}\). Within that framework, employers in both the public and the private sector were expected to register the origin\(^{22}\) of their employees. However, the evaluation of the Wet SAMEN (Essafi et al.: 2004) showed that the effect of the act on awareness was exhausted and the act itself had not led to a demonstrable improvement in the position of allochthons. Research has shown that only 14% of companies have an

\(^{20}\) Wet Stimulering Arbeidsdeelname Etnische Minderheden (Employment of Minorities (Promotion) Act).

\(^{21}\) As also its predecessor the Wbeaa (Wet bevordering evenredige arbeidsdeelname allochtonen) (Fair Employment of Ethnic Minorities Act).

\(^{22}\) Country/countries of birth of employee and his/her parents.
ethnically mixed workforce, whereas a much larger proportion, namely 59.5%, say they believe a diverse workforce to be desirable\(^{23}\). Unambiguous, comparable and recent statistics on the degree to which there is cultural diversity in the various business sectors is however difficult to find. It is stated, however, that as regards the representation of ethnic minorities according to company size, minorities are represented above all in the large companies (from 200 to 499 employees) and relatively little in small businesses. This is possibly the result of the Framework Covenant for Large Companies (Raamconvenant Grote Ondernemingen – RGO) entered into in June 2000. A total of 110 large companies from various sectors signed this covenant in which agreements were made on the implementation of a multicultural personnel policy. Research has shown that the covenant, which expired in June 2004, has led to visible results within companies and in the area of collaboration between parties. For example, the percentage of allochthonous employees in RGO companies is above the national average and a conscious pursuing of a multicultural personnel policy is on the agenda of most organisations involved (Essafi et al.: 2004). An official of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment points out that more and more companies are discovering that they can increase their clientele significantly by employing employees of allochthonous origin. After all, a large group of (potential) customers is also of allochthonous origin and it is generally known that people are more likely to buy something from someone who speaks the same ‘language’. Banks and insurance companies, according to the official, seem to be leading the way in the strategic deployment of allochthons.

Despite the fact that the Wet SAMEN and the Framework Covenant for Large Companies have not been extended, the government, which wants to increase the labour participation of allochthons\(^{24}\), has decided to work actively during the coming years to encourage employers to pursue a policy of diversity management, whereby it is important to set up a National Network of Diversity Management (LND). The LND has been in operation since the beginning of December 2004 and its task is to increase awareness of diversity management and place it on the agenda with public and private organisations. In addition, the LND will play a role in developing a business-economic model which companies can use to shed light on the costs and benefits of a multicultural personnel policy. This, however, is still in the very early stages of development. It would appear to be difficult to obtain an insight, even at company level, into the costs and benefits of cultural diversity. No publications have been found either on the degree to which cultural diversity within organisations contributes to the national economy and competitive position in an international context. The economic impact of increasing cultural diversity seems not to have been studied (yet) in the Netherlands.

Although there is cultural diversity in Dutch organisations and companies, and the government is encouraging this as well, the literature that has been found provides little clarity on the nature and extent of this cultural diversity. No research has been found on the effects of cultural diversity on the Dutch economy and the competitive position of the Netherlands on the international market.

Conclusions regarding cultural diversity and competitiveness:

Is there cultural diversity in private business and the public sector, and to what extent has this presence influenced the national economy and competitiveness in international contexts?

- Some literature has been found on cultural diversity, but this is mostly theoretical in nature. The statistics that have been found are not very consistent on the nature and extent of cultural diversity within the Dutch organisations and companies.
- No research has been found on the effects of this cultural diversity on the Dutch economy and on the competitive position of the Netherlands on the international market.

\(^{23}\) Based on the Social Statistical Database, the CBS reports that the proportion of allochthonous employees in all businesses was 9.3% in 2000 and 8.8% in 1999 (Toor & van der Vliet: 2003).

\(^{24}\) The government wants to increase the labour participation of ethnic minorities from 50% in 2001 to 54% in 2005.
4.2 Impact of immigrants on civil society and culture

In general these were the key findings:

- The Netherlands has many immigrant grassroots organisations with highly diverse compositions and objectives.
- Some research has been carried out into the effect of grassroots organisations on the indigenous civil society, however no clear-cut picture emerged from this.
- Little is known about the effect on the indigenous civil society of the participation of minorities in local organisations.
- Although much has been published in the Netherlands on culture and a fair amount on the participation of allochthons in culture, little is known about the impact of immigrants on society and culture.
- As regards the media, quite a bit of research has been carried out, particularly into participation. There is less literature found in other areas examined (sport, fashion and food).
- Regarding cultural terrains as media, arts, food, sports and fashion we see growing participation of migrants and there is clearly influence. But participation is still lower than that of indigenous residents, and still occurs in separate circuits in too many cases.
- The Dutch government takes the starting point that culture can provide an important contribution to the integration of newcomers. As a result, its cultural policy devotes a great deal of attention to immigrants. Besides the aim to increase the cultural participation of immigrants, an effort is now being made to create links between the separate cultural circuits (from separate 'pillars' towards more interaction between the pillars).

As we will see here, little scientific research has been carried out into the impact of immigrants in the Netherlands on Dutch society and culture. However, quite a number of publications have been found about the participation of allochthons in culture and society. This paragraph therefore discusses above all the degree to which immigrants are organised and the level of participation of immigrants in cultural activities. The policy of the Dutch government to increase participation will also be examined.

4.2.1 Immigrants and civil society

As we will see here, little scientific research has been carried out into the impact of immigrants in the Netherlands on Dutch society and culture. However, quite a number of publications have been found about the participation of allochthons in culture and society. This paragraph therefore discusses above all the degree to which immigrants are organised and the level of participation of immigrants in cultural activities. The policy of the Dutch government to increase participation will also be examined.

The Netherlands has many grassroots organisations and institutions with highly diverse compositions and objectives. For example, there are a great many organisations that focus on their own national and/or ethnic population (e.g. Turkish, Surinamese, Antillean, Moluccan, Kurdish, Tamil, Mauritanian, Sudanese, Chinese, Palestinian) or subregions (e.g. the Association of African Women in the Netherlands (VAVN), the Network for highly qualified and migrant women (ZMV), the National Organisation for Arabian Women (LOAV) and the Association of Iranian Students in the Netherlands (VISN). There are also countless organisations that focus on their religious members (such as the Contact Group for Muslims and Government (CMO), Islamic Relief Nederland (IRN), The Netherlands Sunni Muslim Association (NSMA), the Netherlands Hindu Council) or in fact in other areas of society such as politics, the labour market and culture (e.g. foreign employees from non-
European areas of the Mediterranean, the Association of Afghan Engineers and technicians in the Netherlands (VAIN), the Eritrean Refugee Organisation in the Netherlands, the Iraqi Democratic Centre (IDC) and the Indisch (residents with links to Indonesia/former Dutch East Indies) Cultural Centre (ICC). The 2005 Minorities Yearbook (Smeets et al.: 2005) provides an overview of the migrant organisations in the Netherlands.

It is difficult, however, to say what the impact of the various immigrant networks on Dutch indigenous civil society actually consists of. There would appear to be little written on the subject. There is a study at a local level, though (Brink et al.: 2003), commissioned by the municipality of Amsterdam to examine the impact of (partly government-financed) grassroots organisations on the integration process in Amsterdam. The conclusions were that the grassroots organisations contributed in some way to integration in the form of offering services such as language courses and knowledge of the social support service. Grassroots organisations hardly contribute to the participation of their members in the Dutch society. People come to the organisations above all to meet and be together with fellow countryman in a safe setting. The social function of grassroots organisations is perceived as most important for the grassroots contacts among the members themselves, but being involved in activities outside the home is, at the very least, a first step towards integration, according to the researchers (Brink et al.: 2003).

The conclusion that grassroots organisations hardly contribute at all to the participation of their members in Dutch society is not supported by Michon & Tillie (2003). They explain the difference in turnout of the four classic migrant groups for the municipal elections in 2002 between Rotterdam (relatively high) and Amsterdam (relatively low) by pointing to the halt to investment in grassroots organisations in Amsterdam. Since 1998, Amsterdam has pursued a ‘diversity policy’. Under this banner, organisations based on ethnicity receive less encouragement and support. By contrast, Rotterdam actively encourages grassroots organisations of migrants (at least until 2002). Rotterdam has been pursuing a specific policy and election turnout is being encouraged through grassroots organisations. This would appear to promote the political participation of migrants, according to Michon & Tillie (2003).

It can be generally concluded that some research has been carried out into the effect of immigrant organisations and networks, but this has not led to unequivocal answers.

As far as the participation of migrants in local organisations such as political parties and business associations etc. are concerned, we know that this is generally fairly low. A possible cause of this is that the classic participation models (in structured consultations) do not work, especially among young people and allochthons. An overview of the conclusions of several studies (Knowledge Centre for Big Cities, website 2005) shows that a personal approach and involvement in concrete projects (developing a feeling of ownership) and the use of allochthonous organisations often works better than a structured consultation. An explanation for this is that allochthons often do not have a sufficient command of the language or doubt that their contribution will be of any use.

Encouraging participation, therefore, appears to be particularly difficult among allochthons and young people. For this reason, the youth culture Urban Lifestyle which is now blossoming should be mentioned in this report. After all, although one expects from the studies that the participation of allochthonous young people in all kinds of (inter)cultural organised activities is low, this does not necessarily mean that this group does not integrate. The Urban Lifestyle is a youth culture that has recently blossomed, particularly in the big cities and the urban areas around these cities in the west (the Randstad). The concentration of allochthonous young people is highest in the Randstad and they live together in all kinds of ways, with each other and with autochthonous young people. The Urban Lifestyle has developed from this. Urban is described on an Internet site for young people (www.youngworks.nl/nieuwsbrief/) as a ‘mix of the best from all cultures’ arising from the daily multicultural lives of young people in the city. These young people attend mixed schools and mix with many different nationalities. The site tells us that young urban dwellers spend much time on the streets, as a result of which Urban has become a real street trend. It is not about skin colour, but about the effects that these cultures have brought with them: the close relationship with the family and friends, the music, language, food and clothes. Such a diverse composition of the population ensures
that the best of all cultures mix with each other, according to the newsletter. This cultural mix can be seen in music, clothes, sports, entertainment, events, food, creativity and even in the young people’s whole philosophy of life, where an open mind and tolerance are especially important.

The Dutch government is trying to encourage the participation of allochthons in Dutch society. As part of its minorities policy in the Netherlands, the government has created a consultative structure within which it communicates with consultative bodies that are considered as representing their members. The National Consultative Committee on Minorities (LOM) has been provided for by law since 1997 in the Minorities Policy (Consultation) Act (Wet Overleg Minderheden). The predecessor of the LOM, the National Advisory and Consultative structure for Minorities Policy (LAO) had been in existence since the mid-1980s. Within the institutionalised framework of the LOM, the government wants to discuss matters such as standards and values, the position of women and Islam. The task of the LOM is to discuss the general features of the national government’s integration policy in the policy preparation phase, as well as the evaluation of (parts of) this policy. Specific organisations are admitted, namely the Consultative Body for Turks (Inspraakorgaan Turken - IOT), the National Consultative Body for Southern Europeans (Landelijk Inspraakorgaan Zuid Europeanen - LIZE), the National Consultative Body for the Welfare of Moluccans (Landelijk Overlegorgaan Welzijn Molukkers - LOWM), the Consultative Body for Caribbean Dutch Nationals (Overlegorgaan Caraïbische Nederlanders - OcaN), the Collaborative Group of Moroccans and Tunisians (Samenwerkingsverband Marokkanen en Tunesiërs - SMT), the Surinam Consultative Body (Surinaams Inspraakorgaan - SIO), the Dutch Refugee Organisations (Vluchtelingen-Organisaties Nederland - VON) and since November 2004 the Consultative Body for the Chinese (Inspraakorgaan Chinezen - IOC). Inclusion in the LOM also means that the population group concerned officially forms a minority group, which gives it access to certain municipal subsidies for such things as language courses and homes for the elderly for members of its group.

There is also criticism of the LOM (Bodegraven: 2003). It is felt that the consultative bodies that are admitted are not representative of the many different subgroups in the minority groups. Doubts are also expressed about the desire of the government to involve specific groups outside parliament in preparing and evaluating policy. The government does believe, however, that the involvement of minorities on burning questions to do with integration is badly needed, but acknowledges that the effectiveness of the LOM consultative committee can be improved (Smeets et al.: 2005).

Little is known, though, about the effects of this (institutionalised) participation in government policy on the indigenous civil society.

4.2.2. Immigrants and the cultural context: food, sports, fashion, arts & media

The Netherlands has an active culture policy aimed at migrants, who are described by the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science (OCW) as “people with a different or double cultural background.” (Van der Laan: 2004). The idea behind the policy is that migrants enrich Dutch culture with new stories and images. “The importance of entering into dialogue, learning each other's stories and respecting each other's creative expression cannot be emphasised enough in these times. […] The cultural landscape as a whole must reflect the diversity of society better, not only what is offered but also the cultural institutions, the councils, boards and committees.” (Van der Laan: 2004). The fact that this desired cultural interaction is not automatic is evident from a study in a mixed neighbourhood in the city of Utrecht in 2003, which showed that there was hardly any cultural interaction between the various ethnic groups in this district and that people were above all living parallel lives alongside each other. On the other hand, the young people, more than the older people, did tend to mix with friends across ethnic boundaries (Knowledge Centre for the Big Cities, website 2005). Nevertheless, the government stresses that since the subject of ‘cultural diversity’ in the Netherlands has been put on the agenda, the policy has borne fruit. It cites a report by the Social and Cultural Planning Bureau (SCP) which shows that in the period from 1999 to 2003 the cultural participation of allochthons has risen faster than that of the population as a whole. Museum visits have increased from 15% to 22%, and visits to the theatre, classic music and ballet from 8% to 14% (SCP: 2004).
However, the letter does also observe that this growth is still in very well-defined, individual circuits. Van der Laan outlines the existing situation in the cultural sector as a twofold one: on the one hand there is the established circuit of cultural activities and on the other hand a circuit of multicultural productions, activities and committees has developed. The State Secretary warns that there is the risk that these circuits will become further and further distanced from each other; for this reason she wants to lift her policy of cultural diversity to the next level. She calls this next phase ‘intercultural programming’, in which the intention is to focus more on initiatives that create intercultural connections. In practice this means that the established institutions must get involved in intercultural activities and multicultural institutions must develop relations with the established circuit (Van der Laan: 2004).

In this way, the Ministry is aiming for more intercultural connections in which a greater participation of allochthons, the group with a different or double cultural background, is desirable. It may be assumed that integration, and with it the impact of immigrants on autochthonous culture, will increase with the increased success of this government policy. However, although a reasonable amount has been written in the Netherlands about cultural activities and the cultural participation of allochthons (growing, but still relatively low), there is a lack of research data that specifically examines this influencing factor.

The elements that will be discussed in this paragraph are the media (libraries and literature, audio-visual media, the press, magazines, Internet), art (professional arts events and local, small-scale activities), sports, food and fashion. Despite a lack of research data, a picture will be outlined of the situation with each element as regards the cultural participation of allochthons in the Netherlands – who in fact originate from more than one hundred different countries – and any impact the cultures of allochthonous groups have on autochthonous culture.

4.2.3. Media, arts, food, sports and fashion

Media

How has immigration influenced the expression (manifestations) of autochthonous culture in areas such as the media?

In order to find out how immigration has influenced the expression of autochthonous culture in the Netherlands in an area such as the media, we will examine whether intercultural programming is prevalent in the media and what the level of participation of allochthons is in this area.

Although the media in the Netherlands are independent, a ‘media and minorities policy’ has been pursued since the 1980s. Media and minorities as a theme have developed particularly in the last decade from an ad-hoc subject into a structural part of the media and cultural policy. Within this policy a general trend can be observed since the 1990s whereby the accent has shifted from minorities to multicultural public groups and from categorisation to integration, although there are fluctuations in this trend from time to time, as is evident from the article ‘Media & Minorities in the Netherlands: an overview’ (Bink: 2004). In 1999 the Dutch government presented the memorandum entitled ‘Media and Minorities Policy’ to the Lower House. The starting point was that the changes in the composition of the Dutch population must be visible in what the media is offering and who is making the media, as well as the public which is being targeted. According to the government, this could contribute to mutual integration.

Audio-visual media

In the report in which the public broadcasting service renders account for the year 2002 (‘Multicultural Programming 2002’), minorities programming is no longer referred to, but instead multicultural programming: programming that does justice to the diversity and colourfulness of society (van Dijck & Nellen: 2003). However, this does not alter the fact that most multicultural media is still focused on individual, separate target groups. We do see though that the proportion of migrants participating in the media is growing, but their effect and participation in the various types of media varies. In audio-
visual media, we see that the proportion of allochthonous programme makers is increasing (Bink: 2004).

Where the contents of programmes are concerned, in the light of the above-mentioned regulations for public broadcasting we see a marked difference between the public broadcasting service and the commercial channels. This conclusion can be drawn from a monitor studying the images of ethnicity and gender on television, the Diversity Monitor. In 2002 the Diversity Monitor shows that the commercial companies contain more cultural diversity than the public broadcasting service. On public television 72% of all persons belong to the category white/European and 12% to ‘other ethnic groups’ (black, Asian, Mediterranean or South-American). On commercial television one will see 67% white/European persons and 14% belonging to the category ‘other ethnic groups’. Within the category of ‘other ethnic groups’ public television will show more persons from allochthonous groups living in the Netherlands (Surinam/Antilles and Mediterranean) whilst the commercial broadcasters show more persons from African American (3%) and Hispanic/Latino (2.8%) origin. The researchers involved with this monitor conclude that this difference can be explained by the greater range of comedies, drama series and American films on the commercial channels. Another striking conclusion that emerges from this monitor is that with subjects that are explicitly to do with multicultural society, relatively few ‘other ethnic groups’ (black, Asian Mediterranean or South-American, compared to white/European) have their voice heard (Sterk & van Dijck: 2003).

Press

The second aspect of media that deserves attention here involves reporting in the press. For a long time it has been customary in the Netherlands to mention the ethnic background of perpetrators and victims of incidents and crimes in news reports if the ethnicity is other than Dutch. This situation has been a subject of discussion in society in general, and the world of journalism in particular, for an equally long time. Nowadays, occasionally the Dutch background of a victim of perpetrator is also mentioned. This observation as regards perception would seem to correspond with the general European image that emerges from the results of a pilot study entitled ‘European Day of Media Monitoring’, which reported on a particular day (13 November 2003) when television programmes and newspapers in the (then) fifteen member states of the European Union were monitored. The results showed that most news items where ethnicity played a role concerned not so much neutral subjects about politics, the government or legal affairs, but rather negative reports about conflict situations or subjects that were controversial, relating to public order and crime, protest demonstrations or religion (Van der Wal: 2004).

Newspapers and magazines

Ethnic minorities in the Netherlands usually read foreign newspapers to keep themselves abreast of the news. In the newspaper and magazine market for ethnic minorities in the Netherlands, usually in the language of the minority groups, small newspapers in particular are published that are generally not well marketed and so quickly disappear from the news stands (Bink: 2004). The fact that the newspapers remain small is partly the result of considerable diversity within the minority groups in age, education and social class, which produces small target groups. Nevertheless, a number of positive trends can be observed in the ethnic newspaper market, namely an increase in the range of magazines (glossy or otherwise) for the multicultural society, increasing professionalisation and the range of and increase in the number of advertisements.

Libraries and literature

The library is the cultural institution that allochthons visit the most (Maagdenburg: 2004). Research has also shown that migrants increasingly use libraries (Elsevier: 2005). With both sources, however, these conclusions need some qualification. In the above-mentioned annual memorandum a note is added that no national statistics exist on the reading behaviour of allochthonous young people, but that their reading frequency is probably at the same low level as that of low-skilled young people in general. The magazine Elsevier notes that the migrants who visit libraries more and more frequently do so, not so much to borrow and read a book, but rather to work at a computer (which is usually free of charge for a certain length of time) and to read newspapers and magazines. The greater use of libraries by allochthons is, according to Elsevier partly due to age, as young people are assumed to
read more than older people. The average autochthonous book borrower is 35 years, whereas the average Moroccan or Turkish borrower is 19 years.

Where participation in written literature is concerned, it can be said that writers of allochthonous origin form an integral part of Dutch literature and the range and sales of works by allochthonous writers is developing very well. It has become a normal phenomenon for these writers to appear at virtually all literary festivals (Maagdenburg: 2004).

Internet

The Internet is used to the maximum by allochthonous young people, which reflects the trend in society as a whole. A study by the NPS into viewing and listening behaviour in 2002, entitled Media Use by Ethnic Public Groups, showed that allochthons ‘chat’ more than autochthonous Dutch nationals. Moroccans aged 35 years and older, however, seldom make use of the Internet whereas Internet use among Antilleans and the Surinamese is greater than among Dutch nationals (Bink: 2004). Nearly all Dutch allochthonous target group organisations have a website. Allochthonous sites work because of their accessibility and anonymity as an instrument of emancipation (FORUM website). At the same time, the Internet is used, for example, to listen to radio programmes from the country of origin. Since 2003 the public broadcasting company NOS has run a multicultural Internet site with information about multicultural radio and television programmes on which a cultural agenda and cooking tips are also provided.

Arts

What is the impact on the production, presentation and performance of arts and media?

The sociologist and economist Dr Gowricharn observes in his essay ‘Thuis zijn in de kunst’ (At home with art) (Gowricharn: 2000) that allochthons are largely absent from the Dutch artistic and cultural landscape. The organisation Culture Network, a national expertise centre for cultural education, argues that the circumstance that allochthons ‘consume’ less art than average in Dutch society appears to be less important. It says that the lower participation in the arts by allochthons has a causal link with their average lower level of education. This would apply in particular to Turks and Moroccans, and to a lesser extent also to the Surinamese and Antilleans. Since low-skilled autochthons are also less receptive to art, it can be stated that the disadvantage of allochthons cannot be considered as particularly striking in this light (Cultuurnetwerk, website).

If we consider the term art in a broad sense, and also involve amateur art and local festivities with the professional range of art and museums, a glance at the cultural agendas in the Netherlands will reveal a wide variety of multi- or intercultural festivities and activities. Particularly striking is the wide range of activities in music and theatre. Much is also being done in cultural education at a small-scale, local level. In 1991, for example, it was already being examined how non-Western music styles with their associated instruments could be included in the curriculum at music schools as an extension to the existing Western curriculum (Boekmanstichting: website).

Another example of an attempt to increase the participation of allochthons and to set a highly concrete integration objective in this respect was the ‘knowledge studio' that was organised in May 2002, which involved allochthons in theatre. The conclusion of this activity was that a targeted approach is necessary in order to reach allochthons, and that theatre is a good way of bringing up sensitive issues, and even to use it to make (bureaucratic) procedural matters more understandable for and accessible to allochthons (KCGS, website).

Food

Have ethnic restaurants contributed to changes in food consumption, new products and recipes? What has been the impact of immigration on the development of the catering sector?

In the area of food, the central question is whether ethnic restaurants have made a contribution to changes in food consumption, new products and recipes, and what effect immigration has (had) on the development of the catering sector.

Once again it is observed that no research data is available. However, the effect of migrants on food consumption in Dutch society is clearly evident. Because of the old colonial ties with Indonesia, the
Chinese/Indonesian cuisine was already fairly well known to the average Dutch person. Chinese/Indonesian restaurants can be found in any village that is large enough for such a restaurant to be profitable. The presence of guest workers from Mediterranean countries from the 1960s onwards, and later also the increasing desire for travel among the Dutch from the 1970s onwards, which made them increasingly familiar with the southern European countries, introduced Mediterranean cuisine to the Netherlands. Spaghetti, Macaroni, Paella and Souvlaki also became regular dishes served in Dutch households. In addition, Turkish snack bars became common in the Netherlands and have now developed over the years to become a genuine cultural melting pot where in addition to the traditional Dutch chip, one can also buy pizza and Turkish snacks. During the 1980s and 1990s the range of supermarkets expanded dramatically, offering more and more ready-to-use (spice) packets to which only the fresh ingredients need to be added. These packets are known as ‘world dishes’, Chicken Tandoori, Wraps, etc. During this period the diversity of restaurants also widened considerably to include Thai, African, Indian, etc. Also striking was the rapid increase in the number of Surinamese tokos (mini-markets), small exotic supermarkets and Islamic butchers (hall, “pure”) in Dutch towns and cities. The latest trend is the large number of the late-night shops in the Dutch towns and cities being run by allochthons, who sell not only Dutch or foreign brand products but also Mediterranean delicacies and vegetables. In the 24-hour economy, autochthonous Dutch people are grateful customers of these shops.
Sports

How has immigration influenced the expression (manifestations) of the autochthonous cultures in areas such as sports, as a means of intercultural exchange?

As the fourth category of culture, we will examine how immigration has influenced the expression of autochthonous cultures in sports in the Netherlands, such as in relation to intercultural exchange. Once again, this question is difficult to answer without any research data. More is known about participation: although the Netherlands has many allochthonous elite professional sportsmen and women, research has shown that participation in sports by allochthons is lower than by autochthons. (NOC*NSF, website). There are numerous initiatives in the Netherlands (particularly local, supported by national policy) to involve allochthons in local sports clubs. This is difficult to achieve, though. Here too, the development should be placed in a broader context of people who tend to be less inclined than previously to commit themselves to being actively involved in clubs and associations. If we look at the position of allochthons in particular, it appears that the age, gender, country of origin, duration of residence and socio-economic position of allochthons influence their participation in sports activities (Zwart et al.: 2000).

A surfing session on the Internet produces a good overview of all these initiatives to involve allochthons in sports and exercise. Firstly one can point to the small-scale initiatives to encourage allochthons to exercise more, in a more general context of preventive health and social integration. For example, in October 2004 the project ‘Gespierde taal’ (Muscular language) was started up by Educatieve Televisie. ‘The aim of this programme is to give allochthonous women the opportunity to learn the Dutch language and at the same time to improve their general condition. In addition, they can share experiences with each other so that they can reduce their stress levels.’ (KIEM, website).

Schools and community centres can use the programmes. This appears to the initiators to be effective, since they assert that allochthonous women are often not allowed by their families to attend a sports school.

A concrete example of how a foreign sport has put down roots in the Netherlands is the original Chinese dragon boat race. In Amsterdam, the ‘First Dutch Dragon Boat Club’ has been founded, calling itself a multicultural sports club (multicultureelplein, website)

Fashion

What is the possible impact of immigration on the development of fashion, e.g. by introducing new designs and textiles?

Little research has been carried out in the Netherlands into possible effects of immigration on the development of fashion, such as the introduction of new designs and textiles. We are assuming, however, that there is indeed an impact. In an interview with the owner of an advertising, communication and design agency, Vincent van Dijk, he explains that the trend, for example, in the Netherlands in 2005 is largely inspired by Morocco and Africa in general. Many trends develop, according to Van Dijk, in areas of tension because designers want to show something that will be much talked-about. The Moroccan trend for this year is expressed in all lifestyle areas: clothing (kaftans), interior (Arabic motifs, colours and shapes), jewellery (wooden chains) etc. (marokkonederland2005, website)
4.3 Impact of immigrants on the political arena

In general the key findings concerning the studies found on the impact of immigrants on the political context were:

- There is a reasonably large amount of literature and research into the extent of political participation (both active and passive) of allochthons at the level of local elections.

- Research into the participation and voting behaviour of migrants at a non-local level hardly exists. Only two studies into the political participation of migrants in national parliamentary elections were found. There is also little known about the participation of allochthons in trade unions.

- In general the focus of the research is on the four, still most important, ethnic groups in the Netherlands: the Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese and Antilleans. At a local level this is supplemented by large ethnic groups, such as the Cape Verdeans in Rotterdam. No research has been found on the political participation of relatively new migrant groups (asylum groups).

- No research has been found that answers the question whether the participation of immigrants in political organisations has changed these organisations.

- Since 1985, aliens who have been living legally in the Netherlands have had voting rights for local elections. Only residents of Dutch nationality may vote in national elections.

- As far as the use of passive voting rights is concerned, two developments can be observed: there are more and more allochthonous (local and national) representatives, and the ethnic diversity of these representatives is also increasing. Nevertheless, there is still not a proportional representation of allochthons in the municipal councils or in the Lower House of the Dutch Parliament.

- Parties of and for migrants remain in a minority and are not successful. The presence of allochthons in municipal councils and the Lower House firstly depends on the choices of the traditional, general political parties: they decide whether or not to place allochthons on their list of candidates.

- The turnout of allochthons at municipal elections lags significantly behind that of autochthons.

- Allochthons who vote in national elections would appear, just as allochthons who vote locally, to be more inclined to have left-wing views rather than right-wing, although to a lesser extent.

- If we look at the turnout percentages and the number of members of the municipal councils, we can conclude that the Turks are the most strongly integrated minority group in Dutch local politics.

- The high turnout of Turkish people at elections could possibly be explained by the high level of cohesion of the Turkish community.

Political and administrative participation of allochthons is considered to be an important indicator of integration. Apart from the fact that it is an indicator of the level of integration, participation in political and administrative processes can also be regarded as a factor that encourages the integration
of ethnic minorities. The granting of local voting rights to aliens\(^{25}\) in 1985 has strongly encouraged the political participation of ethnic minorities (Fennema et al.: 2000). The granting of these voting rights was prompted above all by considerations of integration. Once migrants have voting rights, it was reasoned, they will focus on Dutch politics, they will interest themselves in Dutch political parties and the rules of the Dutch political system. In this way they make a new step towards more integration in Dutch society (Jacobs: 1998 and Tillie et al.: 2000). Not everyone was happy at that time with these new rights for non-Dutch people. Some feared that migrants would set up their own political parties based on ethnicity or religion which would lead to segregation. This fear proved unfounded: migrant parties based on ethnicity or religion have proved to be unsuccessful exceptions in the past 18 years (Michon & Tillie: 2003).

Has the participation of immigrants in arenas such as political parties, trade unions and other mainstream political organisations changed such associations and in what ways?

Quite a lot has been published in the Netherlands about the political participation of allochthons at the level of local elections. Only two studies are known on participation in national elections, and only one was found on trade unions and migrants (Roosblad: 2002). No studies could be found in the Netherlands into the effect of the political participation of immigrants on the organisations within which they participate.

**Municipal elections**

A fair amount of literature has been found on the extent of political participation of migrants as far as turnout and voting behaviour at municipal elections and participation in municipal councils is concerned (Fennema et al. (2000), Dominguez et al. (2002), Dekker & Rooduijn (2004)). Michon & Tillie (2003) provide a summary of studies into the political participation of migrants over the years. They report that since 1985 the political participation of migrants has been studied with all municipal elections (1986, 1990, 1994, 1998 and 2002). Initially it concerned largely small-scale studies, as a result of which it was difficult to generalise according to ethnic voters. In addition, not always the same criteria were used to establish ethnicity\(^{26}\), which made mutual comparisons difficult. However, since 1994 the same method has been used in order to study the relationship between ethnicity and political participation. When the respondent and/or the mother and/or the father was not born in the Netherlands, the respondent is put in the group of allochthons. The ethnicity of the respondent is then established according to a (complex) set of rules. These rules have been used in the study by Tillie (1994, 2000) in Amsterdam, Arnhem, The Hague, Enschede, Rotterdam, Tilburg and Utrecht (in 1994 and 1998), van Rhee (2002) in Rotterdam, and Michon & Tillie (2003) in Amsterdam\(^{27}\).

Table 6 gives a summary of the turnout percentages of ethnic minorities at municipal elections in the four big cities (active voting rights).

---

\(^{25}\) This concerns both active and passive voting rights in municipal elections for aliens with a valid residence permit who have been living in the Netherlands for at least five years.

\(^{26}\) Nationality, country of birth and subjectively determined ethnicity were used.

\(^{27}\) Enschede and Tilburg were no longer included in the study in 1998.
Table 6. Turnout percentage at municipal elections, 1994, 1998 and 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Amsterdam</th>
<th>Rotterdam</th>
<th>The Hague</th>
<th>Utrecht</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroccans</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinamese/Antilleans</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total turnout for municipal election</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Dominguez Martinez et al. (2002), Tillie (2000), IMES/O&S Amsterdam/IPP/ Municipality of Amsterdam, COS Rotterdam/ processed by ISEO/Erasmus University of Rotterdam

A striking feature is the upward trend in turnout of ethnic minorities in Rotterdam. This could be to do with the active campaign that is being pursued there to get minorities to the polling stations. Nevertheless, in Rotterdam too the turnout among ethnic minorities is generally lower than the city average, and therefore lower than turnout among autochthons.

Dekker & Rooduijn (2004) too, who only studied the city of Utrecht, conclude that the political participation (both active and passive) of ethnic minorities in Utrecht lags considerably behind that of autochthonous Dutch persons. Other conclusions were:

- The turnout of allochthons in the Utrecht municipal elections is lower than among autochthons.
- Compared to the percentage they make up of the local population, there are few migrants in the municipal council. For example, only 11% of the Utrecht municipal council consists of migrants, while the total number of allochthons in Utrecht is 23%.
- The representation of ethnic minorities in political parties is very low (Dekker & Rooduijn: 2004).

Michon & Tillie (2003) state that a low turnout among ethnic minorities also has consequences for the legitimacy of government. This particularly plays a role in the large cities where a large proportion of the population is allochthonous. In Amsterdam and Rotterdam, at present almost half of the population is allochthonous. The legitimacy of the elected local government depends on turnout, but also on the equal participation of various groups. A low turnout among migrants means that the political wishes of allochthons are underrepresented in the local executive and the city council.

As an explanation for the relatively low turnout among allochthons, Dominguez Martinez et al. (2002) note in the first place that turnout is generally lower among the low-skilled and young people than among the highly skilled and older people. The ethnic minorities in the Netherlands are on average lower-skilled and younger than the autochthonous population. It is also argued that both factors cannot entirely explain the picture outlined in table x. After all, the turnout of Turks is considerably higher than that of Moroccans, whereas both groups are relatively comparable as far as age and educational level are concerned. Tillie (2000) explains the high turnout among Turks based on the relationship between the political participation and the level of civil community or closeness/cohesion of the community. The hypothesis is that the more self-organisations there are within a community and the more these organisations are linked horizontally with each other, the more the individuals within this community will be interested in (local) politics. In addition, political trust will be greater and because of this high level of civic culture the turnout at elections will be higher. Turks score the highest in cohesion of the community. They also have the highest number of grass roots organisations. “In the Netherlands there are 1,125 of these organisations within the Turkish community, 720 for Moroccans and 881 for the Surinamese.” (Dominguez Martinez et al.: 2002). What’s more, Turks not only have many organisations, but their organisations have more structural contacts with each other. The idea is

28 Measured by composite variables of such aspects as level of organisation and the extent to which people read their own newspapers.
that this high level of community cohesion leads to a greater political participation among the Turks. Moroccans seem to be more linked to their family than to their ethnic roots and do not feel particularly connected to the Moroccan State (Vermeulen & Penninx: 1994).

As far as passive political participation is concerned, it can be noted that the number of municipal council members from ethnic minorities in 1998 was more than double that of 1994. “In 2002 there has once again been a substantial rise and the number of councillors has reached 204, which is equivalent to 2.4% of the total number of councillors in the Netherlands (9,080). If we compare this percentage with the percentage of the group of non-Western allochthons in the Netherlands, namely 9.3% in 2001, we can say that the ethnic composition of the municipal councils does not yet reflect the Dutch population.” (Dominguez Martinez et al.: 2002).

Fennema et al. (2000) mention as the causes of the continuing under-representation of ethnic minorities in the municipal councils the fact that many allochthons are newcomers to local politics and therefore are unfamiliar with the system; ethnic minorities will more often lack the qualifications (because they are usually lower-skilled) that the parties feel are necessary to fulfil the role of councillor properly, and the last point that is mentioned is that allochthons and autochthons usually differ in their political background and political culture and that this forms an obstacle for aspiring allochthonous politicians.

Fennema et al. (2000) also report that earlier research has shown that the representation of ethnic minorities in municipal councils is not the same throughout the Netherlands. In the big cities minorities are much better represented than in rural areas. Until 2002 Amsterdam always topped the list with the number of allochthonous councillors, but since the 2002 elections there have been more allochthonous councillors in Rotterdam than in Amsterdam. In both cities the number of allochthonous councillors in 2003 was (roughly) 20% of the total number of councillors. Since roughly one-half of the population in these cities is allochthonous, here too there is not genuine proportional representation.

In their research into the political participation of ethnic minorities in four cities, Berger et al. (2001) establish that there has been a shift as far as the ethnic background of the allochthonous population is concerned. Originally it was mostly the Surinamese who were on the council, but in the period between 1998 and 2002 a greater ethnic diversity developed. This has also been the case since the 2002 elections: the municipal councils of the two largest Dutch cities have Surinamese, Turkish, Moroccan, Cape Verdean and Ghanaian councillors. A large majority of the allochthons who are members of the municipal councils represent the national, traditional, general political parties. Parties of and for allochthons are marginal. The presence of allochthons in municipal councils therefore depends first and foremost on the choices of the political parties: they decide whether or not to place allochthons on their list of electoral candidates (Michon & Tillie: 2003).

Elections for the Lower House of the Dutch parliament

There is hardly any research into the turnout and voting behaviour of migrants at a level other than the local level. As far as is known, only two studies have been carried out into the political participation of migrants in national parliamentary elections: NIPO (2003) and Van Rhee (2002). In view of the actual turnout of the entire electorate on that day (79%) and the turnout measured at a local level among allochthonous voters, the result of the post-election survey conducted by NIPO after the elections for the Lower House on 22 January 2003 (a turnout percentage of 94%) should be interpreted with some caution. Van Rhee (2002) studied the turnout of allochthonous voters in Rotterdam for the Lower House elections of 2002 and arrived at lower figures: Turks 59%; Moroccans 55%; Surinamese 52% and Antilleans 35%.

Since only Dutch nationals are entitled to vote at a national level, the group of allochthonous voters in this case is limited to Dutch nationals with an allochthonous origin (e.g. naturalised Dutch persons and Surinamese born before 1975). At a national level, some 725,000 allochthons are entitled to vote at elections for the Lower House (i.e. 6% of the entire electorate) (Michon & Tillie: 2003). Allochthons
who vote on a national level would appear, just as locally-voting allochthons, to lean more to the political left than the right, although to a lesser extent (Michon & Tillie: 2003).

The first allochthonous member of parliament was John Lilipaly, of Moluccan origin, who entered parliament in 1986 for the PvdA (Dutch Labour Party). He remained the only allochthonous member of parliament until 1994. After the 1994 elections there were 7 members of parliament of allochthonous origin – Dutch persons with a Moroccan, Surinamese and Moluccan background. Recent years have seen a progressive increase in the number of allochthonous members of parliament, an increase in ethnic diversity and more and more parties with allochthonous members of parliament. In 2003 there were 14 members of allochthonous origin in the Lower House, which is 9% of the total number of members of parliament. They are members of six different parties and come from seven different countries. For the national elections too, the presence of allochthons in the Lower House depends primarily on the choices that these parties make in this area. It is also possible at a national level to enter parliament on the basis of preferential votes. It is not the voters, but the parties that determine how many and which allochthons gain a seat in parliament. Furthermore, allochthons have so far depended on the traditional parties in order to enter parliament. Parties of and for migrants remain an exception and perform poorly.

‘Ethnic voting’, i.e. voting for a candidate from a person’s own ethnic group, would appear to be particularly prevalent among the Turks. Allochthons appear in general to use the opportunity more frequently than autochthons to cast a preferential vote (Michon & Tillie: 2003).

Michon & Tillie (2003) conclude that as far as the use of passive voting rights is concerned, two developments can be distinguished: there are an increasing number of (local and national) allochthonous representatives, and the ethnic diversity of these representatives is also increasing. This is largely due to the choices that the largest, traditional political parties make concerning the composition of their candidate lists. In addition, initiatives of migrants to set up their own parties have so far not been very successful. Local differences also show that local factors above all determine the turnout of allochthons at municipal elections. “In view of the relatively high turnout for the Lower House elections, it would seem that the political climate in the Netherlands since 11 September 2001 has not deterred the electoral mobilisation of migrants at a national level. Many allochthons have voted nationally, despite the hardening political climate where the multicultural society is no longer seen as a benefit, but as a burden and sometimes even an evil.” (Michon & Tillie: 2003).

Dominguez et al. (2002) conclude that ethnic minorities are better represented at an administrative level than before. The percentage of ethnic minorities in the civil service was 7.5% in the year 2000, and for the four biggest Dutch cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht) this percentage of ethnic minorities within the population of the municipality has risen. However, this is not expressed in an increased turnout for municipal elections, in fact turnout appears to be falling. If we take the turnout percentages and the number of municipal councillors, we can conclude that the Turks are the most strongly integrated minority group in Dutch local politics.

---

29 In 2001 there were 22% ethnic minorities working at the municipality of Amsterdam and 18% at the municipality of The Hague.
5 Factors impacting on immigrants: provision of support and restrictions

5.1 Social position of immigrants

What is the social position of immigrants and how does this affect the impact of immigrants on the Dutch society?

Since 1983 there has been a coordinated minorities policy in the Netherlands. This coordination is carried out by the Minorities Integration Policy Department (Directie Minderhedenbeleid DCIM) of the Ministry of Justice. In 1983, the government’s minority policy was structured for the first time in the Minorities Memorandum (minderhedennota). The objectives were twofold: focusing on improving the position of minorities in the Netherlands, and the construction of a multicultural, tolerant society (Vermeulen & Penninx: 1994). In the 1990s the collective approach gave way to a more individually-oriented integration policy. This policy focused at that time on newcomers and young people. For the newcomers, a policy of integration was introduced. With young people there was greater attention given to weak school performance and the progression from school into work.

In January 2004 the conclusions of the Parliamentary Inquiry Committee on Integration Policy -named the Blok Committee after its chairman Stef Blok- were published. The central questions of the study into Dutch integration policy concerned the integration policy pursued by the Netherlands over the past 30 years, and whether the authorities have played an encouraging role. The following conclusions were drawn:

- In the 1970s, minorities policy was based on the assumption that the workers’ stay would be temporary.
- In the 1970s and 1980s, the task of encouraging immigrants to understand and appreciate Dutch society was left entirely to private initiative.
- In the 1990s, the Netherlands saw a shift from an ethnic-minority policy towards an integration policy. Whereas the ethnic-minority policy was aimed at groups of people, the new integration policy focused on individuals. There was a shift from a right to care to an obligation to assume responsibility for oneself.
- By 1996 all municipalities had to organise themselves in such a way that each newcomer could effectively participate in an integration programme.
- In 2002 newcomers were offered mandatory integration courses.
- In the 1970s, minorities policy fell under the responsibility of the minister of Culture, Leisure and Social Work, whereas from the 1980s onwards, it became part of the remit of the Minister of the Interior. In practice, cooperation between the various ministries was inadequate.
- Progress has been achieved in the various fields: housing, employment, education and emancipation. With the exception of the improved legal position of immigrants, it is hard to demonstrate a causal connection between the results obtained and the integration policy.
- The committee concludes that the integration of a large number of immigrants has been wholly or partially successful, which is a considerable achievement on the part of the immigrants in question.

The Blok Committee therefore concludes that the integration of many allochthons has been fully or partially successful. The Commission interprets integration as being ‘when there is an equal legal position, equal participation in socio-economic life, and when customary values, standards and behavioural patterns are respected. Integration must come from both sides; the newcomer must be willing to integrate, and society must provide the opportunities to do so.’

The present Dutch government’s assessment of integration that has been achieved for many allochthons is less positive than that of the Blok Committee. In its own analysis of the current position of allochthons, the government places the accent on the social, cultural and economic gap that still...
remains. This gap according to the government is large, in fact too large. The following list of key data, which only reports deficits, was presented by the government in determining the main features of its integration policy:

- Around the year 2000, almost 500,000 first-generation allochthons\(^{30}\) did not have a sufficient command of Dutch to be able to participate successfully in the various social markets\(^{31}\).
- At present more than 180,000 women of Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese and Antillean origin\(^{32}\) are socially in a deprived position\(^{33}\).
- Turkish and Moroccan pupils who were born in the Netherlands still lag behind at the end of primary school by about two years as far as language is concerned\(^{34}\).
- The educational level of more than two-thirds of the Turks and Moroccans has not reached the level of a starting qualification\(^{35}\).
- Young people from ethnic minorities are far better educated than older people, but among them too the proportion without a starting qualification is some 20% higher than among autochthonous young people\(^{36}\).
- The net labour participation of minorities is 15% percentage points lower than the total level of participation (65%). The participation of 15-24 year-olds among the minority population is 36 percentage points lower than the total\(^{37}\).
- The proportion of those claiming benefit is twice as high among minorities as among the autochthonous population\(^{38}\).
- The majority of second-generation Turks and Moroccans choose a partner from the country of origin\(^{39}\).
- Many marriages between Turks or Moroccans on the one hand, and autochthons on the other hand, end in divorce\(^{40}\).
- Information on social contacts points to limited social integration. Among Turks and Moroccans, most contacts are within their own group\(^{41}\).
- Allochthonous young people are over-represented among suspects of crime\(^{42}\).
- The vast majority of minority groups live concentrated together in particular neighbourhoods, which also means that they have fewer social contacts with autochthons. The living conditions in these neighbourhoods are generally relatively unfavourable\(^{43}\).


\(^{30}\) This is approximately 30% of the total number of first generation allochthons (western and non-western) living in the Netherlands.
\(^{32}\) This is approximately 30% of the total number of women of these origins.
\(^{38}\) WRR, *Normen, waarden en de last van het gedrag* (Standards, values and the burden of behaviour). The Hague (WRR) 2003.
\(^{40}\) Justitie Issuemonitor, meting juni-juli 2003 (Justicial Issue Monitor, measurement June-July 2003), internal publication of the Ministry of Justice.
\(^{41}\) R.M. Weijers et al., *De kleur van beleid* (The colour of policy). Rotterdam (ISEO) 2002.
\(^{43}\) Lower House, 2004-2005, 29 203, no. 3.
Even so, the government does not view the glass as half-empty: ‘Having said this, the government expresses its appreciation of the large number of second-generation allochthons who make intensive use of the opportunities for mobility that our education provides. The development of participation of students from minorities in the highest form of education is highly promising. The presence of an intellectual vanguard among ethnic minorities is extremely significant for people's perception. Successful allochthons set an example for young people who are still working their way through the long education process. The government is also aware of the differences that are beginning to emerge within the allochthonous population. For example, it can be concluded that the integration of the Surinamese is further advanced socially, economically and culturally than that of the Turks and Moroccans. Then there are differences within the groups themselves in relation to gender, where it is not unusual for the integration potential of women to be greater than that of men’. 44

It can be concluded that a considerable amount of research has been carried out into (aspects of) the social position of allochthons in the Netherlands (see also Chapter 4). Opinions differ on the assessment of the social position of allochthons, who often unmistakably lag behind autochthons. The question about the impact of the social position of allochthons on Dutch society is more difficult to answer, though. The government does state, however, that the integration of ethnic minorities in Dutch society has developed to become a central social problem in the past few years. The issue of minorities has already been cited by many as the fundamental social issue of the twenty-first century, comparable with the problems that the changeover from rural dwellers to urban workers caused at the beginning of the 20th century.

One of the first people to start a discussion on integration and the multicultural community in the Netherlands was a journalist, Paul Scheffer, who wrote in a major national newspaper on the situation in the country during the late 1990s.45 For many years it had not been politically correct to have an in-depth discussion of these problems and causes. After that Pim Fortuyn started a populist dialogue in society and in politics. His rise and eventually his death (murder) in 2002 can be related for a large part to the immigrants and their integration in the Netherlands and the public discussion he started. These discussions in public have led to a strong discussion in the political arena as well, causing the political parties in government to reconsider their integration and immigration policies.

The government points out that the attacks of 11 September 2001 (Twin Towers) and 11 March 2004 (Madrid) have contributed to a shift in opinions concerning minorities. These events have raised questions about the loyalty of parts of the minority population to core values of Dutch society. In the meantime, these violent acts have seen a continuation with the murder of Theo van Gogh as well as arson attacks on churches, mosques and Islamic schools, where it has become clear that the core values of Dutch society are less embedded in autochthonous circles than had been assumed (Smeets et al.: 2005). Whatever the case may be, the climate in the Netherlands with regard to allochthons would seem to have hardened.

In the government’s response to the Blok Committee, it points to the outline letter on the New-Style Integration Policy (Integratiebeleid Nieuwe Stijl)46 in which it distances itself from ‘multiculturalism as the normative ideal, the noncommittal nature of the past and a government that takes minorities by the hand as if they were a category that needs special care’. New concepts the government is introducing are: shared citizenship, individual responsibility, concrete and controllable objectives, increasing opportunities and, where necessary, obligations. The government speaks of a turnaround in integration policy, the aim of which is to remove the dividing line between minorities and autochthons that have arisen or risk arising; a dividing line that would seem to be drawn more clearly along cultural and religious lines.

Approximately 900,000 immigrants47 in the Netherlands are Muslims. The structure of their community, with its values and customs, is very different from the Dutch view on religion and the

44 Government response to Bruggen bouwen (Building bridges).
45 www.nrc.nl; Paul Scheffer & co., The multicultural drama, archive
47 This is approximately 30% of the total number of allochthons and approximately 50% of the non-western allochthons.
separation of church and state. The countries of origin also have their influence on the immigrant community. The Turkish and Moroccan governments are actively maintaining and improving connections with their nationals in other countries. Many Moroccan and Turkish immigrants have close connections with their country of origin (satellite television). In cities such as Amsterdam and Rotterdam, religious leaders from conservative Muslim countries spread messages through mosques, which cannot and will not be accepted by the Dutch policy-makers (regarding the position of women, homosexuality). The interference policy, whether or not deliberate, of these countries on immigrants could have a negative impact on integration because of their conservative views on society. Even specific legislation in countries of origin can reach immigrants (divorce, military service). In order to improve the participation of Muslims in society, a broader Islamic framework should be realised. The government is actually considering its own training facilities for religious leaders (imams). There is a special contact organisation, which brings together speakers of the Muslim community with government officials. Part of the Muslim community is thought to be more radical in its views. Whether or not this is true, the native Dutch population tend to believe these negative views. Good communication between both groups is necessary to prevent tension rising between Muslim immigrants and the native population.

The (increasing) cultural differences and - until recently - growing number of immigrants affect Dutch society as a whole. For a number of reasons, more than half of the native Dutch population is not satisfied with this situation, and almost half of the immigrant population in fact holds the same views concerning new immigrants. However, actual discrimination appears to be rare. Immigration and integration has its impact on the Dutch state institutions and the structure of the state constitution. The (non-)governmental organisations play an important role in promoting integration and the acceptance of immigrants in Dutch society.

According to the Blok Committee, the integration policy must be based on a realistic acknowledgement of the continuous character of international migration flows. The government believes that by bringing together aliens policy and integration policy in a single ministerial portfolio, the close relationship between immigration and integration policy will be underlined. In the government’s view, this provides the opportunity to manage and direct immigration in both a quantitative and qualitative sense.

5.2 Access to labour and housing market

How is access to the labour and housing market regulated?

Labour market
Subjects of EU/EEA countries have free access to the Dutch labour market. For the eight countries of Central and Eastern Europe that joined the EU on 1 May 2004, a transitional scheme will apply for the time being. Residents of countries outside this area (third-country residents) do not have free access to the Netherlands and come under the Aliens Act 2000 and the Foreign Nationals (Employment) Act (Wav). For aliens from outside the EU/EEA, it is possible on the basis of the Wav to work

48 Temporary Committee for the study of integration policy, report of the study, introduction by the chairman at the presentation of the final report, The Hague, 19 January 2004
51 European Union and the European Economic Area (EEA): the EU member states (except Central and Eastern European states) plus Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein.
(temporarily) in the Netherlands. For migrant workers, the Netherlands is pursuing a selective, demand-led labour migration policy through the Wav, based on economic motives. Employees from third countries are only eligible for admission if there is a domestic employer who wants to take him on and there is an insufficient labour supply within the EU/EEA to meet this need. In practice this means that labour migration in principle moves in line with developments on the labour market. When there are labour market shortages more work permits are granted, and when there are labour market surpluses fewer are issued. Only workers are admitted with qualities that cannot be found within the EU/EEA. As a result, bottlenecks in the labour market can be solved and there is no displacement. The majority of temporary work permits are for temporary seasonal work. At present we see that (with the exception of seasonal workers) the bottlenecks in the labour market are in the higher market segments.\textsuperscript{52}

In his letter to the Lower House, the State Secretary of Social Affairs and Employment stated the following: ‘Young, highly-qualified migrant workers with good earning capacity generate a positive balance for the government in the form of taxes and contributions for social premiums. Highly-qualified persons are less likely than low-skilled workers to become inactive for prolonged periods. In combination with the development towards the knowledge economy and the large, unused labour potential, the importance of selective labour migration focusing on bringing in highly-skilled labour above all is clearly evident. For the low-skilled the situation is slightly different. They are admitted primarily on the basis of bottlenecks in the labour market. For low-skilled migrant workers, the effect on the collective sector is uncertain. Past experience has shown that a more than average number of (usually low-skilled) migrants ended up claiming occupational disability benefit (WAO) and unemployment benefit (WW), later coming to rely on social assistance. This is therefore a risk group for social security. Since the low-skilled migrant workers are often followed by low-skilled ‘following’ immigrants (family formers, etc.), the risk group becomes larger as a result.’ The letter also formulates the following starting points for the Dutch labour migration policy:
1. Labour migration policy must be designed in such a way that results in maximum economic profit for the Dutch economy.
2. Labour migration policy must be a supplement to general labour market policy.
3. Labour migration policy must preferably be complementary to the existing labour supply.

A new scheme has been in force since 1 October 2004 to allow knowledge migrants to be admitted to the Netherlands through a simple and faster procedure without a work permit. This scheme means that ‘knowledge migrants’ – defined within this framework as persons who earn more than 45,000 euro per annum, and persons younger than 30 years 32,600 euro per annum - are exempt from applying separately to the Centre for Work and Income (CWI) for a work permit. Now they only need to apply for a residence permit from the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND), which grants this if the applicant has an employment contract containing an agreed income above the aforementioned threshold. This makes it easier for Dutch employers to attract foreign knowledge workers, and it is made more attractive for highly-skilled migrant workers to come to the Netherlands. The government has said it will formulate a new policy in relation to the admission of self-employed persons, focusing in particular on the self-employed who make a contribution to the knowledge economy.

Asylum migrants may only undertake limited work as long as they have no residence status. Before 1998, asylum migrants were not permitted to work at all until their status had been established. Partly because of the long duration of asylum procedures, it is interesting to note than migrants entering the Netherlands for family reunification and (above all) for family formation more readily find a place on the Dutch labour market than asylum migrants (Sprangers et al.: 2004).

\textsuperscript{52} Lower House, 2004-2005, 29 861.
Access to housing market

Third-country nationals have equal access with Dutch nationals to housing in the Netherlands with respect to legislation. These legal rights are obtained immediately upon receiving a residence permit and count equally for migrants in general as for recognised refugees.

As far as the right to rent subsidies is concerned, besides the amount of income, assets, rent and registration in the Municipal Personal Records Database it is also relevant whether the tenant is an alien or not within the meaning of the Aliens Act 2000. After all, on the grounds of the Aliens Act, the entitlement of aliens to provisions, benefit payments, exemptions and permits is linked to legal residence in the Netherlands.

5.3 Access to language education

| Does the Netherlands offer any possibilities for learning the language spoken in the regions of settlement? |

Since the late 1990s, integration policy has become subject to a thorough revision. Attention has shifted from rights to duties. In 1998 the Civic Integration (Newcomers) Act (‘Wet Inburgering Nieuwkomers WIN’) came into force. This law focuses on new immigrants in the Netherlands. Learning the Dutch language has been given a high priority and has become compulsory as part of the civic integration (inburgering) programme for new immigrants. The successful completion of such a programme will be required for those who want to obtain a permanent residence permit (Roodenburg et al.: 2004). Within the context of the WIN, the Dutch government provides language courses. Soon, however, the responsibility for integration will be placed with the alien himself.

As of April 2001, the Netherlands Nationality Act has been amended significantly. The conditions for the acquisition of Dutch nationality have been tightened. A foreigner has the right to apply for Dutch nationality, if he or she has been living legally in the country for a specific period of time and has achieved a sufficient level of integration in Dutch society. In order to prove the sufficient level the applicant has to undergo a ‘naturalisation test’, which includes an integration exam. Knowledge of the Dutch language as well as social orientation is an important part of this integration exam. The alien himself is responsible for achieving an adequate level of integration.

Another feature of the new integration scheme is integration that begins in the country of origin, which means in practice the application of pre-departure entry conditions. The conditions concern persons who wish to enter the Netherlands on a voluntary basis and for a permanent purpose. This excludes asylum seekers and migrant workers and will in practice be restricted to persons applying for family reunification or formation. Moreover, only persons subject to a visa requirement may be subject to this condition. The draft Act is currently under discussion in Parliament and is expected to come into force in mid-2005. The language requirements will be significantly lower than for the integration examination in the Netherlands. The Dutch embassies will be mobilised for implementation of this new Act. Here too, the alien himself is responsible for his integration in the Netherlands and the Dutch government provides no language education.

It can be concluded that the Netherlands is placing more demands on the alien regarding integration, i.e. knowledge of the Dutch language and culture. The level of integration is measured at various moments and linked to admission, the acquisition of a permanent residence permit and obtaining Dutch nationality. The new integration policy increasingly places the responsibility for integration on

---

the alien himself. Within that context the responsibility for acquiring a certain level of Dutch language lays with the migrant, as well as do the costs for eventual Dutch language courses.

5.4 Access to health, education and welfare services

Do immigrants have access to health, education/training and to welfare services?

Migrants have equal access with Dutch nationals, with respect to legislation, to healthcare, education and social security assistance. They obtain these legal rights immediately upon receiving a residence permit. An alien may be entitled to social security and provisions provided he is living legally in the Netherlands. In order to reside legally in the Netherlands, an alien must possess either a residence permit or an EU right of residence. The principal rule for social security is that if the alien was insured – and has complied with the other statutory conditions too – he is entitled to claim benefit. The principal rule for provisions paid from the public purse is that the alien must be residing in the Netherlands legally. Receiving a particular benefit may lead to the withdrawal of the right of residence or not extending this right. This means that in principle the right to benefit is cancelled at the same time. Working aliens who reside legally in the Netherlands are only insured for employee or national insurance as long as they are working, as acknowledged in accordance with the regulations of the Foreign Nationals (Employment) Act (Wav).

The Work and Social Assistance Act provides a minimum income for all persons residing legally in the Netherlands with inadequate financial resources to meet their essential living costs. People are required to do everything they possibly can to support themselves. The claimant is obliged to take generally acceptable work. The same applies to the unemployed person’s partner. Only if it proves impossible to find work may a person apply for financial support from the government.

5.5 Political participation

To what extent is political participation possible?

Only Dutch nationals are entitled to vote in national elections. Since 1985 local voting rights have been granted to aliens who have lived for five years legally in the Netherlands. This has strongly encouraged the political participation of ethnic minorities (Fennema et al.: 2000). Granting these voting rights was promoted largely by considerations of integration.

55 This principle is laid down in Article 10 of the Aliens Act 2000; the alien who is not living legally in the country cannot claim any facilities, provisions and benefits through a decision of an administrative body.
6  Bibliography

Reports

Advies Commissie Vreemdelingen Zaken: ACVZ (Advisory Committee on Alien Affairs) (2004), Voorbij de horizon van Amsterdam, Een advies over het Europese beleid inzake asiel, arbeids- en gezinsmigratie na 1 mei 2004 ten behoeve van het Nederlandse voorzitterschap (Beyond the horizon of Amsterdam, recommendations for European policy on asylum, labour and family migration after 1 May 2004 for the Dutch Presidency), The Hague.


Berkhout, A. (2003a), Kosten en Baten van de Remigratiewet (Costs and Benefits of the Remigration Act) Regioplan Beleidsonderzoek, Publication no. 1081, commissioned by the Netherlands Migration Institute (NMI), Amsterdam.

Berkhout, A. (2003b), Vervolgonderzoek Kosten en Baten van de Remigratiewet (Follow-up Study into the Costs and Benefits of the Remigration Act), Regioplan Beleidsonderzoek, Publication no. 1131, commissioned by the Netherlands Migration Institute (NMI), Amsterdam.


Brink, M., Tromp, E. & Odé, A.W.M. (2003), De participatie en integratieactiviteiten van stedelijke allochtone zelforganisaties in Amsterdam (The participation and integration activities of urban allochthonous grass roots organisations in Amsterdam), Regioplan Beleidsonderzoek, Amsterdam.


Hartog, Joop & Zorlu, Aslan (2004), Economische effecten van immigratie. Ontwikkeling van een databestand en eerste analyses (Economic effects of immigration. Development of a database and initial analyses), Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies (AIAS), University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam.


Lakeman, P. (1999), Binnen zonder kloppen; Nederlandse immigratiepolitiek en de economische gevolgen (Entering without knocking; Dutch immigration policy and its economic consequences), Meulenhof, Amsterdam.


Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (2002), *Hoe tolerant zijn we eigenlijk?* (How tolerant are we really?) Urban discussions about the multicultural society, The Hague.


Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute: NIDI (2002), *De demografische geschiedenis van de Indische Nederlanders* (The demographic history of East Indian Dutch nationals), The Hague.


Temporary Committee for the study of integration policy, report of the study, introduction by the chairman at the presentation of the final report, 19 January 2004. The Hague.


Toor, L. van & Vliet, R. van der (2003), *Wet SAMEN: de meeste grote bedrijven hebben weinig allochtone werknemers* (Employment of Minorities (Promotion) Act: most large companies have few allochthonous employees). Statistics Netherlands (CBS), Voorburg/Heerlen.


**Magazines and journals**


Magazine ‘Elsevier’, no. 7, 24 February 2005, Reed Business Information Publication: article: ‘Bibliotheek is populair onder allochtonen’ (The library is popular among allochthons), no information on the author.

Specific Internet webpages
Cultuurnetwerk: http://www.cultuurnetwerk.nl/belid/kunstcultuur.htm accessed on 21 February 2005
KCGS (Knowledge Centre for Large Cities) http://www.kenniscentrumgrotesteden.nl/kcgs/, accessed on 21 February 2005
KIEM (Knowledge Network for Integration Policy and Ethnic Minorities) http://www.integratie.net/kcgs accessed on 8 February 2005
multicultureelplein.nl (guide to the multicultural society): http://www.multicultureelplein.nl/mcplein/ accessed on 22 February 2005

Internet webpages used in general
www.acvz.com
www.cbs.nl
www.cpb.nl
www.ind.nl
www.justitie.nl
www.libris.nl
www.nidi.nl
www.regioplan.nl
www.wrr.nl
www.integratie.net
www.eur.nl/risbo
www2.fmg.uva.nl/imes