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SUGGESTIONS FROM THE MIGRATION POLICY CENTRE
FOR A POST-STOCKHOLM AGENDA ON MOBILITY AND MIGRATION

Contribution to the DG Home Affairs Public Consultation on
'Debate on the future of Home Affairs policies: An open and safe Europe – what next?'

The Migration Policy Centre (MPC) at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Florence, conducts advanced research on global migration to serve migration governance needs at European level, from developing, implementing and monitoring migration-related policies to assessing their impact on the wider economy and society.

The MPC carries out field as well as archival research, both of which are scientifically robust and policy-relevant, not only at European level, but also globally, targeting policy-makers as well as politicians. This research provides tools for addressing migration challenges, by: 1) producing policy-oriented research on aspects of migration, asylum and mobility in Europe and in countries located along migration routes to Europe, that are regarded as priorities; 2) bridging research with action by providing policy-makers and other stakeholders with results required by evidence-based policymaking, as well as necessary methodologies that address migration governance needs; 3) pooling scholars, experts, policy makers, and influential thinkers in order to identify problems, research their causes and consequences, and devise policy solutions. Our research includes a core programme and several projects, most of them co-financed by the European Union.

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Introduction

In 2013, the stock of international migrants was estimated at 232 million, representing 3.2% of the world population. In the 2000s migrant stocks grew by 1.2% annually, which was exactly the rate of world population growth. In fact, international migration has remained stable since 2000 in proportion to the population. Annual flows of international migrants are not precisely known but they are estimated to stand somewhere between ten and fifteen million. By contrast, international mobility has been continuously booming over the last decades and it is believed that it will reach more than one billion annually, i.e. 100 times larger than migration. Put in other terms **99% of those who cross an international border will return soon after to their point of departure**. Many of these persons cross borders for work or to visit relatives abroad, which means that labour and family mobility are much more common than the migration of workers and their family dependents.

The last five years have been marked by an acute economic downturn. In the European Union (EU), unemployment has gone up and immigration has fallen. Migrants are particularly vulnerable with an unemployment rate of 21.2%, as compared to 9.6% among EU natives. The risk of poverty and social exclusion is painfully high as well: 46.7% (end of 2012 figures) among migrant populations. Intra-EU mobility is growing, and migrants from outside Europe are often seen as competitors to EU citizens. Protectionism, and, in places, xenophobia are on the rise. Tomorrow, however, will not resemble today. The EU is not facing a durable surplus of manpower.

The downturn will pass and built-in demographic imbalances will come bobbing to the surface. **Once the crisis is over there will be two and only two options. Either European states close their doors on migrants and accept the ineluctable corollary: a shrinking Europe in a growing world; or they open themselves to immigration and citizenship for immigrants and let Europe grow.**

Choosing the second option, i.e. opening, the EU to further immigration in the current context of crisis entails critical challenges. To address these challenges a new programme in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice is required for the period 2014-19. It must be noted, however, that the mixed results of the Stockholm programme have led some EU institutions and many external observers to think that a new programme is not necessary.

I. Legal migration, economic crisis and demography

Most European states and the aggregate EU must prepare for a long-term decline in population numbers and an upward shift in age distribution. These trends will challenge the EU and call for strong and creative policies in four respects.

- *The total population of the EU* will decrease or stabilize depending upon migration scenarios, while world population will continue to steadily increase so that **the relative demographic weight of the EU will dwindle, challenging its role in world affairs.**
- *The EU's workforce* will decline in absolute numbers, challenging the EU's **production and wealth.** If no immigration occurs between 2010 and 2030, the EU27

will lose 33 million persons at working age (-11%) compared with a gain of 1,350 million (+34%) at world level.

- **The EU's welfare systems and the generational contract will become unsustainable** due to old-age dependency ratio (65+/20-65) jumping from 28% in 2010 to 44% in 2030 in the no-migration scenario.
- **A process of ageing of skills will result in a marked shift from young to old actives**, i.e. a continuous elevation of time elapsed since the termination of formal education. From 2010 to 2030 with no migration, population aged 20-30 will decrease by 25% and population aged 60-70 will increase by 29%. Moreover, the ageing of skills will be amplified by a postponement in the legal age at retirement, as a possible measure in response to rising old-age dependency.

To address the consequences of these population trends, the EU has recourse to a range of strategies:

- *Pursuing EU enlargement* by including new countries in the Union would increase the weight of the EU in world population terms, but it will hardly mitigate distortions in its age pyramid, even if new member states have younger populations (e.g. Turkey).
- *Adopting pro-natalist policies*, raising the retirement age, increasing economic participation among women and immigrants of former migration waves, and elevating labour productivity would partly address the consequences of ageing.
- **Redesigning pro-immigration policies would be a complementary response.** Immigration – either temporary or permanent, depending upon whether the objective is to replace missing workers or whether it is to increase citizenry – would affect both the size and the structure (by age, but also by skills) of the population.

Migration can be permanent or temporary.

- Permanent migration adds to manpower, because migrants are active at the time they migrate, and to demographic reproduction, because they found a family in or bring a family to the host country. But the population that permanent migration adds is subject to ageing. There is a widely shared view that permanent migration can delay, but not sustainably curb, the rise of old-age dependency.
- Temporary migration, by contrast, brings to the host country workers who will return to their country of origin before or at retirement. It adds to manpower with no (or little) impact on demographic reproduction. It increases the size of the population at working age but not (or only by a small margin) at young and old ages. Circular migration is often viewed as a solution for sectorial labour shortages, while avoiding the cultural and social problems arising from permanent migration. It presents a number of limitations, in particular: (i) built-in turnover that may challenge economic sustainability; and (ii) society segmentation as it brings workers with limited membership into society, a fact that may endanger social cohesion.

Immigration from third countries has slackened and so, therefore, also migrants' impact on development in the global South (see the contribution on Migration and Development below).

II. European preference

The principle of 'European preference' requires that before recruiting a third-country national from outside the European Union, the Member States must check to establish whether a European Citizen or a third-country-national already belonging to the labour market of one Member State is not available inside the EU to fill the vacant position. This principle, which is at the core of most labour migration policies around the world, is mainly implemented in the European Union by a European network called EURES (European Employment Services). Through EURES member States exchange vacancies that could be filled by EU citizens from another Member State.

The insufficient articulation between EURES managed by policy makers in the framework of Employment policies and the several sets of immigration legislation managed by policy makers in the field of Justice and Home Affairs could be improved. There is the need for a study in order to see how labour market tests that continue to be run by Member States at national level in parallel to EURES could increase labour mobility inside the European Union and also contribute to the emergence of real European citizens. In other words, a synergy between the employment and immigration policies of the European Union should be looked for.

III. Intra-EU mobility

There is a paradox in the EU. European Citizens benefit from the freedom of residence in the EU, in particular to seek a job in another Member State. Yet for several reasons few use this exceptional right, which is almost without parallel in the world today. And third-country nationals who have already the experience of what migration is and might, therefore, be more likely to migrate, do not benefit from this right on the basis of the Treaties.

European secondary legislation adopted thus far is not only scattered into four (students, researchers, highly qualified workers and long-term residents) and what will soon be five categories (rules on intra-corporate transferees are still under discussion). They are also far too limited. With the exception of researchers that benefit from an innovative mechanism of admission involving research institutions, the rules adopted fail to guarantee freedom of residence to the concerned third-country nationals. Member States continue in most cases to retain a rather high level of discretion, in particular the possibility of imposing labour market tests on mobile third-country nationals. Even the card created for highly-skilled workers, which the EU wants to promote in order to attract the highly-skilled workers, who it will increasingly need, is not 'European', never mind what its name (Blue Card) suggests. The same is unfortunately true for long-term residents willing to work in another Member State. All this creates misunderstandings in public opinion and for policy makers, as well as false hopes for third-country nationals and their governments.

Mobility is generally considered a key issue in allowing Member States to benefit from migration, in particular regarding economic growth. It is, therefore, necessary to plan the revision of the provisions applicable to long-term residents and also for highly-skilled workers in the framework of the evaluation of the Blue Card directive. After all, the Commission has already proposed rules to improve the mobility of students. **The EU must**

deliver on EU mobility as its actions will have a clear added value in this area. Due to fact that Member States have not, yet, adopted substantial rules on this issue, a political debate needs to take place. This would, hopefully, enhance the level of mutual trust in their respective immigration policies, something necessary for extending freedom of residence to third-country nationals.

IV. Integration as a three-way process

According to the Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy in the EU, 'integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States.' Lately, however, the European Commission has acknowledged that countries of origin have a role to play in integration. To date, however, there has been no policy framework implementing this acknowledgement, with the exception of some (often fiercely disputed) pre-departure programs.

Definition of objectives and tools to include this new dimension of integration is necessary. **A list of tailor-cut instruments could be proposed to neighbouring countries and those who signed a Mobility Partnership.** Common multi-level taskforces would elaborate action plans covering all nine dimensions of integration: labour market participation, language competence, educational outcomes, religious practices, political and civic participation, access to nationality, housing and socio-cultural integration. These taskforces should reflect the complex structure of integration policies and emigration/diaspora outreach and they should gather representatives of the various branches of government as well as civil-society representatives from migrant countries of origin and of destination. The Migration Policy Centre (MPC) is currently conducting a research program (INTERACT) that improves new knowledge on the topic.

V. Irregular migration and labour markets of Member States

The fight against irregular migration attracts more attention politically than the fight against illegal employment. There is, in fact, a fundamental lack of coherence between employment and immigration policies. This imbalance results because it has been established that the opportunity to work on the black labour market is an important pull factor attracting third-country nationals towards the European Union and its Member States.

A first step in countering illegal employment was carried out by the EU with the adoption, 18 June 2009, of the directive 2009/52 providing for minimum standards on sanctions and measures for third-country nationals staying illegally. As the Commission is due to produce a report on the implementation of this directive by 20 July 2014, efforts should be made to bring this report out in June 2014 in order to feed the debate around the adoption of the post-Stockholm guidelines. The question of the effectiveness of labour inspections carried out by Member States should be at the core of discussions in order to see whether it is necessary or not to strengthen article 14 of the directive.

The fight against employers letting third-country nationals in irregularly work should be considered a top political priority issue and be applied in practice. Financial efforts comparable to those in the field of border control should be made by the EU and its Member

States in the field of illegal employment. As it is obviously difficult to limit the fight against illegal employment to third-country nationals alone, the aim must be to develop an overall policy including European citizens working on the black labour market.

VI. Visa Policy

Insufficient consular coverage and poor accessibility in visa procedures in third countries increase real visa costs (especially under the obligation of personal appearance) and deter potential travellers from applying for a Schengen visa. In response, MS should more readily transfer their consular competence to other MS in the form of full representation (Art. 5(4) of the Visa Code). Other possible responses might include a broader use of outsourcing in the visa services to external service providers and the setting up of more Common Application Centres. This would allow said centres to decide on visa applications and not only to receive them.

Lengthy and intricate procedures affect real time and money expenditure experienced by applicants; due to the absence of harmonised list of supporting documents, visa shopping in the form of picking 'liberal' consulates is frequent. In response, the EU and its MS should increase the efficiency of consular posts as much as possible, as a proper visa policy may be a source of economic growth. It might also accelerate the harmonisation of the lists of supporting documents within Local Schengen Cooperation.

Stringent conditions hinder smooth travel, brain circulation and business exchange. These include difficulties in qualifying as a bona-fide traveller; the optional character of relevant provisions from the Visa Code; and the wide margin with regard to the validity period of multiple entry visas ('between 6 months and 5 years'). In response, the EU should modify the relevant provisions of the Visa Code.

Difficulties in the proper functioning of Local Schengen Cooperation (LSC) are caused by several factors including: absence of an EU Delegation (EUD) in third countries, through which the Commission can perform its coordinating tasks within the LSC; the non-appointment of an LSC contact point by a local EUD; lack of active participation of an EU Delegation contact point in the LSC; etc. The LSC should be put in place in as many third countries as possible by negotiating better terms of representation with EUDs, with alternative solutions in countries where there is no EUD.

Visa Facilitation Agreements (VFA) do not address the problem of complex paperwork effectively, facilitating only the provision of the documents necessary to prove the purpose of the journey. The main elements of the VFAs should be rethought by addressing the issues of bona fide travellers and paperwork to make them more attractive for third-country nationals.

VII. Solidarity between Member States in matters of asylum and immigration

The debate on solidarity between EU Member States is politically sensitive. In order to avoid useless polemics, discussions should be based on objective data. This was notably not the case during the implementation of the Stockholm programme. For instance, most Member

States still continue to present their efforts regarding asylum by quoting the number of asylum seekers on their territory, while such absolute figures obviously do not reflect their real efforts in comparative terms. Some progress has been made, for instance, through the help provided to Member States by EU agencies like Frontex. But the measures taken are contingent and not the result of a global and objective view. **There is an obligation for the EU to make progress in solidarity among its Member States, as a Common European Asylum System cannot be achieved in the absence of a stronger burden-sharing component.** There is also the need for legally binding obligations deriving from article 80 introduced by the Lisbon Treaty in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

Therefore, a study should be launched to elaborate a tool evaluating Member States' efforts in relative terms. There should be an equitable system of burden sharing at the EU level. Such a study seems to be an appropriate way to feed the debate around the Dublin system of responsibility determination that has never been evaluated appropriately. It would also be useful for the Commission when it implements the mid-term revision of the new Migration and Asylum Fund. The most relevant criteria (e.g. GDP) would be identified by the study to measure at EU level the ability of Member States to contribute to solidarity or to benefit from the same. The distributive effect of elements of the current European Asylum Policy like the Dublin system of responsibility determination, resettlement from third-countries, intra-EU relocation and the new EU Migration and Asylum Fund, should be taken into consideration. **'Tradable quotas' of asylum seekers and of protected persons would be assigned to each Member State** on the basis of the implementation of the parameters determined by the study. As already proposed in a study on the future of the Common European Asylum System carried out in 2010 for the European Parliament over-burdened Member States would benefit from increased financial assistance from an EU fund: the study is available on the website of the LIBE Committee. Under-burdened Member States could also be given the choice either of physically accepting relevant persons on their territory (on the condition that they agree to Member State allocation in order to keep the system efficient); or they could pay a compensatory amount to the EU fund in the framework of a system of financial redistribution.

A discussion should also take place to determine the areas of immigration policy where there is a similar need for European solidarity. This might include the impact on asylum. Certainly, studies carried out by the Commission and Frontex on external borders and the feasibility of the creation of a European System of Border Guards are expected. It should be ensured that the dimension of solidarity is adequately taken into consideration by these studies.

VIII. Refugee crisis and burden sharing – Syria

Refugee crises rage around the edge of Europe: the result of the US-led invasion of Iraq, 2006-2009; the revolution in Libya, 2011; and now the civil war in Syria. But the EU has not opened its doors to these refugees in any significant fashion. Moreover, some Member States have closed their border to those seeking protection: asylum seeking and irregular immigration have been effectively lumped together, something quite contrary to the EU's founding values.

The EU adopted in 2013 a set of new rules: revised directives on asylum procedures, reception conditions, qualification and revised Dublin and Eurodac regulations. But it still has to define principles of burden sharing with third countries of first asylum. Huge inflows of refugees in Lebanon and Jordan, and to a lesser extent in Turkey and Iraq, represent an enormous burden as economic and political costs endanger the stability of these nations. **The key question is whether international solidarity with countries of first asylum should consist in sharing the refugee population or in sharing the costs of the crisis?**

The current EU policy focuses on preventive measures to avoid a growing flow of refugees trying to enter EU borders, while at the same time, the EU financially supports the countries of first asylum. If these humanitarian efforts of the EU are welcome and have to be recognised, the number of Syrian refugees getting asylum or resettled in the EU remains very low and contrasts, in terms of resettlement, with the numbers taken in by other industrialised countries. although it must be noted that the EU receives many more spontaneous asylum-seekers than countries like the United States or Canada, which lead resettlement efforts worldwide. A research report of the MPC called Know-Reset has shown that the EU can do more than it does despite the positive impact of the Joint EU Resettlement Programme adopted in 2012. The numbers of resettlement places available has not increased in parallel with the expansion of the number of EU resettling Member States. Furthermore, it appears that the available numbers of resettlement places per year are rarely filled in many Member States.

IX. The EU and its Neighbourhood

An independent, comprehensive evaluation of the impact of Mobility Partnerships with neighbouring countries will soon be needed.

Mobility Partnerships have become the main policy instrument to implement policy dialogue on migration between the EU and partner countries in the EU Neighbourhood. After the Arab Spring, they were extended to the Southern Mediterranean Countries (in 2012 to Morocco and in 2014 to Tunisia). Five years after the signature of the first Mobility Partnership with Moldova (in 2008) and four after that with Georgia (2009), it is possible to draw some conclusions. In particular, evaluation should assess their impact on: 1) mobility, including the visa facilitation agreements when signed (number of applications, number of visas granted and denied, time and cost required to obtain a visa); 2) legal migration (number of legal migrants, percentage of legal vs. irregular migrants...); 3) irregular migration from and through their territories, readmission agreements and border control mechanisms; 4) the rights of migrants, including the portability of social benefits; and 5) the impact of migration on the development of countries of origin. The lessons learnt could be applied in the design and implementation of the new Mobility Partnerships.

Exploring the options to develop legal migration mechanisms across the Mediterranean is becoming a priority.

We face a paradox. **In the EU, according to all projections, there will be an increasing demand for labour immigration (both skilled and unskilled) in the coming decades (see introduction). In Arab Mediterranean Countries, meanwhile, there is a structural incapacity**

to absorb their labour force and increasing willingness to migrate. Yet current legal migration instruments in the EU are not appropriate for legal migration on the required scale.

The Euromed Migration III project has also shown that there is a perceived limit on progress in the development of labour information systems aimed specifically at identifying job opportunities in the EU for workers in EU Neighbourhood countries. Studies are needed to explore and propose (bilateral or regional) mechanisms for skills and job-matching across the Mediterranean on the basis of existing institutions and labour market information systems: including direct cooperation between EU and partner countries' public employment services. They are also needed to evaluate and enhance bilateral labour agreements between EU Member States and partner countries.

X. Migration and Development

Emigration would bring two sorts of positive outcomes to countries of origin. It would alleviate pressures on the labour market and related pressures on social and even political systems, and bring external resources to development. Migrant remittances and direct investments in origin countries reduce poverty, enhance wellbeing, and foster health and education. But financial transfers also produce negative side effects, such as deterring efforts to acquire education and work, and rising social inequalities. Other transfers, those of knowledge, know-how, models and networks, often called 'ideational and social remittances', bring benefits to origin countries too. While governments have built institutions and designed policies to attract their migrant workers' financial remittances, little or nothing has been done to make ideational social remittances work for the development of origin countries.

In order to improve policymaking on migration and development, four gaps must be filled: a gap in knowledge; a lack of tools for channelling ideational and social remittances; a gap in policies to maximize the impact of migration on development; and the lack of mechanisms to turn brain drain into brain gain. They are respectively addressed by the four ideas described below:

- A 'World Migration Observatory' to improve our knowledge of migration and its consequences;
- A 'Migration and Development 'Bank' for Innovation' to gather human and social capital accumulated through migration;
- A more comprehensive approach to migration and development, mainstreaming migration into development policies;
- A Neighbourhood Regional Skills Enhancement Fund to meet the risk of brain drain more generally.

A. World Migration Observatory – WMO

While many countries now have some statistics on immigrants, most have at best fragmented data and usually no data at all on their emigrants and diasporas. This situation is detrimental to assessing the relationship between migration and development from a

sending country point of view, and, therefore, to policymaking on this matter. Establishing a World Migration Observatory (WMO) is feasible and timely. The WMO would have the following features.

- A polyvalent tool to address the deficit of reliable data that hampers informed policymaking
- Database
 - a. Multidimensional: statistics and legislation are in the same database, allowing interested parties to evaluate legislation and its impact;
 - b. Systematic: each country is dealt with as sender and receiver;
 - c. Comparative: statistics have a common origin – e.g. population censuses applying the same UN recommendations – and common tabulation templates;
 - d. Linking migration with other aspects of development (e.g. human development: data on educational level and migration are drawn from the same population censuses).

NB: the built-in limitation of migration statistics, is that only immigrants (who are present) can be counted but not emigrants (who are absent). This will be partly overcome by the use of the 2010 round of censuses, allowing us to establish a worldwide database of migrants by destination and origin, and, therefore, making it possible for the first time to have comprehensive data by origin.

- Existing efforts: where do we stand and where to go?
 - In the last couple of years, considerable effort has been devoted, on the part of international organisations, to improving the state of data on international migration. They largely follow the general guidelines outlined above. While previous efforts have been uncoordinated, with competition migration data sets put together at the UN, the OECD and the World Bank, the situation has been clarified as the OECD and the World Bank have merged their efforts to produce a joint data base using new data from the 2010 Census rounds. However, at the same time, alternative new data sets are emerging (e.g. at IAB-Nuremberg).
 - At the same time, the academic community has identified the lack of comparative data on immigration policies as a major constraint on future policy-oriented research on international migration. This has led to a number of partial and, again, uncoordinated projects such as the IMPIC project (developed at WZB Berlin and based on expert coding) or the IMPALA (International Migration Policy and Law Analysis) project jointly developed by research teams at Harvard, LSE, Amsterdam, Luxembourg and Sydney and based on the coding of legislation.
 - **We propose to rationalize the current collection and publication efforts by hosting the various databases on a single website hosted by the World Migration Observatory.** From this perspective, WMO would serve as an

umbrella to host the various projects, giving them more visibility and allowing users to compare and choose according to their needs. WMO would also provide incentives and funding to rationalize and coordinate different partners, and to identify research gaps in terms of data and so initiate the collection of new data, expanded coverage of existing projects, etc.

- What host institution?
 - e. Ideally, the United Nations Population Division, which already has experience in migration databases, and full legitimacy to request data files from all UN member states;
 - f. The second best option would be the OECD which has considerable expertise on collating migration data from population censuses;
 - g. In either case, the Migration Policy Centre at the European University Institute – which has a migration observatory covering the whole of the EU neighbourhood – would bring its expertise to bear.

Whatever decision is made an International Scientific Board must be set up to ensure that bureaucratic/political views of states will not affect scientific objectivity.

B. Migration and Development (non-financial) 'Bank' for Innovation - MDBI

Development agencies mainly look at the migration-development linkage through the prism of financial flows to origin countries. **An initiative that would expand the focus and be dedicated to facilitating the accumulation of human and social capital through migration would enhance migration potential for development.** Just as pro-remittances policies are supported by efforts to create a climate favourable to investment, this initiative would benefit from efforts to create a climate favourable to the circulation of ideas.

The MDBI rationale is as follows:

- Migrants send home, not only financial remittances, but also ideas, know-how and business connections. These have sometimes been termed 'social remittances', which range from the encouragement of bilateral economic transactions (trade, FDI, financial investments) between home and host countries to the diffusion of preferences and values such as norms of lower fertility or preferences for more democratic practices. The potential for development through such feedback effects should not be under-estimated.
- Migration is thought to work for innovative approaches to solve development issues. This is why migration and development should not be separated from innovation. Recent academic research has demonstrated the potential for migration to diffuse innovation and to contribute to technology adoption.
- Countries should be able to tap into the intellectual resources of their willing citizens and diaspora members through various channels.

- However, studies have shown that the local context (political, economic, social) is crucial, on one hand, for securing migrants' engagement in social remitting, and, on the other, for allowing these remittances to have a broad impact.
- We see two important directions for policy-oriented research aiming at harnessing the developmental effects of diasporas:
 - Understanding the circumstances that favour positive feedback effects (in terms of business links, transfer of host-country norms and ideas) from the diaspora to the home country. Does this depend on the type of destination, on the type of source country, or on matching between the two? What role for the circumstances that led to emigration in the first place: revolution, lost privileges, civil conflicts, discrimination against minorities, economic migration? And, likewise, what role for the degree of economic and cultural integration of immigrants in the host country? Is it the type of migration (temporary/permanent, high/low-skill) that matters?
 - Understanding the policies that allow the diaspora to be harnessed. The international community has successfully implemented and supported policies to exploit the potential for development of financial remittances: for example, lowering the transaction costs of remittances through cross-national banking, remittances accounts and general financial development. **There is, in just the same way, a desperate need to identify and implement policies favouring social remittances:** so what role for double citizenship (as just adopted in Germany), the political representation/participation of diasporas, and for the relaxation of visa policies to favor back-and-forth movements between home and host countries?
- Ideational and social remittances alone cannot reverse misguided macroeconomic policies, eradicate social inequalities, or establish democracies and develop the rule of law. However, under favourable social and economic development, migrants are the first to join and reinforce positive strands, making migration work for development. This is why introducing the notion of transformation into the migration and development nexus is crucial for the future of this policy area. Transformation means political, social and economic change in a country that will contribute to building confidence between migrants and their countries of origin.
- MDBI will rejuvenate the TOKTEN project, conceived by the UN in the late 1970s, and broaden its scope to use new forms of communication and to enhance social innovation. This should include:
 - a. Widening the reference group to older migrants and women (objectives of active ageing and gender equality firmly established in all activities)
 - b. Widening the options for return through virtual return, crowd-sourcing and wider use of idea sharing through social networks.
- The Bank will build tools and instruments that will support specific innovative actions and will help interested states to tap the intellectual resources of their diasporas. This support will be two-fold. First, the MDBI will collect knowledge about the impediments to active engagement by migrants and diasporas. Second, it will

monitor, building on existing indicators of transformation, the progress of countries and their potential in terms of own use migration benefit.

C. Mainstreaming migration into development policies: a more comprehensive approach to migration and development

Migration and development issues have largely been tackled through a project-based approach, including the framework of Mobility Partnerships. Even the very recent proliferation of Mainstreaming Migration into Development (aimed at making development sensitive to migration, instead of migration sensitive to development, as has thus far been the case) is following a scattered pattern. Here the UN system, the OECD-EU and the European Migration Group have implemented their own projects in different countries and with different methodologies) There is the need for a more comprehensive and coherent approach, and the EU is uniquely placed to lead it. This endeavour should include:

- Relating migration and development endeavours to legal migration and mobility issues and dialogue; so far they are dealt with separately (for instance, the development implications of promoting skilled migration are not the same as for unskilled migration, facilitating migration may strengthen the links of migrants with their countries of origin...);
- Linking legal migration schemes to labour market needs with assessments in countries of origin;
- Extending Mainstreaming Migration into Development analysis to the EU-level as well, and analyzing to what extent the GAMM and the enlightened approach on M&D it takes is understood, integrated and implemented in the framework of other EU policies.

D. A Neighbourhood Regional Skills Enhancement Fund to meet the risk of brain drain

The best way to substantiate the endeavour to 'counteract brain drain and brain waste' (as stated in the GAMM 2011) would be to promote Skills Enhancement Programmes linked to the management of legal migration and return migration schemes. This would show the commitment of the EU in this regard and ensure that migration, including the migration of skilled workers, does not undermine the human capital of countries of origin, nor create distortions in their labour markets. At the regional level, a Regional Programme in the form of a Skills Enhancement Fund could be envisaged in this context.

XI. Evaluation of policies

The evaluation of programme implementation did not progress as expected. The 'Scoreboard' used to measure the progress made in the implementation of The Hague programme disappeared and was not replaced by the annual report of the Commission on migration and asylum. Even if this was a descriptive document, it allowed a straightforward quantitative assessment of the progress made in policy building. The communication issued by the Commission in 2006 on the evaluation of EU policies on Freedom, Security and Justice (COM(2006)332) was never implemented, despite it having been the object of conclusions adopted by the JHA Council (Doc. 10893/1/07). Actually, impact assessments (ex-ante) have

been favoured to the detriment of ex-post evaluations that are at best purely legal and take mainly the form of Commission reports into the transposition of directives.

The apparent emergence of a general agreement that the new guidelines succeeding Stockholm should concentrate on the implementation of existing instruments rather than inventing new ones can be considered as positive in policy evaluation terms. However, it remains to be seen if these intentions will be sufficient to overcome the lack of political will to evaluate, that has been the case to date. Certainly, serious evaluations require not only time on the political agenda, but also funding and cooperation between the Commission and Member States' competent administrations.